Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573
Full caption
Van Allen v. The Assessors.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Van Allen v. The Assessors.
1. The act of June 3,1864, “ To provide a national currency,” &c., rightly construed, subjects the shares of the banking associations authorized by it, and in the hands of shareholders, to taxation by the States under certain limitations (set forth in its 41st section), without regard to the fact that a part or the whole of the capital of such association is invested in national securities declared by the statutes authorizing them to be 11 exempt from taxation by or under State authority.”
2. The act thus construed is constitutional.
3. The act of 9th March, 1865, of the legislature of New York, sometimes called the Enabling Act, and which enacts that shares in any of these national banking associations held by any person or body corporate shall be “included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or body corporate, in the assessment of taxes in the town or ward where such banking association is located and not elsewhere,” &c., but which did not provide that the tax imposed should not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of the State, is not warranted by the act of Congress, and is void: there having been under the legislation of the State no tax laid on shares in State banks at all; though there was a tax on the capital of such banks.
This was a suit involving the question of right, on the part 0 tates, to tax shares in the national banking associations [p. 574] created under the act of Congress of June, 1864. The case
was thus:
By an act passed February 25th, 1863, Congress provided
for the organization of national banking associations;* and
the act was amended and re-enacted on the 3d June, 1864. f
By these laws the mode of organizing these associations
was prescribed, their powers defined, and their duties en-
joined. The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to
employ them as depositories of the public moneys, and as
financial agents of the government, taking, however, suf-
ficient security for the faithful performance of those duties.
The general supervision of their action was committed to a
comptroller of the currency, to be appointed by the Presi-
dent on the nomination of the secretary. Ko association
could be organized with a less capital than fifty thousand
dollars, or less than one hundred thousand dollars in any place with more than six thousand inhabitants; or less than two hundred thousand dollars in any place with more than fifty thousand inhabitants. The whole capital was required to be paid in within five months; fifty per centum at the commencement, and ten per centum every month thereafter. Of this capital at least one-third was required to be invested in interest-bearing bonds of the United States, which were to be deposited with the treasurer of the United States. Provision was also made for the preparation of circulating notes of different denominations, of uniform general appearance, and for the delivery to each association of an amount of these notes equal to ninety per centum of the amount of bonds deposited with the treasurer. These notes were made payable by the associations to whom they were delivered, and they were required to pay them on demand. To secure more certainly prompt redemption by the several associations of these notes and of deposits, each association was required to keep always on hand an amount of lawful money equal, in certain cities named, to twenty-five per centum, and in other places to fifteen per centum of its outstanding
j- 18 Id. 99.
* 12 Stat, at Large, 668.
circulation and its deposits; and to accumulate a surplus fund equal to twenty per centum of its capital. In case of default in payment by any association, the notes were to be paid by the United States, and the bonds deposited were to be either cancelled or sold, at the option of the government. The entire amount of note circulation was limited to three hundred millions of dollars, to be apportioned among the associations in the different States and Territories, partly according to the rule of representative population, and partly according to their existing banking capital, resources, and business. The notes were made receivable by all the associations for all debts and liabilities whatever; receivable by all associations employed as depositories, when deposited by the United States; receivable also by the United States for all dues except duties on imports; and by all persons for all dues from the United States, except interest on public debt.
Such are the distinguishing features of the National Banking, or National Currency Act. The general objects of the act are apparent from them.
These associations possess, under the act, all the powers necessary for carrying on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits, buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by lending money on personal security; by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this act, &c. The duration of the charter is twenty years.
Certain provisions, particularly ascertaining the duties and functions of these national banking associations, may thus be stated:
The persons forming an association are required to make a certificate, which shall specify, among other things, the amount of its capital stock, and the number of shares into which the same shall be divided, the names and places of residence of the shareholders, and the number of shares held by each.* The capital stock is to be divided into shares [p. 576] of $100 each, and is to be deemed personal property. The shareholders of the association are to be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association to the extent of the amount of their stock therein at the par value, in addition to the amount invested in such shares.* In the election of directors, and in deciding all questions at meetings of shareholders, each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote on each share of stock held by him.f Fifty per cent, of the capital stock of every association must be paid in before it shall commence business, and the remainder in instalments of at least ten per cent, per month till the whole amount is paid; and if any shareholder, or his assignee, shall fail to make the payment, or any instalment on his stock, the directors may sell the stock at public auction.^ No association can make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital.§
By the 40th section of the act of 1864 it is enacted—the act of 1863 containing no such provision—
“ That the president and cashier of every such association shall cause to be kept, at all times, a full and correct list of the names and residences of all the shareholders in the association, and the number of shares held by each, in the office where its business is transacted, and such list shall be subject to the inspection of all shareholders and creditors of the association, and the officers authorized to assess taxes under State authority, during
business hours of each day,” &c.
The 41st section, of the same act of 1864, provides by one part of it for taxation by the United States. It imposes a tax of one per cent, annually on circulation; one-half of one per cent, on deposits, and then one-half of one per cent, on the capital beyond the amount invested in United States bonds; and after prescribing how the duty is to be collected, and the penalty for default, &c., the section proceeds :
(1.) “Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to [p. 577] prevent all the shares in any of said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under State authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State. (2.) Provided further, that the tax so imposed under the laws of any State upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the State where such association is located. (3.) Provided, also, that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either State, county, or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed.”
With this statute of the Federal Government, authorizing banking associations, in force, the legislature of New York, on the 9th March, 1865, passed “ an act, enabling the banks of this State to become associations for the purposes of banking, under the laws of the United States.”* The act, frequently called “ The Enabling Act,” imposed a tax upon all shares in national banks, in the hands of their holders. The section laying the tax ran thus:
“ § 10. All the shares in any of the said banking associations, organized under . . . the act of Congress, held by any person or body corporate, shall be included in the valuation of. the personal property of such person or body corporate or corporation, m the assessment of taxes in the town or ward where such banking association is located, and not elsewhere, whether the holder thereof reside in such town or ward, or not; but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals of this State, provided that the tax so imposed upon such shares shall not exceed the par value thereof; and provided further, that the real estate of such associations 8 bo subject to State, county, or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according to the value, as other real estate is taxed.”
This act, it will be noted, laid no rate or tax whatever “ upon [p. 578] the shares in any of the banks organized under the authority of the State,” as seems to have been contemplated as necessary by the second proviso of the 41st section of the National Banking Act of 1864; and, indeed, under the legislation of New York, as it appeared, no rate or tax whatever was laid upon shares in State banks at all; though there was one laid on their capital.
*
Session Acts of 1865; chap. 97. vol. in. 3?
However, assuming the validity of this State law whether with or without this proviso, the Board of Assessors, at the city of Albany, assessed one Van Allen for fifty shares, owned by him, of the capital stock of the First National Bank of that c,ity, and assessed all the other shareholders in like manner for theirs. At the time of the assessment, the whole capital of the bank was invested in various obligations of the Federal Government; in regard to all of which, Congress had enacted that, 11 whether held by individuals, corporations, or associations,” they should be a exempt from taxation by or under State authority.”
Van Allen and the other stockholders insisted before the board that the shares of the bank held by them, as stockholders, were not subject to assessment and taxation under State authority; that the enabling act of the New York legislature of 9th March, 1865, was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and also to the laws of the United States. These positions the board denied, and it enforced the tax which had been assessed. On a case stated by the stockholders on the one side, and the Board of Assessors on the other, the question was now taken to the Supreme Court of the State, and thence to the Court of Appeals. This latter court—the highest court of law or equity of the State—having affirmed the authority of the Board of Assessors to lay the tax, the case came here on error.*
Other cases like it, and represented by counsel, were also here from different places in New York. The magnitude [p. 579] of the interests concerned will be readily conceived from the fact mentioned at the bar, that, in December, 1865, the amount of stock in these National Banks, at its par .value—and the amount, therefore, either subject or not subject, according as this case should be decided, to taxation by the States—was:
*
Of course, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; with whose provisions the reader is familiar. See supra, p. 57, The Binghamton Bridge.
In the State of New York, .... $115,217,941 00 In the Union, ...... 404,159,493 00
That the reader may be possessed not only of the essential case, but of some of its important incidents, it may be well to mention that, prior to the enactment of either of the National Banking laws, and 'while its State Bank system was in operation, the legislature of New York (A. D. 1857) had enacted that the capital stock of the banks of the State should be “ assessed at its actual value, and taxed in the same manner as other personal and real estate of the country.” With the State system and the enactment just mentioned in force, several of the banks of New York became, soon after the rebellion broke out, owners of large amounts of the bonds of the United States, and in regard to which, as already said, Congress had, in the statute authorizing them, enacted* that, “ whether held by individuals or corporations, they shall be exempt from taxation by or under State authority.” On a question between those banks as formed under the general State system in New York, and the tax commissioners of the State, this court decided, in March, 1863, in the Bank of Commerce v. New York Cityf that the tax referred to was a tax upon the stock; and that being so, it was by the settled law of this court—as declared in Weston v. The City of Charleston^ McCulloch v. The State of Maryland. Osborne v. The Bank of the United (well known decisions of this court, and in which Marshall, C. J., had given its judgment), and other cases—illegally imposed.
In April, 1863, just after this decision, the legislature of ew York passed another statute,^ which enacted that “ all [p. 580] banks, &c., should be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in, or secured to be paid in, &c., in the manner now provided by law,” &c. On a tax laid, under this act, by the commissioners, upon the different banks of New York city, some of which had invested their whole capital in the securities of the Federal Government, and others of which had largely done so, the question was, whether this second act did or did not also impose a tax upon the stock ? This court, on appeal from the highest court of the State, decided, in the beginning of 1865, in what is known as the Bank Tax Case* that it did. It was within a few days after that decision that the enactment on which the present case arose—a third enactment in the principal matter—was made. Its language was obviously directed to avoid some difficulties which had proved insurmountable in the Bank Tax Case, and in cases before it. Whether it did really avoid them, or whether the new legislation of the State had the fault of exalting the forms and phrases of legislation above its substance and effect, was, in fact, one great question in the case; others being (i) whether Congress had meant, by the first proviso to the 41st section of the act of 1864, to authorize States to lay a tax on shares in National Banks whose whole capital consisted of national securities, declared in the laws authorizing them to be exempt from taxation by States; and (ii) whether, if it did, such an act would or would not be open to the objection of being an attempt by Congress to deliver over to others, powers vested by the Federal Constitution in it alone; and be, therefore, an act unconstitutional.
*
Act of February 25, 1862. f 2 Black, 620. J ¡?ettrS’ 449' § 4 Wheaton, 816. II 9 Id. 738. | Act of 29th April> 1863o * 2 Wallace, 200.
A minor question—treated preliminarily—was, whether, admitting the power of the State, under the provisos of the 41st section of the act of Congress, to tax the shares by an enactment framed with the limitations prescribed by the three provisos in it, this particular act of the State of New York, passed March 9, 1865, which apparently omitted the second one, was an enactment of the kind required?
Numerous counsel appeared in the matter; some in this immediate case, others in other cases just like it from the other places. Among them- Mr. Evarts, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Tremaine, Messrs. Edmonds and Miller, argued against the right of the States to tax, and Mr. Kernan, Mr. A. J. Parker, and Mr. Reynolds in favor of it. After naming such counsel it need not be remarked that everything possible to be well said was said as well as possible. The fact that the main matter is fully and admirably argued from the bench—in the opinion of the court on the one hand, and in the opinion delivered in behalf of the judges who did not concur in it on the other—renders it unnecessary for the reporter to present the discussion af the bar.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
The decree of the Court of Appeals, from which this case comes to us, must be. reversed, on the ground that the enabling act of the State of New York, passed March 9, 1865, does not conform to the limitations prescribed by the forty-first section of the act of Congress, passed June 3, 1864, organizing the national banks, and providing for their taxation. The defect is this: one of the limitations in the act of Congress is, “ that the tax so imposed under the laws of any State upon the shares of the associations authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of the State where such association is located.” The enabling act of the State contains no such limitation. The banks of the State are taxed upon their capital; and although the act provides that the tax on the shares of the national banks shall not exceed the par value, yet, inasmuch as the capital of the State banks may consist of the bonds of the United States, which are exempt from State taxation, it is easy to see that this tax on the capital is not an equivalent for a tax on the shares of the stockholders.
This is an unimportant question, however, as the defect may be readily remedied by the State legislature.
The main and important question involved, and the one [p. 582] which, has been argued at great length and with eminent ability, is, whether the State possesses the power to authorize the taxation of the shares of these national banks in the hands of stockholders, whose capital is wholly vested in stock and bonds of the United States ?
The court are of opinion that this power is possessed by the State, and that it is due to the several cases which have been so fully and satisfactorily argued before us at this term, as well as to the public interest involved, that the question should be finally disposed of. I shall proceed, therefore, to state, as briefly as practicable, the grounds and reasons that have led to their judgment in the case.
The first act providing for the organization of these national banks, passed 25th February, 1863, contained no provision concerning State taxation of these shares; but Congress reserved the right by the last section at any time “ to amend, alter, or repeal the act.” Tfle present act of 1864 is a re-enactment of the prior statute, with some material amendments, of which the section concerning State taxation is one. ,
It will be readily perceived, on adverting to the act, that the powers and privileges conferred by it upon these associations are very great powers and privileges;—founded upon a new use and application of these government bonds, especially the privilege of issuing notes to circulate in the community as money, to the amount of ninety per centum of the bonds deposited with the treasurer; thereby nearly doubling their amount for all the operations and business purposes of the bank. This currency furnishes means and facilities for conducting the operations of the associations, which, if used wisely and skilfully, cannot but result in great advantages and profits to all the members of the association the shareholders of the bank.
In the granting of chartered rights and privileges by government, especially if of great value to the cprporatois, certain burdens are usually, if not generally, imposed as conditions of the grant. Accordingly we find them in this charter. They are very few, but distinctly stated.
Opinion Of the court.
They are, first, a duty of one-half of one per centum each half year, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation ; second, a duty of one-quarter of one per centum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits; third, a duty of one-quarter of one per centum each half year on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds; and fourth, a State tax upon the shares of the association held by the stockholders, not greater than assessed on other moneyed capital in the State, nor to exceed the rate on shares of stock of State banks.
These are the only burdens annexed to the enjoyment of the great chartered rights and privileges that we find in this act of Congress; and no objection is made to either of them except the last,—the limited State taxation.
Although it has been suggested, yet it can hardly be said to have been argued, that the provision in the act of Congress concerning the taxation of the shares by the State is* unconstitutional. The suggestion is, that it is a tax by the State upon the bonds of the government which constitute the capital of the bank, and which this court has heretofore decided to be illegal. But this suggestion is scarcely well founded; for were we to admit, for the sake of the argument, this to be a tax of the bonds or capital stock of the bank, it is but a tax upon the new uses and new privileges conferred by the charter of the association; it is but a condition annexed to the enjoyment of this new use and new' application of the bonds; and if Congress possessed the power to grant these new rights and new privileges, which none of the learned counsel has denied, and which the whole argument assumes, then we do not see but the power to annex the conditions is equally clear and indisputable. The question involved is altogether a different one from that decided in the previous bank cases, and stands upon different considerations. The State tax, under this act of Congress, involves no question as to the pledged faith of the government. The tax is the condition for the new rights and privileges conferred upon these associations.
But, in addition to this view, the tax on the shares is not [p. 584] a tax on the capital of the bank. The corporation is the legal owner of all the property of the bank, real and personal; and within the powers conferred upon it by the charter, and for the purposes for which it was created, can deal with the corporate property as absolutely as a private individual can deal with his own. This is familiar law, and will be found in every work that may be opened on the subject of corporations. A striking exemplification may be seen in the case of the Queen v. Arnoud.* The question related to the registry of a ship owned by a corporation. Lord Denman observed : “ It appears to me that the British corporation is, as such, the sole owner of the ship. The individual members of the corporation are no doubt interested in one sense in the property of the corporation, as they may derive individual benefits from its increase, or loss from its decrease; but in no legal sense are the individual members the owners.”
The interest of the shareholder entitles him to participate in the net profits earned by the bank in the employment of its capital, during the existence of its charter, in proportion to the number of his shares; and, upon its dissolution or termination, to his proportion of the property that may remain of the corporation after the payment of its debts. This is a distinct independent interest or property, held by the shareholder like any other property that may belong to him. Now, it is this interest which the act of Congress has left subject to taxation by the States, under the limitations prescribed, as will be seen on referring to it.
That act provides as follows :
“ That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares of any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by and under State authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands
* 9 Adolphus & Ellis, New Series, 806.
of individual citizens of such State; provided further, that the tax so imposed under the laws of any State, upon the shares of the associations, authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of the State where such association is located: provided, also, that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either State, county, or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed.”*
It is said that Congress possesses no power to confer upon a State authority to he exercised which has been exclusively delegated to that body by the Constitution, and, consequently, that it cannot confer upon a State the sovereign right of taxation; nor is a State competent to receive a grant of any such power from Congress. We agree to this. But as it respects a subject-matter over which Congress and the States may exercise a concurrent power, but from the exercise of which Congress, by reason of its paramount authority, may exclude the States, there is no doubt Congress may withhold the exercise of that authority and leave the States free to act. An example of this relation existing between the Federal and State governments is found in the pilot-laws of the States, and the health and quarantine laws. The power of taxation under the Constitution as a general rule, and as has been repeatedly recognized in adjudged cases in this court, is a concurrent power. The qualifications of the rule are the exclusion of the States from the taxation of the means and instruments employed in the exercise of the functions of the Federal Government.
The remaining question is, has Congress legislated in respect to these associations, so as to leave the shares of the stockholders subject to State taxation ?
We have already referred to the main provision of the act of Congress on this subject, and it will be seen it declares that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person, or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of [p. 586] the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under State authority, at the place where such bank is located and in another section of the act* it is declared “ that the president and cashier of every such association shall cause to be kept, at all times, a full and correct list of the names and residences of ah the shareholders in the association, and the number of shares held by each, in the office where its business is transacted, and such list shall be subject to the inspection of all shareholders and creditors of the association, and the officers authorized to assess taxes under State authority, during business hours of each day,” &c.
These two provisions—the one declaring that nothing in the act shall be construed to prevent the shares from being
included in the valuation of the personal property, &c., in
the assessment of taxes imposed by State authority; and the
other providing for the keeping of the list of the names and
residences of the shareholders, among other things, for the
inspection of the officers authorized to assess the State taxes
—not only recognize, in express terms, the sovereign right
of the State to tax, but prescribe regulations and duties to
these associations, with a view to disembarrass the officers
of the State engaged in the exercise of this right. Nothing,
it would seem, could be made plainer, or more direct and
comprehensive on the subject. The language of the several
provisions is so explicit and positive as scarcely to call for
judicial construction.
Then, as to the shares, and what is intended by the use of the term ? The language of the act is equally explicit and decisive.
The persons forming an association are required to make a certificate, which shall specify, among other things, the amount of its capital stock, and the number of shares into which the same shall be divided, the names and places of residence of the shareholders, and the number of shares held by each.f The capital stock shall be divided into shares of [p. 587] one hundred dollars each, and shall be deemed personal property. The shareholders of the association shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association to the extent of the amount of their stock therein at the par value, in addition to the amount invested in such shares.* In the election of directors, and in deciding all questions at meetings of shareholders, each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote on each share of stock held by him.f Fifty per centum of the capital stock of every association shall be paid in before it shall commence business, and the remainder in instalments of at least ten per centum per month till the whole amount is paid; and if any shareholder, or his assignee, shall fail to make the payment, or any instalment on his stock, the directors may sell the stock at public auction.£ No association shall make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital.§
We have already referred to the list of the names and residences of the shareholders, and the number of shares, to be kept for the inspection of the State assessors.
Now, in view of these several provisions in which the term shares, and shareholders, are mentioned, and the clear and obvious meaning of the term in the connection in which it is found, namely, the whole of the interest in the shares and of the shareholders; when the statute provides, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, &c., from being included in the valuation of the personal property of any person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by State authority, &c., can there be a doubt but that the term “ shares,” as used in this connection, means the same interest as when used in the other portions of the act? Take, for examples, the use of the term in the certificate of the numbers of shares in the. articles of association, in the division of the capital stock into shares of one hundred dollars each; in the personal liability clause, which subjects the shareholder to an
*
§ 12‘ t § 11. | w 14,15. i $ 35.
Opinion of the Chief Justice and of Wayne and Swayne, JJ.
amount, and, in addition, to the amount invested in such shares; in the election of directors, and in deciding all questions at meetings of the stockholders, each share is entitled to one vote; in regulations of the payments of the shares subscribed; and, finally, in the list of shares kept for the inspection of the State assessors. In all these instances, it is manifest that the term as used means the entire interest of the shareholder; and it would be singular, if in the use of the term in the connection of State taxation, Congress intended a totally different meaning, without any indication of such intent.
This is an answer to the argument that the term, as used here, means only the interest of the shareholder as representing the portion of the capital, if any, not invested in the bonds of the government, and that the State assessors must institute an inquiry into the investment of the capital of the bank, and ascertain what portion is invested in these bonds, and make a discrimination in the assessment of the shares. If Congress had intended any such discrimination, it would have been an easy matter to have said so. Certainly, so grave and important a change in the use of this term, if so intended, would not have been left to judicial construction.
Upon the whole, after the maturest consideration which we have been able to give to this case, we are satisfied that the States possess the power to tax the whole of the interest of the shareholder in the shares held by him in these associations, within the limit prescribed by the act authorizing their organization. But, for the reasons stated in the forepart of the opinion, the judgment must be reversed and the case remitted to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in error, with costs.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the following opinion in his own behalf, and in behalf of Associate Justices WAYNE and SWAYNE:
The court is unanimous in the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York must be reversed, be-
Opinion of the Chief Justice and of Wayne and Swayne, JJ.
cause the shares of the national banking associations are not taxed by the law of New York according to one branch of the rule prescribed by the act of Congress; that is to say, as the shares of the banks of the State are taxed.
A minority of the members of the court, however, is unable to concur upon one very important point, with the opinion just read.
That opinion maintains the proposition, that under the-national currency acts, the shares of the capital of national banking associations are subject to State taxation without any reference to the amount of such capital invested in bonds of the United States.
We think that such taxation is actual, though indirect, taxation of the bonds; that it is matter of doubt whether, under the Constitution, Congress has power, without express reservation in the loan acts, to authorize such taxation; and that taxation by the States of the shares of national banking associations, without reference to the amount of the capital invested in national securities, is not authorized, nor was intended to be authorized by Congress.
We will proceed to state the grounds of this opinion.
By an act passed February 25th, 1863, Congress provided for the organization of national banking associations for the purpose of enabling the national government to execute more effectually its constitutional powers and functions; and the act was amended and re-enacted on the 3d June, 1864.
It is unnecessary to examine minutely the various provisions by which the powers and duties and functions of these national banking associations are particularly ascertained and regulated. The general purpose of the act of Congress cannot be misconceived. It is to authorize the organization of associations to be employed, not only in the service of the government as depositories and financial agents, but especially in facilitating the collection of internal • duties, and the transfer and disbursement of public moneys, and in furnishing to the people a safe and uniform note circulation, convertible immediately into notes of the United States, and to be made convertible into coin as soon as the [p. 590] government shall provide for the payment of its own notes in.that medium.
The qualities, powers, and duties, as national agencies, of these associations, resemble, in almost all essential particulars, those of the Bank of the United States authorized by the act of April 10th, 1816. Like that bank, they are organized under national legislation. Their capital, like four-fifths of the capital of that bank, is supplied by individual subscriptions. They are employed, like that bank, as agents and depositories of the national government.
While that bank, however, was organized as one great moneyed corporation, with power to establish branches in the several States, subject to its central power, these associations, under the limitations prescribed by Congress, are formed whenever and wherever citizens, possessing the necessary means, see fit to organize under the law; and they are subject to no control except that of the government executing the law. It is also to be remembered that while the notes of that bank represented nothing but securities held by the bank itself, and were expected to form but a small part of the note circulation of the country, the notes of these associations, besides being secured as to immediate redemption by the several associations, which pay them out, through the deposit of United States bonds, are, in substance and to all practical intents, the obligations of the government itself; and are intended, in connection with the notes issued directly by the government, to supply the entire note circulation of all the States and all the Territories of the Union.
These observations show that the national banking associations are much more intimately connected in their functions and operations with the national government, than was the Bank of the United States. They are, therefore, entitled to all the protection and all the immunities to which that bank was entitled.
The relations of that bank to the government, and its right to protection from State interference and control, were fully considered in the case of *McCulloch v. The State of [p. 591] Maryland, decided in 1819, and again in the case of Osborne v. The Bank of the United States*, decided in 1824.
That Congress may constitutionally organize or constitute agencies for carrying into effect the national powers granted by the Constitution; that these agencies may be organized by the voluntary association of individuals, sanctioned by Congress; that Congress may give to such agencies, so organized, corporate unity, permanence, and efficiency; and that such agencies in their being, capital, franchises, and operations, are not subject to the taxing power of the States, have ever been regarded, since those decisions, as settled doctrines of this court.
Those decisions were the judgments of great men and great judges. They were pronounced by the most illustrious of their number, and are distinguished by his peculiar clearness and cogency of reasoning. For nearly half a century the principles vindicated by them have borne the keen scrutiny of an enlightened profession, and the sharp criticism of able statesmen; and they remain unshaken. All the judges who concurred in them have descended, long since, into honored graves; but their judgments endure, and, gathering vigor from time and general consent, have acquired almost the force of constitutional sanctions.
We assume, then, that the national banking associations, as such, and in their powers, functions, and operations, are not subject to taxation by the States, on the ground that State laws imposing such taxation are repugnant to the law of Congress by which they are established and sanctioned.
The same principle of exemption was applied in 1829, by a judgment of this court in the case of Weston v. The City of Charleston* to the bonds and other securities of the United States in the hands of individuals. The opinion was delivered by the same great judge who pronounced the two former judgments, and the doctrine was summed up thus:
“ The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on
Opinion of the Chief Justice and of Wayne and Swayne, JJ.
the credit of the United States, and consequently to he repugnant to the Constitution; and this doctrine has ever since been maintained as settled law.”
More recently the same principle has been applied generally to the taxation of the capital of associations and corporations, so far as invested in national securities.
This was first done in the case of the Bank of Commerce v. New York* The legislature of Kew York imposed taxes on banking capital as upon other real and personal property of individuals according to valuation. This court held that the bonds and other securities of the United States, included in such valuation, were not liable to be taxed by State authority.
The legislature of Kew York subsequently provided for the taxation of the capital of banks by an arbitrary valuation; that is to say, by requiring the valuation for taxation to be equal to the sum of the capital paid in and secured to be paid in, without reference to its actual value at the time of valuation; and it was then insisted, in behalf of the State commissioners of taxes, that this was a tax on the franchise and not on the property, and that no inquiry could be made, therefore, as to the component elements of the capital, with a view to ascertain whether any of them were exempt from taxation. But this court held that the tax was really on the property of the bank, and could not be constitutionally assessed upon that part of it which consisted of national bonds and securities.!
And it may now be regarded as settled law that the national securities forming part of the property of individual citizens or associations, or of the capital of banks or banking associations, are not subject to taxation by of under State authority.
But it was urged in argument that, though the capital of a bank, so far as it consists of national securities, is exempt from State taxation, the shares of that capital may be taxed
f Bank Tax Case, 2 Wallace, 200.
* 2 Black, 628.
Opinion of the Chief Justice and of Wayne and Swayne, JJ.
without reference to the legislation of Congress, and without regard to the national securities which they represent.
If this were admitted, it would follow that the legislature of New York, by merely shifting its taxation from the capital to the shares, might have avoided the whole effect of the exemptions sanctioned by the decisions just cited. The same tax on the same identical property, without any exemption of national securities, might have been assessed and collected by adopting the simple expedient of assessment on the shares of capital, instead of the aggregate of capital—on the parts-instead of the whole. The whole tax,, too, might have been collected from the very same officers who were authorized by those decisions to refuse payment of so much of it as was derived from national securities, by adopting the equally simple expedient of requiring those officers to deduct the tax on the shares from the accruing dividends, and pay it over to the State collector.
We do not understand the majority of the court as- asserting that shares of capital invested in national securities could be taxed without authority from Congress., We certainly cannot yield our assent to any such proposition. To do so would, in our judgment,, deprive the decisions just cited of all practical value and effect,, and make the exemption from State taxation of national securities held by banks as investments of capital wholly unreal and illusory.
We will consider the question, therefore, as one* of construction.
The majority of the court hold that the act of Congress, rightly construed, subjects the shares of the national associations to taxation by the States, without regard to investment of a part or the whole of their capital in national securities ; and that the act thus construed is warranted by the Constitution. We dissent.
It may be well questioned, in our judgment, whether Congress has power under the Constitution to authorize State taxation of national securities, either directly or indirectly. Taxation of national securities is taxation upon the conracts of the United States, and may be regarded, not unrea-
VOL. HI. gg [p. 594] sonably, as impairing their obligation, unless provision is made for such taxation in the laws authorizing; the loans for which they are issued. It is not alleged that any such provision is contained in the acts under which the government issued the bonds held by the national banking associations. On the contrary, these acts contain express stipulations with the national creditors that the bonds issued under them shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal authority'. This is, in effect, a stipulation on the part of Congress that the takers of the government loan shall have the right to use the bonds issued to them for any lawful purpose, free from State or municipal taxation.
Can Congress, notwithstanding this stipulation, authorize States to tax these bonds indirectly by taxing the capital or the shares of capital invested in them ?
There is sufficient reason, we think, for a negative answer, to make it our duty not to presume without the clearest evidence that Congress has actually authorized such taxation. And were the power to authorize such taxation clear, a superior question would remain,—the question of good faith, of public virtue, of national honor.
We come, then, to the construction of the act.
In enacting the National Bank Law, Congress must have had in view the great principles already established by the decisions of this court: (1) that States cannot tax the agencies of the national government; (2) that States cannot tax the national securities in the hands of individual citizens; (3) that States cannot tax the national securities in which may be invested the whole or a part of the capital of any association or corporation.
They also had in view, doubtless, the exception to exemption suggested by Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch y. Maryland, when he said that the opinion of the court did “ not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank in common with the real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland might hold in the institution in common with the property of the same description throughout the State.”
With these principles and this exception in view, Congress, in order that nothing might be left to inference, expressly authorized State taxation of the real estate held by the national banking associations, and of the interest of private citizens in them. This was done by three provisos to the forty-first section, which prescribed the measure and rule of national taxation. These provisos are as follows:
(1.) “ Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under State authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State. (2.) Provided further, that the tax so imposed under the laws of any State shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the State where such association is located. (3.) Provided alst), that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either State, county, or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed.”
We do not doubt the power of Congress to enact these provisos. The only ground upon which exemption from State taxes of the capital, franchises, operations, or property of corporations or associations has been adjudged by this court, is that of the repugnancy of such taxation to the acts of Congress organizing such corporations or associations, and making them the agencies or instruments of the national government.
The doctrine is, that Congress may create corporations or authorize associations, as means, instruments, or agents for ne execution of national powers, and that such corporations or associations, being such means, instruments, or agents, are exempted from State taxation. But such corporations an associations must be organized in such manner, under such limitations, and with such liabilities as Congress may 8ee to prescribe. If in the judgment of Congress, there-
Opinion of the Chief Justice and of Wayne and Swayne, JJ.
fore, the purposes of their organization will be better, oi more safely fulfilled if subjected, in some respects, to State taxation, the acts authorizing their establishment may be so framed as to allow such taxation, excepting, probably, national securities, as already suggested.
We proceed to consider the effect of these provisos; pausing only to observe that there is nothing in the suggestion of Chief Justice Marshall, in conformity with which they were probably framed, which warrants any inference that it ever entered into his mind that the national stock or bonds could be taxed indirectly, by taxing the interest of citizens in the Bank of the United States. The question of State taxes upon national securities was not at all considered in that case. If it had been, we cannot doubt that the clear intelligence, under the inspection of which all propositions seemed to resolve themselves into their elements, would have detected taxation of bonds under the disguise of taxation of the capital or shares of capital in which they were invested, and would have pronounced against the indirect as decisively as it did afterwards, in Weston v. Charleston^ against the direct taxation.
What, then, was the intent of Congress? We think it not very difficult to collect it from the provisos.
In most of the States, if not in all, the personal property of all individuals and corporations is listed, valued and assessed by public officers under legislative authority. The first proviso simply requires that the shares of individuals in national banking associations shall be included in this valuation and assessment; and, inasmuch as personal property of different descriptions is often valued and assessed by different rules, it further requires that it shall not be so included at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of citizens. The second proviso merely introduces another standard, by comparison with which the taxation of these shares is to be regulated, and requires that thé tax imposed on them shall not exceed the rate impose by the State on the shares of banks organized under its authority.
We think this the plain sense of these provisos. They adopt the exception admitted by Chief Justice Marshall to the rule of exemption in McCulloch v. Maryland. They subject the interests held by citizens in the national banking associations to a tax in common with other property of the same description, and they give to the exception a practical application by determining what property is of the same description with the interest to be taxed in common with it.
Now, by taxation in common, we understand taxation by a common rule and in equal degrees. To tax the shares of citizens in these associations by other rules, or in greater degrees than other like property, would as effectually retard, impede, burden, and control the operation of the national currency act as to tax the associations themselves or their lawful operations, and would be clearly unwarranted by the Constitution.
What then is the rule, and what the degree in which taxes can be imposed by the States on moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens ?
So far as that capital consists of ordinary funds or securities acquired or held under the laws of the States, the measure of taxation must necessarily be determined by the discretion of the State legislature. The responsibility of their members to the people, their own interests in common with those of their constituents, their knowledge, their justice, and their wisdom must be relied on for security against injustice. But so far as that capital consists of bonds or other securities of the United States, it cannot be taxed at all by State authority in the hands of individual citizens. That portion is exempted by the Constitution, as interpreted by this court in the cases already cited.
