Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1
Full caption
Lovejoy v. Murray.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Lovejoy v. Murray.
1. A bond of indemnity given by a plaintiff in an attachment to induce the officer to hold, after levy, property not subject to the writ, makes such plaintiff a joint trespasser with the officer as to all that is done with the property afterwards. 2. A judgment against one joint trespasser is no bar to a suit against another for the same trespass. Nothing short of full satisfaction, or that which the law must consider as such, can make such judgment a bar. 3. A plaintiff in attachment who indemnifies the attaching officer, and afterwards takes upon himself the defence when that officer is sued, is concluded by the judgment against that officer where such plaintiff is afterwards sued for the same trespass.
Lovejoy brought suit in one of the courts of Iowa against 0. H. Pratt, and the sheriff attached certain personal property, which was assumed to be the property of Pratt. A certain Murray, however, claimed it as his. The sheriff, now in possession, was unwilling to proceed further in the attachment, or to sell the property under it, unless indemnified by Lovejoy & Co. These parties accordingly executed a bond, in which, reciting that the sheriff had attached and taken possession of the property, they bound themselves to pay all damages, &c. The sheriff then proceeded to sell the property under Lovejoy & Co.’s attachment, and under direction of their attorneys.
This being done, Murray sued the sheriff for an alleged trespass. The sheriff gave notice of this suit, as soon as
VOL. III. 1 ( J )
' Argument for the plaintiffs in error.
brought, to Lovejoy & Co., and they defended it; counsel, whom they paid, having taken exclusive charge of it. In this suit, Murray obtained
Judgment against the sheriff for . . $6233 Which the sheriff, without execution issued, satisfied to the extent of . . 830
Leaving a balance unsatisfied of . . $5403
Murray then brought suit against Lovejoy f Co. for this same trespass; and the facts being agreed on in a case stated, the court gave judgment for the plaintiffs for the amount of the judgment against the sheriff less the $830 paid by him.
On error here from the Massachusetts Circuit (where Lovejoy & Co. had been sued), three questions were made.
1. Did Lovejoy & Co., in giving the bond of indemnity to the sheriff, become thereby liable as joint trespassers with him in what was done under the attachment ?
2. Did Murray, by suing the sheriff“ alone, and getting partial satisfaction of the judgment against that officer, bar himself of a right to Sue Lovejoy & Co. for the same trespass ?
3. Was Murray’s judgment against the sheriff* conclusive against Lovejoy & Co. in this suit against them?
The case was thoroughly argued on both sides, in this court, on the authorities, ancient and modern, English and our own.
Mr. Hutchins, for Lovejoy $ Co., plaintiffs in error.
On the first point, the effect of the bond of indemnity. One may indemnify an officer for an act committed by him, without being himself liable for that act. He may defend a suit against a trespasser without becoming himself a trespasser. “ It is sometimes said,” remarked Chief Justice Gibson, of Pennsylvania,* “ that in levying an execution the sheriff* is the plaintiff’s agent. Having received a sufficient bond of indemnity, or a tender of it, he is certainly bound to follow p. 3his instructions; but the relation between them is not that of master and servant; for the sheriff is bound to act, not by force of the plaintiff’s command, but by force of the command of his writ. He is the agent of the law; and, therefore, it is that when he seizes by the plaintiff’s direction the goods of a stranger on a fieri facias against the goods of a defendant, the parties do not stand in the relation ofjoint trespassers. The plaintiff creditor is not a trespasser at all; for the sheriff is bound to stand the brunt of the stranger’s action. He acts at his peril, but not without a means of security; and it is his fault if he does not use it.”
*
Fitler v. Fossard, 7 Pennsylvania State, 541; and see Sowell v. Champion,
6
Adolphus & Ellis, 417. __ * Wilkes V. Jackson, 2 Henning & Munford, 355; Hunt et al. v. Bates,
On the second and principal point; how far thejudgment against the sheriff operated as a bar to the suit against Lovejoy Co.
There seems to be a great conflict of opinion in the books, whether a judgment alone against one tort-feasor operates.as a bar to a suit against another; some holding it to be an absolute bar, others that judgment with execution is necessary, and others that satisfaction is necessary.
