Serrano v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 451

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Serrano v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 451
Full caption
Serrano v. United States.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Serrano v. United States.
Long-continued and undisturbed possession of land in California, whilst that country belonged to Spain or Mexico, under a simple permission to occupy it from a priest of an adjoining mission, or a local military commander, did not create an equitable claim to the land against either of the governments of those countries; nor is a claim based upon such possession entitled to confirmation by the tribunals of the United States under the act of Congress of March 3d, 1851.
This was a proceeding, under the act of March 3d, 1851, for the confirmation of a claim to a tract of land in California known as the rancho of “ Temescal,” of four square leagues in extent. The petition to the board of land commissioners asked for the confirmation on two grounds:
1st. By virtue of an alleged grant of the premises by the authorities of the King of Spain to Leandro Serrano, the testator of the claimants; and
2d. By virtue of long-continued and uninterrupted possession of the premises.
The proof negatived the existence of a grant, but showed that Serrano had received the written permission of the priest of the mission of San Luis Bey (to which mission the land originally belonged), or of the military commander of San Diego, to occupy the premises, and that under such permission he took possession of them, and occupied them, or a portion of them, from about 1818 or 1819, until his death, which occurred in 1852.
The present claim was presented by his executrix (the widow), and his executor.
he deceased Serrano, made some improvements on the premises, consisting principally of two or three adobe houses, an he had a vineyard and fruit orchard. He had also severa acres under cultivation, and was the owner of cattle, worses, and sheep, in large numbers, which roamed over and grazed on the hills and in the valleys surrounding his resience’ to the extent of the four leagues claimed by him.
Argument for the United States.
His possession was continuous and undisputed until the cession of the country to the United States.
The land commission rejected the claim, hut the District Court, on appeal, reversed the action of the board, and by its decree adjudged the claim valid, and confirmed it to the extent of four leagues. From this decree the United States appealed to this court.
Mr. Stanbery, A. Gr.,and Mr. Wills, for the United States:
I. There is no archive evidence of the existence of a grant by Spain or Mexico to Serrano.
There is no petition, no diseño, no informe, no concession, no titulo, no confirmation by the departmental assembly, and no act of juridical possession. In short, there is not a single link in the ordinary chain of title for grants of land in California by the Spanish or Mexican governments, either before or after the passage of the colonization law of 1824 and the regulations of 1828.
The claim must, therefore, be rejected, on the authority of a long line of cases.*
II. Serrano’s possession did not originate and continue under such circumstances as to bind the faith of Spain or Mexico, or to create an equity against the United States.
According to his own statement, these lands were originally occupied by the mission San Luis Rey, of which Serrano was the mayor-domo. The priest of that mission permitted him to settle on and occupy a portion of the lan fl claimed by it. Now, it is well settled that the mission h no title, and consequently could give no binding title or pos session.!
According to his own statement, he was allowed to con tinue his possession by the military commandante. Mi 1, v
, ' [p. 453] Dec. 1866.] Serrano v. United States. 453
*
See, among the more recent, Romero v. United States, 1 Wallace> 7 White v. United States, Id. 660; Pico v. United States, 2 Id. 281. f United States v. Ritchie, 17 Howard, 525, 540; United States v. Cervantes, 18 Id. 553 ¡ Nohili v. Redman, 6 California, 325.
Argument for the claimants.
commandantes had no authority to make grants, except in pueblos.
Messrs. J. Hartman and Cornelius Cole, contra, for the respondents:
The positions taken for the claimants are, that Serrano, having entered in good faith under what he believed and may be presumed to have been competent authority, and having continued to occupy and improve the land under the governments of Spain and Mexico until the acquisition of this country by the United States and till this time, a period of about forty-eight years, has acquired thereby a title by prescription against this government as the successor of the former ones; and if this position be untenable, that the facts of the case present an equitable title, which should be confirmed.
I. The Spanish law of prescription is laid down in Escriche*
Attention need be directed only to those provisions which declare a possession of twenty years, without title but in good faith, induced by the acts of others with the knowledge of the proprietor, to be good as a prescription even against the absent, and ten years against the present; and continuous possession of thirty years, however acquired, without suit iought against it, to constitute a prescription, even if it were acquired by violence or robbery; good faith not being exacted in a prescription of thirty years, f
the Spanish law prescription of forty years is good against the king.
n the Recopilación,J will be found a royal decree, which, a er reciting that persons hold cities, towns, and villages out title, and that it is doubted whether the same could ac(luired against the crown, ordained,
. pa$es 741“2’tit- Prescripción de Dominio. «on vlA artlda*’ tÍtle xxix’ L- 18> 19 ? see Moreau & Carlton’s transla.
°1’ Pag- 882 3; Feb Mejicano, vol. i, lib. 2, cap. 2, g 41 to 45.
♦ Aí- i, B. 4, title 16. r » » [p. 454] 454 Serrano v. United States. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the claimants.
“ That immemorial possession, proved in the manner and under the conditions required by the law of Toro,* be sufficient to acquire against us and our successors any cities, towns, use, jurisdiction, civil or criminal, and thing or part thereof annexed or belonging thereto, provided the time of said prescription be not interrupted by our command, naturally or civilly.”
The law of Toro, above referred to as defining the conditions on which property is acquired by prescription, is as follows:
“ The time in which things are prescribed is comprehended under two kinds of prescription, immemorial and temporal; the first is proved by witnesses of good fame and character, who depose to having seen the person in possession of the thing or property for forty years, and having heard their ancestors say they never saw or heard anything to the contrary.”!
In Landry v. Martin^ the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided that the Spanish government recognized verbal as well as written grants to lands; and that after a long possession, for nearly half a century, a written grant, if neces sary, would be presumed.
