Green v. Van Buskerk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 448
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Green v. Van Buskerk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 448
Full caption
Green v. Van Buskerk.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Green v. Van Buskerk.
The ten days given by the 23d section of the Judiciary Act, to take a writ of error from this court, run from the day when judgment is entered in the court where the record remains; and when judgment is given in the highest court of a State on appeal or writ of error from an inferior one, and, on affirmance, the record is returned to such inferior court with order to enter judgment there, they run from the day when judgment is so there entered.
This was a motion made by Mr.. A. J. Parker, in behalf of Green, plaintiff in error, for a supersedeas to stay execution upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Argument against the motion.
It appeared that a judgment was entered by the Supreme Court in favor of Van Buskerk, the defendant in error here, which was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, the highest court of law and equity of the State of New York, on the 22d of December, 1865. Upon this affirmance the record was sent to the Supreme Court, with an order directing that court to enter judgment accordingly.
In pursuance of this order, judgment was entered in the Supreme Court, on the 16th of February, 1866, and on the 20th February a writ of error, which had been duly allowed, to this court, was lodged, together with the proper bond and all other papers in due form to stay proceedings, in the clerk’s office of the Supreme Court of New York. On the 28th of February, 1866, the-attorney for the plaintiffs below directed execution to issue upon the judgment; to prevent which the present motion for supersedeas was made.
The reader will remember, of course, that the Judiciary Act of 1789, by its 25th section, gives a right of re-examination by this court of the judgments of State courts, when “ a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity in a State,” involves certain questions, and the decision on them is given in a particular way: and will recall, further, that, by its 23d section, a writ of error is a supersedeas only where the writ is served by a copy thereof being lodged for the adverse party in the clerk’s office, where the record remains, within ten days, Sundays exclusive, after rendering the judgment or passing the decree complained of; “ until the expiration of which term of ten days,” says the section, “ executions shall not issue.”
Mr.J.B. Gale, against the motion: A party’s right to bring a State court judgment here depends upon the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; and that authorizes a review only of a judgment in the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.
Now, in New York, the highest court of the State is confessedly the Court of Appeals; the Supreme Court, notwithstanding its title, being inferior to it. In this case, the
VOL. in. 29
judgment “ complained of” is the judgment of the Court of Appeals. That judgment was given on the 22d of December, 1865. Ko writ of error was lodged anywhere below until the 20th of February. Of course, it was not lodged within the ten days. The fact that the record may not “ remain” in the court whose “judgment is complained of,” does not alter the case.
It is almost unnecessary to say, that in contemplation of law the record passed instantly from the Court of Appeals, on judgment being given there, into the Supreme Court below. If, in point of fact, it was delayed in transitu, that gives no advantage to the defendant in it, as regards an appeal. He might, in point of fact, delay such transit himself.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
We have already held, at this term, in a case from Massachusetts,* that when the Supreme Court renders final judgment, and sends the judgment to a court below for execution, and with the judgment the record, a writ of error to review the judgment may be issued to the latter court.
In that case, it is true, no question was made in respect to the operation of the writ as a supersedeas; but we think that the true construction of the act of Congress requires us to hold that a judgment cannot be regarded as final, in the sense of the act, until entered in a court from which execution can issue.
In the case now before us, the record was sent by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, and the judgment was entered in the latter court in conformity with the direction of the former. This was, it is true, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court; but it became a final judgment, on which execution could issue only when entered, on the 16th February, 1866, in the Supreme Court, to which the record was returned, and where it remained.
*
McGuire v. The Commonwealth. (Motions.) Supra, 382.
Syllabus
The unsuccessful party had ten days from that entry to take out a writ of error and make it a supersedeas; and he duly availed himself of this right by service of the writ of error on the 20th February, 1866, and giving the required bonds.
The direction to issue execution was given under a mistaken construction of the act; and its issue makes it necessary that a writ to stay the proceedings be sent from this court.
Motion allowed.
The Sally Magee.
1. When a vessel is liable to confiscation, the first presumption is that the cargo is so as well.
2. The primh facie legal effect of a bill of lading, as regards the consignee, is to vest the ownership of the goods consigned by it in him.
3. Ownership thus presumptively in an enemy is not disproved by a test affidavit in prize, stating generally that the goods consigned had been purchased for their consignee contrary to his instructions, and that he had rejected them; and that this appeared “ from the correspondence of the parties,” which the affiant (an asserted agent of the alleged true owner) swore that he “ believed to be true,” but which neither he nor any one produced, or accounted for the absence of; and where, though two years had passed between the date of the claim and that of the decree, the consignors and asserted owners, who lived at Rio Janeiro, had not manifested any interest in the result of the prize proceedings, which were at New York, nor, so far as appeared, had been even applied to in the matter.
[N. B. The court, referring to The Merrimack and The Frances (8th
Cranch, 817 and 354), admitted that the case would be different had the allegation as to purchase by the consignor, in contravention of orders and subsequent rejection by the consignee, been sufficiently proved; and proved affirmatively, as it was requisite to prove it.]
4. A lien on enemy’s property, set up under the act of March 3, 1863, to protect the liens of loyal citizens upon vessels and other property which belonged to rebels, is not sufficiently proved by the test-oath of the party setting up the lien and asserting it without any specification as to date of origin, “from correspondence” with the parties and “copies of the invoice of the cargo” sworn to as “ believed to be true;” the p. 452correspondence and copies not being produced, nor their absence accounted for. The principles asserted in the preceding paragraph of the syllabus apply here. 5. Capture at sea of enemy’s property clothes the captors with all the rights of the owner which subsisted at the commencement of the voyage; and anything done thereafter, designed to incumber the property or to change its ownership, is a nullity. 6. Cases of prize are usually heard, in the first instance, upon the papers found on board the vessel, and the examinations taken in preparatorio; and it is in the discretion of the court thereupon to make, su& sponte, or not to make, an order for further proof. But the claimant may move for the order, and show the grounds of the application by affidavit, or otherwise, at any time before the final decree is rendered; and such an order may also be made in this court. The making of it any« where is controlled by the circumstances of each case. It is made with caution, because of the temptation it holds out to fraud and perjury; and made only when the interests of justice clearly require it.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, condemning as enemy’s property the bark Sally Magee and her cargo, captured during the late rebellion; the question before this court being, however, only as to the cargo; the condemnation of the vessel not being appealed from. The case was thus:
Before the commencement of the rebellion, the vessel had been engaged in trade between Richmond and South America. Her outward voyages were usually to Rio Janeiro. She left Richmond upon her last voyage on the 2d of January, 1861—that is to say, about three months before the outbreak of our civil war* —with a cargo of flour and domestic goods, shipped by Edmund Davenport & Co., of Richmond, and consigned to Charles Coleman & Co., at Rio. She took in a return cargo of coffee and a small parcel of tapioca. Four bills of lading were given. Three of them were to Coleman & Co.; two for consignments to Davenport & Co.; the third for a consignment to Dunlap & Co. The other bill of lading was to Moore & Co., of Rio, and was for a consignment also to Dunlap & Co. All the goods were to be delivered at Richmond.
*
The firing on Fort Sumter was upon the 12th April, 1861.
The vessel sailed from Rio for Richmond on the 12th of May, 1861. When forty-five days out from Rio, and before any intelligence of the war had reached her, she was captured as prize, and sent to New York, where both the vessel and cargo were libelled in the District Court. Upon the return of the monition, on the 23d of July, 1861, two claims, both made by Fry, Price &. Co., of New York, were interposed relative to the cargo. In July, 1863—two years after the proceedings on prize were instituted—both the vessel and cargo were condemned, the latter having been appraised at the considerable sum of $69,000.
One of the claims made by Fry, Price & Co., was in behalf of Coleman & Co., and embraced that part of the cargo (1500 bags of coffee) which was consigned to Davenport & Co. It stated among other things that Coleman & Co., as factors and commission merchants, at Rio Janeiro, “had been directed to purchase and ship for the account, and to the consignment of Davenport & Co., coffee, if procurable, at not over ten and a half cents a pound; that Coleman & Co. did make the shipment of the cargo above claimed to the consignment of Davenport & Co., but that by the invoice thereof it appeared that the said purchase was not made at or within the said limit; for which cause, Davenport & Co. had refused to receive it as purchased for their account, or otherwise than on the account of the shippers, Coleman & Co., and as agents of necessity for them; and that the said Davenport & Co. had authorized Fry, Price & Co. to receive the same in their place and behalf as aforesaid.”
The claim was supported by the affidavit of Mr. Price of this firm. It alleged “ that the facts above stated” were stated “ from the correspondence of the parties, which he believes to be true.” None of the papers referred to were put in evidence by annexing them to the affidavit or otherwise.
The other claim related to the residue of the cargo—^)out 2000 bags of coffee—consigned to Dunlap & Co., of ichmond. It was not denied that this was enemy’s property. The claimants alleged, however, a lien. Their claim p. 454stated that Dunlap & Co. owed them a balance of $35,326, and upwards, and “ that they were authorized and directed by that firm to receive and sell the coffee, and apply the proceeds, as far as necessary, to the payment of the debt, and to hold the balance for the account of the debtor firm.” Like the first claim, this one was supported by the affidavit of Mr. Price, who swore that he stated the above facts “from correspondence with the firm of Dunlap f Co., and copies of the invoices of the cargo, and believed the same to be true.” But as in the case of the preceding claim, neither correspondence nor copies were produced.
It is necessary here to say that, by act of Congress of March 3,1863,* “to protect the liens upon vessels in certain cases, and for other purposes,” it is provided, that where any vessel or other property shall be condemned in proceedings authorized by certain preceding acts (against rebels), the court making the decree of condemnation shall, after condemnation and before awarding the distribution of the proceeds of confiscated property, provide for the payment out of the proceeds, of any bond fide claims by any loyal citizens intervening in the prize proceedings, which shall be duly established by evidence.
Mr. Lord, for the claimants: The vessel having been captured before any intelligence of our civil war begun had reached her, the question of intent to break the blockade of our Southern coast—so usual a question of late in the court—does not arise.
The question, as to the claim set up for Coleman & Co., is one of enemy’s property purely; and as to the other, a question of the protection, under the statute of March 3, 1863, of a lien held by loyal citizens of New York. In both cases we suppose that the onus probandi is with the captors, f
I. respects the claim in behalf of Coleman f Co. The question is one simply, as we have said, of the enemy
* 12 Stat, at Large, 762; referring to certain prior acts. f The ship Resolution, 2 Dallas, 22.
status of the claimant; a proprietary question, whether at the time of capture the cargo was the property of neutral or of enemy? Now,
1, A foreign correspondent making a shipment on the order of his principal, but without the limits of the order, does not vest the property in the principal without some act of adoption, or waiver by him. Here there was none.
The doctrine has been uniform in the prize courts, that although goods are ordered by a correspondent, yet if they are subject to rejection by the principal, the property does not pass unless accepted. Several cases to this effect—the Merrimack and others—may be seen in 8th Cranch.*
In The Francesf one of them, a British agent in Great Britain, in orders given before the war to purchase goods for the claimants, an American house in New York, made purchases, but deviated from the orders. He said: “ I have exceeded in some articles, and have sent you others not ordered. I leave it with yourselves to take the whole of the two shipments, or none at all, as you please.” The bill of lading and invoice were expressed to be on account of the American consignees. Marshall, C. J., speaking of the consignment in excess of orders, says:
“ This, then, is a new proposition, on which the American correspondents are at liberty to exercise their discretion. They may accept or reject it, and until they do accept it, the property must remain in the enemy shipper.”
So here it remained in the Brazilian shipper until the deviation from orders should have been accepted or waived.
2. The claim and test affidavit were sufficient. The claimants at Rio could not be expected to verify the claim person• aUy; the verification by an agent is all that can be asked. The Richmond consignees, from living in Virginia, could not be expected to make the verification. The devolution of the rejected purchase to a competent agent, is in all respects proper, and the only way the claim could be put in.
*
Pages 317, 325, 328, 354. t lb. 354.
The test affidavit with the claim is sufficient. The office of the test affidavit is not to supply the details of evidence, but to aver the simple fact of proprietary interest. The oath annexed is as efficient as any detail of circumstances or correspondence. An order for further proof is made by the court ex motu suo only. It was not competent to the claimant to apply for it. The affidavit is always the summary proof, and, until impeached by further proof, is decisive in prize proceedings.
There is no ground, to doubt the truth of the affidavit, by reason of any want of statement in the bills of lading or papers, that the property is neutral. At the time of the last communication to Rio from the United States there was no war, blockade, or contraband, which the ship’s papers could refer to. Nor could the correspondence between the parties embrace any letters from the consignees respecting this shipment. There is no ground of any suspicion of suppression or unfairness as to documents; and on the claim, not impeached, and on the ship’s papers, the coffee of Coleman & Co. should not have been condemned, but restored to the claimants.
The decree of condemnation precluded all claim to offer further proof. Until the decree, no further proof could be admitted, even if the matters alleged were material, or were capable of an explanation consistent with the right to restoration.
H. As to the claim of Fry, Price & Co., as lien creditors of Dunlap $ Co.
By the doctrines of prize, a creditor having a mere lien, not being a direct proprietary interest accompanied with possession, cannot be heard in a prize proceeding. Whatever be his right, the captured property must be condemned. But the act of March, 1863, introduces certain new and benignant, though just features into the code of prize.
It is submitted that this act should be largely construed in favor of creditors. Also, that no “condemnation creates any rights to interfere with the payment of any debts whic p. 457could be specifically enforced. It overrides condemnations, and has the operation of an actual amnesty as to honest creditors. The cases, indeed, were innumerable where property became subject to condemnation during the rebellion, which to have swept from honest creditors would have been most unjust and cruel; and the principle, the spirit of the act in all particulars, is as applicable, notwithstanding its precise language, to prize condemnations as to any others.
Mr. Speed, A. &., and Mr. Coffey, contra.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.*
When a vessel is liable to confiscation, the first presump-
tion is that the cargo is in the same situation.! The bills
of lading in the case are in evidence. The goods were con-
signed to parties living in Richmond. This vested the owner-
ship in them. Such is the legal effect of a bill of lading as
regards the consignee, unless the contrary is shown by the
hill of lading itself or by extrinsic evidence.^ Upon the
proofs there was clearly &primd facie case for the condemna-
tion of the entire cargo.
We will consider, first, the claim in behalf of Coleman & Co.
In our opinion the law was correctly laid down by the counsel of the appellants. If the facts alleged are made out by the proofs, the claimants are entitled to restitution. The cases referred to in 8th Cranch are in point, and are decisive upon the subject. General principles, in the absence of these authorities, would have led us to the same conclusion. When an agent exceeds his authority, the principal is not bound unless he ratifies. Upon being informed he must exercise his election. Whatever may be the motives of his decision, the result is the same. His acceptance or rejection determines his rights and obligations.
Here, if Coleman & Co., as factors, bought the coffee at a p. 458price exceeding the limit prescribed by Davenport & Co., and the latter, upon learning the fact—no matter when that was, or what the circumstances—repudiated the purchase, the title of the factors thereupon became absolute, and none passed to the principals for whom the purchase was made.
*
Nelson, J., not having sat; having been indisposed. t 2 Wheatqn, Appendix, 24. + Laurence v. Minturn, 17 Howard, 100.
It remains to consider how far the facts alleged by the claimants are sustained by their proofs. The burden of the affirmative rests upon them. The language of the test affidavit implies clearly that the correspondence to which it refers was in their possession. It is not produced, and its absence is not accounted for. The court is asked to take the averment of the affiant as to its existence and construction, in place of the correspondence itself. This no sound system of jurisprudence would tolerate. If the correspondence was not in the possession of the claimants, doubtless that and other evidence was at the command of Davenport & Co.
Between the filing of the claim and the time when the decree was rendered more than two years elapsed. There was time to communicate repeatedly with Rio. Coleman & Co. could have furnished full testimony. If the facts were as alleged it would have been conclusive in their favor. Nothing is produced from them. It does not appear they were applied to, nor does it appear—large as is the amount involved—that they have done any act, or manifested any interest touching the controversy since it began. We can draw but one inference from these facts. It is, that if the evidence were produced, it would be fatal to the claim.
The appellants insist that an order of the court, made sua sponte, after the hearing upon the preparatory evidence, was indispensable to enable them to introduce any additional testimony; that it was not competent for them to apply f°r such an order; and that none having been made, the test affidavit should have been held sufficient. Such is not the rule as to further proof. If it were, the claimants would not be excused for withholding the correspondence, or not accounting for its absence when the test affidavit was submitted.
Cases of prize are usually heard, in the first instance, upon
the papers found on board the vessel, and the examinations taken in preparatory); and it is in the discretion of the court thereupon to make or not to make the order. But the claimant may move for the order, and show the grounds of the application by affidavit, or otherwise, at any time before the final decree is rendered. Such an order may also be made in this court. In one case affidavits were submitted in support of the application, and the order was made after the cause was heard.* In another case a parol statement was submitted by the counsel for the claimant before the hearing, and the consequences were the same.f The result is always in the discretion of the court, and that discretion is controlled by the circumstances of each case. The order is made with great caution, because of the temptation it holds out to fraud and perjury. It is made only when the interests of justice clearly require it. In the case before us no application was made in the court below, and none in this court.
If it be said the court erred in not making the order without an application, and without a showing, we cannot assent to the proposition. The state of the evidence warranted the decree; and, as the case was presented, there was no reason to believe that further evidence would benefit the claimants.
• The other claim relates to the coffee consigned to Dunlap & Co., of Richmond, and it is not denied that this Was enemy property. The claimants allege a lien. The claim states that Dunlap & Co. owed them a balance of upwards of $35,326, and that they were authorized and directed by that firm to receive and sell the coffee, and apply the proceeds, as far as necessary, to the payment of the debt, and to hold the balance for the account of the debtor firm.
The same affiant made the test affidavit, as in the other case. He referred, as in that case, to an important correspondence, and failed to produce it. The same remarks apply upon the subject. It is to be inferred, also, that the p. 460letters were written after the shipment of the cargo, and, indeed, after the capture. In either case the arrangement was made too late to have any effect.
*
Wheaton on Captures, 284-5. t The London Packet, 2 Wheaton, 372.
The ownership of property in such cases cannot be changed while it is in transitu. The capture clothes the captors with all the rights of the owner which subsisted at the commencement of the voyage, and anything done thereafter, designed to incumber the property, or change its ownership, is a nullity. No lien created at any time by the secret convention of the parties is recognized. Sound public policy and the right administration of justice forbid it. This rule is rigidly enforced by all prize tribunals. The property was shipped to the enemy. It was diverted from its course by the capture. The allegation of a lien wears the appearance of an afterthought. It strikes us as a scheme devised under pressure, to save, if possible, something from the vortex which it was foreseen inevitably awaited the vessel and cargo.
The claimants invoke the aid of the act of March 3, 1863. It cannot avail them. The facts relied upon as fundamental to the claim are not established to our satisfaction. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the subject of the proper construction of the act, or the effect of the facts, if they had been sufficiently proved.
Decree affirmed.
Simpson & Co. v. Dall.
1. Where a bill of exceptions at all fairly discloses the fact that the exceptions were made in proper time, this court will not allow the right of review by it to be defeated because the bill uses words in the present tense, when the true expression of the court’s meaning required the use of the past one; nor because the bill is. unskilfully drawn, and justly open, philologically, to censure. 2. A party offering secondary evidence of the contents of papers must show that he has in good faith exhausted, in a reasonable degree, all the sources of information and means of discovery which the nature of the case would naturally suggest, and which were accessible to him: Hence, Where certain original letters had been passing between two attorneys
in a case, and one of the attorneys testified that he had looked over his papers for all such documents as related to the case, and that the needed letters were not among them; that he recollected thinking about the letters at the time he was looking over his papers, hut (being under the impression that he had left them with his colleague) did not make “any special search for them. ’ ’
And where the other attorney testified that he had had the letters, but was under the impression that he had returned them to the first attorney; that he had not examined hisses of letters, and, not finding his letters among the other papers in his possession, supposed that the first attorney had them.
Held, that the secondary evidence of the contents of the letters was wrongly given: the court assuming of course that the search was insufficient.
8. Where a solvent firm owing bond, fide a debt, learns—though by irregular and perhaps improper means on the part of one of their number—that the debt is about to be attached by a creditor of the person to whom they owe it, they may nevertheless pay the debt as s’oon as they please and in such securities, including their own negotiable note, as their creditor is willing to accept; and if the debt is actually paid, and so acknowledged by their creditor to be, the creditor of such creditor cannot make them pay it over again to him; though his attachment may thus have been provokingly defeated. Neither is there anything in the laws of Tennessee relating to the attachment of debts due by non-residents that militates with this doctrine that a solvent man may at any time pay his just debts not attached by lawful process.
Dunham & Kearfoot, of Baltimore, were indebted on two notes, amounting to about $3000, to Dall, Gibbons & Co. of the same place, but were insolvent and did not pay. In this condition of things, Dall, Gibbons & Co. hearing that a house in Rogersville, Tennessee (Simpson, Duff & Co.), which was solvent, owed money to the insolvent debtors just named, at Baltimore, set themselves at work to get payment, by attachment, from it. Addressing his letter to Rogersville, Tennessee, Mr. Cocke, their attorney in Baltimore, accordingly wrote—first on the 16th of March, 1858, and then on the 17th—to a cousin of his, Mr. Jones, a professional gentleman, who had been residing at Rogersville, but who was now in Florence, Alabama, a place three or four hundred miles away; from which place, however, it seemed that he was ready to return when any business worthy of so long a journey made it worth his while to do so; Mr. Cocke, who wrote the letters, being a member of the law firm of G. W. p. 462Howard. & Co., at Baltimore, and the letters having been put under an envelope stamped externally with the business card of that partnership. Cocke was, moreover, a cousin of Mr. Simpson’s wife. The letters were of such a character that Mr. Jones “ might have felt authorized, if not directed, to consult Simpson & Co., whose debt he was requested to attach, in relation to the business.”
On what exact day these letters reached the Rogersville post-office did not appear. The regular course of the mail would have brought them there about the 19th or 20th of March; but if they happened to drop into a distributing-office by the way—“ a thing which very often happened”—they would have been delayed till the 21st or 22d. There was, of course, also, the ordinary chance of other accidents. When they did arrive, however, at Rogersville, they were put, as it turned out, into the post-office box of this very firm of Simpson, Duff & Co. From the post-office the letters went to the counting-house of this firm. Here Mr. Duff, a member of the firm, opened and read them; and perceiving their contents, mentioned the fact of his having opened them and of what was in them to his partner Simpson, the senior and active partner of his firm. He then re-sealed them, and in a letter post-marked the 29th March, though dated the 27th, transmitted them in a friendly letter to Mr. Jones, at Florence; not telling him, however, that he had opened the letters or was possessed, of their contents.
On the receipt of the letters, which got to Florence on the 1st of April, Jones came hastening up to Rogersville, getting there, perhaps, on the 4th. In the meantime, however, the Baltimore creditors having heard that Mr. Jones no longer resided at Rogersville, wrote, on the 25th of March, to another lawyer there, Colonel McKinney, placing the matter in his charge, and directing him to get the letters from the Rogersville post-office. Going to the post-office, he learned that the letters had been put into Simpson, Duff & Co.’s box. Following the matter up to Duff, he was told on the 29th that the letters had been forwarded to Mr. Jones, at Florence, “ several days before.” He then p. 463inquired of Simpson as to the state of their account with Dunham & Kearfoot, the insolvent firm at Baltimore; a matter which Simpson “ did not know about exactly,”—“would look at his books for,”—inviting Colonel McKinney “to call the next day.” On the next day Colonel McKinney called, and learned that, on the 26th preceding, they had remitted $2000 of their debt to their creditor house at Baltimore. They still owed, apparently, about $3100. On the 7th of April an attachment was issued; but it was too late to profit the persons for whom it was issued; for, on the ls£ April preceding, Simpson & Co. had remitted the whole balance to their creditors at Baltimore; sending various negotiable notes for $1600 of it, and their own negotiable note for the remaining $1500. A receipt was returned on the 5th; two days, of course, before the attachment issued.
In the meantime, and perhaps, as already said, about the 4th April, Mr. Jones presented himself at Rogersville. The first thing he did was to go to Simpson, Duff & Co., to consult with them about their debt, which he had been requested to attach. He showed to Mr. Simpson the two letters which he had received, and “asked Simpson’s counsel in the premises.” Simpson, without informing him that he was already apprised of what the letters contained, informed him that the claim had been “ turned over” to another attorney, Colonel McKinney, who was now “ trying to get an attachment on the amount his firm might owe Dunham & Kearfoot; ’ and informed him also of the fact, more important to his principals, that the debt had all been paid. Mr. Simpson added, that he had felt himself under special obligation to pay the debt, as Dunham & Kearfoot had been good friends of his firm; that he had been repeatedly written to by them to pay up the amount due; that he had been trying to get exchange; that he had been waiting till the return of a ceram debtor, whom he named; and for the payment of some ot er debts, so as to get exchange cheaper; and “that he the attachment of McKinney would not catch what o had sent on to Baltimore.” Jones finding out otherwise that his letters had been p. 464opened, re-sealed, and that he had not been told of this, and apparently put out at losing a piece of business that might have been remunerative, declared himself “ astonished.” And the Baltimore firm of Dall, Gibbons & Co., conceiving that they had lost their debt wholly from Duff’s having got possession of the letters, and in consequence of the knowledge which he had acquired by opening and reading what was not intended for him, now sued his firm, Simpson, Duff & Co., of Rogersville.