In numerous cases which may be referred to in this country, it has been either decided, declared, or assumed, as we read the cases, that judgment alone operates as a bar* This is the direction certainly in which these cases set. Other cases would indicate that judgment and execution so operate ;f and in one caseJ it has been held that absolute satisfaction was necessary. ,
It is impossible to reconcile the American cases. The English courts keep clear of the whole difficulty by treating the judgment, of itself, as a bar; and this we submit is the better doctrine.
7
Rhode Island, 217 ; Rogers et al. v. Moore, 1 Rice S. C. 60, 62 ; Floyd v. Browne, Adm’r, 1 Rawle, 121 ; Marsh v. Pier, 4 Id. 288 ; Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & Sergeant, 103, 107; Merrick’s Estate, 5 Id. 9, 17; Norris v. Beckley, 2 Mills’ Constitutional Reports, S. C., New Series, 228; Johnson et al. v. Packer, Nott & McCord, 1 ; Wilburn v. Bogan, 1 Spear, 179; Trafton et al. v. United States, 3 Story, 646; Town of Marlborough v. Sisson et al., 31 Connecticut, 332 ; Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Id. 447, 453. t Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johnson, 290; White v. Philbrick, 5 Greenleaf, 147 ; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pickering, 65. Ì Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aikin, 195.
The leading English case is Brown v. Wootton, temp. James I, reported by three different reporters, Yelverton, Croke, and Moore, all essentially in one way.* Sir Henry Yelverton gives the case thus:
li In trover of certain goods in particular, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had brought the like action against J. S. for the same goods before this action brought, in which suit he so far prosequtus est against J. S. that he had judgment and execution against J. S., and averred that the goods contained in both actions were the same goods. Upon which the plaintiff demurred, and it was adjudged against the plaintiff.”
This is much in point, and the case was decided in the best days of the old English law; Popham being Chief Justice; Fenner, Gawdy, Sir C. Yelverton, and Williams, eminent names injudicial history, his associates. Mr. Theron Metcalf (now Mr. Justice Metcalf, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts), commenting on it, A.D. 1820, in his excellent edition of Yelverton, says: “ No case has been found in which the precise point adjudged in the text, viz., that in the action of trover a former recovery against one of two or more joint tort-feasors for the same conversion and a writ of execution sued out is a bar, has been otherwise decided.”
In King v. Hoare, A.D. 1844, the Court of Exchequer! decided that a judgment, without satisfaction, recovered against one of two joint debtors, is a bar to an action against the other; though secus where the debt is joint and several. The court, Baron Parke giving its judgment, refers to Brown v. Wootton, just cited, and declare that“ a joint contract cannot be distinguished from a joint tort;” thus assuming Brown v. Wootton to have been rightly decided, and in effect affirming it.
Buckland v. Johnson, decided ten years later in the p. 5Common Pleas of England,* is to the same result. In that case it appeared that a father and son had wrongfully converted the goods of the plaintiff by selling them; that the proceeds of the sale, £150, were received by the son alone; and that the plaintiff had sued the father, and recovered a verdict for £100 as the value of the goods so converted; but that in consequence of his insolvency he had obtained no satisfaction. He now sued the son. But Jervis, C. J., says: “ If two jointly convert goods, and one of them receives the proceeds, you cannot, after a recovery against one in trover, have an. action against the other for the same conversion, or an action for money had and received to recover the value of the goods for which a judgment has already passed in the former action. . .. The fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument arises from his losing sight of the fact, that by the judgment in the action of trover the property of the goods was changed, by relation, from the time of the conversion, and that consequently the goods from that moment became the goods of the son;” and his lordship quotes with approbation the language of Baron Parke in the case last cited: “ The judgment of a court of record changes the nature of that cause of action, and prevents it being the subject of another suit; and the cause of action, being single, cannot afterwards be divided into two.”
*
Yelverton," 67; Croke Jac. 73; Moore, 672. f 13 Meeson & Welsby, 504; gee, also, Leachmere & Fletcher, 1 Crompton & Meeson, 634; and what is admitted by the S. G. arguendo, in Bird v. Randal, 3 Burrow, 1347.