In Barclay v. Howell’s Lessee,§ this court held that an uninterrupted possession for thirty years would authorize the presumption of a grant. “ Indeed, under peculiar circumstances,” they say, “ a grant has been presumed from a possession of less than the number of years required to bar the action of ejectment by the statute of limitation.” It seems that the common law rule (that the presumption derive from possession is that the possessor owns absolutely), is aP plicable to possession before the introduction of the common law.|| [p. 455] Dec. 1866.] Serrano v. United States. 455
*
Which is law 1, title 7, b. 5, of the Recopilacion. ^gg f White’s Recop., 1 vol. 95; see Lewis ». San Antonio, 7 Texas, ’ where the above law is cited. J 15 Louisiana, 1. § 6 Peters, 498. c tei 10 || Herndon v. Casiano, 7 Texas, 322; New Orleans v. United ta > Peters, 734.
Argument for the claimants.
In United States v. Castro* where the grant was not produced, but the claimant had occupied the land for twenty years, the court says :
“An occupation so long-continued and notorious, with a claim of ownership so universally recognized, might of itself be deemed sufficient evidence of ownership.”
Serrano undoubtedly always believed he was lawfully in possession, and had a right to the possession; and that belief was induced and fully justified by the acts of the Mexican authorities for a long course of years.
It is difficult, if not impossible at this day, to ascertain exactly what discretionary authority was vested, by the governors under the Spanish regime, in the priests of the mission, and the military commandantes in remote and thinly settled districts. Rockwell, in his Spanish and Mexican Law,f gives us some “ instructions of the viceroy (dated Mexico, August 17th, 1773), to be observed by the commandante appointed to the new establishments of San Diego and Monterey.”
Among them were :
“ Article 12iÀ. With the desire to establish population more speedily in the new establishments, I, for the present, grant the commandante the power to designate the common lands, and also even to distribute lands in private to such Indians as may most dedicate themselves to agriculture and the breeding of cattle; for haying property of their own, the love of it will cause them to radicate themselves more firmly; but the commandante must ear in mind that it is very desirable not to allow them to live ispersed, each one on the lands given to them, but that they must necessarily have their house or habitation in the town or mission where they have been established or settled.
Article lath. I grant the same faculty to the commandante wit respect to distributing lands to the other founders Çpobla-ores), according to their merits and means of labor. They also
* 1 Hoffman, 125. lit ^PPen<^^x> No. 1; see Halleck’s Report, California Correspondence,
’ Where also these instructions are to be found.
456 Serrano v. United States. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the claimants.
living in the town and not dispersed, declaring that in the practice of what is prescribed in this article and in the preceding twelfth, he must act in every respect in conformity with the provisions made in the collection of the laws respecting newly acquired countries and towns (reducciones y poblaciones), granting legal titles for the owner’s protection, without exacting any remuneration for it, for the act of possession.”
Here is authority conferred upon the commandante, whose successor, at San Diego, placed Serrano in possession, for the distribution and granting of lands, with full discretion as to quantity, outside of the towns and missions; for it provides that the grantees shall not live dispersed on the lands granted, but in the towns and missions, for mutual defence.
The commandantes sometimes acted as the informing officers, when there was no civil officer in the vicinity, and grants were made upon their informations; and in pueblos, at least, they had full power to put parties in possession of land.
Similar functions were exercised by the priests, and they could give permission to occupy. It is not assuming anything to say that Serrano entered into possession lawfully, and not as a trespasser.
At common law the general rule with regard to prescriptive claims is, that every such claim is good, if by possibility it might have had a legal commencement,* and for upwards of twenty years’ enjoyment of an easement, or profit a prendre, a grant, or, as Lord Kenyon is reported to have said, even a hundred grants, will be presumed, even against the crown, if by possibility they could legally have been made.f Parker v. Baldwin^ Lord Ellenborough recognizes the right to presume a grant after twenty years, and asserts the practice of the courts to do so. And this doctrine has been repeatedly affirmed in our own country.§
The law will presume anything which would make the [p. 457] Dec. 1866.] Serrano v. United States. 457
*
Lord Pelham v. Pickersgill, 1 Term, 667. j Roe v. Ireland, 11 East, 284. t Id. 490. § Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Massachusetts, 49; Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheaton, 241; Rowland v, Wolf, Bailey, 56; Hogg v. Gill, 1 McMullan, 329.
Argument for the claimants.
ancient appropriation good, for/whatever may commence by grant is good by prescription.
This court has passed upon the validity of permission to occupy lands where no grant had ever issued. It did so in the case of Berdugo et al. v. United States, for the San Rafael rancho, and in that of Yorba el al. v. United States, for the rancho of Santana, in both of which the claims were confirmed and appeals dismissed. The court has also uniformly held that the term “grants” in a treaty comprehends not only those which are made in form, but also any concession, warrant, or permission to survey, possess, or settle, whether evidenced by writing or parole, or presumed from *possession, and that in the term “ laws,” is included custom and usage, when once settled, though of recent date.t
II. The equities of this case are sufficient to sustain the claim for a decree of confirmation. In Mitchel v. United States,J this court, in referring to the Florida cases, uses this language:
“Another objection is of a more general nature, that the grantees did not acquire a legal title to the land in question. But it must be remembered that the acts of Congress submit these claims to our adjudication as a court of equity, and, as o ten and uniformly construed in its repeated decisions, confer the same jurisdiction over imperfect, inchoate, and inceptive tit os, as legal and perfect ones, and require us to decide by the same rules on all claims submitted to us, whether legal or equita le. Whether, therefore, the title in the present case can partake of the one case or the other, it remains only for us to inquire whether that of the petitioner is such, in our opinion, t at he has, either by the law of nations, the stipulations of any reaty, the laws, usages, and customs of Spain, or the province m which the land is situated, the acts of Congress and the proceedings under them, or a treaty, acquired a right which would [p. 458] 458 Serrano v. United States. [Sup. Ct.
*
Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 436. t Renner v. Bank, 9 Wheaton, 585.