The declaration set out the existence of the debt, the writing of the two letters, that Duff’ a member of the firm, “ took the .same from the post-office without any authority for so doing, and opened and read them, and had thus illegally, wrongfully, and fraudulently acquired a knowledge of their contents, and communicated the same to the other members of his firm.” And it averred, that after the firm had in this way obtained information of the intention of Dall, Gibbons & Co. to attach the debt, the said Simpson, Duff & Co. wrongfully, illegally, and fraudulently detained the letters aforesaid, and illegally and fraudulently failed, for eight days, to forward or to deliver the same to the said Jones; with the purpose, design, and intention of preventing them, the plaintiffs, from obtaining payment of the notes due them, and for the purpose of favoring Dunham & Kearfoot aforesaid. By means of which tortious act and several grievances, and by reason of the insolvency and bankruptcy of the said Dunham & Kearfoot, which occurred soon after, they, the plaintiffs, had lost the whole amount of their debt.
Mr. Duff, however, for himself and his firm, had also an account to give of the transaction. This account appeared partially in the testimony of Mr. Cocke, the attorney in Baltimore, who had written and sent the letters, partially in the testimony of Mr. Jones himself, and partially in a letter of Duff’s own, written in reply to one which Mr. Jones had written to him, complaining of what Duff had done about the letters, and which letter of Duff’s, in vindication of himself, Jones had made evidence by referring to.
Mr. Cocke, the attorney, stated that the claim had been sent to Mr. Jones, “ because his intimacy and relationship with Simpson, Duff & Co. would enable him to ascertain from them the amount of their indebtedness to Dunham & Kearfoot.”
Mr. Jones gave more full particulars. He testified that before studying law he had been a clerk in the house of this same Simpson, Duff & Co.; that Simpson had married his first cousin, and that he and Duff had “ always, for years, been upon the most intimate terms of friendship;”—one evidence of which he signalized in the fact mentioned by him, that while he was at college “ he had carried on a correspondence with a young lady through the defendant Duff, and had authorized Duff to read his letters before giving them to the young lady.” He mentioned, also, the fact, that after the occurrence about the letters, he, Jones—as yet knowing nothing about it—had seen Duff constantly, and “for a part of the time slept with him at night.” He stated, also, that Duff had “ for years been authorized to take his letters out of the post-office at Rogersville, and to forward them to him when absent;” though he declared solemnly that he had “ never authorized him to open his business letters during his absence.”
The postmaster, too, of Rogersville, testified that it was his general practice, and had been for years, to put Mr. Jones’s letters into the box of Simpson, Duff & Co.; that. Dufi boarded with him, the postmaster; and Jones himself testified, that had he been in Rogersville when the letters came, he would have gone directly to Mr. Simpson and told him about them; adding, “ I think this from my intimacy with him, and from some directions to that effect in the letters themselves.”
The letter of Duff to his friend of so many years was thus, in substance and material parts, expressed:
Bear Jone Rogersville, 8th July, 1858.
Yours is to hand; and but for my absence from home, at the ime of its arrival, should have had an earlier notice. I have
vol. in. 30 p. 466only to say, it is true I opened the letter referred to. In so doing I was actuated by none other than pure motives. The letter was from a place I believe you had no private correspondence with, and at the time, it occurred to my mind that it might be a business letter, and one that demanded prompt and immediate attention. This was the only reason I had for the act. Owing to the very friendly relations that had always existed between us, and feeling a lively interest in your welfare, I thought I might safely take this liberty, and in taking it I was prompted alone by the feeling of doing what I supposed would be of service to you in your absence. When I found that the letter was connected with our business, I mentioned it to Colonel Simpson, your relation, and my partner, who expressed himself very sorry that it had been opened. I then resealed and forwarded it to you at once. If I committed an error, it was in not then informing you what I had done; this, however, was an error of omission only. Before opening the letter, I had no knowledge or intimation of its contents. You say you are “ astonished” at it. I am surprised that you should express astonishment, in view of our long intimacy, and in view of the fact that I have for so many years taken out your letters from the post-office at your request, and forwarded them to you, when you were absent from Rogersville, as you were when I opened the letter. I sincerely thought I was doing right, and for the promotion of your interest. It distresses me to learn, from the disapprobation implied in your letter, that you condemn an act, which, had it been done by yourself under similar circumstances, I would not have censured. The fact that I opened the letter, did you, I trust, no harm, nor your ^client. I forwarded it at once, on finding, as I did, most unexpectedly, that the letter contained claims sent out in behalf of Dall, Gibbons & Co., against Dunham & Kearfoot, which they desired to secure by attaching a debt due from us to the house last .named. When I first saw the letters, I did not know how long they had been in the store—and seeing two letters with the name of G. W. Howard & Co. stamped on the envelopes, it occurred to me that they were business letters of importance, and required immediate attention; knowing that Howard & Co. did a considerable business in this section of the country, and not for one moment supposing that the business could have any connection with our house, as we at the time did not owe them anything. I knew, also, that Mr.
Statement of the ease.
Cocke, a member of the firm of G. W. Howard & Co., was a relation of yours, and it was natural for me to suppose that business from them would be placed in your hands, when they needed an agent at this point.
I have reason to believe that Dall, Gibbons & Co., hearing that you had removed to Alabama, engaged the services of Colonel McKinney, and that he was at Knoxville, endeavoring to obtain an injunction as you came up from Alabama with the claims. If the business was transferred into his hands before you reached Rogersville, and when, as a citizen of Florence, you could not be expected to attend to it, I am really at a loss to perceive how my intended kindness can have operated to your prejudice, as we were making arrangements, and using every effort to settle our indebtedness to Dunham & Kearfoot, before we had any intimation of Dall, Gibbons & Co.’s claims. I repeat, however, that I am sorry this thing has occurred, and hope that this explanation will prove satisfactory, and that our former friendship may still remain unchanged. I trust I shall hear from you soon.
Your friend, truly,
J. M. Duff.
To sustain the plaintiff’s case it was necessary, of course, to prove that the two letters had been written. Mr. Jones proved that he had received two letters inclosing the notes; describing the letters. The record then went on in substance thus:
“ On the witness being asked to produce the letters, he stated that when he left Florence, a few days before this trial—for the purpose of attending as a witness—he locked over his papers for all such documents as related to this case. The letters were not among his papers. The witness recollects thinking about the two letters during the time he was looking over his papers; but being under the impression, that when the declaration was filed in this case, he had left them with J. R. Cocke, the plaintiffs’ attorney, he did not make any special search for them more than for the other documents.
‘ The attorney, Cocke, being then introduced by plaintiff, testified that he had had the letters in his possession, while he was drawing the declaration in this case, but was under impression p. 468that he had returned them to Jones. The witness had noi* examined his files of letters before the commencement of this term of the court, in getting his papers together for the trial, and had not found said letters; ,and not finding them among the other papers in his possession, he had supposed the witness Jones had them.
“ Upon this testimony the court permitted Mr. Jones to go on and testify as to his recollection of the contents of the letters; to which action of the court, in allowing secondary evidence while the existence of better evidence was shown, the defendants except.f The witness Jones then went on to testify that one of the letters was dated Baltimore, 16th March, 1858, and the other, Baltimore, 17th March, 1858; that one of them contained two notes, drawn by the firm of Dunham & Kearfbot, dates and amounts not recollected; that one of the notes was due at the time it was sent to witness; that the other note was not due, but would shortly fall due. In one of the letters there was a statement of the amount due from Dunham & Kearfoot to the plaintiffs, Dall, Gibbons & Co. But the amounts and particulars of that statement the witness was unable to remember.”
By the statutes of Tennessee, it should here be said, the property in Tennessee, of debtors non-resident within the State, is allowed to be attached only when such “ non-resident debtor shall be removing, or about to remove, his property beyond the limits of the State.”|
The record went on in substance thus :
“ The court, among other things not excepted to, charged the jury in effect, as respects material parts, as follows:
1st. That this debt was property within the meaning of the statutes of Tennessee; and that if the defendants were about to remove their property beyond the limits of the State, the plaintiffs would have had the right to attach it; that if the defendants, by arrangement with insolvent creditors, intended to pay portions of their debts, and convert other parts into negotiable securities, so as to defeat the power of the plaintiffs to collect their debts from such insolvent non-resident creditors, who were
* Sic, in the printed record. f Sic, i. e. in the present tense, in the printed record.
1
Sessions Acts of 1855-6.
plaintiffs’ debtors, such conduct would amount to a removal of the property from the limits of the State, and if such measures were in contemplation, the plaintiffs would have the right to attach such indebtedness, to prevent its removal and secure their debt.
“ 2d. That authority to forward a letter is not an authority to break it open; that if, even with good motives, the defendants broke open the plaintiffs’ letter to their attorney without authority. it was a violation of the legal rights of plaintiffs.
“ 3d. That if the defendants detained the letters thus broken open, with the view and purpose (as charged in the declaration) to enable them to use the information so illegally obtained, and pay the debt and convert it into negotiated securities, before the plaintiffs could issue their attachment and secure their debt, such detention, with such motives, was an illegal, wrongful, and fraudulent violation of the rights of the plaintifis, for which a right of action exists.
“ 4th. That in the event of the jury finding that the plaintiffs lost their debts by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the defendants, as above stated, and the insolvency of Dunham & Kearfoot, they would be entitled to recover the amount of their debts, such debts being not more than the amount due from Simpson, Duff & Co.
“ 5th. That all the partners who knew how the information was illegally and wrongfully obtained, and concurred in the subsequent acts to defeat the plaintiffs’ attachment by payment to the insolvent debtors, were liable for the damages, and none but those who did.”
A motion was afterwards made for a new trial, and the record went on in these words :
“ The court overruled the motion for a new trial; to all which action of the court the defendants except, and tender this their bill of exceptions, which is signed and sealed by the court, and ordered to be made a part of the record in this case.”
The case was now here on error: Mr. Maynard, for the plaintiff in error, contending:
!• That secondary evidence of the contents of the letters had been improperly received; there having, as he argued, een no sufficient proof of search for the originals.
• That the charge was wrong; and that Simpson, Duff & p. 470Co. were under no obligation to withhold from their creditor a debt which they justly owed him, and which he was pressing for,, merely because they had accidentally become possessed of intelligence that somebody else wanted it held back for their benefit.. Suppose1 they had accidentally or even designedly overheard a conversation instead of seeing a letter. Does any one think that in law they would have been bound to hold back payment?
Mr. Browning, contra:
1. Before passing to either of the objections, we note that no errors are assigned on this record. The plaintiffs in error say in this bill that they “ except” to the decision of the court admitting secondary evidence of the contents of the letters; but it does not appear that any exception was taken when the decision was made and the trial was in progress. On the contrary,, exception seems to have been first tendered after the motion for a new trial was overruled. Exception so taken cannot be availed of here.. It is a well-settled principle that no bill of exceptions is valid which is not for matter excepted to at the trial. The original authority under which bills of exception are allowed, has always been considered to be restricted to matters of exception taken pending the trial and ascertained before the verdict. It need not be drawn out and signed before the jury retire; but it must be taken in open court, and must appear by the certificate of the judge, who authenticates it, to have been so taken. This was fully admitted in Hutchins v. King,* where the rule was only not insisted on through a clerical mistake. Nor is this a mere formal or technical provision. It was introduced and is adhered to for purposes of justice. For if it be brought to the attention of the court that one of the parties excepts to his opinion, the judge has an opportunity of reconsidering or explaining it more fully to the jury.
2. The counsel for plaintiffs in error has raised a question upon the ruling of the court in admitting secondary evidence of the contents of two letters.
* 1 Wallace, 60.
No general rule can be laid down upon this subject applicable alike to all cases. The proof necessary to establish the loss of a writing, so as to let in secondary evidence of its contents, must depend upon the nature of the transaction to which it relates, its apparent value, and other circumstances. If suspicion hangs over it, and there is any reason to believe that it is designedly withheld, a rigid inquiry should be made into the reason of its non-production; but if there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is reasonable diligence to obtain the original—in respect to which the courts extend great liberality.* In this case, the search for the originals might have been more* thorough and rigid; but reasonable diligence was used, and there is no reason to suspect they were intentionally withheld..
But however this may be, the evidence of their contents was given to the jury without objection,, and the question of its admissibility cannot now be raised here.
3. Objection is made to the charge of the court. Is the charge really open to censure ?
Mr. Jones testifies that he never gave Duff authority to. open his business letters. There is no evidence that Duff" had such authority. What a college boy chose or did not choose to do a half century perhaps; ago, and on. one of those occasions when it is not given to men to be wise, is a small affair; of no pertinence to the case» If certain, letters were submitted to him open, it does not follow that he had a right to break open others not submitted» No. purpose that Duff m. his letter states as having animated him was to- be answered by opening and reading the letters instead of forwarding them. He saw the card of Howard & Co., on them, and could have replied to them that the letters were forwarded. He pretends to wish to serve his friend,, and does it by depriving him as fast as possible of a valuable piece of business.
But the gravamen of our charge is; less here than in that p. 472Duff communicated his irregularly obtained knowledge to Simpson, the leading and senior member of his firm. He had assuredly no authority to do that. Duff’s duty, when becoming accidentally possessed of information not intended for him, was to forward the letters as fast as possible, with an explanation to Mr. Jones, and to keep profound silence as to everybody else. If under those circumstances Simpson, or the firm generally, had gone on to pay the debt before an attachment bound it, we might, perhaps, have less to say. But here the debt was discharged in the way that it was, and with the haste that it was, obviously, in consequence of the information given by Duff to his copartner. Dates show this. Mr. Simpson is “ very sorry” to hear that the letters had been opened, and shows his extreme sorrow by profiting as fast as possible of the knowledge that through their being opened he had acquired. He went to work immediately to defeat the attachment; sending all the cash and drafts that he had, and- then to make short, clear, clean, and conclusive work of it, the firm’s own negotiable note for a balance that he could not pay in cash. The note did not pay the debt; and the only purpose of sending it was to put the debt in a form not susceptible of being attached.
As matter of fact, there is no doubt at all that it was in consequence of Duff’s opening and reading of the letter, and consequent communication of its contents to Mr. Simpson, that our claim was lost.
Mr. Jones’s statement of what he might, could, or would have done, if he had been at Rogersville—he not having been there—is of no value. It is based on a hypothesis non-existent, and is more than any man ought, perhaps, to state on his oath. In fact, Jones says that he only “thinks this.” Certainly, as a professional man, it would have been the least prudent thing that he could have done. It is not to be presumed of him that he would have so acted.
The instructions of the court, then, were substantially right. Taken as a whole, they presented the case fairly on both sides, and could not have misled the jury as to the
• Opinion of the court.
issues they were to try, or the principles by which they were to be governed.
But it is a sufficient answer to say that no exception was taken to them, when given, and that, therefore, this court will not review’ them.
Reply to the first point. The bill of exceptions, we'may admit, is not well drawn; but it is plain enough that the exception was taken before the witness was examined. It says, indeed, that the plaintiffs “ except” to the action of the court in allowing the secondary evidence. But it proceeds straight to add, “the w’itness, Jones, then went on to testify;” showing that the exception was taken before the testimony was given; and that though, in a present tense, the term relates to a past transaction. All that this court cares for is the fact; if it was properly taken, the omission to state it in the best way is not important.*
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
It is contended by the defendants in error that the rulings of the Circuit Court, which are alleged to be erroneous, were not saved during the progress of the trial, and cannot, therefore, be investigated here. If this was so, it would be fatal; but we do not thus interpret the record. It is well settled that bills of exception are restricted to matter which occurred during the progress of the trial; but it is not necessary, neither is it the practice, to reduce to form every exception as it is taken, and before the trial is at an end. It will do for the judge to note them as they occur, and after the trial is over, if it is desirable to preserve them, they can be properly embodied in a bill of exceptions. In this case the bill of exceptions is unskilfully drawn, and is justly subject to criticism; but it clearly enough appears that the rulings of t e Circuit Court, which are sought to be reviewed here, were excepted to in proper time, and when the cause was on trial, and not afterwards.
*
Hutchins V. King, 1 Wallace, 60.
If this is so, we cannot allow a valuable right to be defeated, because the judge carelessly used a word in the present tense, when the true expression of his meaning required the use of a word in the past tense.
It is a fair inference from the bill of exceptions that the defendants excepted to the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of certain letters, when the court decided to admit it; and it is an equal inference that they also excepted, before the jury retired from the bar, to each of the series of instructions which the court gave to the jury. The bill of exceptions is, therefore, valid, and brings to our notice the proceedings of the Circuit Court, which, it is asserted, are erroneous.
The theory of this action is, that the defendants in error, wTho resided in Baltimore, Maryland, in March, 1858, addressed two letters to Jones, an attorney-at-law, in Rogersville, Tennessee, which, in his absence, were opened and read by Duff, one of the plaintiffs in error, and their contents communicated to his copartners, and then were detained for the purpose of obstructing the defendants in error in the prosecution of an attachment suit against the indebtedness which the plaintiffs in error owed to Dunham & Kearfoot, a mercantile firm, also resident in Baltimore. These letters were not produced on the trial, and the court permitted Jones to testify as to his recollection of their contents. This action of the court was excepted to, because no sufficient evidence of their loss had been made to justify it. The best evidence in the power of the parties must always be furnished, and the court was not authorized to allow secondary evidence of the contents of these letters to go to the jury, unless it was shown that they were either lost or destroyed.
The well-settled rules of evidence require this, and the danger of departing from them is well illustrated in this case; for on the important point of the dates and amount of the notes the testimony of the witness was imperfect, and wanting in clearness and precision. In order to show the p. 475loss of the letters, it was necessary to prove that a diligent search had been made for them yhere they were most likely to be found. There is no general rule as to the degree of diligence in making the search; but the party alleging the loss is expected to show “ that he has, in good faith, exhausted, in a reasonable degree, all the sources of information and means of discovery which the nature of the case would naturally suggest, and which were accessible to him.”*
In the case before us this plain rule of evidence was palpably violated; for there was no diligence whatever used to obtain the letters, and no such search as would justify the court in inferring that they were lost.
J. R. Cocke, the attorney, went to the place of trial, under the belief that Jones, who was to be a witness, had the letters and would bring them. Jones was in the same category. Neither had made, any special search for them, for each rested in the conviction that the other was the custodian of them. It was a case of pure negligence, and should have been so treated by the court. To approve the ruling of the court would justify the admission of secondary evidence on the merest pretence, and would do away entirely with the necessity of producing primary evidence. We cannot countenance a practice so loose, and such a manifest departure from the plainest legal principles.
The decision on this point remits the cause to the Circuit Court; but as it may be tried again, we are called upon to go further and decide the merits of this controversy, as they are involved in the instructions which the court gave to the jury.
Among other things, the court substantially charged the jury, that if Simpson, Duff & Co. were about to remove their property beyond the limits of the State, Dall, Gibbon & Co. would have the right to attach it, and that they could not pay their debt to Dunham and Kearfoot, who were insolvent,
so as to defeat the measures which Dall, Gibbon & Co. had in contemplation to prevent it. Such a doctrine as this would effectually destroy credit and commerce.
If Simpson, Duff & Co. were indebted to Dunham & Kearfoot, they surely had a right to pay them, and the court will not inquire into the motive which prompted the payment. But the motive was meritorious, for the law does not favor a partial appropriation of an insolvent debtor’s effects, but prefers an equal and general distribution. When the debt was contracted in Baltimore, both parties contemplated that, in the usual course of dealing, remittances or negotiable securities would be sent from Tennessee to discharge it, and it would be singular if the fact that Simpson, Duff Co. were x about to remove their property from Tennessee, in order to comply with their agreement, should authorize the issue of an attachment.
The mere statement of the proposition is enough to show its fallacy. Dall, Gibbon & Co. had no claim against Simpson, Duff & Co. The relation of debtor and creditor did not subsist between them, and we cannot see why it was necessary for these last to procure the consent of Dall, Gibbon & Co. before they could send money and negotiable notes to pay in good faith an honest debt, due to a mercantile firm residing in Baltimore, which was contracted there, and in the usual course of trade must be paid there.
But it is necessary to discuss the evidence in the case, as the charge of the court assumed that there was a cause of action. Duff and Jones were intimate friends, and to a degree not often seen, for Duff was permitted to open and read certain letters written by Jones, which are not generally read by third persons. Duff had for years been authorized to take the letters of Jones out of the post-office at Rogersville, and to forward them when he was absent, and the postmaster always put them into the box of Simpson, Duff & Co. Jones and J. K. Simpson (the active member of the firm) were connected by marriage; and Cocke, who wrote the letters from Baltimore, was also his relative, and a member of the firm of G. W. Howard & Co., whose name p. 477was stamped on the envelopes. This fact Duff knew, and as his house had no dealings with Howard & Co., it was very natural for him to suppose that the letters were on business requiring prompt attention, which, as an act of kindness, he ought to give to it, during the absence of Jones.
Cannot Duff’s authority to open these letters be fairly inferred from these circumstances, and who can say that he erred in doing so ? It is true that he committed an error in not informing Jones that he had opened them, but no harm resulted from that omission. The right to open them cannot be affected by what occurred afterwards. These letters were not detained, but were immediately resealed and forw’arded to Florence, Alabama, where Jones lived. There is absolutely no evidence raising a presumption e’ven that they were withheld. Duff was probably to blame for telling Simpson the purpose for which they wrere written; but he could hardly have refrained from doing so; and if he obtained the information rightfully, what principle of law or morals prevented Simpson, Duff’ & Co. from paying their Baltimore creditors, who had indulged them, and were then pressing them for payment? If they had acted otherwise, they would have been justly censurable. Their obligation was to Dunham & Kearfoot, not to Dall, Gibbon & Co., and the information obtained simply hastened the payment of an overdue debt, which they had for some time been endeavoring to procure exchange to discharge.
But if Duff had not opened the letters, is it not manifest that Jones, on his arrival in Rogersville, would have communicated their contents to Simpson ?
Jones swears that he would, on account of their intimacy, and because Cocke had directed him to do so. And if Dall, Gibbon & Co. authorized their attorney to consult Simpson, and give him the same information which Duff did, how can they complain of the manner in which the information was obtained ?
The procurement of Cocke, who had nothing to do with the matter, to select an attorney in Tennessee, who was his p. 478relative and also a relative of one of the Simpsons, was a contrivance to obtain more surely and easily the information on which the proceedings in attachment could be founded. The scheme was a failure, and Dall, Gibbon & Co. have no just right to complain. They are in no proper sense the losers by the conduct of Duff. The result would have been the same if Jones had got the letters unopened, for he would have told Simpson what he wanted; and it is easy to see that, instead of responding to his request, the firm would, in obedience to a plain sense of duty, have paid their just debts to their own creditors.
On what basis, then, can this claim be sustained? The examination of the record discloses none, and we are unable to supply the omission.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and a
New venire awarded.
Beard v. Federy.
1. The act of August 31st, 1852, relating to appeals from the Board of Land Commissioners to ascertain and settle private land claims in California, created under the act of March 3d, 1851, provides that the filing of a transcript of the decision and proceedings of the board with the clerk of the District Court shall operate ipso facto as an appeal on behalf of the party against whom the decision was rendered, and that the attorney-general shall, within six months after receiving a certified transcript of such decree and proceedings, when the decision is against the United States, cause notice to be filed with the clerk that the appeal will be prosecuted, and on failure to give such notice that “ the appeal shall be regarded as dismissed.” Under this act—
Held, that when the attorney-general gave notice that he would not prosecute the appeal, such appeal was for all legal purposes in fact dis missed, and the decree of the board took effect precisely as if no appea had ever been taken; and an order or decree of the District Cour giving leave to the claimant to proceed upon the decree of the board as upon a final decree was a proper disposition of the case. \2. To give jurisdiction to the Board of Land Commissioners to investigate and determine a claim to land alleged to have been derived from t e
Spanish or Mexican governments, it is not necessary that the petition of the claimant should aver that such claim was supported by any grant or concession in writing ; it is sufficient if the petition allege that the claim asserted was by virtue of a right or title derived from either of those governments. The right or title may rest in the general law of the land.
3. All Mexican grants in colonization, under the decree, of 1824 and the regulations of 1828, were made subject to the approval of the Departmental Assembly. Until such approval they were not definitively valid. If not thus approved before the change of jurisdiction, it devolved upon the United States, succeeding under the stipulations of the treaty of cession to the obligations of the former government, to complete what thus remained imperfect. By the act of March 3d, 1851, the United States have declared the conditions under which they will discharge their political obligations to Mexican grantees.