But if the court shall be of the opinion that a party may sue and recover separate judgments against co-trespassers, and then elect which judgment he will enforce, then we say that the recovery of judgment against the sheriff’, and the receipt of partial satisfaction on that judgment from him before the commencement of this suit, will operate as a bar to this suit. How can the court proceed now to try the original trespass when it has been partially settled for ? How would a declaration be framed ? How would the court proceed at the trial ? What becomes of the $800 paid ? Must it not be credited in some way, or deducted? and if so, how? The plaintiff is seeking to recover full damage for a wrong partially redressed.
* 15 C. B. (80 English Common Law), 145.
In the Vermont case of Sanderson v. Caldwell* which is opposed to our general view, the judgment first recovered was in no part satisfied.
On the third point, the effect of the judgment against the sheriff; is it conclusive ?
Lovejoy & Co., we think, are not estopped to defend this suit because they gave the sheriff a bond of indemnity, or because they took part in the defence of the suit against him. If this were a suit by sheriff against Lovejoy & Co. upon their bond of indemnity to him against that suit, and upon notice or otherwise they had defended the suit against him, then perhaps as between them and the officer they would have been concluded by the judgment against him. But that is not the question here. The defendants were neither parties nor privies to the judgment against the sheriff, f
Mr. Ball, contra:
On the first question: All persons who direct or request another to commit a trespass are liable as co-trespassers, and giving a bond of indemnity in such case makes the party a trespasser. The proposition is well-established elementary law, and need not be unfolded or enforced. Upon the facts the court will readily apply what we conceive to be both true and applicable.
On the second and principal question: It is a settled principle that all torts are several as well as joint, and that the injured party can maintain an action against all the tort-feasors jointly or against each one separately. Hence such party must have the right to pursue each tort-feasor to judgment and execution till he gets satisfaction. That satisfaction is the essential matter appears even in cases contemporary with Brown v. Wootton, reported in Yelverton, and which seems to be the foundation of the recent decisions in England, and is one of the citations of the opposite counsel. In
* 2 Aiken, 195. f See Sprague v. Waite, 19 Pickering, 458; Eastman v. Cooper, 15 Id.. 279; Church v. Leavenworth, 4 Day, 278.
Cocke v. Jenner, reported by Lord Hobart,* the court in speaking of joint trespassers says:
“ If they be sued in several actions, though the plaintiff make choice of the best damage, yet when he hath taken one satisfaction he can take no more; and if he require two an audita querela will lie.”
The same idea is presented in Corbett v. Barnes, which arose soon after and is reported in Sir William Jones.f The report is in Horman French, but translated, reads in the material parts, thus:
“ Barnes brought trespass of assault and battery, in London, against Hill in the Common Bench and recovered; and afterwards trespass of assault and battery against Corbett in the King’s Bench, and two others for the assault and battery in Hertfordshire. Hill was taken in judgment, and afterwards judgment given against the three others in the King’s Bench. Hill paid the damages recovered against him, and satisfaction was entered. Then Corbett was taken in execution, when he and the other two brought an audita querela, setting forth the whole matter, with an averment that the said assault and battery in London and Hertford was the same assault. And by Justices Jones, Croke, and Barkeley, the audita querela lies; for although for the same assault the plaintiff may have several actions and recover, yet when a recovery is had against one, and satisfaction, he cannot have another satisfaction; just as where an obligation is made jointly and severally, and the obligee sues in the Common Bench one by several writ, and recovers, and afterwards sues another in the King’s Bench upon the same obligation, nevertheless if one of them makes satisfaction, the other shall have an audita querela to avoid the execution; for the plaintiff cannot have nisi unica satisfactio. So here the plaintiff can have several recoveries, but if one satisfy, the other shall have audita querela to set aside the execution against him.”
*
Hobart, 66. t Sir W. Jones, 377; sometimes cited as first Jones, to distinguish it from Sir Thomas Jones, in the subsequent reign cited as second Jones.
Many American cases decide or declare this explicitly.*
So in the recent English case of Cooper v. Shepherd,^ the
former judgment had been paid, although that fact is by mis-
take omitted in the marginal note. The court say, “ The
plaintiff, after he has once received the full value, is not en-
titled to further compensation in respect to the same loss,
and according to the doctrine of cases cited in the argument,
by a former recovery in trover and payment of the damages,
the plaintiff’s right of property is barred, and the property
vested in the defendant in that action. See Adams v. Brough-
ton (2 Strange, 1078), and Jenkins, 4th Century, Case 88,
p. 189, where it is laid down in trespass against B. for taking
a horse, A. recovers damages by this recovery and execution
done thereon, the property in the horse is vested in B., soilutio pretii emptionis loco habetur.”