12
Peter^01,8’ ’ see’ a^S0’ °P^nl°n °f the court in Strother v. Lucas, titles rS> f°r H discussion of the equity jurisdiction over inceptive f 1 Black, 267. * 23 Reward, 818.
Argument for the claimants.
have been valid if the territory had remained under the dominion of Spain.”
The same construction has been placed upon the rights of claimants, under the act of Congress by which this case is brought within the jurisdiction of this court. In United States v. Alviso* where the claimant had only taken the preliminary steps for the acquisition of title, and had obtained, pending his application, a mere permission to occupy, under which he had occupied the land since 1840, had improved and cultivated it, and his family had resided on it, the court says:
u The claimant appears to have been a citizen of the department, and no objection was made or suggested why he should not have been a colonist of that portion of the public domain he has solicited; no imputation has been made against the integrity of his documentary evidence, and no suspicion exists unfavorable to the bona fides of his habitation, or the continuity of his possession and claim. He has been recognized as the proprietor of this land since 1840.”
The documentary evidence referred to in that case, consisted only of the petition and permission to occupy; of no legal effect as a grant, but showing the bona fides of his occupancy, and the knowledge and assent of the authorities, which, coupled with his continuous possession, gave him, in the opinion of the court, an equitable title which they felt bound to recognize.
In United States v. Wilson,f where the claim rested upon a general order of Governor Alvarado, in 1842, to the alcalde of the mission of Obispo, to distribute the mission lan e among the resident Indians, according to the merits of each, under which order the alcalde made a general distribution, giving to one Romualdo much more than to the others, upo a special order of the governor, in reward for meritorious services, Romualdo having lived on the land for many years, the court says:
Dec. 1866.] Serrano v. United States. 459
“The title seems to be in conformity with the practice and usages of the Mexican Government. ... In the present instance the possession and cultivation were of considerable duration, and the distribution was intended to be permanent, and as a home for the occupant. The claim appears to be an honest one, unaccompanied by suspicion, and under the circumstances, we think, was properly confirmed.”
The decision of the court does not recognize the order of Alvarado as competent to convey title, but as merely creating an equity recognized by Mexican usages, which, coupled with a long possession and cultivation, constituted “an honest claim,” which the court did not feel it could disregard.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The court below confirmed the claim of the appellees to the rancho known as “ Temescal,” embracing five leagues, and situated in the county of San Bernardino.
It is insisted by the United States that this judgment was wrong, because Leandro Serrano, under whom the appellees claim, had no title, legal or equitable, to the land in controversy.
It can serve no useful purpose to review the voluminous testimony in the record, for there is no substantial difference ln on any point material to the decision of the cause, and ardly any portion of it but what can be readily reconciled, t is clear that Serrano occupied a portion of the property w ich was confirmed to his widow and heirs continuously, rom 1818 or 1819 until his death, which occurred in 1852.
e improvements on the place consisted of two or three a obe houses, a small vineyard and fruit orchard, and a few acres in actual cultivation. At different periods of his occupancy he was the owner of cattle, sheep, and horses, which I? sisted on the uninclosed valleys and hills that surrounded is residence. That his possession and occupation were uns ui ed and undisputed during the whole period of Mexii sovereignty in California until our acquisition of the un ry, m fully established. It is not so easy to determine [p. 460] the extent of his possession, but in the view we take of the case, the question is unimportant.
The petition presented to the board of land commissioners asked for the confirmation of this claim on two grounds,—first, because a provisional grant was made; and, second, by virtue of long-continued and uninterrupted possession. The proof not only negatives the existence of a grant, but clearly shows that Serrano occupied the premises by a written permission from the priest of the mission, or the commandante of San Diego, or from both conjointly. The only witness who pretends ever to have seen a paper concerning a grant was Villia, an ignorant man, unable to write, with very little knowledge of reading, and who, on being shown some writing, in order to test his ability to read, was unable to tell what it was. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that this witness was mistaken, without discrediting all the remaining evidence, including the repeated declarations of Serrano that he had no title. Villia evidently saw a paper in the hands of Serrano in relation to this land, but it was not a title of concession by7 Governor Sala, but the written permission to occupy given by the commandante and priest. The archives of the country are totally silent on the subject of this pretended grant, and there is no record evidence even of an application for a grant, which exists in ordinary cases. If Serrano even thought he had such a grant, why did he reply to Wilson (who was his friend and relative by mairiage), on being advised of the necessity of perfecting his title, if he had any, “ that he had no title, but had been living on the place ever since the settlement of California, an everybody respected his claim.”
It is apparent, from the testimony produced by the claim ants, without considering that offered by the United States, that the grant was a fiction, and that Serrano occupied y a written permission given to him by the priest, and perhap8 by the commandante. It is equally certain that this Pernl sion was the paper sent by him to Governor Echandea or the purpose of obtaining from him a title. Under the gov ernment of Spain, in California, the commandante or pries [p. 461] had no authority to grant lands, or to make contracts that could bind the Spanish government to grant them. The governors of the country only had this power. If Serrano had an imperfect grant, it would show that he was in possession, claiming title, but a possession under a simple permission to occupy could not raise even an equity against the government.*
It is clear, therefore, that there was nothing done which estopped the Spanish government from denying Serrano’s title, and his bare possession did not bind the Mexican government, during its dominion in California, from 1823 to 1846, not to deny it. The colonization laws of Mexico were exceedingly liberal, and yet they were never invoked by Serrano to aid him in getting a title..
If, then, Spain and Mexico never granted this land, or contracted to grant it, or were under obligations to grant it, the claim has surely no validity as against the United States.
But it is insisted that if the legal title fails, yet the notorious and long-continued possession establishes an equitable one.
