Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 188
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 188
Full caption
Gordon v. United States.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Gordon v. United States.
1. An act of Congress referring a claim against the government to an officer of one of the executive departments, to examine and adjust, does not, even though the claimant and government act 'under the statute, and the account is examined and adjusted, make the case one of arbitrament and award in the technical sense of these words, and so as to bind either party as by submission to award.
Hence a subsequent act repealing the one making the reference (the
claim not being yet paid), impairs no right and is valid. De Groot v. United States (5 Wallace, 432) affirmed. 2. Semble that the court does not sanction the allowance of interest on claims against the government.
Appeal from the Court of Claims; the case having been thus:
The legal representatives of George Fisher, deceased, by petition represented to the court just named, that duiing the lifetime of the said George, and in the year 1813, a large amount of his property in Florida was taken or de stroyed by the troops of the United States. That before his p. 189decease, the said Fisher made application to Congress for compensation for the loss and destruction of his property. That after his decease this application was renewed by his legal representatives. That after a delay of several years, Congress, in 1848, passed an act for the relief of such, representatives, authorizing and requiring the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department to examine and adjust their claims on principles of equity and justice, having due regard to the proofs, for the value of the property taken or destroyed; providing that the said representatives should be paid for the same out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated. This law also enacted, that if it should be found impracticable for the claimants to furnish distinct proof as to the specific quantity of property destroyed by the troops, and by the Indians, respectively, it should be lawful for the accounting officer to apportion the losses caused by the two respectively, in such manner as the proofs should show to be just and equitable, so as to afford a full and fair indemnity for all losses occasioned by the troops; but nothing was to be allowed for property destroyed by the Indians.
That this act of Congress was accepted by the claimants, and that the auditor proceeded to examine and adjust the claims under it. 4 That the auditor refused to receive and consider certain depositions presented by the claimants, because he did not consider them properly authenticated.
hat the auditor made what the petition states to be “ an award on the 22d April, 1848, allowing one-half of the value of such property as he considered the proof estabis ed had been destroyed, assuming, as is alleged, that onea f of the destruction was occasioned by the Indians, and npt j the troops. This award amounted to $8873, and did not, as was alleged, include interest or compensation for the losses and injuries sustained.
That in December, 1848, the auditor (at whose instance not appear) reconsidered the case, corrected an error in rer)011^10^ 'n ^avor °f the claimants in his former
' , an allowed interest on the amount as corrected by p. 190him, being $8973, from 1832, the date of the first application for relief, to the date of the allowance in 1848, which interest amounted to $8997.94. Not satisfied, the complainants demanded interest from the time of the loss until the award, at the rate of interest allowed in Florida. What that rate was did not appear. This renewed controversy was submitted by the auditor and the claimants to the attorney-, general of that day, who gave an opinion that interest at the rate of 6 per cent, should be allowed from the date of the loss to the time of the allowance. Upon this a further allowance of interest was made by the auditor, amounting to $10,004.89. All which allowances were granted under the original act of April 12, 1848, and were paid to the claimants as fast as the auditor furnished his statements.
The claimants, still feeling aggrieved, renewed their application to Congress, and asked relief from the ruling of the auditor; complaining that he had excluded certain depositions, which he deemed not properly authenticated. Thereupon, on December 22,1854, Congress passed a supplemental act, directing the auditor to re-examine the case, and to allow the claimants the benefit of the depositions theretofore rejected, provided they were then legally authenticated, the adjustment under this supplemental act to be made in strict accordance with the previous act. What^teps, if any, were taken under this supplemental act by the auditor, was not stated.
On the 3d of June, 1858, a joint resolution was passed, devolving upon the Secretary of War the execution of the supplemental act above referred to, directing him to proceed de novo to execute the act and its supplement according to their plain and obvious meaning, but to deduct from any amount which might be found justly and equitably due to the claimants all sums which had been previously paid.
