Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434
Full caption
Peralta v. United States.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Peralta v. United States.
1. Written documentary evidence, no matter how formal and complete, or how well supported hy the testimony of witnesses, if coming from private hands, is insufficient to establish a Mexican grant if there is nothing in the public records to show that such evidence ever existed; though the court remarks that if the claimant can show to the satisfaction of the court that the grant has been made in conformity to law and recorded, and that the record has been lost or destroyed, he will then be permitted to give secondary evidence of its contents. 2. A bare possession for a year before our conquest of California insufficient to establish an equity in opposition to the above first-announced rule. 3. In this case the court enforces the necessity of adhering to general rules when experience has demonstrated their wisdom, even though, sometimes, adherence to them should make cases of individual hardship.
Appeal from the decree of the District Court for Northern California on a claim presented in 1853, by Maria de Valencia, for herself and others, heirs of Teodora Peralta, for a piece of land in California on which they were living; the claim being founded on a grant alleged by them to have been made in the spring of 1846 to the said Teodora by Governor Pio Pico. The case had come of course to the District Court on an appeal from the Board of Land Commissioners established by the act of March 3, 1851, to settle private land claims in California.
The expediente which was produced by the claimant showed that in 1845, the Señora Peralta petitioned the a - calde of San Hafael to obtain a report from the neigh ors or colindantes of the tract which she desired to solicit rom p. 435the government, in order that the report might accompany her petition to the governor for a grant of the land. On the same day the magistrate certified that the colindantes had stated before him that the sobrante or surplus asked for was vacant and might be granted. On the 8th November, 1845, she presented a petition to the prefect, in which she set forth her previous application to the alcalde and the report of that officer, and requesting him to take such further proceedings as might be necessary. This petition was referred by the prefect to the sub-prefect, and by the latter to the first judge of San Rafael. On the 29th November the first judge reported the land to be vacant. On the 20th December the prefect recommended to the governor that the title issue. And on the 18th February, 1846, the governor attached to the expediente an order to that effect.
The expediente containing all these documents was produced by the claimant. The archives contained no record or trace whatever of any of these proceedings.
There seemed no reason, perhaps, to doubt the genuineness of any of the papers except the last and most important of all, viz., the order by the governor that the title issue. This order and the signature were evidently in Pico’s handwriting, but the court below noted that his signature on this particular document bore little resemblance to his signatures elsewhere found in the archives, the uniform and striking peculiarities of which it had frequently commented upon; but, on the contrary, resembled the mode of signing his name, and especially of forming the letter11 P” in it, adopted * by him at a much later period.
No explanation.was offered of the circumstance that the expediente was found in the claimant’s possession.
The Señora Peralta, mother of the petitioner, belonged, it was said, to a well-known and good family, and was a native of the region, with a perfectly fair character. One witness swore that she was occupying the land in 1844; another that she was on it even a year earlier.
The petition itself (or an amended petition rather, which differed in important respects from the original petition) set p. 436forth that title, a written document of concession signed by Pio Pico, did in fact issue, granting the land to the said Teodora Peralta; that, as the petitioner was informed and verily believed, the said document of concession, and also a map of the land, and a certificate of possession thereof, were delivered to the said Teodora Peralta, at the time of the said granting of said land, and within the knowledge and distinct recollection of the petitioner, were held and possessed by the said Teodora during her lifetime; that until within a short period the petitioner, and, as she was informed and verily believed, the rest of the heirs, had believed the same to be on file along with the said expediente in this cause; that the petitioner had made and caused to be made diligent search therefor without finding the same, and that she verily believed that the same had become lost or destroyed since the death of the said Teodora.
One of the daughters of Madame Peralta swore to her reception of the grant, and that for about a year previous to its delivery she had been in occupancy under a provisional license, although the case showed no record evidence of the same.
The Board of Land Commissioners, admitting that the proofs of occupancy and cultivation were satisfactory, and that, if the parties had used the proper diligence in procuring the issue of the grant and judicial measurement and formal possession, there might have been no difficulty in the case, still considered that in the absence of the issue of the grant, and a segregation of the land, they could do nothing but reject the claim.
