White’s Bank v. Smith, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 646

Case details
Bluebook Citation
White’s Bank v. Smith, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 646
Full caption
White’s Bank v. Smith.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
White’s Bank v. Smith.
1. Under the act of Congress of July 29th, 1850, enacting—“ That no bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance of any vessel, or part of any vessel, of the United States, shall be valid against any person other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof, unless such bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance, be recorded in the office of the collector of the customs where such vessel is registered or enrolled,” a recording of a mortgage in the office of the collector of the home port of the vessel has the effect, by its own force and irrespective of any formalities required by a State statute to give effect to chattel mortgages, to give the mortgagee a preference over a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee.
2. The home port of the vessel is the port in the office of whose collector the bill of sale, mortgage, &c., should be recorded; not the port of last registry or enrolment when not such home port.
3. The act is constitutional.
Error to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York.
The case was this:
An act of Congress, “ providing for the recording of con-
veyances of vessels and for other purposes,” and passed July 29th, 1850,* thus enacts:
“No bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance of any vessel, or part of any vessel of the United States, shall be valid against any person other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof, unless such bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance, be recorded in the office of the collector of customs where such vessel is registered or enrolled.”
And a statute of the State of New York thus enacts:
“ Every mortgage of chattels which shall not be accompanied, &c., shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed as directed in the succeeding section of this act.”
The “ succeeding section” above referred to directs where the mortgage shall be filed. And a third section proceeds:
“ Every mortgage filed in pursuance of this act, shall cease to be valid as. against the creditors of the person making the same, or against subsequent mortgagees in good faith, after the expiration of one year from the filing thereof, unless within, &c., a true copy of such mortgage shall be again filed in the office of the clerk or register aforesaid of the town or city where the mortgagor shall then reside.”
With these two acts, one of the United States and the other of the State of New York, in force, one Hoyt, then a resident of Buffalo, Erie County, New York, executed, on the 22d May, 1863, a mortgage to White’s Bank, of Buffalo, upon the schooner Emmett, of which he was owner. This mortgage was recorded, on the 12th of the June following, in the collector’s office at Buffalo, where the Emmett was duly enrolled, and where, as just said, Hoyt, her owner, resided. The mortgage was filed, also, in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie, on the 5th June, 1863, according to the re-
* 9 Stat, at Large, 440.
Argument for the appellant.
quirement of the above-quoted law of New York, but it was not refiled at the end of a year.
Subsequently to the date of this mortgage of Hoyt to White’s Bank, the vessel became the property of one Zahn, residing at Sandusky, Ohio; and on the 2d June, 1865, he mortgaged her to one Smith. The mortgage to Smith was recorded in the collector’s office, at the port of Sandusky, Ohio, on the 17th of June, 1865, where the Emmett was duly enrolled, and at which place, as above stated, the then owner, Zahn, resided. The vessel having been sold subsequently to the date of both the mortgages, under a paramount lien for seamen’s wages, and a remnant of the proceeds of sale, after payment of such wages, remaining, but being insufficient to pay either mortgage, the question was, to which of the mortgages it should be applied,—to the first mortgage, that of the bank ? or to the subsequent one, Smith’s? Smith set up that the lien of the mortgage to White’s Bank was lost on account of the omission to refile it in the clerk’s office of Erie County at the end of the year, and this position it was which raised the material question in the case; the question, namely, whether or not the recording of the mortgage in the collector’s office at Buffalo had the effect, by its own force, and irrespective of the filing in the clerk’s office, to give a preference to it over any subsequent purchaser or tnortgagee ?
The court below decreed that the fund should be appropriated to Smith’s mortgage; and White’s Bank appealed.
Mr. Haddock, for the appellant, contended that the act of the legislature of New York, so far as it required chattel mortgages upon vessels to be recorded, was a regulation of commerce, and therefore repugnant to that clause of the Federal Constitution which provides that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States. In Steamship Company v. Portwardens,* where a statute of Louisiana, imposing a tax upon
* 6 Wallace, 81.
Argument for the appellee.
vessels, was declared repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the court says: “ The power to regulate commerce was given to Congress in comprehensive terms. It was thus given with the obvious intent to place that commerce beyond interruption or embarrassment, arising from the conflicting or hostile State regulations.” So here the subject-matter, having been acted upon by Congress, was placed beyond the reach or control of the States.
Mr. Rogers, contra:
The act of Congress did not supersede the necessity of a compliance with the statute of New York. It is not repugnant to, nor in anymaniler in conflict with that law. There is no difficulty in complying with both. To regulate commerce was not the purpose of the State act; and if it does affect commerce, it does so only by acting incidentally on one of its instruments. But if the two acts are inconsistent, which should give way ?
The act of Congress is, in some sort, a recording or registry act, having in view, apparently, the protection of the interests of bond, fide purchasers, as well as those of the United States, in the enforcement of its revenue and navigation laws. In so far as it thus assumes to regulate the transfer of the title of parties in such property, is the act constitutional? Can Congress enter the domain of property and assume in all cases to regulate the transfers thereof? We submit that it cannot. The clause of the Constitution which gives to Congress power to “ regulate commerce,” contains nothing in terms giving to that body the power to enter the domain of private property, and to enact what shall be, and what shall not be, a valid transfer thereof. Nor does any such power arise from implication from the power actually given. The rights of property as well as of person are carefully left to the several States, which, according to the theory of the Constitution, were better fitted to regulate them properly than any general government could possibly
e. An owner who obtains the enrolment of his vessel because he cannot otherwise engage her in commerce, cannot [p. 650] be deemed, thereby to resign his right to sell or dispose of her, by the observance of such formalities as the laws of his State alone prescribe.
If Congress have power to enact this registry law for the protection of creditors, purchasers, &c., simply because a ship is a vehicle of commerce, they have also the power to enact a similar law in relation to all locomotives, cars, wagons, sleighs, and other vehicles used in the carrying on' of commerce between the States or with foreign nations: and in fact to regulate the transfer of title to all property which is the subject of commerce.
[A question was also made as to whether the record of the vessel under the act of Congress should be in the vessel’s home port, or, as was decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Potter v. Irish* and afterwards by the Supreme Court of Maine, in Chadwick v. Baker in the port of the last registry or enrolment, though not the home port?]
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. The act of Congress, July 29, 1850, on this subject, of the present case, is as follows:
“ That no bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance of any vessel, or part of any vessel of the United States, shall be valid against any person other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof, unless such bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance, be recorded in the office of the collector of customs, where such vessel is registered or enrolled.”
The next section provides for recording these bills of sale, &c., and also certificates of discharge and cancellation in a proper book. No provision was made for any authentication of these instruments preparatory to their being recorded. They were received by the collector from the parties deliveiing them, and were recorded, with no proof of their verity, except from the execution of the same, as appeared on then face; and this, both as it respects the bills of sale, mortgages,
f 54 Maine, 9.
&c., and the discharge and cancellation of the same. And the law thus stood for some fifteen years. On’March 3,1865, it was enacted that “ no bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, conveyance, or discharge of mortgage, or other incumbrance of any vessel, shall be recorded, unless the same is duly acknowledged before a notary public, or other officer authorized to take acknowledgment of deeds.”
Previous to this act of 1850, providing for the recording of bills of sale, mortgages, &c., of vessels, they were required to be filed, by the laws of many of the States, in the clerk’s office, or some place of public deposit in the town or city where the vendor or mortgagor resided, in order to protect the interest of the vendee or mortgagee against subsequent bond, fide purchasers or mortgagees. And this practice continued in many places after the passage of the act of 1850, for abundant caution, on account of a doubt as to the effect that would or might be given to it as a recording act, from the very imperfect provisions of the law. There can be no. doubt, however, but that the system of recording these instruments in the collector’s office, at the home port of the vessel, furnishes a much readier opportunity to persons dealing in this species of property, to obtain a knowledge of the condition of the title, than by the former mode under the State law. We say the home port, because it is quite apparent from the language of the act, “be recorded in the office of the collector of customs, where such vessel is reedstered or enrolled,” means the permanent registry or enrolment, which is at the port, “ at or nearest to which the owner, if there be but one, or if more than one, the husband or acting and managing owner of said ship or vessel usually resides. And the name of the said ship or vessel, and the port to which she shall so belong, shall be painted on her stern, on a black ground, in white letters, of not less than three inches in length,” and, if found without such name and the name of the port, the owner is subject to a penalty of fifty dollars.*
*
Act 31st December, 1792, § 3.