The Secretary of War proceeded to examine the case, and estimated the value of the property destroyed at a sum higher by $158 than the auditor had done; but he also found that all the property had been destroyed by the troops, and none of it by the Indians. Thereupon he allowed for t e p. 191entire value of the property, instead of half its value, and added interest from the date of the destruction, making a further sum of $39,217.50. This sum was also paid to the claimants.
Still dissatisfied, another petition was presented by the claimants to Congress, and on the 1st of June, 1860, another joint resolution was passed, authorizing and requiring the Secretary of War to revise his execution of the supplemental act aforesaid, and on such revision to give effect to all the testimony filed, including the depositions formerly rejected by the auditor, and to restate and resettle the account, and to make such corrections in his former statement and settlement, and such further allowances, if any, as, in his opinion, justice to the claimants should require. The Secretary of War (then Mr. Floyd) did revise his statement and resettle the account; and on the 23d November, 1860, stated his conclusions in favor of the claimants, making a further allowance of $66,519.85.*
The object of the petition now filed in the Court of Claims was, to obtain from this court a judgment for this further allowance of $66,519.85.
It appeared, however, that on the 2d of March, 1861, Congress had passed a joint resolution declaring the resolution of the 1st of June, 1860, under which the Secretary of War had made the last allowance, rescinded, and pronounced the same and all the proceedings under it null and void.
But the petitioners averred, that this repealing resolution was passed without their knowledge or consent, and without notice to them. By reason of it they had not been paid.
The petition was demurred to by the United States.
he court below, considering that there was no cause of .action set up in the petition save that founded upon the finding of the Secretary of War, under the resolution approved nne 1, I860, styled an award, and holding that that resolu-
®n^re sum thus allowed, it was said by the court below, was com-
. .° lnJ'erest- But this statement was alleged by the claimant to be a unstaKe.—Bep.
Arguments for the appellant and appellee. ..... ................................... i_________________________ ____ , tion, and all action under it, became null by the repeal of March 2, 1861, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition.
The only question, therefore, presented here, was, whether the court below gave a proper construction to the repealing resolution of March 2, 1861. It was, however, asserted by the claimant, that if this construction was erroneous, this court ought to give the same judgment which the court below should have given, to wit: a judgment for the amount of the award with interest. The whole subject of interest, as allowed in the awards, was also made a matter of discussion.
Jfr. Bennett, for the appellant, contended, that an award having been made under the law of 1860, the repeal of the law of 1861 could not divest it. Rights had vested. “ In such a case,” says Dr. Bouvier,* “ the rights acquired are left unaffected.” That in fact the arbitrator having made and published his award, the resolution of June 1st, 1860, was executed, and nothing remained to be repealed. The case came thus within the principle of Bayne v. Morris.]
As respected interest: All money due and unpaid properly draws interest. An exception is made in favor of governments, because they are presumed to be always ready to pay, and that any non-payment is owing to the fault of the creditor in not presenting his claim. Here the presumption is rebutted in every part of the case. As respected the awards of interest (though they were not now in question) they were right, both on general principles and under the statute. The case was to be settled “on principles of equity and justice.” There was to be “a full and fair indemnity.”
Mr. Norton, contra, argued, that Bayne v. Morris was the case of an “ award ” in its proper sense, and was not applicable to this case; that on the contrary, the finding of the secretary in cases like this had been decided in De Groot y. Unite States] not to be an “ award,” nor in that sense binding.
*
Law Dictionary, title “Kepeal.” f 1 Wallace, 97. I 5 Id. 432.
The whole matter of interest was therefore unimportant, though the court could hardly fail to disapprove such allowances as had been made here.
Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.