Here, then, we have the common rule and common degree of taxation applicable alike to shares in national banking associations and to moneyed capital in the hands of inivi uals. That proportion of each which is liable to taxa-10n niust be taxed alike; that proportion of each which is exempt under the Constitution must not be taxed at all by ate authority. Taxation of the former by no greater rate [p. 598] than the latter, means equal taxation for both. Any construction of the proviso which denies the same exemptions to the proportion of the shares invested in national securities, which it concedes to the like proportion of other moneyed capital invested in like manner, seems to us manifestly at variance with the declared intention of Congress.
But, it is insisted that the shares of capital may be taxed by another rule than that which governs the taxation of other moneyed capital, because of something peculiar in the nature of shares. It is said, that the association owns the capital, and that the shareholders have no control over this property except through the choice of officers, directors, or agents, and no right to the property except the right to receive a due proportion of the earnings of the association while it exists, and a similar proportion of the property after its dissolution.
It is true that the shareholder has no right to the possession of any part of the corporate property while the corporation exists and its affairs are honestly managed. He has committed his interest, for a time, to the possession and control of the corporation of which he is a member, and he has only a member’s voice in the management of it.
So a man who has leased a farm has no right to possession or control during the lease; but who denies his property in the farm ? And if a dozen owners join in the lease, has not each one an interest in the property to the extent of one-twelfth ?
So, if for the time the property of the shareholder is placed beyond his direct control, and converted into property of the association, how can that circumstance affect the intrinsic character of his shares as shares of the whole corporate property ? How can a man’s shares of any property be the subject of valuation at all if not with reference to the amount and productiveness of the property of which they are a part. What value can they have except that given them by that amount and that productiveness ? A certificate of title to a share is not a share. It is evidence of the shareholder s interest His interest may be transferred by the transfer of
Opinion of the Chief Justice and of Wayne and Swayne, JJ.
the certificate; but it is not the certificate that is valued when the worth of the share is estimated either by the speculator in the market, or by the tax assessor. It is the property which it represents that is valued, by the speculator often with reference to speculation only, but by the public officer, always, if he does his duty, by the real worth of the property, all things considered.
It is said, also, that the taxation of the shares by the States was intended as part of the price of the privileges granted to the associations by Congress, and especially for the new use allowed to be-made of the bonds by depositing them as security for the redemption of the circulating notes issued to the associations by the government.
But while we see privileges granted in the act to these associations, in order that they may fulfil the public purposes of their organization, and while we see that these privileges may enhance the value of the capital invested and consequently the value of the shares, we see no new use allowed to be made of the bonds. It has been common in many States, of late years, to require banks of circulation to secure prompt redemption by securities deposited with the State officers, and among such securities preference is usually given to bonds of the United States. But this is for the benefit and security of the note-holders, not of the banks. The requirement restricts rather than increases the amount of their circulation.
These privileges, moreover, and the new use, if there be one, are granted directly to the associations, and only indirectly to the shareholders; and if the right to tax is to be inferred from consent manifested by organization under the act, the tax should be imposed on the capital of the associations rather than upon the shares. And we may remark, also, that the imagined new use is restricted to the limited amount of onds required as security for circulation, while.the greater part of the bonds, held by the associations, are not so pledged a all, and no such reason as new use or special privileges can be alleged for denying exemption to them.
t is worthy of notice, that the banks of New York, whose [p. 600] claim to the exemption of the bonds held, by them from State taxation was held valid by the two decisions we have cited, were organized upon the same principles with the national banking associations which now claim a similar exemption. The same privileges, substantially, were conferred on those institutions by the laws of New York as are conferred on these by act of Congress. The former were allowed to issue an amount of currency proportioned to the bonds deposited by them with the bank superintendent, just as the latter are allowed to issue an amount proportioned to the bonds deposited by them with the treasurer of the United States. If the tax is the price of privilege in the case of the latter, so it must have been in the case of the former. If it is a duty on the new use of bonds by national banking associations, it was a duty on the same new use by the New York banks. If -consent of the former to taxation could be inferred from organization, so could the consent of the latter. And yet it was held, in the New York bank cases, that the tax could not reach the bonds which made a part of the capital, while it is now held that it may be imposed on the shares of the capital invested partly or wholly in these bonds. Surely no argument drawn from new use or price of privilege can be valid for the latter tax which was not valid for the former.
The truth is, we think that Congress, when providing for State taxation of shares, had no reference whatever to any new use of bonds or any price of privilege. The national legislature was engaged in providing a uniform currency for the whole country, and for its circulation and redemption. For this and other great national purposes the organization of the national banking associations was authorized, and it was expected that these associations would take the place of the State banks, from taxes on which the States derived considerable revenues. It was to remove the objections to the new system, founded on the loss of this revenue through the conversion of State banks into national associations, that Congress authorized the taxation of shares by the States. This taxation should be allowed to the extent of [p. 601] the concession of Congress. That concession limits it to the same taxation as the States impose on moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, in whose hands the proportion invested in national bonds is exempt. There is no reason for extending taxation on shares beyond that concession.
But it is urged that other provisions in the act of Congress require that construction of the proviso which allows taxation on shares without deduction of investments in national securities. We think otherwise.
One of these provisions is that which requires the capital to be divided into shares of one hundred dollars each. This provision only shows that, at the outset, each share of paid up capital represented a property interest in the association, bearing the same proportion to the whole that one hundred dollars bore to the entire capital.
The only other provision much relied on as favoring the construction of the majority, is that clause of the fortieth section which requires the officers of the several associations to keep correct lists of the names and residences of the shareholders, subject to the inspection of shareholders and creditors, and of the officers authorized to assess taxes under State authority. But is it not obvious that this list would be as useful to the State officers in valuing the shares with exemption of bonds, as in valuing them without exemption ?
It is said that exemption would embarrass valuation. How? All the assessor would have to do, would be to ascertain the value of the whole property of the association and deduct the amount of bonds. The remainder, divided by the number of shares, would give the value of each share to be taxed. And the assessor must value the whole property and divide it by the number of shares, in order to make a true valuation of shares. If he does not do this, he must assess the shares at an arbitrary or speculative valuation. This is not what is required. The law demands true valuation; and true valuation, with deduction of bonds, places the shareholder on exact equality with the holder of other moneyed capital, which the law also demands. Ho other mode of valuation secures that equality.
There is another provision of the act which appears to us conclusive of the correctness of our view. It is that clause of the 41st section which provides for taxation by the United States. It imposes a tax of one per centum annually on circulation; one-half of one per centum on deposits; and, then, one-half of one per centum on the capital, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds. Is it possible that Congress observed so scrupulously the obligations of good faith as to refuse to tax capital invested in bonds for national purposes, and this in the midst of war, and was yet so negligent of those obligations as to allow the same capital invested in bonds to be taxed in shares, for State purposes? Can it be supposed that Congress, having undoubted power to tax national securities, refrained from exercising it because its exercise would be inconsistent with good faith, and yet intended, by ambiguous phrases, and in the exercise of questionable constitutional authority, to authorize such taxation by11 the States who, without such authority, could not impose it at all ? Suppose that, by this clause, Congress had imposed double the amount of tax actually assessed, and had provided for the payment of half of it to the States. That would have provided an indemnity to the States for the loss of taxes on the State banks, and would have subjected the national bonds to no tax. Is it reasonable to believe that Congress intended to adopt another mode of indemnity, which, by indirection, would subject those bonds to heavy taxation, and that by the States?
To us these questions seem to answer themselves. We are entirely satisfied that the construction of the proviso and the rule for valuation of shares, which we have endeavored to vindicate, is the true one, and the only one consistent with sound principle and perfect faith. We dissent, on this point, from the majority of the court with reluctance; but we are constrained to dissent.
We concur with the majority of the court as to the effect of the second proviso.
The laws of New York, brought under review in the case before us, provide for the taxation of the shares of the na [p. 603] tional banking associations, and for the taxation of the capital of State banks, but not of the shares; while the second proviso of the act of Congress requires that the tax on the shares of the former shall not exceed the tax on the shares of the latter. It is clear that this taxation by the State is not in accordance with the authority given by Congress. The variance might not be a matter of much practical importance, if we agreed in opinion that taxation on capital and shares must be by the same rule; but the application of the rule of exemption, heretofore sanctioned, to the capital of the State banks, while the rule denying exemption, which is now announced, is applied to the national associations, would work great .and manifest injustice. We think, moreover, that the second proviso is a substantive part of the act which cannot be disregarded, and that it withholds from States, whose policy does not allow the organization of banks and provide for the taxation of shares, the authority to tax the shares of the national banking associations.
It is hardly necessary to add, that we agree that the judgments of the Court of Appeals, in the three cases before us, must be reversed. But we think they should be reversed on the gfound that the taxation of New York is repugnant to the first proviso as well as to the second.
Judgment reversed, and the case remitted to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in error, with costs.
The Admiral.
• A case. in prize, carried by appeal from a District Court into a Circuit Court, before the statute of March 3, 1863, allowing appeals in prize directly from the District Courts to this court, is properly here on appeal from the Circuit Court. 2. A vessel setting sail from England on the 9th September, 1861, with actual knowledge of a proclamation which the President of the United
States made on the 19th of the April preceding,—that is to say, made nearly five months previously,—declaring that certain of our Southern States were in insurrection, and that a blockade would be established of their ports,—had no right, under an allegation of a purpose to see if the blockade existed, to sail up to one of those ports actually blockaded. 3. The declaration in the President’s proclamation of the date just mentioned, that if a vessel, with a view to violate the blockade, should approach or attempt to leave either of the said ports, she would be “ duly warned by the commander of the blockading vessels, who would indorse on her registry the fact and date of such warningand that if the same vessel “shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port she will be-captured,” does not apply to such a case; but the vessel is liable without any previous warning.
4. Mere sailing for a blockaded port is not an offence; but where the vessel has a knowledge of the blockade, and sails for the blockaded port with the intention of violating it, she is clearly liable to capture.
5. Where, during our civil war, the clearance of a vessel expressed a neutral port to be her sole port of destination, but the facts showed that her primary purpose was to get cargoes into and out of a port under blockade,—the outward cargo, if got, to go to the neutral port named as the one cleared for,—the fact that the vessel’s letter of instructions directed the master to call off the blockaded port, and, if he should find the blockade still in force, to get the officer in command of the blockading ship to indorse on the ship’s register that she had been warned off (in accordance with what it was asserted by the owners of the vessel was their understanding of neutral rights under the President’s proclamation above mentioned), and then to go to the port for which this clearance called—will not save the vessel from condemnation as prize in a case where she has been captured close by the blockaded port, standing in for it and without ever having made an inquiry anywhere whether the port was blockaded or not. Presumption of innocent purpose is negatived in such a case.
On the 19th April, 1861—seven days after Fort Sumter was fired on, and near the beginning, therefore, of our late civil war—the President of the United States issued a proclamation, by which he declared that an insurrection existed in certain of the Southern States, and that he deemed it advisable “ to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the said States.” “For this purpose,” the proclamation proceeded, il a competent force will be posted so aS to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid.” 11 If, therefore,” the document continued, “with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach, or shall attempt to [p. 605] leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her registry the fact and date of such warning; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo as may be deemed advisable.”
Among the ports included with the proclamation was the port of Savannah, Georgia.
On the 9th September, 1861—that is to say, five months after the proclamation was published, and the English having knowledge of it—the British ship Admiral was chartered at Liverpool by the firm of W. & R. Wright, of the British province of New Brunswick, to proceed with a cargo of salt “ off the port of Savannah, and, if the blockade is raised, then to proceed into port, and deliver the salt according to her bill of lading; and if the blockade be not raised, then the ship to proceed to St. Johns, New Brunswick, and there deliver the same, with the usual despatch of the port.” The stipulated freight was thirty shillings per ton, if the cargo should be landed at Savannah, and fifteen shillings per ton, if landed at St. John’s.
The owners’ letter of instructions to the master, inclosing the charter-party, and referring to our civil war, ran thus:
“ The inclosed charter with the Messrs. Wright will show you nature of the voyage. These gentlemen, like many others, hold the opinion that this unfortunate contest cannot last long, it being so obviously the interest of both parties to bring it to a close. This being so, and their being very wishful to have a cargo of pitch-pine from Savannah to St. John, so soon as the port is again opened, is our great reason for their making it a condition in taking the ship, that she should go off Savannah, so that, if possible, they might have the very first shipment of timber. Of course, in calling off, you will endeavor to meet the ockading ship (if the blockade is found to exist still), and en get the officer in command to indorse on your register that e ship has been warned off. This will be all that is necessary or us, as owners of the ship, to justify your departure for St.
John’s, and there consigning the ship to the Messrs. Wright, to whom, in the meantime, we will write respecting you.
“ You will distinctly understand, therefore, that you run no risk whatever with the ship, but rather endeavor to satisfy yourself as to the blockade, and then find out the man-of-war, report yourself, and get the register indorsed. You will, no doubt, speak some vessels when approaching the American coast, so as to ascertain exactly the state of matters, and be guided thereby in such way as not to infringe the blockade regulation.”
Under this charter-party and this letter of instructions, the Admiral sailed from Liverpool, upon a direct course for Savannah, on the 12th of September, 1861. Her certificate of clearance on board expressed St. John’s, New Brunswick, as the sole port of her destination.
On the 11th December, 1861, when about thirty miles off Tybee Island—an island that lies near the entrance to Savannah—the vessel was boarded by a ship of the blockading squadron. At this time she was standing directly for the port of Savannah, the same being then under efficient blockade, and the boarded vessel having made no inquiry anywhere, after leaving Liverpool, as to whether the blockade existed. At this time Port Royal, one of the ports of the Southern coast, and some distance above Savannah, was in our possession, having been taken by our squadron on the 7th of November preceding. This fact, however, was not known to those aboard the Admiral. When hailed, she made no resistance. On being boarded she produced her clearance for St. John’s (which was more than a thousand miles from the place she then was), along with her letter of instructions; and professed that, in coming to the region in which she was, her purpose was to ascertain whether the blockade was raised, as she supposed when leaving England that it would be; numerous predictions to that effect having been made before she left England, as also confident assertions that the Federal Government would find it impossible to blockade effectively the Southern coast, three thousand miles in length. She declared her readiness, on having a notice and warning indorsed on her registry—as the [p. 607] proclamation of the President contemplated that, in such a case as hers, notice and warning should be indorsed—to proceed to St. John’s, in accordance with what her letter of instructions contemplated she should do, if she found the blockade existing, and had “notice” and “warning” indorsed accordingly.
This was not satisfactory to the blockading officers, and the vessel was brought in to Philadelphia, and proceeded on, with her cargo, in the District Court there, for prize. The vessel was claimed by a certain Fernie & Co., of Liverpool, England, and the cargo by W. & R. Wright, already mentioned as of St. John’s, all the claimants being British subjects.
The District Court restored the cargo but condemned the vessel. From this condemnation Fernie & Co., her claimants, appealed to the Circuit Court;—Congress not having as yet required, as it did by the statute of 3d March, 1863, afterwards passed, that appeals in prize causes to this court should be made directly from the District Court.
In the court below it was argued in behalf of the claimants of the cargo, that the papers fully set out the voyage and intent of the parties; that the captain’s conduct, when captured, was frank; no resistance, no attempt to falsify, and no suppression. That to ascertain what the intent was the case was to be tried and the conduct of the parties judged by the state of things in September, 1861; that the proclamation of the President did not say that the ports were blockaded, but that they would be; that this was all in the beginning of the rebellion; that it was then again and again declared that, within a short time, at farthest, the blockade would cease. Port Royal, as the event proved, had come to be in our possession at the time. It might as well, nearly, have been Savannah; but, as it was, events showed that—giving “ days of grace” proportioned to the matter—allowing the margin proper—not holding parties too much au pied de la lettre—there was perhaps no such misconception, after all, by those who predicted, as eminent persons in our country notoriously did, that the rebellion would be an affair of sixty days, and that the Southern ports would soon be open. Neither was the English idea that the blockade would [p. 608] be ended, wrong as to result—though it was greatly so as to the cause by which the end would come. However, that was unimportant; the question being only as to the purity of intent, and the matter resting, therefore, on the fact of actual belief; a belief which certainly existed in England when the Admiral sailed; and at New Brunswick. Undoubtedly—it was said—in these questions intent is the matter to be inquired of. In Medeiros v. Hill, in the English Common Bench,* and where Sir Nicholas Tindal gave the judgment, the whole reasoning goes on the idea that where no actual entry or exit is shown, the intent is the matter to be inquired into; and, that while in the absence of express proof, any bad intent may be presumed, yet that where the true intent is shown none other than it can be inferred. And the stringency of a contrary rule was relaxed by Lord Stowell himself in some cases; as The Betsey.^ Speaking of Americans during a blockade of European ports, he there said: “ I cannot think it unfair to say, that lying at such a distance, where they cannot have constant information of the state of the blockade, whether it continues or is relaxed, it is not unnatural that they should send their ships conjecturally.” He expressed like views in The Adelaide.^ It was said finally that here the enterprise, whatever it was, was for the benefit of the cargo; that, in fact, the whole undertaking was a charter of the ship to dispose of this cargo and get another for the same owner, and that no case could be. cited in which where the cargo—the whole object and intent of the voyage—was found to be honest, the ship (the mere carrier) was held. In this case both ship and crew were but the merest servants of the cargo; all of it belonging to one adventure and having but only one ultimate object.
The Circuit Court affirmed the decree of the district judge, the following being the opinion given by the presiding justice on the former bench:
Grier, J.: I agree with Chief Justice Tindal, in Medeiros v. Hill, “ that the mere act of sailing to a port which is blocka e
* 8 Bingham, 231. t 1 Robinson, ^4-+ 3 Id. 283; see also The Little William, 1 Acton, 141, per Sir W. r [p. 609] at the time the voyage is commenced is not an offence against the law of nations, where there is no premeditated intention of breaking the blockade.” Consequently, if, in the present case, the Admiral had taken out a clearance for Savannah, with the expectation that the blockade might be removed before her arrival, with instructions to make inquiry as to its continuance at New York, or Halifax, or other neutral port, and after having made such inquiry, had made no further endeavor to approach or enter the blockaded port, her seizure and condemnation as prize could not have been justified; but she presents a very different case. She was off Tybee Island, sailing for the blockaded port. She had made no inquiry on the way; had no reason to believe the blockade to be raised; and when arrested in her attempt to enter, she exhibits a clearance for St. John’s, New Brunswick, a port she may be said to have passed, and a letter of instructions from the owners “ to call off the harbor of Savannah, to endeavor to meet the blockading ship, and get the officer in command to indorse the register,” &c., but to make no attempt to run the blockade.
The clearance is the proper document to exhibit and disclose the intention of a ship. The clearance, in thia case, may not properly come within the category of “ simulated papers;” but it does not disclose the whole truth. The suppression of a most important part makes the whole false. It may be true, that in times of general peace, a clearance-, exhibiting the ultimate destination of a vessel, without disclosing an alternative one, may have sometimes been used by merchants to subserve some private purpose. But in times of war, when such omissions may be used to blindfold belligerents as to the true nature of a ship’s intended voyage, and to elude a blockade, the concealment of the truth must be considered as primcb facie evidence of a fraudulent intention. The Admiral, with a full knowledge that her destined port is blockaded, takes a clearance for St. John’s, and is found a thousand miles from the proper course to such port, m the act of entering a blockaded port; and when thus arrested, or the first time, inquires whether the blockade has been raised.
A vessel which has full knowledge of the existence of a blockade, before she enters on her voyage, has no right to claim a warning or indorsement when taken in the act of attempting to en er. It would be an absurd construction of the President’s proclamation to require a notice to be given to those who al-
v °l. m. 39 [p. 610] ready had knowledge. A notification is for those only who have sailed without a knowledge of the blockade, and get their first information of it from the blockading vessels. Now. the primary destination of this vessel was to a blockaded port. If the owners had reason to expect that possibly the blockade might be raised before the arrival of their vessel, and thus a profit be made by their ability to take the first advantage of it, their clearance, in the exercise of good faith, should have made admission of the true primary destination of the vessel. If the truth had appeared on the face of this document, and if the master had been instructed to inquire at some intermediate port and to proceed no further in case he found the blockade still to exist, the owners might justly claim that their conduct showed no premeditated intention of breaking the blockade. But when arrested in the attempt to enter a port known to be blockaded, with a false clearance, it is too late to produce the bill of lading or letter of instructions to prove innocency of intention. In such eases intention can be judged only by acts. The true construction of this proceeding may be thus translated: “ Enter the blockaded port, if you can, without danger; if you are arrested by a blockading vessel, inform the captor that you were not instructed to run the blockade, but had merely called for information, and would be pleased to have your register indorsed, with leave to proceed elsewhere.” If so transparent a contrivance could be received as evidence of a want of a premeditated intention to break the blockade, the important right of blockade would be but a brutumfulmen in the hands of a belligerent. 11 It would,” says Lord Stowell, in some case, “ amount, in practice, to a universal license to attempt to enter, and being prevented, to.claim the liberty of going elsewhere.” In the cases where the stringency of the general rule, established by this judge (but overruled in Medeiros v. Hill) had been by him relaxed as to American vessels in certain circumstances, the clearances were taken contingently, but directly for the bloc aded port, in the expectation of a relaxation of the blockade, with instructions to inquire as to the fact at a British or neutra port. The clearance exhibits the whole truth, and the place o inquiry, their good faith. In these most material facts, this case differs from them.
I concur in the decree of the District Court.
Affirmed.
On appeal from this decree of the Circuit Court the matter—including apparently some query as to the right of appeal from the Circuit Court under the act of March 3, 1863,—came for review here. It was argued fully by Mr. Donahue for the appellants, and by Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton (who had argued it also in the courts below), for the United States.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Capture of the ship, together with the cargo, was made on the eleventh day of December, 1861, as lawful prize of war, and both were regularly prosecuted as such in the District Court. Claim for the ship was presented by the master on behalf of Fernie Brothers & Co., of Liverpool, in which he alleged that they were British subjects, and the true, lawful, and sole owners and proprietors of the vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture. Record also shows that the master filed at the same time a claim for the cargo on behalf of W. & R. Wright, of St. John’s, in the province of New Brunswick, in which he alleged that they were the true, lawful, and sole owners and proprietors of the same, and that they also were British subjects. Accompanying the claims for the ship and cargo is the test affidavit of the master, which was filed at the same time, and which contains substantially the same allegations. Preparatory proofs were duly taken, and the parties were fully heard.
District Court entered a decree condemning the vessel as lawful prize, but acquitted the cargo, and ordered that the same be restored to the owners. Claimants of the vessel appealed to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district where the decree of the District Court condemning 6 vessel was affirmed, and thereupon the claimants appealed to this court.
!• Appeal to the Circuit Court was allowed before the passage of the act of the third of March, 1863, which requires that appeals from the District Courts in prize causes [p. 612] shall be made directly to the Supreme Court.* Prior to the passage of that act the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction in prize causes, except when the same were removed here from the Circuit Courts. Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act conferred upon the District Courts, and it was conclusively determined, at a very early period in our history, that prize jurisdiction was involved in the general delegation of admiralty and maritime powers as expressed in the language of that section.j* First decision to that effect was that of Jennings v. Carson,% but the question was shortly afterwards authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in the same way.§
Admiralty and maritime causes, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum or value of three hundred dollars, might under the Judiciary Act be removed by appeal from the District Courts to the Circuit Courts, but such causes could only be transferred from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court by writ of error.||
Provision, however, for appeals from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court was afterwards made in cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars.
Same act also reduced the minimum sum or value required for appeals from the District Courts to the Circuit Courts to the sum or value of fifty dollars exclusive of costs, and made it the duty of the Circuit Courts to hear and determine all such appeals. Present case was appealed from the District Court to the Circuit while the last-mentioned provision was as applicable to prize causes as it still is to all the other matters of jurisdiction therein specified, and con-
* 12 Stat, at Large, 760. t * 77. J 1 Peters’s Admiralty, 7. $ Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dallas, 16; 1 Kent’s Commentaries, » 2 Stat, at Large, 761.
ij 1 Stat, at Large, 83, 84. H 2 Id. 244. [p. 613] sequently the casé under consideration is properly before the court.
2. Coming to the merits of the controversy, it is proper to refer to the evidence exhibited in the record, and to deduce from it as far as possible the real character of the adventure, which is the subject of investigation. Owners of the ship were Fernie Brothers & Co., of Liverpool, and the charterers were W. & R. Wright, of St. John’s, New Brunswick. Charter-party was dated at Liverpool on the ninth day of September, 1861, and the principal stipulation as to the voyage was that the ship should proceed off the port of Savannah, and if the blockade was raised, then to proceed into port and deliver the cargo as per bill of lading; but if the blockade wan not raised, then the ship was to proceed to St. John’s, New Brunswick, and there to deliver the same with the usual despatch of the port. Stipulated freight was thirty shillings per ton if the cargo should be landed at Savannah, and fifteen shillings per ton if landed at St. John’s, for which'latter port the vessel was cleared, as represented in the clearance certificate. Charterers furnished the cargo, but the owners were to have an absolute lien on the same for all freight, dead freight, primage, and demurrage. Vessel sailed for the port of Savannah, and there is not a fact or circumstance in the case tending to show that her primary destination was such, or was ever intended to be such, as is described in the clearance. On the contrary, the owners, in their letter of instructions to the master, admit that the charterers, being anxious to procure a particular cargo from Savannah, made it a condition in taking the ship that she should proceed off that port, so that if the port was open they might secure the very first shipment. When the ship sailed the mate supposed that she was bound for St. John’s, but he soon found, as he states, that she was going too far to the southward for such a voyage, and he at once began to suspect that the master intended to go into a southern port. Master’s instructions evidently contemplated that the ship might speak ei vessels as she approached the coast of the United tes, and that the master would be enabled through those [p. 614] means to ascertain the exact state of affairs, but the master was not directed in any event to abandon the voyage and return.
Substance of the directions in that event was that he was to be guided by any information he might thus obtain, so as not to infringe the blockade regulations, but the clear inference from the document is that the ship was nevertheless to proceed off the blockaded port, and then if met by a blockading vessel to get the officer in command to indorse on the register that the ship had been warned off. Specific directions to the master are that he is to run no risk with the ship, but he is to proceed on the voyage and rather endeavor to satisfy himself as to the blockade, and then find the blockading vessel and get his register indorsed. Cautious as these instructions are, still there is enough in them to show the criminal motives of their authors, especially when it is considered that the ship, under the eye of the owners, sailed from the port of departure under a clearance expressing a false destination. Shippers doubtless expected considerable, profits from the sale of the outward cargo, but their controlling motives in chartering the ship were the anticipated profits of the return voyage from the blockaded port. Ship-owners were also deeply interested in the success of the adventure, as they were to receive double the amount for freight if the outward cargo was landed at the port of primary destination. Full proof of these facts is exhibited in the record, and it is shown beyond the possibility of doubt that the master, the charterers, and the owners had full knowledge of the existence of the blockade at the inception of the voyage, and there can be no doubt that it was the knowledge of that fact which induced the parties to commence the voyage under a clearance which misrepresented the primary destination of the vessel.
3. Settled rule as established by a majority of this court is that a vessel which has a full knowledge of the existence of a blockade is liable to capture if she attempts to enter t e blockaded port in violation of the blockade regulations, an that it is no defence against an arrest made under such cir [p. 615] cumstances that the vessel arrested had not been previously warned of the blockade, nor that such previous warning had not been indorsed on her register.*
4. Unlike what is usual in cases of this description it is conceded in this case that the primary destination of the vessel was to the blockaded port; but it is insisted that the mere act of sailing to a port which is blockaded at the time the voyage is commenced is not an offence against the law of nations where there is no premeditated intention of breaking the blockade. Take the proposition as stated, and it is undoubtedly correct, but it is equally well established that it is illegal for a ship having knowledge of the existence of a blockade to attempt to enter a blockaded port in violation of the blockade, and this court decided at the last term that after notification of a blockade the act of sailing for a blockaded port with the intention of violating the blockade is in itself illegal.^
5. But it is unnecessary even to consider any extreme rule in this case, as every pretence of innocence is negatived by the circumstances. Fraud is stamped upon the adventure from the commencement of the voyage to the moment of capture. Such a misrepresentation as that expressed in the clearance might be used to advantage by the master, if his vessel was met by a cruiser in mid ocean as a means to allay suspicion, and it was doubtless intended for some such purpose. "While sailing for the blockaded port such a document might be very effectual to enable the master before he had passed the port of pretended destination to deceive belligerents and elude the vigilance of their cruisers. Successful nse of that means of deception, however, could not be made at the time of the capture, because the vessel was then off Tybee Island, more than a thousand miles from the proper course to the port specified in the clearance. Seeing that such a pretence would not be likely to avail, the master did [p. 616] not present the certificate of clearance, but resorted to the terms of the charter-party and the letter of instructions, and insisted that those showed that the vessel did not intend to violate the blockade regulations. Arrested, as the ship was, when near the blockaded port, and when heading for the land, and when in point of fact she was in the act of entering the port, the master then, instead of presenting the clearance for the port which he had passed, set up the pretence that his purpose was to inquire whether the blockade had been raised, and claimed that he must be first notified of a fact, which he knew when the ship sailed, before the capture could lawfully be made. Such a defence is without merit, and finds no support in any decided case, or in any acknowledged principle applicable to prize adjudications.
*
The Barque Hiawatha, 2 Black, 677. Th Circassian’ 2 Wallace, 185; Medeiros v. Hill, 8 Bingham, 234; Coun R°binson> HO; The Panaghia Bhomba, 12 Moore, Privy Decree affirmed.
Inculpatory force of the evidence is much increased by the fact that the inception of the voyage is marked by a full knowledge of the existence of the blockade; and that the vessel, instead of touching at the port for which she was properly cleared, where inquiry might have been made, proceeded directly for the prohibited destination. Conduct of the master also, in withholding from the mate all knowledge of the real destination of the vessel, shows that the clearance certificate was evidently obtained in the form referred to as the means, if it became necessary to use it for that purpose, of deceiving belligerents and of eluding the vigilance of national cruisers. None of these circumstances can be successfully controverted; and the claimants admit that the course of the vessel was directly for the blockaded port, and that she was heading for the land at the moment of capture. Every pretence that the vessel intended to desist from her unlawful purpose, if she found that the port was blockaded, is negatived by the circumstances. Those in charge of h£r knew before she sailed that the port was blockaded, and they also knew that they had no reason to suppose that it was to be raised before her arrival, consequently they made no inquiry and did not wish to make any until it became necessary to do so as a defence or excuse for an illegal act.
The Reform.
1. The act of July 18, 1861, “ to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes,” and which by one section, on a proclamation by the President, makes intercourse between citizens of those parts of the United States in insurrection against its government, with citizens of the rest of the United States unlawful, “so long as such condition of hostilities should continue,” was not a temporary act, though passed during the late rebellion; nor on the cessation of hostilities did forfeitures, which had been incurred, after proclamation, under that section, cease to be capable of enforcement.
2. The act of 13th February, 1862, by which a sum of money was appropriated “for the purchase of cotton-seed, under the superintendence of the Secretary of the Interior, for general distribution, provided that the said cotton shall be purchased from places where cotton is grown as far north as practicable,” did not give power to the Secretary of the Interior to authorize an agent to transport merchandise to any district where the seed was to be got; such district having been then declared by proclamation, authorized by Congress, to be in a state of insurrection against the authority of the United States, and all intercourse with it prohibited, except where the President in his discretion might allow it in pursuance of rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
8. Nor was a letter from the Secretary*©f the Interior to a person, which by its terms did no more than authorize and appoint him to “ procure” a cargo of such seed “in” a prohibited or partially prohibited district (Virginia), and to “bring it to” a place not prohibited (Baltimore), even in its terms, such a license.
On the 13th July, 1861, Congress passed “ An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes.” The late rebellion was in its rise at this time, but the act did not refer to it, nor was its operation declared, in any part of it, to be temporary.
By the 5th section it was enacted that “ whenever” the militia called forth by the President had failed to disperse insurgents in any State against the national authority, it should be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or part of a State, were in “ a state of insurrection against the United States;” and thereupon the statute proceeded,
“ All commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof, and the citizens of the rest of the United [p. 618] States, shall cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue; and all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from said State or section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such State or section by land or water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or conveying persons to or from such State or section, be forfeited to the United States.”*
The act contained, however, this proviso:
“ That the President may in his discretion license and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said State or section, the inhabitants of which are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such a time, and by such persons as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.”
Soon after the passage of this act, to wit, on the 16th of August, 1861, President Lincoln made such proclamation as the act itself authorized declaring that the inhabitants of several States, which he named, including Virginia—“ except the inhabitants of that part of it lying west of the Alleghany Mountains, and of such other parts of that State, and the other States hereinbefore named, as may maintain a lawful adhesion to the Union and the Constitution; or may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of such insurgents”
“ Are in a state of insurrection against the United States, and that all commercial intercourse between the same and the inhabitants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, and the citizens of other States and other parts of the United States, is unlawful, and will remain unlawful until such insurrection shall cease oi has been suppressed; that all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from any of said States, with the exceptions aforesaid, into other parts of the United States, without the specia license and permission of the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury, or proceeding to any of said States, with the excep
f 12 Id. 1262.
* 12 Stat, at Large, 257.
tions aforesaid, by land or water, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or conveying persons to or from said States, with said exceptions, will be forfeited to the Uniled States.”