The same act provides for a temporary registry, when the owner acquires* her in a different district from that in which he resides; but this is to enable him to bring the vessel within the home district or port, where she can obtain her permanent registry. The character of this temporary registry is expressed on the face of it, and is delivered up to the collector on the issuing of the permanent registry, whose duty it is to return it to the collector that granted it.*
So a registered vessel may be enrolled, or an enrolled vessel registered, on the master giving up to the collector the registry or enrolment, as the case may be; and if such vessel shall be in any other district than the one to which she belongs, the collector of such district, upon the master taking an oath that, according to his best knowledge and belief, the property remains as expressed iij a registry or enrolment proposed to be given up, and on giving the bond required, shall make the exchanges above mentioned; but the collector to whom the registry or enrolment is given up, shall transmit the same td the Register of the Treasury, and the registry or enrolment granted in lieu thereof, shall, within ten days after the arrival of such vessel within the district to which she belongs, be delivered to the collector of said district, and be by him cancelled.-!*
This exchange of registry or enrolment may occur in any part of a voyage or voyages, and the temporary registry or enrolment continues till the vessel, in the regular course of her employment, arrives at the port to which she belongs, where she may again obtain a renewal of her permanent documentary title. As we have said, we think it apparent that the collector’s office in the district in which this temporary registry or enrolment is made, is not the office contemplated by the act of 1850. The temporary papers are made in the office where the vessel happens to be at the time of the sale or exchange of the documentary title, and continues only till her arrival at the port to which she belongs. Her name, and the name of her home port, remains painted en
f 1 Stat, at Large, 288, g 3.
* Act 31st December, 1792, § 11.
her stern, notwithstanding this temporary document, and satisfies the requirement of the act in that respect, and both continue until a new home port is acquired by a change of ownership, requiring a permanent registry or enrolment on account of the different residence of the owners, when the name of that port is substituted. And, confining the record to the home port, there is great propriety and convenience in requiring bills of sale, mortgages, &c., of the whole, or parts of a vessel, to be made matters of record in this office, as in the registries there are the names of all the owners under oath, together with their residences; and since the act of 1850, containing also the part or proportion of such vessel belonging to each.owner (§ 5). And in this same section it is provided that, “ in all bills of sale of vessels registered or enrolled, shall be set forth the part of the vessel owned by each person selling, and the part conveyed to each person purchasing.” And in this connection we may also mention, that in case of the sale of a vessel, which can only be to a citizen or citizens of the United States, and a new permanent registry becomes necessary, the former certificate of registry must be delivered to the collector to whom application is made for the new registry, to be transmitted by him to the Register of the Treasury to be cancelled; and in every such sale or transfer of a vessel, there shall be some instrument in writing in the nature of a bill of sale, which shall recite at length the certificate of the former registry, otherwise the ship or vessel shall be incapable of being registered anew.* And as this bill of sale is recorded in the collector’s office in which the new permanent registry is made, it affords information to any person examining it as to the former home port and collector’s office in which the vessel had been previously registered, and where examination can be made for any bill of sale, mortgage, or other incumbrance, upon or against the vessel.
It will be seen, therefore, as the law now stands, there can be very little difficulty on the part of a purchaser or
* 1 Stat, at Large, 294, § 14.
mortgagee in ascertaining the true condition of the title of a vessel, as it respects written evidences of the same, or of incumbrances thereon, from an examination of the records of thez collector’s office at the several home ports of the vessel, as the records of the last home port refers to the preceding one, the last bill of sale incorporating into it a copy of the previous certificate of registry. In this respect, the system of recording in the collector’s office possesses very great advantages over the filing of these instruments in the clerks’ offices where the vendor or mortgagor happened to reside at the time, as no means exist, under this practice, by which the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, by any diligence, could obtain a knowledge of the actual condition of the title.
We are aware that in the case of Potter v. 'Irish,* the court came to the conclusion, upon an examination of the acts on this subject^ that bills of sale, mortgages, &c., under the act of 1850, in order to protect the title of the purchaser or mortgagee, should be recorded in the office of the collector of customs at the port of the last registry or enrolment, though not the home port of the vessel. And the court in the case of Chadwick v. Baker,followed this decision. Our respect for the courts rendering these decisions has led us to examine the several statutes upon which this question depends with more than usual care, and after the best consideration we have been able to give, we are obliged to differ with them. We think the better construction of these statutes leads to the conclusion that the home port was the one in the contemplation of Congress at which these instruments were to be recorded, and is the more appropriate one in furtherance of the object for which the act was passed.
The temporary registry or enrolment is at a collector s office in a district where the owners do not reside, and is made without any reference to such residence. It is made at any collector’s office, and at any port within the limits of the United States where the vessel may happen to be at the time this temporary document is registered.
f 54 Maine, 9.
While the home port may be at the city of New York, the temporary registry or enrolment may be made at New Orleans or San Francisco, or Portland, in Oregon, where it would be as inconvenient for the vendee or mortgagee to make a record of the bill of sale or mortgage as it would be for a person dealing in this species of property to acquire any notice of such record; whereas a record at the home port is within the district where the owners reside, and where negotiations or dealings in respect to this species of property would naturally be conducted.
Some question is made as to the power of Congress over the title and property of vessels of the United States to such an extent as to enable it to pass a recording act.
But, after the regulation of this species of property by the several acts of Congress to which we have referred, and in respect to which there has never been a question, there can be very little hesitation in conceding the power to protect the rights of subsequent bond fide purchasers and mortgagees therein.
Ships or vessels of the United States are the creations of the legislation of Congress. None can be denominated such, or be entitled to the benefits or privileges thereof, except those registered or enrolled according to the act of September 1,1789; and those which, after the last day of March, 1793, shall be registered or enrolled in pursuance of the act of 31st December, 1792, and must be wholly owned by a citizen, or citizens of the. United States, and to be commanded by a citizen of the same.*
And none can be registered or enrolled unless built within the United States before or after the 4th of July, 1776, and belonging wholly to a citizen, or citizens, of the United States, or, not built within said States, but on the 16th of May, 1789, belonging, and thence continuing to belong, to a citizen or citizens thereof; or ships or vessels captured from the enemy, in war, by a citizen, and lawfully condemned as prize, or adjudged to be forfeited for a breach of the laws of
* 1 Stat, at Large, 287.
Syllabus.
the United States, and being wholly owned by a citizen or citizens thereof.*
Ships or vessels not brought within these provisions of the acts of Congress, and not entitled to the benefits and privileges thereunto belonging, are of no more value as American vessels than the wood and iron out of which they are constructed. Their substantial if not entire value consists in their right to the character of national vessels, and to have the protection of the national flag floating at their mast’s head.
Congress having created, as it were, this species of property, and conferred upon it its chief value under the power given in the Constitution to regulate commerce, we perceive no reason for entertaining any serious doubt but that this power may be extended to the security and protection of the rights and title of all persons dealing therein. The judicial mind seems to have generally taken this direction.!
Decree reversed, and a
Decree entered for the appellant.
The Nichols.