4. The legislation of Congress requiring all claims to lands in California, by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments, to be presented'to the Board of Commissioners created under that act for investigation and settlement, and providing that all claims which are not thus presented within a specified period shall be considered and treated as abandoned, is not subject to any constitutional objection, so far as it applies to grants of an imperfect character which require further action of the political department of government to render them perfect.
5. A patent of the United States issued upon a confirmation of a claim to land by virtue of a right or title derived from Spain or Mexico is to be regarded in two aspects,—as a deedof the United States, and as a record of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant as it existed upon the acquisition of California. As a deed its operation is that of a quitclaim, or rather of a conveyance of such interest as the United States possessed in the land, and it takes effect by relation at the time when proceedings were instituted by the filing of the petition before the Board of Land Commissioners. As a record of the government it is evidence that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico, that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty; and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now so as to. embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government and parties claiming under the government, this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive.
6. The term “ third persons,” mentioned in the fifteenth section of the act of March 3d, 1851, against whom the decree and patent of the United tates are not conclusive, does not embrace all persons other than the United* States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles, such as will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property. In the Federal courts for the California circuit (which have herein
adopted the practice prevailing in the State courts under the State act regulating proceedings in civil cases), not only may distinct parcels of land, if covered by one title, be included in one complaint or declaration, but, with a demand for these, may be united a claim for their rents and profits, or for damages for withholding them.
8. Under this act, the provision as to the description by metes and bounds of the lands.sued for, is directory, only.
9. When the pleadings in an action of ejectment do not state the value of the property in controversy, the value may be shown at the trial.
After our conquest of California, in 1846, Congress, by act of 3d March, 1851, “to ascertain and settle the private land claims” in that State* constituted a board of commissioners, in the nature of a judicial body, before which, claims to land there were to be investigated. Every person claiming lands there “ by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments” was to present his claim to this board with the documentary and other evidences of it: notice of depositions, when taken, were to be given to the law officers of the United States. In case of confirmation of the claim, an appeal was given the United States to the District Court; in which case, says the act (§ 10), that court shall proceed to render judgment upon the pleadings and evidence in the case, and upon such further evidence as may be taken by order of the said court. If the decree in that court was adverse to the government, an appeal was given to this court. The act declares that “ for all claims finally confirmed by the said commissioners or by the District Court, or the Supreme Court, a patent shall issue to the claimant,”—but that such patent shall be “ conclusive between the United States and the said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons.” It declares moreover “ that all lands, the claims to which shall not have been presented to the said commissioners within two years after the date of the act, shall be deemed, held, and considered as part of the public domain of the United States.”
One section of the act—the 16th—enacts that it shall be “ the duty of the commissioners to ascertain and report to the
* 9 Stat, at Large, 631.
secretary of the interior the tenure by which the Mission Lands* are held.”
A subsequent statute,! that of August 31, 1852, and amendatory of the former act, provides that, when a final decision is rendered by the commissioners,
“ It shall be their duty to have two certified transcripts prepared of their proceedings and decision, and of the papers and evidence on which the same are founded; one of which transcripts shall be filed with the clerk of the proper District Court, and the other shall be transmitted to the Attorney-General of the United States, and the filing of such transcript with the clerk aforesaid shall ipso facto operate as an appeal for the party against whom the decision shall be rendered; and if such decision shall be against such private claimant, it shall be his duty to file a notice with the clerk aforesaid, within six months thereafter, of his intention to prosecute the appeal; and if the decision shall be against the United States, it shall be the duty of the attorney-general, within six months after receiving said transcript, to cause a notice to be filed with the clerk aforesaid, that the appeal will be prosecuted by the United States; and on a failure of either party to file such notice with the clerk aforesaid, the appeal shall be regarded as dismissed.”
Under the first act, Alemany, Bishop of Monterey, presented his petition to the commissioners for confirmation of a claim which he made to certain lands described by him, including church lands at the Mission of San José, consisting of the church, churchyard, burial-ground,, orchard, and vineyard, with the necessary appurtenances; the whole embracing a little over nineteen acres of land. His petition averred, in substance, that by the laws of Spain, from time immemorial, and by the laws of the republic of Mexico at the time of the cession of California to the United States, the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church had the force of law in all things relating to the acquisition, transmission, use, and disposal of property, real or personal, belonging p. 482to the Catholic Church, or devoted to religious purposes, or to the service of God; and that by the same laws it was not necessary that any grant of land for ecclesiastical or church purposes should be proved by any deed or writing, public or private; but the right of the church to the property devoted to religious purposes, &c., was always recognized as regulated by the canon law. That the premises of which he sought confirmation had been for a long term of time devoted to religious purposes and uses, the public worship of God, the administration of the sacraments, and sacrifice of the church; according to the rites, ritual, and ceremonial, of the said Catholic Church. That by the canon law, and the laws of Spain and Mexico, the title, control, and administration of this and all other church property of the same description, absolutely essential to the religious uses and purposes above mentioned, was vested in the bishop and clergy of the diocese, who, for such purposes, were regarded as a body corporate; that the Catholic Church, at the date of the conquest and cession of California to the United States, had been in the actual and undisturbed possession of the premises in question since the year 1797; and that for the purpose of enabling him to hold the property, and rightly administering it for the use of the church, he, the petitioner, had been made a corporation sole by the State of California, under the title of “Bishop of Monterey.”
*
Lands occupied by the Roman Catholic Church missions, t 10 Stat, at Large, 99> VOL. in, gj
The board confirmed the claim of the bishop. The United States appealed to the District Court. Subsequently, however, the attorney-general gave notice that11 an appeal would not be prosecuted in the case, and the District Court, on the 16th March, 1857, at a stated term, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the claimant have leave to proceed under the decree of the United States Land Commission, heretofore rendered, in his favor, as a final decree.”
Thereupon a patent issued to the bishop ram the United States. It recited the bishop’s petition, the decree of confirmation by the board in his favor, the appeal by the United States, and the notice that it would not be prosecuted, and in usual form gave and granted the lands to the bishop and his p. 483suecessors, in trust, &c., having about it every circumstance of formality.
Of the same lands, thus the subject of confirmation and patent to the Bishop of Monterey, one of the governors of California, Pio Pico, on the 20th of June, 1846—Mexico being then invaded by the United States, but the authority and jurisdiction of the Mexican officers not having yet terminated* — made a grant to a certain Castenada and others. The grant recited on its face that the governor had been authorized previously, by the Departmental Assembly, “ to alienate the Missions, with the end of preventing their total ruin, and providing the government with the resources which it then immediately for its exigencies required. Neither the said grant, however, n or any claim founded thereon, had ever been submitted for confirmation to the Board of Land Commissioners; and neither the grant nor any copy or counterpart or record of it, or any paper relating to it, existed or was to be found among the archives of the Mexican government; though the parties who held under it asserted and declared themselves able to prove that it was executed on the day it bore date, and that the consideration-money named in it, $3000, had been on that day paid.
Upon this state of titles, as they appeared from deeds produced or offered, one Federy, claiming title through the patent to the Bishop of Monterey, brought ejectment, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, against Beard, who relied on the title derived under the deed of Governor Pico.
In the State courts of California—their practice in common-law cases being adopted essentially in the Federal tribunals there—a statute allows a plaintiff to unite in the same complaint claims “ to recover specific real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, or for p. 484waste committed thereon, and the rents and profits of the same;” though the same statute provides that such property “ shall be described with its metes and bounds.” In this case the declaration (or complaint, as it is called in California) demanded three parcels of land, describing one by metes and bounds; one as “having two springs of water thereon, and lying outside of the adobe wall which inclosed a garden and orchard” previously described; and the third as having “ a mill-dam and a pond or reservoir of water thereon, lying to the- north or northeast, or thereabouts, of the said adobe wall.”
*
They terminated 7th July, 1846. See United States v. Yorba, 1 Wallace, 423. t l'or an interesting exhibition of the various documents issued by the overnor of California, in the exigent moment here spoken of, see United otates v. Workman, 1 Wallace, 753-4.
The plaintiff, in the same action, demanded judgment for possession of the premises, for mesne profits, stated to be $5000 a year, and for costs and damages, the last alleged at $1000. On, the trial, the claim for mesne profits was stricken out; but it was then mutually admitted that the value of the first item of the three parcels claimed, and the only one recovered, was $2500.
After judgment for the plaintiff for one of the parcels, the case came here on error taken by the defendants. Several points were made in their behalf. They were these: Mr. Wills arguing in support of them:
1. That under the 10th section of the act of 1851—which says, in terms, that on an .appeal from the commissioners to the District Court, that court shall proceed to render judgment upon the pleadings and evidence in the case—it was the duty of that court to proceed and render judgment; that, upon the refusal of the attorney-general to prosecute the appeal, the court should have dismissed the appeal or affirmed the decree of the board; that, having done neither, the case was still pending undetermined, and consequently that there had been no decree on which a patent could issue.
2. That the petition of the Bishop of Monterey to the commissioners did not show that he claimed “ by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government;” on the contrary, that it showed that the missionaries of the Roman Church had had but a permissive possession—though a long, peaceful, and unquestioned one p. 485under government protection—and, therefore, did not show right or title; but, on the contrary, showed affirmatively no right, no title. Precedents could be cited in support of this view.* Moreover, the 16th section of the act under which the commissioners sit required them. “ to ascertain and report” to the secretary of the interior the tenure by which the mission lands were held, and by strong inference deprived them of power to pass upon the validity of the claim of the church to them. The lands in question were confessedly of this class. ’ The board, then, had acted on a case without its jurisdiction; and its action was void. The patent founded on its void action was also and equally void. The case fell within Paterson v. Winn, in this court.f
3. That the grant by Governor Pico—having been, not a grant in colonization, but a sale, according to a recital on its face, made by order of the Departmental Assembly; a sale, too, to save the nation in a crisis of supreme need—vested a good title in the parties under whom Beard claimed, anteriorly to the patent to the Bishop of Monterey; a title not to be divested by any title subsequent to the conquest. The fact that this grant by Governor Pico was not submitted to the commissioners within two years from the 3d March, 1851, was unimportant. The act never meant to destroy titles complete, and fully existing anterior to the conquest.
4. That if the commissioners could pass upon the claim of the church to these lands,z yet, by the terms of the act of March 3,1851, the patent is “ conclusive between the United States and the claimants only,” and does not affect the interests of third persons; language which is plain, and conformable to the principles of common law, which deprives no man of his property unless upon hearing. The patent is, therefore, not evidence against the defendants for any purpose, and as between them and the plaintiff the whole subject of title was open.
The plaintiff, therefore, having offered no legal evidence of p. 486title, as against the defendants, they should have had judgment.
*
Nobile v. Redman, 6 California, 225; United States v. Cruz Cervantes,
18
Howard, 553. t U Wheaton, 380.
A party who had no title, under any right or title derived from Spain or Mexico, acquired none as against third parties by a patent from the United States. A patent in such a case only protected the claimant against the United States. His original title or possession must be shown, as against all others.
5. That the two last parcels of land were not described with sufficient certainty; and that the complaint united in one count three distinct causes of action; and united, also, a claim for damages for the rents and profits and detention of the land, with a claim to recover possession; a position which was apparently taken by Mr. Wills without knowledge that the Federal court in California had adopted the State rule of practice in this matter as its own; a fact which the learned judge of the tenth circuit announced from the bench to him, arresting argument on that point.
6. That by striking out from the complaint or declaration the claim for the rents and profits, the court had lost jurisdiction of the case, the argument hereon being that the facts necessary to give jurisdiction must appear affirmatively in the pleadings; that here the value of the land, as shown in the- pleadings, was made to depend on the amount of damages, viz., $1000, and the claim for mesne profits $5000; that these having been both stricken out, left the court, under the pleadings, without jurisdiction, and that this defect of the pleadings could not be supplied by proof or admissions made on the trial.
Mr. Carlisle, who argued the case thoroughly on principle and precedents, contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in the court below deraigned his title by various mesne conveyances from Joseph S. Alemany, Catholic bishop of Monterey, to whom a patent, embracing the premises in controversy, was issued by the United States. The patent is in the usual form, and purports on its face to be
x Opinion of the court.
issued under the act of March 3d, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of California. It recites that the bishop presented his claim to the board of commissioners created under that act, for confirmation; that the board, by its decree, rendered on the 18th of December, 1855, confirmed the claim; that an appeal was taken on behalf of the United States to the District Court; and that the attorney-general, having given notice that the appeal would not be prosecuted, the District Court, by its decree, gave leave to the claimant to proceed upon the decree of the board as upon a final decree. Upon this form of the decree of the District Court, thus recited, the defendants below objected to the introduction of the patent,, and the objection is pressed in this court. Their position is, that under the tenth section of the act of 1851 it was the duty of the District Court to proceed and render judgment upon the pleadings and evidence in the case; that,, upon the refusal of the attorney-general to prosecute the appeal, the court should have dismissed the appeal or affirmed the decree of the board; that, having done neither, the case is still pending undetermined, and consequently there has been no decree on which a patent could issue.
The objection is a very narrow one, and does not merit the attention which it has received from counsel. Its answer is found in the amendatory act of August 31st, 1852. That act provides that when a final decision is rendered by the commissioners they shall prepare two certified transcripts of their proceedings and decision, and of the papers and evidence upon which the same, were founded, one of which shall be filed with the clerk of the proper District Court, and the other shall be transmitted to the attorney-general; that the filing of the transcript with the clerk shall operate ipso facto as an appeal on behalf of the party against whom the decision is rendered; and, if the decision be against the United States, that it shall be the duty of the attorney-general, within six months after receiving the transcript, to cause a notice to be filed with the clerk that the appeal will be prosecuted; and, on failure to give such notice, “the p. 488appeal,” says the statute, “ shall be regarded as dismissed.” If it can be regarded as dismissed, it is for all legal purposes in fact dismissed. Here the attorney-general did not allow his intention to be drawn from his silence; he announced it at once. The decree of the court authenticates by its record the refusal of the attorney-general, not leaving this fact open to contestation by oral proof. The form of the decree is the usual one adopted in such cases, and probably a large number of patents issued to parties in California contain a similar clause. By the action of the attorney-general the decree of the board took effect precisely as though no appeal had ever been taken, and it certainly cannot constitute any valid objection to the decree of the court that it declares in terms the effect which the law gave to such action.
After the patent was admitted in evidence the defendants produced the petition of the claimant to the Board of Land Commissioners, and insisted that it showed a want of jurisdiction in the board in this, that it did not set forth any right -or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government. The position of the defendant appears to have been, that the claim of the bishop was invalid because it did not rest upon, or was not sustained by, any direct grant or concession in writing.
The petition sets forth two sources of title, one founded on the laws of Spain and Mexico, and the other on continued possession of the property for a period exceeding half a century. It avers that, at the time of the conquest and cession of California to the United States, the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church was in force as the law of Mexico, as it had been previously of Spain when Mexico was a dependency thereof, in all things relating to the acquisition, transmission, use, and disposition of property, real and personal, belonging to the church, or devoted to religious uses; that, by the laws of Spain and Mexico, it was not necessary that a grant of land for ecclesiastical or church purposes should appear by deed or writing, public or private, but that the right of the church to such property was always recognized as regulated by the canon lawr; that the premises in ques p. 489tion, being church lands at the mission of San José, consisting of the church, churchyard, burial-ground, orchard, and vineyard, with the necessary buildings and appurtenances, the whole embracing a little over nineteen acres of land, had for a long period been devoted to religious purposes and uses; that, by the canon law and the laws of Spain and Mexico, the title, control, and administration of all ecclesiastical and church property was vested in the bishop and clergy of the diocese, who, for such purposes, were regarded as a body corporate; and that the Catholic Church, at the date of the conquest and cession of California to the United States, had been in the actual and undisturbed possession of the premises in question since the year 1797.
These averments clearly present a case within the jurisdiction of the Board of Commissioners. They show “ a claim by virtue of a right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government,” which is all that is required by the act of 1851. That act does not define the character of the right or title, or prescribe the kind of evidence by which it shall be established. It is sufficient that the right or title is derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, and it may in some instances rest in the general law of the land, as is the case usually with the title of municipal bodies, under the Spanish and Mexican systems, to their common lands.
The board having acquired jurisdiction, the validity of the claim presented, and whether it was entitled to confirmation, were matters for it to determine, and its decision, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed on the ground that it was rendered upon insufficient evidence. The rule which applies to the judgments of other inferior tribunals applies here,—that when it lias once acquired jurisdiction its subsequent proceedings cannot be collaterally questioned for mere error or irregularity.
The grant of Pio Pico, bearing date on the 20th of June, 1846, under which the defendants below claimed title to the greater part of the premises in controversy, was rightly excluded. With the offer of the grant the defendants admitted p. 490that it had never been presented to the Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation, and had never been confirmed. The court treated the grant as one in colonization. All such grants, it is a matter of common knowledge with the profession in California, were made subject to the approval of the Departmental Assembly. Until such approval they were not definitively valid; and no such approval was obtained of the grant in question previous to the 7th of July following, when the jurisdiction of the Mexican authorities was displaced, and the country passed under the government of the United States. It remained for the new government succeeding to the obligations of the former government to complete what thus remained imperfect. By the act of March 3d, 1851, the government has declared the conditions under which it will discharge its political obligations to Mexican grantees. It has there required all claims to lands to be presented within two years from its date, and declared in effect that if, upon such presentation, they are found by the tribunal created for their consideration, and by the courts, on appeal, to be valid, it will recognize and confirm them, and take such action as will result in rendering them perfect titles. But it has also declared in effect, by the same act, that if the claims be not thus presented within the period designated, it will not recognize nor confirm them, nor take any action for their protection, but that the claims will be considered and treated as abandoned. It is not necessary to express any opinion of the validity of this legislation in respect to perfect titles acquired under the former government. Such legislation is not subject to any constitutional objection so far as it applies to grants of an imperfect character, which require further action of the political department to render them perfect.
The Circuit Court, as already stated, treated the grant as one in colonization. This was the most favorable view for the defendants, for if the recitals that it was made upon a sale of mission lands, and upon authority conferred by the Departmental Assembly, are to determine its character, it is without any efficacy in passing the title. It is simply a void p. 491instrument, and falls directly within the decision of this court in the United States v. Workman.* In that case the powers of the Departmental Assembly in the alienation of lands were very fully and elaborately considered, and particularly its asserted power to authorize the governor to sell the mission lands, and it was held that this body could not confer any power upon the governor, and that its own power was restricted to what was conferred by the laws of colonization, which was simply to approve or disapprove of grants regularly made by the governor under those laws.
This grant being laid out of the case, the only question for determination is, whether the defendants constitute third persons within the meaning of the fifteenth section of the act of March 3d, 1851. That section provides that the decree of confirmation and patent shall be conclusive between the United States and the claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons. The position of the defendants is, that as against them the patent is not evidence for any purpose; that as between them and the plaintiff the whole subject of title is open precisely as though no proceedings for the confirmation had been had, and no patent for the land had been issued. Their position rests upon a misapprehension of the character and effect of a patent issued upon a confimation of a claim to land under the laws of Spain or Mexico.
In the first place, the patent is a deed of the United States. As a deed, its operation is that of a quit-claim, or rather of a conveyance of such interest as the United States possessed in the land, and it takes effect by relation at the time when proceedings were instituted by the filing of the petition before the Board of Land Commissioners.!
In the second place, the patent is a record of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant as it existed upon the acquisition of the country. Such acquisition did not affect the rights of the inhabitants to their property. They retained all such rights, and were entitled by the law
of nations to protection in them to the same extentas under the former government. The treaty of cession also stipulated for such protection. The obligation, to which the United States thus succeeded, was of course political in its character, and to be discharged in such manner and on such terms as they might judge expedient. By the act of March 3d, 1851, they have declared the manner and the terms on which they will discharge this obligation. They have there established a special tribunal, before which all claims to land are to be investigated; required evidence to be presented respecting the claims; appointed law officers to appear and contest them on behalf of the government; authorized appeals from the decisions of the tribunal, first to the District and then to the Supreme Court; and designated officers to survey and measure off the land when the validity of the claims is finally determined. When informed, by the action of its tribunals and officers, that a claim asserted is valid and entitled to recognition, the government acts, and issues its patent to the claimant. \ This instrument is, therefore, record evidence of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant. By it the government declares that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. And it is equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. It is in this effect of the patent as a record of the government that its security and protection chiefly lie. If parties asserting interests in lands acquired since the acquisition of the country could deny and controvert this record, and compel the patentee, in every suit for his land, to establish the validity of his claim, his right to its confirmation, and the correctness of the action of the tribunals and officers of the United States in the location of the same, the patent would fail to be, as it was intended it should be, an p. 493instrument of quiet and security to its possessor. The patentee would find his title recognized in one suit and rejected in another, and if his title were maintained, he would find his land located in as many different places as the varying prejudices, interests, or notions of justice of witnesses and jurymen might suggest. Every fact upon which the decree and patent rest would be open to contestation. The intruder, resting solely upon his possession, might insist that the original claim was invalid, or was not properly located, and, therefore, he could not be disturbed by the patentee. Ko construction which will lead to such results can be given to the fifteenth section. The term “third persons,” as there used, does not embrace all persons other than the United States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles, such as will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property.
It only remains to notice the objections taken to the complaint in this case. They are advanced in misapprehension of the system of pleading and practice which prevails in the State of California. The system is there regulated by statute, and differs in many important particulars from the system which existed at the common law. There the ancient forms of action are abolished. In every case the plaintiff’ must state, in ordinary and concise language, his cause of action, with a prayer for the relief to which he may deem himself entitled. The fictions of the action of ejectment at common law have no existence. The names of the real contestants must appear in the pleadings. The complaint, which is the first pleading in the action, must allege the possession or seizin of the premises, or of some estate therein, by the plaintiff, on some day to be designated, the subsequent entry of the defendant, and his withholding the premises from the plaintiff. Ko other allegations are required, where possession of the property alone is demanded.
ut in the same action there may be united a claim for the rents and profits, or for damages for withholding the p. 494property, or for waste committed thereon.* Distinct parcels of land may also be included in the same complaint where they are covered by the same title, and the action equally affects all parties. The property should be described, if practicable, by metes and bounds; but this is not essential. The provision of the statute on the subject is only directory, its object being to insure such particularity of description, as to enable the officer, who may be charged with the execution of a judgment for the possession, to ascertain the locality and extent of the property. A description by name, where the property is well known, will often answer equally with the most minute description by metes and bounds.f This brief statement of the system of pleading and practice existing in California will furnish the answer to the several objections urged. That system, with some slight modifications, has been adopted by rule of the Circuit Court of the United States in common-law cases.
When by the consent of parties on the trial the claim for the rents and profits was stricken from the complaint, the court did not lose jurisdiction of the case, because the value of the property did not appear by any allegations of the pleadings. It was admitted that the first parcel, the only one recovered in the action, was of the value of twenty-five hundred dollars. This was sufficient, for it has long been the settled practice of the courts of the United States in actions where the demand is not money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the property in controversy to be stated, to allow the value to be proved at the trial.J
Judgment affirmed.
* Act regulating proceedings in civil cases, $ 64.
Bank for Savings v. The Collector.
1. Savings banks which receive deposits and lend the same for the benefit of their depositors, although they may have no capital stock, and neither make discounts nor issue any money for circulation, are “engaged in the business of banking” within the meaning of the first clause of the 110th section of the Revenue Act of 80th June, 1864, which enacts that “ there shalj. be levied, collected, and paid a duty of ^th of 1 per cent. each month upon the average amount of the deposits of money............ with any person, bank, association, corporation, or company engaged in the business of banking. ’ ’ 2. On the repeal of the proviso to that section, which declared that the section should not apply “to any savings bank having no capital stock, and whose business is confined to receiving deposits and loaning the same on interest for the benefit of the depositors only, and which do no other business of banking,” such savings banks became subject to the duty imposed by the principal enactment.
3. Moneys received by such banks from depositors become “deposits” within the meaning of the act as soon as they are received, and as such are immediately subject to taxation.
4. In interpreting a section of a statute which remains in force, resort may be had to a proviso to it, although the proviso be repealed.
The 110th section of the Internal Revenue Act of June 30,1864, enacted as follows :
“ There shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of 2’jth of one per cent, each month upon the average amount of the deposits of money subject to payment by check or draft, or represented by certificates of deposit, or otherwise, whether payable on demand or at some future day, with any person, bank, association, company, or corporation, engaged in the business of banking............
“ And a duty of J^th of one per cent, each month, as aforesaid, upon the average amount of the capital of any bank, association, company, or corporation, or person engaged in the business of banking beyond the amount invested in United States bonds.
And a duty of f’jth of one per cent, each month upon the average amount of circulation issued by any bank, association, corporation, company, or person; including as circulation all certified checks, and all notes and other obligations calculated or intended to circulate or be used as money.