From an early date of the insurrection certain persons in the loyal States were desirous, it seemed, to get cotton-seed from the South. And some of the executive departments—to which these persons addressed themselves—with a view of seeing how far northward this national staple could be profitably cultivated, had listened, it appeared, on particular occasions, with favor to the idea. The Treasury was apparently deterred, however, from giving much co-operation to any project of the sort, from its unwillingness to grant either passes or requests for passes, the effect of which might be to violate the blockade by which the government was then vigorously affecting the rebellious ports; and in January, 1862, an authority, not long previously granted by the then Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of high military persons, to one Smith, was on this account by him revoked.
Congress, however, a short time afterwards, to wit, on the 13th of February, 1862, passed—
“ An act making an appropriation for the purchase of cotton-seed for general distribution.
“Be it enacted, &c., That there be, and is hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $3000 for the purchase of cotton-seed, and $1000 for the purchase of tobacco-seed, under the superintendence of the Secretary of the Interior, for general distribution; provided that the said cotton-seed shall be purchased from places where cotton is grown as far north as practicable.”
Among the persons who wished to enter into this business of getting cotton-seed was Mr. William L. Hodge, of Washington City. On the 7th of March, 1862—after the passage of the above-quoted act of Congress,—he obtained from the Secretary of the Treasury a license “ to employ a vessel to carry cotton-seed from any point on the waters of Virginia emptying into the Chesapeake Bay to the port of Baltimore;
Statement of the case,
provided that he, the said William, shall first execute a bond, with one or more sureties, to be approved by the Solicitor of the Treasury, in the penal sum of $20,000 conditioned that the vessel so employed shall not transport to or from Baltimore or Virginia, any goods, wares, or merchandise, or supplies other than those actually required for the use of the crew thereof for one trip;” and with a further proviso, among some others, “ that one-half of the cotton-seed so obtained shall be furnished to the Secretary of the Interior at the cost thereof.”
Of this license for some reason Mr. Hodge never availed himself. He gave no bond and the document remained a dead letter. He did, however, procure on the next day after the date of this license a letter, in these words, from the Secretary of the Interior:
Department of the Interior,
March 8, 1862.
Sir: Congress having authorized this department to procure* cotton-seed for planting in the loyal States, I hereby authorize and appoint you to procure a cargo of the same in Virginia, and bring it to Baltimore, &c.
This letter will be your authority to procure said seed, and all parties in employ of the United States are respectfully requested to allow you to pass freely for said purpose.
I am, &c.,
C..B. Smith,
Secretary.
W. L. Hodge, Esq.,
Washington City, D. C.
The Secretary of the Navy some time afterwards thus indorsed this letter:
x Navy Department,
April 25, 1862.
Naval officers in command of ships of war will respect the inclosed, and will afford protection in waters under their control and jurisdiction inside the capes of Chesapeake Bay.
G. Wells.
*
The word in the statute, as the reader will have noted, is to ‘ pur chase” cotton-seed.
In possession of the letter of the Secretary of the Interior, thus indorsed, Mr. Hodge entered into a contract with one Penniman, who it seemed had been associated in the former enterprise of Smith, to supply the Secretary with li cotton-seed under the recent act of Congress.” In pursuance of this agreement Penniman loaded first a vessel called the Hunter, with which he went into prohibited districts, but brought back no cotton-seed, though he got some tobacco. He then loaded u The Reform,” a schooner of fifty-seven tons, at Baltimore, with a cargo of a miscellaneous kind, well suited to a blockaded region,—several considerable items of which it was alleged were not on the manifest; though this document was sworn to as true. With this cargo the Reform cleared for Alexandria, a lawful port; and then set sail for Urbanna, in the eastern district of Virginia; a district then in insurrection against the United States, and so proclaimed by the President to be.* Before the vessel had got far she was seized by the revenue officers, brought back and libelled for forfeiture in the District Court for Maryland.
The libel set forth the act of 1861, the President’s proclamation under it, and that this vessel was in the act of going to a prohibited district.
The answer which was put in by the claimant of the vessel, one Bailey, and by Penniman, owner of the cargo, admitted in the main these allegations; defending by matter in avoidance chiefly. It gave very interestingly a narrative of the project to get cotton-seed in the welfare of the country by different persons; of Smith and Penniman’s failure; alleging various confidential interviews with officers of the government, military, naval, and civil; that secrecy was understood by all to be a matter indispensable to success; and also a diversion of public attention from what was really doing; and this—along with the fact that the respondents were informed at the Treasury when Smith’s license was re-
It did not appear that Mr. Hodge knew of the inconsistency of the manifest with the complete items of the cargo, or, indeed, of the clearance which had been made at the custom-house.
voked, that it was revoked because too much publicity had been given to his intention, and for no other reason—was assigned as the cause for the clearance to one port while the real destination was to another; a matter which it was said the military commander of the region, General Dix, was perfectly apprised of, though of course others generally were not; that at the time of the passage of the act of 1862, no part whatever of the cotton-growing country was occupied by forces of the United States; that the act, by its express terms, contemplated a purchase from places as far north as the staple grew; and that the point to which the voyage was directed, Urbanna, did answer and was the only place that did satisfy the requisitions by the act prescribed. A cargo was taken aboard, it was said, because the only currency at this time common to the northern and southern portions of the United States was gold, and because—there having been a universal suspension of specie payments with an establishment of paper as a legal tender for almost everything—gold was an article of commerce as much as anything else, and specially dangerous from its now sudden mutations in market value to deal in at all; that it was necessary to take something which could be advantageously exchanged for cotton-seed; that the respondent, Penniman, selected such articles as he supposed would best effect the object of obtaining such seed. And the answer submitted that if the sending of such a mission into Virginia by the Secretary of the Interior under the authority of Congress was a lawful act, the enterprise had not become unlawful, and the goods intended to be used therein forfeited, because of a difference of opinion as to the details of the execution of such mission between the officers of the customs and the messenger of the government. The most that could be done was to reform such mission according to what might be determined to be its true object and scope, and not to impose a forfeiture for a mistake in construction of an act of Congress; especially in a matter where secrecy was of the essence and where the want of means to have full and clear understandings was so conspicuous.
The District Court dismissed the libel; and its decree was confirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court. The case was now here for review on appeal by the United States.
Between the time when the proceeding in the District Court was begun, and that when the case came here to be heard on appeal, the insurrection, in vigor when the libel was filed, had been in effect suppressed. The rebel armies had everywhere surrendered. The civil head of it was a prisoner of the United States, in one of its fortresses; and the whole insurrectionary combination was scattered and destroyed. Military forces were, however, still kept in parts of the rebellious region. The ancient order of things was not in all matters renewed. From the States lately in rebellion members were not yet received in Congress.
Before any argument on the merits, Messrs. Thayer and Dobbin, for the appellees, claimants of the vessel and cargo, moved to dismiss the writ on account of this termination of the insurrection. The act of Congress of 1861, so far as .this matter was concerned, or more properly the proclamation under it, they argued, was of a temporary character. It was not a general provision without limitation as to its duration. Its very terms limited the duration of the restrictions on commerce to the term during which the “ condition of hostility should continue.” The rebellion was terminated. Of its termination the court would of course take judicial notice. The case then fell within Yeaton v. United States in this court,* **and numerous other cases, establishing that a forfeiture incurred under a provision temporary in its character cannot be enforced after the expiration of the same.f In Yeaton v. United States, a schooner had been condemned below for a breach of an act of Congress prohibiting commerce with St Domingo. The act was originally limited in duration to one year, and was afterwards continued until the end of the next session, when it expired. The case was pend-
**
Miller’s case, 1 W. Blackstone, 451; and other authorities in support o. it cited in Steamship Company v. Joliffe, 2 Wallace, 464-5.
ing in this court on appeal. The court, Marshall, C. J., held (i), that the case being here on appeal, was as a new case; and (ii), that the statute having expired, no penalty could be enforced for its violation.
On the merits, they reiterated, amplified, and enforced the grounds taken by the answer. Assuredly the act of 1862 authorized a purchase of cotton-seed. Such seed could be then had from no other place than a district in insurrection. If this was so—and the fact was not denied—the act of 1862 did, to some extent, qualify the act of 1861; not generally, not in all things, but pro tanto, and as to one narrow and particular thing; not generally even as to that, since the purchasing of the cotton-seed was put under the control of the Secretary of the Interior alone. The claimants require, for the purposes of their argument, no “repeal” larger than this; a very partial, limited, and special one; a qualification rather than a repeal.
If the Secretary had power to give a license to get cotton, his license authorized the use of convenient, and of the most convenient, means to get it.* The whole matter was under his “ superintendence,”—a large word. He could buy it and give gold. He could buy it and give merchandise. Gold was now merchandise, and merchandise only. It was not currency at all. What difference did it make—he having authority to buy, and of course to pay for—whether he paid in one sort of merchandise or in another ?
Then what will be said of the authority by the Secretary of the Navy ? Here is the head of the department giving an authority to pass!
The act of Congress, in short, conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior the performing a judicial act, and he having performed that act (whether this court may think he interpreted the act of Congress rightly or not), and other departments, like the Navy, having agreed with him in view, the citizen who reposed in the interpretation, and put his property at risk in accordance with it, is not liable to [p. 625] have it confiscated, especially in a case where no wrong was consummated, and where the same act performed now would be both lawful and meritorious.
*
See The Cornelia, Edwards, 860; The Freundschaft, 1 Dodson, 816.
Mr. Speed, A. G., and Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton, contra.
As to the motion to dismiss.
The act was not a temporary act in its terms, or in any true sense temporary at all. It remains in force for any future rebellion, if there should be one; and though this particular section may become practically useless at present, if the rebellion is fully suppressed, it does not cease to-be effective so far as it has, by proclamation made under it, already operated. In Yeaton v. United States, the act was in its nature and by its terms temporary.
As to merits.
1. The act of 1861 gave no one but the President, through the Secretary, who was to establish “rules and regulations,” power to license the trade. Hodge was aware of this, and applied to and obtained from the Treasury a license. That license he did not use. It did not suit him. It had conditions inconvenient for him to comply with, and which would have defeated his ends. Hey therefore, on the next day after he saw that it was impracticable, and not before, applied for the license under which the vessel was freighted.
Now the act of 1862 gave the Secretary of the Interior no authority to purchase cotton-seed in insurrectionary districts; districts, that is to say,, with which the President had prohibited all intercourse. It extended no further than to the purchase, and to remove it from regions in some way “ excepted” by the proclamation. It said, simply, “ take $3000 from the treasury, and with that money buy cotton-seed in the northernmost section of the cotton-growing, country.” It assumed that such purchase might be made lawfully; that is to say, without any intercourse with rebels. It was lawful to trade with persons in those districts “ excepted” by the President in his proclamation. Parts were then loyal, and parts occupied.. Our armies were successful from
vol. in. 4o [p. 626] the time that they became well organized. They were daily recovering the country. Intercourse with the portions permanently and completely under eontrol, were within the President’s exceptions. We so held iu The Venice* Thus interpreted,, the act of 1862 is quite consistent with the act and the proclamation of 1861. All remain in force. Authority to purchase the seed in the prohibited districts cannot be asserted, if it was possible to buy it elsewhere. If it was not possible to do this, then the case was simply that of an appropriation which it was not practicable to use, unless you suppose that the act of 1862 repealed the act of 1861. This cannot be argued. In express terms it does not repeal it. It does so as little by implication; a kind of repeal in no case favored, and in such a matter as this—purchasing from rebels—to be greatly disfavored; not to be presumed at all. But even stronger grounds remain; and we say:
2. If the act of 1862 did pro tanto repeal the act of 1861, and if the Secretary of the Interior had authority to direct a purchase of $3000 worth of cotton-seed from rebels, he yet had no authority to license the transportation of merchandise to districts declared to be in insurrection; obtaining, finally, from them with the proceeds—supposing which is a benignant supposition, that the merchandise was simply to be exchanged—a cargo of cotton-seed. That is a vastly different authority from the other. Every consideration of policy forbids such a broad construction of the act So do the authorities;! and if the Secretary did by his letter of March 8th, 1862, mean to authorize Hodge to freight a vessel and carry a cargo to the rebels, and thus deal with them for cotton-seed, he meant to do what the act of 1862 never authorized. But,
3. He meant no such thing. He meant simply to authorize Mr. Hodge to purchase or buy the seed in Virginia; to go there in ballast, if he had to go with a vessel, and by water; but not to take a cargo of assorted merchandise to an insurrectionaiy district and there sell it, in order to raise
* 2 Wallace, 277.
money. Hodge could enter into no such enterprise as that, and not violate, at every step, the President’s proclamation. If Hodge had not the money already, then he was not in a condition to make the purchase. That was his affair. A license to trade with an enemy is, of course, to be construed most strictly. The party may trade only to the extent of the license.* Under the license it was lawful, if the party had the money, to purchase. It was not lawful, if he had not money, to do unlawful things to get it. The authority, as the other side construes it, would have given Hodge a power to trade almost indefinitely with the enemy, or to have done any other prohibited act, till he had raised money necessary to buy the cargo of seed. The Secretary’s letter says not one word of taking a cargo from Baltimore to Virginia. It says only you may procure one “ in Virginia and bring it to Baltimore.”
On these two grounds alone the matter may safely rest. The indorsement of the letter by the Secretary of the Navy did not, of course, mean to confer a privilege not conferred by the Secretary of the Interior. We need not discuss that. It protected the licensee only in the execution of such authority as the Interior conferred. Certainly it had no power to relax the blockade in Hodge’s behalf, or to license an intercourse prohibited by Congress and the President.
4. Independently of all this we may add what is certain, that no license to Hodge to trade with the enemy could authorize other persons to do so. The license here, if it was a license, was not a general but a special one; and special licenses are never transferable, f Hodge, tor aught that appears, was a proper person. It is plain that his transferees were not.
5. The license, whatever it was, was exhausted, by the Hunter’s voyage. With that completed, it became functus officio. But irrespective of the law of the case,
6. The enterprise of Penniman & Baily was an attempt [p. 628] at illicit trade. The whole facts point to this conclusion; and the wonder is, how two courts have agreed in viewing it otherwise.
*
The Jonge Klassina, 5 Robinson, 265; The Juno, 2 Id. 118; The Cosmopolite, 4 Id. 12; The Jonge Arend, 5 Id. 19. t The Jonge Johannes, 4 Robinson, 263; The Aurora, Id. 220.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Cause of seizure, as alleged in the libel of information, was that the vessel with her cargo was, on the seventh day of May, 1862, proceeding from the port of Baltimore, on a voyage to that part of the State of Virginia which was in insurrection against the United States, and which had been so proclaimed to be by the President of the United States. Allegations of the libel, so far as the charge is concerned, are founded upon the provisions of the 5th section of the act of the thirteenth of July,, 1861, which, under certain conditions, conferred authority upon the President to declare, by .proclamation, that the inhabitants of a State, or part of a State, falling within the category therein described, were in a state of insurrection against the United States. Whenever a State or part of a State was so proclaimed to be in a state of insurrection, the provision was, that thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof, and the rest of the United States, should cease and be unlawful, so long as such condition of hostility should continue. Purpose of the section was, in case of such insurrection, not only to interdict commercial intercourse, but to enforce the prohibition by forfeiture. Provision was accordingly made, that all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from said State or section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such State or section, by land orVater, should, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or conveying persons to or from such State or section, be forfeited to the United States. Defence of the vessel and cargo is placed upon the same ground, and, therefore, it will not be necessary to give the respective claims a separate examination.
Decree of the District Court discharged the vessel and cargo, and dismissed the libel; and the Circuit Court, on [p. 629] appeal, affirmed the decree. Libellants appealed to this court; and they now insist that the decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed, because, as they contend, the vessel and cargo are both justly forfeited, as alleged in the libel of information.
1. Before considering the merits of the controversy, however, it becomes necessary to examine the motion filed by the respondents to dismiss the appeal, which presents a preliminary question, and consequently should be first decided. Theory of the respondents is, that commercial intercourse with the States lately in insurrection is no longer unlawful; and inasmuch as there is no reservation in any act of Congress, nor in any proclamation of the President, whereby a liability for former violations of the law is continued and preserved, no condemnation of the vessel or cargo can now take place, and that the appeal ought to be dismissed. They contend that the act of Congress was a temporary act; because the restrictions upon commercial intercourse, as therein declared, were limited in duration, by the terms of the act, to the existence and continuance of actual hostilities; and the argument is, that hostilities having ceased, the act has expired, and, consequently, that the appeal cannot be sustained.
Respondents are correct in supposing that a forfeiture incurred under a penal statute, temporary in its terms, cannot be enforced after the statute has expired, and that the repeal of a penal statute has the same effect, unless the repealing law contains a saving clause as to pending prosecutions. Many authorities were cited in support of these propositions; but it does not seem to be necessary to give them much examination, as the propositions are elementary and undeniable. Granting all this, however, still it is quite evident that the motion cannot prevail, because the act of Congress under consideration was not a temporary act, as assumed by the respondents, nor has it ever been repealed. On the contrary, it is a general law without any limitation as to its duration, and is still in full force for the.recovery of penalties, or for the enforcement of forfeitures incurred [p. 630] during the insurrection, and before the termination of hostilities. Restrictions upon commercial intercourse were limited to the period of the continuance of hostilities, but there was no limitation as to the duration of the act of Congress. Cessation of hostilities restored the right of commercial intercourse; but the restoration of such intercourse could not have the effect to repeal the act of Congress which suspended such intercourse during the continuance of hostilities, or to exonerate a vessel or cargo from a forfeiture incurred for a violation of the restrictions while they were in full operation. Motion to dismiss the appeal is, therefore, overruled.
2. Principal defence upon the merits was, that the vessel, with the cargo, was engaged, at the time of the seizure, in a lawful voyage under a license from the Secretary of the Interior, issued by the express authority of the government. Claimants admit that th** vessel, with the cargo, was proceeding, at the time of seizure, to the place specified in the libel of information, and that all commercial intercourse, not specially authorized by the government, between the States declared to be in rebellion and the rest of the United States, was prohibited and unlawful. Considering the nature and extent of the admissions as exhibited in the answer, it is clear beyond controversy that the burden of proof is upon the respondents to establish their defence.
Such a defence, unquestionably, may be valid, and, if fully proved, the decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed. Authority was conferred upon the President, by a proviso of the section under consideration, to license and permit in his discretion commercial intercourse, in the interdicted States or places, in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons, as he might think most conducive to the public interest; but all such intercourse was to be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.* Congress, also, on the thirteenth day of February, 1862, appropriated the sum
* 12 Stat, at Large, 257.
of three thousand dollars out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated for the purchase of cotton-seed, and one thousand dollars for the purchase of tobacco-seed, under the superintendence of the Secretary of the Interior, for general distribution; but the provision was that the cotton-seed should be purchased from place» where cotton was grown, as far north as possible.
3. Referring to those two acts of Congress, the claimants allege that the Secretary of the Interior appointed William L. Hodge to procure the cotton-seed as authorized in the place for which the vessel was embarked, and to which she was proceeding at the time of the seizure. They plead the letter of the Secretary of the Interior in their answer as a license and permit from the government, and as a document affording a full defence to the allegations of the libeh Substance of the letter is as follows: “ Congress having authorized this department to procure cotton-seed for planting in the loyal States, I hereby authorize and appoint you to procure a cargo of the same in Virginia, and bring it to Baltimore, this department to have the privilege' to take such portion of said cargo as it may require, not exceeding one-half, at the actual cost and charges.” Statement of the letter also, was, that it “ will be your authority to procure said seed,” and contained a request to all parties in the employment of the United States to allow the appointee to pass freely for that purpose. Answer of the claimants also shows that the Secretary of the Navy, on the twenty-fifth day of April following, indorsed the letter of appointment in the terms following, to wit: “Naval officers in command of ships of war will respect the inclosed, and will afford protection in waters under their control and jurisdiction inside the capes of Chesapeake Bay.”
4. Sufficiency of the defence is denied by the United States upon various grounds, but in the view taken of the case there is no necessity of examining more than two of the series. 1. They deny that the Secretary of the Interior had any authority under the appropriation act to license or permit the transportation of merchandise from any loyal State [p. 632] to any section of a State declared and being in insurrection, in order that the same might be there sold for the purpose specified or for any other purpose. 2. Purport of the second proposition is, that the Secretary of the Interior, by his letter of appointment to William L. Hodge, did not authorize and did not intend to authorize him, or any one, to transport merchandise for that or any other purpose, to any State or section of a State with which commercial intercourse was prohibited.
1. Proclamation of the President of the sixteenth of August, 1861, which declared that certain States and parts of States were in insurrection, expressly excepted from that condition those districts, or parts of the same, which might be “ from time to time occupied and controlled by the forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents.” Intercourse for commercial purposes was not prohibited with such places or districts while so occupied and controlled. They were not regarded, as this court said, in the case of The Venice* * as in actual insurrection, or their inhabitants as subject in most respects to treatment as enemies.”
Such intercourse, however, with any such State, place, or district, so occupied and controlled, was absolutely forbidden, unless the person or persons conducting it were furnished with a license and permit of the President, and conformed in all respects to the treasury rules and regulations. Respondents do not pretend that the Secretary of the Interior possessed any power under those provisions to grant any license or permit for any such adventure as that which is the subject of the present controversy, and it is clear that the pretence, if set up, could not for a moment be sustained, as the power is expressly vested in the President, and the requirement was that any commercial intercourse carried on under such a license and permit, should be conducted in conformity to the regulations of the Treasury Department.
Want of power, therefore, in the Secretary of the Interior,
* 2 Wallace, 277.
Dec. 1865.] The Reform. 683
is clearly shown, unless it be made to appear that those provisions had been modified or repealed before the date of the letter under which the claimants attempt to justify. Express repeal is not set up, and the pretence of implied repeal has no better foundation. Repeal by implication, upon the ground that a subsequent provision upon the same subject is repugnant to the prior law, is not favored in any case; but where such repeal, if admitted, would operate to the prejudice of the government, the supposed repugnancy ought to be clear and controlling before it can be held to have that effect.*
Instead of the last provision being repugnant to the former, the truth is that the two are entirely consistent. Whole effect of the subsequent provision was, that it appropriated the sum of three thousand dollars for the purchase of cotton-seed under the general superintendence of the Secretary of the Interior for general distribution. Purchase of the cotton-seed, it is presumed, might have been made in the districts or places within the insurrectionary States, which were occupied and controlled by our military forces, or at all events, the conclusion is a reasonable one that such were the views of Congress when the appropriation was made. Pre-' sumption is that Congress did not intend to relax the existing restrictions upon commercial intercourse with the States or districts declared to be in insurrection, because there is not a word or phrase in the act indicating any such intention. Condition of affairs was wéll known to Congress at that period, and it is to be presumed that those who voted for the appropriation act and directed the purchase of the cotton-seed, if they had intended to relax the commercial restrictions as a means of facilitating the purchase, would ave employed appropriate language to signify that intention Nothing of the kind is expressed in the appropriation act, and consequently there is no repugnancy between that act and the prior provision which established the [p. 634] commercial restrictions, and prohibited commercial intercourse to the place where the vessel in question with the cargo was bound at the time of the seizure.
*
United States v. Walker, 24 Howard, 311 : Wood v. United States, 16 deters, 363. .
2. Second proposition of the appellants is, that by the true construction of the letter under which the claimants attempt to justify, it did not give to the appointee, or any one else, any authority whatever to transport a cargo of merchandise from Baltimore to the place where the vessel was bound at the time of the seizure. Admission of the answer, it will be remembered, is, that the vessel was bound to the place alleged in the information, and that the place, as there alleged, was one of the places declared by the President to be in a state of insurrection. Question here presented is one of construction, but the court, in determining it, may look at the surrounding circumstances and the subject-matter, as well as at the language employed in the instrument. Legal presumption is, that the author of the letter, inasmuch as he was a public officer, intended to perform his duty, and that he did not intend to violate the law of the land. Three thousand dollars, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, were placed at his disposal for the purchase’ of cotton-seed for general distribution.
Directions in the act making the appropriation were, that he should make the purchase from places where cotton was grown, as far north as possible; but the presumption is,that he had full knowledge of the then existing commercial restrictions, and that the appropriation act, under which all his authority was derived, did not in terms repeal or in any manner modify or relax those restrictions. Satisfactory evidence that the Secretary of the Interior and his appointee had such knowledge, is exhibited in the record. First application for the license was made to the President. Pursuant to that application, the Secretary of the Treasury, on the seventh day of March, 1862, granted a license and permit to the same William L. Hodge, and the recital of the document is, that it was granted with the approbation of the President, and by virtue of the power conferred by the act under which the forfeiture of the vessel and cargo is now [p. 635] claimed. Power conferred was, that the licensee might em - ploy a vessel to carry cotton-seed from any point on the waters of Virginia, emptying into Chesapeake Bay, to Baltimore, provided he gave bond in the penal sum of twenty-thousand dollars, conditioned that the vessel so employed should not transport, either way, any merchandise or supplies, other than those actually required for the use of the crew for one trip; or convey any person, letter, or information, or in any way aid or comfort those in rebellion. Although this license was never used by the licensee, still it is proper to refer to it as showing the views of the government, and as affording conclusive evidence that the licensee knew that the commercial restrictions, established under the prior act, were unrepealed and in full force.
Dissatisfied with the license and permit granted by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approbation of the President, the licensee proceeded to the Department of the Interior, and there obtained the letter under consideration. Introductory recital of the letter is not quite correct, but in determining what is the true construction of the document, it is proper to weigh the language as it is written. Substantial statement of the author of the letter is, that he is “ authorized to procure cotton-seed for planting in the loyal States,” and that in consequence thereof, he authorizes and appoints the licensee to procure a cargo of the same in Virginia, and bring it to Baltimore, on the conditions therein named. He says nothing about transporting cargo to the place of destination, or about bringing back any other cargo than the cotton-seed. No allusion is made to the existing commercial restrictions, nor any intimation given that they would be modified or repealed. Applying the usual rules of construction to the letter, the conclusion must be that it conferred no authority whatever upon the licensee to transport any merchandise to the port or place where the vessel was bound at the time of the seizure.
5. Evidence of authority in William L. Hodge to embark m any such adventure being entirely wanting, it is unnecessary to examine the question whether the license, if valid, [p. 636] and sufficiently comprehensive in its terms to protect the licensee, would afford any justification to the claimants.
6. Grounds of the decision, as already stated, render it unnecessary, also, to examine the question of fraud, or to remark upon the evidence respecting the prior voyage.
Decree of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree of forfeiture against both the vessel and cargo.
Decree accordingly.
Younge v. Guilbeau.
1. The statute of Toxas, relating to the organization, &c., of its District Courts, which enacts that when a party shall file an affidavit of the loss of an instrument recorded under the statute, or of his inability to procure the original, a certified copy of the record shall be admitted in like manner as the original—does not dispense with the proof which is exacted when the original instrument is filed, in case an affidavit (which the statute also allows) alleging a belief of its forgery, is made. It only allows the certified copy to take the place of the original when that is lost or cannot be procured: and the copy produced under such circumstances will have no greater weight than the original itself.
To avail himself, therefore, of the statute, the party must, in all cases, file, as therein prescribed, the original or the copy from the record, and give notice of the filing; and even then the statutory proof will be insufficient, if the affidavit alleging a belief of its forgery be made. Such affidavit being filed, the party relying upon the deed must make proof of its execution, with all its essential formalities, as required by the rule of the common law.
2. To constitute delivery of a deed the grantor must, as a general thing, part with the possession of it, or at least with the right to retain possession. Upon a question of delivery, its registry, if by him, is entitled to great consideration, and might, perhaps, in the absence of opposing evidence, justify a presumption of delivery. But where the grantee had no knowledge of the existence of the deed, and the property which it purported to convey always remained in the possession and under the control of the grantor, and where, therefore, any registry was of course without either his assent or knowledge, the presumption of a [p. 637] delivery from the fact of registry is repelled. [N. B. In the case at bar, there was an allegation that the deed registered was a forgery.]
A statute of Texas, relating to the registry of deeds, &c., provides as follows:*
“ Every instrument of writing which is permitted or required by law to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county court, and which has been, or may be so recorded after being proven or acknowledged in the manner provided for by the laws in force at the time of its registration, shall be admitted as evidence, without the necessity of proving its execution; provided, the party who wishes to give the same in evidence shall file the same among the papers of the suit in which he proposes to use it, at least three days before the commencement of the trial of such suit, and give notice of such filing to the opposite party, or his attorney, of record; and unless such opposite party, or some other person for him, shall, within one day after such notice, file an affidavit that he believes such instrument of writing to be forged. And whenever any party to a suit shall file among the papers of the suit an affidavit, stating that any instrument of writing recorded as aforesaid, has been lost, or that he cannot procure the original, a certified copy of the record of any such instrument shall be admitted in like manner as the original could be.”
With this statute in force, Mrs. Younge brought trespass against Guilbeau and eleven others in the Federal Court for the Western District of Texas, to try the title to a lot of ground in that district. She proved that the lot belonged originally to one Nixon, her ancestor, now deceased, and that she was his sole heir. Guilbeau and the others, defendants in the case, admitting the original ownership alleged, set up that Nixon had conveyed the lot, by deed, in his lifetime to a certain Shelby; from whom they, Guilbeau and the other defendants, derived title to themselves.
The suit thus involved, in its merits, the existence of a deed from Nixon to Shelby..
. . ,^a^u^e May 1846, relating to the organization, &c., of the Dis-
ourts; Oldham & White’s Digest, of Texas Laws, art. 469, pp. 124-5.
No original deed to Shelby was produced. A document, however, purporting to be a deed executed by Nixon to Shelby, embracing the premises in question, bearing date the 10th day of October, 1838, and acknowledged the 29th of the same month, had been filed for record on the 7th of December, 1846, in the office of the clerk of the proper county, in Texas, and was afterwards in due form placed on the records of the office. A certified copy of this instrument was offered in evidence by the defendants and admitted against the objection of the plaintiffs.
The defendants, on their side, and as a foundation for the admission of this certified copy, relied upon various affidavits by one of the defendants, and the counsel of the others, to show a loss of or inability to procure the original. None of the affidavits, however, though circumstantial enough, were clear and direct to this point; nor did any of them show, plainly, and as a matter of fact, that the deed (genuine or forged) which had been recorded, might not yet be in the possession or control of some of the numerous defendants.
The plaintiff, on her side, and in anticipation that this certified copy instead of any original would be offered in evidence, had filed an affidavit under the statute, that the original instrument purporting to be a conveyance from her ancestor to Shelby, and of which a copy was now offered, was, as she verily believed, “forged.”
The court charged the jury with respect to the effect of this affidavit, as follows :
“ It furnishes no proof whatever to thè jury, that such deed is a forgery. It merely lays the foundation, or affords a basis, upon which the plaintiff might introduce evidence to sustain the charge, and show to the satisfaction of the jury, if she could, that it was, in fact, a forgery.”
And further, in the same connection, and on the same point, the court refused the following instruction, asked by the plaintiff as to the effect of the affidavit, to wit:
u It devolves upon the defendants, in order to enable them to hold the property under the said deed, to show, by evidence [p. 639] satisfactory to the jury, that the said deed was, in fact, signed, sealed, and delivered by Nixon in his lifetime. Otherwise the fee (the legal title) to the property remained in him at the time of his death, and was cast, by descent, on his heirs.”
As to the delivery of the deed by Nixon to Shelby, the latter testified that he never knew of the existence of the deed until after the death of Nixon, and that he never made any claim to the property; and the evidence showed that the deed and the property which it purported to convey remained in the possession and control of the grantor until his death.
The court, at the instance of the defendant, charged the jury on this head as follows:
“ This suit is not to be regarded as the contest of creditors against the deed, nor as a contest between deeds of different dates; but as a contest, just as though Nixon himself was the plaintiff; his heir being bound by all his acts. And if he made the deed, the question of consideration is of no consequence, because as between Nixon and Shelby, or Shelby’s vendors, the deed was binding, whether there was any consideration or not, or whether the deed was actually delivered to Shelby or not. If it was Nixon’s deed, and Shelby acted under it, Mrs. Younge is bound by those acts.”
The defendants had judgment, and the plaintiff brought her writ of error here.
Mr. Peverdy Johnson, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. Gr. W. Paschall, contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
The State of Texas has provided by her legislation, as has been done in other States, a system for the registry of deeds and conveyances affecting the title to real property; and in connection with it, has modified, in some particulars, the rule of the common law with respect to the proof of their execution, when produced in the course of legal proceedings. One of her statutes enacts that every such instrument, when [p. 640] duly acknowledged and recorded pursuant to laws in force at the time, shall be admitted in evidence without proof of its execution, if the party desiring its introduction file it among the papers of the suit three days before the commencement of the trial, and give notice of the filing to the opposite party, unless such opposite party, or some one for him, shall, within one day after the notice, file an affidavit that he believes the instrument to be forged. The same statute enacts that when a party shall file an affidavit of the loss of the recorded instrument, or his inability to procure the original, a certified copy of the record shall be admitted in like manner as the original.
This latter provision does not dispense with the proof which is exacted when the original instrument is filed, in case an affidavit alleging a belief of its forgery is made; it only allows the certified copy to take the place of the original, when that is lost or cannot be procured. It was not intended to give to the copy produced under such circumstances greater weight than to the original itself. To avail himself, therefore, of the statute, the party must, in all cases, file as therein prescribed, the original or the copy from the record, and give notice of the filing; and even then the statutory proof will be insufficient, if the affidavit alleging a belief of its forgery be made. Such affidavit being filed, the party relying upon the deed must make proof of its execution, with all its essential formalities, as required by the rule of the common law.
The court below held otherwise, and instructed the jury in substance, that the affidavit with respect to the deed under which the defendants claimed in this case, only laid the foundation upon which she might introduce evidence to sustain the charge, and to show that such deed was in fact a forgery, and refused an instruction requested,, that under these circumstances it devolved upon the defendants to shoM the due execution of the instrument.
The ruling of the court in this particular was clearly erroneous. The plaintiff, contesting the validity of the dee, was at liberty to show that it was a forgery without a pre [p. 641] vious affidavit of his belief on the subject. The affidavit was only required to meet the notice under the statute, that the adverse party intended to rely upon the statutory proof.