The District Court was apparently of this same view: observing that the reports of the alcalde, the prefect, &c., showed that the Señora Peralta would have had no difficulty in obtaining the land, if she had followed out her original purpose; that the case was thus a hard one for the claimant, or rather her heirs, since she herself was now dead; but still declaring that if by accident or neglect she had failed to get what she might have laid a good foundation for obtaining, and but for accident or neglect might perhaps have got, p. 437in fact, the misfortune was one which that court could not remedy.
Messrs. Speed, A. Gr., and Wills, for the United States, relied on numerous decisions in this court, of which Romero v. United States,* a leading case on the subject, and which Mr. Wills noted had been argued by Mr. Black, adverse counsel here, in opposition to the positions which he would be compelled now to maintain, was one. The counsel also contended that the case had been even more than benignantly enough considered by the Land Commission and by the court below; it being, as was evident from the amendment of the petition in important particulars (afterthoughts plainly), and from the positive oath made by Madame Peralta’s daughter as to having seen a petition of which no record could be found, and from other circumstances not necessary to be detailed, a case less of misfortune and accident than of a fraudulent kind.
Mr. J. S. Black, contra, acknowledging the rule set up by the other side to be generally true, sought to take the case out of it as an exception; he denied all fraud, and referring to United States v. Alvisof where there was no archive evidence, and to other cases, submitted that the difficulty, suggested by the fact that the expediente wTas not found in the archives but was produced by claimants, was fairly explained by the reasonable presumptions, arising from the proof of a bona fides from the very beginning, confessed both by the Land Commission and the District Court, of the meritorious qualifications of the grantee; of the integrity of her documentary evidence; of its transmission to and reception from the government authorities; of the undoubted continuity of her possession and claim, accompanied by actual occupation and cultivation, as the permanent family home for a period of some ten years, and under a well-known and recognized p. 438claim of title; that it was also met and explained by the irregularity and want of system shown, as he argued, by various cases which he cited from the Appendix to Hoffman’s Reports and from the California Archives and Records, to have existed in the registry and record of Mexican land grants as aforesaid. He argued also that it was accounted for by the analogy of the numerous other cases which could be cited, and which showed, as he considered, that in many claims of undoubted bonafides and merit which had been held on behalf of the government to be good and entitled to patent, the expedientes were in some manner returned to the Mexican grantees, and were thus not found in the archives, but in the possession of the claimants themselves, and were by them produced before the Land Commission or United States District Courts, unauthenticated by any archive evidence whatever.
1
Wallace 721; see also White v. United States, 1 Id. 660, and Pico v. Same, 2 Id. 279. f 23 Howard, 318.
He had himself, it was true, as much perhaps as any counsel at this bar, supported as a general rule, the rule which the other side would apply as an inflexible one to this case. But on previous cases he was stating a rule, not the exceptions to it. Of course he did not overlay his arguments as if he were writing a text-book, with a consideration of everything that might, could, would, should, or possibly ought to qualify his general propositions. The case here was different. It was an exception to a rule, and the rule was to be applied so as to subserve and not so as to destroy justice.
The whole matter rested in judicial construction. It was not an affair of statute. To apply previous decisions on general cases to a case purely exceptional, would be to judge without discrimination. “Statutes,” said Hobart, C. J.,* “ are like tyrants: where they come they make all void; but the common law is like a nursing father, and makes void that part only where the fault is and leaves the rest.” Even statutes, however, and statutes where the language is positive—the statute of frauds being a well-known instance have been largely qualified so as to prevent rules intended
* 1 Modern, 36.
for general cases operating to do injustice in such special ones, as they were really meant not for.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
This claim cannot be sustained, according to the rules of evidence which this court has established to determine the validity of Mexican titles in California. We are asked to relax the severity of those rules in this case, because it is alleged to be meritorious. Courts administer justice by fixed rules, which experience and wisdom have demonstrated are necessary in the investigation of truth. There will sometimes, in applying those rules to the various affairs of life, be cases of individual hardship; but this does not prove that the rules are unwise, or not the best that can be adopted for the purposes of judicial investigation. The right of property, as every other valuable right, depends in a great measure for its security on the stability of judicial decisions.