11 Provided, That this section shall not apply to associations which are taxed under and by virtue of the act ‘ to provide a national currency/ &c........... [Nor to any savings bank having no capital stock, and whose business is confined to receiving deposits and loaning the same on interest for the benefit of the depositors only, and which do no other business of banking.”]
By an act of March 3, 1865—an act itself of numerous pages—amendatory of the former one, and inserting or striking out passages all through it, this 110th section was amended by “ striking out” that part of the proviso relating to savings banks, and above inclosed in brackets.
In this state of the revenue statutes, “ The Bank for Savings in the City of New York,” a respectable institution, incorporated by the State of New York, A.D. 1819, was existing in the city just named. The features which,, under its charter and by-laws, distinguished, as was conceived by its managers, this corporation from those which exercise to some extent the same functions, and especially from ordinary banking corporations and associations, were apparently these:
1. It was incorporated, not for private gain, but upon the application of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of New York.
2. It had no capital stock.
3. It had no shareholders, and no corporators interested in or entitled to participate in the profits of the institution.
4. The corporators were the “ trustees” for the time being, who constituted the “ Board of Managers.” These were prohibited from directly or indirectly receiving any pay or emolument for their services; neither could they have any interest in the deposits or the profits arising therefrom.
5. It was prohibited from issuing notes, making discounts, or transacting any business which belongs to or is transacted by incorporated banks other than is specified in the act, and from lending money “ upon notes, bills of exchange,, drafts, or any other personal securities whatever.”
6. It was enjoined and required to use the funds' intruste to it, and exercise the powers conferred for the promotion of the objects stated in the preamble to its charter, viz., p. 497“ encouraging in the community habits of industry and economy, by securing and investing in government securities or stock created and issued under and by virtue of any law of the United States, or of this State, and in no other way, such small sums of money as may be saved from the earnings of tradesmen, mechanics, laborers, minors, servants, and others, thereby affording the twofold advantage of security and interest.”
Its object, as declared in the preamble, was “ to ameliorate the condition of the poor and laboring classes of the community.”
[Power was subsequently given to invest in the debt of the city of New York, and to lend upon bond secured by mortgage upon unincumbered real property in the city of New York; and the institution was subjected to a closer scrutiny by the officers of the State.]
7. All the profits derived from the business were divisible ratably semi-annually among the depositors, except that a small percentage was permitted to be retained for accumulation, to prevent or to make good any loss to the depositors by reason of a reduction in the market price of securities or stocks held below the par value.
8. Money, when received by it from its depositors, was to be entered in a pass book,, which, when presented, was a voucher or warrant for payments made by the bank and entered in the book; and the corporation—which by its charter had power to pay cash to- depositors when required, and at such times and with such interest and under such regulations as the trustees should from time to time prescribe—could by its by-laws only be called upon to make payments either of principal or profits on four stated days in the year, and then only upon a week’s notice of the intended call. It was at liberty, however, to return all or any part of any deposit whenever it thought proper; and moneys might “ be voluntarily paid by the bank daily and without such notice, and without thereby waiving the right of the bank to such notice and time of payment.”
One of its by-laws was that “ all drafts must be made per-vol. hi. 32 p. 498sonally, or by order in writing,............. and must be accompanied by the pass book.”
9. All the money received by it under the charter was, and at all times had been, either actually invested in stocks or lent on bond and mortgage, except some small sum which was kept on deposit in a bank of deposit in the city for current expenses, or waiting an opportunity to invest.
10. Deposits of $1, or of any number of dollars, were receivable; but no person, “ except in rare and special cases,” and with the special direction of the attending committee, was allowed to have with the corporation moneys amounting in the aggregate to more than $1000, and in no case could the amount exceed $5000. Those having less than $500 with the corporation were, by law, entitled to receive one per cent, more of the profits than the others.
11. A large proportion of the depositors, it appeared, had incomes less in amount than $600 per annum, and were not liable to pay an income tax.
12. Courts were enjoined, by the charter of the institution, to construe the act of incorporation favorably and benignly for every beneficial purpose therein intended.
It was not asserted that the corporation had in any way exceeded its powers, or violated the laws of its creation.
The character of its “ depositors” appeared from a return of the new ones in 1865. These numbered 13,071; of whom 5905 were married women, minors, &c.; 300 washers, 571 seamstresses, 798 laborers, 1534 domestics. About four-fifths of the deposits were in sums of less than $100.
It may be here well to add that the statute of 1864, already spoken of, enacts by its 79th section thus:
“ Every person, firm, or company, and every incorporated or other bank having a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted upon draft, check, or order; or where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes; or where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes, are received for discount or sale, shall be regarded a banker under this act.
“ Provided, That any savings bank, having no capital stock, and whose business is confined to receiving deposits and loaning the same for the benefit of its depositors, and which does no other business of banking, shall not be liable to pay for a license as a banker.”
In the amendatory act of 1865, the above given proviso to this 79th section, a proviso which, the reader will have observed, much resembles that to the 110th section, was not stricken out.
The directors of the institution, conceiving that this was not a corporation li engaged in the business of banking,” nor otherwise within the sections of the act already quoted, made no returns for several months to the assessor of the United States of the average amount of the deposits out on loan or invested for individuals in pursuance of its charter, as every corporation engaged in the business of banking is required to do. Hereupon the assessor estimated the amount as the statute provides in cases of delinquency, and these being returned to and adopted by the commissioner, the last-named officer gave a warrant to the collector of the district, to collect the amount as estimated and assessed, with penalties. The collector, being about to proceed accordingly, the corporation filed a bill in the Supreme Court of New York to enjoin him. A preliminary injunction having been granted there, the case was removed by certiorari into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of that State.
The case coming on to be tried, the judges there were divided on the following questions:
1. Whether the Circuit Court could restrain the collection of the tax and penalties by injunction ?
2. Whether an injunction could properly issue in this case ?
3. Whether under the 110th section of the act of June 30th, 1864, as amended by the act of March 3d, 1865, the corporation ■was liable to pay a duty of jjth of one per cent, per month on the average amount of money so received and invested or lent as afoi esaid, and represented and entered in the pass-book as p. 500aforesaid, and payable to the parties entitled under the laws of the corporation already sufficiently set forth.
4. Whether moneys so received and invested were deposits within the meaning of the acts of Congress.
5. Whether moneys received on deposit in any one month and invested as aforesaid during the same month, were deposits within the meaning of the said acts, so as to render the plaintiff liable to pay a tax thereon for such month.
And on a certificate of division these questions were now before this court.
Messrs. Allen, Strong, and Bidwell, for the Bank for Savings:
The main question, and the one upon which all the others turn, is this:
Are these moneys—received for investment, and actually invested, or permanently lent for the sole benefit of the owners, and repaid with the profits, if any have been earned, at stated periods upon notice, upon a prescribed voucher, and upon presentation of the “pass-book” as a voucher,—taxable as “ deposits with a person or corporation engaged in the business of banking.”
The other questions are unimportant. If the decision upon the merits is adverse to the plaintiff, the injunction necessarily falls,, and if adverse to the United States there will be no, attempt to enforce the collection of the tax. The questions, as to the injunction, are, therefore, as presented here,, abstract questions, without particular interest.
The third and fourth questions are substantially the same, expressed in different terms, and must receive the same answers..
Now,, this institution is not a “ bank,” by which term, in an unqualified presentation of it, is meant a bank of the ordinary kind. It is a Bank for Savings only. But if it still be a bank,—that is to say, a common repository for people s money, having a bench or counter,—it is assuredly not a bank “ engaged in the business of banking.” The business of banking consists in buying, selling, and discounting commercial paper, with or without collaterals; in issuing notes, p. 501in making collections, and in receiving deposits of money and in paying them out on check, at call. This bank is engaged in none of these things. Will it be said that one sort of banks is banks of deposit, and that this is of that class ? Certainly it is not of that class as commonly so called. Deposits in any sense of the term cannot generally be made in this “ Bank for Savings:n and in the ordinary, popular commercial sense—which is the legal sense, also—and the sense in which, when used without restriction, the word “ deposits” must be presumed to be used in the statute* —deposits, in no sense can. What is meant by the word 11 deposit?” In its widest sense it applies to any material thing laid down; other things as well as money. But in connection with banking and in ordinary commercial parlance it means money taken to a bank, left there, and understood to be subject to check or draft.f Money thus deposited and drawn on enters largely into the commerce of the countrychecks and drafts are mercantile instruments, part of the machinery of trade, having commercial value and bearing no resemblance to the li pass-book” held by the poor seamstress, or washerwoman, or cook, who can go but four times a year and after notice to have a debit entered in it.
Neither, on the other hand, do “ banks,”—i. e, companies or corporations “ engaged in the business of banking” perform services like those performed by this bank for savings. The business of receiving, investing, or lending out the u savings” of the industrious poor, for the benefit of the poor themselves and irrespectively of advantage to the corporators, is not engaged in by any bank, whether the bank be one of deposit, or one of discount, or one of circulation, or, finally, one of all three characters combined. Banks avoid the poor; they seek, and properly, the rich: those who have p. 502the largest deposits are there the welcomed guests. This institution is the friend and agent of the poor only. The rich are repelled, and those who have small deposits—less than $500—receive greater interest than those who have large ones—over $500. Indeed, banks would not, ordinarily, be permitted to perform the sorts of services which alone are performed by this institution. Public policy has not permitted the savings of the poor to be hazarded by the perils incident to commercial institutions and business.
*
Hallewell v. Morrell, 1 Scott’s New Reports, 309. t Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, tit. Banker: where a banker is defined, ‘‘One engaged in the business of banking; receiving other people’s money on deposit, to be returned on demand, discounting other persons’ notes, and issuing his own for circulation'” Onrtis v. Leavitt, 15 New York, 9, 166,
Both State and national legislatures recognize the distinctive features of the two classes of institutions. The one class may, under the laws of Congress and the laws of most of the States, be organized under general laws, and by the voluntary action of those desiring to associate for gain, and they choose their own trustees or directors. “ Banks for savings” are created by special charter, and the trustees or directors named by the legislature, and provision is made for the filling of vacancies in the management by the board itself.
In all books and treatises, “ banks,” and “ banks for savings” are treated of as separate institutions, as distinct in all their characteristics as are abanks” and “insurance companies.” We in New York call them sometimes “ banks for savings.” In other cities they are known by other names. In Philadelphia they are called universally “ saving fund societies.” In France they are distinguished from banques of any sort; being styled “ caisses d’eparnes.”
It cannot be supposed that Congress intended to make an innovation, and so by the Internal Revenue Act, to confound and make one two classes of institutions, always before regarded as entirely distinct, and having nothing in common between them, except a similarity of title.
What, then, in reality, is this institution ? Its mere name, —though its name, a bank or common receptacle or repository for savings is not inappropriate—cannot impress upon it qualities which it has not. Its character must be determined by the services rendered and the business transacted, rather than by a title given for convenience or by accommodation, by any one. The “trustees” of the plaintiff are, in tiuth, p. 503but the trustees of the individuals owning the fund, and for convenience permitted to act in a corporate name; and if the same individuals should perform the same services as individuals associated together for the benevolent purpose that now binds them in a body, it would never have suggested itself to any one that they were bankers or engaged in the banking business, or that the funds of their beneficiaries were taxable as “ deposits” with such persons.
Negatively, the company is not a commercial institution, or one of business. Its transactions do not enter into or make a part of the ordinary commercial transactions of life. It has no capital and gain, and profit is not made to the corporation or its managers.
It is positively, as also pre-eminently and solely, a benevolent institution—a public charity—gratuitously rendering valuable service to the public, to its employers, and to the State.
The relation between the corporation and its poor beneficiaries is that of a Trust. The money is received for investment, and the plaintiff is liable to account. The special contract evidenced by the entry in the “ pass-book,” creates the trust, and the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, between the plaintiff and the individuals availing themselves of its services, and the rights and obligations springing out of the contract are those incident to the relation named. The money to which the cestui que trust is entitled, may be more or less than the sum deposited, depending upon the result of the investments. The relation of debtor and creditor as distinguished from that of trustee and cestui que trust is probably not created and does not exist.
The whole force of any argument which can be made in opposition to our view must rest, we suppose, on the fact, that by a proviso to the 110th section of the act of 1864, this class of banks was by a specific description of their functions excluded, and that by the act of 1865 this proviso was repealed. But if it be clear that under the general or substantive enactment the institution was not liable, the proviso was p. 504useless to discharge it, and the repeal of the proviso leaves the case where it was. Suppose it were enacted that all white male citizens of the age of twenty-one years shall pay a poll-tax, provided that no women or children shall be so charged. Could it be inferred from a repeal of such a proviso that women and children were meant to be made chargeable? Would it not rather be inferred that the proviso had been seen to be useless or absurd, and had been repealed on that account? Whatever might or might not be inferred, the repeal of the useless proviso would leave the principal and preceding enactment where it was; and if by it they were not charged they would not be chargeable at all.
■So, too, here. This institution for savings, not being an institution in any way engaged 11 in the business of banking?” it8 deposits were not liable under the principal enactment which makes liable to the tax no deposits but those of institutions so engaged. The proviso which exempts institutions for “ savings” was therefore unnecessary; and, philologically, perhaps, even worse. It did but redeclare in a literal form that which was already declared in a legal and commercial and orthoepical and scientific one. The repeal of such a proviso, of course, left the preceding enactment where it was5 that is to say, without savings banks included.
We all know that enactments are frequently made which do but declare what was already law; what would have existed just ;as well if the enactment had never been made. This is no strange circumstance in legislation. This term affords a case of this sort.* Especially is the observation true of what are called provisos: appendages, or clauses cast in adjectitiously at the suggestion of some one to remove a doubt which he had, or, more probably, supposed that some one else might have, but which no one would have had, and which, whether or not, would never have been declared a well-founded doubt by the law. Our internal revenue laws, the fruit of our civil war, have been recently and hastily enacted, in a crisis and emergency. They are enactments of p. 505immense magnitude, of a sort which was quite new to us; filled with obscure or incongruous provisions; and which if interpreted as some persons would seek to interpret them would seem to have been passed to show that Congress was seeking to exercise a despotism over the English language and to shame our mother tongue. In the present case we submit that the proviso was inserted ex cautela only, and, on a revision of the whole statute, has been repealed as superfluous
*
See supra, p. 293; Cincinnati City v. Morgan.—Bep.
Consider this question on public poncy and legislative probabilities. What are these u saving banks” or “ saving funds,” which exist in England, France, and all over the North of our own country?
In the State of New York there are seventy-three savings banks:*
Total deposits,.............................................................$111,793,425
Number of depositors,............................................ 456,721
The average’ amount of savings belonging to each depositor is $244 and a fraction; and there is about one depositor to every nine of thè inhabitants.
In the New England States there are two hundred and twenty-two savings banks :
Total deposits...................................................................... $119,382,941
Number of depositors,............................................ 527,090
The average amount of savings belonging to each depositor being $226 and a fraction.
Of the number and character of the depositors in the institution before the court, the reporter gives some mention In his statement
The annual percentage of increase in savings, fostered and encouraged, if not in truth, wholly induced by these institutions, has been very great within the last few years. In New England it was thirty per cent, from January, 1862, to January, 1865. In New York greater.
A reference to the savings of Great Britain, in comparison with those in New England and New York, will show the p. 506beneficial workings of these institutions, and that the true policy of the government is not to burden them with taxes of any description. Great Britain, with a population of 30,000,000, has aggregate savings deposits equal to. $190,- 494,406, or about $6.33 per head. « New England and New York, with a population of 7,500,000, has an aggregate savings deposit of $231,176,366, or about $30 per caput.
*
Bankers’ Magazine for July, 1865.
It will not be denied that the greater part of these savings are the fruits of institutions for savings, and that the laborers, mechanics, married women, and infants to whom they belong, would, but for the facilities for investment for accumulations of small sums thus afforded, have parted with them as they were earned, and that the State would have been the loser, the individuals so much the poorer, and the habits of thrift and good morals would have lacked the encouragement they now have.
Certainly, no wise government will tax institutions of these kinds, conducted upon principles and with motives such as govern the one here sought to be charged. They stand on the same footing as schools, churches, orphan asylums, hospitals, and those other foundations of religion and charity, and providence for the poor, which make the honor and glory of any land.
If well-known principles of law have settled it—as they have—that every act placing an imposition or tax upon the citizen is to be construed strongly against the government and liberally in favor of the citizen—that such acts are never to be extended by implication, and that their application will be restricted to cases within their spirit as well as to those within their words, with what an emphasis of reason do the principles apply to a case like this, where the collector seeks to take from the capital deposited in these institutions,—the capital of the poor, of even the very poor; “ men who work for their daily pay; women who perform domestic services for their weekly wages; persons who have garnered up their little treasures, the dearer treasure to them as it has been pinched off and hoarded from the scanty supply of their personal comfort;’’ persons who have little power to protect p. 507themselves against the arm of power, and who now look to this court only as their earthly avenger.
Mr. Speed, A. G., and Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Ashton, contra.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.*
Immediate purpose of the suit in this case was to restrain the respondent, as the collector of internal revenue for the sixth collection district of the State of New York, from collecting certain internal duties or taxes assessed against the corporation complainants, by the commissioner of internal revenue. Charter of the complainants was granted by a special act of the legislature of the State of New York, passed on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1819, and entitled An Act to incorporate an association by the name of a Bank for Savings in the City of New York.
Statement of facts as proved or admitted shows that the complainants did business in the city of New York under that act of incorporation, and certain other acts of the legislature of the State, as detailed in the record from the date of their charter to the time of the tiling of the bill of complaint. Complainants denied that they were subject to the payment of any internal duties or taxes as a savings bank, and they accordingly neglected and refused to make any returns either to the commissioner of internal revenue or to the assessor of the district. Failing to receive such returns the assessor of the district estimated the average amount of their deposits for the periods specified in the record, and certified the same to the commissioner of internal revenue as required by law m case of delinquency.
.Assessor’s estimates as certified were adopted by the commissioner as correct, and he thereupon proceeded to assess the duties or taxes in controversy, adding thereto certain penalties for the neglect and refusal to make the returns as p. 508required by the act of Congress, and directed the respondent as the collector of that collection district to collect the amount so estimated and assessed.
*
Field, J., not having sat.
1. Exemption from liability to taxation in the case is claimed by the complainants upon the ground that the corporation is not a bank, either in the ordinary and popular sense or in the legal sense of that word, and they allege that they have never transacted any business of banking within the meaning of the acts of Congress under which the duties or taxes were estimated and levied. Respondent in his answer alleged that the complainants were an incorporated savings bank within the usual and proper meaning of that term, and that as such they have been and were engaged in the business of banking as assumed by the revenue officers. Wholly unable to agree in opinion, the judges of the Circuit Court certified five questions to this court for decision, but in the view taken of the case it will not be necessary to examine the first two, as the answers to be certified to the other three will enable the Circuit Court to dispose of the cause.
2. Substantial import of the third question is whether the complainants are liable under the internal revenue acts to pay a duty of one-twenty-fourth of one per cent, per month on the average amount of money which they receive and invest or loan, as described in the statement of facts exhibited in the record.
Their powers are set forth in their charter and the other acts of the legislature to which reference has been made. Purpose of the charter as described in the preamble is to encourage in the community habits of industry and economy, by receiving and investing in government securities or in Federal or State stocks, such small sums of money as may be saved from the earnings of tradesmen, mechanics, laborers, minors, servants, and others. They are constituted by the first section of the charter a body corporate and politic by the name of the Bank for Savings in the City of New York, and the provision is, that by that name they shall have perpetual succession, and that they shall be capable of suing p. 509and being sued, pleading and being impleaded, and defending and being defended in all courts and places whatsoever. Power to hold real and personal estate to such an amount as may be necessary for the purposes of the incorporation is also conferred, provided that the clear annual value thereof, exclusive of profits arising from interest or from the sale of any stock in which the deposits made in the bank may be invested, shall not exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.
Trustees or managers are appointed by the act of incorporation, but they are forbidden to receive any pay or emolument for their services, and it is provided that they shall not “ issue any notes, make any discounts, or transact any business which belongs to or is transacted by incorporated banks, other than is herein specified.” Funds of the corporation are required to be used and appropriated for the promotion of the objects stated in the preamble, and the second section of the charter provides, in effect, that the association shall receive as deposits, from persons of the description mentioned in the recital to the act, all sums of money which may, on the terms specified, be offered for that purpose, and that the same shall be invested accordingly, and shall be repaid to the respective depositors when required, and at such times, and with such interest, and under such regulations as the trustees shall from time to time prescribe.
3. Such trustees may make by-laws and regulations, and they are expressly required by the charter to regulate the rate of interest to be allowed to depositors, so that they shall receive a ratable proportion of all the profits of the bank after deducting all necessary expenses. Authority is conferred upon the trustees to manage the affairs of the bank, and for that purpose to appoint clerks and fix their salaries, but they are required to make an annual report of their funds to the legislature and to common council of the city. Subsequent enactments very much enlarged the powers of the trustees, and subjected the bank to a much closer scrutiny by the proper authorities of the State. Investment of the funds under those additional provisions may be made in any State stocks, where the faith of the State is pledged for p. 510their redemption, or the moneys received on deposit may be loaned on bonds secured by mortgage of real estate in the city where the bank is located. They are also authorized to accumulate and “ hold invested” a surplus fund, not exceeding ten per cent, on the amount of deposits, as a protection to depositors against loss in case of the reduction in the market price of their securities. Bank commissioners have the power to visit and inspect the bank under existing laws whenever they deem it necessary, or whenever thereto required by the comptroller of the State, and they are required to report the general condition of the bank to the legislature once at least in every three years.
4. Intention of Congress undoubtedly was, to impose a duty of one-twenty-fourth of one per centum each month, upon the average, amount of deposits of money, subject to payment by check or draft, or represented by certificates of deposit, or otherwise, whether payable on demand, or at some future day, if made with any person, bank, association, company, or corporation engaged in the business’of banking, except deposits with associations which were taxed under and by virtue of the acta to provide a national currency,” and with savings bank having no capital stock, and whose business was confined to receiving deposits and loaning the same on interest, for the benefit of the depositors only, and which were doing no other business of banking.* Confirmation of that view is derived from the language of the next clause, which imposes the same duty upon the average amount of the capital of any bank, association, company, or corporation, or person engaged in the business of banking, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds.
Savings banks having no capital are not included in that provision; nor are they included in the next succeeding clause, which imposes a duty of one-twelfth of one per cent, each month upon the average amount of circulation issued by any bank, association, corporation, company, or person, including as circulation, all certified checks, and all notes p. 511and other obligations calculated or intended to circulate or to be used as money. Such savings banks having neither capital nor circulation, did not fall within the words of either of those clauses, and consequently it did not require any proviso to exclude them from the operation of those provisions. But those banks, as banks of deposit, did fall directly within the words of the first clause of the section, and therefore it became necessary to insert the proviso near the close of the section, to exclude them from the otherwise plain meaning and operation of the clause.
*
g 110, 3 Stat, at Large, 277-
Precise language of the proviso is, that the section shall not apply “ to any savings bank having no capital stock, and whose business is confined to receiving deposits, and loaning the same on interest, for the benefit of the depositors only, and which do no other business of banking.” More exact description of the corporation complainants than is expressed in the language of that proviso, could not be conceived; and it amounts to a legislative enactment, that the receiving of deposits and loaning the same on interest, for the benefit of the depositors, is a business of banking. Throughout the section the distinction between deposits, capital, and circulation as separate objects of taxation, is clearly maintained and enforced, both in respect to the monthly returns and the monthly payment of the duties.
Same remarks apply to the seventy-ninth section of the act, which requires bankers to pay a certain sum for a license, and defines the meaning of the word as used in the section. Doubt cannot be entertained that the definition as there given would have included savings banks having no capital stock, but for the proviso annexed to the clause, which is in the very words of the proviso under consideration.
5. Argument for the complainants is, that the proviso was only inserted out of abundant caution, and that it was unnecessary, inasmuch as such an association was not included m the substantive words of the section; but it is not possible to sustain that proposition for the reasons already given, as well as others which will be briefly stated. 1. p. 512Unquestionably the complainants receive deposits as one of the primary purposes of the charter, and the second by-law of the bank provides, that M deposits of one dollar, or any number of dollars, may be received, but are not, in the whole, to exceed one thousand dollars from any depositor, without the special direction of the attending committee.” General rule is, that no depositor is allowed to have deposits beyond one thousand dollars; but he may have that amount, and, in special cases, when it is made to appear that he can find no other investment, he may exceed that amount. 2. By the terms of their charter they are obliged to pay each depositor, when required,“ and at such times, and with such interest, and under such regulations as the trustees shall from time to time prescribe.”
Obligation of repayment exists throughout, and it cannot make any difference as to the liability of the complainants in this case that the entries are made in a pass-book, and that the depositors can only obtain their deposits at certain stated periods. Deposits are made to be invested for the benefit of the depositors, and the bank is under obligations to repay the amount when demanded, agreeably to the by-laws and charter. 3. Only remaining condition to bring the case within the words of the body of the act is, that the deposits should be made with a person, bank, association, company, or corporation engaged in the business of banking. Agreed case shows that the corporation complainants were engaged in receiving deposits, and loaning the same on interest for the benefit of the depositors. Irrespective of the definition given to that phrase in the language of the proviso, the same conclusion must be adopted from the facts exhibited in the statement of the case, unless it can be established that the receiving of deposits by a chartered company, and loaning or investing the same for the benefit of the depositors, is not a business of banking.