The actual possession in this case was limited to a very small quantity of ground; but, conceding that it embraced five leagues, no equities attached to it, considering the manner in which it was obtained and continued. There is no adverse holding here, but the possession was a permissive one, and consistent with the proprietary interest of Spain and Mexico; and the fact that those governments did not terminate the possession, which was a mere tenancy at will, cannot create an equity entitled to confirmation. Serrano held under a license to occupy, and that license could be revoked at any time. The failure to revoke it cannot change the original character of the possession into an adverse one.
er rano had entered into possession under a claim of right, and had title-papers, though imperfect, he might say that e length of his possession entitled him to the favorable consideration of the court. Kot so, however, where he had
Syllabus.
no interest in the land, never applied for any, either to Spain or Mexico, and was content with a permission to occupy it for the purposes of pasturage.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court of California, with directions to enter an order
Dismissing the petition.
Mr. Justice FIELD did not sit in this case, nor take any part in its decision.
License Tax Cases.
United States v. Vassar.
u
V. SCHUREMAN.
(C v. Green.
C( v. Beatty.
a v. Shelly.
u v. Bowen.
a v. Swain.
a v. Craft.
a v. Craft.
1. Licenses under the act of June 30, 1864, “to provide internal revenue to support the government, &c.” (13 Stat, at Large, 223), and the amendatory acts, conveyed to the licensee no authority to carry on the license business within a State.
2. The requirement of payment for such licenses is only a mode of imposing taxes on the licensed business, and the prohibition, under penalties, against carrying on the business without license is only a mode of enforcing the payment of such taxes.
3. The provisions of the act of Congress requiring such licenses, and imposing penalties for not taking out and paying for them, are not con trary to the Constitution or to public policy.
4. The provisions in the act of July 13, 1866, “to reduce internal taxation, &c.’’ (14 Stat, at Large, 93), for the imposing of special taxes, in lieu o requiring payment for licenses, removes whatever ambiguity exis e the previous laws, and are in harmony with the Constitution and pu 1C policy 6. The recognition by the acts of Congress of the power and right of t
States to tax, control, or regulate any business carried on within its limits is entirely consistent with an intention on the part of Congress to tax such business for National purposes.
Congress, by an internal revenue act of 1864, subsequently amended, enacted that no persons should be engaged in certain trades or businesses, including those of selling lottery tickets and retail dealing in liquors, until they should have obtained a “ license”* from the United States.
By an amendatory act of 1866, the word “special tax” was substituted in the place of the word license in the former act.
A party exercising any business for which a “ license ” was necessary, or on which the “special tax” was imposed, without having obtained the former or paid the latter, was made liable, under the acts respectively, both to the tax and to fine or imprisonment, or both. By the two principal acts, respectively, it was provided that no license so granted, or special tax so laid, should be construed to authorize any business within a State prohibited by the laws thereof, or so as to prevent the taxation by the State of the same business.
In New York and New Jersey, selling lottery tickets, as in Massachusetts retailing liquors (except in special cases, not important to be noted), is, by statute, wholly forbidden. Such selling or dealing is treated as an offence against public morals; made subject to indictment, fine, and imprisonment; and in one or more of the States named, high vigilance is enjoined on all magistrates to discover and to ring the offenders to justice; and grand juries are to be specially charged to present them.
In this condition of statute law, National and State, seven cases were brought before this court.
hej all arose under the provisions of the internal revenue acts relating to licenses for selling liquors and dealing u o^enes, a,1d to special taxes on the latter business.f
e first came before the court upon a certificate of di-
+ u«!3?tat;at Large’248’ 249> 252> 472> 485; 14 Id-113> n6,137, 801. ' ©tat. at Large, 252, 472, 485, and 14 Id. 116, 137, 301-2.
164 License Tax Cases. [Sup. Ut.
vision from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.
It was argued at the last term, with the five next cases, which came here upon writs of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey.
During the present term another case of the same general character, coming from the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, was argued, with two others, similar, except in one particular, to the New York and New Jersey cases, and coming here upon a certificate of division from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York.
In the first case, Vassar, a citizen and resident of the State of New York, was indicted for selling lottery tickets in that State without having first obtained and paid for a license under the internal revenue acts of Congress. He demurred to the indictment, and the division of opinion arose upon the question presented by the demurrer and joinder.
In the five cases from New Jersey, citizens and residents of that State were severally indicted for the same offence. They set up, by way of plea, the statute of New Jersey prohibiting the business, for carrying on which, without obtaining a license and payment of the required duty, they were indicted. The district attorney demurred to each of these pleas, and in each case there was a judgment for the defendants upon demurrer and joinder.
In the case from Massachusetts, the defendant was indicted for carrying on the business of retailing liquois without license, to which indictment there was a demurrer. A statement of facts was agreed on to the effect that the defendant was a retail dealer as charged, and that this busi ness was prohibited by the laws of the commonwealth. n the division of opinion occurred on the question presente by the pleadings and this agreed statement.
The general question in these cases was: Can the de e ants be legally convicted upon the several indictments oun^ against them for not having complied with the acts of gress by taking out and paying for the required licenses
Argument for the defendants.
carry on the business in which they were engaged, such business being wholly prohibited by the laws of the several States in which it was carried on ?
In one of the two remaining cases the defendant was indicted for being engaged in the business of a lottery dealer, and in the other for being engaged in the business of a lottery ticket dealer, in New York, without having paid the special tax required by law. In each case there was a demurrer and joinder in demurrer. The division of opinion occurred upon the pleadings, and the question certified was the same in each case.
In these two cases, therefore, the general question was: Could the defendants be legally convicted upon an indictment for being engaged in a business on which a special tax is imposed by acts of Congress, without having paid such a special tax, notwithstanding that such business was, aud is, wholly prohibited by the laws of New York?
The different cases were argued here for the different defendants by different counsel, Mr. W. M. Evarts representing the defendants in the New York cases, Mr. Senott the defendant in the case from Massachusetts, and Mr. Woodbury (by brief), one of the defendants in the cases, each like the other, from New Jersey.