The treaty of G-uadalupe Hidalgo imposed the obligation on this government to protect titles to land in California acquired under Mexican rule. The country was new, and rich in mineral wealth, and attracted settlers, whose industry and enterprise produced an unparalleled state of prosperity. The enhanced value given to the whole surface of the country by the discovery of gold, made it necessary to ascertain and settle all private land claims, so that the real estate belonging to ,individuals could be separated from the public domain. Yielding to this necessity, and in obedience to the obligations of the treaty, Congress passed an act on the-3d of March, 1851, to accomplish this purpose. The laws and usages of the Mexican government, as administered in California before the conquest of the country, and the principles of equity, were prescribed as rules which should govern the courts in adjudicating the questions of
title. Very many claims were tested by these rules,, and ound to be valid, and were confirmed; others were imperect and could not be recognized. Then commenced a struggle, which has never been abandoned, to induce the p. 440courts to fritter away the act of Congress, and substitute parol proof for record evidence. The history of the cases in this court from California, show the extent of the struggle and the result. We have refused to allow oral testimony to prevail when archive evidence was necessary.
The colonization regulations of 1828 constitute the “laws and usages” by which the validity of a Mexican title is to be determined. It is not important to restate the nature and extent of those regulations, for they have been so often commented on that they are familiar to the profession. The Mexican nation attached a great deal of form to the disposition of its lands, and required many things to be done before the proceedings could ripen into a grant. But the important fact to be noticed is, that a record was required to be kept of whatever was done. This record was a guard against fraud and imposition, and enabled the government to ascertain with accuracy what portions of the public lands had been alienated. The record was the grant, and without it the title was not divested. The governor was required to give a document to the party interested, which was evidence of title, and enabled him to get possession; but this “ titulo” did not divest the title, unless record was made in conformity with law.
Written documentary evidence, no matter how formal and complete, or how well supported by the testimony of witnesses, will not suffice if it is obtained from private hands and there is nothing in the public records of the country to show that such evidence ever existed. But it may be said that the archives of the country may be lost or destroyed, and if so, that the party in interest should not suffer. This is true; and if the claimant can show, to the satisfaction of the court, that the grant was made in conformity to law and recorded, and that the record of it has been lost or destroyed, he will then be permitted to introduce secondary evidence of it. But the absence of record evidence is necessarily fatal, unless that absence can be accounted for. Testing the case in hand by these principles of law, it cannot be confirmed. There is neither a p. 441grant nor archive evidence. If there had been a grant according to law, the expediente would have remained in the archives; but there is no trace of it there, and it is produced from private hands, which tends strongly to show that the governor never saw it. If the grant had been made, and recorded in the proper office, possession would have been given to the grantee of the lands which were conveyed. This was not done, and no reason is assigned for the omission. There are circumstances in proof which are calculated to cast suspicion on this claim, but we forbear to notice them.
It is said that an equity arises on account of possession. But the bare possession is too limited to raise any substantial equity, because the claimant only occupied the place about a year before the conquest of the country.
Decree affirmed.
United States v. Cutting.
Under the Internal Revenue Act of June 30, 1864, as amended by the act of March 3, 1865, the sales of stocks, bonds, and securities made by “brokers” for themselves are subject to the same duties as those made by them for others.
The Internal Revenue Act of 30th June, 1864,* declares by its 99th section as follows:
“ All brokers and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, &c., and shall also be subject to all the provisions, &c., of the act for making returns, assessments, and collection of the duties.”
The ninth paragraph of the 79th section says:
Brokers shall pay $50 for each license. Every person, firm, or company (except such as hold a license as banker),
* 13 Stat, at Large, 218.
whose business it is as a broker to negotiate purchases or sales of stocks, exchange, bullion, coined money, bank notes, promissory notes, or other securities, shall be regarded as a broker, [and shall make oath or affirmation that all their transactions are made for a commission.”]
On the 3d March, 1865, Congress passed an act to amend the former act.* This last act amends the former, by inserting, after the words “ other securities” (given above in italics) the words “for themselves or others;” and by striking out from the paragraph that part of it included above in brackets.
In this state of the statutes, as assumed by the court, Cutting & Co., duly licensed as “brokers” besides having bought and sold stocks, bonds, and securities for others, had sold on their own account other stocks, bonds, and securities, of which they were themselves the owners at the time. On these last they refused to pay any duty; and suit being brought by the United States to recover the duty, the question here, on error to the New York Circuit, was, whether they had refused rightfully; in other words, whether one licensed as a “ broker” only, was liable to pay duty on his own stocks sold on his own account. The Circuit Court thought that he was not.