Banks, in the commercial sense, are of three kinds, to wit. 1, of deposit; 2, of discount; 3, of circulation. All or anj two of these functions may, and frequently are, exercised by the same association; but there are still banks of deposit, p. 513without authority to make discounts or issue a circulating medium.*
“Banks for savings,” says McCulloch, “are banks established for the receipt of small sums deposited by the poorer class of persons for accumulation at interest.”t Definition given by Grant is more extended, but it amounts to the same thing.| Courts of justice, also, as well as text writers, recognize the well-known distinction between banks of deposit and banks of discount or circulation.§
6. Beyond all controversy the proviso, while it continued in force, had the effect to exclude the corporation complainants from the operation of the substantive words of the section. ^ince the passage of the act, however, the proviso has been stricken out, and the palpable effect of the repeal is to leave the body of the act in full force and operation, without any such qualification as was imposed by the proviso.|| Although the proviso is repealed, still it is proper to resort to it as well as to the proviso in the seventy-ninth section of the same act, as affording a legislative exposition of what is meant by the phrase, engaged in the business of banking, as employed in the first clause of the section under consideration. Looking at the case, therefore, in any point of view, it is clear that the answer to the third question must be in the affirmative.
7. Fourth question presented for decision is, whether the moneys so received on deposit and invested,, are deposits within the meaning of the act of Congress. Obviously the question as presented is substantially answered by the remarks already made in disposing of the preceding question. AU the moneys received by the bank, whether for safe-keeping or for investment, are deposits within the meaning of their by-laws, and within the very words of their charter. Answer to this question, also, must be in the affirmative.
*
Angel & Ames on Corporations, § 55; McCulloch’s Commercial Dictionary, 73. -j. Id. 146. J Grant on Banking, 614. § Duncan v. Savings Institution, 10 Gill &. Johnson, 309; People v. Utica Insurance Co.,. 1.5. Johnson, 390; Grant on Banking, 1, 6, 381, 614. || 13 Stat, at Large,479. vol. in. 33
8. Fifth question is, whether moneys received on deposit in any one month, and invested during the same month, are deposits within the meaning of said acts, so as to render the complainants liable to pay a tax thereon for such month. Moneys received, as already explained, whether invested or not, are deposits within the meaning of the acts of Congress, and if so, then it is clear that the amount, whatever it may be, is liable to taxation as soon as it is received by the bank, because when received by the bank, it becomes deposits, and continues to be such till it is repaid to the depositor. An affirmative answer must also be certified to this question.
No answers will be certified to the first two questions, because the court is of the opinion that those given to the others are sufficient to dispose of the cause.
Answers accordingly.
GRIER and NELSON, JJ., dissented; FIELD, J., who, as already said, had not sat in the case, took no part in the judgment.
The Bermuda.
1. No trade honestly carried on between neutral ports; whether of the same dr of different nations, can be lawfully interrupted by belligerents; but good faith must preside over such commerce: enemy commerce under neutral disguises has no claim to neutral immunity.
2. Neutrals may establish themselves, for the purposes of trade, in ports convenient to either belligerent; and may sell or transport to either such articles as either may wish to buy, subject to risks of capture for violation of blockade or for the conveyance of contraband to belligerent ports.
8. Goods of every description may be conveyed to neutral ports from neutral ports, if intended for actual discharge at a neutral port, and to be brought into the common stock of merchandise of such port; but voyages from neutral ports intended for belligerent ports are not protected in respect to seizure, either of ship or cargo, by an intention, real or pretended, to touch at intermediate neutral ports.
4. Neutrals may convey to belligerent ports, not under blockade, whatever belligerents may desire to take, except contraband of war, which is p. 515always subject to seizure when being conveyed to a belligerent destination, whether the voyage be direct or indirect; such seizure, however, is restricted to actual contraband, and does not extend to the ship or other cargo, except in cases of fraud or bad faith on the part of the owners, or of the master with the sanction of the owners.
5. Vessels conveying contraband cargo to belligerent ports not under blockade, under circumstances of fraud or bad faith, or cargo of any description to belligerent ports under blockade, are li able to seizure and condemnation from the commencement to the end of the voyage.
6. A voyage from a neutral to a belligerent port is one and the same voyage, whether the destination be ulterior or direct, and whether with or without the interposition of one or more intermediate ports; and whether to be performed by one vessel or several employed in the same transaction and in the accomplishment of the same purpose.
7. Destination alone justifies seizure and condemnation of ship and cargo in voyage to ports under blockade ; and such destination justifies equally seizure of contraband in voyage to ports not under blockade; but, in the last case, ship and cargo not contraband are free from seizure, except in cases of fraud or bad faith.
8. Circumstances, such as selection of master, control in lading and destination, instructions for conduct of voyage, and other like acts of ownership by an enemy, may repel, in the absence of charter-party or other explanation, presumptions of ownership in a neutral arising from registry or other documents, and will warrant condemnation of a ship captured in the employment of enemies as enemy property.
9. Spoliation of papers, at the time of capture, under instructions and without explanation by production of the instructions, or otherwise, warrants the most unfavorable inferences as to employment, destination, and ownership of the captured vessel.
Appeal from a decree made by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, regarding the steamship Bermuda and her cargo, captured during the rebellion b} the government war-vessel Mercedita, and sent into Phila delphia, and libelled there and proceeded on in prize.
The allegations of the captors were, that the vessel was enemy’s property, and with her cargo—largely composed of munitions of war—had been intending, either directly or by transshipment, to break the blockade, then established by our government, of the southern coast, and that both she and her cargo were, on these and other grounds, subject to be captured and condemned.
The case was interesting, partly from the value, larger than common, of the ship and cargo, but more particularly p. 516from the fact, that while many and strong indications of a general sort pointed at once to the truth of the allegations of the captors, blockade-running had been brought, by our adventurous English kinsfolk, during the Southern rebellion, to so much of a science; true purposes, by the aid of intermediate neutral ports of their own, had come to be so very well disguised; the final general destination of the cargo in this particular voyage was left so skilfully open, and the capture was so confessedly in neutral neighborhoods, that it was not quite easy to prove, with that certainty which American courts require, the intention, which it seemed plain must have really existed. Thus to prove it, required that truth should be collated from a variety of sources, darkened or disguised; from others opened as the cause advanced, and by accident only; from coincidences undesigned, and facts that were circumstantial. Collocations and comparisons, in short, brought largely their collective force in aid of evidences that were more direct.
The history of things, as they appeared on one side and on the other respectively, was in substance thus:
On the captor’s sale. The vessel herself had been built at Stockton-upon-Tees, in 1861. In August of that year, a certain Edwin Haigh made the declaration of ownership required by the British Merchants’ Shipping Act of 1854. He described himself as a “ natural born British subject,” of Liverpool, “and entitled to be registered as owner;” swearing, according to the usual form, that no other person qualified to be owner of British ships is entitled as owner to any interest whatever.”* E. L. Tessier, a South Carolinian,
*
It w.as, perhaps, a noteworthy fact that, in most of the affidavits, &c., about the ownership, the language was of a sort that did not necessarily involve an unqualified assertion of real and equitable ownership, as distinguished from the legal title and ownership on the registry, which the British statutes, like our own, largely look to. One of the documents, for example, said: “Your memorialist is a British subject and sole registered oymer” of the ship Bermuda, &c. In another, Mr. Haigh styles himself, “shipowner and merchant.” In another, he thought that certain contraband things found on board should not affect his position “ as owner of the vessel,” &c. &c.
Dec. 1865.] The Bermuda .517
was stated to be master of the ship. It was not denied that Haigh was a British subject. On the day after her registry, as appeared by a document from the Liverpool customs, entitled, “ Certified Copy, Transaction subsequent to registry,” Haigh executed a power of attorney, or “certificate, as it was called, to Allan Stuart Hencle and George Alfred Trenholm, both of Charleston, South Carolina, merchants, “jointly or severally to sell the ship, at any place out of the kingdom, for any sum he or they may deem sufficient, within twelve months from the date of the certificate.” There was no evidence that this power had ever been revoked or returned.
Trenholm was a member of the firm of Frazer, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, a firm which, with its branch house, John Frazer & Co., of Charleston, was one of the firms most largely engaged in rendering aid to and sustaining the rebellion, by fitting out blockade-runners, and corsairs to injure American commerce. They were also the disbursing agents of the rebel confederation in England, and they had several vessels, the Ella, Helen, Herald, Economist, Albert, and others, forming a sort of “ line” between Liverpool and Charleston, which carried on blockade-running, with the aid of agents at Bermuda and Kassau, K. P., intermediate British neutral isles. The firm was composed of Frazer & Trenholm, as also of a certain Prioleau, one Weisman, and a J. R. Armstrong; the first four being South Carolinians; and the last, alone, a British subject.
In possession of the registry and power of sale already mentioned, the Bermuda sailed for Charleston, then a port in rebellion and under blockade, in August, 1861. For some reason not stated, and inferable only, she ran into Savannah instead—a port also in rebellion and under blockade—running out again and back to Liverpool in the autumn of that year. Her master was now changed. Captain Tessier was transferred to the Bahama, which afterwards became notorious in the United States as having carried armament to the rebel corsair Alabama, sunk oft* the coast of Kormandy by the United States ship of war Kearsarge. A certain Westendorff was put on the Bermuda. The British p. 518statutes, however, requiring a recommendation to authorize a license to any one as captain, Frazer, Trenholm f Co., in December, 1861, declared that they had known Westendorff for ten years; that he served under an experienced shipmaster, sailing out of Charleston, and that he had afterwards commanded one of their ships. Among these was the Helen, a blockade-runner. Westendorff was, accordingly, legally licensed by the British merchant authorities captain of the Bermuda.
By the practice of the British ports, it is usual to indorse the address of the captain licensed on the back of his certificate of license. This indorsement on Captain Westendorff’s ran thus:
“ Address of bearer: Messrs. Frazer, Trenholm & Co., Liverpool.”
Being brought round from West Hartlepool, on the east coast of England, the Bermuda now prepared for another voyage. Ostensibly it was to Bermuda. The cargo consisted of various things, some of which would have been useful enough at Bermuda, but which—cut oft* as the place had been by the blockade from commerce—were supremely desired at Charleston; such as tea, coffee, drugs, surgical instruments, shoes, boots, leather, saddlery, &c. Among the dry-goods were five cases of lawns, each having a card upon it, representing a youth gallantly mounting a parapet, and bearing onward the “Flag of the Confederate States,” which in all its colors was spread to the breeze.
There were found, also, several cases of military decorations, &c.; epaulettes for all grades; stars for the shoulder-straps of officers of rank; bugles, crossed swords and cannons for different sorts of cap fronts; swords for staff and line officers; chapeaux de bras; embroidered wreaths, “ without U. S. on;”* various sizes of military buttons for coats and vests; some with the palmetto tree; belts with the same designations; other buttons and belts with the letters S. C.; L.;f T. ;J &c., and with eagles surrounded by eleven
*
So labelled. Louisiana ? J Texas, or Tennessee ?
’ Statement of the case: Captors' side.
stars; palmetto trees embroidered on blue cloth, &c.; sash buckles, with the arms of Georgia, of South Carolina, &c.
Among the cargo were several cases of cutlery, which was
stamped as
“Manufactured expressly for John Treanor & Nephew, Savannah, Ga.” It embraced a variety of articles, stamped with portraits
and legends, thus:
“Jeff. Davis,
OUR FIRST PRESIDENT.
The right man in the right place.”
Others presented a military figure, emblazoned
“General Beauregard.
He lives to conquer.”
Others represented a bull running after a man, with soldiers chasing; and over the bull this motto:
“ On to Washington ! Bull Run.”
The blades of these were stamped,
“ Courtney & Tenant, Charleston, S. C.”
Several cases of double-barrelled guns were found, stamped as
“ Manufactured for J. E. Adger, of Charleston.”
There was also a large amount of munitions of war; five finished Blakely cannon in cases, with carriages; six cannon —some cast, some wrought—not in cases; some thousand shells, varying from seven to a hundred and twelve pounds each, and fuses for them. Three hundred barrels, seventy-eight half-barrels, and two hundred and eighty-three quarter-barrels of gunpowder, seven hundred bags of saltpetre; seventy-two thousand cartridges, two and a half million percussion caps, two cases of Enfield rifles, twenty-one cases of swords, marked N. D. (navy department?), seven cases of pistols, and a variety of like or accessory things; in all about eighty tons weight. In addition to these was a large amount of army blankets, army cloths, kerseys, vulcanized cloth, with fifteen hundred yards of adhesive plaster; these last large enough to be invoiced at $62,500.
Numerous letters of friendship and business were found p. 520in the vessel from people abroad to different persons in the rebel States, Mrs. Trapman, Mrs. Trenholm, Mrs. Rose, Mr. T. M. Hende, Mr. C. F. Hencle, Mr. John Hencle, &c.; also five numbers of the Times, sent by some person in England to his friend in the South; also a book by one Spence, published by Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, London, showing the bad effects which the American Union had had on the national character and policy, and that “ secession” was “ a constitutional right;” several passages being marked in margine, apparently as if to invite attention specially to them.
A few memoranda, also, were found aboard;—requests apparently from persons in Charleston to Captain Westendorff to buy things for them in England, and bring them through the blockade. A part of one may serve for illustration;—it having been evidently by some lady.
Memorandum.
“ Charleston, 18.
2 pair ladies’ kid gloves, silver-gray color.
2 “ “ “ tea color. Best quality. 2 “ “ “ ashes of rose, light and Size 6f.
dark.
2 11 “ gaiters, best kid, stout soles, soft upper, 3| full. 1 ladies’ parasol, best silk, color drab or ashes of rose.
i pound black sewing silk, fine. If it can be had of mixed colors, get i pound of best qualities.
1 pair lady’s scissors, ordinary size, and some needles of best make. M. S. D.
Get the best quality of everything.”
One of the memoranda, which like the other was a lady’s, and contained an order for gloves,—“ dark-colored kid”—concludes:
“ May God bless Captain W., and protect him, and bring him in safety back to his family, church, and friends, is our prayer for him.”
On the vessel were several persons, called in various p. 521letters “ government passengers;” being in fact “ artists” sent from Scotland. An account of them was given in certain letters found on the vessel: some addressed to a certain Mr. Morris, “ lithographer,” in Charleston, who it appears had safely ran the blockade not long before. In different parts they ran thus:
Stationery Department,
80 Bishopsgate within, 26 Leadenhall Street,
London, February 12, 1862.
Dear Morris :
I was very much pleased to hear that you managed to escape the vigilance of the Yankee vessels in getting into Charleston, and from the accounts I have heard, should think you had a very narrow escape.
A commissioner (Major Ficklin) from the Confederate government has been over here, and has sent a lot of printers and engravers, and presses, and paraphernalia complete, which he obtained from Scotland. He served me very shabbily and ungentlemanlike. I had many interviews with him, and gave him all necessary information; furnished him with a list of requirements, compromising myself with several workmen, and put myself to many inconveniences. He admitted my price being proper and correct, and led me to believe he would give me his order, but having got out of me all he could, he then intrusted the order with another house. I hardly think that fair, after promising to trust me with it and within a few weeks of its execution.
We, in England, do not think the North can hold on much longer, the financial state being such as to induce us to hope that two or three months will settle your present deplorable state.
We inclose our catalogue, which may guide you; and we make and can buy paper of all kinds as well as any London house; so could execute your order for foolscap loan paper, with watermark C. S. A., as shipped you, at 42s. per ream double, equalling two reams single. . Trusting soon to hear of you, I am yours, I C. Straker.
This “ lot of printers and engravers” which Major Ficklin had obtained in Scotland, embarked, under the charge of one George Dunn, on the Bermuda, on this voyage, the whole p. 522party being entered on the crew list as common sailors. They appeared to have taken their “paraphernalia complete” with them. There were at least 26 boxes marked P. 0. D. (post-office department ?), with immense numbers of“ Confederate States” postage stamps; “printing ink for postage stamps;” copper-plates with 400 dies for printing at each impression 400 rebel postage stamps; also 200,000 letter envelopes; some “ American-shape,” “ official blue,” &c.; many reams of fine white bank-note paper, watermarked
C. S. A.
intended obviously for “ Confederate States ” bank notes or bonds—“foolscap-loan-paper;” and the same apparently which is referred to and so styled in the concluding paragraph of the letter of Mr. C. Straker, of London, to his friend and correspondent Morris, quoted on the preceding page, “ as shipped you at 42s. per ream double, equalling two reams single.” All this stationery having gone with the captured vessel to the port of Philadelphia, was there sold.
So among the persons that embarked on the Bermuda, at Liverpool, were certain gentlemen, residents of Charleston, but perfectly well known in circles of gentility, both North and South, before the rebellion began. Among these, as was specially noted by the counsel of the captors, was the late amiable Mr. John Julius Pringle, a well-known gentleman of education and fortune, resident in South Carolina during the winter, but at Newport, Rhode Island, in summer. Mr. Pringle, with his two sons, Mr. Joel Poinsett Pringle and Mr. John Julius Pringle, Jr., with Mr. Arthur Huger, all of whom the rebellion found in Europe, and whose unquestionable wish and purpose was to return to the South, were entered on the shipping list as common sailors, and by disguised names. The nature of a shipping list and some of the regulations under which as ordinary seamen [O. S.] these gentlemen came, appear by presenting original instruments themselves. The gentlemen’s names on the list are in italics.
['9981 , shj -vanwHHa 839
initials. or ture
signar s’ master Shipping
CushmanC. C. C. C. C. C. C. C. &c. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T.
. voyage.0 0 0 0 0
or share, month, endar
0 10101010
- cal per wagesof Amount 10 10 10 &c.,
1862. 101 2 4 0 0 0 0 0
greement
A board. on be to is he which at TimeFeb.Feb.Feb.Feb.Feb.Feb.Feb.Feb.Feb. of &c., February,
ate 22
D
SHIPS..
- en
aster
M
of Westendorff.
ame W.
N C.
FOREIGN-GOING.
umber
FOE
N
,
42,608
fficiai
O
.
AGREEMENT
hip
S
of
Bermuda.
ame
N
Willott, &c.,
Arthur,
ignature Dempsey, Johsen, Richardson, Geo. Isard, Julius, Poinsett,
&e.,
JohnThomasPeterJohnWm.JohnJohnJoelHenry
25 25 25 25 25 26 26 26 26
gaged. cook,
capaoitywhatIn B., S.,8.,8.,S.,S.,
&c.,
Boy,Asst,A.Fireman,0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
served.
last
he London,Bath, Crown,Liverpool, &c.,
which Voyage,Voyage,Voyage,Voyage,Voyage,
in
&c.,
Ship Demetrius,Holyhead,NorthernBermuda,FirstFirstFirstFirstFirst
&c.,
born.
Where &c.,
Dublin,Liverpool,Copenhagen,Derham,Richmond,Charleston,Charleston,Georgetown,Savannah,
Age. 15 16 22 25 29 52 19 18 19 &c.,
.
rew
C
of
Embleton,
524_______________ The Bermuda. [Sup. Ct.
REGULATIONS FOR MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE,
Sanctioned by the Board of Trade, in pursuance of the Merchants' Shipping
Act, 17 18 Viet. a. 104.
No. Offence. Amount of fine or Shipping mas
punishment. ter’s signature
or initials.
-
Of the ship’s real company, the master, Westendorff, the first mate, and the master’s brother (calling himself and shipped as a hand, but acting as clerk) and three seamen, were citizens of South Carolina; and the second mate, the carpenter, and cook belonged to other States in rebellion.
There were forty-five bills of lading, of which thirty-one were for goods shipped by Fraser, Trenholm & Co. The whole of the cargo was shipped under their direction; and according to the bills of lading it was to be delivered at Bermuda, “ unto order or assigns.” No consignees were named on the bills.
Several of the persons connected with the ship or otherwise, and who were examined in preparatorio, appeared to regard her as owned by Fraser, Trenholm & Co. Thus the chief engineer, when thus asked to whom she belonged, snswered: “To the best of my knowledge, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. are the owners.” Heenan, a fireman, said: “ I have understood that Fraser, Trenholm & Co. are the owners.” Noble, another fireman: “ The owners of the captured vessel, to the best of my knowledge and belief, are Fraser, Trenholm & Co.” And Pierson, a third one, said:
1
Quarrelling, or provoking to quarrel, . One day’s pay. 3 Swearing,Carrying a or sheath-knife, using improper . language.. OneOne dayday’’ss pay.pay. £ 4 Drunkenness. First offence, ..... a Two days’ half al- w OQ lowance provisions. . 5 “ Second offence, Two days’ pay. oo 6 Not attending divine service on Sunday, unless prevented by sickness or duty of the ship, .... ..................................... One day’s pay. 7, Interrupting divine service by indeecrous conduct, ........ One day’s pay. CD 8 Not being cleaned, shaved, and washed on a Sundays, . . . . . . ' . One day’s pay.O 9 Washing clothes on a Sunday, . . d One day’s pay. Secreting contraband goods on board, with intent to smuggle,..................................... One month’s pay.
Statement of the ease: Captors’ side. •
“ At Liverpool, it was the common talk that Fraser, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, owned the captured vessel.” A letter of one of the mates, found on board and written to some friend,* seemed to speak of them in the same way. So, too, Tessier, the old captain, writes to Westendorfi*, his successor, thus:
Stockton -on -Tees, 20th Feb., 1862.
Dear Westendorff :
Will you do me a favor ? Opposite the Brumley Moore Dock wall there is a boot-maker of the name of Warner. As you are passing by, will you have the kindness to step in and inquire whether a pair of sea-boots I ordered have been sent to the office of our owners. If they have, please request Mr. Griffiths, head-porter of Frazer, Trenholm & Co., to forward them to me.
Captain Mitchell must have had a trying time since he sailed. I hope he kept her well to the southward after leaving the channel. To take the H. [erald?] across the Atlantic, at this season, will require some working.
With sincerest regards, I remain ever yours respectfully,
E. L. Tessier.
Certain correspondence between Fraser, Trenholm & Co. and their branch house, &c., was specially relied on by the captors to show that the British subject Haigh was not the owner, and that the firm of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. was. Thus it appeared that, on the 16th of January, 1862, the Liverpool house of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. write to the Charleston branch, John Fraser & Co., that they had despatched the ship “Ella” with a cargo to Butterfield, Bermuda, and that she would be followed by the steamer Bermuda with goods.
They now write as follows: [“ Ella.”]
Liverpool, 23d January, 1862.
Messrs. Jno. Fraser & Co., Charleston.
Dear Friends: Referring to our respects of 16th inst., we now hand inclosed bills lading of the cargo per ship Ella, and copies of invoices.
See infra, p. 528. “ I have seen the owners. All fudge what he told me.
r. Preleau [principal man) came up to me," &c.
• Statement of the case: Captors’ side.
These goods are all shipped by our friends here; but the disposition of them there is left entirely to you, and in any market to which you may please to direct them.
The bills of lading are indorsed to your order, or that of your authorized agent. Captain Carter is an intelligent shipmaster, and we believe a good man of business; any communication for him, if you do not find it expedient to send an agent to Bermuda, should be sent under cover to Mr. N. T. Butterfield, Hamilton, Bermuda. Captain Carter is instructed to proceed to Bermuda, and there await your instructions. The ship is now in the river ready for sea.
The “Albert” sailed yesterday for Nassau, and will proceed, after landing her cargo, to Rio for a cargo of coffee, with which
she is to return to Nassau/or orders.
We remain yours, very truly,
Fraser, Trenholm & Co.
[“ Bermuda.”]
Liverpool, 28th February, 1862.
Messrs. Jno. Fraser & Co.,
(or their authorized agent,)
Hamilton, Bermuda.
Dear Sirs: The letters we have written by this opportunity, with invoices and bills of lading of the cargo of the ship, are very full in every particular, and we think will greatly facilitate the delivery and also the transshipment, should this be determined upon. We think that care should be taken to prevent the loss of any of the invoices or bills of lading; but should this unfortunately happen, duplicates can be furnished hereafter, which would, however, involve much delay and great inconvenience in the delivery of the goods; and without the invoices there would necessarily be much embarrassment in effecting sales.
In case of there being an opportunity of sending the letters forward with the invoices and bills of lading, we cannot too strongly impress upon you the adoption of the most certain means of preventing any of them falling into improper hands.
Yours, truly,
Fraser, Trenholm & Co.
On the 1st of April, 1862, the Charleston house write to Butterfield thus, having by previous letter informed him of p. 527their being advised that the Ella was despatched, and that she would be followed by the Bermuda.
Charleston, April 1, 1862.
Dear Sir :
We suppose that the steamer Bermuda may be with you ere this; and the ship Ella.