Argument for the defendants:
The provisions of the acts of Congress under which these 111 ictments are found, if regarded as legislation for the suppression and punishment of crime, which selling lottery tickets is regarded in New York and New Jersey to be, as retailing iquor is also regarded in Massachusetts, would be consistât with morality, but, being beyond the competency of ongress, under the Constitution of the United States, wou d be void; for no question can be made that the whole juris iction over domestic crimes and misdemeanors within
its territory rests with each State.
J,16 validity and the construction, therefore, of the acts ongress, the violation of which, within the States of ew ork, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, is imputed to
V0L v- 30 [p. 466] 466 License Tax Cases. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the defendants.
the defendants as a crime, must depend upon considerations appropriate to these acts as Revenue Laws.
How, in this aspect, are they to be regarded ?
1. Congress cannot, constitutionally, punish for a refusal to pay for a license to commit crime, or constitutionally levy a tax for the privilege of committing it. Such a mode of raising revenue would be palpably against public policy. It matters not whether the crime or offence was malum in se or malum prohibitum. Vending lottery tickets and vending liquors appear to be regarded in some of the States,—perhaps from the consequences to which vending them often lead—as mala in se. But whether or not, with the States,—not with Congress,—rests (confessedly, we suppose) a complete and exclusive right to say whether such acts are criminal or not.
2. The various acts of Hew York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, on the subject of dealing in lotteries and retailing liquor, were perfectly known to Congress; and it is apparent that the frame and purpose of the scheme of taxation made by Congress in regard to the two matters now before the court, assume the business of lotteries and vending liquors to be open and lawful pursuits, in the gains of which the Federal government may rightfully participate, and which can endure the regulation in protection of the tax imposed, which these provisions of law establish, and yet yield tn revenue sought.
But such a scheme of taxation applied to communities whose exclusive and paramount legislation proscribes the taxed pursuit as common and public nuisances, impu es every step in such pursuit as a crime, and punishes every transaction out of which the tax is raised by fine an nn prisonment, and requires every grand jury to be specia ) charged to inquire into every perpetration of these crime, is an absurdity.
If the acts of Congress had, in terms, provided 11 that no person should, within the different States of New or^, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, perpetrate the crime ot se^ ing lottery tickets or liquor, without having first paid to
Argument for the defendants.
United States $100, and registered his name and the place where he intended to perpetrate these crimes, and given bond that he would account to the United States for a fair share of the lucre which the crimes brought him,” &c.,—ot all this were expressed in the acts of Congress, it would have been no more a taxation of crime than it is now asserted to be in reference to these different States by the attempts made in the courts below to punish for the non-im-petration of a license or to enforce the collection of the tax.
Suppose that a State, while proscribing and punishing all dealing in liquor or in lottery tickets, should enact as its law the scheme of taxation upon selling liquor and upon lotteries which Congress has adopted. Could a more absurd example of cross-purposes in legislation be imagined ?
But the absurdity is in the absolute repugnancy of the two courses of legislation, and is inherent in them. This repugnancy is equally great, though the Federal government is the author of one and the State government of the other of the opposing laws.
In this repugnancy between an act of Congress raising a revenue from crime in a State, and the legislation of the State suppressing the crime, there can be no doubt of the supremacy of the State legislation.
Whatever room for argument there may be as to the competency of State legislation to extinguish material products, as sources of internal revenue to the United States, by proscription of their legal use while their actual use continues, it can never be tolerated that personal vice and guilt constitute a un for Federal taxation, which ousts the States of police and penal regulation of the personal conduct of their inhabitants.
euce, upon the natural construction of these acts of Congress, not less than upon the foregoing reasons, it is to be u erred that this revenue is sought to be raised only when m't Pur8uit taxed is a lawful occupation, and ad-so t e methods for its regulation and the collection of
Ue tax Prescribed by Congress.*
279’ Moil?- ^Une $0’ 1864, gg 78, 111, last clause; 13 Stat, at Large, 250, » ouire v. Commonwealth, 3 Wallace, 387.
3. If this is not a correct view; if Congress meant to exact the license and. lay the tax wherever lotteries or liquors were dealt in,—whether declared crimes by the States or not,—there remains another argument:
A license to carry on a particular business is an authority to carry it on. The licensee pays a valuable consideration and gets, or rather “purchases, a right” to do what he is licensed to *do. The trades or businesses here licensed were part of the internal trade of the States; a sort of trade over which, as we have said, Congress has no jurisdiction. And the States have declared them nuisances and crimes, and forbidden them to be carried on at all. The license proffered, and the special tax attempted to be laid, were thus void, and no penalty could be imposed for refusing either to accept the license or pay the tax
Indeed, it is obvious that if a State, by prohibitory legislation, withdraw a large class of articles from taxation, Congress must either lose the revenue or protect, the citizen in its violation of the State law.
But Congress, as we have said, cannot dictate the domestic law of any State. And this court has decided, recently,! that a license from the United States is no protection to the licensee against acts forbidden by the State laws.
Mt. Speed, A. G. (at the last term), Mr. Stanbery, A. G. (at this), with the former of whom was Mr. Reed, A. G. of Massachusetts, contra.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the argument of all the cases here before the court, it was strenuously maintained by counsel for the defendants that the imposition of penalties for carrying on any business prohibited by State laws, without payment for the license or special tax required by Congress, is contrary to PuD [p. 469] policy; and illustrations of this supposed contrariety were drawn from hypothetical cases of the license of crime for revenue.
*
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419. f McGuire v. The Commonwealth, 3 Wallace, 387.
We will dispose of this objection before proceeding to consider the other important questions which these cases present.
It is not necessary to decide whether or not Congress may, in any case, draw revenue by law from taxes on crime. There are, undoubtedly, fundamental principles of morality and justice which no legislature is at liberty to disregard; but it is equally undoubted that no court, except in the clearest cases, can properly impute the disregard of those principles to the legislature.
And it is difficult to perceive wherein the legislation we are called upon to consider is contrary to public policy. • This court can know nothing of public policy except from the Constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and decision. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that sort must, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy determined there are concluded here.