The case of Ferreira* was the first to bring before us these claims, under the treaty with Spain in 1819. This was in 1857, more than thirty years after the date of the treaty. In the opinion of the Chief Justice in that case,f will be found a concise history of the previous legislation of Congress on this subject. That case was brought here by way of appeal as from the judgment of the District Court of Florida. And this court was importuned to give some utterance by which the Secretary of the Treasury might be justified in a departure from the rule adopted on the subject, with regard to the allowance of interest. In the argument of the case the Attorney-General said, stating the matters as historical facts:
“The first of these claims was presented to the Seetetary of the Treasury for payment in the year 1825, and others have been constantly and successively presented from that time to the present. The number of claims thus presented was about two hundred, and the amount paid has exceeded one million of dollars. But from the first, and in every case where interest has been allowed by the Florida judge, the principal only was paid, and the interest disallowed by the Secretary of the Treasury. For the last twenty-five years this has been the unvaried and uniform course of decision and action by every successive Secretary of the reasuiy who has acted on the subject, sustained by the official opinions of several attorney-generals, without the express dissent of any one of them officially declared.”
But notwithstanding the persistent importunity of the paries who brought forward those stale claims, to obtain some jc um or hint of an opinion that interest for more than thirty J ars s ould be paid, this court refused to take jurisdiction nd pronounce any opinion on tBe subject.
* 13 Howard, 40. f Page 45.
lu
Since that time it appears that the treasury has been thought to labor under the very unusual disease of a plethora, and the Attorney-General, unwilling to 11 follow in the footsteps of his predecessors,” has discovered a mode of relief for its depletion by allowing forty years’ interest to these claimants as a reward for their laches in not pursuing them in proper time.
As respects the effect of the repealing statute of March 2, 1861, the whole argument urged on behalf of the appellants is founded on a false assumption. It is asserted that this is a case of arbitrament and award, and was binding as such on the government, and that the repeal of the resolution of Congress could not affect or invalidate rights vested by the award previously made under it. But the Secretary of War was not an arbitrator. An arbitrator is defined* as “a private extraordinary judge chosen by the parties who have a matter in dispute, invested with power to decide the same.” The Secretary of War acted ministerially. The resolution conferred no judicial power upon him.f In order to clothe a person with the authority of an arbitrator, the parties must mutually agree to be bound by the decision of the person chosen to determine the matter in controversy. The resolution under which the secretary assumed to act did not authorize him to make a final adjustment of the matter embraced in it. It did not bind the appellant to an acceptance of the amount reported by the secretary, or that he would cease to clamor for more, after being a fifth time paid the amount of damages awarded to and accepted by him.
The joint resolution of June 1st, 1860, was fas fourth resolution which had been passed for the adjustment of the claim of the legal representatives of George Fisher against the United States, for injuries done to his property by the United States troops in 1813. In pursuance of the first three of these resolutions, five different allowances were made in favor of, and paid to the appellant, amounting in all to sixty p. 195six thousand eight hundred and three dollars and thirty-three cents. If the finding of the Secretary of War, under the joint resolution of June 1st, 1860, was final and conclusive, so also must have been the finding and allowance of the second auditor of the treasury, under the joint resolution of April 12th, 1848. Yet the appellant insisted that he was not concluded by the finding of the second auditor. He claimed and received after this allowance four additional allowances.
*
An arbitrament and award which concludes one party only is certainly an anomaly in the law. The various acts and resolutions of Congress in this case emanated from a desire to do justice, and to obtain the proper information as a basis of action, and were not intended to be submissions to the arbitrament of the accounting officer. They were designed as instructions to the officer by which to adjust the accounts, Congress reserving to itself the power to approve, reject, or rescind, or to otherwise act in the premises as the exigencies of the case might require. In other words, these references only require the officer to act in a ministerial, not a judicial capacity.
The joint resolution of June 1st, 1860, gave the appellant a tribunal, before which his claims might be investigated, lhe repeal of that resolution only deprived him of that tribunal. It was competent for Congress to abolish the tribunal it created for the adjustment of the appellant’s claims, or it might have committed them to some other authority, n either event the claimant’s right would not have been violated, only his remedy for the enforcement of those rights would have been taken away or changed. The power that created this tribunal might rightfully destroy it, unless some ng ts had accrued which were the result of the creation of sue tribunal, and inseparable from it. Here no such rights a resulted from the passage of this resolution. The appel-ant was left where that resolution found him. His right to importune Congress for more was not at all impaired by its AvpCQ,!, 1
Judgment affirmed.