No attempt was made to meet the requirements of the common law in the proof of the deed. The affidavits of its loss only negatived, upon information and belief, its possession by some of the defendants. Its possession by some of them was consistent with every averment made. The defendants relied alone upon the copy from the record,, and the court erroneously held that such copy was sufficient.
We might rest our decision here, but it is proper to notice another ruling of the court below, to prevent its repetition on a second trial. The proof of the execution of the deed necessarily involved proof of its delivery.. The evidence offered, so far as appears by the record,, showed that the : grantor never parted with its possession, except as may be inferred from the fact of its registry.. And the grantee testified that he never knew of its existence until after the death of the grantor, among whose papers it was found;, and that he never claimed any interest in the property. Yet the court instructed the jury that as there was no> contest of creditors against the deed, the instrument was binding, whether delivered or not. In this instruction there was also clear error. The delivery of a deed is essential to the transfer of the title. It is the final act, without which all other formalities are ineffectual. To constitute such delivery the grantor must part with the possession of the deed, or the right to retain it. Its registry by him is entitled to great consideration upon this point, and might, perhaps,, justify, m the absence of opposing evidence,, a presumption of delivery. But here any such presumption is repelled by the attendant and subsequent circumstances. Here the registry was of course made without the assent of the grantee, as he had no knowledge of the existence of the deed,, and the property it purported to convey always remained in the possession and under the control of the grantor.*
The judgment of the District Court must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; and it is
So ORDERED.
United States «. Scott.
Upon a comparison of the 25th section of the act of 3d March, 1863, passed during the rebellion, “for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes,, ’’ with the 12th section of the act of 24th February, 1864, enacting that any person who shall forcibly resist or oppose any enrolment of persons for military service, &c., shall be punished, &c.; held, that the former act is limited to the prevention of resistance to the draft, -and the latter to preventing resistance to the enrolment. Comparing .the two acts together, the latter bne is to be regarded as a legislative construction of the first, by which a service in relation to the draft, is not a service in relation to the enrolment.
On the 3d March, 1863, Congress, with a view to enable the government to put down the rebellion, which was then exerting itself to destroy the nation, passed “ An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes.”* This act creates boards of enrolment, and prescribes their duties.
By one section, each board was to be composed of the provost marshal of the district as president, and two other persons, to be appointed by the president, one of whom was to be a licensed and practising physician and surgeon.
By another, the board was to appoint enrolling officers, whose duty it should be to enrol all persons of their districts subject to military duty, noting their age and places of residence, and to report all to the board of enrolment, who were to consolidate the names into one list.”
By another section it was enacted, that whenever it might be necessary to call out the national forces for military services, the President might assign to each district the numbei
Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Massachusetts, 456; Wiggins v. Lusk, 12 Illinois, 132; Roosevelt®. Carow, 6 Barbour, 194.; 2 Washburn on Real Property, 581.
* 12 Stat, at Large, 731.
of men to be furnished by it; and thereupon the enrolling board,il under the direction of the President” had power to make a draft of the required number, and a complete roll of the names of the persons so drawn, and the persons so drawn were to receive notice of the fact, requiring them to appear at a designated rendezvous to report for duty.
Another section required, that all persons who had been drafted and received notice should, on arriving at the rendezvous, be inspected by the surgeon of the board, who was to report to the board the physical condition of each one; and that all persons drafted and claiming exemption from military duty, on account of disability or any other cause, should present their names to’the board, whose decision as to their right of exemption should be final.
The 16th section authorized the board to discharge any excess of numbers; and provided that the expenses connected with the enrolment and draft, including subsistence while at the rendezvous, should be paid from the appropriation for enrolment and drafting, under such regulations as the President of the United States should prescribe.
By the 25th section of this act it was enacted,
“That if any person shall resist any draft of men enrolled under this act into the service of the United States, or shall counsel or aid any person to resist any such draft; or shall assault or obstruct any officer in making such draft, or in the performance of any service in relation thereto; or shall counsel any person to assault or obstruct any such officer; or shall counsel any drafted men not to appear at the place of rendezvous, or wilfully dissuade them from the performance of military duty as required by law, such person shall be subject to summary arrest by the provost marshal, and shall be forthwith delivered to the civil authorities, and, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment, not exceeding J;wo years, or by both of said punishments.”
On the 24th February, 1864, Congress passed an act “to amend” the former one.* This amendatory act recognizes
*13 Stat, at Large, 8.
the old “boards of enrolment;” declaring that they “shall enrol all persons liable to draft;” and section three of the act declares that if the quotas are not made up within a time fixed by the President, the provost marshal of the district shall, under the direction of the provost marshal general, “ make a draft for the number deficient.”
The 12th section of this amendatory act reads as follows:
“ That any person who shall forcibly resist or oppose any enrolment, or shall incite, counsel, encourage, or who shall conspire or confederate with any other person or persous, forcibly to resist or oppose any such enrolment; or who shall aid or assist, or take any part in any forcible resistance or opposition thereto; or who shall assault, obstruct, impede, or threaten any officer or other person employed in making or aidiug to make any such enrolment, or employed in the performance, or aiding in the performance, of any service in any way relating thereto, &c., shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine not exceeding $5000; or by imprisonment not exceeding five years; or both of said punishments, in the discretion of the court. And in cases where such assaulting shall produce the death of such officer or other person, the offender shall be deemed guilty of murder, and upon conviction, &c., be punished with death, &c. And nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve the party offending from liability, under proper indictment or process, for any crime against the laws of a State.”
The amendatory act repeals so much of the former act as may be inconsistent with it.
In this state of the statutes, Scott was indicted, in the Circuit Court for Indiana, under the above quoted 12th section of the amendatory act of 1864, for the murder of Eh McCarty. The indictment charged that McCarty was murdered while in “the performance of his legal service in relation to the enrolment of the national forces;” but in stating more particularly what that service was, it .was alleged to be the “ serving with notice the enrolled and drafted men, requiring them, as such enrolled and drafted men, to appear, &c., and report for military duty.”
Scott was tried and found guilty. But on a motion in
Argument for the United States.
arrest of judgment, the judges of that court were divided in opinion upon the question, whether the services of McCarty, in notifying to “ enrolled and drafted men” to appear at the designated rendezvous “ and report for military duty,” considered in connection with the other averments in the indictment, constituted any employment in the performance, or in aiding in the performance, of any service in any way relating to the enrolment mentioned in the said 12th section?
The ground of the query doubtless was—as McCarty was engaged in notifying to enrolled and drafted men to appear at the place of rendezvous—that this presupposed not only a completed enrolment, but a draft in pursuance of it; and the work in which he was engaged had direct relation to the draft, and necessarily followed it. Could the court, then, pass over the important act of the draft, from which the duties of McCarty directly resulted, and without which he would have had no power to act, and attach the service, in the performance of which he was engaged, to the antecedent act of enrolment?
The division being certified here, the question, whether the service of a notice of the draft was a service relating to the enrolment, within the meaning of the 12th section of the act of 1864, was now before this court for resolution?
Mr. Speed, A. G., and Mr. Coffey, special counsel of the United States, contended (Messrs. McDonald and Niblack, contra} that the act of March 3, 1863, to which the one under which Scott was indicted is an amendment, provided a system for the enrolment and calling into service of the military forces of the country; that the execution of the details of the act was intrusted to three officers, called a board of enrolment; that the duties of this board did not end with the ascertainment of the names of persons liable to a draft and placing them on a list kept for that purpose, but extended to all acts necessary to place the drafted man in actual service, and under the control of his military commander; that the word enrolment” was used as a general term, and included all the services required to put the drafted man into such [p. 646] service and under such control; that the law intended to prevent resistance to any lawful act of this board, and to protect the lives of its members and their agents, while engaged in such service; and the counsel inferred as a conclusion that the answer should be in the affirmative, and with the effect, of course, of not making any arrest of judgment.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The argument made in behalf of the United States is entitled to much consideration, and if there were nothing in the other provisions of the two statutes which have been discussed, to lead to the inference that Congress used the word enrolment in a narrower sense than the government would assett, it is not improbable that the court would assent to the soundness of the proposition made.
It is to be observed, however, that this construction of the word enrolment must depend entirely upon the statute for its support, as there is nothing in the derivation of the word, or in its ordinary use, which would justify such a meaning. It may be defined to be the act of inserting in a list or roll; and in reference to the purpose of calling the able-bodied men of the country into its service, its usual meaning is fully satisfied when the names of the persons liable to such service are placed on a roll or register. We accordingly find that the first duty imposed by the act on this board of enrolment, is to ascertain who those persons are, and place their names on a register. This catalogue is properly called the roll, and the completion of it, the enrolment of the military force of the country.
The title of the act of 1863, which is referred to and incorporated into the amendatory act of 1864, confirms this definition of the word enrolment. It is called “An act foi enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for othei purposes.” Here the word enrolling is not used as the equivalent for all the acts necessary to bring the soldier into service; for it is implied that the enrolling is one thing, an the calling out is another. Otherwise, these last woids aie without meaning.
A further examination of the two statutes tends still more to confirm this view of the signification attached to the word enrolment. By those acts the hoards of enrolment are directed to ascertain the persons liable to military duty, to determine their exemptions, to classify them and make proper lists of them; and there their duty, as a board, ceases, so far as it depends on the statute. They have no authority, under the statute, to make a draft, or to call out the forces. This is dependent on the proclamation of the President. The enrolment may be completed and all the duties of the board performed and ended, without a draft taking place. How, then, can it be said that the enrolment includes the draft ?
Again, the enrolment is a matter which is under the joint control and supervision of all three of the officers who- constitute the board. But by section three of the act of 1864 the provost marshal alone is charged with the duty of making and supervising the draft.
Looking at these provisions of the act, the conclusion would seem to be, that if the word enrolment, as- used in section twelve of the act of 1864, is to have- the enlarged meaning which is contended for, it must have a different meaning there from that which belongs to it and its cognate words in other parts of the two acts on the same subject..
But if we consider attentively section twenty-five- of the original act of 1863, in connection with the section -which we are called upon to construe, we shall be forced to the conclusion that the word enrolment in the latter, does not include the draft.
By the former it is enacted, that if any person shall resist any draft of men enrolled under this act, or shall counsel or aid any person to resist any such draft, or shall assault or obstruct any officer making such draft, or in the performance of any service relating thereto, such person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
It will hardly be asserted that the act of 1864 repeals this [p. 648] provision of the act of 1863; for there is no express repeal, and repeals by implication are allowed only when the two provisions are so inconsistent that they cannot both be permitted to stand. No such inconsistency exists in this case; for using the words draft and enrolment in their ordinary sense both acts can stand,—the one punishing resistance to the enrolment, and the other resistance to the draft.
If both these sections, in these two acts, are to stand, it is impossible to construe them both as defining and punishing the offence of resisting the draft: first, because the punishment denounced by the act of 1863 is limited to a fine of five hundred dollars, or two years’ imprisonment, or both, while the punishment prescribed by the act of 1864 may extend to a fine of five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for five .years, or both.; secondly, because the act of 1863 describes and well defines offences relating to the draft, and says nothing about offences relating to the enrolment, while the other, with equal clearness, defines offences relating to the enrolment, and says nothing of the draft.
It may be said that the act of 1863 makes no provision for an assault resulting in death, while that of 1864 does; and therefore the provisions of the latter should be made to cover eases where the party murdered was engaged in a service relating to the draft It is possible, if the attention of Congress had been called to the omission, it would have been supplied; but certainly no court can go so far as that, in construing a statute whose penalty is death.
To make a party guilty of murder under the act of 1864, it is clear that the assaulting and resistance from which the the death results, must be an assault or resistance of a person engaged in precisely the same service as that which subjects thé guilty party to fine and imprisonment, when it does not so result. The definition of the service in which the officer assaulted was engaged, can have no more libera] interpretation in the one case than the other. We have already shown that this does not include service in relation to the draft.
It is not difficult to explain the motives which governed [p. 649] Congress in enacting section twelve of the act of 1864. At the time the act of 1863 was passed, it was not anticipated that any trouble would be made to the officers engaged in merely obtaining the names of persons liable to draft, while it was supposed there might be some resistance, in particular cases, to the enforcement of the actual draft. But a year’s experience showed many defects in the act of 1863, requiring amendment. Among these it was found that resistance to the enrolment was a thing to be expected, quite as often as resistance to the draft. The extent and malignity of this resistance had also been found to be greater than had been anticipated, and the increased demand for soldiers, rendered more stringent legislation necessary. Hence Congress, among many other amendments, provided for the case of resistance to the enrolment, and in doing so, made the penalty heavier than what it had provided for resisting the draft, and added a provision for punishment in cases of resistance resulting in the death of an officer or agent engaged in making the enrolment. That it did not provide for a similar homicide occurring in a service relating to the draft, may have been an omission, but not a remarkable one, when we consider the many other weighty matters which the pressure of the rebellion forced on its attention, and also that the law of the State made full provision for cases of murder.
Question answered in the negative.
[See the next case.—Eep .J
United States v. Murphy.
Under the second section of the act of Sth August, 1840, “ to regulate the proceedings in the Circuit and District Courts,” and which, after authorizing the transfer of criminal causes from either court to the other on motion of the district attorney, says that “ the court to which such remission is made, shall, after the order of remission is filed
therein, act and proceed in the case as if the indictment and all the other proceedings in the same had been originated in said court,” an indictment may be remitted from the District Court to the Circuit Court, though it have come into the District Court originally only by being sent there from the Circuit Court. And a demurrer to the indictment made in the District Court, may properly receive a joinder in the Circuit Court. 2. The twenty-fifth section of the act of 3d March, 1863, “for enrolling and calling out the national forces and for other purposes,” must be construed by the twelfth section of the amendatory act of 24th February, 1864; and so construed it does not embrace services in relation to an enrolment.
An act of Congress, passed during the late rebellion, entitled “An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes,” and which has numerous provisions tending to prescribe a mode of giving effect to its purpose, provides in its 23d section, that
“ If any person shall resist any draft of men enrolled under this act into the service of the United States, or shall counsel, or aid any person to resist any such draft, or shall assault or obstruct any officer in making such draft, or in the performance of any service in relation thereto, or shall counsel any person to assault or obstruct any such officer, such person shall be subject to summary arrest by the provost marshal, and shall be forthwith delivered to the civil authorities, and upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or by both of said punishments.”
This act was passed March 3, 1863.
On the 24th February, 1864, Congress passed an act amendatory of it. The 12th section of this amendatory act runs thus:
“ That any person who shall forcibly resist or oppose any enrolment, or shall incite, counsel, encourage, or who shall conspire or confederate with any other person or persons forcibly to resist or oppose any such enrolment, or who shall aid or assist, or take any part in any forcible resistance or opposition thereto, or who shall assault, obstruct, impede, or threaten any officer or other person employed in making or aiding to make any such enrolment, or employed in the.performance, or aiding in the [p. 651] performance of any service in any way relating thereto, &c., shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine not exceeding $5000, or by imprisonment, &c. And in cases where such assaulting, &c., shall produce the death of such officer or other person the offender shall be guilty of murder, and upon conviction, &c., be punished with death.”
The amendatory act repeals so much of the former act as may be inconsistent with it.
In July, 1863, that is to say before the passage of the act last mentioned, but after the passage of the one of March 3, 1863, and while it alone was in force, a certain Mrs. Murphy, with two other “ married women” of Milwaukie, were indicted in the Circuit Court for Wisconsin, for assaulting and obstructing Patrick Finney, “ an enrolling officer” for that district, “duly appointed as such by the board of enrolment organized under and by virtue of an act of the Congress of the United States of America, approved on the third day of March, A. D. 1863, entitled lAn act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes,’ in making a draft of men enrolled under said act into the service of the United States, and in the performance of service in relation thereto, to wit, in making an enrolment of persons subject to do military duty in said district, for said draft; and that they then and there did violently strike and beat the said Patrick, enrolling officer as aforesaid, by means whereof he was grievously hurt and wounded; and did counsel certain persons to assault and obstruct the said Patrick, enrolling officer as aforesaid, against the peace and dignity of the United States, and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.”
The indictment thus pending in the Circuit Court, that court, in October, 1863, remitted the case, on motion of the district attorney, to the District Court, where the defendants filed a general demurrer. In April, 1864, the District Court on the motion of the same district attorney, remitted the case back to the Circuit Court; and in this last court the United States joined in the demurrer.
These remissions, forward and back, were conceived by [p. 652] the district attorney to be warranted by the act of Congress of 8th August, 1846. That act thus ran:
“ Whenever the district attorney shall deem it necessary, it shall be lawful for any Circuit Court, in session, by order entered on its minutes, to remit to the next term or session of the District Court of the same district any indictment pending in the said Circuit Court, when the offence or offences therein charged may be cognizable by the said District Court; and in like manner it shall be lawful for any District Court to remit to the next term or session of the Circuit Court of the same district any indictment pending in the said District Court; and such remission shall carry with it all recognizances, processes, and pleadings pending in the case in the court from which the remission is made, and the court to which such remission is made shall, after the order of remission is filed therein, act and proceed in the case as if the indictment and all other proceedings in the same had been originated in said court.”
The demurrer coming on to be argued, the Circuit Court was divided in opinion as to the questions:
1st. Whether the court had jurisdiction, the indictment having been found in the Circuit Court, remitted to the District Court, and by the District Court again remitted into this court.
2d. Whether the offence charged in the indictment, namely, an assault and obstruction of an officer in making an enrolment of men for military duty, is embraced in the 25th section of the act of 1863, as an assault or obstruction of an officer in making the draft or in the performance of services in relation thereto.
And these two questions were now here for resolution.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton argued them in behalf of the United States; no one contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
We are of opinion that under the circumstances of this case, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the cause.
We see no reason in the nature of the transaction, nor in [p. 653] the language of the statute of 8th of August, 1846, under which the remission is supposed by the counsel of the United States to be justified, why a case brought into the District Court by an order of this kind should not be sent back under proper circumstances. The order can only be made on the motion of the district attorney, or whenever in the opinion of the District Court difficult and important questions of law are involved in the case. There is, therefore, no danger of collision between the courts on account of such orders; and as they tend to the despatch of business, and to sound decisions on legal propositions, there is no reason for limiting the rule further than the language of the statute requires.
As respects the second question.—The defendants were indicted for assaulting an officer while engaged “in making an enrolment of men subject to do military duty.” This language describes with entire accuracy the offence provided for by the 12th section of the act of February 24,1864. But the indictment was found before that act was passed. It was found under the 25th section of the act of March 3, 1863, on the supposition that making an enrolment was a service relating to the draft; and the judges divided on the question whether this was so, within the meaning of the last-mentioned act.
If Congress had not passed the amendatory act of February 24, 1864, it might very well have been asserted that making an enrolment of persons liable to draft, was a service relating to the draft; for being a necessary preliminary to putting the draft in force, it bears a very close relation to it. We have, however, held in the case of the United States v. Scott, just preceding, upon a comparison of the 25th section of the act of 1863, with the 12th section of the act of 1864, that the one is limited to the prevention of resistance to the draft, and the other to preventing resistance to the enrolment. Comparing the two acts together, the later one must be held to be a legislative construction of the first, by which a service in relation to the enrolment cannot be held to be a service in relation to the draft.
The first of the questions certified to us must be answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative.
Answers accordingly.
Rogers v. Burlington.
1. Where a demurrer to a declaration in the Circuit Court is improperly sustained, and judgment is rendered accordingly, the case may be re-examined here upon a writ of error without any formal bill of exceptions. 2. Power “to borrow money for any public purpose” gives authority to a municipal corporation to borrow money to aid a railroad company, making its road as a way for public travel and transportation; and, as a means of borrowing money to accomplish this object, such municipal corporation may issue its bonds, to be sold by the railway company, to raise the money. 3. Power to issue the bonds being shown, the municipal corporation, as against bond fide holders of them for value, is estopped to deny that the power was properly executed.
The act of incorporation of the city of Burlington, in Iowa, vested the government and legislative power of the city in a city council, composed of the mayor and a board of aidermen. In addition to conferring various police powers, it authorized the city council to establish and organize fire companies, and provide them with proper engines, and such other instruments as might be necessary to extinguish fires; to establish and construct landing-places, wharves, docks, and basins within the city; to cause all grounds within the city, where water should at any time become stagnant, to be raised, filled up, or drained; and to cause to be opened, paved, repaired, or improved, any street, lane, alley, market-space, public landing, or common. The act then provides, in its 27th section, as follows :
“ That whenever, in the opinion of the city council, it is expedient to borrow money for any public purpose, the question [p. 655] shall be submitted to the citizens of Burlington, the nature and object of the loan shall be stated, and a day fixed for the electors of the said city to express their wishes; the like notice shall be given as in cases of an election. The loan shall not be made unless two-thirds of all the votes polled at such election shall be given in the affirmative.”
Assuming to act under this section, the city council, on the 23d of June, 1856, passed
“ Ordinance No. 44. ‘An ordinance to authorize a loan of city bonds to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, &c.
“Whereas, at a meeting of the city council, held on the 19th of May, 1856, a resolution was adopted, authorizing the mayor to call an election, and to submit the question, whether or not the city issue and lend to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company $75,000, in the bonds of said city; said bonds payable in twenty years from date of issue, with an interest of 10 per cent, per annum, and to be secured by the first mortgage bonds of said company, &c. And whereas the said election' was duly and legally held on the 2d of June, 1856, and the said question was legally decided in favor of the same, whereby said loan is duly authorized to be made. Therefore, “ Be it ordained, by the City Council of the City of Burlington,
“ 1st. The bonds of the city, to the extent of $75,000, and in such amounts as the mayor may direct, bearing interest, and payable as aforesaid, and duly signed, sealed, and authenticated, and with coupons for interest, be issued by said city.
“ 2d. That the mayor execute, with the said company, a contract of loan thereof, taking therefor the obligation of said company, and as collateral security therefor the mortgages aforesaid, and deliver said bonds to said company, and receive said mortgages.”
Under the authority of this ordinance, bonds of the city to the amount of $75,000 were issued. The bonds were coupon bonds in the ordinary form; except in so far, peraps, as they declared on their face that they wTere issued, y the city of Burlington, under Ordinance 44, to authorize a oan of city bonds, to thé amount of $75,000, to the [p. 656] Burlington and Missouri Railroad Company, and as they contained a copy of the ordinance printed at large upon their back.
Certain of these instruments having got, after this, into the hands of one Rogers, a bond fide holder for value, and the interest being unpaid, he brought suit in the Circuit Court for Iowa to recover it.
The defendant demurred, among other grounds, on the following:
1st. That the petition did not aver nor show that the city had any authority to issue the bonds therein described.
2d. That the bonds on their face showed that they were not issued for any municipal purpose, but as a loan of the credit of the city to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company.
3d. That there was no law of the State of Iowa authorizing the city to issue such bonds, or to lend her credit to any railroad company.
The demurrer was sustained, and judgment rendered for the defendant. To review this judgment, the case was brought here on writ of error.
Messrs. Ewing, Browning and Phelps, for the City of Burlington: The question before the court arises on demurrer, and is a precise one. We assert that the city had no authority to issue the bonds sued upon; and that, having been issued without authority, they are null and void? and cannot be recovered upon. More particularly, our position is, that this is not a case of the irregular and informal execution of an admitted power, but the performance of an act without power; one, therefore, which no formality of execution can validate.
1. The well-settled and familiar principle of law is, that a corporation can bind itself only in pursuance of the powers given by the act of incorporation, and not otherwise.*
*
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 636; Augusta v. Earle,
13
Peters, 584; Runyan v. Lessee of Costar et als., 14 Id. 129; Perrine v. The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Company, 9 Howard, 184.
2. And all persons dealing with a corporation are bound to take notice of the extent of its powers. They are bound, at their peril, to know whether the corporation has competent authority to make the contract.
3. It is a further well-settled rule of English and American law, that every corporation is limited, as to. its powers, by the objects to be accomplished—to the sphere of action prescribed by its charter.*
4. And these principles are as applicable to public as to private corporations—to municipal as to commercial.
5. Moreover, the powers of a corporation can never be extended, by implication, beyond the objects of its creation. If a clause of its charter be susceptible of two constructions, one limiting it to the purposes of its creation, and the other extending its powers to objects foreign to the general scope of its charter, the former is to be adopted.!
6. And if a corporation exceeds its powers, and makes contracts, and issues evidences of indebtedness,, not authorized by its charter, such contracts and evidences of indebtedness are void, apd cannot be enforced against the corporation.J
7. In this charter, section 27 authorizes borrowing money for public purposes. But the words used are to be construed as referring to the powers elsewhere granted by the charter; and this section was intended to enable the city to exercise the powers conferred by the charter, or rather to prevent their defeat for want of cash on hand, and not as a sweeping authority to borrow money at their discretion for any purpose whatever. Moreover i A railroad company is a private corporation, and borrowing money to lend to it is not borrowing money for a public purpose.
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company v. The Merchants’ Insurance and Trust Company, 11 Humphreys, 19; Broughton v. Salford Water Works, 3 Barnewall & Alderson, 1; Beatty v. Lessee of Knowler, 4 Peters, 169,171.
J Attorney-General v. Life and Eire Insurance Company, 9 Paige, 476; Bank of Chillicothe v. Dodere, 8 Barbour, Supreme Court, 233.
vol. m. ^2
8. But, even if it were admitted that the city of Burlington had authority to borrow money for other objects than than those pertaining to the good order and government of the city, such admission would not uphold these bonds. These were issued on a contract of lending—not of borrowing. It was a lending of the credit of the city to a railroad corporation; not borrowing money for any purpose whatsoever, either public or private. Power given to a corporation to borrow money, does not include the power to lend either its money or its credit.*
9. The cases on county and city bonds heretofore considered by this court—Mercer County v. Hackett; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,^ and others—have been decided against the corporations resisting payment, mainly on the ground that the bodies issuing the bonds were estopped from making the defences which they sought to interpose. In none of these cases, however, was it a question of power; but a question, whether a power, admitted to exist, had been executed with technical precision. In all of them the bonds recited that the requirements of the law had been complied with. The cases were applications of the rule, that where a corporation acts within the sphere of its general authority, but fails to comply with some formality or regulation w’hich it should not have neglected, but which it has chosen to disregard, it is estopped to deny recitals of conformity to the law, upon which others have been induced to act.J Here, however, the objection is not to the mode and manner of executing a power, but that there is a total defect of power. If so, there can be no estoppel. No formality of execution, however exact, can give validity to an act which the corporation had no right, under the law, to do; there being no estoppel against a legal disability^*§
*
Colman v. Eastern ^Counties Railway Company, 10 Beavan, 1 to 14; The Caledonian Railway Company v. The Hellensburg Harbor Trustees,
39
English Law and Equity, 28; Smith v. The Alabama Life Insurance and Trust Company, 4 Alabama, 561. f 1 Wallace, 83,*175. + See Cincinnati City v. Morgan, supra, 275. § Fairtitle v. Gilbert, 2 Term, 169.
Argument for the bondholder, ,
10. The bonds show upon their face—in the recitals, we mean, upon them—the object for which they were issued. Had they been obligations, without explanatory recitals, they might have been presumed to be for a lawful consideration; issuable within the corporate powers; and, under decisions of this court, the city would have been estopped to show the contrary. But they show that they were made, not as a means of borrowing money, or securing the payment of money borrowed for any purpose public to the city, in the sense in which the statute giving the power must be construed, but as a loan to a railroad company, with which the city had no connection, and with which, as a matter of fact, it does not appear to have had the power to connect itself.
Of course, all parties had notice of the charter of the city; a public act. We need not enlarge on that point.
Mr. F. A. Dick, contra, for the bondholder, Rogers, plaintiff in error, contended that under numerous decisions made in former years in the Supreme Court of Iowa* (and only departed from of late years), as well as by not less numerous ones made in the last two years in this courtj"—the city had power under its charter to borrow money to subscribe to the stock of the company and issue bonds in payment; that this power to borrow money authorized the issue that had been made to the company, and that the bonds were regular, valid, and binding on the city.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Corporation defendants were authorized by their charter to borrow money for any public purpose whenever in the [p. 660] opinion of the city council it should be deemed expedient to exercise that power.
*
State®. Bissell, 4 G. Greene, 328; Clapp v. County of Cedar, 5 Iowa, 15; Rmg v. County of Johnson, 6 Id. 265; McMillen v. Boyles, Id. 304; McMillen v. County Judge of Lee County, Id. 391; Games v. Robb, 8 Id. 193. f Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wallace, 175; Mercer County v. Hackett, Id. 83, Seybert v. City of Pittsburgh, Id. 272; Van Hostrup v. Madison City, Id. 291; Meyer v. City of Muscatine, Id. 384.
Material conditions annexed to the power, as conferred, were that the question of borrowing, when proposed, should be previously submitted to the citizens of the city, and that the loan should not be made unless two-thirds of all the votes polled at such election should be given in the affirmative.
Pursuant to that authority the defendants voted to issue and lend to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company seventy-five thousand dollars in the bonds of the city, payable in twenty years, with an interest of ten per centum per annum, and to be secured by the first mortgage bonds of the company on the second section of the road. Directions to the mayor of the city, as expressed in the ordinance, were that he should issue the bonds and execute with the company a contract of loan thereof, taking therefor the obligation of the company, and the stipulated mortgage as collateral security for the bonds.
Ordinance under which the bonds were issued was passed on the twenty-third day of June, 1856, and the same is fully set forth in the record.
The action was assumpsit, and the declaration was founded upon certain interest coupons annexed to the bonds, which had become due and payable prior to the commencement of the suit.
Declaration contained twenty counts, and the defendants demurred specially to the entire series. Principal causes shown for the demurrer were:
1. That the declaration did not aver nor show that the city had any power or authority to issue the bonds therein described.
2. That the bonds on their face showed that they were not issued for any municipal purpose, but as a loan from the city to the beforementioned railroad.
3. That there is no law of the State authorizing the city to issue such bonds, or to loan her credit to any railroad.
Parties were fully heard in the court below, and the court [p. 661] sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendants.
I. Plaintiff excepted to both those rulings, and a bill of exceptions to that effect, in due form, is exhibited in the record; but it is unnecessary further to advert to it, as it is well settled that the ruling of the Circuit Court in sustaining or overruling a demurrer to a declaration and rendering judgment for the wrong party may be re-examined in this court by a writ of error without any formal bill of exceptions.*
Reason for the rule is, that the error is apparent on the record; and it is generally true that where the error is apparent on the face of the record a bill of exceptions is unnecessary. f
II. Substance of the defence in this case upon the merits, as presented in argument, may be stated in three propositions:
1. That the defendants, under their charter, had no lawful authority to issue the bonds described in the declaration, and that inasmuch as the bonds were issued without authority they were null and void, and, consequently, the plaintiff* cannot in any point of view maintain the suit.
2. That municipal corporations are limited as to their powers by the objects to be accomplished by their creation, and to the sphere of action prescribed in their charters; and that the corporation defendants, under a fair application of those rules, could not borrow money or issue their bonds for the object specified in the ordinance, because such an object was not a public purpose within the meaning of their charter.
3. That the defendants, even if they have authority to borrow money for objects other than those pertaining to the good order and proper government of the city, could not issue the bonds in this case because the contract under which [p. 662] the bonds were issued was a contract of lending and not of borrowings and that the power given to the defendants to borrow money did not authorize them to lend either their money or their credit.
1. Reasonable doubt cannot be entertained that the terms of the charter, if valid, are sufficiently comprehensive to confer upon the defendants the power to borrow money for such a public purpose as that described in the ordinance under which the bonds were issued, unless it be shown that those terms have in some way been shorn of their usual and ordinary signification.
Charter of the defendants was granted on the tenth day of June, 1845, by the Territorial legislature, acting under its organic act.*
Subject to certain exceptions, not material to be noticed, the sixth section of the act provided that the legislative power of the Territory should extend to all rightful subjects of legislation; and there can be no question that the Territorial legislature, acting under that general delegation of legislative power, had the authority to incorporate the defendants and confer upon them, as such corporation, the functions specified in their charter, f
Citation of authorities in support of the proposition seems to be unnecessary, as it is not denied, and, therefore, it may be assumed in the further consideration of the case that the corporate powers vested in the defendants, as expressed m their charter, were legitimately conferred.
Power to borrow money for a public purpose, within the meaning of the provision, is conferred by the charter in express terms, and there is nothing in the constitution of the State which limits the authority so conferred, or renders it invalid. On the contrary, the constitution of the State, as originally adopted, provided that all laws in force in the Territory which were not repugnant to the constitution, should remain in force until they expired by their own lirni-
tation, or should be repealed by the General Assembly of the State.*
When the new constitution was. adopted it contained no such provision,, but the omission was shortly afterwards substantially supplied by a general law re-enacting and reviving all acts in force at the time it went into effect, except such as had been repealed by the General Assembly, or were repugnant to its provisions.f
Validity of the charter, therefore, is established beyond the possibility of a doubt, unless it be assumed that the particular provision authorizing the defendants to borrow money for a public purpose exceeds the constitutional authority of the legislature.
In considering this question it will not be necessary again to advert to the fact that the charter was granted by the Territorial legislature, because it has already been shown that it has the same validity that it would have had if it had been re-enacted by the legislature of the State.