1. Sailing ships are “ meeting end on,” within the meaning of the eleventh article of the act of Congress of April 29, 1864, fixing “ Rules and Regulations for Preventing Collisions on the Water,” when they are approaching each other from opposite directions, or on such parallel lines as involve risk of collision on account of their proximity, and when the vessels have advanced so near to each other that the necessity for precaution to prevent such a disaster begins; a condition which always depends, to a certain extent, upon the state of the navigation, and the circumstances of the occasion. \2. The expression, “meeting nearly end on,” in the same article, includes cases where two sailing ships are approaching from nearly opposite di-
* 1 Stat, at Large, | 2, 288.
t The Martha Washington, 25 Law Reporter, 22; Fontaine v. Beers, 19 Alabama, 722; Mitchell v. Steelman, 8 California, 363; Shaw v. McCandless, 36 Mississippi, 296.
reetions, or on lines of approach substantially parallel, and so near to each other as to involve risk of collision; but the application of the rule must be considered as subject to the same limitations and qualifications as is the phrase “ meeting end on,” in the same article.
3. Accordingly, two sailing vessels pursuing, in the night time, lines which, if followed, it was probable, would bring them into collision, were considered, when but two or three miles apart, as “ meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision” within the meaning of the eleventh article above referred to, their rate of speed having been, at the time, six miles an hour each, and their rate of approximation, therefore, a mile in each five minutes. Held, consequently, that the helms of both vessels ought to have been put to port, as provided for in such contingencies by the said article, so that each might have passed on the port side of the other. And a vessel which, in such circumstances, put her helm a starboard, and was run down and sunk by the other vessel, was held to have no claim on her for damages.
4. Mistakes committed in moments of impending peril, by a vessel, in order to avoid a catastrophe made imminent by the mismanagement of those in charge of another vessel, do not give the latter, if sunk and lost, a claim on the former for any damages.
Brown, owning a schooner of that name, filed a libel in the District Court for Northern New York, against the barque Nichols; the ground of his complaint being, that the two vessels being on Lake Erie, one going in one direction, and the other coming towards it in another nearly opposite, and the two so approaching each other, the barque had, in violation of the “ Rules and Regulations for Preventing Collisions on the Water,” fixed by the act of Congress of April *29,1864, run into his schooner, and sunk her and her cargo. The Phcenix Insurance Company, which had insured the cargo, and paid for the loss, filed a similar libel.
The case was thus:
Congress, by the act above referred to,* laid down certain rules or articles, to prevent collisions on the water, and among them these:
“Article 11. If two sailing ships are meeting/end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so that each may pass on the port side of the other.
* 13 Stat, at Large, 60.
vol. vii. 42
“Article 12. When two sailing ships are crossing, so as to involve risk of collision, then, if they have the wind on different sides, the ship with the wind on the port side shall keep out of the way of the ship with the wind on the starboard side, except in the case in which the ship with the wind on the port side is closehauled and the other ship free, in which case the latter ship shall keep out of the way. But if they have the wind on the same side, or if one of them has the wind aft, the ship which is to windward shall keep out of the way of the ship which is to leeward.
“Article 18. Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course.’’
With these articles in force, the schooner was bound up Lake Erie, of a clear, starlight night; her course west by north. The barque was bound down it; her course east by south, half south—the two vessels being nearly dead ahead of each other. The wind was from the northeast, and the speed of each vessel full six miles an hour; the two so approaching one another at the rate of a mile every five minutes. The schooner had the wind free and on her starboard side. The barque was closehauled, with the wind on her port side. Each vessel was seen from the other about the same time, and when they were some two or three miles apart; the evidence being conflicting as to the exact distance.
When the two vessels made each other, the mate of the barque ordered her helmsman to “ keep her off a little,” so as to give the schooner “a good full;” but as the vessels approached closely, he ordered him to “put the helm hard up, and keep her right off;” in other words, to port the helm. The effect of this was, of course, to turn the vessel’s head southward. Such were the manœuvres of the barque.
The master of the schooner, on his part, so soon as he saw the barque’s lights—-judging them to be two or three miles off, “ nearly dead ahead, a very little on our starboard bow ordered his helm put starboard, “ to keep her off to the west. The vessels were advancing rapidly, and with the manœuvres ordered, respectively, were fast approaching each other as well. Two or three minutes before the collision—and the vessels being then not more than a quarter of a mile apart the [p. 659] master of the schooner “seeing the barque bearing down on him, and that she was off the wind,” ordered the wheel of his schooner put “hard up,” and to “let the main sheet run out.” The schooner accordingly swung to the south, somewhat of the southwest. But this was too late, or perhaps the very cause of the catastrophe. The barque advancing, went, bow first, and at right angles, into the starboard quarter of the schooner, and the schooner went down at once.
The collision being, of course, the exact result which was liable to follow from the combined manœuvres of the vessels, the question was, which vessel had made the false navigation, under the act of Congress? And this question involved largely a consideration of the element and effects of distance; that is to say, in this particular case, the proximity of the vessels at the time when the master of the schooner gave the first order to starboard.
The District Court, not without hesitation, came to the conclusion that the distance between the vessels at this time —two or three miles—was such that the master was not in fault in making the order; that the case fell within the twelfth rule, and that the barque ought not to have changed her course. Conceding that the vessels were clearly approaching each other, “nearly end on,” and that if they had both continued their courses, they would soon have been “ meeting nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision,” within the meaning of the eleventh rule; that court was yet in doubt whether, at the distance at which these vessels were when they first made each other, they were “meeting end on, . . . so as to involve risk of collision” which the plain import of the eleventh rule required them to be before both were obliged to port their helms. It accordingly dismissed the libels.
On appeal, the Circuit Court was of a different opinion. The vessels being nearly dead ahead, their combined speed being twelve miles an hour, and they being thus within ten to fifteen minutes of meeting, that court considered that they were dangerously close together,” and their .proximity such that the execution of the first order to starboard the helm of
Argument for the schooner.
the schooner, involved not only the risk of the collision, but was the controlling cause of it; and thinking that the master of the schooner had mistaken the position of the barque, and had supposed that her lights were to the windward, when, in fact, they were to the leeward, reversed the District Court’s decrees.
The correctness of this reversal was the question now here, on appeals by the owner of the schooner and by the insurers of her cargo, the Phcenix Company.
Mr. Hibbard, for the appellants:
1. There is no risk of collision when vessels, upon an open lake, and in a clear night, make each other at the distance of two or three miles; nor would there have been the slightest danger of collision, in this case, had not the barque disregarded the eighteenth article, and changed her course.
The act of Congress contemplates such nearness of approach, and imminency of danger, as makes it necessary for both vessels to change; for, beyond question, the act will not be so construed as to require unnecessary manoeuvres. Certainly it is not necessary that both should so change when they are two miles or anything like that distance apart upon an open lake.* On a narrow river the rule might be different.
If the eleventh article does not apply, it of necessity follows that the twelfth and eighteenth do, and if the barque changed her course (as it is plain that she finally did), she violated absolutely a statutory provision, and must be in fault; for if a vessel bound to keep her course, changes that course, how can a vessel bound to “ keep out of her way, know where to turn to avoid her ?
2. The case being to be governed by the twelfth and eighteenth articles, it follows that the barque was bound to “keep her course.” The schooner was bound simply to “ keep out of the Way.” To do this she could either port or starboard, as she pleased.
*
The Ericsson, Swabey, 38; The Monticello, 17 Howard, 152.
3. As the Nichols largely changed, her course, and commenced that change when ¿he vessels were yet at a considerable distance apart, that change must make her solely responsible for all the damage done by this collision.