The Grace Girdler.
1. Although the rules of navigation require that a vessel coming up behind another, and on the same course with her, shall keep out of the way, yet the rule presupposes that the other vessel keeps her course, and it is not to be applied irrespective of the circumstances which may render a departure from it necessary to avoid immediate danger. 2. Where, in case of collision, with loss, there is reasonable doubt as to which party is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the one on which it has fallen. 3. This court will not readily reverse in a case of collision, depending on a mere difference of opinion as to the weight and effect of conflicting testimony, where both the District and Circuit Courts have agreed. It affirmed, accordingly, a decree in such a case.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, in a case of collision, the question being one largely of fact; and the case being submitted.
Messrs. Carlisle and C. N. Black, for the appellants; Mr. O’Donohue, contra.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a case of collision. It occurred on the East River, in the afternoon of the 5th of August, 1863, between the yacht Ariel and the schooner Grace Girdler. Both vessels were beating down the river to the bay. The yacht had made her long tack, and had gone about near the New York shore, and was standing upon her short tack across the river. The schooner had done the same things, and was standing in the same direction. In going about she had passed to the windward of the yacht, and held that position in her short tack. The yacht was to the leeward, and a very little way in advance. As she was beginning to make headway, the approach of a steam ferry-boat coming up the river compeled her suddenly to luff three or four points in order to get out of the way. This threw her unexpectedly in the way of the schooner, and was the proximate cause of the collision. p. 197The vessels came together, and the yacht was sunk and lost. The locality of the collision was opposite to the foot of Stanton or Grand Street, in the city of New York, and about one-third of the way across the river.
So far both sides agree as to the facts, but no further. Here begins the stress of the case, and the antagonisms in the testimony of the parties gather around it.
The libellants allege that the schooner was wholly in fault. They say that she ought not to have been so near the yacht; that she ought to have seen the danger to the yacht from the approach of the ferry-boat, and seeing it, ought immediately to have luffed, to get more to the windward; and that if she had done so, the accident would not have occurred. They insist that the schooner, being so nearly in. the track of the yacht, and in such close proximity, it was her duty to exercise the greatest vigilance, and to omit no precaution against danger.
The respondents insist that there was no fault on the part of the schooner; that when the yacht suddenly came into her path to avoid the ferry-boat, the schooner, if not in stays, had so little headway on that she was powerless to change her course, or to do anything else to prevent the two vessels from coming in contact. In behalf of the schooner there is testimony to the effect that the yacht, having escaped the ferry-boat by luffing, should have luffed still more to avoid the schooner, and that if she had performed this simple and obvious duty, the collision could not have occurred.
The schooner was thoroughly manned. The captain was an experienced seaman. A regular Hurlgate pilot was at the helm.
A pleasure-party was on board the yacht. Lockwood, the captain, "was the superintendent of an oil warehouse. He had a 8eaman dui’ing a voyage to California in 1849.