There are cases, it is true, in which arguments drawn from pu lie policy must have large influence; but these are cases m which the course of legislation and administration do not eave any doubt upon the question what the public policy is, an in which what would otherwise be obscure or of doubt-interpretation, may be cleared and resolved by reference already received and established.
Ihe cases before us are not of this sort. The legislature as t ought fit, by enactments clear of all ambiguity, to imU se penalties for unlicensed dealing in lottery tickets and in an ]018' h.ese enactments, so long as they stand unrepealed
,. ^naodified, express the public policy in regard to the DubfC 8 °r ^iera‘ proposition that they are contrary to tend 1C7.’S therefore a contradiction in terms, or it is in-as a denial of their expediency or their propriety. If [p. 470] intended in the latter sense, the proposition is one of which courts cannot take cognizance.
We come now to examine a more serious objection to the legislation of Congress in relation to the dealings in controversy. It wTas argued for the defendants in error that a license to carry on a particular business gives an authority to carry it on; that the dealings in controversy were parcel of the internal trade of the State in which the defendants resided; that the internal trade of a State is not subject, in any respect, to legislation by Congress, and can neither be licensed nor prohibited by its authority; that licenses for such trade, granted under acts of Congress, must therefore be absolutely null and void; and, consequentlyj that penalties for carrying on such trade without such license could not be constitutionally imposed.
This series of propositions, and the conclusion in which it terminates, depends on the postulate that a license necessarily confers an authority to carry on the licensed business. But do the licenses required by the acts of Congress for selling liquor and lottery tickets confer any authority whatever.
It is not doubted that where Congress possesses constitutional power to regulate trade or intercourse, it may regulate by means of licenses as well as in other modes; and, in case of such regulation, a license will give to the licensee authority to do whatever is authorized by its terms.
Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade wi the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper 01 the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be in cident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights the licensee. e ,
But very different considerations apply to the in er commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over tins co merce and trade Congress has no power of regulation
any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. Ko interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Tnus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.
If, therefore, the licenses under consideration must be regarded as giving authority to carry on the branches of business which they license, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the granting of them with the Constitution.
But it is not necessary to regard these laws as giving such authority. So far as they relate to trade within State limits, they give none, and can give none. They simply express the purpose of the government not to interfere by penal proceedings with the trade nominally licensed, if the required taxes are paid. The power to tax is not questioned, nor the power to impose penalties for non-payment of taxes. The granting of a license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing more t an a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying nothing except that the licensee shall be subject to no penalties under national law, if he pays it.
This construction is warranted by the practice of the government from its organization. As early as 1794 retail dealers in wines or in foreign distilled liquors were required to tain and pay for licenses, and renew them annually, and
Pena ties were imposed for carrying on the business without °mp lance with the law.* In 1802 these license-taxes and
* 1 Stat, at Large, 377.
the other excise or internal taxes, which had been imposed under the exigencies of the time, being no longer needed, were abolished.* In 1813 revenue from excise was again required, and laws were enacted for the licensing of retail dealers in foreign merchandise, as well as to retail dealers in wines and various descriptions of liquors.f These taxes also were abolished after the necessity for them had passed away, in 1817. J No claim was ever made that the licenses thus required gave authority to exercise trade or carry on business within a State. They were regarded merely as a convenient mode of imposing taxes on several descriptions of business, and of ascertaining the parties from whom such taxes were to be collected.
With this course of legislation in view, we cannot say that there is anything contrary to the Constitution in these provisions of the recent or existing internal revenue acts relating to licenses.
Nor are we able to perceive the force of the other objection made in argument, that the dealings for which licenses are required being prohibited by the laws of the State, cannot be taxed by the National government. There would be great force in it if the licenses were regarded as giving authority, for then there would be a. direct conflict between National and State legislation on a subject which the Constitution places under the exclusive control of the States.
But, as we have already said, these licenses give no authority. They are mere receipts for taxes. And this would be true had the internal revenue act of 1864, like those of 1794 and 1813, been silent on this head. But it was not silent. It expressly provided, in section sixty-seven, that no license provided for in it should, if granted, be construed to authorize any business within any State or Territory pr° hibited by the laws thereof, or so as to prevent the taxation of the same business by the State. This provision not on y recognizes the full control by the States of business cariie on within their limits, but extends the same principle,
* 2 Stat, at Large, 148. f 3 Id- 72- 1 H' 4° ‘ [p. 473] as such business licensed by the National government is con* cerned, to the Territories.
There is nothing hostile or contradictory, therefore, in the acts of Congress to the legislation of the States. What the latter prohibits, the former, if the business is found existing notwithstanding the prohibition, discourages by taxation. The two lines of legislation proceed in the same direction, and tend to the same result. It would be a judicial anomaly, as singular as indefensible, if we should hold a violation of the laws of the State to be a justification for the violation of the laws of the Union.
These considerations require an affirmative answer to the first general question, Whether the several defendants, charged with carrying on business prohibited by State laws, without the licenses required by acts of Congress, can be convicted and condemned to pay the penalties imposed by these acts ?
The remaining question is, Whether the defendant, indicted for carrying on a business on which a special tax is imposed by the internal revenue law, but which is prohibited by the laws of New York, can be convicted and condemned to pay the penalty imposed for not having paid that tax ?
What has been already said sufficiently indicates our judgment upon this question.
Congress, in framing the act of 1866, has carefully guarded against any misconstruction of the legislative intention by substituting throughout the term “ special tax” for the word icense. This judicious legislation has removed all future possibility of the error which has been common among persons engaged in particular branches of business, that they ^nved from the licenses they obtained under the internal evenue laws, an authority for carrying on the licensed business in ependently of State regulation and control. And it rows, moreover, upon the previous legislation all the light tion eC^ara^01^ enactment. It fully confirms, if confirmathe11 Wer.e uee(^ed, the view we have already expressed, that requirement of payment for licenses under former laws WaS a mere form of special taxation.