On the third question. It is submitted that the judgment against the sheriff is conclusive upon Lovejoy & Co. The sheriff was their agent. They directed the attachment and sale; they gave the bond of indemnity; they defended the suit against him, and were the real defendants in it; they paid the attorneys and counsel, and had the exclusive control of the defence. Privies, as well as parties, are concluded by a judgment. Lovejoy & Co. cannot, therefore, again contest the case on its original merits.J
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The record before us raises three questions, all of which depend upon the principles of the common law exclusively for their solution.
We will consider them in the order in which they naturally arose on the trial, and in which also they have been argued.
*
See Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johnson, 290; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aiken, 195; Osterhout v. Roberts, 8 Cowen, 43; Blann v. Crochern, 20 Alabama, 320; Knott-v. Cunningham, 2 Sneed, 204. f 8 Manning, Grainger & Scott, 266. J Rapelye v. Prince, 4 Hill, 119,123; Calkins v. Allerton, 3 Barbour, 173; Glass v. Nichols, 35 Maine, 328; Warfield v. Davis, 14 B. Monroe, 41, 42; Castle v. Noyes, 14 New York, 329; Farnsworth v. Arnold, 3 Sneed, 252; Griffin v. Reynolds, 17 Howard, 609.
1. Did the defendants, in giving a bond of indemnity to the sheriff, thereby become liable as joint trespassers with him in the proceedings under the attachment ?
The question arises upon the hypothesis that a writ of attachment was issued in favor of the present defendants against one O. H. Pratt, which was wrongfully levied by the sheriff on property of tho present plaintiff. The bond of indemnity given by the present defendants recites upon its face that the sheriff has alreadv levied the attachment; and there is nothing in the case, except the bond, to show that in making the levy, or in anything done by the sheriff' prior to the giving of the bond, he acted under the direction or instruction of the defendants, or at their request. That the attaching creditor is not answerable for the act of the officer, unless he in some manner interferes so as to make himself liable, must be conceded. And unless the defendants have so interfered in this case as to incur this responsibility the action cannot be sustained.
It is contended by counsel that a trespass cannot be ratified like a contract so as to make the party liable ab initio. But it is not necessary to decide, in this case, whether the defendants by giving the bond became liable for what had been done previous to that time. It is sufficient, if they become liable for what was done by the sheriff after they gave the instrument. The trespass complained of was a continuing trespass, and consisted of a series of proceedings, ending in the sale of the plaintiff’s property under execution. At the time the bond was given, the sheriff had merely taken possession of the goods under the attachment. No great injury had, probably, been done. The demand for indemnity, and the giving of it by the defendants, proceeded upon the supposition that the sheriff would without it go no further in that direction, but would give up the property to the claimant, the present plaintiff, and make his peace on the best terms he could. By the present statute of Iowa he had a right to do this, if the plaintiff in attachment refused to assume the hazard of indemnifying him. And if there were no such statute, he had a right to deliver the property to the p. 10claimant, and risk a suit by the plaintiff* in attachment, rather than a contest with a rightful claimant of the goods.
The giving of the bond by the present defendants must, therefore, be held equivalent to a personal interference in the course of the proceeding, by directing or requesting the sheriff to hold the goods as if they were the property of the defendants in attachment. In doing this they assumed the direction and control of the sheriff’s future action, so far as it might constitute a trespass, and they became to that extent the principals, and he their agent in the transaction. This made them responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession, and for the sale and conversion of the goods; in other words, for all the real damages which plaintiff sustained.
The first question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative.
2. Did the plaintiff, by suing Hayden, the sheriff, alone, recovering judgment for about six thousand dollars, and receiving from him eight hundred and thirty dollars on the saidjudgment, thereby preclude himself from maintaining this suit against these defendants for the same trespass? Is the judgment, or the judgment and part payment, in that case a bar to this action ?
Parke, Baron, in the case of King v. Iloaref speaking in reference to the same proposition in its application to actions on joint contracts, says, in 1846, that it is remarkable that the question should never have been decided in England. It is equally remarkable that the proposition here presented should be an open question at this day.