e a no other nautical experience. Slavin was the sailing-aster. He was twenty-two years of age, and had some exP rience as a sailor. He “had been, off and on, five or six an/“ 8ay?®"ma8ter those small vessels about New York,” a een on the Ariel six or seven weeks at that time.” p. 198Before he went upon the yacht he had been at work for Lockwood in an oil factory. Lockwood, in his deposition, says, “All on board were gents but Slavin and an extra hand.” The testimony of the extra hand has not been taken, and it is not shown who he was, what were his qualifications, or in what capacity he served. It does not appear that any one was charged with the duty of a look-out. Lockwood, the captain, was at the helm. He says:
“ The schooner made a longer tack than I, and followed on nearly in our track—a little to the southward. Before I got across the steam ferry-boat Cayuga crossed track on my bow. I luffed a little up to avoid a collision with her, and as I was filling away again, the Grace Girdler came up behind and struck me astern. Her jib-boom went into my mainsail. We bad got about first, and she was about one hundred feet behind us when she got about. I did not pay any particular attention to her, as I was watching the ferry-boat. When I got clear of the latter, then I saw the Grace Girdler coming down upon us. Mr. Slavin, the sailing-mastei', hailed her three times, but received no answer. She was not further than this room from us when I saw she was coming down on to us. When I saw she was coming I put my helm hard up, expecting she would go off to the windward of me. I also let go my main sheet, to let my vessel run off before the wind; but she hit me before she (the yacht) run off. . • • She could have cleared me by coming up into the wind. . . • The ferry-boat was from fifty to seventy-five feet from me. She was bound to Williamsburg, and crossed my bow, and I came within fifteen or twenty feet of hitting her, notwithstanding I luffed. ... I did not suppose it necessary to act to avoid the ferry-boat till she got near us. I luffed three or four points, and continued that long enough to let her run by.”
From this testimony it appears that no very great vigilance was exercised on the yacht to supply the place of a look-out, and that the judgment formed by the captain as to the an ger involved in the approach of the steamer was by no mean accurate. . , «a The chief fault attributed to the schooner is, that sne
not luff into the wind and avoid the yacht by passing p. 199windward. It is not denied that the schooner was to the windward after running out her long tack and coming about, nor that she would have avoided the yacht if the yacht had not thrown herself in the way of the schooner to avoid the ferry-boat.
Horton, the pilot of the schooner, had been a Hurlgate pilot for sixteen years. He says:
“ After we went about, we drawed away our jibs, let up anything forward; saw the yacht to the leeward, about fifty yards on our lee quarter, dead to the lee quarter. She kept hauling up and nearing us all the while, and we was motionless at the time, and I told them on the yacht to slack the main sheet, but they paid no attention to me, and came right up to our lee bow in contact with our jib-boom, which hooked his mainsail. We had not got undeb headway at the time of the collision. Our jibs had not filled. We could not have done anything in our condition to avoid it. The helm was to the leeward, in the lee-becket dover. When we got around so that the jibs took, I put my helm down.”
This testimony, if credible, vindicates the schooner and fastens the blame upon the yacht. Perhaps the reason why the warning of the pilot was not heeded was, that the officers of the yacht had not recovered from the perturbation produced by their narrow escape from the ferry-boat, and that there was no look-out to give notice of the dangerous proximity of the schooner, induced by the new position which the yacht had been compelled to assume. The statement of the pilot is fully sustained by the captain and several of t e crew of the schooner who were examined. They all aver that she had so little headway that nothing could be done on her part to avert the collision.
The sailing-master and gentlemen on the yacht sustain more or less fully the facts stated by Captain Lockwood.
usual, those on board on each side acquit their own and ondemn the other vessel. The statement of Lockwood is CnL8kStaiued by Mc^ueen> the pilot of the Cayuga, and by t e pilot of the Peck Slip ferry-boats- They saw p. 200the collision—inculpate the schooner and exculpate the yacht.
On the other hand, Captain Barber, of the schooner Jenny Lind, who was near at hand and saw everything that occurred, exonerates the schooner and casts the entire responsibility upon the yacht. Such also is the effect of the testimony of Gilbert, a pilot on the Hunter’s Point line of boats. He too was a spectator. Captain Barber says:
“ I have followed the water eighteen years, and now am master of a vessel. Know the Grace Girdler. I live in Westerly. My vessel belongs to Stonington. I was on the schooner Jenny Lind the day of the collision. We went about somewhere near the coal-yard of the Penn Coal Company at Williamsburg. After we went about we were in the wake of the yacht and the Grace Girdler. All three of us were standing toward New York side. As I was walking back and forth on my deck, I saw the yacht a little ahead of the Grace Girdler. As the latter came up with the yacht she kept off a little to go under her lee to clear her quarter. The yacht was a little ahead and tacked first, and the Grace Girdler rounded her and came up to the windward. The yacht made headway. The schooner payed off some, and her jib was shaking all the time until they went clear. I don’t see as the Grace Girdler could do anything to prevent this collision, as her head sails were shaking and her gaff topsails and mainsail full. The schooner’s fore sheets were all slacked up and she payed off and hooked iijto the yacht. The schooner had no command of herself. The yacht was not ahead at all after I saw them. I did not see the yacht sink. Saw the schooner sag off on to her. The yacht ought to have gone around the schooner s stern or started a sheet and gone off on the other hand.