We will thank you to request the masters to act as follows, viz.:
Captain Westendorff to take in the tea and other light articles per Ella (if he has room for them), and proceed to Nassau, reporting himself, on arrival there, to Messrs. Hy. Adderly & Co.
Captain Carter to keep in his cargo and wait further orders from us. They will reach him, we think, very shortly.
Yours respectfully,
Jno. Fraser & Co.
N. T. Butterfield, Esq.,
Hamilton, Bermuda.
Butterfield, who received this letter nineteen days after it was written, immediately sent it to Captain Westendorff, at St. George’s. Westendorff acted on it at once. He took the new articles aboard, and the artists having got out from his ship—though he refused, as involving him in too great a responsibility in the face of his new orders, to deliver to Dunn the printing-presses and working apparatus consigned with the party under him to Bermuda—he proceeded from St. George’s towards Nassau, on the 23d of April. Mr. Pringle and the other South. Carolina gentlemen were aboard. On the 27th the vessel was captured. He had arrived at Bermuda on the 19th March, and was accordingly there about five weeks. His cargo was not touched while there.
Among the papers taken on board the Bermuda was an unfinished letter, without signature, and apparently written by an engineer of the Bermuda to a friend (another engineer it was said) at Stockton-upon-Tees. It ran thus:
Liverpool, Wellington Dock, February 16, 1862. Mr. A. Gray, Stockton-on-Tees:
We are all the talk of Liverpool at present, taking in those arge rifled cannon (without cases), and large lots of ammunition p. 528and materials of war. In American circles our fate is discussed pretty freely; they have us taken, imprisoned, and hung already. Our Hartlepool friend, Mr. Detective Maguire,* has got a job here again; is regularly to be seen on the quay, to take a look of what is going on board. They put the custom-house inspectors to a great deal of trouble, because they are coming down every day, opening boxes and cases—to satisfy J. The inspector said to me yesterday, that there existed great jealousy on account of our cargo; but fortunately they cannot stop us. We are on a lawful voyage; people won’t believe it here; they are bound to think we are for running the blockade again.
Our tender left yesterday; don’t be at all surprised we have got a tender; they bought a light draft-boat at Dublin, used to run the mail once, called the Herald; length, 280 feet; deep -water line, 10 feet; light, 5J; side-width, 225; horse, nominal, used to press up to 28 pounds; got her boilers stayed, strengthened, and soforth; strains up to 20 pounds now; average speed, 18? knots per hour; razeed all her lower cabins, to make cargo space; shipped crew for twelve months, for some port or ports south of Mason and Dixon’s line. Three captains on board; one an Englishman, nominal; another, an experienced coast pilot from the Potomac to Charleston; another, ditto, ditto, from Charleston to the San Juan River in Texas. If the Yankees reach her, they are smarter than I give them credit for. 8he awaits our arrival in Bermuda; goes first into Charleston, though, to see about the stone fleet. Don’t tell Tessier I gave you the information; he’ll write straight to the owners, and tell them I am a traitor, and blabber out secrets; I know him. I have seen the owners; all fudge what he told me. Mr. Preleau (principal man) came up to me; shook hands; said was glad to see me. I said, I hope I didn’t incur your displeasure by remaining in the Bermuda. Answer. Not at all.
The record showed that, after his arrival at Bermuda, Mitchell, captain of the Herald, drew a bill on Fraser, Trenholm & Co.,'at Liverpool, in favor of Westendorfi, captain p. 529of the Bermuda, for £258, to be charged to the account of the Herald; showing that Captain Westendorff advanced to the Herald that amount.
*
This was obviously a person employed by the United States, to see what vessels were engaged in giving aid to the rebellion. He had been watching, it appears, the vessel before she was brought round to Liverpoo. —Rep.
So to one Farrelly, a person on the Bermuda, and apparently a candid, though not a much educated witness, testified:
“ At Bermuda there was a steamer called the Herald, which we understood was intended to run the blockade; but the captain who brought the steamer out from England refused^to run it. The talk at Bermuda was that there were other captains on board the Herald, and that they were trying to get one of these captains in command. It was also the talk that the Herald was connected with our ship.”
At the time of the capture,, and after the vessel was boarded, the captain’s brother, by his order, threw overboard two small boxes and a package, which he swore that he understood contained postage-stamps, and a bag, which he understood contained letters, and which he was instructed to destroy in case of capture. Mr. Huger also destroyed a number of letters, which he swore were private letters, intrusted to him by Americans in Europe.
Such essentially was the case on the captors’ side.
On the other side the ease existed thus
As to the place where the vessel was captured.—When captured, the Bermuda was not far from the eastern coast of Great Abaco Island, an English colony, and steering along the coast, not in the route to any of our ports, but in a southwestwardly direction, and, as was alleged, between Abaco and Eleuthera (another English island),, to New Providence (Nassau), a third English colony. She was captured within sight of British land, within the range of the Abaco light. The distance was from five to seven miles from the shore; exactly ow far was not sufficiently *shown The British flag was flying at the time of the capture, and was not hauled down until t e prize was taken a distance of twenty or thirty miles art er out to sea. There was, perhaps,, but slight evidence,
x °l. in. 34 p. 530certainly slight direct evidence, to show that her immediate destination was to any blockaded port. Being on the eastern side of the Bahama group, she was, in a straight line, as was said at the bar, 160 miles from Florida, 410 miles from Savannah, 430 miles from Charleston, and 480 miles from Wilmington, N. C. The Mercedita was cruising near the Abaco entrance to Nassau; and it was asserted, and perhaps rather made to appear, that orders had at one time been given, or rather, maybe, understood to be given, to capture the Bermuda wherever found on the high seas between England and the United States. A previous conclusion, derived from our agents in England and from trustworthy evidence, quietly collected by orders of our government, had possibly existed on the part of the government that the vessel was built for the very purpose of running the blockade.*
As to ownership.—Haigh, who had been desirous to make the British government interpose, as for a capture within neutral territory, and who had made claim in the court below as owner, in a paper prepared by him to induce the British government to interfere, swore that he was “ the sole registered owner” of the vessel; that she was bound to Bermuda, with instructions to deliver her cargo there to one N. T. Butterfield, and to ship a homeward cargo for Great Britain; that it was 11 not intended that she should attempt to break the blockade,” &c.; that, on the arrival of the ship at Bermuda, the consignee of the cargo was desirous that it should be carried to Nassau, and made an arrangement with the master to have it carried with some additional cargo, the particulars of which he, Haigh, had not been informed of.
So Captain Westendorff, in previously asking to make claim to the vessel and cargo for the parties whom he asserted were interested, swore that Haigh was “ the true, lawful, and bona jide owner” of the vessel, and that no other person was owner of or interested in her; and that the vessel had no destination either for herself or cargo when she left Liverpool, except for Bermuda in the first instance, and ulti-
*
See supra, p. 528.
Statement of the case: Claimants’ side.
mately for Nassau; that he, the captain, was directed to receive instructions and place himself under the care of N. T. Butterfield, of Hamilton, in the island of Bermuda named;* that the cargo was shipped and owned by British subjects and on British account, and not for or on account of or for the use of any person in the insurrectionary States; and that, if restored, it would belong to British subjects, and not to them ; and that neither vessel nor cargo, nor any part of it, was intended for the insurgents; and that the vessel did not intend to violate the blockade anywhere. His affidavit was as direct and full as possible.
So Armstrong, the British partner in the firm of Trenholm, Fraser & Co., by writing filed, swore that “ the said firm, acting as agents for Mr. Edwin Haigh, owner of the British ship Bermuda, procured for her from various shippers a full cargo;” that the steamer sailed hence for Bermuda; that the cargo laden here was intended to be discharged at Bermuda or Nassau; and that a return cargo had been provided by her consignees at Nassau; that the general management of the steamer had been placed in the hands of his firm “ by the owner,” but that no charter-party was entered into, “ this not being customary under such circumstances.”
-4s to intent to run the blockade.—In addition to what was above sworn, Harris, a member of the firm of Adderly & Co., in Nassau (the correspondents of Fraser, Trenholm & Co.), declared, on oath, that when the Bermuda was consigned to them from the island of Bermuda, the instructions then given to them were, that, on the arrival of the ship at Nassau, the cargo laden on her should be landed, and the ship again laden with a cargo to be delivered at some port in Europe; and he swore 11 that it was the intention of the firm of Adderly & Co. to carry out strictly these instructions, and that there was never any intention that the ship should run the blockade of any of the southern ports of America; but p. 532that the vessel«, at the time when she was taken and captured, was, so far as the instructions of the firm went, in the bona fide prosecution of a voyage from the island of Bermuda to these islands, with a cargo which was to be delivered here.”
*
See, however, the letter of instructions, infra, p. 535.
As respected the power of attorney, or “ certificate,” to sell? Haigh, in a letter, “per J. R. A.” to his agent at Philadelphia, represented, by way of explanation, that “ it was given on the first voyage of the Bermuda, as would be seen by the date, and was intended to apply to that only.” “ On the vessel’s return,” he adds, “ I endeavored to sell her, but could neither do this nor cancel the power until the document was returned from Charleston, whither it had been sent. This my agents have hitherto failed to do, owing, seemingly, to the interruption of communications.” •
“ The registry of such power of attorney,” he concluded, “ is compulsory, and a copy can be obtained from the customs authorities by any one who pays the trifling fee necessary.”
In another paper he gave an account thus:
u In August, 1861, being then the sole registered owner of the steamship Bermuda, I was in hopes that the blockade imposed by the Northern government of the United States against the southern ports might be raised by reason of intervention, arrangement, or otherwise, and I accordingly caused the said steamship to be sent on a voyage to Charleston, in South Carolina.
“ I was also desirous that the said steamship should be sold at Charleston, or any other port of the United States, if the opportunity should offer and a sufficient price could be got for her. I accordingly executed a certificate of sale authorizing Mr. Hanckel and Mr. Trenholm, of Charleston, jointly or severally, to carry into effect any desirable sale.
111 am informed and believe that the said steamship, in the prosecution of her voyage, was not warned off by any of the blockading cruisers, and that she entered the port of Savannah without meeting with any of such cruisers, or having the opportunity of ascertaining whether the said blockade was in fact still in force, and there discharged her cargo.
11 In the month of January last the ship returned to England without having been sold, but the certificate of sale was not returned to me.
“ In the month of February last, 1862, seeing that the blockade had become effective, and that there was little hope of its being raised, I caused the ship to be loaded for Bermuda or Nassau; and, as there was no intention of the said ship entering any of the blockaded ports, I caused application to be made to the registrar of shipping at Liverpool, to grant a new certificate of sale to some parties at Bermuda or Nassau, with a view to her sale at either of those British ports; but the said registrar declined to issue such new certificate unless the old certificate should be first given up to him cancelled.
“ The old certificate has never been returned to me, probably by reason of the difficulty of communication between the Southern States and Great Britain; but it was virtually revoked and annulled in the month of February last, all intention of entering any of the Southern ports of the United States being then abandoned.
u Edwin Haigh ”
In regard to the munitions of war, Blakely, late a captain in her Majesty’s service, but who was now “ a cannon manufacturer and merchant,” swore that in shipping the cannon, shells, fuses, limbers, &c., aboard, which, it appeared, was his part of the cargo (and which he interposed in the District Court to claim), he intended part for the government of Hayti and the rest “ for sale at Bermuda or Nassau, in the usual course of business, to any person willing to purchase the same;” that he had shipped the goods for Bermuda in the first instance, the steamer being bound for that port, but having been informed that Nassau, N. P., offered better opportunities, he desired them to be forwarded thence to Nassau, instructing his friends there, the Messrs. Adderly & Son, to sell those not intended for Hayti “ to any persons willing to become purchasers, whether Federals, Confederates, or others, according to the prices which they might respectively offer.”
[Captain Blakely, however, did not, nor did the Messrs. p. 534Adderly, though they made oaths in the case,* produce either originals or copies of these letters.]
It is to be noted, also, that the cargo was by no means confined to munitions of war and such articles already mentioned as were plainly destined for the rebel States. A large part of it consisted of British dry goods and of groceries generally.
As respected the “government passengers” (the engravers or artists), who undoubtedly wished to run the blockade and get to Charleston, it appeared that they all got out at Bermuda, and that none of them rejoined the vessel when she went to Nassau.
So in regard to Mr. Pringle and the South Carolina gentlemen, registered by disguised names as common sailors, and brought under obligation not to quarrel, swear, carry sheath knives, interrupt divine service by indecorous conduct, &c., &c., under penalty of forfeiting more or less pay, the explanation given by Captain Westendorff was, that when they expressed their wish to embark he was on the point of sailing; and that they were put on the crew list in order to get round the British statutes, which required that before a vessel took passengers she should be inspected; an operation which would have required a. week’s time. All these gentlemen swore that they knew of no purpose on the vessel’s part to violate the blockade. The testimony of Mr. Pringle was positive about this.
To the fifth interrogatory, in preparatorio, he answered as follows:
“ The said vessel sailed from Liverpool on her present voyage and was bound to Bermuda alone, and was not to run any blockade; so I was assured by the agents, the Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co.-, of Liverpool, who are a branch house, I believe, of John Fraser & Co., of Charleston, S. C.”
All the gentlemen, and several of the artists, in fact, while testifying distinctly their wish and intention to get p. 535into the Southern States, testified that they did not expect to get there on this vessel. Indeed, on arriving at Bermuda, they prepared and offered to the captain
*
See supra, p. 531.
a testimonial of parting thanks.
“On board the Steamship Bermuda,
20th March, 1862.
“ Dear Sir: The undersigned, passengers on board your vessel from Liverpool to Bermuda, beg leave, before parting with you, to express their thanks for the kind treatment and unceasing attention which we have received at your hands. Your efforts to add to our comfort and make our time pass pleasantly has served in a great measure to destroy the monotony of a sea voyage. We also take much pleasure in assuring you that the strict attention we have observed you paid to the management of your fine ship has been such as to make us feel always a perfect security and confidence under your care. With our best wishes for your future prosperity,
We are, dear sir, yours, respectfully,
J. J. Pringle, W. E. Sparkman, George Dunn, Wm. G. Embleton, James McHugh, P. Gellatly, George Henry Keeling, J. McFarland, J. J. Pringle, Jr., Arthur Huger, J. Poinsett Pringle, Jno, Gemmell.”
It was not pretended that any of these passengers had concealed their true character from the captain, or in any way changed at any time their ordinary dress; or that they had made concealments of any sort.
The following, in material parts, was the letter of instructions, which, when the vessel set sail from Liverpool, the captain received:
. n “ Liverpool, 28th February, 1862. Captain C. W. Westendorfe,
Steamship Bermuda.
Dear Sir: You will proceed hence to the port of Hamilton, ermuda, and there deliver your cargo, as per bills of lading. p. 536Inclosed is a letter of introduction to Mr. N. T. Butterfield, who will assist you in the purchase of coals and in the disbursements of your ship. The bills inclosed (£500) on the Bank of Liverpool, will furnish you the means of paying your disbursements in Bermuda.
“ Instructions will follow you as to a return cargo for your ship. If you should have any surplus funds after paying the accounts of the ship, you will bring them in British gold; but should you require more money than the bills herewith will furnish you, we authorize you to value upon us at short sight for what may be wanted, and Mr. Butterfield will assist you in negotiating your bill upon us.
11 Our friends in St. John, N. B., are Messrs. W. & R. Wright, and in Nassau, N. P., Messrs. Henry Adderly & Co.; and in case of having to take cargo from Bermuda to either of these ports, you will call upon them.
“We are, dear sir, yours truly,
“Praser, Trenholm & Co.,
■it Agents of the owner.”
There was no concealment, apparently, as to anything on board. Everything was fairly entered on the bills of lading and manifest. The crew were shipped, it seemed, for a term not exceeding twelve months, from Liverpool to Bermuda, thence, if required, to any ports or places in the West Indies, British North America, United States, and back to1 the United Kingdom. The wages, if fairly set down, seemed to be at a rate not exceeding that of ordinary voyages in peaceful times, without special risk.
The court below condemned the vessel and the part of her cargo which consisted of munitions of war; reserving judgment as to the rest. Appeals were now taken here by Mr. Haigh and Captain Blakely. The case was twice elaborately and very well argued, both on reason and authorities, once at the last term and again at this.
Mr. U. M. Wharton and Mr. W. B. Reed, on both arguments, for these appellants: There is really no sufficient evidence of enemy ownership of the vessel. Such ownership is denied positively by numerous respectable persons on oath. The
Argument for the claimants. ♦
control which John Fraser & Co., of Charleston, had over the voyage of the ship, did not clothe them with any ownership, even in a prize court. That control must be treated as confined to a direction of the ship within the limits of her prescribed voyage, and if that voyage did not include a trip to any blockaded port, or to any port of the enemies of the United States, it cannot affect injuriously the neutral owners. The power of attorney from Mr. Haigh, was not accompanied with any interest in the attorney. Any sale under it must have been for the use of the principal, and all money received under it would have been the funds of the principal. The power had no reference to the then voyage of the Bermuda. It was an unexecuted one and capable of revocation. If the Bermuda were not, on the voyage in question, destined to a Southern port, the execution of the power would either have been impracticable, or could only have been carried into effect through correspondents in some neutral territory.
Neither is there any sufficient evidence that the vessel meant to run the blockade. Her instructions were to go to Bermuda, to deliver her cargo there, and to bring back a return in British gold; and while there was a provision made for the possibility of carrying the cargo to Nassau, there was none for a destination beyond. The vessel was captured in her direct course to a port confessedly neutral. The artists, who, all admit wished to get to the Southern States, left the vessel when she got to Bermuda. They left her, because on her they could not get to our Southern States. Mr. Pringle, and his friends who embarked at Liverpool, it is as plain, originally expected to go on this vessel to Bermuda only; and though they went on her to Nassau afterwards, it was m the expectation of finding some other conveyance thence to Charleston. The testimony of Mr. Pringle, whose accuracy no one who knew him will question, is positive that f e parties knew of no purpose to run the blockade. The unsigned letter attributed to an engineer of the Bermuda — an which will be relied on to support a condemnation—dis-pi oves intent to run a blockade. After saying that a detec- p. 538, Argument for the claimants.
tive was watching them, and that great jealousy existed on account of the cargo, it declares: “ Fortunately they cannot stop us. IFe are on a lawful voyage. People won’t believe it. They are bound to think we are for running the blockade.” And this foregone conclusion about the Bermuda, which it seems was conveyed here by detectives when she was on the stocks, has been one of the worst impediments to justice in our case. The government had ordered the Bermuda to be captured wherever found.* It is assumed, without proof, that the vessel belonged to Fraser, Trenholm & Co.; and then inferred as an irresistible conclusion that they could not own any vessel and not set her to breaking a blockade.
It being impossible to fix unlawful enterprise on the Bermuda, it will be said that the purpose was to transship the Bermuda’s cargo at Bermuda or Nassau ? That is easy to conceive of and to suggest, and even to aver. But conception, suggestion, and even averment are of no weight. Does the evidence prove such a purpose ? We say that it does not. It will be argued that the “ Herald” was to perform this office for the Bermuda. The only thing which gives countenance to such an idea is the unsigned and not very trustworthy letter said to have been written by the Bermuda’s engineer. The inference is a strained one which gets this purpose of the Herald from that scrawl; one which, moreover, declares on its face that the voyage on which the Bermuda was about to sail, was a “lawful voyage:” which, would it be if the Herald went as a tender to transship?
The one or two memoranda found on board and said to have been for Captain Westendorff are of the least possible significance. If there be anything in them which shows that they were orders to bring articles through the blockade—which there is not at all as respects the largest there is assuredly nothing which proves that Captain Westendor p. 539did execute them, or ever meant to execute them, especially to execute them for this voyage or by this ship.
*
See correspondence of Lord Lyons and Mr. Seward, in August, after the capture, in which these general orders referring to a list were scinded. (Parliamentary papers, No. 5, 1863.)
That portions of the cargo—the cutlery, &c.—were intended to invite purchasers at Bermuda for the Southern States may be; but that does not prove enemy ownership in this vessel or her intent to run the blockade. The articles at best were but a fraction, and not a large one, of the cargo; and after having mingled with the stock of the commerce of Bermuda—or Nassau,—sold, bond fide, to British subjects there—would have found purchasers from the Southern States, of which class of persons the islands had many.
As to the cannon and other munitions of war—sent by Captain Blakely—his affidavit in explanation is clear, reasonable, and sufficient. Federáis and Confederates to him were both alike. He was any man’s customer in a war.
The fact that Mr. Pringle and his friends, as well as the artists, were entered on the crew list as sailors is abundantly explained by Captain Westendorffi They had not disguised themselves when captured; nor at any time. Indeed there was no concealment as to any part of the cargo. Everything was on the bills and manifests.
The counsel for the claimants then submitted these points of law, which they enlarged upon, enforced, and applied:
1. If the Bermuda were on a voyage, at the time of her capture, from the port of Bermuda, a neutral port, to the port of Nassau, another neutral port, being then a British vessel and owned by a British subject, she was not liable to capture. In order to render her so liable to capture, under t ese circumstances, she must have been actually on a voyage to Charleston, or some other blockaded port of the Southern States, with an intent to run the blockade.
2. There can be no legal blockade by a belligerent of any ot er than a hostile port. There can be none of a neutral port. The Bermuda was, therefore, at perfect liberty to navigate to and fro among the British West India islands, p. 540so far as the question of blockade is concerned, unless she were actually on a voyage to a blockaded port of our country. No blockade of a Southern port could be lawfully extended so as to embrace the waters lying between or about the West India islands.
3. There can be no proper legal assertion of a continued voyage of which Nassau was but an intermediate port, unless the evidence shows (which it does not) that the Bermuda was on her way to a blockaded port, vid, Nassau. Every voyage must have a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quern; the latter of which, under the evidence, was a port of discharge in the United Kingdom; and no part of the evidence shows that the Bermuda herself was to proceed as a part of her voyage to any blockaded port. It was no breach of the blockade of any such port to intend to land her cargo, either at Bermuda or Nassau, even though some other vessel was afterwards to endeavor to carry on the cargo to Charleston, provided the Bermuda herself was to return to England.
4. What the voyage of the Bermuda was, is a question of fact to be deduced from all the evidence in the cause. The shipping articles which described it with particularity, are persuasive evidence of the voyage on which the Bermuda started from Liverpool. The letter of instructions to the captain at that place, is in accordance with the shipping articles. The legal construction of those documents is, that the violation of a blockade was not embraced by them; and that if, after arriving at Bermuda the ship should be ordered to a port of the United States, some open port, and not a blockaded port, must have been intended. The instruction to the captain which he received at Bermuda to proceed to Nassau, exhausted the power which the verbal charterers of the ship had over her; and after leaving Nassau under the terms of the voyage, she could only be brought back to the United Kingdom.
5. British merchants, as neutrals in our present war, had a perfect right to trade, even in military stores, between their own ports, and to. sell at one of them, even to an enemy o p. 541the United States, goods of all sorts, although with a knowledge that the purchaser bought them with a view of employing them afterwards out of the neutral territory in war against us. A neutral may sell in his own territory, to either belligerent, munitions of war; the only exception, so far as England and America are concerned, being a prohibition against fitting out vessels of war, or warlike expeditions, in the neutral country, against one of the belligerents.
6. The question of contraband of war cannot arise with, respect to any portion of the Bermuda’s cargo, unless she were on a voyage to a blockaded port. It is not necessary in law to show that it was part of the intention of the shippers of the cargo to land and sell it at Nassau. If it was intended to be stored there, and the voyage of the Bermuda to terminate at that place, except as regards her return to England, no question of contraband can arise in the cause.
7. Spoliation of papers is cause of condemnation, and excludes further proof only as against the party committing it, if interested in the vessel or cargo. Against a party not committing the spoliation, and not authorizing it, nor interested in the act, it neither excludes further proof, nor is it damnatory where other circumstances are clear.
8. There is no proof in the cause that any spoliation of
papers was authorized by Mr. Haigh, or conduced to his
benefit as owner of the ship; nor is there any evidence of
the spoliation of any papers which might properly be con-
sidered as proprietary documents.
9. The capture of the Bermuda was unjustifiable; be-
cause, first, it was made within the range of modern cannon-
shot from British territory; second, it was made within a
space embraced by a line drawn due south from the nearest
headland on the island of Abaco, above the place of capture;
third, because it was made, not on the open sea, but in
waters constituting channels between islands belonging to
reat Britain, a neutral power; and fourth, because it was
made before actual search, and under a general authority to
seize certain vessels wherever found.
On each of these points, we conceive that authorities sustain us.*
After argument, on the other side, by Mr. Speed, A. Gr., and by Mr. Coffey, special counsel of the captors, who argued the case thoroughly every way—on the facts, on principles of public law, and on English and American precedents—
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
These appeals were very fully and ably argued at the last term; and, because of the desire of the court to have all the aid that counsel could give in the examination of the important questions of fact and law presented by the record, were ordered to be reargued at this term. Under this order they have been again thoroughly and exhaustively discussed, and have since received our most deliberate consideration.