The faithful and exhausting research of counsel, in this case, shows that there are conflicting authorities, not only on the main proposition, but on several incidental and collateral points closely connected with it. Two propositions, however, seem to be conceded by all the authorities, which bear with more or less force on the main question, and which may as well be stated here.
1. That persons engaged in committing the same trespass
* 13 Meeson & Welsby, 502.
are joint and several trespassers, and not joint trespassers exclusively. Like persons liable on a joint and several contract, they may be all sued in one action; or one may be sued alone, and cannot plead the nonjoinder of the others in abatement’; and so far is the doctrine of several liability carried, that the defendants, where more than one are sued in the same action, may sever in their pleas, and the jury may find several verdicts, and on several verdicts of guilty may assess different sums as damages.
2. That no matter how many judgments maybe obtained for the same trespass, or what the varying amounts of those judgments, the acceptance of satisfaction of any one of them by the plaintiff’ is a satisfaction of all the others, except the costs, and is a bar to any other action for the same cause.
In the latest English case upon the principal question, namely, Buckland v. Johnson,* Jervis, C. J., holds the former judgment against the son, although fruitless, to be a bar to the second suit against the father for the same goods, upon the ground that by the former judgment the property in the goods was vested in the defendant in that action. As this is the latest case in the English courts which expressly decides the point, it may, perhaps, be received as the English doctrine. But this concession must be made with some hesitation in view of opinions expressed in other cases decided in the same country. In the very case in which that judgment is rendered, the chief justice takes occasion to correct what he supposes to be an erroneous statement of Tindal, C. J., in Cooper v. Shepherd, to the effect, “ that, according to the doctrine of the cases, which were cited in argument by a former recovery in trover and payment of damages, the plaintiff’s right of property vests in the defendant in that action.”
It was, therefore, the opinion of C. J. Tindal, that payment of the damages recovered is essential to vest the property in defendant, and this only a few years before the case of John son v. Buckland was decided. That case was decided in 1854, and mainly on the authority of Brown v. Wootton, reported in p. 12Yelverton, as also by Croke, J. The reason for the decision, as given by Popham, C. J., is thus stated in the latter book: “ In the cause of action being against divers, for which damages uncertain are recoverable, and the plaintiff having judgment against one person for damages certain, that which was uncertain before, is reduced in rem judicatam, and to certainty, which takes away the action against others.” If the only object, or indeed the principal object, in obtaining a judgment in trespass, was to render certain the extent of plaintiff’s injuries, or the amount of damages which would compensate for those injuries, we might be able to comprehend the force of this logic. But as it is the purpose of the law, and the main purpose for which courts of justice are instituted, to procure satisfaction for these injuries, we do not see the sequence in the reasoning of the learned judge.
Brown v. Wootton was decided in Trinity Term, 3 James I. Prior to that time, the law had been thought to be the other way.* In Claxton v. Swift,Shower said,“ it was never pretended, until the case of Brown v. Wootton, that a bare judgment should be a bar.”
In Cocke v. Jenner, reported by Hobart, and which was in Trinity Term, 12 James I (only nine years after Brown v. Wootton), the question arose on a release of one joint trespasser, which was held to be a bar to a suit against the other, on the ground that it was equivalent to satisfaction; yet the language of the report leaves a strong impression that it was the opinion of the court that several judgments might be had, and that only satisfaction, or its equivalent, would bar proceedings against all who were liable. And the case of Corbett v. Barnes, cited from Sir W. Jones (time of Charles the First), which was on audita querela, while it holds that only one satisfaction can be had, implies clearly that several judgments may be rendered against joint trespassers. Indeed, that very case was where one judgment had been rendered in the King’s Bench against one, and in the Com mon Pleas against three others, for the same trespass.
*
See Brooke’s Abridgment, Pl. 98; Morton’s Case, Cro. Eliz. 30. f 2 Shower, 494.
Dec. 1865.] Lovejoy v. Murray. 1±e> °
These cases show that, after as well as before the case of Brown v. Wootton, the law was supposed, by some of the ablest judges in England, to be otherwise than what it decides; and we know of no case in which it was followed in England as implicit authority, until Buckland v. Johnson, in 1854.