No one had a better opportunity of seeing and understanding all that occurred than this witness, and there is none whose testimony we deem entitled to more weight. Theie is no impeaching testimony. The witnesses upon each vessel must have known the condition of things and what occurred there. Unless we impute perjury, which we see no reason to do, they are entitled to credence as to this class o facts. As to what occurred upon the other vessel they are p. 201liable to be mistaken, and their testimony is entitled to less weight than the testimony of witnesses who were present.
In respect to the yacht, we pass by the inquiries whether she was properly manned, whether she had a sufficient look-out, and whether by due vigilance and good seamanship she might not at her leisure have given the ferry-boat a safe berth, and thus have avoided the necessity of placing herself, as it were by a leap, across the bows of the schooner. These points have not been pressed upon our attention by the learned counsel for the appellants, and in the view which we take of the case their solution is not necessary to its proper determination. The testimony of those on board of the yacht proves clearly that all was done in the emergency that was practicable and proper. If there was any omission, under the circumstances it was an error and not a fault. In the eye of the law the former does not rise to the grade of the latter, and is always venial.* For the purposes of this case we hold that the yacht was blameless. But she suddenly thrust herself before the schooner, and took the latter by surprise. If the testimony of the pilot, captain, and crew of the schooner be true, it is indisputable, as is insisted by the appellants, that she had then so little headway as to be impotent to do anything to prevent the impending catastrophe. Her helm was kept where it should have been to have the greatest effect in turning her head more to the windward.
er jib might have been lowered, to give greater effect to the wind upon the sails in the after-part of the vessel; but if, as the proof is, it was shaking at the time, this could have ad no effect, and would have been useless. This testimony s ows that the schooner, as to this part of the case, was also roe floni fault. The superadded testimony of Barber and 1 eit leave no room for doubt in our minds upon the sub-Jec. The loss of the yacht was not produced by a blow ^om t e schooner, but by the jib-boom of the schooner runng t rough her mainsail, and turning her so far upon her
But it is insisted that the schooner is blamable for not having provided in advance for the contingencies of the approach of the ferry-boat to the yacht, and the sudden transit of the latter to the windward. To this there are two answers.
First. The schooner came about near the New York shore, under the stern of the yacht, and was passing to the windward of her. Lockwood expected the schooner to pass on that side. The witnesses on both sides agree that she was there when the yacht luffed and changed her course three or four points in the same direction to escape the ferry-boat. It is not denied by any one that but for this there would have been ample room between them for both to pass in safety. There is no proof that it was in the power of the schooner to put herself any further to the windward than she was. We suppose it will not be insisted that the schooner was bound to stop before running out her long tack, or to make it longer.
Secondly. The case made against the schooner is contained in the fourth article of the libel. The charges set forth are confined to omissions at the time of the collision or immediately preceding it. Neither in the pleadings nor proofs is fault charged at any other time. It is nowhere charged or proved that it was the duty of the schooner to have foreseen the contingencies which caused the collision, or to have made any provision against them. The record before us is a blank as to that subject.
It is not intended to impugn anything said by this court in the case of Whitridge et al. v. Dill et al.* as to the rules which should govern a vessel behind another and pursuing the same course. This case is plainly distinguishable from it in several particulars. It is sufficient to mention one o them. In that case there was no sudden change by the lea ing vessel to a course across the bows of the one behind her. That Is the controlling fact in the case under consideration.