The act of 1866 contains the same provision in respect to the effect of special taxes which the original act of 1864 contained in respect to licenses. It provides expressly that the payment of the taxes imposed by it shall not exempt any person carrying on a trade or business from any penalty or punishment provided by State laws for carrying on such ♦ trade or business, or authorize the commencement or continuance of any such trade or business contrary to State laws, or prevent the imposition of any duty or any tax on such trade or business by State authority.
It was insisted by counsel that whatever might be the power, it could not have been the intention of Congress to tax any business prohibited by State laws. And the argument from public policy was much relied upon in support of this view.
We think it unnecessary to repeat the answer already made to this argument, when urged against the requirements of licenses. It is, if possible, less cogent against the direct imposition of a tax on a prohibited business than against the indirect imposition.
It may, however, be properly said that the law of 1866 was enacted after the arguments of the last term, and that Congress imposed these special taxes with the distinct understanding that several branches of business thus taxed were prohibited by State legislation. This is conclusive as to the intention. The hypothesis we are asked to adopt would nullify some of the plainest provisions of the act, and is ina - missible. The question must be answered affirmatively.
Upon the whole, we conclude—
1. That licenses under the act of 1864, and the amendatory acts, conveyed to the licensee no authority to carry on e licensed business within a State.
2. That the requirement of payment for such licenses^ only a mode of imposing taxes on the licensed business, a that the prohibition, under penalties, against carrying o the business without license is only a mode of enforcing payment of such taxes.
3. That the provisions of the acts of Congress requirm
Syllabus.
such licenses, and imposing penalties for not taking out and paying for them, are not contrary to the Constitution or to public policy.
4. That the provisions in the act of 1866 for the imposing of special taxes, in lieu of requiring payment for licenses, removes whatever ambiguity existed in the previous laws, and are in harmony with the Constitution and public policy.
5. That the recognition by the acts of Congress of the power and right of the States to tax, control, or regulate any business carried on within its limits, is entirely consistent with an intention on the part of Congress to tax such business for National purposes.
It follows: That in the case from the Northern District of New York, the question certified must be answered in the affirmative.
That in the five cases from the District of New Jersey, the several judgments must be reversed, and the several causes remanded to the Circuit Court for new trial, in conformity with this opinion.
That in the case from the District of Massachusetts, the two questions certified must be answered in the affirmative; and—
That in each of the two cases from the Southern District of New York, the following answer must be returned to the Circuit Court, namely: “ That the law imposing the special tax in the indictment mentioned, and for the non-payment of which, said indictment was preferred and found, is valid, and not unconstitutional.”
All which is ordered accordingly.
Pervear v. The Commonwealth.
0^ frOn\the Federal government, under the internal revenue act» th 01?gress’ is no bar to an indictment under a State law prohibiting
e sa e of intoxicating liquors. The License Tax Cases, supra, p. 462,
herein affirmed. r v
w of a State taxing or prohibiting a business already taxed by Con*
gress, as ex. gr., the keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors,—Congress having declared that its imposition of a tax should not be taken to abridge the power of the State to tax or prohibit the licensed business,—is not unconstitutional. 3 The provision in the 8th article of the amendments to the Constitution,
that “ excessive fines ” shall not be “ imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” applies to National not to State legislation; the court observing, however, that if this were otherwise, a fine of $50 and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction, during three months—the punishment imposed by a State for violating one of its statutes, forbidding the keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors—cannot be regarded as excessive, cruel, or unusual.
This cause was brought before the court by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
Pervear, the plaintiff in error, was indicted in the State court for keeping and maintaining without license a tenement for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors.
In bar of this indictment he pleaded specially three matters of defence:
(1) That he had a license from the United States under the internal revenue acts of Congress to do all the acts for which he was indicted:
(2) That he had paid a tax or duty on the intoxicating liquors, for keeping and selling which the indictment was found, in the same packages, and in the same form and quantity in which he sold the same; and
(3) That the fine and punishment imposed and inflicted by the law of Massachusetts for the acts charged in the indictment were cruel, excessive, and unusual, and that the State law was therefore in conflict with the Constitution o the United States [the 8th article to the amendments o which, proposed in 1789, declares that “ excessive bail sha^ not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel an unusual punishments inflicted]. .
This plea was overruled, and Pervear declining to p ea further, a plea of not guilty was entered for him. He then put on trial, and the court instructed The jury that t e
Argument for the plaintiff in error.
plea was no defence to the indictment; to which instruction exception was taken. A verdict of guilty was thereupon found, and Pervear was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars and to be confined at hard labor, in the house of correction, for three months.
The writ of error brought this sentence under review, and the general question now was, Did the State court err in instructing the jury that the plea was no defence to the indictment?
Mr. Sennott for Pervear, plaintiff in error:
I. Congress, in the exercise of its power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, &c., has constantly taxed imported articles. Such articles, so taxed, have been protected from State interference by this court because they were taxed by Congress to raise revenue. The same body, in its internal revenue acts, has of late taxed domestic spirits and beer by measure, for the purpose of raising a revenue.
Now, if the payment of the first impost protects imported brandy from State laws, why does not the payment of the second impost protect the plaintiff’s domestic spirits and
In Brown v. Maryland,* Chief Justice Marshall declares that, “ by the payment of the duty to the United States, the importer purchases a right to sell his merchandise, a State aw to the contrary notwithstanding.” If this be true, the p aintiff, by paying his duty, purchased a similar right to ee his goods, notwithstanding a State law.
• The end of government is the protection of the persons and the property of men, and not to enforce morality 01 to teach religion, or to carry on farming, or the lumber r c, or to monopolize the liquor traffic. Laws passed by government, which it has no right to pass,, are not laws, flicted men^8 i11 pursuance of them are illegally in-
ho punishment, in this case, being for doing a lawful
act, was excessive, cruel, and unusual, and therefore against the eighth amendment of 1789.