Mr. Ganson, contra, contended that there was not any necessity for any change of course on the part of the schooner; that she was on a course that would have taken her safely to the northward and windward of the barque; that there was nothing to prevent her pursuing that course; and that the change of her course caused the collision. Neither the eleventh nor twelfth articles applied therefore to the case, but the schooner was guilty of bringing about the collision, by attempting to pass across the bows of the barque when there was no occasion for her so doing; and in violation of the rules of navigation.o
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Controversies growing out of collisions between ships on navigable waters are in general of easy solution in cases where the facts are agreed, or where there is no material conflict in the testimony of the witnesses. Few cases, however, find their way into the tribunals of justice where the witnesses examined in the case concur either as to which vessel was in fault, or as to the circumstances attending the collision. On the contrary, such investigations are almost always complicated and embarrassed with conflicting testimony, and sometimes to such an extent that it is exceedingly difficult to form any satisfactory conclusion upon the merits.
Some of the causes which promote such contrariety of recollection are, that the moment when the collision occurs is necessarily one of alarm, and, frequently, of consternation, and also because the disaster is seldom witnessed with much care by any persons other than those on board the respective vessels, and all experience shows that they are quite too apt to see fault in the navigation of the other vessel, more readily than in that of the vessel to which they belong. Where such conflict exists the inquiry is very perplexing, [p. 662] and the difficulty can only be overcome in a satisfactory manner by a critical analysis of the testimony, and a careful comparison of the respective conflicting statements of the witnesses with the undisputed or well-established facts and circumstances developed in the testimony.
Decrees of an entirely opposite character were rendered in this case in the District and Circuit Courts, obviously on account of differences of opinion produced by the conflicting character of the testimony, and the appellants now set up a theory different from either of those adopted in the courts below, and it must be admitted that it finds some support in the evidence exhibited in the transcript.
In the investigation of such a case the first step is to ascertain the facts material to the issue involved in the pleadings, but in accomplishing that purpose, in this case, it is not deemed necessary to enter much into the details of the testimony, as any such a discussion would not benefit the parties nor any one else not possessed of the entire record. Views of the District Court were that the Nichols was in fault, but the' Circuit Court was of a different opinion, and reversed the decree, and dismissed the libel. Appeal was taken by the libellant from that decree of the Circuit Court to this court. Succinctly stated, the material facts of the case, as they appear to the court, are as follows:
Heavily laden with coal and iron, the schooner William
0. Brown was bound up Lake Erie, on a voyage from Buffalo to Chicago. Her course was west by north, and when the collision occurred she was about halfway between Little’s Point and Bar Point, and about one and a half miles from the Canada shore. Statement as to the voyage of the barque A. P. Nichols is, that she came out from Detroit River early in the evening before the collision, and that she was bound down the lake to Buffalo, laden with a full cargo of corn. Undisputed fact is that she was heading east by south, half south, and that she, as well as the schooner, had competent lookouts properly stationed on the vessel.« Both vessels also showed good lights, as required by law, and they were wel manned and equipped. Prior to their arrival at the place [p. 663] where the collision occurred they had met with no difficulty, and they had fair weather and a good breeze from the northeast, not exceeding six or seven knots, and the speed of the respective vessels was about six miles an hour. Parties agree that the time and place of the collision is truly alleged in the libel, and there is neither fact nor circumstance in the case to warrant the conclusion that it was the result of any other cause than faulty navigation. Inexcusable as the disaster was, the principal question is, which vessel "was in fault? When the vessels came together they had sufficient sea room, and they'were both under full sail. The schooner had the wind free, and on her starboard side, but the barque was closehauled, with the wind on her port side. They were on lines which diverged not more than half a point, and which, in any event, if they continued their respective courses, would bring them into collision. Obliged to change their course or collide, the true inquiry is, what should have been done? Clear weight of the evidence is that each vessel was seen from .the deck of the other, about the same time, when they were some two or three miles apart, and as they were approaching each other from nearly opposite directions it is quite clear, under the regulations enacted by Congress, that the helms of both should have been put to port, so that each might have passed on the port side of the other, unless the distance between them, at that precise time, was so great as not to involve risk of collision. Rules of navigation are obligatory upon vessels approaching each other, from the time the necessity for precaution begins, and continue to be applicable as the vessels advance, so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain.*
When the two vessels made each other it was the mate’s watch on board the Nichols, and he had command of her deck. His first order to the man at the wheel was to keep her off a little, so as to give the vessel ahead a good full; but as the vessels advanced, seeing that there was danger of collision, he gave the order to put the helm “ hard up and keep [p. 664] her right off,” which, under the circumstances, was equivalent to the order to port the helm, as the helmsman stands on the weather side of the wheel, and consequently the effect of the order “ hard up,” when executed, was to bring the helm to port, and turn the prow of the vessel to the leeward.
*
Mail Steamship Company v. Rumball, 21 Howard, 384: The Ericsson, owabey, 38; Lowndes on Collision, 24.
Before remarking further as to the movements of the barque, it becomes necessary to ascertain what was done on board the schooner, as she was approaching from nearly the opposite direction, at about the same speed. Her master admits that he saw both side lights of the other vessel at the same time, and he testifies that he immediately ordered the helm of his vessel to be put to starboard. Plain effect of that order, when executed, was to turn the prow of the vessel to the leeward, instead of hugging the wind closer, as she should have done, to avoid a collision.
Article eleven of the regulations enacted by Congress provides that if two sailing ships are meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so that each may pass on the port side of the other.
Sailing ships are meeting end on within the meaning of that provision when they are approaching each other from opposite directions, or on such parallel lines as involve risk of collision on account of their proximity, and when the vessels have advanced so near to each other that the necessity for precaution to prevent such a disaster begins, which cannot be precisely defined, as it must always depend, to a certain extent, upon the state of the navigation, and the circumstances surrounding the occasion.
Where vessels approaching are yet so distant from each other, or where the lines of approach, though parallel, are so far apart as not to involve risk of collision, that rule of navigation has no application to the case.
Much greater difficulty will arise in any attempt to define, with technical accuracy, the phrase nearly end on, as the language itself is in terms somewhat indefinite. Such attempts have been made in the English Admiralty Court, but without much practical success. Nearly end on, as the [p. 665] phrase is employed in that article, may doubtless be construed to include cases where two sailing ships are approaching from nearly opposite directions, or on lines of approach substantially parallel, and so near to each other as to involve risk of collision; but the application of the rule must also be considered as subject to the same limitations and qualifications as the preceding phrase in the same article. Decided cases may be found in the English admiralty reports where the attempt is made to define, with precision, how great the variation may be from opposite directions, or from parallel lines, and the case still be within the eleventh article; but the present case does not necessarily involve that inquiry, as the variation, in. any view of the evidence, did not exceed half a point by the compass, which is clearly insufficient to take the case out of the operation of that article.*
Argument for the appellant is, that the distance between the two vessels wras so great when the helm of the schooner was put to starboard that it cannot be considered as a fault, and such, it seems, was the opinion of the district judge; but the proposition, in view of the circumstances, cannot be sustained, as it was in the night time, and the combined speed of the two vessels was at least twelve miles an hour, and none of the witnesses pretend that more than ten or fifteen minutes elapsed after the second order of the master of the schooner was given, to put the helm hard up, before the collision took place.
Strong doubts are entertained whether the effect of the first mistake made by the schooner would have caused a collision if she had then kept her course; but the second order to put the helm hard up, was fatal as the schooner then fell off even faster than the barque, and the collision became inevitable. Particular description of the effect of that movement need not be given, except to say that it brought the schooner directly across the bows of the barque. Confirmation of this view is derived from the conceded fact, that the schooner was struck by the stem of the barque on
*
Holt’s Bule of the Eoad, 64, 70, 154.
Syllabus.
her starboard quarter. The effect of the blow was that she sunk, and, with her cargo, became a total loss.
Remaining proposition of the appellant is, that the barque is also in fault, because her helm, just before the collision occurred, was put to starboard; but it is clear that the error, if it was one in that emergency, was produced by the impending peril, which is justly chargeable to those having the control and management of the other vessel. Mistakes committed in such moments of peril and excitement, when produced by the mismanagement of those in charge of the other vessel, are not of a character to relieve the vessel causing the collision from the payment of full damages to the injured vessel.