Municipal corporations are created by the legislature, and they derive all their powers from the source of their creation; and those powers are at all times subject to the control of the legislature. Such powers, also, in the absence of any constitutional regulation forbidding it, may be enlarged or diminished, extended or curtailed, or withdrawn altogether, as the legislature shall determine. Construction and repair of highways or ' streets for public travel within their limits are among the usual purposes of their creation, and the expenses of accomplishing those objects are among their usual and ordinary burdens. Railways, also, as a matter of usage, founded on experience, are so far considered by the courts as in the nature of improved highways, and as indispensable to the public interest and the successful pursuit even of local business, that a State legislature may authorize the towns and counties of the State, through which a railway passes, to borrow money, issue their bonds, subscribe for the stock of the company, or purchase the same [p. 664] with the view of aiding those engaged in constructing or completing such a public improvement; and that a legislative act conferring such authority is not in contravention of any implied limitation of the power of the legislature. Decisions to that effect have very much increased in number within the last few years, and are constantly increasing both in the State and Federal courts, until it may be said that the rule here laid down pervades the jurisprudence of the United States.
*
Code 1851, p. 557. t Code 1860, p. 8.
Exceptional opinions advancing the opposite doctrine may be found, but they cannot be regarded as sound, in view of the fact that the weight of authority is very greatly the other way.
Printed argument of the plaintiff shows that the Supreme Court of the State for a series of years held the same views, as appears in some seven or eight of their reported decisions; and it is proper to remark that the reasons given for the conclusions in those several cases are much more satisfactory than those assigned in the more recent decisions which adopt the opposite rule.
Repeated determinations of this court, embracing a period of ten years, have expressed the concurrence of the court in the general current of the decisions upon the subject in the State courts, and it is vain for parties to expect that the court, in the face of those recorded judgments, can come to any different conclusion. Recent as many of those decisions are, it seems unnecessary to incumber the opinion with the names of the cases, or to reproduce the reasons assigned as the basis of the respective judgments. Irrespective of the State decisions it is quite obvious that the decisions of this court control the question under consideration, and, consequently, that no farther remark upon the proposition is necessary, except to say that the decision in the case of Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque* although the opinion of the court contains a reference to other statutes, was chiefly founded upon the construction of a provision in the charter
* 1 Wallace, 202.
of that city expressed in the same words as the provision contained in the charter of the defendants. Decision, also, in the case of Meyer v. City of Muscatine,* is to the same effect. Unless, therefore, it be assumed that no prior decision of this court can furnish the rule in a subsequent controversy, it would seem that the present case is controlled by those decisions.
2. Second proposition submitted is, that the defendants could not borrow money or purchase bonds in aid of the improvement specified in the ordinance, because such a work is not within the usual and ordinary objects to be accomplished by a municipal corporation, and consequently was not a public purpose within the meaning of that phrase as employed in the charter of the city. They admit that the construction of a railroad is a public improvement, and they insist that the phrase public purpose as employed in the charter must be limited in its signification to such public purposes as fall within the usual and ordinary sphere of municipal corporations. Undoubtedly there is much force in the latter suggestion, and it would seem that as applied to many improvements of great public utility, the proposition may well be conceded. None of the decided cases which maintain the power of the State legislatures to au«- thorize such material aid in the construction of railroads decide or even intimate that the power may be exercised without limit, or be extended to a public enterprise entirely foreign to the general objects which the corporation was created to subserve. Those adjudications are not obnoxious to any such charge, but the theory maintained is, that a railroad is nothing more than an improved highway, and that it is as competent for the legislature to authorize a municipal corporation to furnish material aid in the construction of a railroad connected with the same as to construct a highway.
Regarded in that point of view they are analogous objects, and experience shows that the railroad, as well as the high-
* 1 Wallace, 385.
way, is promotive of the highest and best interest of the corporation.*
3. Third proposition is in substance and effect, that the defendants, even if they could borrow money for the object described in the ordinance, could not lawfully issue the bonds in this case, because the contract under which they were issued was a contract of lending and not of borrowing within the meaning of the charter. Evidently the proposition admits that the defendants might borrow money in aid of the improvement described in the ordinance, but the argument is, that in issuing the bonds and delivering them to the company they did not exercise the power in the manner which the charter authorized. Where a municipal corporation was authorized to subscribe to the stock of a railroad company, and to borrow money to pay for the stock subscribed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, in the case of Middleton v. Alleghany Cb.,f that the issuing of their bonds as a means of making the payment was borrowing money for that purpose, within the meaning of the provision conferring the power, especially as it appeared that the bonds had been received in payment of the subscription. Same court also held in the case of Reinboth v. Pittsburg,X that, where an act of the legislature authorized a municipal corporation to subscribe for stock in a railway as fully as an individual, that the provision gave authority to the corporation to issue their negotiable bonds in payment of the stock, and this court, upon a re-examination of the case, came to the same conclusion. §
Common experience shows that the issuing of bonds by a municipal corporation as material aid in the construction of a railroad is merely a customary and convenient mode of borrowing money to accomplish the object, and it cannot make any difference so far as respects the present question [p. 667] whether the bonds as issued by the defendants were sold in the market by their officers, or were first delivered to the company and were by their agents sold for the same purpose. Money was what the company wanted to be expended in the construction of the railroad, and the bonds were issued by the defendants to enable the company to accomplish that purpose. Technically speaking, it may be said that the transaction, as between the company and the defendants was, in form, a contract of lending, but as between the defendants and the persons who purchased the bonds in the market, it was undeniably a contract of borrowing money; and the same remark applies to the transaction in its practical and legal effect upon all subsequent holders of the securities who have since become such for value, and in the usual course of business.
*
Redfield on Railways, 533; Rome v. Rome, 18 New York, 38; Prettyman v. Tazewell Co., 19 Illinois, 406; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wisconsin, 195; Reinboth v. Pittsburg, 41 Pennsylvania State, 278. j- 37 Pennsylvania State, 241. t g Seybert v. Pittsburg, 1 Wallace, 272.
III. Viewed in that light it is unmistakably a contract of borrowing money in the open market, and the rule that a corporation quite as much as an individual is held to fair dealing with other parties, applies with all its force, and we repeat, that corporations cannot by their acts, representations, or silence, involve others in onerous engagements, and be permitted to defeat the calculations and claims which their own conduct has superinduced.*
Perfect acquiescence in the action of the officers of the city seems to have been manifested by the defendants until the demand Was made for the payment of interest. They never attempted to enjoin the proceeding, but suffered the bonds to be issued and delivered to the company, and when that wras done it was too late to object that the power conferred in the charter had not been properly executed.! Precisely the same objection was made in the case of Meyer v. The City of Muscatine,X but the objection was overruled by this court upon the ground that the object of issuing the bonds was as effectually accomplished by their delivery to the company as they would have been if the defendants [p. 668] themselves had sold them in the market, and that the obligors were not injured by the transaction.
*
Bissel v. Jeffersonville, 24 Howard, 300. t Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 Id. 544. J 1 Wallace, 392.
Judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity to the opinion of the court.
Reversal accordingly.
Mr. Justice FIELD (in whose opinion concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE, and GRIER and MILLER, JJ.), dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case. I am unable to find any authority for the city of Burlington, either in her charter or in any other legislation of Iowa, to issue the bonds, to recover the interest upon which the present action is brought. Municipal corporations differ from private corporations only in the purpose of their creation. They are equally dependent for their existence, and the powers they can exercise, upon the legislative will. They are limited to the powers specifically granted, and such other powers as are necessary to carry into effect those granted. They can exercise none other, and the plea of ultra vires may always be interposed as a defence to the enforcement of any contract or obligation not made or incurred within the limits prescribed. And the rule rests upon the most obvious reasons. The corporation consists of all the inhabitants within the corporate limits; they are the corporators. Thus, in the charter of Burlington, the first clause, after defining the limits of the city, declares that li the inhabitants thereof shall constitute a body corporate and politic.” The officers of the corporation, the mayor and city council, constituting its legislative body, are merely the public agents of the corporation, and are bound by all the restrictions which bind other agents acting for their principals. The charter is to them the letter of authority, to which every one may look when called upon to consider the validity of their acts. The corporation can only be bound when these agents keep strictly within theii prescribed limits.
But this is not all; the power granted must be exercised substantially in the mode designated. The adoption of the mode to this extent is essential to the validity of any act done. If the charter provide that a measure shall be authorized by ordinance of the council, it cannot be authorized by resolution of that body; if it prescribe a sale at auction, a sale in any other manner is void; if it authorize a borrowing of money upon a vote of the citizens, the money cannot be borrowed in any other way. In all such cases the mode becomes the measure of the power. This is too obvious to require argument; and so are all the adjudications. Thus, in Head v. The Providence Insurance Company,* Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in speaking of bodies which have only a legal existence, says: “ The act of incorporation is to them an enabling act; it gives them all the power they possess; it enables them to contract, and when it prescribes to them a mode of contracting they must observe that mode, or the instrument no more creates a contract than if the body had never been incorporated.’’^
But still more: the power granted must be exercised for the purpose designated; it is limited to the objects to be accomplished, to the sphere of action prescribed by the charter. If it be given for the construction of a city building, it cannot be exercised for the construction of a city railroad; if it be allowed for the establishment of a public library, it cannot be exerted for the opening of a public market; if it be conferred to enable*the corporation to bor-' row money, it cannot be used to enable the corporation to lend money, or to lend its credit.
These observations are legal truisms. They are elementary principles. They are recognized by all the authorities both of England and America. They are controverted in none, and they envelop the present case on all sides.
Here the authority conferred is to borrow money; yet no
t McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 California, 619; The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company v. Carroll, 5 Barbour, 649; The New York Fire Insurance Company v. Ely, 5 Connecticut, 568.
money was borrowed, but the bonds of the city were lent. Borrowing money and lending credit are not convertible terms. The two things which they indicate are essentially distinct and different. The utmost which can be said is, that the railroad company might have borrowed money on these bonds, and thus the transaction would amount to a borrowing of so much money by the city through the railroad company as its agent. The answer to this suggestion is, that there is no Authority to be found for constituting the railroad company the fiscal agent of the city. The company having possession of the bonds might dispose of them at any rate of discount which it deemed proper. Could the legislature have intended that the city should be liable in any event to taxation on the supposition that a public enterprise had been aided by its money to a specified amount, when in fact no such sum was ever given for the enterprise ?
The question presented is not a new one. In Gouldv. The. Town of Sterling* a statute of New York had authorized the officers of the town to borrow the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, and pay it over to the president and directors of a railroad company, to be expended by them in grading and constructing a railroad. Instead of borrowing the money, the officers of the town delivered over the bonds of the town to the company in payment for stock, for which they were authorized by the act to subscribe, and the company sold them at a discount. The question was, whether this was within the authority conferred by the act? Mr. Justice Selden, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York, in an opinion of marked ability, answers the question in the negative. “ It is clearly,” says that learned justice, “ not within its language. No money was borrowed, and nothing else was authorized by the terms of the act. If, however, what was done was the same in effect as if the money had been borrowed and paid over to the railroad company, the difference in form would not be material. But it is plain that neither in respect to the railroad com-
* 23 New York, 458.
pany nor the town was its effect the same. If the statute had been pursued, the company would have had a sum equal to the par value of the bonds to expend upon their road. As it was, they were compelled to sell the bonds at a discount in order to realize the money.” . . . . “ It is true, the town did not itself sell the bonds, nor make any sacrifice upon them. It transferred them to the railroad company at par, in payment for stock for which it was authorized to subscribe. This, however, does not. strengthen the plaintiff’s case. It was as much a departure from the terms of the statute as if the town had itself sold the bonds at a discount, and was equally inconsistent with the object and intent of the act, which was, that the railroad company should receive a sum equal to the amount of the debt incurred by the town, to expend upon the road, in the completion of which the town was supposed to have an interest. There is, therefore, in this case, not only a literal but a substantial difference between the course pursued and that pointed out by the statute. It follows that the bonds were illegally issued, and were, consequently, void in the hands of the railroad company; and as the referee has expressly found that the plaintiff became the purchaser with full knowledge that the bonds had not been issued for money borrowed, but in payment for the stock of the company, he is in no better situation than the railroad company itself.”
I can add nothing to this language, or to the cogency of the reasoning of the learned judge. Every word is applicable to the case under consideration.
I might proceed and show that the purpose for which the bonds in this case were issued, was not within the objects to be accomplished by the charter of incorporation; that those objects were such as are usually contemplated in the creation of a municipal corporation,—the establishment of a local government, the securing of peace, good order, and health within the corporate limits, and the promotion of such measures as would conduce to the general good of the municipality, and that the power to borrow money was restricted to the purposes declared. But it is unnecessary to
Opinion of Miller, J.
pursue the matter further. When the authority to borrow i money is made to cover a case of lending credit, it is vain 1 to contend that the “public purpose” prescribed by the charter was limited to any of the purposes for which such charter was created.
This is not a case where the doctrine of estoppel has any application. It is not a case where the purchaser of the bonds was misled by any recitals of conformity to law. Here the statute and the ordinance of the city of Burlington, under which authority to issue the bonds was assumed to exist, are both printed in full in the indorsements upon the bonds; and the ordinance is also referred to on their face. But if this were not so the case would not be changed, as the! statute did not authorize the issue of the bonds. No formality of execution, and no extent of recitals could give validity to instruments thus issued. The public agents of the city could not cure the inherent defect in their action arising from want of power, by any amount of representation that they had the requisite authority.
I am clear that the bonds are void, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice MILLER:
In addition to what has been said by my brother Field, in all of which I concur, I desire to state, that on the 8th of January, 1866, the Supreme Court of Iowa, by a decision which was unanimous, held the bonds which are the foundation of this suit to be void, on the ground that the charter conferred no authority on the city to lend its credit, and that the transaction in this ease was a loan of credit, and not a borrowing of money.
United States v. Circuit Judges.
A proceeding in the District or Circuit Court of the United States under the act of March 3d, 1851,* for the ascertainment and settlement of private land claims in the State of California, is in the nature of a proceeding in equity. A decree of the Circuit Court in one of these cases transferred to it is therefore subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States under the amendatory Judicial Act of March 3d, 1803. f
The fourth section of an act of Congress of July 1, 1864, J “ To expedite the settlement of titles to lands in the State of California,” provides as follows:
“ That whenever the district judge of any one of the District Courts of the United States for California is interested in any land the claim to which, under the said act of March 3, 1851, is pending before him on appeal from the Board of Commissioners created by said act, the said District Court shall order the case to be transferred to the Circuit Court of the United States for California, which court shall thereupon take jurisdiction and determine the same. The said District Courts may also order a transfer, to the said Circuit Court, of any other cases arising under said act pending before them affecting the title to lands within the corporate limits of any city or town; and in such cases both the district and circuit judges may sit.”
An appeal pending in the District Court for the Northern District of California from a decree of the Board of Commissioners,—the United States being a party on one side and the City of San Francisco party on the other—was transferred from the District Court to- the Circuit under the above section. It was there heard and decided in favor of the city; and the United States, represented by the attorney-general, considering itself aggrieved by the decree, applied in, due form to the Circuit Court for an appeal to this court. The application, after full consideration,, was denied, on. the ground that upon a true construction of the section above quoted no appeal had been provided for.
* 9 Stat, at Large, 631. f 2 Id. 244. + 13 Id. 333. Vol. in. 43
The section itself, it will be seen, provides for no appeal.
On a petition by the United States for a mandamus to the judges of the Circuit Court to allow one, the question accordingly was whether under the Constitution and different statutes of the United States any appeal lay.
Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Ashton and Mr. Black, for the relators and in support of the motion; Mr. W. W. Cope, contra.
Mr. Justice NELSON" delivered the opinion of the court.
The question raised by the present application is a nice one in practice, and is not without its difficulties.
The section itself does not provide for an appeal, and, unless the case is governed by some general law, or established practice of the court derived from acts of Congress, the right of appeal cannot be maintained.
By the 22d section of the Judiciary Act, in connection with the act of March 3, 1803, all judgments and decrees in civil actions, and in suits in equity in a Circuit Court, brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or removed there by appeal from a District Court, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court. It is said that the present case was not brought into the Circuit by an appeal from the District Court, and hence is not within the provision. The case, as we have seen, comes into the Circuit under the 4th section of the act of 1864, not by appeal, but by an order of the District Court transferring it to the Circuit.
This 4th section was taken from, or part of it, at least, is but a transcript of the 11th section of an act of Congress, passed May 8, 1792. The act provided that in all suits and actions in any District Court of the United States in which it shall appear that the judge is in any way interested, or has been counsel for either party, it shall be his duty to cause the fact to be entered in the minutes of his court, and order an authenticated copy thereof, with all the proceedings in the suit, to the next Circuit Court, which court shall thereupon take cognizance of the case, and hear and [p. 675] deteimine the same. And a similar provision will be found in the act of March 2, 1809,* in case of the disability of the district judge to perform the duties of his office during such disability. The cases are transferred by the clerk on the order of the circuit judge. And a like provision is found in the act of March 3, 1821,f in case of the relationship of the judge to either of the parties to the suit.
Now, these acts, as will be seen from their date, have been in force from an early period, and it has never been doubted but that the judgments and decrees rendered in the Circuit Court were subject to be re-examined, reversed, or affirmed by the Supreme Court, as in any other case under the 22d section of the Judiciary Act A case was before us at the present term that had been transferred to the Circuit under the act of 1792.
The law providing for the transfer of the case from the District Court to the Circuit, was regarded as enlarging the cases provided for in the 22d section; and virtually incorporated therein a removal by transfer, when thus authorized, to the Circuit, in addition to the cases of removal by appeal as provided for in that section.
It will be observed that this 4th section of the act of 1864 provides for a compulsory transfer only in the case of an interest of the judge in the land in controversy. But suppose he has been counsel in the cause, or disabled by sickness, or by reason of relationship to either of the parties, this 4th section does not provide for the disability. The cases were, however, already provided for by the acts of 1792, 1809, and 1821, and they are peremptory, that on application of the counsel of either party, the case shall be transferred to the Circuit Court. The construction, therefore, contended for, would pres'ent the singular inconsistency of a denial of an appeal, in case of the interest of the judge in the subject-matter of the controversy; but its allowance in case of a transfer, when he had been counsel in the cause, or general disability to discharge his duties, or in case of relationship to either of the parties.
* 2 Stat, at Large, 534. f 3 Id. 643.
The remaining clause of this section makes it optional with the judge to transfer other causes arising under the act of 1851, affecting the title to lands within the corporate limits of a city or town, and then both judges may sit.
But whether the transfer is optional or compulsory, cannot vary its legal effect. If made at all, it must be by the authority of the 4th section—by the authority of law—the same as in the case of interest of counsel, or general disability of the judge, or from relationship, and falls within the practice applicable to these cases.
This clause is subject to an additional objection; for, as the transfer is optional,, and may be granted or not, if the decree or judgment of the Circuit Court is not matter of appeal, or writ of error, whether any appeal be permitted or not in the case, is within the power of the district judge. If he retains the case and determines it, an appeal, it is admitted, lies; if he transfers the case, and the decree or judgment is in the Circuit, it must be denied. We think Congress could hardly have intended this result. It places the right of an appeal not on the judgment of the circuit judge who rendered it, but in the discretion of the judge of the District Court.
It is urged that the proceedings under the act of 1851, concerning California land titles, are special, and are not to be regarded as cases either in law or equity. The law is general, and concerns the title to the whole of the real property of the State. Many of the provisions of this law are taken from the act of May 26, 1824, which provided for the trial of claims under imperfect Spanish and French grants within the State of Missouri before the district judge of that district. These were grants under the protection of the treaty of San Ildefonzo. The proceedings were informal, like those under the act of 1851.. The claims were to be determined according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty, the several acts of Congress in relation thereto, the laws and ordinances of the government from which the titles were derived. The proceedings were regarded as in the nature of a proceeding in equity, though the analogy [p. 677] was not very close, the decision on the claim being in the form of a decree.
The proceedings under the act of 1851, we think, should be regarded in the same light—in the nature of a proceeding in equity. The form of the decision has always been in conformity thereto. An appeal is the appropriate mode of bringing the case up to the appellate court for review, and such has been the uniform practice under the act.
Upon the whole, our conclusion is, that an appeal lies in behalf of the United States.
Mr. Justice FIELD, with whom concurred GRIER and MILLER, JJ., dissenting:
Unable to concur in the opinion of a majority of the court, which has just been read, I will proceed to give the grounds of my dissent.
The Supreme Court, by the Constitution, takes its appellate jurisdiction over cases “with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” And the designation, by acts of Congress, of the cases to which this jurisdiction shall extend, has uniformly been held to be a legislative declaration that all other cases are excepted from it. Thus in Wiscart v. Dauchy.* which was decided as early as 1796, the court said, that if Congress had not provided any rule to regulate its proceedings on appeal, it could not exercise an appellate jurisdiction, and, if a rule were provided, the court could not depart from it. And, in Clarke v. Bazadone^ it was decided that a writ of error did not lie from this court to the General Court for the Territory northwest of the Ohio, because Congress had not by its legislation authorized such writ. It was urged, on the argument, that the judicial power under the Constitution extended to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to controversies in which the United States were a party; and that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction in all these cases, with such exceptions
and under such, regulations as Congress might make; that Congress had made no exception in that case, which was one arising under the laws of the United States, and no regulation was necessary to give the- court the appellate power; that it derived that from the Constitution itself. But the court adhered to its previous ruling, although observing at the same time that from the manifest errors on the face of the record it felt every disposition to support the writ.
In Durousseau v. The United States* the subject was again considered, and the court held, that though its appellate powers were given by the Constitution, they were limited and regulated’by the judicial act and such other acts as had been passed on the subject. u When the first legislature of the Union,” said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, “ proceeded to carry the third article of the Constitution into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms. They have not declared that the appellate power of the court shall not extend to- certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and its affirmative description has been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.” And, in illustration of this principle, reference is made to the provision of the law which allows a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court, where the matter in controversy exceeds the value of two thousand dollars. “ There is no express declaration,” said the chief justice, “ that it will not lie where the matter in controversy shall be of less value. But the court considers this affirmative description as manifesting the intent of the legislature to except from its appellate jurisdiction all cases decided in the circuits where the matter in controversy is of less value, and implies negative words.”
It follows, therefore, that the appellate jurisdiction of this court exists only in those cases, in which it is expressly granted. In conformity with this principle it has been held that such jurisdiction does not extend to final judgments in criminal cases, it not having been conferred by Congress. A question arising in a criminal case can only be brought before this court for decision upon a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court.* So, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, jurisdiction to review a judgment or decree of the Circuit Court, rendered in an action brought before it from the District Court on writ of error, was denied, as the act only mentioned judgments and decrees brought before the Circuit Court on appeal from the District Court, t
The act of July 1st, 1864, under which the Circuit Court acquired jurisdiction over this case, makes no provision for an appeal from the decree of the court, or for any re-examination of the decree by the Supreme Court. If an appeal exists it must be found in the amendatory Judicial Act of March 3d, 1803, or in the act of March 3d, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of California!
The Judiciary Act of 1789 only provides for a review upon a writ of error of the final judgments and decrees of the Circuit Court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars. It is the act of 1803 which extends the appellate power of the court to a review of final judgments and decrees brought up on appeal when the matter in dispute is of the like amount or valueand it limit» the review to judgments and decrees rendered in “-cases; of equity, of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize-or no prize.” Subsequent acts of Congress have reduced the required amount or value of the matter in dispute- in some cases—as in suits for the protection of copyrights and patents; but in none of them is there any change in the character of the case in which the judgment or decree of the
Opinion of Field, Grier, and Miller, J J., dissenting.
Circuit Court can be reviewed on appeal. Where a review of the action of the Circuit Court upon any other matter is intended, it is authorized by special provision in the act creating the proceeding.
The question, then, upon the act of 1803 is, whether its terms embrace a proceeding taken for the ascertainment and settlement of a claim to land derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments ? Such a proceeding is not a suit in admiralty, of course; nor is it a suit in equity, as those terms are there used. By those terms is meant a regular proceeding in a court of justice for relief on equitable grounds in contradistinction to an action at law. for the enforcement of legal rights—a proceeding which can only be sustained when plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had at law. The act mentions the pleadings by which the suit is to be conducted; it requires a transcript of the bill, answer, and deposition to be transmitted to the Supreme Court on appeal, clearly indicating the nature of the proceeding to which it refers. The proceeding for the confirmation of a California land claim is of a very different character; is governed by different principles, and supported by different evidence. It is a proceeding taken under a statute conferring a peculiar and limited jurisdiction, created for the purpose of enabling the government to separate private lands from the public domain, and to discharge its political obligations under the treaty of cession. It is in the nature of an inquisition of the government, invoked by the petition of the claimant, and governed by the stipulations of the treaty, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the former government, the principles of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court, so far as they are applicable. Though the principles of equity are to constitute one ground of the decision, the proceeding has nothing in it whatever which will justify its designation as a suit in equity as those terms are used in the act of 1803.
The heads of the different departments are often required by acts or resolutions of Congress to settle claims for losses and liabilities incurred on behalf of the government, or in [p. 681] the attempted performance of contracts on the principles of equity. Thus, in the case of De Groot, who asserted claims for furnishing materials for the Washington aqueduct, the resolution of Congress directed the Secretary of War to settle the claims “ on the principles of justice and equity.”* Yet, no one would pretend that the proceeding before the secretary was a suit in equity, as these terms are understood in a legal sense. Nor is an application for a patent, or a proceeding for the assessment of damages, where private property is taken for public purposes, a suit of that nature. Nor would such special proceeding lose its distinctive and special character if by an act of Congress it was made subject to review on appeal by the District Court of the United States. These cases belong to that class of controversies which are properly the subjects of administrative regulation, and do not become converted into suits in equity because judicial agency is brought in to aid the administrative proceeding. They may be submitted to the entire disposition of a board of commissioners without the violation of any principle, just as the California land cases are submitted in the first instance to such board for investigation.
The act of March 3d, 1851, does not provide for any consideration by the Circuit Court of cases of this character. The jurisdiction over these cases is by that act vested, in the first instance, in a board of commissioners, and afterwards, on appeal from the decision of the board, in the District Court. From the decrees of the District Court an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court. The language of the act is, “ that the District Court................ shall, on application of the party against whom judgment is rendered, grant an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.”
The act of July 1st, 1864, authorizes a transfer from the District Court to the Circuit Court of cases of this kind, where the district judge is interested in the land, the claim to which is pending before him, and also where the case affects the title to lands within the corporate limits of any
* 12 Stat, at Large, 874.
city or town; but it does not confer any right of appeal from the action of the Circuit Court in these cases after they are transferred. It is contended, however, by counsel, that the right of appeal goes with the transfer of the case.
The argument is, that there is no rule for the decision of the case after it is transferred, unless the provisions of the act of 1851 on this point are considered as governing; and that it is not to be presumed that Congress intended that the right of appeal from the decision should depend upon the contingency of the district judge having an interest in the claim, or the fact that some of the lands involved are situated within the limits of a corporate city.
The answer to the first head of the argument is found in the fact that the rules prescribed by the act of 1851 would govern, independent of their statutory enactment. Whether a title, alleged to have been acquired under the former government, was in fact thus acquired, and entitled to recognition after a change of sovereignty by the new government, would necessarily depend upon the laws, customs, and usages of the former government, the laws of nations, the stipulations of the treaty by which a change of jurisdiction was effected, and the considerations which should govern a just nation in treating of the property of its newly acquired subjects, as explained by the highest tribunal of the country.
And as to the second head of the argument, it may be suggested that it would be a reasonable position to assume that Congress, in passing the act in question, understood the meaning of the language it used, and recognized the difference between the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, and when it omitted to provide any appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court, it intended that none should exist. There is no repugnancy between the acts of 1851 and 1864. Reading them together, it would seem to be clear that Congress intended that when a case was decided by the District Court an appeal should lie; but when decided by the Circuit Court, its decision should be final. There is nothing singular in a provision of this kind, and if there [p. 683] were, it is sufficient that such was the will of the legislature. In matters of survey, which oftentimes determine the value of the whole claim, the decision of the Circuit Court is admitted to be final, made so in express terms by the act. Is there any more reason for doubting the disposition of Congress to trust to that court the final settlement of the title, than there is to trust the final settlement of the boundaries of the land when the title is confirmed ?
But it is not necessary to rest this matter upon reasons of this nature. The absence of a provision allowing an appeal was not an oversight on the part of Congress. It is evident, from the general language of the act, and the object sought to be accomplished by it, that it was the intention of the legislature to give finality to the action of the Circuit Court?
The act was designed, as its name purports, to expedite the settlement of titles to land in the State. Great delays and embarrassments were found to exist in determining the location and boundaries of tracts confirmed after the question of title had been adjudicated. The hearing by the District Court of exceptions to surveys returned by the surveyor-general, interposed by parties possessing or asserting adverse interests, the taking of depositions, the discussion of counsel, and the modifications or new surveys sometimes ordered, necessarily occupied the time usually taken by an ordinary suit at law. Then followed the right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the action of the District Court, not merely by the original contestants to the proceeding, but by third parties intervening, whether adjoining proprietors, purchasers under the original grantee, or persons claiming by pre-emption, settlement, or other right under the United States. To obviate the delays and expense necessarily attending proceedings of this character, particularly as occasioned by the appeal to the Supreme Court, and to relieve that tribunal, burdened by a crowded docket, the act limited its jurisdiction to cases in which appeals were then pending, and vested jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, over cases in which appeals might be subsequently taken [p. 684] When from the decree of the District Court, approving or correcting the survey, no. appeal had been taken, “ no appeal,” says the act, “ to that court shall be allowed, but an ■ appeal may be taken, within twelve months after this act shall take effect, to the Circuit Court of the United States for California, and said court shall proceed to fully determine the matter.”
Following these provisions is the section which directs that when the district judge is interested in any land, the claim to which, under the act of March 3d, 1851, is pending before him on appeal from the board of commissioners, the case shall be transferred to the Circuit Court, “ which shall thereupon take jurisdiction and determine the same.” The act then proceeds as follows: “ The said District Courts may also order a transfer to the said Circuit Court of any other cases arising under said act, pending before them, affecting the title to lands within the corporate limits of any city or town, and in such cases both the district and circuit judges may sit.”
The answer to the last objection will be more obvious if reference is made to the circumstances under which the act of 1864 was passed, as given in the opinion of the Circuit Court. These circumstances are not referred to for the purpose of controlling the construction of the language of the act, but in answer to suppositions as to the intention of Congress.
At the passage of the act there were only two cases pending in the District Courts of California, with reference to which the authority conferred by the clause in question could be exercised,—the case of the City of San Francisco, and the ease of the City of Sonoma, both against the United States. The first case had then been pending in the District Court for over eight years. In the mean time the city had extended in all directions, and interests of vast magnitude had grown up, which demanded that the title to the land upon which the city rested should be, in some way, speedily and finally settled. The land commissioners had adjudged that the claim of the city was valid within certain described [p. 685] limits. The United States, through their highest legal officer, had assented to this adjudication, and the principal question on appeal before the District Court was as to the additional quantity claimed over the quantity confirmed.
The case of the City of Sonoma had been likewise pending in the District Court on appeal for over eight years. In this case the United States had, through the attorney-general, signified their assent to a confirmation of the decree of the board, and the principal question on appeal here was also as to the additional quantity claimed by the city.
It was under these circumstances that the law was passed authorizing a transfer of these cases to the Circuit Court. If an appeal from its action had been intended, no beneficial object would have been accomplished by the transfer, for the same delay would follow an appeal from the Circuit Court as would follow an appeal from the District Court. Nor can any reason, in that view, be assigned for allowing both the district and circuit judges, if they desired, to sit in the hearing of these cases.
The acts of 1792, 1809, and 1821, which authorize a transfer of causes from the District Court to the Circuit Court, where the district judge is interested, or has been counsel in the case, or is disabled from performing the duties of his office, or is related to either of the parties, have no bearing upon the question under consideration. They do not confer any right of appeal from the action of the Circuit Court after the cases are transferred, or any right to have such action reviewed on writ of error. Such right, when it exists, depends upon the acts of 1789 and 1803; that is, upon the nature of the case and the amount or value of the matter in controversy; and the latter act, which is the only one relating to appeals, does not cover, as I have endeavored to show, a decree in a proceeding for the settlement of a California land claim, where the right or title is alleged to have been derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments.
Note.
For a short time it seemed possible that the present case might assume an interest beyond that of the point of law involved. The decree of the Cir- [p. 686] Note.
cuit Court from which an appeal was prayed, and which was made May 18th, 1865, was one settling the title to a large part of the city of San Francisco; how considerable will be seen from the decree itself, of which the following is the material portion:
“The land of which confirmation is made, is a tract situated within the county of San Francisco, and embracing so much of the extreme upper portion of the peninsula above ordinary high-water mark (as the same existed at the date of the conquest of the country, namely, the 7th of July, A.D. 1846), on which the city of San Francisco is* situated, as will contain an area of four square leagues—said tract being bounded on the north and east by the Bay of San Francisco; on the west by the Pacific Ocean; and on the south by a due east and west line, drawn so as to include the area aforesaid, subject to the following deductions, namely: such parcels of land as have been heretofore reserved or dedicated to public uses by the United States; and, also, such parcels of land as have been by grants from lawful authority vested in private proprietorship, and have been finally confirmed to parties claiming under said grants by the tribunals of the United States, or shall hereafter be finally confirmed to parties claiming thereunder by said tribunals, in proceedings now pending therein for that purpose; all of which said excepted parcels of land are included within the area of four square leagues above mentioned, but are excluded from the confirmation to the city. This confirmation is in trust, for the benefit of the lot-holders under grants from the pueblo, town, or city of San Francisco, or other competent authority, and as to any residue, in trust for the use and benefit of the inhabitants of the city.”