Mr. Reed, Attorney- General of Massachusetts, contra:
The only distinction which it can be pretended exists between McGuire v. Commonwealth* and The License Tax Cases,] already decided by this court, and the case now under consideration is, that in the present case the tax paid was upon the articles sold instead of upon the business carried on. But the distinction is not one of essence, and, notwithstanding it, the rule established in the cases cited must apply.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, after stating the case as already given, delivered the opinion of the court.
We have already decided at this term that the first proposition of the plea in this case is no bar to an indictment under a State law taxing or prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors.
The second proposition of the plea is nothing more than a different form of the first. Both are identical in substance.
The case of Brown v. Maryland was referred to in argument as an authority for the general proposition that the sale of goods in the same packages on which a duty had been paid to the United States cannot be prohibited by State legislation. But this case does not sustain the proposition in support of which it is cited.
The discussion in Brown v. Maryland related wholly to imports under National legislation concerning commerce with foreign nations. A law of Maryland required importers of foreign goods to take out and pay for a State license for the sale of such goods in that State; and under this law the members of a Baltimore firm were indicted for having sold certain goods in packages as imported, without having taken out the required license. The defence was that t e duty on the goods, imposed by the act of Congress, na been paid to the United States; that the license tax was, id
* 3 Wallace, 888. f Supra, last preceding case, p.
effect, an additional import duty, which could not be constitutionally imposed by State law.
This court sustained the defence then set up. It held that, by the terms of the Constitution, the power to impose duties on imports was exclusive in Congress; and that the law of Maryland was in conflict with the act of Congress on the same subject, and was therefore void.
But the defence set up in the case before us is a very different one. It is not founded on any exclusive power of Congress, nor any act of Congress in conflict with State law. It is founded on the general power to levy and collect taxes, admitted on all hands to be concurrent only with the same general power in the State governments; and upon an act of Congress imposing a tax in the form of duty on licenses, but expressly declaring that the imposing such a tax shall not be taken to abridge the power of the State to tax or prohibit the licensed business.
The defence rests, then, in this part, on the simple proposition that a law of a State taxing or prohibiting business already taxed by Congress is unconstitutional. And that proposition is identical in substance and effect with the first proposition of the plea, and has been held in the License Tax Cases* to be no bar to the indictment.
The circumstance that the State prohibition applies to naerchandise in original packages is wholly immaterial ven in the case of importation, that circumstance is only available to the importer. Merchandise in original packages, once sold by the importer, is taxable as other property. But in the case before us there was no importation. So far as appears the liquors were home-made, or, if not, were in second hands. And the sale of such liquors within a State is subject exclusively to State control.f
The third proposition of the plea is that fines and penalties niposed and inflicted by the State law for offences charged 1are excessive, cruel, and unusual.
t is proposition it is enough to say that the article of
pra, last preceding case, p. 462. + License Cases, 5 Howard, 504 [p. 480] the Constitution relied upon in support of it does not apply to State but to National legislation.*
But if this were otherwise the defence could not avail the plaintiff in error. The offence charged was the keeping and maintaining, without license, a tenement for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors. The plea does not set out the statute imposing fines and penalties for the offence. But it appears from the record that the fine and punishment in the case before us was fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction for three months. We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in this. The object of the law was to protect the community against the manifold evils of intemperance. Ihe mode adopted, of prohibiting under penalties the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors, without license, is the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States. It is wholly within the discretion of State legislatures. We see nothing in the record, nor has anything been read to us from the statutes of the State which warrants us in saying that the laws of Massachusetts having application to this case are in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth must be
Affirmed.
Note.
The same order was made in four other cases, f “presenting, as the Chief Justice said, “substantially the same facts an governed by the same principles.”
At a later day of the term, to wit, April 30th, 1867, severa other cases on this same subject, coming here in error to the a preme Court of Iowa,| were submitted to the court on the rec-
*
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243. „ f Lynde®. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Salmon®. Same; ». Same; Armstrong ®. Same. . J Carney ®. State of Iowa; Munzenmainer ®. Same; Bachman v. am > Bahlor ®. Same ; Newman ®. Same; Stutz ®. Same; Bennett ®. Same.
Syllabus.
ords and briefs of Mr. Riddle, for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Cooley, contra.
On the following 7th of May the CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court, that the cases resembled, in all essential features, cases already decided at this term, which presented the question of the constitutionality of State laws prohibiting, restraining, or taxing the business of selling liquors under the internal revenue licenses of the United States; that the brief of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error calling upon the court to review its decisions affirming the validity of those laws, the court had done so, and was satisfied with the conclusions already announced.
The several judgments of the Supremo Court of the State of Iowa were therefore
Affirmed.
The Eddy.
• Contracts of affreightment are maritime contracts over which the courts of admiralty have jurisdiction. Either party may enforce his lien by a proceeding in rem in the District Court.
• In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the shipowner has a lien upon the cargo for the freight, and may retain the goods after the arrival of the ship at the port of destination until the payment is made. The master cannot, however, detain the goods on board the vessel. He must deliver them.
• An actual discharge of the goods at the warehouse of the consignee is not
required to constitute delivery. It is enough that the master discharge t e goods upon the wharf, giving due and reasonable notice to the consignee of the fact.
Where the goods, after being so discharged and separated into their different consignments, are not accepted by the consignee or owner, the carrier discharges himself from liability on his contract of affreightments by storing them in a place of safety and notifying to the consignee or owner that they are so stored, subject to the lien of the ship
for the freight and charges. frequent and even general but not at all universal practice in a paricu ar port, of shipowners to allow goods brought on their vessels.to be ransported to the warehouse of the consignee and there inspected before reig t is paid, is not such a “ custom” as will displace the ordinary ^ri^lme to demand freight on the delivery of the goods on the
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