Appeal was taken to this court at the same time from the decree of the court below, in the case of The Phoenix Insurance Company v. James R. Slanson, claimant, &c., and the two cases were argued here together, as the parties conceded that they depend upon the same facts. All the testimony was taken in the first case, and the stipulation of the parties is, that it should be regarded as also taken in the other, and that both cases should be heard at the same time. Libellants in this case were insurers of the cargo, and having paid the loss to the owner, they claimed that they were subrogated to his rights and interests, and that, by reason thereof, they had a lien upon the barque for the amount which they paid to the owner of the cargo. Evidently the appeal is disposed of by the opinion in the other case.
Decrees affirmed.
The Floyd Acceptances.
1. The government of the United States has a right to use hills of exchange in'conducting its fiscal operations, as it has the right to use any ot appropriate means of accomplishing its legitimate purposes. 2. "When the government becomes a party to such a bill, it is boun y same rules in determining its rights and its liabilities as individua s are
3. As the United States can only become a party to a bill of exchange by the action of an officer or other authorized agent of the government, the authority of the officer or agent may be inquired into as in the case of the agent of an individual.
4. This authority, in case of bills of exchange, depends upon the same principles that determine such authority in other contracts, and is not aided by the doctrine, that, when once lawfully made, negotiable paper has a more liberal protection than other contracts in the hands of innocent holders.
5. Under our system of government, the powers and duties of all its officers are limited and defined by laws, and generally by acts of Congress.
6. As there is no express authority to be found for any officer to draw or accept bills of exchange, such authority can only exist when these are the appropriate means of carrying into effect some other power belonging to such officer under his prescribed duties.
7. It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully issue bills of exchange for some purposes, he can in that mode bind the government in other cases where he has no such authority.
8. As under existing laws there can be no lawful occasion for an officer to accept drafts on behalf of the government, such acceptances cannot bind it, though there may be occasions for drawing or paying drafts which
■ may bind the government.
9. The acceptances known as the “Floyd acceptances”—(certain acceptances on long time, made by the Hon. J. B. Floyd, Secretary of War, of drafts drawn on him by army contractors, before the services contracted for were received, or the supplies to be furnished were delivered) —were mere accommodation loans of the credit of the United States, without authority, and therefore void.
10. If they had been given and received as payment (which they were not) they were payments in advance of the services rendered and supplies furnished, and were void, because forbidden by the act of January 31st, 1823 (3 Stat, at Large, 723).
Appeals from the Court of Claims.
The facts, as found by that court, were thus:
Russel], Majors & Waddell had contracts for supplies and transportation, to be furnished to the army in Utah. By these contracts, they were to be paid either by the quartermaster at St. Louis, or by his drafts on the assistant treasurer of the United States in New York. In all the contracts, except one, these payments were to be made on the final delivery of the supplies in Utah; but in on.e contract theie was an agreement that partial payments should be made when the trains were started. In all cases, such [p. 668] payments were to be made upon certificates of the proper quartermaster.
The performance of these contracts required a very large outlay of money, and Russell & Co. finding it difficult to advance this and wait for its return until they were entitled to receive payment under their contracts, made an arrangement with the Secretary of War, under which they should draw time-drafts on him, payable to their own order, at the Banlj of the Republic in New York, which should be accepted by the secretary. On these drafts they were then to raise the money necessary to enable them to perform their contracts, and as the money for the transportation and supplies became due, they were to receive it, and take up the acceptances of the secretary before or at maturity. Under this arrangement the secretary accepted drafts to the amount of $5,000,000, most of which were taken up by Russell, Majors & Waddell, as agreed; but over a million of dollars in amount remain unpaid.
The drafts, with unimportant verbal differences and differences of date, were in this form :
$5000. Washington, November 28, 1859.
Ten months after date, for value received, pay to our own order, at the Bank of the Republic, New York City, five thousand dollars, and charge to account of our contract for supplies for the army in Utah.
Russell, Majors & Waddell.
Hon. J. B. Floyd, Secretary of War.
[Indorsement.]
li Russell, Majors & Waddell.”
[Acceptance.] War Department, November 28, 1859.
“Accepted: John B. Floyd,
Secretary of War.”
The drafts passed into the hands of different holders, among them T. W. Pierce, the Dover Five Cent Saying Bank, E. D. Morgan, and the Boatmen’s Saving Institution; and Mr. Floyd having retired from the War Department, [p. 669] and the department refusing to pay the acceptances, Pierce, by his separate bill, and the other parties in a proceeding treated by the Court of Claims as one in substance, brought suit in that court. The petition of Pierce averred:
“That the said Floyd, as Secretary of War, and in behalf of the United States, and as the principal officer of an executive department, had authority to accept the drafts, and that, in accepting them, he acted in his official capacity, and in behalf of the United States. And that he, in behalf of the United States, as such Secretary of War, was authorized to accept drafts of such and the like tenor and effect as the drafts aforesaid; and that the said Pierce, relying upon the apparent, as well as upon the actual authority of the said Secretary of War to make such acceptances, and upon the fact of his acceptance of the bills, became the holder and owner of them, in a regular course of business, before they severally matured and for valuable consideration.”
Similar averments were made in the petitions of the other three parties. And by an amended petition they set forth the further facts:
That when the bills were accepted, and when they became due, the government owed the contractors a larger sum than the amount of them.
That at that time the army in Utah-was in imminent danger from cold and starvation; that it was the duty of Floyd, as Secretary of War, to save it; and that to so save it he authorized the drawing of the bills and accepted them.
That as secretary he had authority by law to make advances to the contractors after their trains were ready to start; and that their trains being ready to start, he did what was done.
That he had authority by law to ascertain and determine the debt of the United States to the contractors, and did so determine; that there was due them the sums specified in the bills; and that the bills so drawn and accepted were conclusive evidence of the debt as against the government.
These same additional matters were considered by the [p. 670] court below in the case of Pierce. The general issue was pleaded in all the suits.
To present the case more completely, it must be stated that by statute of 31st January, *1823, it is enacted:
“ That from, and after the passage of this act no advance of public money shall be made in any case whatever; but in all cases of contracts for the performance of any service, or the delivery of articles of any description, for the use of the United States, payment shall not exceed the value of the service rendered, or of the articles delivered previously to such payment.”
The Court of Claims—upon a full history of the facts, as presented by evidence introduced by the government, and whose introduction was opposed by the petitioner, Pierce, —the admission being one of the errors alleged by Pierce himself—dismissed all the cases, holding, in the case of Pierce, that the secretary had no power to bind the United States by the acceptances; that the acceptances were to be regarded as within the act of 31st January, 1823, and as an attempt to avoid it, and were, therefore, void; that no decision of the Supreme Court authorized such acceptances; that the evidence failed to establish any usage, in the different departments, by which the Secretary of War was authorized to accept, in behalf of the United States, the bills in suit, and that if Such usage or practice were established, it could not avail the claimant, because forbidden by law.
And finding, in the other three cases, that though it is and has been the practice of heads of departments to accept drafts or bills of exchange for the transmission of funds to disbursing officers, or the payment of those serving in distant stations, or for services rendered, the cases were still substantially the same as the case of Pierce, and, like it, to be dismissed.
The record-did not show that anything remained due to the contractors, or was due when the bills matured; no evidence on the state of the accounts being given on either side.
* 3 Stat, at Large, 723.
Argument for the appellants.