. However, immediately after the expression of the views of the majority of the judges, as given in the preceding case, Congress passed the following act:
An act to quiet the title to certain lands within the corporate limits of the City of San Francisco.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: That all the right and title of the United States to the land situated within the corporate limits of the city of San Francisco, in the State of California, confirmed to the city of San Francisco by the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, entered on the 18th day of May, 1865, be and the same are hereby relinquished and granted to the said city of San Francisco and its successors, and the claim of the said city to said land is hereby confirmed, subject, however, to the reservations and exceptions designated in said decree, and upon the following trusts, namely: that all the said land, not heretofore granted to said city, shall be disposed of and conveyed by said city to parties in the bond fide actual possession thereof, by themselves, or tenants, on the passage of this act, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as the legislature of the State of California may prescribe; except such parcels thereof as may -be reserved and set apart by ordinance of said city for public uses. Provided, however, That the relinquishment an grant, by this act, shall not interfere with or prejudice any valid adverse right or claim, if such exist, to said land or any part thereof, whether e-rived from Spain, Mexico, or the United States, or preclude a ju icia examination and adjustment thereof.
Approved, March 8, 1866.
Merriam v. Haas.
A motion to dismiss an appeal in a decree of foreclosure, in chancery, refused, though the complainant below, appellant here, had, after his appeal made, issued execution and got the amount for which the decree he appealed from, was given.
Merriam filed his bill in equity in the Federal court for Minnesota, for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by Haas and wife for $6000, with interest at 15 per cent.
The defendants answered, admitting the execution of the mortgage, and that $4000 and interest (parcel of the amount so secured) was due; and they submitted to a decree for that sum. But as to the residue ($2000 and interest) they insisted that they never owed it, because, they alleged, they had only received from Merriam the sum of $4000, and not the sum of $6000 as was agreed, and on the faith of which agreement the mortgage had been executed.
In June, 1861, the court gave a decree for $4000, with interest and costs; the whole amounting to $5271, but refused to give a decree including the $2000 disputed. In April, 1862, the complainant appealed. On the 15th November, of the same year, that is to say, after the appeal, there was a sale and report of the master in execution of the decree; and on the following November, that, to wit, of 1863 (the sale not being yet confirmed), the defendant paid into court the amount for which the decree was given, with interest; which whole sum the complainant received and gave his receipt for. The case being now here, Mr. Carlisle moved to dismiss the appeal, 11 for that after the same was prayed by these appellants and allowed by the court, the decree below having been in their favor for $5271, interest and costs, but having denied them an additional sum which they had claimed in their bill, the said appellants by their voluntary act as appears by the record, enforced and took advantage of the said decree, and accepted and received the sum thereby awarded [p. 688] to them; whereby they waived their appeal, and are estopped to question the said decree in this court.
“ On consideration,” &c.
“ Motion overruled.”
Note.
This motion was decided in February, 1864, about a month before the present reporter was appointed, and is reported now by him from the records only. The decision, to which Miller, J., referred counsel, from the bench, was much relied on by the attorney-general, in argument, in the next case; on which account specially the reporter presents the matter; though, of necessity, in an imperfect way. It may be added, that the case coming on finally to be heard on its merits, the decree below was reversed : and the case remanded, with directions to enter a decree which should give the complainant the whole $6000 claimed by him.
United States v. Dashiel ..
1. Where a writ of error is taken to this court by a plaintiff below, who previously to taking the writ issues execution below and gets a partial but not a complete satisfaction on his judgment, the writ will not, in consequence of such execution merely, be dismissed.
2. Levy of an execution, even if made on personal property sufficient to satisfy the execution, is not satisfaction of the judgment, and, accordingly, therefore, does not extinguish it if the levy have been abandoned at the request of the debtor and for his advantage; as ex. gr. the better to enable him to find purchasers for his property.
The United States brought suit at common law—■“ debt on bond”—for $20,085.74 against Major Dashiel, a paymaster in the army of the United States, and his- sureties. Dashiel denied every part of the demand, but claimed specially a deduction of $13,000 from the sum sued for, on the ground that while travelling in remote regions of Florida, where he was going with the whole sum in gold coin to pay the' army, he had, without the least want of care on his part, been robbed of about $16,000; as was proved among other ways by the fact that a portion of the money, $3000, easily [p. 689] identified, was discovered among negro slaves of the neighborhood, and got back.
The jury under a charge from the court made allowance for the part of which Major Dashiel alleged that he had been robbed; and found for the United States for a portion only of the sum claimed, to wit, $10,318.22. Judgment was entered accordingly. Not being satisfied with judgment for this amount, the United States, on the 1st September, 1860, took a writ of error to this court. Dashiel had also excepted. On the 15th April, 1860, however—before the government had thus taken its writ of error—it sued out execution. and, Major Dashiel having waived advertisement, levied on a large amount of real estate and on eight slaves. A. portion of the real estate was sold June 5th, 1860; $5275 having been got for it. The sale was then adjourned.
The only evidence as to what led to an adjournment of the sale appeared in a letter from the deputy marshal who superintended it to the acting marshal, his principal, sent up in the record, which came up on certiorari for diminution after the writ of error was taken out. In regard to this, the record, or amended record as it may be called, after setting out the execution, levy, and return, thus in substance ran:
“Accompanying said return and inclosed with the execution, whether as part of the return or explanatory of the same, as made a part of the record, is the following letter, in words, to wit:
San Antonio, Texas , June 7th, 1860.
To W. Masterson, Esq.,
Acting United States Marshal, Austin.
Dear Sir: Your note of the 4th June came to hand yesterday. You learned by my note of the 5th that Zhad adjourned the sale, after the bids amounted to $5275, as directed by your note of the 2d. I now act upon your note of the 4th, received yesterday, and return, as you directed, the execution. I think the attorney will certainly approve of your action in staying the sale on the bids reaching $5000; and I cannot but think that he will, upon seeing the abundance of the levy, and learning that there is no hindrances thrown in the way of a forced collection, but a modest
vol. in. 44 [p. 690] petition for time the better to enable the defendant to find purchasers for his property, now in the clasp of the law. The sympathies of this community for Major Dashiel, where he has long lived, with his family, all plead for extension of time, if possible, to the next January Term of the honorable District Court. The interest still accruing, would the United States be much injured by the extension ?
Yours, respectfully,
S. Newton.”
Mr. Paschall, for Dashiel, defendant in error, now moved to dismiss the writ of error; the ground assigned in the motion having been that after judgment rendered “ there was an execution sued out by the plaintiff, a levy, and sale, and satisfaction.”
In favor of the motion he argued:
I. It is an old rule of the law, one not departed from either in modern times, that a levy on sufficient personal property operates, generally speaking, as an extinguishment of a judgment. So far back as Queen Elizabeth’s time, Croke gives us the case of Mountney v. Andrews,* where it is said, that “ to a scire facias on a judgment the defendant may plead execution on a fi. fa. for the same debt, without showing that the writ is returnedimplying, of course, that the levy was satisfaction. Lord Raymond, in a later day (Queen Anne’s), gives us Clerk n. Withers,f in which the marginal abstract is this: “ When the defendant’s goods are seized on &fi. fa. the debt is discharged.” Nor is this ancient English law alone. It has been nowhere so explicitly declared, or so far carried out, as in the United States. “ When an officer, under an execution, has once levied upon the property of the defendant sufficient to satisfy the execution,” says the Supreme Court of New York, A.D. 1815,1 can" not make a second levy. This principle appears to be well settled.” Indeed, as that court remarks in the case cited, it had been previously held in New York,§ that a sheriff could [p. 691] not take security on a Ji. fa., and still hold the execution in his hand, using it afterwards to enforce payment; and they say, “According to the principle here recognized, it was immaterial whether the property first levied on was* sufficient to satisfy the execution or not.” In 1825, we have in the same Supreme Court the case of JEx parte Lawrence,* where the abstract is—“A levy on personal property sufficient to satisfy a ji. fa., is an extinguishment of the judgment on which it issued.” “ This,” say the court there, “ has been often held;” and they declared that the judgment therefore ceased by such levy to be a lien on real estate which it previously bound. Numerous other New York cases may be referred to for the same law;f if, indeed, after a matter has been once solemnly adjudged, it is respectful to refer to cases affirming it with each reverting term.
*
Croke Eliz. 237. f Page> 1072 5 s- C- 1 Salkeld> 322< J Hoyt v. Hudson, 12 Johnson, 208.
2
Reed v. Pruyn, 7 Id. 428
In New England, the great name of Chief Justice Parsons, delivering the opinion of his court, sanctions the same position. J He says:
“ When goods sufficient to satisfy an execution are seized on fi.fa., the debtor is discharged, even though the sheriff waste the goods or misapply the money arising from the sale, or does not return his execution; for by a lawful seizure the debtor has lost his property in the goods/’
And these principles of law, found alike in England and in our older States, were early adopted, and are completely encysted in the jurisprudence of Texas, from which this case comes. There, as elsewhere, the courts declare, that prinifi. facie a levy of goods, if valid and on property sufficient, is “ satisfaction.”§
There is really no authoritative case contrary to these decisions about the effect of a levy, though there are extra-judicial dicta, and some head-notes reporting them, and*§
* 4 Cowen, 417. t Jackson v. Bowen, 7 Cowen, 13; Wood v. Torrey, 6 Wendell, 562; Shepard v. Rowe, 14 Id. 262.
f Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Massachusetts, 402. § Bryan v. Bridge, 10 Texas, 151.
giving dicta rather than points adjudged, which might lead to a conclusion that there was. Thus in Green v. Burke, in New York, A.D. 1840,* it is said in the syllabus:
“A levy by virtue of an execution is not always a satisfaction of the judgment; though the property levied on be of sufficient value to satisfy the execution, and the defendant be not guilty of eloignment. It is only satisfaction submodo. If the levy fail to produce satisfaction in fact without any fault of the plaintiff, he may proceed to obtain execution.”
But, without affirming or denying what is here said, it is enough to remark that the case itself was one where the so-called “ levy” was made by a constable who was a minor, and who had abandoned the levy to relieve himself from the consequence of assuming the duties of the office within age—an office which it was a fraud in him to attempt to fill. It was held, and rightly of course, that such a levy—no levy whatever—was not a satisfaction.
So, in The People v. Hopsen,f Bronson, C. J., says:
“If the broad ground has not yet been taken, it is time it should be asserted that a mere levy upon sufficient personal property, without anything more, never amounts to a satisfaction of the judgment. There is no foundation in reason for a different rule. . . . It often happens that a levy is overreached by some other lien, is abandoned for the benefit of the debtor, or defeated by his misconduct. In such cases there is no color for saying that the judgment is gone; and yet they are included in the notion that a levy satisfies the debt. . . . The true rule I take to be this, that the judgment is satisfied when the execution has been so issued as to change the title, or in some way deprive the debtor of his property.”
If Bronson, C. J., meant only to say that the presumption of satisfaction from a levy on sufficient property, was not one juris et de jure—one not incapable of being rebutted a rule which had certain exceptions—as the italicized portion of his remarks might lead us to suppose he did mean there
is nothing to be denied by us. If, however, he meant to say that the rule established by his predecessors, in his own court, in its best days, had “ no foundation in reason,”—a meaning difficult, with proper respect to him, to suppose—then we may observe, as the fact is, and as he himself declares* it was, that his remarkson this subject were not necessary to the decision; and were made only at the wish of counsel; and, we may observe also, that they are put by the reporter as dicta simply “per Bronson, C. J.impertinent really to the case. What he, Bronson, C. J., under these circumstances “took to be the true rule”is not vastly important in considering what the rule is as established by judicial precedents.
It must be observed that neither this case where Bronson, C. J., thus speaks, nor Green V. Burke before it, where we have extracted the loose syllabus, were cases at all concerning writs of error, or of motions to dismiss or quash them.
Will the doctrine, declared in the New York case of Ostrander v. Walter,^ and recognized in some few others,^ be set up as a reply ?—“ that where an execution has been levied upon property of the defendant, and abandoned by his request and for his benefit, this will not amount to a satisfaction of the judgment?” If it is, the answer is that the rule does not apply to any facts of this case. Assuming—what is not true in law—that the letter of the deputy marshal was a part of the marshal’s “ return” to his execution, yet it is plain that the sale was stayed by the deputy in consequence of an order from the marshal. “ I had adjourned the sale,” he writes, “ as directed by your note of the 2d.” “ I think the attorney will certainly approve your action in staying the sale,” &c. There were “ no hindrances” thrown in the way by Major Dashiel. He had forwarded a sale by waiving advertisement; and even the “ modest petition” seems to have come from others rather than from himself. It was “ the [p. 694] sympathies of the community,” where he had long lived and all his family, which pleaded “ for an extension” of time: not himself.
*
Page 577. | 2 Hill, 329. t Porter v. Boone, 1 Watts & Sergeant, 251: Walker v. Bradley, 2 Arkansas, 595.
In this state of facts it is not necessary to consider what is the effect of a surrender made in consequence of a debtor’s request when the creditor has his hand full of property. A striking effect of such an act may be seen in Magniac v. Thomson* where the act, done clearly for the debtor’s benefit, cost the creditor $80,000. Creditors who have pushed their debtors to the wall with all the sharp instruments of the law must be careful what they do. In seizing a man’s property and putting it under a sheriff’s wand, they do an extreme act. They can, indeed, have satisfaction if they will pursue such odious measures. But if they become compunctious and alarmed, and afraid to go to the ultima ratio of the law, and sell, they throw their chance away. That is their affair: and they had better have thought of it before they made the levy. If a creditor, with his eyes open, were at his debtor’s request and for his debtor’s benefit deliberately to enter satisfaction of record, who doubts that his writ of error would be gone ? If having a levy, from which, as in this case, the whole debt could have been obtained, he abandons it, wherein differs the case ? But this is useless discussion; for there is no evidence that Dashiel asked anything.
Will it be said again that the rule does not’apply to a levy made on land ? Granted. But here the levy was on slaves; chattels as our laws then stood.
Or that the rule has several exceptions ? Granted again. But unless you show that they apply to us, of what pertinence is the argument ?
Or will it be said that there is no evidence that the levy was sufficient? The answer is twofold; first of law and second of fact. Of law, in that the presumption of law is, when a levy is made, on goods, that the goods are sufficient to satisfy the levy. In Bryan v. Bridge^ as here, a levy had
* 2 Wallace, Jr., 209.
been made on slaves. The court say: “ If the levy had been valid the plaintiffs in the execution could have had no other until it had been shown that the levy so first made was not sufficient. Primo, fade, it was sufficient.” In our case without doubt the levy was, in fact, sufficient. The letter of the deputy marshal shows it. He speaks of “ the abundance” of the levy. The property was large.
We have then these general rules: (i) that a levy on sufficient personal property is satisfaction; and (ii) that the prima facie presumption is that any levy on personal property is on sufficient property.
But if a judgment is satisfied, how can error lie on it? “When a party,” says an eminent Missouri judge, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of that State,* “ voluntarily extinguishes his own judgment, he cannot afterwards complain of it. He is under no necessity of suing out execution to enforce his judgment and receive satisfaction of it; and if by his own voluntary act he extinguishes his judgment, what is there on which a writ of error can operate ?”
In Pennsylvania, also, the doctrine so forcibly above expressed was acknowledged and acted on by its Supreme Court, Gibson, C. J., being then at the head of it. A motion was made there in Laughlin v. Peebles^ to quash a writ of error; various reasons were put forward why the writ should be quashed: among them that the plaintiff had in some way received the benefit of his judgment. This was enough: and the reporter says:
“ The court being satisfied from the evidence exhibited that the plaintiff had received the benefit of his judgment, on this ground alone, quashed the writ of error.”
II. Independently of this ground of satisfaction of the debt and extinction of the b'ase of error, comes the settled and here kindred rule about election. A party having several remedies must elect. On this principle it is, rather [p. 696] perhaps than on the other, that proceeds the case of Hall v. Hrabrowski in the Supreme Court of Alabama.* The syllabus of the case is:
*
Scott, J., in Cassell v. Fagin, 11 Missouri, 902. t 1 Pennsylvania, 115.
“ Where a plaintiff who had obtained judgment below, sued out a writ of error to this court to reverse it, and whilst the cause was pending here, sued out execution on his judgment and collected the money, and the fact not being brought to the notice of this court until after its judgment had been pronounced, reversing and remanding the cause, an order was made directing that the certificate of this court should not issue, until the debt, interest, and costs below were refunded to the defendant?’
The court in giving its opinion says:
“ If the motion had been made before judgment was rendered in this court we would have directed a stay of all proceedings; it being obviously unjust that the plaintiff should collect the amount of his judgment which he is complaining of as erroneous, and in which he may on another trial fail to recover anything. It is both vexatious and oppressive in the plaintiff to prosecute a suit here to reverse a judgment the correctness of which he impliedly affirms by coercing payment from the defendant under it.”
The observations of the court above italicized have particular force in this case, for Dashiel denied the whole claim; both parties excepted; and on a second trial the government may get nothing.
Indeed, in thus applying this rule of election—the rule, that where a party has two remedies, and exhausts one, he shall not afterwards invoke the other—we do but carry out principles that exist in analogous matters. Thus, a defendant cannot have a writ of error after audits quereld.^ So, where a party had agreed that he would not prosecute a writ of error, he cannot afterwards be allowed to do so, but is estopped.^ So, where he voluntarily elected to take a nonsuit, he cannot have a writ of error. §*§
* 9 Alabama, 278; and see Bradford v. Bush, 10 Id. 274. f Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johnson, 486. J Executors of Wright v. Smith, 1 Term, 388-9. § Kent v. Hunter, 9 Georgia, 207.
The fact that our suit was one at common law will be noted. In cases in chancery there may be many appeals; appeals coming from different parts of it. Blossom v. Railroad Company * illustrates our idea; and it is this which renders Merriam v. Haas, reported just before this case, no precedent in it. That was a case in chancery; a bill to foreclose a mortgage; nor was there any execution levied.
Mr. Speed, A. Gr., contra; citing and relying on Merriam v. Haas.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendants move to dismiss the case because it appears by the record, as they allege in the motion, that the judgment in the court below was in favor of the plaintiffs, and, that before suing out the writ of error, they obtained satisfaction of the judgment “by execution and sale.”
1. Principal defendant had been a paymaster in the army of the United States, and the record shows that the suit was commenced against him and the other defendant, as one of his sureties on the official bond of the former, given for the faithful discharge of his duties. Breach of the bond as assigned in the declaration was that the principal obligor failed to pay over, or account for the sum of twenty thousand and eighty-five dollars and seventy-four cents of the public moneys intrusted to his keeping, and for which he and his sureties were jointly and severally liable.
2. Claim of the plaintiffs was for that sum, as shown in the treasury transcript, but the defendants in their answer denied the whole claim, and they also pleaded specially that the principal obligor was entitled to a credit of thirteen thousand dollars, because, as they alleged, he was robbed, without any negligence or fault on his part, of that amount of the moneys so intrusted to his custody, during the period covered by the declaration. Verdict was for the plaintiffs
* 1 Wallace, 657.
for the sum of ten thousand three hundred and eighteen dollars and twenty-two cents, and on the eighteenth day of January, 1860, judgment was entered on the verdict. Both parties excepted, during the trial, to the rulings and instructions of the court, and the record shows that their respective exceptions were duly allowed.
3. Execution was issued on the judgment on the fifteenth day of .April, in the same year, and the return of the marshal shows that on the twenty-eighth day of the same month he seized certain real property and slaves sufficient in all to satisfy the judgment. Formality of an advertisement, prior to sale, was omitted by the marshal at the request of the principal defendant, and on the fifth day of June following, the marshal sold certain parcels of the real property at public auction, amounting in the whole to the sum of five thousand two hundred and seventy-five dollars, as appears by his return. Nearly half the amount of the judgment was in that manner satisfied, but the clear inference from the return of the marshal, and the accompanying exhibit, is that the sale was suspended and discontinued at the request of the principal defendant and for his benefit. Request for the postponement of the sale came from him, and it was granted by the marshal, as stated in the record, the better to enable the defendant to find purchasers for his property. Writ of error was sued out by plaintiffs on the first day of September, 1860, and was duly entered here at the term next succeeding, and since that time the case has been pending in this court.
4. Motion to dismiss is grounded solely upon the alleged fact that the judgment was satisfied before the writ of error was sued out and prosecuted. Matters of fact alleged in a motion to dismiss, if controverted, must be determined bj the court. Actual satisfaction beyond the amount specified in the return of the marshal cannot be pretended, but the theory is, that the levy of the execution in the manner state affords conclusive evidence that the whole amount was pai, and it must be admitted that one or two of the decided cases referred to appear to give some countenance to that view o [p. 699] the law; that is, they assert the general doctrine that the levy of an execution on personal property sufficient to satisfy the execution, operates per se as an extinguishment of the judgment.* Kone of those cases, however, afford any support to the theory that any such effect will flow from the issuing of an execution, and the levying of the same upon land. On the contrary, the rule is well settled that in the latter case no such presumption arises, because the judgment debtor sustains no loss by the mere levy of the execution, and the creditor gains nothing beyond what he already had by the lien of his judgment.f Reason given for the distinction is that the land in the case supposed remains in the possession of the defendant, and he continues to receive and enjoy the rents and profits.^ Many qualifications also exist to the general rule as applied to the levy of an execution upon the goods of the judgment debtor, as might be illustrated and enforced by numerous decided cases. Where the goods seized are taken out of the possession of the debtor, and they are sufficient to satisfy the execution, it is doubtless true, that if the marshal or sheriff wastes the goods, or they are lost or destroyed by the negligence or fault of the officer, or if he misapplies the proceeds of the sale, or retains the goods and does not return the execution, the debtor is discharged; but if the levy is overreached by a prior lien, or is abandoned at the request of the debtor or for his benefit, or is defeated by his misconduct, the levy is not a satisfaction of the judgment.! Rightly understood, the presumption is only a prima fade one in any case, and the whole extent of the rule is that the judgment is satisfied when the execution has been so used as to change the title of the goods, or m some way to deprive the debtor of his property. When the property is lost to the debtor in consequence of the legal*§ [p. 700] measures which the creditor has pursued, the debt, says Bronson, C. J., is gone, although the creditor may not have been paid. Under those circumstances the creditor must take his remedy against the officer, and if there be no such remedy he must bear the loss.*
*
Mountney v. Andrews, Croke Eliz. 237; Clerk v. Withers, 1 Salkeld, 322; Ladd®. Blunt, 4 Massachusetts, 403; Ex parte Lawrence, 4 Cowen,
Tested by these rules, and in the light of these authorities, it is very clear that the theory of fact assumed in the motion cannot be sustained. Satisfaction of the judgment beyond the amount specified in the return of the marshal is not only not proved, but the allegation is disproved by the amended record.
5. Amended record undoubtedly shows that an execution was issued on the judgment, and that the same was partially satisfied before the writ of error in this case was prosecuted: but the defendants scarcely venture to contend that a partial satisfaction of the judgment before the writ of error is sued out, is a bar to the writ of error, or that it can be quashed or dismissed for any such reason. Doubt may have existed upon that subject in the early history of the common law; but if so, it was entirely removed by the elaborate judgment of Lord C. J. Willes, in the case of Menton v. Stevens,which is most emphatically indorsed in a well-considered opinion of this court. Nothing is better settled at the common law, says Mr. Justice Story, in the case of Boyle,v. Zacharie et al.,\* than the doctrine that a supersedeas,, in order to stay pioceedings on an execution, must come before there is a levy made under the execution; for if it come afterwards, the sheriff is at liberty to proceed, upon a writ of venditioni exponas*, to sell the goods.
Form of the supersedeas at common law was “that if the judgment be not executed before the receipt of the supersedeas, the sheriff* is to stay from executing any process of execution until the writ of error is determined.” Settled construction of that order was,^ “ that if the execution be begun before a writ of error or supersedeas is delivered, the [p. 701] sheriff ought to proceed to complete the execution so far as he has gone.” Directions in the leading case were accordingly that the sheriff should proceed to the sale of the goods he had already levied, and that he should return the money into court to abide the event of the writ of error.*
*
Taylor v. Kanney, 4 Hill, 621. t Willes, 272. J 6 Peters, 659.
6. Effect of a writ of error under the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act, is substantially the same as that of the writ of error at common law, and the practice and course of proceedings in the appellate tribunals are the same except so far as they have been modified by acts of Congress, or by the rules and decisions of this court. Service of a writ of error, in the practice of this court, is the lodging of a copy of the same in the clerk’s office where the record remains.! Whenever a defendant sues out a writ of error, and he desires that it may operate as a supersedeas, he is required to do two things, and if either is omitted, he fails to accomplish his object: 1, he must serve the writ of error as aforesaid, within ten days, “ Sundays exclusive,” after the rendition of the judgment; and 2, he must give bond with sureties to the satisfaction of the court, for the benefit of the plaintiff, in a sum sufficient to secure the whole judgment in case it be affirmed.^ Security for costs only is required of the defendant when the writ of error sued out by him does not stay the execution, and he is not compelled, in any case, to make the writ of error a supersedeas, although it may be sued out within ten days after the judgment.§
Plaintiff also may bring error to reverse his own judgment, where injustice has been done him, or where it is for a less sum than he claims; but he, like the defendant, is required to give bond to answer for costs. || Writs of error at common law,, whether sued out by plaintiff or defendant, operated in all cases as a supersedeas; but it has never been heard in a court of justice since the decision in the case of [p. 702] Meriton v. Stevens, that they had any retroactive effect, or any effect at all, until they were allowed and served.
*
Meriton v. Stevens, Willes, 282. t Brooks v. Norris, 11 Howard, 204. + Catlett v. Brodie, 9 Wheaton, 553; Stafford v. Union Bank, 16 Howard, y § 1 Stat, at Large, 404. II Johnson v. Jebb, 3 Burrow, 1772; Sarles v. Hyatt, 1 Cowen, 254.
Applying these rules to the present case, it is clear that there was no conflict between the action of the marshal in obtaining partial satisfaction of the judgment in this case, and the pending writ of error which was subsequently sued out and allowed. Partial satisfaction of a judgment, whether obtained by a levy or voluntary payment, is not, and never was a bar to a writ of error, where it appeared that the levy was made, or the payment was received prior to the service of the writ, and there is no well-considered case which affords the slightest support to any such proposition. Subsequent payment, unless in full, would have no greater effect; but it is unnecessary to examine that point, as no such question is presented for decision. Where the alleged satisfaction is not in full, and was obtained prior to the allowance of the writ of error, the authorities are unanimous that it does not impair the right of the plaintiff to prosecute the writ, and it is only necessary to refer to a standard writer upon the subject to show that the rule as here stated has prevailed in the parent country from a very early period in the history of her jurisprudence to the present time.*
Substance of the rule as there laid down is, that where the execution is issued before the writ of error is sued out, if the sheriff has commenced to levy under the execution, he must proceed to complete what he has begun; but if when notified of the writ of error he has not commenced to levy, he cannot obey the command of the execution.! Even the levy of the execution after the supersedeas has commenced to operate, is no bar to the writ of error; but the court, on due application, will enjoin the proceedings and set the execution aside, and it has been held that the sheriff and all the parties acting in the matter, are liable in trespass.^
* 1 Chitty’s Archbold’s Practice, 558 (ed. 1862). f 2 Williams’s Saunders, 101, h.; Perkins v. Woolaston, 1 Salkeld, 821; Milstead v. Coppard, 5 Term, 272; Kennaird v. Lyall, 7 East, 296; Belshaw v. Marshall, 4 Barnewall & Adolphus, 336; Messiter v. Dinely, 4 Taunt. 280.
J 2 Williams’s Saunders, 101, g.; 3 Bacon’s Abridgment, Error, H.; Dudley v. Stokes, 2 W. Blackstone, 1183.
Opinion of Grier, Nelson, and Swayne, JJ., dissenting.
Neither the decisions of the courts, therefore, nor text writers, afford any countenance to the theory that partial satisfaction of the execution operates as an extinguishment of the judgment, or a release of errors, or that it takes away or impairs the jurisdiction of this court. Carefully examined it will be found that the cases cited assert no such doctrine, but that every one of them proceeds upon the ground that where the plaintiff has sued out execution,’ enforced his judgment, and obtained full satisfaction, there is nothing left on which a writ of error can operate.
Import of the argument is, that a writ of error lies only on a final judgment, and that the plaintiff, when he accepts full satisfaction for his judgment, removes the only foundation on which the writ of error can be allowed. Suffice it to say, in answer to that suggestion, that no such question arises in the case, which is all that it is necessary to say upon that subject at the present time.
The motion to dismiss is Denied.
Mr. Justice GRIER (with whom concurred NELSON and SWAYNE, JJ.), dissenting:
I think this writ of error ought to be dismissed. The plaintiff having elected to take execution and satisfy his judgment, has no longer any judgment upon which the writ can operate. His election to accept and execute his judgment below is a retraxit of his writ of error. Such has been the unanimous decision of every court of law that has passed on the question. Appeals in chancery can furnish no precedent for a contrary decision. A decree in chancery may have a dozen different parts, some of which may stand good and be executed, while others may be litigated on appeal. A judgment at law is one thing. The plaintiff cannot divide his claim into parts, and when he obtains judgment for part, accept that part, and prosecute his suit for more. Having a right to elect to pursue his judgment or his writ of error he cannot elect to have both.
Minnesota Company v. Chamberlain.
Graham & Scott v. Same, impleaded with La Crosse Railroad Company.
The language of a decree in chancery must be construed in reference to the issue which is put forward by the prayer for relief and other pleadings, and which these show it was meant to decide. Hence, though the language of the decree be very broad and emphatic,—enough so, perhaps, when taken in the abstract merely, to include the decision of questions between codefendants,—yet where the pleadings, including the prayer for relief, are not framed in the way usual in equity when it is meant to bring the respective claims and rights of codefendants before the court, but are framed as in a controversy between the complainant and défendant chiefly or only—such general language will be held down to these two principal parties alone.
These were appeals from decrees of the Circuit Court for Wisconsin, sustaining demurrers to two bills of complaint. Both bills and the essential question in each were the same; certain small differences between the bills being noted furtheron. The case was this :
In September, 1857, the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company, a company organized to build a railroad from Milwaukie to La Crosse, across the State of Wisconsin, but whose road was not then completed, entered into articles of agreement with Chamberlain, for the double purpose of insuring the completion of the road and securing to him a large debt, alleged to be due from the company. By this contract the road was leased to Chamberlain, in consideration that he would apply the income to the working and extension of the road, to the payment of interest on debts of the company, and to the payment of Chamberlain’s own debt, on satisfaction of which, either by application of the income or otherwise, the road was to be restored to the company. After the execution of this contract, and in the following month, the company confessed a judgment in his favor for $629,089.72. Afterwards, and in the same month, [p. 705] Cleveland obtained a judgment against the company for $111,- 700.71.
To enforce the satisfaction of this judgment, by sale of the road and other property of the La Crosse Company, as for brevity the corporation was usually styled, Cleveland filed his bill in the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, against that company and Chamberlain, with whom were joined some other defendants.
In this bill, according to the account given of it by the complainants in the present cases, Cleveland insisted that the lease to Chamberlain and the judgment confessed in his favor were without consideration and in fraud of creditors, and that they hindered the collection of his judgment, and he prayed that they might be declared void. The La Crosse Company and Chamberlain answered, denying all fraud, and Cleveland took issue by replication.
The court found against the respondents, and at January Term, 1859, decreed that the articles of agreement between the La Crosse Company and Chamberlain “ be and hereby are vacated, annulled, and made void, so that the same shall not be of any force and effect whatever,’’ and that “the judgment and all executions and proceedings thereon be and hereby are vacated, annulled, made void, and set aside, so that the same shall have no effect whatever.” The decree also “perpetually enjoined and restrained” Chamberlain from “ controlling or meddling with the railroad or anything belonging to it under the articles of agreement.”
In 1860, a company—called for brevity the Minnesota Company—succeeded, through a purchase,, and through a subsequent organization, such as is allowed by the statutes of Wisconsin, as a railroad company,, in order to take and manage the property acquired by the purchase, to all the property, franchises, and rights of the La Crosse Company; subject, however, to prior incumbrances.
This Minnesota Company being thus interested, in. the matter, alleged by their bill below (the first of the two cases now under review), that by this decree the agreement and the
VOL. III. 45
confessed judgment were made absolutely void, not only against Cleveland, the judgment creditor, but also as between Chamberlain and the La Crosse Company, and that Chamberlain, notwithstanding this decree, having purchased the Cleveland judgment, remained in possession of the road, receiving large sums of money, amounting altogether to more than $200,000, for which he was bound to account. They prayed, therefore, that Chamberlain might be ordered to apply to the payment of the Cleveland judgment, from the money sc received, a sum sufficient for that purpose; that he might be ordered to account; that he might be credited with the sum applied to the Cleveland judgment; that the balance be ascertained; that the Cleveland judgment be ordered to be cancelled; and that the ascertained balance, if against Chamberlain, be paid to the Minnesota Company, or, if in his favor, by the Minnesota Company to him. They also prayed further relief.
The bill of Scott & Graham—the second of the two bills below and now here for review—was, as already signified, essentially like the first, that of the Minnesota Company. Like it, it did not seek specifically to set aside Chamberlain’s lease; but while prominently making its alleged fraudulent nature inducement in this case, went on the assumption that the lease and judgment were already vacated as to everybody and for all purposes by the decree of January, 1859. The bill, however, in this second case, did allege, also, that the lease was ultra vires, and void, therefore, on its face; as also void, because, by its terms, hindering creditors; but its general tenor was, as already mentioned; and as in the first bill the Minnesota Company asked that the fund arising from the working of the road should be applied in satisfaction of the Cleveland judgment, for an account, &c., so the only prayer of Graham & Scott was that the same money might be applied in payment of their debt.
The essential question in both cases, therefore, considered by the court, was this: whether the lease made to Chamberlain, and the judgment confessed in his favor by the La Crosse Company, in 1857, was annulled as between th£ [p. 707] parties to the lease and judgment, by the decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, a* the January Term, 1859, or only as against Cleveland, the judgment creditor, in whose suit against the company and Chamberlain the decree was rendered ?
The court, it may here be said, had been informed by the counsel for the Minnesota Company and for Graham & Scott, as well as by the counsel for Chamberlain, that there was now pending in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin a suit, brought by the company against Chamberlain, for the specific purpose of setting aside the contract between Chamberlain and the La Crosse Company.