The case, which largely concerned, of course, both the government and great numbers of persons in all our large cities, was thoroughly and ably argued by Mr. Speed, A. G-., for the United States, and by Messrs. Allen, Burrill, and Evarts, contra. The matter involving, however, nothing but the construction of a statute of immense length hastily drawn of necessity in many of its provisions, and liable to be amended indefinitely, even the ability which marked the discussion would not compensate the general reader for the space which any presentation of it would require.
Mr. Justice GRIER, delivered the opinion of the court. The act of 30th June, 1864, is entitled “An act to provide
* 13 Stat, at Large, 469.
ways and means for the support of government and for other purposes.” It imposes specific taxes upon a large list of articles manufactured or sold, and prescribes the mode of assessing and collecting them. In addition to these, it imposes certain taxes on all persons carrying on certain “trades or professions” enumerated. The persons on whom this tax is assessed receive what is called a “ license,” which is the evidence of permission to exercise such trade or calling in consequence of payment of this tax or duty. Among these is the trade or employment of broker, mentioned in the ninth paragraph of the 79th section of the act. Brokers are required to pay fifty dollars for a license. The act also defines the term broker to “ be one whose business it is to negotiate purchases or sales of stocks, exchange, coined money, bank notes, promissory notes, or other securities.” Other species of the genus broker are indicated by the affix to the general term, as well as by special definition, such as “pawn brokers,” “ cattle brokers,” &c., &c. Besides, the tax paid by auctioneers and the different species of brokers under form of a license or permission “ tp prosecute their trade, business, or profession,” they were required to pay certain duties on the sqles made by them respectively.
Being by mean^of these licenses brought within the cognizance of the revenue officers, and into a quasi-official relation with them, they were required to make “returns, assessment, and collection of these duties,” under certain penalties. By the 99th section “all brokers, and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, &c., and shall also be subject to all the provisions of the act for making returns, assessments, and collection of the duties.”
Now, the 9th paragraph of the 79th section, after defining a broker to be one “ whose business it is, as a broker, to negotiate purchases or sales,” &c., required him also to make oath that all his transactions are made for a commission.”
his clause might have been construed to forbid a licensed p. 444broker to purchase or sell stocks, &c., on his own account, so that his sales being made through the interposition of another broker, might be made liable to tax. But it has been construed to release him from the necessity of making any return of sales made for himself, or from paying any tax on such sales.
But there was no good reason why these transactions in stocks, bullion, &c., by a broker, for his own profit, should not be liable to the same tax or duty imposed on those made by him for other parties. Besides, such construction gave great opportunities of evading the tax altogether. To obviate this difficulty, an act was passed on 3d of March, 1865, to amend the act of 30th June, 1864. Among other things it amends the ninth paragraph of section 79, by inserting after the words “ other securities” the words “for themselves or others” and by striking out from said paragraph the words “ and shall make oath or affirmation that all his transactions are made for a commission.”
The intention of this amendment might have been better provided for by an amendment of the 99th section, but it cannot be doubted that the meaning of the act was to subject sales made by a broker for himself to the same tax as those made for others. «
The definition of a broker will now read, in the section as amended, “ whose business it is, as broker, to negotiate purchases or sales of stocks, exchange, bullion, coined money, bank notes, promissory notes, or other securities, for themselves or others”
That it was the intention of Congress to subject the sales made by brokers for themselves to the same duties as those made by them for others, cannot admit of a doubt, though it must be admitted their intention is rather obscurely expressed.
The judgment below is reversed and a
Venire de novo awarded -
[See the next case.—Rep.]
United States v. Fisk.
“Bankers” who sell the Federal securities no otherwise than for the United States and for themselves, and who, therefore, do not sell them for others or for a commission, are not liable to pay the duties imposed by the 99th section of the Internal Revenue Act, of June 30, 1864, imposed upon “brokers and bankers doing business as broker° ”
The “ Internal Revenue Act,” of 30th June, 1864, “ to provide ways and means for the support of government, and for other purposes,” declares, by its 99th section, as follows
“ All brokers and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, and shall also be subject to all the provisions of the act for making returns, assessments, and collection of the duties.”