The questions arising upon the ownership of the steamship, will first be disposed of.
She was built in 1861, on the eastern coast of England, at Stockton-upon-Tees. On the 1st of August in that year, Edwin Haigh made the declaration of ownership required by the British Merchants’ Shipping Act of 1854.f In this
* On the first three points the counsel cited The Ada, Daveis, 407, The Moss, Gilpin, 219; The Steen Bille, cited in Dean on Blockade (Introduction), p. xii; The Jonge Pieter, 4 Robinson, 65; The Stert, Id. 53; T e Maria, 5 Id. 325; The Thomyris, Edwards, 17.
On the 5th and 6th points: Hautefeuille, Des Droits et des Devoirs es Nations Neutres, tome iii, pp. 222-3; The Imina, 3 Robinson, 167, e Hendrick and Alida, 1 Hay & Marriot, 96; Wheaton’s International Law, 568; The Jacob, 1 Robinson, 90; The Tobias, 1 Id. 329; The Franklin, Id. 217; The Neutralitet, 3 Id. 295.
On the 7th and 8th: The Rising Sun, 2 Robinson, 104; The Hun er, 1 Dodson, 480; The Pizarro, 2 Wheaton, 227.
On the 9th : the question of immunity from capture within actua rang of modern cannon-shot—one of the points assumed here was discuss vJF interestingly, and with great ingenuity and learning; but it all having on the assumption of a case not regarded by the court as proved, the au ities are not presented.
f 22 British Statutes at Large, 267, 351, 352.
declaration he described himself as a natural born British subject, asserted himself to be the sole and exclusive owner, and named E. L. Tessier as master. Upon this declaration a certificate of registry was issued the next day, which repeated the statement that Haigh was owner, and Tessier master; and on the following day, the 3d of August, a joint and several power of attorney to sell the ship, at any place out of the kingdom, at any time within twelve months, and for any price thought sufficient by the attorneys, or either of them, was given by Haigh to A. S. Hanckel and G. A. Trenholm, of Charleston, in South Carolina. With these papers the steamship was despatched to Charleston, on her first voyage; but finding, probably, the entrance of that port too dangerous, ran successfully the blockade of Savannah, and returned to England in January, 1862, after an absence of about five months.
The power of sale was sent to Charleston, and remained there. Haigh asserts that this power was intended only for the first voyage; was given because he wished to have the steamer sold in Charleston, or in some other port of the United States, if opportunity should offer, and a sufficient price could be obtained; and was afterwards virtually revoked when he abandoned the idea of sending her again to any southern port.
It is unfortunate for the credit of these statements, that the power was given to enemies of the United States, resident in Charleston, without access to any loyal port except by running the blockade; that it was not limited by its terms to the first voyage, but, on the contrary, was to continue in force twelve months; that it contained no provision insuring a sufficient price, but left that matter, so important to a real owner contemplating a real sale, to the decision of the attorneys, or either of them; and that there is no evidence in the record of any actual revocation of the power, or of any attempt to revoke it, and none, except Haigh’s assertion, that the purpose of again sending the ship to a rebel port Was ever abandoned.
These first acts bring the ownership into doubt. Haigh
Opinion of thé court.
may have been then the true owner; but it is certainly strange that he was in such haste to remove her from his own neutral control, and place her absolutely in the power and at the disposal of the enemies of the United States.
After her return to England a new voyage was planned for the Bermuda, and Fraser, Trenholm & Co., under whose direction, probably, the first voyage was made, now appear conspicuously in her concerns.
Of the members of this firm, Fraser and Trenholm were, doubtless, citizens of South Carolina; so also were, probably, Prioleau and Wellsman, who are mentioned as partners.* The only partner whose declaration that he was a British subject appears in the record was J. R. Armstrong. The Liverpool house thus composed was a branch of the house of John Fraser & Co., of Charleston, and was employed as a depositary and agent of the rebel government at Richmond, t It was under the direction of this firm that the Bermuda was loaded at Liverpool in February, 1862.
Her former master, Tessier, had been transferred to the Bahama, then at Stockton-on-Tees, but destined to become notorious three months later by her employment, under Tessier, in the conveyance of guns and munitions to the Alabama.J In his place, Westendorff had become master of the Bermuda. This person, a citizen of South Carolina, arrived in Liverpool from Charleston in December, in command of the Helen, a ship belonging to John Fraser & Co. Through Fraser, Trenholm & Co., he obtained the official certificate of competency necessary to enable him to take command of the Bermuda, and was appointed master, probably by them, on the 17th January. On the day before this appointment, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. had advised John Fraser & Co. of the despatch of the ship Ella with a cargo to Bermuda Island, to be followed by the steamship Bermuda with goods. The letter containing the advice is not in the record, but the fact appears from a letter of John Fraser & Co. to K. T. Butterfield at Bermuda, relating to these vessels and their cargoes.
*
Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part I, App., p- Ixxii. f lb., 1863, Part I, p. 90. Î lb., 224, 304, and App., v °l. in. 35
The Bermuda, at the date of the Liverpool letter, was lying at a port on the eastern coast, but was at once brought round to Liverpool to receive her cargo.
Her whole lading was under the direction of the Liverpool firm. Haigh was not known in it; while, on the other hand, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. were regarded as owners by many persons on the ship, and by others who certainly were not ill-informed. Thus Tessier, then in command of the Bahama, writing to Westendorff on the 20th February, spoke of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. as “ our owners.” And so Graham, chief engineer of the Bermuda, deposed on the preparatory examination, “ To the best of my knowledge and belief, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. of Liverpool, England, are the owners of the captured vessel.” The depositions of Heenan, Noble, and Pierson, firemen on board, were to the same effect.
Against this evidence are the declaration of Haigh, the deposition of Westendorff, and the affidavit of Armstrong, all affirming ownership in Haigh.
Thus stood matters in relation to ownership when the Bermuda left Liverpool on the 1st of March. She was controlled absolutely, in all respects, by Fraser, Trenholm & Co., and they were quite generally regarded as her owners. They, on the other hand, assert that Haigh was the real owner, and that they were acting as his agents; admitting, however, that they had no charter, and no written authority to represent him.
On the day before sailing, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. addressed a letter to the master, Westendorff, directing him to proceed to the island of Bermuda, and deliver his cargo according to the bills of lading. After some general directions as to money for disbursements and other matters.,, the letter concludes with the information that “ the friends” of the firm “ in Nassau, New Providence,, are H. Adderly & Co., and with a direction to “ call on them, in case of having to take cargo from Bermuda to that port.” What other special instructions were given to Westendorff*, at Liverpool, t e record does not disclose. Every bill of lading required p. 546the cargo mentioned in it to be delivered at Bermuda, to order or assigns. It is clear that the ship was to go to Bermuda, and not beyond, unless something not specified should occur; and the cargo was to be delivered there and not elsewhere, except in the same contingency, to the order of somebody not named.
The ship arrived at the port of St. George’s, in Bermuda, on the 19th or 20th March, and remained there five weeks waiting for orders.
And here we may expect to learn who was the unnamed party to whose order the cargo was to be delivered, and what was the contingency in which it was to be taken from Bermuda to another port.
Haigh asserts, and so does Westendorff, that the unnamed consignee was one Butterfield, a resident of Hamilton, one of the ports of Bermuda, and that Butterfield, as consignee of the cargo, being desirous to have it carried on to Nassau, “ made an arrangement with the master to that effect.” Nothing in the proofs supports, but everything contradicts, this. Butterfield is nowhere named in any paper as consignee; we find no instructions anywhere given to deliver the cargo to him; nor was it by his direction or arrangement that the cargo was sent forward from Bermuda to Nassau.
The real state <of facts is disclosed by the letters of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. to John Fraser <& Co., and of John Fraser & Co. to N. T. Butterfield, considered in connection with some other matters in the record. On the 23d January, 1862, the branch house at Liverpool wrote to the Charleston house, giving advice of the immediate despatch of the ship Ella to Bermuda with a ¡cargo consigned to John Fraser & Co., or their authorized agent, with authority to dispose of it in any market they should select. This letter suggested that if the Charleston house should not think best to send an agent to Bermuda, any communication for the master of the Ella should be sent, under cover, to Butterfield, and added, that the master was instructed to await orders at Bermuda. On the 28th of February the Liverpool firm directed another letter to John Fraser & Co., or their p. 547authorized agent at Bermuda, in which they spoke of the “invoices and bills of lading” of the cargo of the Bermuda as “very full, and as suited to facilitate greatly the delivery and also the transshipment, should this be determined upon.” The letter goes on to say that, “ should the loss of any of the invoices or bills of lading unfortunately happen, duplicates can be furnished hereafter,” but strongly urges, “ in case of an opportunity to send them forward with the letters, the adoption of the most certain measures of preventing any of them falling into improper hands.”
These letters show what unlimited control John Fraser & Co. were expected to exercise over’the ship and cargo of the Bermuda; and that control was exercised.
They had been advised of the coming both of the Ella and Bermuda by the letter of the 16th of January, and on the 1st of April they wrote to their correspondent, Butterfield, saying: “We suppose the steamer Bermuda may be with you ere this, and the ship Ella. We will thank you to request the masters to act as follows, namely: Captain Westeudorff to take in the tea and other light articles per Ella, if he has room for them, and proceed to Nassau, reporting himself, on arrival there, to Messrs. Henry Adderly & Co.; Captain Carter to keep in his cargo, and wait further orders from us. They will reach him, we think, very shortly.”
This direction was received at Hamilton, where Butterfield resided, on the 19th of April, and was forwarded the same day to Westendorff, at St. George’s, and was implicitly obeyed. Captain Westendorff even refused to allow certain printing presses and materials, which formed part of his cargo, to be landed at Bermuda, though requested to do so y George Dunn, the person who seems to have had them in charge, and though the bills of lading expressly required t at they should be delivered at Bermuda. He said that the 1 s were “ signed to be delivered to order;” that “ the responsibility” of delivery to Dunn would be too great, unless he received instructions to that effect
°. ownership could give more absolute control than was exercised over the ship and whole cargo by John Fraser & p. 548Co. That control and the action of the master leave no doubt that they were the unnamed party to whom the cargo was to be delivered, and whose orders the Bermuda was to await; nor can there be any doubt that Westendorff had instructions to obey, absolutely and in all things, their directions, both as to ship and cargo.
Whether the cargo was to be transshipped, or to be carried on to Charleston without transshipment, was probably left to be determined by circumstances after arrival at Nassau.
It appears from letters and papers in the record that a light draft steamship, named the Herald, was connected with the Bermuda as a tender; and it seems that it was to transshipment into that steamship that Fraser, Trenholm & Co. referred in their letter of January 28.
There is not much about the Herald in the record; but what we find is instructive. A letter, dated Liverpool, February 16, 1862, without signature, but addressed to one of the engineers of the Bahama, and written, probably, by one of the engineers of the Bermuda, says: “ Our tender left yesterday; don’t be at all surprised that we have got a tender. They bought a light draft boat at Dublin, used to run the mail once, called the Herald.” The writer proceeds to describe this tender as “ two hundred and eighty feet in length,” drawing “ ten feet heavy, and five and a half feet light;” with “her boilers stayed and strengthened;” with “an average speed of eighteen and a half knots;” with “ all her lower cabins razeed to make cargo space;” with “a crew shipped for twelve months, for some port or ports south of Mason’s and Dixon’s line;” with “three captains on board: one an Englishman, nominal; another, an experienced coast pilot from the Potomac to Charleston; and another, the same from Charleston to San Juan.’ This correspondent expresses the opinion, that “if the Yankees catch her, they are smarter than he gives them credit for, and adds, “ she waits our arrival at Bermuda,” “ but goes into Charleston first, to see about the stone fleet. T e letter of Tessier to Westendorff, written four days later and already cited, speaks of the Herald as on her voyage across p. 549the Atlantic, under the command of Captain Mitchell. There is a statement, too, in the deposition of Farrally, one of the firemen of the Bermuda, that the Herald was at Bermuda with several captains, while the steamship was there, and was understood to be intended to run the blockade; and that it was “ the talk that the Herald was connected with our ship.” It appears, also, from a bill of exchange drawn by Mitchell, master of the Herald, on Fraser, Trenholm & Co., that Westendorff supplied funds for that steamer at Bermuda.
This bill must have been drawn under instructions, and the fact strongly confirms what other parts of the record disclose of the connection between the two vessels.
The attendance of the Herald was, doubtless, to facilitate transshipment, should transshipment be directed by John Fraser & Co., and to secure the conveyance of the cargo to its ultimate destination.
Why no transshipment took place at Bermuda; whether transshipment was intended at Nassau; whether the Herald visited Charleston during the detention of Westendorff’s ship at St. George’s; whether it was finally concluded that the Bermuda herself should attempt to run the blockade, are matters thus far left in doubt.
The Bermuda sailed from St. George’s on the 23d of April, and was captured on the 27th.
At the time of capture, two small boxes and a package, supposed to contain postage-stamps, were thrown overboard, and a bag, understood to contain letters, was burned. The bag was burned by the captain’s brother, and under the orders of the captain, after the vessel had been boarded by the captors. It was burnt, as Westendorff says, in pursuance of his instructions. One of the passengers, also, burned a number of letters, which, he says, were private.
The instructions, in pursuance of which this destruction of papers was made, are not produced; nor is any explanation 0 this spoliation offered. The instructions were, doubtless, given by John Fraser & Co., in view of the contingency of cap ure, and were in accordance with the suggestion of p. 550Fraser, Trenholm & Co.’s letter of the 28th of February, that the most certain measures should be adopted to prevent any of the bills of lading or invoices falling into improper hands. They, doubtless, included directions for the destruction of all compromising papers, and among them of the instructions themselves. If they had been preserved and produced, it is not unlikely that they would have disclosed the real ownership of the vessel, the true nature of her employment, and the actual destination of both ship and cargo.
This spoliation was one of unusual aggravation, and warrants the most unfavorable inferences as to ownership, employment, and destination.
All these transactions,, prior to capture, and at the time of capture, repel the conclusion that Haigh was owner. Not a document taken on the ship shows ownership in him except the shipping articles, and these were false in putting upon the crew list employees of the rebel government and enemy passengers—the last under assumed names. He was permitted to put into the cause his original declaration of ownership of August 1, 1861, by way of further proof; but we cannot give much weight to this, in view of the “ Certificate of Transactions subsequent to Registry,” which shows his execution of the power of sale to Hanckel & Trenholm. After giving that power, there is no indication that he performed a single act of ownership. No letter alluded to him as owner. No direction relative to vessel or cargo recognized him as owner. All the papers and all the circumstances indicate rather that a sale was made in Charleston under the power, by which the beneficial control and real ownership were transferred to John Fraser & Co., while the apparent title, by the British papers, was suffered to remain in Haigh as a cover.
The spoliation makes the conclusion of ownership out of Haigh and in John Fraser & Co. wellnigh irresistible. Would the master have obeyed such instructions from John Frasei & Co., if he had been really appointed by Haigh, and was really responsible to him as owner? We are obliged to p. 551think that the ownership of Haigh was a pretence, and that the vessel was rightly condemned as enemy property.
We will next consider the questions relating both to vessel and cargo, which join arising from employment in the trade and under the direction and control shown by the record, assuming for the moment that Haigh was owner.
How, then, was the Bermuda employed? In what trade, and under what control and direction ?
The theory of the counsel for Haigh is that she was a neutral ship, carrying a neutral cargo, in good faith, from one neutral port to another neutral port;, and they insist that the description of cargo, if neutral, and in a neutral ship, and on a neutral voyage, cannot be inquired into in. the courts of a belligerent.
We agree to this. Neutral trade is entitled to protection in all courts. Neutrals, in their own country, may sell to belligerents whatever belligerents choose to buy. The principal exceptions to this rule are, that neutrals must not sell to one belligerent what they refuse to sell to the other,, and must not furnish soldiers or sailors to either; nor prepare, nor suffer to be prepared within their territory, armed ships or military or naval expeditions against either. So, too, except goods contraband of war, or conveyed with intent to violate a blockade, neutrals may transport to belligerents whatever belligerents may agree to take. And so, again, neutrals may convey in neutral ships, from one neutral port to another, any goods, whether contraband of war or not, if intended for actual delivery at the port of destination, and to become part of the common stock of the country or of the port.
It is asserted by counsel that a British merchant, as a neutral, had, during the late civil war, a perfect right to trade, even in military stores, between their own ports, and to sell at one of them goods of all sorts, even to an enemy of the United States, with knowledge of his intent to employ them in rebel war against the American government.
If by trade between neutral ports is meant real trade, in p. 552the course of which goods conveyed from one port to another become incorporated into the mass of goods for sale in the port of destination; and if by sale to the enemies of the United States is meant sale to either belligerent, without partiality to either, we accept the proposition of counsel as correct. ;
But if it is intended to affirm that a neutral ship may take on a contraband cargo ostensibly for a neutral port, but destined in reality for a belligerent port, either by the same ship or by another, without becoming liable, from the commencement to the end of the voyàge, to seizure, in order to the confiscation of the cargo, we do not agree to it.
Very eminent writers on international maritime law have denied the right of neutrals to sell to belligerents, even within neutral territory, articles made for use in war, or to transport such articles to belligerent ports without liability to seizure and confiscation of goods and ship. And this is not an illogical inference from the general maxim that neutrals must not mix in the war. International law, however, in its practical administration, leans to the side of commercial freedom, and allows both free sale and free conveyance by neutrals to belligerents, if no blockade be violated, of all sorts of goods except contraband; and the conveyance, even of contraband goods, will not, in general, subject the ship, but only the goods, to forfeiture.
We are to inquire, then, whether the Bermuda is entitled to the protection of this rule, or falls within some exception to it.
It is not denied that a large part of her cargo was contraband in the narrowest sense of that word. One portion was made up of Blakely cannon and other guns in cases, of howitzers, of cannon not in cases, of carriages for guns, of shells, fuses, and other like articles—near eighty tons in all; and of seven cases of pistols, twenty-one cases of swords, seventy barrels of cartridges, three hundred whole barrels, seventy-eight half-barrels, and two hundred and eighty-three quarter-barrels of gunpowder. Another portion consisted of printing-presses and materials, paper, and Confederate States p. 553postage stamps, and is described in a letter, found on board, as “ presses and paraphernalia complete,” “ obtained from Scotland by a commissioner of the Confederate government, and sent with a “ lot of printers and engravers.” The names of these printers and engravers, or at least the names by which they were known on board, are in the crew list; but Westendorff, in a letter already referred to, calls them his “government passengers;” and all the facts connected with this part of the cargo indicate that it actually belonged to the rebel government and was intended for its immediate use. Other very considerable portions of the cargo were also contraband within the received definitions of the term.
The character of this cargo makes its ulterior, if not direct, destination to a rebel port quite certain. And there is other evidence. The letters of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. make distinct references to the contingency of transshipment; and the evidence shows that the Herald was sent over with a view to this. The consignment of the whole cargo was to order or assigns—that is to say, as we have seen, to the order of John Fraser & Co. or assigns, and is conclusive, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that its destination was the port in which the consignee resided and transacted business.* There is much other evidence leading to the same conclusion; but it is needless to go further.
It makes no difference whether the destination to the rebel port was ulterior or direct; nor could the question of destination be affected by transshipment at Nassau, if transshipment was intended, for that could not break the continuity of transportation of the cargo.
The interposition of a neutral port between neutral departure and belligerent destination has always been a favorite resort of contraband carriers and blockade-runners. But it never avails them when the ultimate destination is ascertained. A transportation from one point to another remains continuous, so long as intent remains unchanged, no matter what stoppages or transshipments intervene.
This was distinctly declared by this court in 1855,* in reference to American shipments to Mexican ports during the war of this country with Mexico, as follows: “ Attempts have been made to evade the rule of public law by the interposition of a neutral port between the shipment from the belligerent port and the ultimate destination in the enemy’s country; but in all such cases the goods have been condemned as having been taken in a course of commerce rendering them liable to confiscation.”
The same principle is equally applicable to the conveyance of contraband to belligerents; and the vessel which, with the consent of the owner, is so employed in the first stage of a continuous transportation, is equally liable to capture and confiscation with the vessel which is employed in the last, if the employment is such as to make either so liable.
This rule of continuity is well established in respect to cargo.
At first, Sir William Scott held that the landing and warehousing of the goods and the payment of the duties on importation was a sufficient test of the termination of the original voyage; and that a subsequent exportation of them to a belligerent port was lawful.f But in a later case, in an elaborate judgment, Sir William Grants reviewed all the cases, and established the rule, which has never been shaken, that even the landing of goods and payment of duties does not interrupt the continuity of the voyage of the cargo, unless there be an honest intention to bring them into the common stock of the country. If there be an intention, either formed at the time of original shipment, or afterwards, to send the goods forward to an unlawful destination, the continuity of the voyage will not be broken, as to the cargo, by any transactions at the intermediate port.
There seems to be no reason why this reasonable and settled doctrine should not be applied to each ship where several p. 555are engaged successively in one transaction, namely, the conveyance of a contraband cargo to a belligerent. The question of liability must depend on the good or bad faith of the owners of the ships. If a part of the voyage is lawful, and the owners of the ship conveying the cargo in that part are ignorant of the ulterior destination, and do not hire their ship with a view to it, the ship cannot be liable; but if the ulterior destination is the known inducement to the partial voyage, and the ship is engaged in the latter with a view to the former, then whatever liability may attach to the final voyage, must attach to the earlier, undertaken with the same cargo and in continuity of its conveyance. Successive voyages, connected by a common plan and a common object, form a plural unit. They are links of the same chain, each identical in description with every other, and each essential to the continuous whole. The ships are planks of the same bridge, all of the same kind, and all necessary to the convenient passage of persons and property from one end to the other.
*
Jecker«. Montgomery, 18 Howard, 114. f The Polly, 2 Robinson, 369. J The William, 5 Id. 395; 1 Kent’s Commentaries, 84, note.
There remains the question whether the Bermuda, on the supposition that she was really a neutral ship, should be condemned for the conveyance of contraband. For, in general, as we have seen, a neutral may convey contraband to a belligerent, subject to no liability except seizure in order to confiscation of the offending goods. The ship is not forfeited, nor are non-offending parts of the cargo.
This has been called an indulgent rule, and so it is.* It is a great, but very proper relaxation of the ancient rule, which condemned the vessel carrying contraband as well as the cargo. But it is founded on the presumption that the contraband shipment was made without the consent of the owner given in fraud of belligerent rights, or, at least, without intent on his part to take hostile part against the country of the captors; and it must be recognized and enforced in all cases where that presumption is not repelled by proof.
*
The Ringende Jacob, 1 Robinson, 90; The Sarah Christina, Id. 238. See opinions of Bynkershoeck and Heineccius, cited in notes to The Mercutins, Id. 288, and The Franklin, 8 Id. 222.
The rule, however, requires good faith on the part of the neutral, and does not protect the ship where good faith is wanting.
The Franklin, therefore, carrying contraband with a false destination, was condemned, after mature consideration, by Sir William Scott in 1801.* He said that, “the benefit of the relaxation could only be claimed by fair cases.” This doctrine was shortly after applied to The Neutralitet by the same great judge and it received the sanction of this court in an opinion delivered by an equal judge, in 18344 The leading principle governing this class of cases was stated very clearly by Mr. Justice Story in that opinion, thus: “ The belligerent has a right to require a frank and bond,fide conduct on the part of neutrals in the course of their commerce in times of war, and if the latter will make use of fraud and false papers to elude the just rights of belligerents and cloak their own illegal purposes, there is no injustice in applying to them the penalty of confiscation.”
Mere consent to transportation of contraband will not always or usually be taken to be a violation of good faith. There must be circumstances of aggravation. The nature of the contraband articles and their importance to the belligerent, and the general features of the transaction, must be taken into consideration in determining whether the neutral owner intended or did not intend, by consenting to the transportation, to mix in the war.
The Ranger, though a neutral vessel, was condemned for being employed in carrying a cargo of sea stores to a place of naval equipment under false papers. The owner had not consented, but the master had, and Sir William Scott said, “If the owner will place his property under the absolute management and control of persons who are capable of lending it in this manner to be made an instrument of fraud in the hands of the enemy, he must sustain the consequences of such misconduct on the part of his agent.”§
*
The Franklin, 3 Robinson, 224. f The Neutralitet, Id. 296. J Carrington v. Merchants’ Insurance Co., 8 Peters, 518, opinion Story, J. § The Banger, 6 Robinson, 126.
So, too, The Jonge Emilia, a neutral vessel, was condemned on the ground that she appeared to have been altogether in the hands of enemy merchants and employed for seven voyages successively in enemy trade;* and The Carolina} was condemned for employment in the transportation of troops, though the master alleged that it was under duress, and the actual service was at an end.