The rule in that case has been defended on two grounds, and on one or both of these it must be sustained, if at all. The first of these is, that the uncertain claim for damages before judgment has, by the principle of transit in rem judieatum, become merged into a judgment which is of a higher nature. This principle, however, can only be applicable to parties to the judgment; for as to the other parties who may be liable, it is not true that plaintiff has acquired a security of any higher nature than he had before. Nor has he, as to them, been in anywise benefited or advanced towards procuring satisfaction for his damages, by such judgment.
This is now generally admitted to be the true rule on this subject, in cases of persons jointly and severally liable on contracts; and no reason is perceived why joint trespassers should be placed in a better condition. As remarked by Lord EHenborough, in Drake v. Mitchell,* li A judgment recovered in any form of action, is still but a security for the original cause of action, until it be made productive in satisfaction to the party; and, therefore, till then, it cannot operate to change any other collateral concurrent remedy which the party may have.”
The second ground on which the rule is defended is, that by the judgment against one joint trespasser, the title of the property concerned is vested in the defendant in that action, and therefore no suit can afterwards be maintained by the former owner for the value of that property, or for any injury done to it:
This principle can have no application to trespassers against the person, nor to injuries to property, real or personal, unaccompanied by conversion or change of possession. Nor is the principle admitted in regard to conversions of
* 3 East, 258.
personal property. Prior to Brown v. Wootton, the English doctrine seems to have been the other way, as shown by Kent, in his Commentaries,* referring to Shepherd’s Touchstone, f and Jenkins.J
We have thus far confined ourselves to the examination of the English authorities, and the principles discussed in them, and we are forced to the conclusion that even at this day the doctrine there is neither well settled nor placed on any satisfactory ground.
In turning our attention to the American cases, we have been able to find but two in which the point directly in issue has been ruled in favor of the bar of the former judgment; although there are some other cases which hold that the right of property is transferred by the judgment. The first of these two cases is Wilkes v. Jackson.^ This was an early case in the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which seems to have passed without much consideration, and was mainly rested on the judgment of the same court in a former case, which does not appear to sustain it.
The other is the Rhode Island case of Sunt v. Bates.|| It is a very recent case, decided in 1862; but the absence of any other reasoning than a mere recapitulation of the English cases, and the remark that upon their authority the court is obliged to rest its decision, deprives it of any other weight than what should be attached to those cases. This we have already considered.
In addition to this, it has been decided in South Carolina and Pennsylvania, that the recovery of a judgment for the value of the goods converted, transfers the title to the defendant. Bogers v. Moore Floyd v. Brown.**
On the other hand, in the case of Livingston*?. Bishop,^ in the Supreme Court of New York, in 1806, Kent, C. J., overrules Brown v. Wootton, and holds that judgment alone is not a bar.
* 2 Kent, 388. f Title “Gift.” J Page 109, Case 88. g 2 Henning & Munford, 355. || 7 Rhode Island, 217. j 1 Rice, 60. ** 1 Rawle, 121. ff 1 Johnson, 290.
In Sheldon v. Kibbe,* decided in 1819, in the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the court, by Hosmer, C. J., enters into an elaborate examination of the authorities, and a full consideration of the question on principle, and lays down the doctrine that neither a judgment, nor the taking of the body of the defendant in execution, will bar a second action against a co-trespasser. Nothing short of satisfaction or release can have that effect.
In Sanderson v. Caldwell,in the Supreme Court of Vermont, in 1826, it is held that neither judgment, nor issuing execution, nor anything short of satisfaction, is a bar to a second suit brought against another joint trespasser.
Osterhout v. Roberts^ a year later, in the Supreme Court of New York, was a plea that defendant’s son had been sued, had a judgment rendered against him, and had been taken in execution and imprisoned sixty days for the same trespass. Yet the plea was held bad. The trespass was for taking a watch.
In Elliott v. Porter,§ Robertson, C. J., of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, examines the whole subject fully, both on principle and authority, and holds that the first judgment is no bar, and that the title to the property does not pass by judgment in trespass or trover. This case is affirmed by the same court, in Sharps. Gray.\\
Blann v. Cochem, in Alabama,^ was an action of trespass. The defendant pleaded a former recovery against a co-trespasser, and payment of the judgment and costs so recovered, to the clerk of the court. But the plea was held bad, because it was not averred that it was accepted by the plaintiff.