The appellants have invoked the aid of the act of Congress of April 29, 1864, “fixing rules and regulations for preventing collisions on the water.” The 17th article does, as suggested, provide “that every vessel overtaking another vessel shall keep out of the way of the said last-mentioned vessel.” But the 18th article provides, subject to certain qualifications, that the other vessel shall keep her course; while the 19th and 20th provide that due regard shall be had to the circumstances which may render a departure from the rules prescribed necessary in order to avoid immediate danger, and that nothing in the act shall warrant the neglect of any proper precaution, or excuse the fault of bad seamanship, under any circumstances that may occur.
It would be a strange result if the statute should make an innocent vessel liable for an inevitable accident.
In order to recover full indemnity it is necessary that the suffering vessel should be without fault. Generally the burden of proof rests upon the libellants. Where fault is shown on the part of the damaging vessel, it is incumbent on her to show that such fault had in no degree the relation of cause and effect to the accident.*
Inevitable accident is where a vessel is pursuing a lawful avocation in a lawful manner, using the proper precautions against danger, and an accident occurs. The highest degree of caution that can be used is not required. It is enough that it is reasonable under the circumstances—such as is usual in similar cases, and has been found by long experience to be sufficient to answer the end in view—the safety of life and property.! Where there is a reasonable oubt as to which party is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the party on whom it has fallen.!
The case of The Thornley,§ though unlike this case in its acts, has one point of resemblance which renders it worthy attention. That vessel, while “ forging ” her way through
*
Waring V. Clarke, 5 Howard, 441. libo 3 QPa’n14 Juri8t’ 6295 The Vir&U>2 W. Robinson, 205; The Loch+ Tk nt’ ■^■oses> Mitchell’s Maritime Register, 1553. I •‘•he Catherine of Dover, 2 Haggard, 154. g 7 Jurist, 659.
Dissent of the Chief Justice, and Clifford and Davis, JJ.
the Nore Sands, was hailed by the Mentor, a vessel at anchor near them, to come to anchor. She could not then do so without danger of destruction. Very soon after she passed the Sands a collision occurred. She alleged that it was an inevitable accident. It was objected (1) that she should have anchored instead of passing the Sands, and (2) that she should have anchored as soon as she passed them. The Trinity Masters said: “We consider the collision accidental. She could not let go her anchor until clear of the Sands; if in this case she had let go her anchor, immediately on being clear, the collision would still have occurred.” Dr. Lushington took that view of the case, and pronounced against the claim of the libellants. His judgment proceeded upon the ground that the Thornley was powerless to prevent the accident. The point that she should have anchored before attempting to pass the Sands was not noticed.
There is another feature of the case before us, to which it is proper to refer. The District Court acquitted the schooner and dismissed the libel. The libellants appealed to the Circuit Court. That court affirmed the decree. The case is now here by a second appeal. This court ought not to reverse upon a mere difference of opinion as to the weight and effect of conflicting testimony. To warrant a reversal it must be clear that the lower courts have committed an error, and that a wrong has been done to the appellants.* This is not a case of that character. If it were now before us for decision the first time, although our minds are not entirely free from doubt, we could not come to any otner conclusion than the one we have announced.
Decree affirmed.
Mr. Justice DAVIS (with whom concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice CLIFFORD), dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion in this case. I think the rules p. 205of navigation require that a vessel coming up behind on the same course as the vessel before her, is bound to keep out of the way, and I cannot agree that the collision was the result of inevitable accident, us it occurred in the daytime, on smooth water, and in fair weather.
*
Walsh v. Rogers, 13 Howard, 284; The Marcellus, 1 Black,^414; lb-» The Water Witch, 494; The Grafton, 1 Blatchford, 173; Ib.,T e arragansett, 211; Cushman v. Ryan, 1 Story, 95; lb., Bearse v. Pigs, &c., » Tracey v. Sacket, 1 Ohio State, 54.'