Messrs. Carpenter and Cushing, for the appellant: The decree was not one merely postponing the lease and judgment of Chamberlain as to other creditors, but one which annulled the lease and vacated the judgment. The language of it is of that kind, in regard to which it is impossible to attempt to give it strength; as impossible as to prove an axiom; or to reason into force a seal plainly set upon a bond. No illustration can make the decree plainer; for no language can be more specific, complete, or absolute, than that of the decree itself. When a lease is u vacated, annulled, and made void, so that the same shall not hereafter be oj any force or effect whatever;” and the lessee is “perpetually enjoined and restrained” from claiming or doing anything under or by virtue of the lease; can anything more be done to complete its destruction? When a judgment is “vacated, annulled, made void, set aside, so that the same shall have no further effect whatever,” can it be asserted that the judgment is good as between the parties to it, and remains a lien upon the debtor’s property against all the world, except one? If this lease and judgment have any existence after the sweeping decree above quoted, then it is not in the power of any court to destroy either of them. By nothing, in short, but by violence upon language, can this decree be read otherwise than as it is written,—a clear, complete, [p. 708] absolute annihilation of both lease and judgment, to. all intents and purposes, and as to all persons and parties.
But three parties, it will be remembered, were before the court.
1. .Cleveland, a judgment creditor.
2. The Railroad Company.
3. Chamberlain.
It is certain Chamberlain could not thereafter manage the road under his lease, for he was “ perpetually enjoined and restrained.” The decree did not authorize Cleveland to work it, or in any way interfere with it, by appointing a receiver or otherwise. Who was to work it ? Manifestly the railroad company and no one else. In the nature of things, the court must have intended that the company should resume control of the road after Chamberlain was enjoined. The court could not have intended that a great public enterprise like the one in question should be abandoned, its franchises become forfeited, and creditors, and everybody else connected with it, be ruined outright. It is impossible to say that, this decree did not change the relations of Chamberlain and the company, inter se, as to this great property. It bound Chamberlain hand and foot, not for a time, nor for a purpose, but absolutely, perpetually, forever. It manifestly proceeded upon the ground, that the lease was an unauthorized act of the company, ultra vires, void as between the parties, and as between the parties and the public; and so it extirpated the lease, trampled it under foot and out of existence. It was no longer to be any protection to Chamberlain in his usurpation of great corporate franchises; no longer to protect the company in its evasion of its duty to work this road itself. And the moment the decree was enrolled, it became the right and the duty of the company to resume its abdicated franchises, and exercise them for the public benefit, according to its charter obligations to the State, and neither Chamberlain nor any one else could interfere.
It is the boast of a court of equity, that it does complete justice, and not by halves; that its decrees not only settle [p. 709] rights as between plaintiff and defendants, but as between the defendants themselves. The reason given for making all persons interested in the subject-matter parties defendant is, that the court may by one decree accomplish what would otherwise require many suits, and may at once adjust the rights of all parties interested. This its decrees would not do, if they were not as binding among defendants in subsequent litigation, between themselves, as between the plaintiff and the defendants. Cases establish this quality of decrees in equity. Farquharson v. Seaton* is a strong authority to show that this decree would be conclusive in any subsequent litigation upon the subject between Chamberlain and the company. So is Chumley v. Lord Dunsanyrf in Irish chancery; a case decided by Lord Sedesdale, as able a chancellor as ever sat.
The counsel also argued extensively on a comparison of the charter-powers of the La Crosse Company, which were exhibited in the record, with those exercised in the lease to Chamberlain, also shown, that the lease made by the company was beyond their charter-powers, and was void as ultra vires; that it was void, therefore, absolutely and irrespective of intent. They argued also that independently of this, it and the judgment were, in fact, made to defraud creditors, and that both were void on that score also.
After full argument by Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, contra—
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
These two appeals present the same controlling question to be decided upon the same facts and principles. That question is, Were the lease made to Chamberlain and the judgment confessed in his favor by the La Crosse Company, annulled as between the parties to the lease and judgment by the decree of 1859, or only as against Cleveland, the judgment creditor, in whose suit against the company and Chamberlain the decree was rendered ?
* 5 Russel, 45. f 2 Schoale? 4 Lefroy, 718.
It was the manifest intention of the Minnesota Company, in the bill filed by it, as the pleadings show, to seek a decree in this suit only upon hypothesis of the nullity of the Cleveland judgment, and the prayer for particular relief was framed accordingly. We are also informed by counsel that there is now pending in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, a suit, brought by the company against Chamberlain, for the direct object of setting aside the contract between Chamberlain and the La Crosse Company. In disposing of the cause before us, therefore, we shall not inquire whether that contract was or was not one which the La Crosse Company could legally make, nor whether the contract and the judgment were or were not in law void absolutely or as against creditors only. These matters may be better and more regularly investigated and passed upon in the cause now before the Circuit Court, and, if necessary, upon appeal from the decree in that cause. At present we shall only inquire into the effect of the decree of the District Court upon the article of agreement and the judgment which it declared to be void.
We have seen already that, according to the allegation of the Minnesota Company in their bill now before us, the issue between Cleveland, the complainant, and the La Crosse Company and Chamberlain, the respondents in the cause in which that decree was made, was upon the question whether the agreement and judgment were or were not void as against Cleveland and his judgment. The decree was evidently intended to determine that issue. It was, as evidently, not intended to determine the question whether the making of the agreement was beyond the corporate powers of the La Crosse Company, for there are no terms which affirm its inherent invalidity without regard to intent. It is our duty to construe the decree with reference to the issue it was meant to decide. Its words are very broad and very emphatic; but we cannot say that they were intended by the District Couit to have any greater effect than to avoid and set aside, as against Cleveland, the agreement and the judgment impeached by his bill. We think, on the contrary, that a [p. 711] decree having such an effect could not have been properly rendered upon the pleadings and issue in that cause. Neither the La Crosse Company nor Chamberlain sought to avoid the agreement or the judgment, nor asked any-relief whatever as against each other. Indeed, the case shows that both regarded the agreement and the judgment as essential to their respective interests. We cannot ascribe to any court an intention, by a decree on such pleadings, to annul such an arrangement as between the parties to it, nor could we approve such action even were the intent clear beyond question. No question was made between Chamberlain and the La Crosse Company, nor could any question arise between them of any such nature as that between those parties and Cleveland, nor could they be required, in a suit prosecuted by Cleveland to enforce satisfaction of his judgment by setting aside their arrangement as void against creditors, to submit that arrangement, as between themselves, to the action of the court.
It is true that it is the constant practice of courts of equity to decree between codefendants upon proper proofs, and under pleadings between plaintiffs and defendants, which bring the respective claims and rights of such codefendants between themselves under judicial cognizance. In the case of Farquharson v. Seton, cited by counsel, the pleadings showed that Farquharson, as a co-defen'ant with Seton in another suit, had, by answer, set up the same case against him that he afterward set up by bill. In the former suit the decree had been against Farquharson, and he afterward sought to renew the litigation by an original proceeding, and it was held properly that the former decree, though between codefendants, was a bar. So in the case of Chamley v. Lord Dunsany, the general litigation was for the settling and marshaling of incumbrances, and it was held that where a case was made out between defendants, by evidence arising from pleadings and proofs between plaintiffs and defendants, a court of equity was entitled to make a decree between the defendants. In this case the decree was between defendants who asserted adverse interests in the incumbered estate.
But neither of these cases assert the doctrine maintained here for the appellants, that a court of equity may decree between defendants when neither pleadings nor proofs show any controversy or adverse interest between them. Nor have we been referred to any case which does assert that doctrine.
We think, therefore, that the decree of the District Court in the case of Cleveland against the La Crosse Company and Chamberlain must be regarded as having made void the arrangement between the company and Chamberlain only as against the judgment creditor, Cleveland, and not as having determined anything between those parties.
Nor do we intend here to determine anything as between them. We leave all questions concerning the validity of Chamberlain’s judgment and its lien on the railroad, or touching the validity of the articles of agreement between Chamberlain and the La Crosse Company, or relating to the rights of parties in or to Chamberlain’s receipts under that agreement, to be investigated and determined in the suit now pending in the Circuit Court.
Nor do we understand the decrees dismissing the bills in the two cases before us as determining anything on either of these points, but only as determining that the Cleveland decree adjudged nothing between Chamberlain and the La Crosse Company, and, therefore, cannot be regarded as evidence of the annulment of the contract between them in another suit where the validity of the contract is directly m controversy.
In the second of the cases before us, that of Graham and Scott v. Chamberlain and The La Crosse Company, there are averments in the bill which would require an answer if the general structure and the special prayer of the bill and the absence of a general prayer did not show that in this case, as in the case of the Minnesota Company, the real object of the suit was to establish the Cleveland decree as an absolute bar to the assertion by Chamberlain of any right whatever under his agreement and judgment. We do not think it such a bar, and therefore, without prejudice to any [p. 713] suit which is now pending, or may be hefeafter brought, to determine any other controversy of the La Crosse Company, or of its creditors, or of its successors in right or interest, we shall affirm the decrees of the Circuit Court in the two cases now before us by appeal.
Affirmance accordingly.
Gilman v. Philadelphia.
The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those on which they lie; and includes, necessarily, the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise. And it is for Congress to determine when its full power shall be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions which shall be provided.
This power, however, covering as it does a wide field, and embracing a great variety of subjects, some of the subjects will call for uniform rules and national legislation; while others can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of differing places, and limited in their operation to such places respectively. And to the extent required by these last cases, the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States.
To explain. Bridges, turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of commercial transportation as well as navigable waters, and the commerce which passes over a bridge may be much greater than that which will ever be transported on the water which it obstructs. Accordingly, in a question whether a bridge may be erected over one of its own tidal and navigable streams, it is for the municipal power to weigh and balance against each other the considerations which belong to the subject the obstruction of navigation on the one hand, and the advantage to commerce on the other—and to decide which shall be preferred, and how far one shall be made subservient to the other. And if such erection be authorized in good faith, .not covertly and for an unconstituti°nal purpose, the Federal courts are not bound to enjoin it.
owever, Congress may interpose whenever it shall be deemed necessary, y either general or special laws. It may regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish those who shall thereafter erect them. Within the sphere of their authority, both the legislative and judicial power of the nation are supreme. [p. 714] Annunciating these principles on the one hand and on the other, the court refused to enjoin, at th<? nstance of a riparian owner, to whom the injury would be consequential only, a bridge about to be built, under the authority of the State of Pennsylvania, by the city of Philadelphia, over the river Schuylkill, a small river—tidal and navigable, however, and on which a great commerce in coal was carried on by barges—which river was wholly within the State of Pennsylvania, and ran through the corporate limits of the city authorized to erect the bridge; and on both sides of which citizens in great numbers lived, and on both sides of which municipal authority was exercised on one as much as on the other; the bridge being a matter of great public convenience every way, and another bridge, just like it, having been erected and in use for many years, over the same stream, about five hundred yards above.
The Constitution gives to Congress power to “regulate commerce between the States;” and this case was one relating to the respective jurisdiction of a State and of the United States over tide and navigable waters. The case was thus:
The city of Philadelphia, as originally laid out by Mr. Penn, was situated between the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers; the former a wide river, on the east of the city; the latter a small and narrow stream, on the west, which, making a curve below the city, falls into the far larger water, about six miles below the town.
This river Schuylkill is tidal from its mouth, seven and a half miles upwards—that is to say, completely past every part of the rear of the city—and though narrow, muddy, and shallow, is navigable for vessels drawing from eighteen to twenty feet of water. It is wholly within the State of Pennsylvania. Ko large vessels of any kind are seen upon it. Being one outlet of the coal regions of Pennsylvania, the principal, almost the sole commerce of the river is coal. But this is a very large commerce, and one of importance to this country generally. Great numbers of persons, from many States, are engaged in it; and many small steamers, barges, and other vessels concerned in it, are properly enrolled and licensed as vessels of the United States. Millions of dollars have been invested in property on the Schuylkill front of the built city, meant to assist the coal trade. The coal above spoken of as the subject of this river’s commerce, is brought by canal-boats into the river, just at or above
Philadelphia. The canal-boats are then towed by small steam-tugs along the river.
So important, indeed, was this trade, in connection with the Schuylkill, considered in 1853, that in that year or thereabouts, when the legislature of the State proposed to allow the Penrose Ferry bridge—a bridge some distance below any ever previously erected, and over deeper and broader parts of the stream—the city of Philadelphia, by its councils, then largely, perhaps, influenced by traders in a great staple of the city, remonstrated against any legislative license for the new means of crossing;. declaring that, by “this dangerous obstruction, trade amounting to more than a million of tons annually would be seriously impaired, and driven from that portion of the port; and that the large investments of the city in her gas-works, and other property on the Schuylkill, and a large proportion of all the wharf-, front, would be greatly injured by any further bridge below Gray’s Ferry, now the lowest bridge upon the Schuylkill.” The bridge, however, was authorized.
The space from river to river—the width of the neck of land, that is to say, on which “ Philadelphia” stands—may be about two miles.
Notwithstanding, however, the separating river, residents of Philadelphia, more than fifty years ago, had their rural homes on the west side of the Schuylkill. Here was Lansdowne, the Woodlands, and Belmont, and Solitude; well-known places in the local history of Philadelphia. Little villages, also, Mantuaville, Hamiltonville, &c., grew up there. From necessity, the great roads from the interior, including that from the State capital, came to the city in this direction. Still the region was without the city limits.
In 1854, the old charter of Philadelphia was abrogated.
Consolidation” was thought advisable. What had been the. county of Philadelphia was made the city, and the region west of the Schuylkill was placed under the same government completely as the region east. Lighting, pav-police, penny-postage, and such like things as had be-ore belonged to the “ city,” now were imparted to the new [p. 716] region. Mantuaville, Hamiltonville, &c., became forgotten titles; and “ West Philadelphia” usurped, in common talk, their place. The streets running from east to west, in “ Philadelphia,” were carried, by name, and continuous line of survey, so far as practicable, west of the Schuylkill; and the numbers which, beginning in the old city on the Delaware with Front Street, and running westward to the Schuylkill, in progressive numbers up to Thirtieth, reappeared across the river in Thirty-first Street, running to a number not yet practically familiar to the citizens. From its cheaper ground and fresher air, in connection with street cars found west of the river as east, “ West Philadelphia”—a sort, as yet, of urbs in rure, or rus in urbe—had become a residence for many hundreds of persons who passed more or less of every day in the walks of business in the older parts of the town.
From an early date the river at and just above and below the city, that is to say within its tidal and navigable parts, had been treated by the State of Pennsylvania as more or less within her jurisdiction.
Thus in 1798, what was then called the Permanent Bridge, a bridge across the river at Market Street, was authorized,* and in 1799 a lot granted by the State for its purposes, f This bridge was begun in 1801 and finished in 1805. Judge Peters, the district judge of the Federal court of Pennsylvania, himself distinguished as an admiralty lawyer, who was the proprietor of Belmont, near one end of it, having been chiefly instrumental in the erection.^ In 1806, a bridge at
* 3 Smith’s Laws, 312. f Id. 362. | It was in regard to this bridge that the Judge, who was noted in ancient Philadelphia for his pleasantry not less than for his law, made one of his replies. The bridge being the first permanent one across the Schuylkill, many persons predicted that the spring currents and ice would sooner or later sweep it away: and this was the opinion of several professed architects. “ Well,” said the Judge, upon being rallied one day about his bad bridge-building, “all that I ask is to be tried by ray piers.” His piers and peers alike acquitted him in the end; for the bridge stood firm until it was pulled down many years after it was built to make room for a larger one.
Gray’s Ferry (permanent) was authorized; 75 feet high.* In the same year the State regulated “ the upper and lower ferries”]" opposite the city. In 1811 another bridge was authorized, at the upper ferry,| which was afterward built, burnt down, and rebuilt. In 1815 a large canal, the Schuylkill Navigation Company, was authorized, which drains the river immediately above the city.§ It was completed in 1826. In 1822 the Fairmount Water-works, which dam the river and supply the old city of Philadelphia with water out of the river, were completed. In 1837|| a bridge was authorized to be built by the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, with a draw of 33 feet, and was afterwards built below the town. In 1838^[ the West Philadelphia Railroad Company was authorized to build a bridge at Market or Callowhill Street. In 1839** a free bridge was authorized at Arch Street. In 1852ft free bridges were authorized at Chestnut Street and at Girard Avenue. None of these last four bridges were ever built.
Over one of these bridges runs the great Central Railroad of Pennsylvania; and over another, below the built city, the Gray’s Ferry bridge already mentioned, runs the railway from Philadelphia to Baltimore, which leads from the North to Washington City and the South. This railroad bridge—which has a draw, however—was built in 1838; though a draw-bridge had been there from a time long before the Revolution.
The right of the State to authorize these bridges had not been seriously questioned by any one, while undoubtedly the' river from its mouth to and beyond the port of Philadelphia is and has been considered as an ancient, navigable, public river and common highway, free to be used and navigated by all citizens of the United States. t
The only legislation, apparently, which Congress had made about the river was. in 1789 and in 1790, in both* which
* 4 Sm. Laws, 297. f Id. 347. X 5 Id. 221. g 6 Id. 257. J Pamphlet Laws of 1836-7, p. 20. f Pamphlet Laws of 1837-8, p. 697.
Pamphlet Laws of 1838-9, p. 100. ff Pamphlet Laws of 1852.
years* Philadelphia was declared a port of entry; in 1793,f when the coasting laws were applied to it; in 1799,J when two districts were created in Pennsylvania^ in 1822, when Philadelphia was made the sole port of entry for the Philadelphia district; and in 1834,|| when the limits of the port were enlarged on the Delaware front. The important acts seemed to be those of 1799 and 1834. The former is in these words:
“ The district of Philadelphia shall include all the shores and waters of the River Delaware, and the rivers and waters connected therewith lying within the State of Pennsylvania; and the City of Philadelphia shall be the sole port of entry and delivery of the same.”
The subsequent act (that of 1834) thus reads:
“ The port of entry and delivery for the district of Philadelphia shall be bounded by the Navy Yard on the south, and Gunner's Pun on the north, anything in any former law to the contrary notwithstanding.”
No act spoke of the Schuylkill as within the port: though undoubtedly by its charter the city extended to the Schuylkill. The soundings of the Coast Survey, authorized by the United States, do not come into the Schuylkill.
The “ Navy Yard” is on the Delaware. “ Gunner’s Run” was a stream in the north of the city, falling into the Delaware; but nowhere touching or feeding the Schuylkill.
Notwithstanding, however, the numerous bridges authorized by the State and the two or three that had been built, but one principal connection existed practically, between the two parts of the built and populous city; and this was the old Permanent or Market Street Bridge: a bridge running fro*m the western end of one great east and west thoroughfare of.the city—perhaps the greatest—across the stream; and connecting West Philadelphia with the more populous “ city” as a short and narrow isthmus might connect two
* 1 Stat, at Large, 32, 148. t Id- 305-t Id. 632. g 3 Id. 662. || 4 Id. 715. [p. 719] continents. There was, indeed, the Wire or Suspension Bridge, at Fairmount; rather above the city at its north extremity; and Gray’s Ferry, sometimes called Baltimore Railroad Bridge, at its southern end, and below the populous districts. But, as already said, the old bridge was the' great line of transit—artery and ligament at once—between the districts.
In this state of things, not much set out in the pleadings, but being matters of common notoriety, and as such spoken of at the bar, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1857 authorized the City of Philadelphia to erect a permanent bridge over the Schuylkill at Chestnut Street. This street was about five hundred feet below Market Street, where was the other and older bridge. The contemplated erection would be, of course, over a part of the Schuylkill that was tidal wholly, and navigable. Chestnut Street now had an existence on both sides of the river. On the eastern, it is one of the chief thoroughfares of Philadelphia, and in West Philadelphia, in anticipation of connection with Chestnut Street on the east, was daily assuming importance. The contemplated bridge would in fact connect parts of one street, municipally speaking; a street having one part on the east and one part on the west of the stream; here about four hundred feet across.
The city being about to begin the erection, Gilman, of New Hampshire, owning valuable coal wharves on the west side of the river, just below the old bridge, and which by the erection of the proposed bridge at Chestnut Street would be shut up between the two erections, now filed his bill in the Circuit Court for Pennsylvania to prevent the structure. It was conceded that he was neither a navigator nor a pilot, nor the owner of a licensed coasting vessel; and this was objected to him. His title to ask relief rested on his ownership of coal wharves, as mentioned, and his citizenship in New Hampshire.
His bill charged that a bridge at that point without suitable draws would be an unlawful obstruction to the navigation [p. 720] of the river, and an illegal interference with his rights, and was a public nuisance producing to him a special damage; that it was not competent for the legislature of Pennsylvania to sanction such an erection, and that he was entitled to be protected by an injunction to stay further progress on the work, or to a decree of abatement, if it should have been proceeded with to completion.
The answer admitted the erection of the bridge complained of, justified such erection under the act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, and alleged that other obstructions of a similar or greater extent had theretofore been placed across the stream at a higher point of the river, or beyond the complainant’s wharves, by virtue of other acts of the same legislature. The answer conceded that the bridge would prevent masted vessels from approaching to or unloading at the complainant’s wharves, and insisted that this was the only injury suffered by the complainant, and that for it the City of Philadelphia, the defendant, was able to respond in damages. The answer further alleged that the proposed bridge was a necessity for public convenience.
The bridge, it was admitted, would be not more than thirty feet high—the same height as the old one above, at Market Street. Being an erection of the city it was built in the best style of science, and with the greatest practicable regard to the navigation and general interests of commerce; but it necessarily somewhat impeded navigation. The navigation at that point required a wide channel. One pier was indispensable. Vessels with masts could not pass, and the property of the complainant was rendered less valuable.
Mr. Justice Grier dismissed the bill. The same question nearly had been then recently considered by him very fully, in an application made, in New Jersey, to restrain the erection of a railroad bridge over the Passaic, at Newark. The matter had been there fully argued and deliberately considered; an opinion being delivered from the bench, dismissing the appeal. That decree had, by the judgment of this court, been affirmed; though the case was not reported, the judgment of affirmance having been by an [p. 721] equally divided bench. His honor, in accordance with what was declared in Queen v. Willis,* considering that an affirmance of a decree was binding irrespective of the number of judges who were in favor of such judgment; and that the obligation, in point of mere precedent, was the same, whether the court was full and unanimous, or partial and divided, hardly conceived the question open for discussion before him.f The case was, therefore, not argued below.
In this court it was elaborately and well discussed by Messrs. George Harding and Courtland Parker, for the appellant Gilman; and by Messrs. F. C. Brewster and D. W. Sellers, contra, for the City of Philadelphia.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.J
There is no contest between the parties about the facts
upon which they respectively rely.
The complainants are citizens of other States, and own a
valuable and productive wharf and dock property above the
site of the contemplated bridge. The river is navigable
there for vessels drawing from eighteen to twenty feet of
water. Commerce has been carried on in all kinds of ves-
sels for many years to and from the complainants’ property.
The bridge will not be more than thirty feet above the
ordinary high-water surface of the river, and hence will
prevent the passage of vessels having masts. This will largely reduce the income from the property, and render it less valuable.
The defendants are proceeding to build the bridge under the authority of an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania. The Schuylkill Kiver is entirely within her limits, and is “ an ancient river and common highway of the State.” For
* 10 Clark & Finn ally’s Appeal Cases, 534. See Krebs v. Carlisle Bank, 2 Wallace, Jr., note, 49.
T As part of the judicial history of an interesting question, as well as for the value which the opinion itself has, a report of the case referred to ^ove and decided byGrier, J., will be found in a note.—See Appendix,
+ Nelson, Jnot having sat, and taking no part in the decision.
VOL. III. 4g
Opinion df the court.
many years it has been navigable for masted vessels for the distance of about seven and a half miles only, from its mouth. At Market Street, about five hundred feet above Chestnut, there is a permanent bridge without a draw over the same river, and no higher above the water than it is intended to elevate the bridge about to be built. A bridge at Market Street was erected prior, perhaps, to the year eighteen hundred and nine. It rendered the passage of masted vessels above that point impossible, and since that time comparatively few have appeared above the foot of Chestnut Street. The river there has since been used chiefly as a highway for canal-boats.
The injury to the property of the complainants will be entirely consequential. A large city is rising up on the opposite side of the river. The new bridge is called for by public convenience.
The case resolves itself into questions of law.
At the threshold of the investigation we are met by the objection from the defendants, that the complainants, “not being specially interested in navigation, cannot intervene for its protection.” It is said, “ that they are not the owners of licensed coasting vessels, and are not pilots nor navigators.”
As regards this objection, the case is not essentially different in principle from the Wheeling bridge case.
The further objection was also taken in that case, that if a nuisance existed, it was of a public nature, and was an offence against the sovereignty whose laws were violated, and that the sovereign only could intervene for the correction of the evil.
It was answered by the court, that wherever a public nuisance is productive of a specific injury to an individual, he may make it the foundation of an action at law, and if the injury would be irreparable, that a court of equity will interpose by injunction. The decision was not put in anywise upon the ground of the trustee character of the oom plainant. The State. alleged that she had lines of improvements for the transportation of freight and passengers [p. 723] extending from the east to Pittsburg, and that by reason of the bridge about to be erected across the river at Wheeling, and the obstruction which it would cause to the navigation of that stream, business would be diverted from her works to other channels, and that the income from her works would thereby be greatly lessened, and their value diminished or destroyed. The court said:
“ The State of Pennsylvania is not a party in virtue of her sovereignty. It does not come here to protect the rights of its citizens, . . nor can the State prosecute the suit upon1 the ground of any remote or contingent interest in herself. It assumes and claims, not an abstract right, but a direct interest, and that the power of this court can redress its wrongs, and save it from irreparable injury. ... In the present case, the rights assumed and relief prayed are in no respect different from those of an individual. From the dignity of the State, the Constitution gives to it a right to bring an original suit in this court, and this is the only privilege, if the right be established, which the State of Pennsylvania can claim in the present case.”
In regard to the facts it was said:
“ And this injury is of a character for which an action at law could afford no adequate redress. It is of daily occurrence, and would require numerous, if not daily, prosecutions for the wrong done; and from the nature of that wrong, the compensation could not be measured or ascertained with any degree of precision. The effect would be, if not to reduce the tolls on these lines of transportation, to prevent their increase with the increasing business of the country. . . . In no case could a remedy be more hopeless than an action at common law. The structure complained of is permanent, and so are the public works sought to be protected. The injury, if there be one, is as permanent as the works from which it proceeds, and as are the works affected by it. And whatever injury there may now be, will become greater in proportion to the increase of population and the commercial development of the country. And in a country ike this, where there would seem to be no limit to its progress, the injury complained of would be far greater in its effects than under less prosperous circumstances.”
The law upon the subject is learnedly and ably examined. The objections were overruled. Considerations of fact, of the same character with those adverted to, exist in the case before us, and the reasoning and conclusions there are alike applicable in both cases. Whatever might be our views upon the legal proposition, in the absence of this adjudication, we are, as we think, concluded by it. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should be settled correctly. Its rules should be fixed deliberately and adhered to firmly, unless clearly erroneous. Vacillation is a serious evil. “ Misera est servitus ubi lex est vaga aut ineerta.” This brings us to the examination of the merits of the case.
The defendants assert that the act of the legislature, under which they are proceeding, justifies the building of the bridge.
The complainants insist that such an obstruction to the navigation of the river is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, touching the subject of commerce.
These provisions of the Constitution bear upon the subject:
“ Congress shall have power . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”
“ This Constitution, and the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
il The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
The act of the 18th of February, 1793, authorizes vessels enrolled and licensed according to its provisions to engage in the coasting trade.
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, an to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the [p. 725] United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress.* This necessarily includes the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the eyil and for the punishment of offenders. For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adoption of the national Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament in England.
It is for Congress to determine when its full power shall be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions which shall be provided.!
A license under the act of 1793, to engage in the coasting trade, carries with it right and authority. “ Commerce among the States” does not stop at a State line. Coming from abroad it penetrates wherever it can find navigable waters reaching from without into the interior, and may follow them up as far as navigation is practicable. Wherever “ commerce among the States” goes, the power of the nation, as represented in this court, goes with it to protect and enforce its rights.^ There can be no doubt that the coasting trade may be carried on beyond where the bridge in question is to be built.
We will now turn our attention to the rights and powers of the States which are to be considered.
The national government possesses no powers but such as have been delegated to it. The States have all but such as they have surrendered. The power to authorize the building of bridges is not to be found in the Federal Constitution.
*
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Washington Circuit Court, 878. t United States ®. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodbury & Minot, 420, 421; United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 72; New York v. Milne, 11 Id. 102,155. t Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1; Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cowen, 713,
It has not been taken from the States. It must reside somewhere. They had it before the Constitution was adopted, and they have it still. “ When the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the General Government.”*
In *Pollard’s Lessee v. Ifagang\* this court said:
“ The right of eminent domain over the shores and the soil under the navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the States within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional power to exercise it................. But in the hands of the States this power can never be used so as to affect the exercise of any national right of eminent domain or jurisdiction with which the United States have been invested by the Constitution. For although the territorial limits of Alabama have extended all her sovereign power into the sea, it is there, as on the shore, but municipal power, subject to the Constitution of the United States and the laws which shall have been made in pursuance thereof.”
In Gibbons v. Ogden it is said :
“Inspection laws form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.”
Bridges are of the same nature with ferries, and are undoubtedly within the category thus laid down.f
The power to regulate commerce covers a wide field, and embraces a great variety of subjects. Some of these subjects call for uniform rules and national legislation; others can [p. 727] be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively. To this extent the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States.
*
Martin et al. v. Waddell, 16 Peters, 410. t 3 Howard, 280. J .People v. S. & K. R. R. Co., 15 Wendell, 113.
Whether the power in any given case is vested exclusively in the General Government depends upon the nature of the subject to be regulated. Pilot laws are regulations of commerce; but if a State enact them in good faith,, and not covertly for another purpose, they are not in conflict with the power “ to regulate commerce” committed to> Congress by the Constitution.*
In the Wheeling bridge case this court placed its judgment upon the ground li that Congress had acted upon the subject, and had regulated the Ohio River, and had thereby secured to the public, by virtue of its authority, the free and unobstructed use of the same, and that the erection of the bridge, so far as it interfered with the enjoyment of this use, was inconsistent with and in violation of the acts- of Congress, and destructive of the right derived under them; and that, to the extent of this interference with the free navigation of the Ohio River,, the act of the legislature of Virginia afforded no authority or justification., It was in conflict with the acts of Congress, which were the paramount law.”^
The most important authority,, in its. application to the case before us, is Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.X Blackbird Creek extends from the Delaware River into the interior of the State of Delaware. The legislature of the State passed an act whereby the company were authorized and empowered to make and construct a good and sufficient dam across said creek, at such place as the managers or a majority of them shall find to< be most suitable for the purpose, &c. The company proceeded to erect a dam, whereby the navigation of the creek was obstructed. The defendant,, being the owner of a sloop of nearly a hundred tons, [p. 728] regularly enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, broke and injured the dam. The company brought an action of trespass against him in the Supreme Court of Delaware. The defendant pleaded that the place where the trespass was committed was “ a public and common navigable creek, in the nature of a highway, in which the tides had always flowed and reflowed; and that all the citizens of the United States had a right, with sloops, and other vessels, to navigate and pass over the same at all times at their pleasure,” &c., and therefore, &c.
The plaintiffs demurred. The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer and gave judgment in their favor. The Court of Appeals of that State affirmed tfie judgment. The case was brought into this court by a writ of error. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Marshall said:
“ But the measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it; but this abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens, of which this court can take no cognizance. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error insist that it comes in conflict with the power of the United States ‘ to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.’ ”
He remarked that if “ Congress had passed any law which bore upon the subject the court would not feel much difficulty in saying that a State law, coming in conflict with such an act, would be voidand added, in conclusion:
“ But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect the question. We do not think that the act empowering the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek can, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”
This opinion came from the same “ expounder of the Constitution” who delivered the earlier and more elaborate judgment in Gibbons v. Ogden. We are not aware that the soundness of the principle upon which the court proceeded has been questioned in any later case. We can see no difference in principle between that case and the one before us. Both streams are affluents of the same larger river. Each is entirely within the State which authorized the obstruction. The dissimilarities are in facts which do not affect the legal question. Blackbird Creek is the less important water, but it had been navigable, and the obstruction was complete. If the Schuylkill is larger and its commerce greater, on the other hand, the obstruction will be only partial and the public convenience, to be promoted, is more imperative. In neither case is a law of Congress forbidding the obstruction an element to be considered. The point that the vessel was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade was relied upon in that case by the counsel for the defendant. The court was silent upon the subject. A distinct denial of its materiality would not have been more significant. It seems to have been deemed of too little consequence to require notice. Without overruling the authority of that adjudication we cannot, by our judgment, annul the law of Pennsylvania.
It must not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of commercial transportation, as well as navigable waters, and that the commerce which passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be transported on the water it obstructs.
It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations which belong to the subject, and to decide which shall be preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the other. The States have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects of the two systems of government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation.
The States may exercise concurrent or independent power in all cases but three :
1. Where the power is lodged exclusively in the Federal Constitution.
2. Where it is given to the United States and prohibited to the States.
3. Where, from the nature and subjects of the power, it must necessarily be exercised by the National Government exclusively.*
The power here in question does not, in our judgment, fall within either of these exceptions.
“It is no objection to distinct substantive powers that they may be exercised upon the same subject.” It is not possible to fix definitely their respective boundaries. In some instances their action becomes blended; in some, the action of the State limits or displaces the action of the nation; in others, the action of the State is void, because it seeks to reach objects beyond the limits of State authority.