Messrs. Black, Curtis, and Gooderich, for the appellants:
The Court of Claims declared the acceptances to be null and void, for the reasons, in substance, that—
1. To accept these particular bills was a violation or evasion of the act of 1823.
2. No usage to accept bills like these existed in the department, and that such usage would be unlawful if it did exist.
3. No decision of the Supreme Court authorized these acceptances, or made them binding.
Now was this an advance of public money? Take it to be true that the acceptance was given for money yet to be earned. Then the case is this: The contractor comes to the secretary and tells him that the army in a distant and hostile territory is in danger of suffering for lack of supplies, and he (the contractor) cannot furnish them without more capital than his present means will command. The secretary says, “ I can pay you no money out of the public treasury until it is due, according to the very terms of your contract; but your credits are daily accumulating, and in a few months the sum you want will be legally payable. I have no objection to put the future obligation of the United States into a negotiable form, so that if you are willing to pay the discount, you can get somebody else to make the advance, which I cannot make. But I must do this cautiously. I will subject the government to no risk. I will accept your bills only for fifty per cent, of the amount which will be due upon the delivery of the goods which are now actually in transitu.” This was the reverse of an advance of the public money.
The court assert that the acceptances were not authorized by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Yet the power is recognized in many decisions, and in The United States v. Bank of the Metropolis,* at least, it is directly and positively affirmed.
The authority of the secretary to give these acceptances,
Argument for the appellants.
is proved beyond a doubt, unless the practice of eighty years, , with the sanction of Congress and the express adjudication of this court, is to be disregarded. It is a curious fact, that the Court of Claims in the case of Pierce, deny the authority of a secretary to accept bills of exchange, and accompany that denial with an assertion that the practice does not exist; while in the other case they admit that “ it is and has been the practice of heads of departments to accept drafts or bills of exchange for the transmission of funds to disbursing officers, or for the payment of those serving at distant stations, or for services rendered.” This last statement is true. Being true, it shows the existence of the power in a secretary to bind the United States in that way.
The Equities.—So far as regards these, the defence is • utterly naked. All the facts found by the court show that there was no fraud or collusion between the drawers and Floyd, nothing done and nothing intended except what was right and proper.
In United States v. Reeside, tried before the late Mr. Justice Baldwin,* a case very similar to this, though the acceptance there was by the Postmaster-General, he charged the jury thus:
“This is the broad rule by which to measure the official acts of the Postmaster-General, done within his granted powers: The agency of the Postmaster-General is not confined to the letter of the law. The known usage of this department, not corrected or repudiated by any law, may be equivalent to a new grant of power by Congress, especially in matters officially communicated to either House, and not disposed of by resolution or forbidden by law; the acquiescence of the legislature in a notorious usage having the same effect of a law where former laws are silent on the subject. This is a rule in relation to all the departments of the government. The operations of the Post-office Department cannot be suspended for an hour without public complaint and inconvenience. Yet contingencies constantly arise, which require the most prompt and efficient action, without regard to
Argument for the appellees.
expense in any case, and often without inquiring into his powers, which the public take for granted are adequate to any emergency, and hold him responsiblefor their plenary exercise. We cannot sanction the doctrine contended for, that we must settle controverted accounts with a view to the public interests. If injustice has been done to the United States by their authorized agent, which can only be repaired by the invasion of a private right, they must seek their remedy against their officer. If he accept the draft of a contractor, absolutely, the United States is bound to pay it to the holder to the same extent and on the same principle which apply to a bill of exchange drawn on, and accepted by, a private person. So the Supreme Court have settled the law, in United States v. Bank of the Metropolis.”
Mr. Evarts, Attorney-General, and Mr. Dickey, Assistant Attorney-General, contra, contended:
That the Secretary of War is in no sense a principal; he is only one of the agents of the executive departments of the government, with powers defined and duties indicated by law.
That the powers of a public agent are to be determined by law, and those powers are limited by the law to the performance of specific duties imposed upon such agents; and his powers are to be construed with reference to the design and object of them.
That the powers of such an agent being conferred and limited by law, all persons dealing upon his authority, are chargeable with notice of the extent of his powers.
That all the fiscal operations of the United States, all the bonds, bills, and notes issued by the government, are required, by law, to be done by the Treasury Department, the sole agency, under the law, authorized to perform those functions.
That no bond, bill, treasury note, or other evidence of debt, can be issued, nor can any debt against the United States be created, except in virtue of a law of Congress.
That, therefore, the Secretary of War had no authority, in viitue of his official character, to accept bills of exchange and bind the United States for their payment.
VOL. VII. 43
That the issuing and use of the bills of exchange, in this case, for the purposes disclosed in this investigation, was without authority of law.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The cases before us are demands against the United States, founded upon instruments claimed to be bills of exchange, drawn by Russell, Majors & Waddell, on John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, and accepted by him in that capacity; purchased by plaintiffs before maturity, for a valuable consideration, and, as they allege, without notice of any defence to them.
Mr. Pierce, in his petition, relies on the facts that the signature of John B. Floyd, to these acceptances, is genuine, and that he was at the time of the acceptance Secretary of War, as sufficient to establish his claim. He avers that Floyd, as Secretary of War, had authority to accept the drafts, and that by his acceptance the United States became bound. It is evident that he means by this merely to assert, as a principle of law, that, by virtue of his office, the secretary had such authority, and not that there existed, in this case, special facts which gave such authority; for he mentions no such facts in his petition, and when the solicitors for the defendant undertook to show under what circumstances the bills were issued and accepted, he objected to the evidence. Its admission is one of the alleged errors on which he brings the case to this court.
Both Mr. Pierce and his counsel, therefore, claim to recover on the doctrine that when a party produces an instrument in the form of a bill of exchange, which he has purchased before its maturity, drawn on the Secretary of War, and accepted by him, he has established a claim against the government which admits of no inquiry into the circumstances under which the acceptance was made.
The other defendants, also, in their original petitions, assert and rely upon the same principle; but they have also filed amended petitions, in which they set forth facts connected with the acceptance of the secretary, which they [p. 675] deem sufficient to establish his right or authority to do so. Most of the facts, found under the issues made by these amended petitions, were also found under the general issue in Pierce’s case, notwithstanding his objection; so that, if they avail the other plaintiffs, they will also support his claim.
It will be convenient, therefore, to consider, first, the proposition on which he rests his case, which, if found to be sound, disposes of all the cases in favor of plaintiffs.
One of the main elements of that proposition, much and eloquently urged upon our attention, seems to be too well established by the decisions of this court, to admit now of serious controversy. It must be taken as settled, that when the United States becomes a party to what is called commercial paper—by which is meant that class of paper which is transferable by indorsement or delivery, and between private parties, is exempt in the hands of innocent holders from inquiry into the circumstances under which it was put in circulation—they are bound in any court, to whose jurisdiction they submit, by the same principles that govern individuals in their relations to such paper.
Conceding, then, for the sake of argument, that the instruments under consideration are, in form, bills of that character, and that the signature of Floyd is genuine, and that he was at the time Secretary of War, there remains but one question to be considered essential to plaintiffs’ right to recover, and that concerns the authority of the secretary to accept the bills on behalf of the government.
It is not to be denied, that in the extensive and varied fiscal operations of the government, bills of exchange are found to be valuable instruments, of which it has the right to avail itself whenever they may be necessary. In the transfer of immense sums of money from one part of the country to another, and in the payment of dues at distant points, where they should properly be paid, it uses, as it ought to use, this time-honored mode of effecting these purposes.
In the case of such paper, issued by an individual, when [p. 676] we make ourselves sure of his signature, we are sure that he is bound, because the right to make such paper belongs to all men. But the government is an abstract entity, which has no hand to write or mouth to speak, and has no signature which, can be recognized, as in the case of an individual. It speaks and acts only through agents, or more properly, officers. These are many, and have various and diverse powers confided to them.