Now, what were the marks by which the conveyance of contraband on the Bermuda was accompanied ? First, we have the character of the contraband articles, fitted for immediate military use in battle, or for the immediate civil service of the rebel government; then the deceptive bills of lading requiring delivery at Bermuda, when there was either no intention to deliver at Bermuda at all, or none not subject to be changed by enemies of the United States; then the appointment of one of these enemies as master," necessarily made with the knowlege and consent of Haigh, if he was owner; then the complete surrender of the vessel to the use and control of such enemies, without even the pretence of want of knowledge, by the alleged owner, of her destined and actual employment.
We need not go further. We are bound to say, considering the known relations of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. with the rebel leaders; and the relations of John Fraser & Co. to the same combination, justly inferable from the fact that they were the consignees of the whole cargo; and considering, also, the ascertained character of most of it, that it seems to us highly probable that the ship, at the time of capture, was actually in the service of the so-called Confederate government, and known to be so by all parties interested in her ownership.
However this may be, we cannot doubt that the Bermuda was justly liable to condemnation for the conveyance of contraband goods destined to a belligerent port, under circumstances of fraud and bad faith, which make the owner, if
Haigh was owner, responsible for unneutral participation in the war.
The cargo, having all been consigned to enemies, and most of it contraband, must share the fate of the ship.
Having thus disposed of the questions connected with the ownership, control, and employment of the Bermuda, and the character of her cargo, we need say little on the subject of liability for the violation of the blockade. What has been already adduced of the evidence, satisfies us completely that the original destination of the Bermuda was to a blockaded port; or, if otherwise, to an intermediate port, with intent to send forward the cargo by transshipment into a vessel provided for the completion of the voyage. It may be that the instructions to Westendorff* were not settled when the steamship left St. George’s for Nassau; but it is quite clear to us that the ship was then at the disposition of John Fraser & Co., and that the voyage, begun at Liverpool with intent to violate the blockade, delayed at St. George’s for instructions from that firm, continued toward Nassau with the purpose of completion from that port to a rebel port, either by the Bermuda herself or by transshipment, was one voyage from Liverpool to a blockaded port; and that the liability to condemnation for attempted breach of blockade was, by sailing with such purpose, fastened on the ship as firmly as it would have been by proof of intent that the cargo should be transported by the Bermuda herself to a blockaded port, or as near as possible, without encountering the blockading squadron, and then sent in by a steamer, like the Herald, of lighter draft or greater speed.
We have not thought it necessary to examine the questions made by counsel touching the right of belligerents to make captures within cannon-shot range of neutral territory, for there is nothing in the evidence which proves to our satisfaction that the Bermuda was within such range.
Our conclusion is, that both vessel and cargo, even if both were neutral, were rightly condemned; and, on every ground, the decree below must be
Affirmed.
[After the preceding confirmation of the decree of the District Court of Philadelphia—which, it will have been noted by the reader, was one condemning only the vessel (claimed by Haigh), and the munitions of war, &c. (claimed by Captain Blakely)—judgment as to the residue of the cargo having been reserved,—a decree was passed by the District Court, condemning this whole residue also.—See 23 Legal Intelligencer, 116.]
Note.
Along with the preceding case was submitted another, much like it, the case of—
The Hart.
Neutrals who place their vessels under belligerent control, and engage them in belligerent trade; or permit them to be sent with contraband cargoes, under cover of false destination, to neutral ports, while the real destination is to belligerent ports; impress upon them the character of the belligerent in whose service they are employed, and the vessels may be seized and condemned as enemy property.
The present case came here by appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York; a decree condemning the schooner Hart and her cargo as lawful prize of war. The vessel was claimed below by one Harris; the cargo by Samuel Isaacs.
The whole cargo consisted of arms and munitions of war, taken on board, principally, at London, under the direction of agents of the rebel government, with consent, by the owner or owners of the schooner, to the intended fraud on belligerent rights. The nominal destination of the vessel and cargo was Cardenas; but the preparatory proofs clearly established that this pretended destination was false, and that the entire lading was to be there transshipped, to be conveyed by a swifter vessel, or was to be carried on without transshipment to its belligerent destination, at the discretion of the rebel agent, whose instruc-10ns the master was directed to receive and obey on arrival at Cardenas.
. r* Coffey, for the captors; no one appearing, nor any argument being submitted for the claimants.
The CHIEF JUSTICE: The case in its principal features resembles that of the Bermuda and her cargo; they are, perhaps, even more irreconcilable with neutral good faith.
It is enough to say that neutrals who place their vessels under belligerent control, and engage them in belligerent trade, or permit them to be sent with contraband cargoes under cover of false destination to neutral ports, while the real destination is to belligerent ports, impress upon them the character of the belligerent in whose service they are employed, and cannot complain if they are seized and condemned as enemy property. The principles recognized in the preceding case require the
affirmance of the decree of the District Court; and it is
Affirmed accordingly.
Bollinger’s Champagne.
1. Under the Tariff Act of June 30, 1864, which lays a specific duty per gallon upon wines, and an ad valorem, duty also, with a proviso that no champagne in bottles shall pay a less rate than $6 per dozen (quart) or two dozen (pint) bottles, the effect is that if the specific duty upon the gallon and the ad valorem duty exceed the sum of six dollars per dozen . (quart) or two dozen (pint), the rate thus estimated will be the duty imposed. It is only when the rate falls under the sum of $6 that no less sum is chargeable.
2. Any entry of champagne wines knowingly made by means of false invoices, false certificates to the consul, or by means of any other false or fraudulent documents or papers, forfeits it, irrespective of the fact that if the entry had been truly made, the duty would have been no greater. The penalty is attached to the act of false entry, not to the result which such entry may, in the specific instance, produce on the revenue.
The Revenue Act of March 3, 1863,* provides that every invoice of goods imported from a foreign country (when obtained otherwise than by purchase and subject to ad valorem duty) shall have indorsed upon it a declaration signed by the owner, agent, &c., setting forth that it contains “ a true
* 12 Stat, at Large, 737.
and full statement of the actual market value thereof at the time when and the place where they were procured or manufactured;” and further, that if any such owner, agent, consignee, &c., of any goods, shall knowingly make, or attempt to make an entry thereof by means “ of any invoice which shall not contain a true statement of all the particulars herein before required, or, by means of any other false or fraudulent document, or paper,* or any other false or fraudulent practice, or appliance whatsoever, said goods, &c., shall be forfeited” &c. •
The Tariff Act of June 30,1864,* lays the following duties:
“ On wines of all kinds, valued at not over fifty cents per gallon, twenty cents per gallon and twenty-five per centum ad valorem; valued at over fifty cents, and not over one dollar per gallon, fifty cents per gallon, and twenty-five per centum ad valorem; valued at over one dollar per gallon, one dollar per gallon, and twenty-five per centum ad valorem; provided, that no champagne, or sparkling wines, in bottles, shall pay a less rate of duty than six dollars per dozen bottles, each bottle containing not more than one quart, and more than one pint, or six dollars per two dozen bottles, each bottle containing not more than one pint.”
With these statutes in force, a libel for undervaluation was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of California against a quantity of champagne imported from France to the port of San Francisco, and entered at the customs there in November, 1864. On the trial evidence was given tending to prove that the wines in question were knowingly invoiced by their manufacturers at prices below the actual market value at the time when and place where they were manufactured; that he knowingly entered them at the customs on an invoice that did not state such actual market value; and that such actual market value’w&s forty-eight francs per case of twelve (quart) bottles.
The court charged that under the act of June 30th, 1864, t e undervaluation did not affect the amount or rate of
* 13 Stat., at Large,. 202.
V0L- ln- 36 p. 562duties chargeable on the wines: that, if they had been invoiced and entered at their true and actual market value, they would still have been subject to a specific duty of but six dollars per dozen (quart) bottles, and, therefore, that the wines were not forfeited by reason of their having been knowingly entered on a false invoice.
The idea of the learned district judge, so far as the reporter could understand a case which came up on a very meagre record and was not argued here at all on one side, and» by short brief only on the other, was this. The true, actual market value of the wine at the place of production was forty-eight francs or (estimating the franc at its custom-house valuation of 18 cents 6 mills) $8.92 for twelve quarts in bottles.* This would make the wine worth $2.97 per gallon; on which the ad valorem duty (25 p. c. per gallon), would be:
For three gallons, or the whole twelve bottles, . . . 75 Adding the specific duty ($1 per gallon), . . . . 3 00 Gave tlfe entire duty, independently of the proviso, .. $3 75
But the importer had paid at any rate $6; and paid, therefore, just as much as he would have paid had he given in the true, actual market value of 48 francs per dozen quart bottles.
The claimant having had judgment, and this being approved by the Circuit Court, the case was now here on writ of error for review.
*
I presume that in a question of customs duty the custom-house valuation of the franc was taken. It is a curious fact, however, shown by a note addressed to me in reply to an inquiry from me as to the matter, by the Hon. James Ross Snowden, ex-director of the Federal mint and well known to the country as one of its most learned numismatologists, that in the United States the franc has no less than three different values: c. m. Q g
1
Custom-house valuation,.........................................................iO
2
Silver franc, mint price,....................................................
3
Gold franc, full weight, . . • • • . 19 27 The matter is perhaps of a sufficient interest, extraneous to the case, to in duce my preservation of his note to me in an appendix. (See Appen No. II.)—Rep.
Dec. 1865.] Bollinger’s Champagne. 566
Messrs. Speed, A. G., and Lake, D. A. for California, by brief, for the United States; no counsel appearing for the claimant.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
It will be perceived that the duty imposed by the Tariff Act of June 30th, 1864, is both specific and ad valorem; and, according to the proviso, as it respects champagne or sparkling wines, in bottles, of a given quantity in each, not less than six dollars per dozen, or six dollars per two dozen, as may be the quantity, shall be imposed as the duty. The effect of the proviso is, that, if the specific duty upon the gallon, and the ad valorem duty on the appraised value, in the aggregate, as it respects the article of champagne or sparkling wines, as the case may be, in bottles, exceed the sum of six dollars per dozen, or two dozen, the rate thus estimated will be the duty imposed; but if the rate falls under the sum of six dollars, then, by virtue of the proviso, not less than that sum shall be exacted.
It will be observed that, in order to carry into effect this act, an appraisal at the customs, in the/ case of the specific duty on the gallon, is as essential as the appraisal in the case of an ad valorem duty. For the specific duty is apportioned according to the value of the article; wines valued at not over fifty cents per gallon, pay twenty cents per gallon; valued at over fifty and not over one dollar per gallon, fifty cents specific duty, and so on.
Now, the District Court charged in effect that, as the specific and ad valorem duty, in the aggregate, if properly appraised and estimated as appraised on the trial, was under six dollars per dozen, no higher duties would have been charged by the government than that sum; the sum which was paid on the entry to the collector.
ine principle involved in the ruling is, that no matter °w much fraud and imposition may have been practised upon the officers of the customs, or, however false may have cen the invoice, or other papers of the shipment, and oath ? the importer or agent upon which the entry of the goods 18 e’ turns out in the result, that the value of duty required by law has been paid, no penalty attaches.
We cannot agree to this construction of the act of 1863, which prescribes this penalty, nor of the act of 1864 imposing the duty. The penalty of forfeiture is annexed to the act of making an entry knowingly by means of false in voices, or false certificate of the consul, or of any other in voice which contains an undervaluation, or by means of any other false or fraudulent documents or papers. No doubt one of the objects of the provision is to secure to the gov ernment the duties imposed by the statute, but another is, to protect the officers against imposition and fraud by the importer or agent, and to inculcate and enforce good faith and honest dealing with those officers while engaged in the execution of their duties.
Besides, under this provision of the act of 1864, the result which is assumed in the instruction to- the jury, as the only material fact in disposing of the case, is one to be ascertained by the officers of the customs, and this, after the entry of the goods upon the invoice duly verified, and an appraisal and estimate of the amount of the duties. This is the way prescribed by the law to determine whether or not the duties in the aggregate fall under the rate of six dollars per dozen bottles. The reason, therefore, for integrity in all the documents and papers of the shipment, and fair dealing on the part of the importers or their agent, is as applicable to the present case as to any other importation and entry.
We think that the court below erred, and that the judgment should be
Reversed.
The Douro.
The court reproves counsel who take appeals without any expectation oi reversal, and declares that if it had power to impose a penalty in sue cases, as it has when writs of error are sued out for delay mere y, 1 would impose it. Appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, condemning p. 565the Douro and her cargo for a breach of the blockade of the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, established by our government during the late rebellion.
The vessel had been captured as prize of war by one of the government steamers, about two hundred miles off the port just named, and being brought into the port of New York was there libelled in prize.
C. Edwards, Esq., as attorney, filed a claim for certain British subjects, owners of the vessel and cargo. These admitted in substance that the vessel had come out of the port of Wilmington on the voyage in which she was captured, but alleged that there was no efficient blockade of that port, and seemed to rest their defence on the ground, that having eluded the vigilance of the blockading vessels on duty off that port, and reached the open sea, she was not subject to capture by any other vessel of the United States. The test-oaths were made by Mr. Edwards only.
The master of the captured vessel, on his examination preparatory to the original hearing, said: “ I knew the port of Wilmington was blockaded when I went in, for I had six guns fired at me; and I knew it when I came out.” And again: “ The vessel was captured because she had been running the blockade.” And again: “ The capturing vessel fired a broadside, or half a broadside at us, amounting to some fifty-five guns. This was done because we were trying to escape.” The mate said the same thing.
The District Court condemned both vessel and cargo as lawful prize of war; from which decree the claimants, by counsel whose name the reporter supposes that, after the opinion of the court has been read, he will be excused by the benevolent reader for not signalizing—appealed to this court.
Coffey, special counsel for the captors, remarking that it was difficult to see why the court was troubled with this appeal, declined to argue the case, as being too plain to occupy the time of the court with; and submitted it with e record and a short brief. No counsel for the claimant appeared before this tribunal.
•566 The Mohawk . [Sup. Ct.
Syllabus. w.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The decree of the District Court in this cause is affirmed. It is impossible to imagine a plainer case for condemnation for breach of blockade. The statements of the captain as to breaking the blockade are explicit, and the mate says substantially the same thing as he does.
We cannot approve the conduct of the counsel who advised this appeal. An appeal is a matter of right, and, if prayed, must be allowed; but should never be prayed without some expectation of reversal. We impose penalties when writs of error merely for delay are sued out, in cases of judgments at law for damages; and if the rule were applicable to the case before us we should apply it.
The Mohawk.
1. The act of December 23, 1852, authorizing foreign vessels wrecked and repaired in the United States, to be registered or enrolled, is to be taken as a part of our system of registration and enrolment.
2. Vessels engaged in the foreign trade are registered, and those engaged in the coasting and homo trade are enrolled; and the words “register” and “enrolment” are used to distinguish the certificates granted to thóse two classes of vessels.
8. The two statutes providing generally for registry and enrolment of vessels, are the act of December 81,1792, applicable exclusively to registry of vessels engaged in foreign commerce, and the act of July 18, 1793, applicable exclusively to vessels engaged in domestic commerce.
4. The penalty of forfeiture of a vessel for the use of a certificate of registry to which she is not entitled, found in the 27th section of the act of 1792, is not imported into the act of 1793; and there is no forfeiture under that act for the use of a fraudulent enrolment.
5. But the act of March 2d, 1831, concerning vessels used on our northern frontiers, which are necessarily engaged in both the foreign and homo traffic at the same time, makes the certificate of enrolment equivalent to both registry and enrolment.
6. This act does, by the proviso to its 3d section, apply the penalty of for feiture contained in the 27th section of the act of 1792 to an enrolment, having the effect of a register fraudulently obtained.
An act of Congress of 1792* (section 27th), provides that “ if any certificate of registry or record shall be fraudulently or knowingly used for any ship or vessel not then actually entitled to the benefit thereof, according to the true intent of this act, such ship or vessel shall be forfeited to the United States.”
An act of 1793f concerning the enrolment of vessels engaged in domestic commerce, enacts (section 2d) that 11 in order for the enrolment of any vessel, she shall possess the same qualifications, and the same requisites, in all respects, shall be complied with, as are necessary for registering ships by the registry law; and the same duties are imposed on all officers wTith the same authority in relation to enrolments, and the same proceedings shall be had touching enrolments.”
An act of December 23, 1852,J authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a register or enrolment for any vessel built in a foreign country, whenever such vessel may have been, or shall hereafter be wrecked in the United States, and shall have been, or may hereafter be purchased and repaired by a citizen or citizens thereof; provided, that it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury, that the repairs put upon such vessel shall be equal to three-fourths of the cost of said vessel, when so repaired.
Intermediate in date between the act last mentioned and the one of 1793 just before it set forth, there is another act. This act, dated March 2,1831,§ provides by its third section that any vessel of the United States navigating the waters of our northern, northeastern, and northwestern frontiers, otherwise than by sea, shall be enrolled and licensed in such form, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, which enrolment and license shall authorize any such vessel to be employed either in the coasting or foreign trade; an no certificate of registry shall be required for any vessel
Argument against the forfeiture.
so employed on said frontiers; provided, that such vessel shall be in every other respect liable to the rules, regulations, and penalties now in force relating to registered vessels on our northern, northeastern, and northwestern frontiers.”
With these four different statutes in force, Sloan and others, wishing to give to a Canadian-built and owned vessel, the advantages of one with American papers, scuttled her and pretended that she had been accidentally made a wreck. They then raised her and put her in order; and falsely swearing, for the purpose of changing her to an American vessel, that the repairs were “ equal to three-fourths of her cost when so repaired,” procured American papers for her from the Secretary of the Treasury under the act of December 23,1852.
The United States now libelled her in the District Court •of Michigan, with the idea—
1. That under the three acts, first above mentioned, to wit, the acts of 1792, 1793, and 1852 alone, she was liable to forfeiture.
2. That if this was not so, she was certainly liable under these acts in connection with the act of March 2, 1831.
The District Court thought that the acts were not so essentially parts of one system as that the earlier ones could be imported into the latter, and dismissed the libel; and of this view was the Circuit Court. On appeal by the United States, the matter was now here for review.
Mr. W. A. JMoore, in favor of the decrees below: The idea of the United States in libelling this vessel has been, that the act of 1852 is to be read as if it was a part of the original act of 1792; and that by this process the vessel will become subject to the 27th section of the latter act. The government assumes the acts to be acts in pari materid; and accordingly concludes that they are to be read as one act. But this is a misapplication of a sound maxim. The rule of^«rz materid is one of construction simply. Acts on the same subject are to be read together, that you may get such light as all the parts throw on each part, and thereby more accu-
Argument against the forfeiture.
rately interpret any doubtful provisions. The language of Lord Mansfield is: “ They shall be taken and construed together as one system, and explanatory of each other.”* For no other purpose are different acts to be taken as one law. There is no case which authorizes a court to import independent and distinct provisions from one act into another; to tack the independent provisions of one act to another. There could not be; for, under the rule of pari materiel, laws which have expired, or which have been repealed, may be considered. Now, it would be absurd to say that the repealed or expired acts were to be taken as a part of the law itself. Yet such would be the logical effect, if we accepted the meaning which government gives the rule.
An act may, indeed, be amended; and this by substitution, addition, diminution, or other qualification. The legal effect is, of course, to substitute the amended form for the original form, and to render it subject to the same relation to all other parts of the act. In this case, the amendments become a part of the amended law, in the most literal sense. It becomes such by incorporation. But this is not the sense which the rule pari materia contemplates, when it says that different acts are to be taken together as one law.
The government has probably proceeded, we, suppose, on a misapplication of the rule which the cases lay down for construing revenue statutes. The court, under the rule referred to, reads the whole revenue code together, in order to interpret its different parts; to see how far a subsequent act has repealed or modified a former act; to see what provisions of the former acts, relating to the same particulars, are still in force, &c., &c. Thus, in Stuart v. Maxwell,the question was, whether the Tariff Act of 1846 repealed certain provisions of the Tariff Act of 1842; and in order to reach a sound interpretation, the court read both acts together. So in Hing v. Maxwell,\ the question was, whether a provision of the Tariff Act of 1842 had been repealed by a subsequent act. These were both correct applications of
t 17 Id. 147.
the rule. The critical observations of Curtis, J., in the last case,* confirms both of our positions.
Applying this rule to the case, we are unable to see that the decree should be reversed. We think it plain that the penalty of forfeiture found in the 27th section of the act of 1792 is not imported into the act of 1793; and that it would be straining to hold even that the proviso to the 3d section of the act of March 2, 1831, applied the penalty contained in the section above named of the act of 1792, to any enrolment.
Mr. Speed, A. G., and Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Ashton, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The act of December 23, 1852, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a register or enrolment for any vessel built in a foreign country, whenever such vessel may have been, or shall hereafter be, wrecked in the United States, and shall have been, or may hereafter be purchased and repaired by a citizen or citizens thereof: provided, that it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury, that the repairs put upon such vessel shall be equal to three-fourths of the cost of said vessel, when so repaired.
In this act, under which the owners of the Mohawk procured the enrolment, and the whole of which we have just quoted, there is nothing which inflicts such forfeiture, or any other penalty for fraud or false swearing, in procuring the action of the secretary.
This act is, however, to be construed as a part of our system of registry and enrolment of vessels, and as merely adding another class which may be registered and enrolled to those enumerated in the previous statutes. Whatever, therefore, may be found in those statutes imposing a penalty for fraud in procuring the enrolment of a vessel, may well be held to apply to an enrolment under the act of 1852.
We emphasize the word enrolment, because the registry
*
Pages 150-1.
of a vessel and the enrolment of a vessel are essentially different things, are provided for by different statutes, and are applicable to vessels engaged in different and distinct pursuits. Hence the act of 1852 says that the secretary may issue to a vessel, such as it describes, “ a register or enrolment.”
The purpose of a register is to declare the nationality of a vessel engaged in trade with foreign nations, and to enable her to assert that nationality wherever found. The purpose of an enrolment is to evidence the national character of a vessel engaged in the coasting trade or home traffic, and to enable such vessel to procure a coasting license.*
The distinction between these two classes of vessels is kept up throughout the legislation of Congress on the subject, and the word register is invariably used in reference to the one class, and enrolment in reference to the other.
There are two statutes in force making general provisions for the subjects of registry and enrolment of vessels. One of them is the act of December 31, 1792, which applies exclusively to vessels engaged in foreign commerce and to their registry, and the other is the act of February 18,1793, which relates to vessels engaged in the coasting trade and fisheries, and to their enrolment.
The act of 1792 provides, that “ if any certificate of registry or record shall be fraudulently or knowingly used for any ship or vessel not then actually entitled to the benefit thereof, according to the true intent of this act, such ship or vessel shall be forfeited to the United States.” This section does not refer to an enrolment, because neither the word registry or record is usually applied to an enrolment, and because the true intent of the act can have reference to no other class of vessels than those engaged in foreign comnierce, which are required to take out a register.
The act of 1793, concerning the enrolment of vessels engaged in domestic commerce, enacts, by the second section, in order for the enrolment of any vessel, she shall p. 572possess the same qualifications, and the same requisites, in all respects, shall be complied with, as are necessary for registering ships by the registry law; and the same duties are imposed on all officers with the same authority in relation to enrolments, and the same proceedings shall be had touching enrolments.” From this it is argued, that forfeiture shall take place under like circumstances as is provided for in the registry law. But there is not only nothing in the terms used which refers to penalties, but there is nothing which can be held to have such reference by any fair implication. These provisions concern the class or qualifications of vessels which may be enrolled, the requisites to be complied with before enrolment, the duties and authority of officers connected with the enrolment, and the proceedings to be had in obtaining enrolment. In all these particulars the rules of the registry law are adopted. The act makes sufficient provision for false affidavits, and has its penalties for them, but forfeiture of the vessel is not one of them.
But the act of March 2, 1831, undertakes, as its title imports, to regulate both the foreign and coasting trade, on the northern, northeastern, and northwestern frontiers of the United States.
In these regions the domestic and the foreign trade are so blended that the same vessel is almost necessarily engaged in both at the same time, and often during the same voyage. To meet this kind of trade the third section of that act says, in reference to vessels engaged in navigating those waters, that “ they shall be enrolled and licensed in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury; which enrolment and license shall authorize any such boat, sloop, or other vessel, to be employed either in the coasting or foreign trade, and no certificate of registry shall be required for vessels employed on said frontiers; provided, that such boat, sloop or other vessel, shall be in every other respect liable to the rules, regulations, and penalties now in force relating to registered vessels, on our northern, northeastern, and northwestern frontiers.”
It is the obvious policy of this act to enable a class of vessels which are engaged in both the foreign and the coasting trade at the same time, to do so without the necessity of taking out both a register and an enrolment. For this purpose the act makes the enrolment equivalent to both register and enrolment. In giving to the enrolment the effect of a register, it very properly subjects the vessel to all the rules, regulations, and penalties relating to registered vessels. One of these penalties, as we have already seen, is the forfeiture of the vessel, for the fraudulent use of a certificate of registry, when she is not actually entitled to the benefit thereof.
The statements of the libel and the evidence in the case which supports them bring the Mohawk within this penalty.
Decree reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to enter a decree of forfeiture and condemnation of the vessel.