A State law, requiring an importer to pay for and take out a license before he should be permitted to sell a bale of imported goods, is void,f and a State law, which requires the master of a vessel, engaged in foreign commerce, to pay a certain sum to a State officer on account of each passenger brought from a foreign country into the State, is also void.J But, a State, in the exercise of its police power, may forbid spirituous liquor imported from abroad, or from another State, to be sold by retail or to be sold at all without a license ; and it may visit the violation of the prohibition with such punishment as it may deem proper.§ Under quarantine laws, a vessel registered, or enrolled and licensed, may be stopped before entering her port of destination, or be afterwards removed and detained elsewhere, for an indefinite period; and a bale of goods, upon which the duties have or have not been paid, laden with infection, may be seized [p. 731] under “health laws,” and if it cannot be purged of its poison, may be committed to’the flames.
*
Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton, 49; Federalist, No. 32. f Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419. t Passengers’ Cases, 7 Howard, 273. § License Cases, 5 Id. 504.
The inconsistency between the powers of the States and the nation, as thus exhibited, is quite as great as in the case before us; but it does not necessarily involve collision or any other evil. None has hitherto been found to ensue. The public good is the end and aim of both.
If it be objected that the conclusion we have reached will arm the States with authority potent for evil, and liable to be abused, there are several answers worthy of consideration. The possible abuse of any power is no proof that it does not exist. Many abuses may arise in the legislation of the States which are wholly beyond the reach of the government of the nation. The safeguard and remedy are to be found in the virtue and intelligence of the people. They can make and unmake constitutions and laws; and from that tribunal there is no appeal. If a State exercise unwisely the power here in question, the evil consequences will fall chiefly upon her own citizens. They have more at stake than the citizens of any other State. Hence, there is as little danger of the abuse of this power as of any other reserved to the States. Whenever it shall be exercised openly or covertly for a purpose in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States, it will be within the power, and it will be the duty, of this court, to interpose with a vigor adequate to the correction of the evil. In the Pilot case, the dissenting judge drew an alarming picture of the evils to rush in at the breach made, as he alleged, in the Constitution. None have appeared. The stream of events has since flowed on without a ripple due to the influence of that adjudication. Lastly, Congress may interpose, whenever it shall be deemed necessary, by general or special laws. It may regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish those who shall thereafter erect them. Within the sphere of their authority both the legislative and judicial power of the nation are supreme. A different doctrine finds no warrant in the Constitution, and is abnormal and revolutionary.
Since the adoption of the Constitution there has been but one instance of such legislative interposition; that was to save, and not to destroy. The Wheeling bridge was legalized, and a decree of this court was, in effect, annulled by an act of Congress. The validity of the act, under the power “to regulate commerce,” was distinctly recognized by this court in that case. This is, also, the only instance, occurring within the same period, in which the case has been deemed a proper one for the exercise, by this court, of its remedial power.
The defendants are proceeding in no wanton or aggressive spirit. The authority upon which they rely was given, and afterwards deliberately renewed by the State. The case stands before us as if the parties were the State of Pennsylvania and the United States. The river, being wholly within her limits, we cannot say the State has exceeded the bounds of her authority. Until the dormant power of the Constitution is awakened and made effective, by appropriate legislation, the reserved power of the States is plenary, and its exercise in good faith cannot be made the subject of review by this court. It is not denied that the defendants are justified if the law is valid. We find nothing in the record which would warrant us in disturbing the decree of the Circuit Court, which is, therefore,
Affirmed with costs.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD (with whom concurred WAYNE and DAVIS, JJ.), dissenting:
I concur in many of the views expressed by the majority of the court in the introductory part of the opinion which has just been read; and if the decree of the court had been such as the propositions there laid down would seem to demand, I might have felt justified in remaining silent as to certain other propositions advanced in the concluding part of the opinion, which appear to be of an inconsistent character, and to which I can never assent. Such, however, is not the fact. On the contrary, the order of the court is that the decree entered in the court below, dismissing the bill of
Opinion of Clifford, "Wayne, and Davis, JJ., dissenting.
complaint, be affirmed, and it must be understood that the majority of the court, in directing that decree, adopt the views expressed in the concluding part of the opinion, else they never could have agreed to that result. Regarding the matter in that light, it seems to be an obvious duty that I should express my dissent from the decree of the court, and briefly assign the reasons why I cannot concur in the conclusion to which the majority of the court have come.
1. Complainants are the owners of a valuable wharf property situated upon the River Schuylkill, within the port of Philadelphia, which is a port of entry established by an act of Congress passed at a very early period in the history of the country.* They claim that the River Schuylkill is an ancient public river and common highway, and that it is navigable for ships and vessels of the largest description, from above their wharf property to the sea; that many of the ships and vessels navigating the river are duly enrolled and licensed at the port of Philadelphia and other ports of entry of the United States, under and by virtue of the acts of Congress in that behalf provided; and that foreign vessels, entitled to certain rights of commerce and navigation, have long been accustomed to, and are of right entitled to navigate that river, with cargoes bound to the port of Philadelphia; and that such vessels, in pursuance of that right, have been accustomed to enter their cargoes at the port, and to discharge the same at the wharves of the port bordering on the river, and to load with return cargoes at the said wharves, and clear direct to foreign ports.
Injury alleged is, that the respondents have collected materials, employed workmen, and are now engaged in erecting and constructing a bridge across the channel, of the river at Chestnut Street, in the city of Philadelphia, below the place where the wharf property of the complainants is situated. Bridge about to be erected is, as alleged, and as the plan shows, without any draw, and with but a single pier and at an elevation of only thirty-three feet above the ordinary water surface of the river.
* 1 Stat, at Large, 632.
Substance of the charge as contained in the bill of complaint is, that the erecting and keeping the bridge over and across the channel of the river, in the manner as proposed and threatened, will impede and obstruct the navigation of the river, and will hinder and interrupt the citizens in their lawful use of the same as a common and public highway; and they also charge that it will hinder and obstruct licenses granted under the enrolment act, and that it will hinder and obstruct the subjects of foreign countries in the exercise of their rights of commerce and navigation; and that it will interrupt, diminish, and greatly tend to destroy the trade, commerce, and business of the citizens upon the river, to the great damage and common nuisance of all the citizens of the United States, and their irreparable injury.
Statement of complainants is, that many millions of dollars have been expended by the citizens of the United States in the construction of works of public improvement, terminating at the head of tide-water navigation on that river, which depend, in a great measure, for their prosperity, usefulness, and value upon the free and unobstructed use of the river; and in this connection they charge that the bridge will greatly injure and lessen the value of their wharf property upon the river, and will divert commerce and trade therefrom, and will thereby diminish the tolls, revenue, and profits of their wharves, and will, in fact, destroy the trade and commerce to and from their wharves, to their great damage and irreparable injury.
Allegation of the bill of complaint also is, that the Schuylkill River, being a navigable river, and having a good tide-water navigation, extending to and beyond the wharf property of the complainants, and for about seven miles from its mouth, and being a branch of the River Delaware which river passes by and between the States of New Jersey and Delaware—the citizens of all the States are lawfully entitled to its free navigation, and to carry on their lawful commerce without hindrance or obstruction by the respondents, under the pretence of State authority, or any pretence whatever.
Respondents justify, under an act of the General Assembly of the State of Pennsylvania, authorizing them to build the bridge described in the bill of complaint.
2. Complainants insist that the bridge is a public nuisance, and pray that it may be abated, and for suoh other and further relief in the premises as the nature of the case and equity and good conscience may require. Propositions of the complainants are, that the River Schuylkill is a public navigable river, subject to the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, as conferred in the Constitution; and that Congress has exercised that power, and regulated the navigation of that river within the meaning of the Constitution, and has thereby secured to the citizens of the several States, by virtue of their authority so conferred by the Constitution, the free and unobstructed use of the river as a paramount right, for all the purposes of commerce and navigation.
Congress, as the complainants say, has exercised the power and regulated the navigation of/the river; and their next proposition is, that the bridge as constructed, or threatened to be constructed, interferes with the enjoyment of that use, and is inconsistent with, and in violation of the acts of Congress regulating the navigation, and destructive of the rights derived under them, and that to the extent of that interference with the free navigation of the river, the act of the legislature of the State of Pennsylvania affords to the respondents no authority or justification, because it is in conflict with the acts of Congress, which are the paramount law.
Argument to show that the ground assumed by the complainants is exactly the same as that on which the case of the "Wheeling bridge proceeded and was finally decided, is unnecessary, because the proposition stands forever affirmed by the authority of this court, in an opinion pronounced by one of the justices who decided the cause, and who still holds a seat on this bench.* Referring to that opinion, it will be seen that the judge who delivered it first stated the [p. 736] grounds assumed in the bill of complaint, and then said: “ Such being the view of the case taken by a majority of the court, they found no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the obstruction of the navigation of the river by the bridge was a violation of the right secured to the public by the Constitution and laws of Congress, nor in applying the appropriate remedy in behalf of. the plaintiff.” None of these propositions are denied in the introductory part of the opinion of the majority of the court. On the contrary, the opinion just read repeats the views expressed by Mr. Justice Nelson in the case already referred to, and impliedly indorses those views as a correct exposition of the power of Congress over public navigable rivers emptying into the sea, and of the right of this court to redress private injuries resulting from unlawful obstructions in the same, to the paramount right of navigation.
3. Conceding the correctness of those views as applied in the case in which they were expressed, the opinion of the majority of the court, as just read, sets up a distinction between that case and the case under consideration, and maintains that those views are not applicable to the present case. Stripped of all circumlocution, the supposed distinction, as maintained in the opinion of the majority of the court, is, that in the case at bar it does not appear that Congress has passed any act regulating the navigation of the river described in the bill of complaint. Power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, as well as with foreign nations, is fully admitted, and the concession is at least impliedly from the course of the argument—that this court would have jurisdiction in the case, and that the complainants would be entitled to relief, if it appeared that Congress had exercised the power as conferred, and had regulated the navigation of the river within the meaning of the Constitution. Precise doctrine advanced, as I understand the opinion, is, that Congress has not passed any act regulating the navigation of the river, and that inasmuch as there is no Federal regulation upon the subject, the law o the State legislature, authorizing the erection of the bridge, [p. 737] is a valid law, even if the bridge is an obstruction to navigation, because the State law is not in conflict with any act of Congress giving protection to the otherwise paramount right of navigation. Implied admission is, that if there is an act of Congress regulating the navigation of the river, then the right of navigation is a paramount right, and the conclusion must be that, in that event, no law of the State could afford any justification to the respondents in erecting the bridge, if it is a public nuisance and an obstruction to that paramount right.*
4. Dissenting from the opinion of the majority of the court on this point, I hold that Congress has regulated the navigation of this river within the meaning of the Constitution, and that the law of the State, pleaded in justification of the acts of the respondents, so far as it authorizes an obstruction to the free navigation of the river, is an invalid law. Commerce, it is admitted, includes navigation; and it is well settled, on the authority of this court, that in regulating commerce with foreign nations, or among the States, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. Express decision of this court is, that commerce with foreign nations is that of the whole United States, and that the power of Congress to regulate it may be exercised in the States wherever the foreign voyage may commence or terminate; and that the commerce among the States cannot be stopped at the exterior boundary of the State, but may be introduced into the interior.!
5. Right of intercourse between State and State was a common-law privilege, and as such was fully recognized and respected before the Constitution was formed. Those who framed the instrument found it an existing right, and regarding the right as one of high national interest, they gave to Congress the power to regulate it. Such were the views of Marshall, C. J., as expressed more than forty years ago;
*
Attorney-General v. Burridge, 10 Price, 350; Same v. Parmeter, Id. 378; Parmeter v. Attorney-General, Id. 412. t Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 194. vol. in. 47
Opinion of Clifford, Wayne, and Davis, J J., dissenting.
and he added, that in the exercise of this power Congress has passed an act for enrolling or licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting-trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same. Respondents contended that the enrolment act did not give the right to sail from port to port, but confined itself to regulating a pre-existing right so far only as to confer certain privileges on enrolled and licensed vessels in its exercise; but the court promptly rejected the proposition, and held that where the legislature attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the exercise of a right over which its control is absolute, the law must imply a power to exercise the right. Direct adjudication was, that it would be contrary to all reason, and to the course of human affairs, to say that a State is unable to strip a vessel of the particular privileges attendant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right itself.
License, as the word is used in that act of Congress, means, say the court, permission or authority; and the court held that a license to do any particular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing, and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. Adopting the language of the court in that case, it certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer to do what is within the terms of the license.
Ships and vessels enrolled and licensed under the acts of Congress, and no others, are deemed ships and vessels of the United States entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade. Majority of the court, as stated in the opinion just read, admit that a ship or vessel of the United States, which is duly enrolled and armed with a coasting license, such as is required by the enrolment acts, may navigate along the coast of the United States, and may pass from the open sea into the public navigable rivers of the United States, and up the same as far as navigable waters extend. Coming more directly to the case under consideration, the opinion admits that such a ship or vessel has a right, under such an enrolment and with such a [p. 739] coasting license, to navigate from the sea up the river described in the record to the wharves of the complainants.
6. Unrestricted and unexplained, that admission covers everything which the complainants claim, and shows conclusively that they are entitled to relief. But it is said that this right, under the circumstances of this case, is subject to the paramount right of the State to bridge or dam the river, and close it against all commercial intercourse. Extent of the right as conceded, therefore, is, that a ship or vessel duly enrolled and licensed, and sailing from the port of another State, may enter a public navigable river of the United States from the sea, unless the State through which the river flows as it falls into the sea has bridged the river, or constructed a dam across it, before the vessel arrives off the mouth of the river. Plain right of the owner of the vessel, in that state of the case, is to instruct the master to go about and return to the port of departure; but if the river is open when the ship or vessel arrives at its mouth, she may pass up to the highest port of entry, and discharge cargo and load for the return trip.
Her right to return is then undoubted, unless in the meantime the navigation of the river is forever closed by a bridge or dam constructed under the authority of the State, and in that event the owner of the vessel has the same privilege that he has in case of shipwreck. He may direct the master and mariners to return by land.
Doubtless a question may arise as to what is to be done in that state of the case with the impounded vessel and cargo, but, as that question is not involved in the present record, it must be left for future consideration. Such a rule as it seems to me, is contrary to all reason, and absolutely subversive of one of the great interests of the country, which, more than any other, induced the people of the colonies to call the convention which framed the Constitution.
7. Unquestionably the decision of the court in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden proceeded throughout upon the ground that the act for enrolling or licensing ships or vessels, to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating [p. 740] the same, was of itself a sufficient regulation of the navigation of all the public navigable rivers of the United States to secure to the ships and vessels of the United States, sailing under the coasting license, the free navigation of all such public highways. Best exposition of the decision of the court in that case is to be found in the decree, where the court say that the several licenses set up by the appellant in his answer to the bill of complaint, which were granted under an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States for the purpose of carrying on the coastwise trade, any law of the State to the contrary notwithstanding; and that so much of the laws of the State as prohibited vessels so licensed from navigating the waters of the State by means of fire or steam is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and void. Express as the language of that decree is, it is incomprehensible to me how it can be the subject of any difference of opinion.
Complete protection is afforded by the doctrines of that great case to all ships and vessels of the United States, duly enrolled and licensed, in navigating all the public navigable rivers of the United States which empty into the sea or into the bays and gulfs, which form a part of the sea, and they are all treated as arms of the sea and public rivers of the United States. None of the judges who participated in that decision even intimated that the Hudson was anything else than an arm of the sea and a public navigable river of the United States. Public navigable rivers, whose waters fall into the sea, are rivers of the United States in the sense of the law of nations and of the Constitution of the United States. They are so treated by all writers upon public law, and there is no well-considered decision of the Federal courts which does not treat them in the same way.*
8. Claim of the appellants, however, does not rest alone upon the doctrines of that case, but the proofs show that [p. 741] their wharf property and the river at the place where it is situated are both within a port of entry, as established by an act of Congress.
*
Propeller Commerce, 1 Black, 579.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution the power to establish ports of entry was in the several States, but this
court held, in the last opinion delivered in the case of the
Wheeling bridge,* that the power in that behalf, was sur-
rendered under the Constitution to the Federal Government,
and left to Congress. Eighth section of the act of the 2d of
March, 1799, provides that the district of Philadelphia shall
include all the shores and waters of the River Delaware and
the rivers and waters connected therewith lying within the State
of Pennsylvania; and that the city of Philadelphia shall be
the sole port of entry for the same.f
Subsequent provision is, that the port of entry and delivery
for the district of Philadelphia shall be bounded by the navy
yard on the south, and Gunner’s Run on the north, anything
in any former law to the contrary notwithstanding.^
Appellees suggest rather than argue that the mouth of
the river described in the bill of complaint is not included
in that description, but the point is of no importance, be-
cause it is clear, beyond controversy, that the river at the
place where the wharf property of the complainants is situ-
ated, and for a considerable distance above and below it, is
within the acknowledged limits of the port. Ample confir-
mation of this view, if any be needed, will be found in the
case of Devoe et al. v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co.^ which was
decided by Mr. Justice Grier. He said the commerce on
River Schuylkill below the port of Philadelphia is as much entitled to protection as that of the Ohio, Mississippi, Delaware, or Hudson; and that the complainants in that case had the same right to the interference of the court in their behalf as was shown by the State of Pennsylvania in the Wheeling bridge case. Although it is supposed the views of the learned judge have undergone some change as to the
* 18 Howard, 435. f 1 Stat, at Large, 632. t 4 Id. 715.
§ 3 American Law Register, 83. [p. 742] 74'2 Gilman v. Philadelphia. [Sup. Ct.
jurisdiction of the Federal courts, it has always been supposed that he was entirely accurate in all the matters of fact on which the judgment of the court was founded.
9. Other acts of Congress are cited by the complainants as supporting the proposition under consideration, but it will not be necessary to> give more than two of them any special examination. First section of the act of the 2d of March, 1819, divides the sea-coast and navigable rivers of the United States into two great districts, and the declared purpose of creating the districts is “ for the more convenient regulation of the coasting trade.” All the districts on the sea-coast and navigable rivers between the eastern limits of the United States and the southern limits of Georgia are included in the first district, and the second district includes all the districts on the sea-coast and navigable rivers between the River Perdido and the western limits of the United States.* Subsequent acts created a third great district, and pro-
vided that it should include all the ports, harbors, sea-coasts, and navigable rivers between the southern limits of Georgia and the River Perdido, and that it should be subject to all the regulations and provisions of the prior act.f
Doubt, therefore, cannot be entertained that all of the public navigable rivers of the United States falling into the sea, or into the bays and gulfs which form a part of the sea, are included in one or the other of the three great commercial districts expressly established for the convenient regulation of the coasting trade.
Looking at these several acts it is'not surprising that Marshall, C. J., should have said, in Gibbons v. Ogden, that “ to the court it seems clear that the whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade.” Strong support to that view of the law is also derived from the case of the Wheeling bridge, as appears in the first opinion delivered in the case.J
* 3 Stat, at Large, 492. J Wheeling Bridge, 13 Howard, 557.
Opinion of Clifford, "Wayne, and Davis, JJ., dissenting.
Remarking upon this view of the case, the court say in effect that the navigability of the Ohio River is a historical fact which all courts may recognize. They add that for many years the commerce upon it has been regulated by Congress, under the commercial power, by establishing ports, requiring vessels which navigate it to take out licenses and to observe certain rules for the safety of their passengers and cargoes. Every one of those acts of Congress, from the moment they were passed, became and are, as applicable to the river described in the bill of complaint as to the Ohio, and there can be no doubt, as it seems to me, that they must be held to have the same effect. Nothing has been said respecting the case of Wilson v. Blackbird Creek,* because, in the view I take of it, the opinion has nothing to. do with the present question. Judgment was rendered by the same court in that case which gave judgment in the case of Gibbons v.. Ogden, and there is not a man living, I suppose, who has-- any reason to conclude that the constitutional views of the court had at that time undergone any change.
Instead of overruling that case, it will be seen that the? Chief Justice who gave the opinion did not even allude to itr although as a sound exposition of the Constitution of the United States it is second in point of importance to1 no one which that great magistrate ever delivered. Evidently he had no occasion to refer to it or to any of its doctrines,, as he spoke of the creek mentioned in the case as a low, sluggish water, of little or no importance, and treated the erection described in the bill of complaint as one adapted, to reclaim the adjacent marshes and as essential to the public health, and sustained the constitutionality of the law authorizing the erection upon the ground that it was within the reserved police powers of the State.
Conclusion is, that Congress has regulated the navigation of this river, and that the State law under which, the respondents attempt to justify is in conflict with those regulations, and therefore is void, and affords no justification, to the re-
* 2 Peters, 250..
spondents. Admitting the facts to be so, then the complainants are entitled to recover even upon the principle maintained in the opinion of the majority of the court.
Secrist v. Green.
1. An acknowledgment on the day of its date, before a master of chancery, in New York, of a deed executed 3d March, 1818—probate being made by a subscribing witness personally known to the master, of the identity of the party professing to grant with the party presenting himself to acknowledge—and the record of acknowledgment, certifying that the grantor “consented that the deed might be recorded where necessary”—was a sufficient acknowledgment of the deed, by the laws of New York regulating the subject, at the date when the deed was made. 2. Having been so, and conveying land in Illinois, such deed was entitled to be recorded in Illinois; the laws of that State allowing deeds for lands in the State, executed out of it but within the United States, to be recorded when acknowledged or proved in conformity with the law of the State where executed; and when so recorded, it was properly read without other proof of execution.
3. Reputation being sufficient to establish death and heirship, a statement of them in a deposition, by an ancient witness, long and intimately acquainted with the family about which he testifies, and who says that certain children (“as appears from entries in the family Bible, and which I believe to be true,”) died at such a time, and another child at another time, “as I am informed and believe,”—is not subject to exception at the trial.
4. When a decree finds that due legal notice of intended proceedings in partition had been given to all the heirs of a decedent, the finding is, in Illinois, primfi, facie though not conclusive evidence of the fact.
5. Jurisdiction of a court being once established, its proceedings cannot be questioned collaterally by one not a party to them, and who seeks no rights under them.
6. By the laws of Illinois, a copy of a will proved in one State, and with its probate and letters duly authenticated under the act of Congress for the authentication of records to be used in others, may, after certain formalities gone through, be recorded in the county courts of a county of Illinois, where the testator had property. And when so recorded, certified copies of such county court records are evidence; being so under the general laws of the State.
Green brought ejectment against Secrist, in the Circuit Court for Korthern Illinois, to recover land in that State [p. 745] which had belonged originally to Tibbitts. The title which he set up, and the respective items of which he offered in evidence on the trial, was thus:
1. A deed from Tibbitts to William James, of Albany, acknowledged as hereinafter stated.
2. Death of this William James, and a descent to his heirs-at-law, of whom J. B. James was alleged to be one; all asserted to be proved by a deposition of Mr. Gideon Hawley.
3. Partition of a large body of lands in Pike, Morgan, Adams, and other counties in Illinois, of which the piece sued for was part, and allotment of it to this J. B. James, under proceedings in the Circuit Court of Pike County, Illinois; a record from which court was offered.
4. Death of J. B. James, and his last will, making one Dexter executor, giving power to sell real estate, with probate and letters testamentary, which will, &c., was presented in the form of a certified transcript of a record of Adams County, Illinois, recording, in that county, a copy (duly certified under the act of Congress,* “to prescribe the mode in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings in each State shall be authenticated so as to take effect in every other State”) of the will, proved and registered in Albany, with the probate and letters testamentary there granted thereon to Dexter, as beforesaid.
5. Deed from Dexter, executor, as above mentioned, to Green, or persons through whom he claimed, for the premises demanded.
1. As respected the first item in the title—the deed from Tibbitts to James. The deed, dated 3d March, 1818, was thus acknowledged on the day of its date: State of New York, ss :
Be it remembered that, on the day of the date of the within deed, personally came before me the within named George Tibbitts, and acknowledged before me that he had executed the within deed freely, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned, and consented that the same might be recorded where necessary; and
* 1 Stat, at Large, 112; Act of May 26, 1790.
further that Zachariah Galusha, to me personally known, a subscribing witness to the execution of this deed, having been duly sworn, made oath before me that he knew the said George Tibbitts to be the same person described in and who executed the said deed, and that he was a subscribing witness to the execution thereof; all which being satisfactory to me, the said deed may therefore be recorded.
Gideon Hawley,
Master in Chancery.
The defendant made objection to the deed, because:
(i) That there was no proof that the person taking the acknowledgment was really a master in chancery; and,
(ii) That a master in chancery of the State of Hew York had no power to take acknowledgments to deeds for lands in Illinois, and to be recorded there; a matter of course which depended on the statute laws of Illinois, and perhaps on those of New York also. The court below deemed the acknowledgment sufficient, and the deed was read.
2. As respected the second item in the title—the death of William James and the heirship of J. B. James. Both facts rested on the deposition of Mr. Gideon Hawley, aged seventy-two, a retired counsellor-at-law. Mr. Hawley testified to his long and intimate acquaintance with James, the ancestor, and to his death; to the fact of his leaving children, whose number and names he stated. He mentioned who of them were living, and “ that the children who died prior to his decease (as appears from entries in his family Bible, and ivhich this deponent believes to be true”), were J. B. James, &c.; that J. B. James, son of the said William, died in Chicago, on or about 22d May, 1856, testate as I am informed and believe. The deposition was objected to, because “ as to the contents of the family Bible, the said Bible itself is the best evidence, and because so much of the deposition as is on information and belief is incompetent.” The objection was overruled, and the deposition read.
3. In regard to the next link—which depended on the proceedings and allotment in partition under proceedings had in the Circuit Court of Pike County. It was not denied that the court named [p. 747] had jurisdiction of matters of partition; but objection was made that it nowhere appeared that the parties, James, were properly or legally brought into court, . . . and because the bill for partition was not filed or suit brought in the county in which the greatest amount of lands lie (as required by the statute), and because publication was made in Morgan County adjoining, and not in Pike County, where the proceedings in partition were had.
By the laws of Illinois all the parties in interest were required to have notice of the application for such partition, by summons duly served, or by advertisement, to be published for four weeks in the nearest newspaper to the premises.*
In the case of this partition, the record on the subject of notice ran thus:
“ The cause now coming on to be heard, and it appearing satisfactorily to the court that due legal notice had been given to all the defendants in this suit of the pendency of the same, by publication in the ‘ Illinoian,’ a public newspaper printed in Jacksonville, in the County of Morgan, and State of Illinois, four weeks successively, commencing on the first day of July, A.D. 1843, and ending on the fifth day of August, A.D. 1843; and the guardian ad litem of the infant defendants having filed his answer, setting up no opposition to the granting of the prayer of said bill, and all the other defendants, although three times solemnly called, coming not, but making default, and summons having issued, in pursuance to law, for all the defendants in this suit, and there being no opposition to the prayer of the bill, it is ordered that the said bill be taken for confessed.”
The Court below allowed the record to be read.
As to the fourth and final matter—the death of J. B. James, the probate of his will, and the record produced from Adams County, Illinois. It appeared that J. B. James died leaving a will executed at Albany, New York, where he lived; that this will was admitted to probate in the Surrogate’s Court of Albany [p. 748] County, and letters testamentary granted by the surrogate, Dexter, who was named in it executor and trustee; that the will with its probate and letters, properly authenticated by the surrogate according to the act of Congress already mentioned—which enacts that records and judicial proceedings authenticated as it directs shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence they are taken—was recorded in Adams County, Illinois. This record from Adams County, Illinois, it was which was offered—offered, of course, as a foundation for the introduction of the fourth link in the chain of Green, the plaintiff’s, title—the deed, namely, from Dexter, executor of J. B. James.
*
See Revised Laws of Illinois, 1833, p. 238, 13, 14, 15.
To understand the ground on which the record from Adams County, obviously not admissible on common-law principles, was offered, it is necessary to say that by statute in Illinois, passed in 1853,* entitled “ An act in relation to conveyances of real estate by non-resident creditors,” it was made lawful for a non-resident executor, who had proved the will of his testator and accepted the trust, in any one of the States of the Union, to execute the wTill in Illinois in the same manner as though he had qualified in that State. Before he could sell any real estate he was required to produce the will, or a copy of it, with the probate of it and authority to execute it, properly authenticated, and have it recorded in the County Court of that county in Illinois, where the property of the testator, or a part of it, was situated; and he was obliged to give bond for the faithful appropriation of the effects of th.e testator in Illinois. It was then the duty of the judge of the County Court to certify that such will was duly authenticated under the provisions of the act of the legislature.
The record from Adams County was duly authenticated. It showed that the bond which the Illinois statute of 1853 requires for “ faithful appropriation” had been given by
* 2 Purple’s Statutes, 1226.
Dexter; and that the judge of the County Court had made all the authentication required by the act to authorize the recording in Adams County.
The reading of this record from Adams County was objected to, because it was a record not of the original of any will, but a record of that which was but an alleged transcript of one; a copy of a copy therefore, or at best a record of a record. . . . The court below overruled the objection, and the record was read.
Two trials were had below, both resulting for the plaintiff. On exceptions to the evidence already mentioned as received, the questions here were:
1. Whether the acknowledgment of the deed to William James, before the New York master in chancery was sufficient to allow it to be read in Illinois ?
2. Whether the heirship of J. B. James had been sufficiently proved ?
3. Whether the court below erred in suffering the record of the proceedings in partition in Pike County to go to the jury?
4. Whether it erred in allowing to be read the record from Adams County, of the copy of J. B. James’s will, proved originally in Albany, New York, and with the record of probate and the letters testamentary, certified under the act of Congress as already mentioned ?
Mr. Grimes, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. Browning, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
1. The authentication by the master in chancery in New York of the deed to William James, when made, was in conformity to the laws of New York for the conveyance of real estate within the State. By the terms of an act concerning the proof of deeds and conveyances, passed by the legislature of New York on the 6th of April, 1801, and substantially re-enacted on the 12th of April, 1813, a master in chancery was authorized to take the proof and [p. 750] acknowledgment of deeds.* This authority remained unchanged until July 1, 1818.f After that, he was forbidden jto do any official act which did not exclusively pertain to his duties as a master in the Court of Chancery. If the grantor was not known to the officer taking the acknowledgment, the law required that the deed should be proved by satisfactory evidence, and that the substance of the evidence, with the names of the witnesses, should be incorporated in the certificate of acknowledgment. All this was done in the case of this deed; and if the lands had been in New York it is certain that the deed could have been read in evidence in any of the courts of that State without further proof. What effect is to be given to such an instrument, thus authenticated, in Illinois, must of course depend wholly upon the statutes of that State; and on this point we are not left in doubt. Provision is made in an act of the legislature of Illinois| for the record of all deeds to lands in that State which have been executed without the State and within the United States, and have been acknowledged or proved in conformity to the laws of the State where executed. The act also declares that all such deeds, when so recorded, may be used as evidence without further proof of their execution. The deed under review, having been acknowledged and proved, as required by the laws of New York, when it was executed, was entitled to be recorded in Illinois, and was properly read in evidence. It was, indeed, insisted that there should have been some proof of the official character of the master in chancery. But neither the legislatures of New York or Illinois saw fit to require any such proof, and therefore none was necessary. §
2. As respects the deposition of Mr. Hawley, read to the jury to prove the death of William James, and the names of his heirs-at-law, the exceptions taken to it cannot be sus-**§ [p. 751] tained; for the witness really testifies to every material fact of his own knowledge, although it is competent to prove death and heirship by reputation.
*
See vol. 1 Laws of New York, published at Albany by authority in 1802, p. 478; also Revised Laws of New York of 1813, p. 369. t See 4th vol. Laws of New York, session 1818, p. 44. t Session Laws Illinois, 1847, p. 47, § 3. § Vance v. Schuyler, 1 Gilman, 163,
3. Did the court err in suffering the record of the proceedings in partition to go to the jury?
The Circuit Court of Pike County, where a part of the real estate was situated, had jurisdiction, on proper bill or petition filed, to decree partition. All the parties in interest were required to have notice of the application for such' partition, by summons duly served or by advertisement, to be published for four weeks in the nearest newspaper to the premises. .
Such a notice was published, for the time specified, in a newspaper printed in an adjoining county, and the presumption is, that it was the nearest newspaper to the premises, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, or that a newspaper was printed in Pike County.* But the decree finds that due legal notice had been given to all the defendants, and the courts of Illinois hold that such a finding is primâ fade evidence of the fact, although not conclusive.! There was nothing in the record to show that the finding was not true, and the burden of proof rested on Secrist, who attacked the jurisdiction, to prove that notice in conformity with the statute was not given, notwithstanding the finding of the court.| '
The jurisdiction of the court being once established, its subsequent proceedings cannot be collaterally questioned. Secrist is a stranger to the proceedings, and does not claim under them, and can make no objection that does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. He cannot be allowed to object to a result of which the parties to the decree have not complained. § There was enough in the record to show that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties; and one who was not a party to it, and seeks no rights under it, cannot complain that it does not contain the original bill or petition for partition.
*
Stow v. Kimball, 28 Illinois, 107. f 30 Id. 116, Goudy v. Hall. Î lb. 117. g Gregg v. Forsyth, 24 Howard, 180.
We think all the objections which were taken to the introduction of this record in evidence were properly overruled by the Circuit Court.
Whether the record from Adams County—read in evidence as a foundation for the introduction of a deed from Dexter, the executor, which was a link in Green’s chain of title—was properly received, depends altogether upon the laws of Illinois. In 1853, the legislature of that State provided for the conveyance of real estate by non-resident executors. The substance of the act has been stated on a preceding page.* What the act requires was done in regard to the. will of Mr. J. B. James, and the record which was resisted shows that the executor complied literally with its requirements, and was authorized to execute the powers given in the will, so far as to convey real estate in Illinois. A certified copy of the record of the County Court of Adams County became, under the general laws of the State, evidence.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
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