An individual may, instead of signing, with his own hand, the notes and bills which he issues or accepts, appoint an agent to do these things for him. And this appointment may be a general power to draw or accept in all cases as fully as the principal could; or it may be a limited authority to draw .or accept under given circumstances, defined in the instrument which confers the power. But, in each case, the person dealing with the agent, knowing that he acts only by virtue of a delegated power, must, at his peril, see that the paper on which he relies comes within the power under which the agent acts. And this applies to every person who takes the paper afterwards; for it is to be kept in mind that the protection which commercial usage throws around negotiable paper, cannot be used to establish the authority by which it was originally issued. These principles are well established in regard to the transactions of individuals. They are equally applicable to those of the government. Whenever negotiable paper is found in the market purporting to bind the government, it must necessarily be by the signature of an officer of the government, and the purchaser of such paper, whether the first holder or another, must, at his peril, see that the officer had authority to bind the government.
When this inquiry arises, where are we to look for the authority of the officer ?
The answer, which at once suggests itself to one familiar with the structure of our government, in which all power is delegated, and is defined by law, constitutional or statutory, is, that to one or both of these sources we must resort in every instance. We have no officers in this government, [p. 677] from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as
the President, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, exercise
powers in some sense left to the more general definitions
necessarily incident to fundamental law found in the Con-
stitution, the larger portion of them are the creation of stat-
utory law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited
by that law. It would seem reasonable, then, that on the
question of the authority of the Secretary of War to accept
bills of exchange, we must look mainly to the acts of Con-
gress.
The counsel for -claimants, not altogether rejecting this
view of the matter, maintain that the power is derived—
1st. From the true construction of the Constitution and
acts of Congress.
2d. From the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States; by which is probably meant only the authori-
tative construction of the Constitution and laws.
3d. From the usage of the government in similar cases.
We will examine these several alleged sources of the power
in the reverse order to that here stated.
1. As regards usage, it must occur at once that if there
are instances in which the use of bills of exchange by the officers of government is authorized by law, as undoubtedly there are, the use of them in such cases, however common, cannot establish a usage in cases not so authorized. It may also be questioned whether the frequent exercise of a power unauthorized by law, by officers of the government, can ever by its frequency be made to stand as a just foundation for the very authority which is thus assumed.
It is to be observed in this connection, that the Court of Claims finds as a fact, in Pierce’s case, that the evidence fails to establish any usage or practice in the different departments of the government, by virtue of which the Secretary of War was authorized to accept, in behalf of the United States, the bills in suit; ” and so far as that case is concerned this inquiry might close there.
But in the finding of facts which the same court makes in the other three cases, it is said, “ That it is, and has been the practice of the heads of departments, to accept drafts or bills of exchange for the transmission of funds to disbursing officers, or the payment of those serving in distant stations, or for services rendered.” The usage here found is limited to specified classes of cases, and if authorized by law, can be no evidence of a usage in cases not so authorized. It cannot be held to support the allegation of a usage so general as to apply to any case in which the head of the department may see proper to use it.
We make the further observation in this connection, that while it is readily to be seen that the exigencies of the business of the departments may require drafts to be drawn by them, and may justify drafts being drawn on them, which they ought to and do pay when presented, there can be no occasion for an acceptance by any department or officer of a draft drawn on either of them.
We do not think, therefore, that usage is a sufficient reliance as an authority for the acceptance of these drafts.
2. The United States v. Bank of the Metropolis,* is the case mainly relied on as establishing the doctrine contended for by plaintiffs, and is confidently asserted to be conclusive of the cases under consideration, unless overruled.
That case undoubtedly did decide, that when an officer of the government, authorized to do so, accepted a draft in behalf of the United States or one of the departments, the validity of the instrument could not be disputed in the hands of an innocent holder. We have already stated this as the established doctrine of this court. And that proposition was the principal, if not the only one, controverted in that case. An attentive examination of it will show that the authority o the officers to accept was not raised by counsel or considere by the court. . .
The Bank of the Metropolis being sued for certain balances in favor of the United States, pleaded as a set-o a
draft drawn by Edwin Porter on Richard C. Mason, Treasurer of the Post Office Department, at ninety days, and accepted by him as Treasurer; and also four drafts at ninety days, drawn by James Reeside on Amos Kendall, Postmaster-General, and “ accepted on condition that his contracts be complied with.”
It does not appear to have been controverted that Mason had authority to accept the draft of Porter, by either the counsel for the government or the bank; and the court seem to have treated it as conceded.
The opinion of the court, after stating the facts, opens with the declaration that, “ when the United States, by its authorized officer, becomes a party to negotiable paper, they have all the rights, and incur all the responsibilities of individuals who are parties to such instruments.” And further on it is said, that “ an unconditional acceptance was tendered to it (the bank) for discount; .... all it had to look to was the genuineness of the acceptance, and the authority of the officer to give it.” If this language has any significance, it is that the authority of the officer, like the genuineness of the signature, is always to be inquired into at the peril of the party taking an acceptance purporting to bind the government.
Only a small part of that elaborate opinion is devoted to . Porter’s draft, and to the questions involved in it, and the remainder of it is occupied in discussing .the effect of the condition annexed to the acceptance of Reeside’s draft on its commercial character, and to determining what is implied in that condition.
It seems, therefore, quite clear that no consideration whatever was given by the court to what constituted an authority to draw or accept bills of exchange; but that it was impliedly held to be a matter always open to inquiry when the draft was attempted to be enforced against the government. Nor are we aware of any case in this court in which the rule for determining that authority has been laid down.
Recurring, then, to the written law as the exclusive source of such authority, we may confidently assert that there is no [p. 680] express authority to any officer of the government to draw or accept bills of exchange.
Our statute books are filled with acts authorizing the making of contracts with the government through its various officers and departments, but, in every instance, the person entering into such a contract must look to the statute under which it is made, and see for himself that his contract comes within the terms of the law.
Does the contract, called a bill of exchange, stand on any different footing ? It is true, that when once made, by a person having authority to make it, in any given case, it is not open to the same inquiries, in the hands of a third party, that ordinary contracts are, as to the justice, fairness, and good faith which attended its origin, or any of its subsequent transfers; but, in reference to the authority of the officer who makes it, to bind the government, it is to be judged by the same rule as other contracts. .
The authority to issue bills of exchange not being one expressly given by statute, can only arise as an incident to the exercise of some other power. When it becomes the duty of an officer to pay money at, a distant point, he may do so by a bill of exchange, because that is the usual and appropriate mode of doing it. So, when an officer or agent of the government at a distance, is entitled to money here, the person holding the fund may pay his drafts. And whenever, in conducting any of the fiscal affairs of the government, the drawing a bill of exchange is the appropriate means of doing that which the department, or officer having the matter in charge, has a right to do, then he can draw and bind the government in doing so. But the obligation resting on him to perform that duty, and his right and authority to effect such an object, is always open to inquiry, and if they be found wanting, or if they be forbidden by express statute, then the draft or acceptance is not binding on the government.
It cannot be maintained that, because an officer can lawfully issue bills of exchange for some purposes, that no inquiry can be made in any case into the purpose for which a [p. 681] bill was issued. The government cannot be held to a more rigid rule, in this respect, than a private individual.
If A. authorizes B. to buy horses for him, and to draw on him for the purchase-money, B. cannot buy land and bind A., by drawing on him for the price. Such a doctrine would enable a man, in private life, to whom a well-defined and limited authority was given, to ruin the principal who had conferred it. So it would place the government at the mercy of all its agents and officers, although the laws under which they act are public statutes. This doctrine would enable the head of a department to flood the country with bills of exchange, acceptances, and other forms of negotiable paper, without authority and without limit. No government could protect itself, under such a doctrine, by any statutory restriction of authority short of an absolute prohibition of the use of all commercial paper.
In accordance with these views, we are of opinion that, as there can be no lawful occasion for any department of the government, or for any of its officers, or agents, to accept drafts drawn on them, under any statute or other law now known to us, such acceptances cannot bind the government.
An examination of the facts found by the Court of Claims, confirms the views already staged.
Counsel for the plaintiffs seem to have been of the opinion, from the start, that there was nothing in the nature of the transaction which would support the paper on which they sued, for they steadily resisted all efforts on the part of government to give the facts in evidence; and in the arguments made in this court, the right to recover is rested almost exclusively on the proposition that, because in some cases the secretary might lawfully accept, it must be presumed in their favor that these drafts were lawfully accepted.