The ninth paragraph of the 79th section of the same act says:
“ Brokers shall pay 050 for each license. Every person, firm, or company (except such as hold a license as banker), whose business it is as a broker to negotiate purchases or sales of stocks, exchange, bullion, coined money, bank notes, promissory notes, or other securities, shall be regarded as a broker [and shall make oath or affirmation that all their transactions are made for a commission], provided that any person holding a license as a banker shall not be required to take out a license as a broker.”
On the 3d of March, 1865,’ Congress passed an act to amend the former act. The last act amends the former by inserting, after the words “other securities” (given above in italics), the words “for themselves or others;” and by striking out from the paragraph that part of it above included in brackets.
n this state of the statutes it was decided, in the preceding case of United States v- Cutting, that “ brokers” were la pay the duties and rates of duty prescribed by p. 446the 99th section of the act of 1864, whether the sales were made for themselves or for others.
In the present case a different question arose.
Fisk & Co. were bankers, doing a general business as such, making returns, and paying duties and taxes imposed by law upon their capital and deposits. As such they negotiated and sold for the United States large amounts of government securities. At the same time they bought and sold government securities for themselves, and not for others or for a commission.
The distinction, then, between the two cases was:
1. That, in the present case, the defendants were licensed as “ bankers,” and carried on the business of banking and nothing else, and did not act as “brokers;” while the defendants in the preceding case were licensed as “ brokers,” and did business as such, as well as on their own account.
2. That the sales by the defendants in this action, upon which the duty was sought to be recovered, were of government securities only, held and owned by them in their own right; while the sales by the defendants in the preceding case embraced other stocks, bonds, and securities, as well as government securities.
On a suit by the government against Fisk & Co., for duties on sales made by them, the question was, whether on these sales they were liable to pay the duties imposed by the 99th section upon “brokers, and bankers doing business as brokers” in addition to those imposed upon them as bankers ?
The first paragraphs of the 79th section of the act of 1864, which concerns bankers as distinguished from brokers, is as follows:
“ Bankers using or employing a capital not exceeding the sum of $50,000, shall pay $100 for each license; when using or employing a capital exceeding $50,000, for every additional $1000 in excess of $50,000, $2.
“Every person, firm, or company, and every incorporated or other bank, having a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be p. 447paid or remitted upon draft, cheek, or order; or where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes; or where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes, are received for discount or sale, shall be regarded a banker under this act.”
The 110th section prescribes the additional duties (beside the license tax) to be paid by “ any person, bank, association, company, or corporation engaged in the business of banking.”
The Circuit Court for New York, where the suit originated, was of opinion that “ bankers” were not liable on such sales as those made in this case. The matter was now brought here by the government on error.
Mr. Speed, A. (r.,for the United States; Messrs. Allen, Burrill, and Evarts, contra.
Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.
In the construction of statutes, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled to construe “ or” as
meaning “ and,” and again “ and” as meaning “ or.”
The purpose and intent of the legislature, in the amendment made to the ninth paragraph, was evidently not to change the correct definition given of the term “ broker,” and to make it mean that every man who sold his own stock was a broker, and liable to pay fifty dollars for a license. The obvious purpose of the amendment was to compel brokers to render an account of all sales made, whether for themselves or others, and to pay the duty on them. As is often the case in statutes, though the intention is clear, the words used to express it may be ill chosen.
The evil intended to be remedied by the amendment was transparent. If the amendment had been properly expressed, it should have been added as a proviso to the 99th section, which relates to the rates of duty to be paid on sales made in the stock-market by brokers or others licensed and p. 448doing business as such, and in the preceding case the court have so construed it.
Now, a banker pays a much higher license tax than a broker, and is permitted to “prosecute or carry on” the business or profession of a broker without paying any further license; but if he prefers, he may not combine that business with his own. The 110th section prescribes the duties to be paid by a banker. It is not amended so as to require him to render an account of his purchases or sales of government stocks for himself. The case before us, therefore, presents no other question than the construction of the 99th section. It enacts that “all brokers and bankers doing business as brokers shall be subject to the following duties,” &c.
Now, in order to subject a banker to the duties prescribed by this section, we are asked to interpolate the important word “ not,” and to construe it as including bankers who do not, as well as those who do transact “ business as brokers.” This would not be a construction of the statute, but an amendment thereof in direct contradiction of its language. This we do not feel at liberty to make.
Judgment affirmed.