It seems to us that such a transaction can be defended on no principle of law, and that, in thus lending to Russell & Co. the name and credit of the United States, the secretary was acting wholly beyond the scope of his authority. The paper was, in fact, accommodation paper, as it was found to [p. 682] be by the Court of Claims, by which the secretary undertook to make the United States acceptor for the sole benefit of the drawers. It was a loan of the credit of the government volunteered by him, without consideration and without authority. That the transaction was not payment, nor intended to be payment, for the supplies furnished, is clear, because the acceptances were not expected to be paid by the government, nor payable at the treasury, but were to be met by the drawers at the bank with which they dealt. These drafts did not interrupt in the least the regular payments made to Russell & Co. by the Quartermaster’s Department, according to their contracts. Nor do the drafts seem to have had any relation to anything due on these contracts, or to what might become due before their maturity. It was, therefore, not payment, nor so considered by either party.
But if these acceptances can be considered as payments, they were payments in advance of the service rendered and supplies furnished—payments made before anything was due. They are in that view not only without authority of law, but are expressly forbidden by the act of January 31, 1823.* The first section of that statute, which has never been repealed, enacts “that,,from and after the passing of this act, no advance of public money shall be made in any case whatever; but in all cases of contracts for the performance of any service, or the delivery of articles of any description for the use of the United States, payment shall not exceed the value of the services rendered, or the articles delivered previous to such payment.”
The transaction by which these drafts were accepted was in direct violation of this law, and of the limitations which it imposes upon all officers of the government. Every citizen of the United States is supposed to know the law, and when a purchaser of one of these drafts began to make the inquiries necessary to ascertain the authority for their acceptance, he must have learned at once that, if received by Rus-
* 8 Stat, at Large, 723.
Opinion of Nelson, Grier, and Clifford, JJ., dissenting.
sell, Majors & Waddell, as payment, they were in violation of law, and if received as accommodation paper, they were evasions of this law, and without any shadow of authority.
It is proper to observe, that it does not appear from this record, that anything remains due to Russell & Co., under their contract with the government, or that anything was due them at the maturity of any of these drafts, nor is there any attempt on the part of plaintiffs to show either of these things, or the state of the accounts between those contractors and the government at the time the drafts matured.
These cases have long been before the departments, before Congress, and the Court of Claims, and have been the subject of much -laborious consideration everywhere. The amount involved is large, the principles on which the claims are asserted, are, to some extent, new, and we have given them a careful and earnest investigation. We are of opinion that the judgments rendered by the Court of Claims against the plaintiffs, must be
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice NELSON (with whom concurred GRIER and CLIFFORD, JJ.) dissenting:
I am unable to concur in the opinion just delivered.
The instruments, in the form of bills of exchange, drawn by Russell, Majors & Waddell, upon, and accepted by Floyd, Secretary of War, were drawn on “account of our contract for supplies for the army in Utah,” or “on account of our transportation contract of the 12th April, 1860.”
These are not bills of exchange, in the sense of the law merchant, or possessing the properties of negotiable paper. They are drawn upon a particular fund, in terms which may or may not be sufficient to pay the bills, and hence a contingency exists whether or not they will be paid at maturity. All the cases agree that the money mentioned in the instrument must be payable absolutely and at all events, and not made to depend on any uncertainty or contingency.*
* 8 Kent’s Com. 76-7, and notes; Story on Bills of Exchange, § 46.
Opinion of Nelson, Grier, and Clifford, JJ., dissenting.
The instruments not being negotiable, the assignees or holders taking them, are subject to all the equities that may exist between the acceptor and the drawer, and stand in no better position, in the present case, than Russell, Majors & Waddell. As between these parties and the government, the obligation assumed by Floyd, as representing it by his acceptance, was to account and to apply all the moneys due, or that might become due on the contracts for transportation or supplies, specified in the bills or drafts, at their maturity. To this extent the government became bound to the contractors, or to the assignees or holders of the same; and as the acceptance by the secretary assumes or implies that there were some funds due, or might become due on the contracts in his hands, subject to these drafts, the onus was on the government to give evidence of the amount, or to state the account with the drawer, so as to ascertain the amount due, if any. This evidence was peculiarly in the power of the government. As no such adjustment has been made, for aught that appears, the government may now have in its hands moneys belonging to these contractors, to pay the drafts.
I am of opinion, also, that under the sixth section of the act of May 1, 1820, it was competent for the Secretary of War to accept bills of exchange in behalf of these contractors, and that if the bills in question had possessed negotiable properties, the government would have been bound to a bond, fide holder for value.
That section provides, “that no contract shall hereafter be made by the Secretary of State, or of the Treasury, or of the Department of War, or of the Navy, except under a law authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment; and excepting, also, contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army or navy, and contracts by the Quartermaster’s Department, which may be made by the secretaries of those departments.”
It will thus be seen that contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army and navy, by the secretaries, are not tied up by any necessity of an appropriation or law [p. 685] authorizing it. The reason of this is obvious. The army and navy must be fed, and clothed, and cared for at all times and places, and especially when in distant service. The army in Mexico or Utah are not to be disbanded and left to take care of themselves, because the appropriation by Congress, for the service, has been exhausted, or no law can be found on the statute book authorizing a contract for supplies. The above act confers upon the secretaries full authority to contract for these supplies, and which bind the government; and the most ready and convenient mode of accomplishing this, would be by accepting bills of exchange drawn by the contractors of the distant army or navy, upon the secretaries at home.
The credit of the government, thus pledged, would at once furnish the necessary subsistence, clothing, and shelter.
Our conclusion is, that the judgment below should be reversed, and the cause remitted, with directions to grant a new trial, and further proofs taken, that complete justice may be done between the parties.
Whitely v. Swayne.
1. Where a patent has been granted for improvements, which, after a full and fair trial, resulted in unsuccessful experiments, and have been finally abandoned, if any other person takes up the subject of the improvements, and is successful, he is entitled to the merit of them as an original inventor. 2. He is the first inventor, and entitled to the patent, who, being an original discoverer, has first perfected and adapted the invention to actual use.
Whitely filed a bill against Swayne, in the Circuit Court or Southern Ohio, to enjoin the use of a certain machine known as the Kirbey Harvester.
As the case was presented in the argument, he relied upon a patent granted to one Steadman, May 23,1854, for an improvement in clover and grass-seed harvesters, which had [p. 686] been assigned to him (Whitely), and surrendered, and three reissues granted to him on the 19th June, 1860.
The machine complained of, and sought to be enjoined, had been originally patented to one Byron Dinsmore. Dinsmore’s specification was sworn to, December 31st, 1850, and was received at the Patent Office, January 10th, 1851. His patent was issued February 10th, 1852. He made and tried one of his machines in 1850, and cut some ten or twenty acres with it. In 1851 he made twenty-one of them, and between fifty and sixty of them in the following year. On the 18th of April, 1852, three months after the date of Dinsmore’s patent, Steadman filed a caveat in the Patent Office, in which he stated that he was engaged in making experiments for perfecting certain improvements in a machine for harvesting clover and grass-seed, preparatory to letters patent therefor. As- already stated, this patent was granted May 23, 1854. Besides the caveat and the patent, there was an account, given in the testimony, of the working of the machine, by Mr. Hatch, a neighbor of Steadman’s, who resided in Holley, Orleans County, New York, in 1854. The machine was tried in the neighborhood on several occasions in clover fields, but never went into successful practical operation. No machines were ever made under the patent after the first, which was about the time the patent was granted. The experiment appeared to have been wholly given up and abandoned by Steadman as a failure; and it thus remained for some six years, when the complainant (Whitely), took from him an assignment of the patent, and procured the three reissues already referred to.
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