In Knott v. Cunningham** the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a former judgment against one tort-feasor, was no bar to a suit against another, for the same tort, without satisfaction.
In Page v. Freeman,^ the Supreme Court of Missouri held the same doctrine.
* 3 Connecticut, 214. f 2 Aiken, 195. | 8 Cowen, 43. ? 5 Dana, 299. || 5 B. Monroe, 4. fl 20 Alabama, 320.
2 Sneed, 204. ft Missouri, 421.
In Floyd v. Browne* Gibson, C. J., of Pennsylvania, while holding that after a judgment in trover against two trespassers without satisfaction, plaintiff cannot bring assumpsit against another trespasser, uses this language: “A plaintiff is not compelled to elect between actions that are consistent with each other. Separate actions against a number who are severally liable for the same thing, or against the same defendant on distinct securities for the same debt or duty, are concurrent remedies. Trespass is, in its nature, joint and several, and in separate actions against joint trespassers, being consistent with each other, nothing but satisfaction by one will discharge the rest.” Trover and assumpsit, however, he holds to be inconsistent remedies.
If we turn from this examination of adjudged cases, which largely preponderate in favor of the doctrine that a judgment, without satisfaction, is no bar, to look at the question in the light of reason, that doctrine commends itself to us still more strongly. The whole theory of the opposite view is based upon technical, artificial, and unsatisfactory reasoning.
We have already stated the only two principles upon which it rests. We apprehend that no sound jurist would attempt, at this day, to defend it solely on the ground of transit in rem. judicatum. For while this principle, as that other rule, that no man shall be twice vexed for the same cause of action, may well be applied in the case of a second suit against the same trespasser, we do not perceive its force when applied to a suit brought for the first time against another, trespasser in the same matter.
In reference to the doctrine that the judgment alone vests the title of the property converted, in the defendant, we have seen that it is not sustained by the weight of authorities in this country. It is equally incapable of being maintained on principle.
The property which was mine, has been taken from me by fraud or violence. In order to procure redress, I must
* 1 Rawle, 125.
sue the wrong-doer in a court of law. But, instead of getting justice or remedy, I am told that by the very act of obtaining a judgment—a decision that I am entitled to the relief I ask—the property, which before was mine, has become that of the man who did me the wrong. In other words, the law, without having given me satisfaction for my wrong, takes from me that which was mine, and gives it to the wrong-doer. It is sufficient to state the proposition to show its injustice.
It is said that the judgment represents the price of the property, and as plaintiff has the judgment, the defendant should have the property. But if the judgment does represent the price of the goods, does it follow that the defendant shall have the property before he has paid that price ? The payment of the price and the transfer of the property are, in the ordinary contract of sale, concurrent acts.*
But in all such cases, what has the defendant in such second suit done to discharge himself from the obligation which the law imposes upon him, to make compensation? His liability must remain, in morals and on principle, until he does this. The judgment against his co-trespasser does not affect him so as to release him on any equitable consideration. It may be said that neither does the satisfaction by his co-trespasser, or a release to his co-trespasser do this; and that is true. But when the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury done him, from whatever source it may come, he is so far affected in equity and good conscience, that the law will not permit him to recover again for the same damages. But it is not easy to see how he is so affected, until he has received full satisfaction, or that which the law must consider as such.
We are, therefore, of opinion that nothing short of satisfaction, or its equivalent, can make good a plea of former judgment in trespass, offered as a bar in an action against another joint trespasser, who was not party to the first judgment.
* 2 Kent, 388-9; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 533; Hyde v. Noble, 13 New ampshire, 500; Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 Harris & Johnson, 211.
vol. in, 2
The second question must, therefore, be answered in the negative.
3. Is the judgment of plaintiff, against the sheriff, Hayden, conclusive against the defendants in this action ?
The facts on which this proposition is based, are the giving of the bond of indemnity by the defendants, and that Hayden, when sued, notified them of the suit, and called on them to defend it; that they did employ counsel to defend it, and that the counsel so employed had exclusive control of the defence of the suit.
The legal facts necessary to enable plaintiff to recover m the present suit are, first, his title to the goods which had been converted; second, the value of those goods; and, third, the participation of the defendants in the conversion. The latter point, we have already seen, is established by the indemnifying bond to the sheriff. Does the record of the judgment against Hayden conclusively establish the other two points, under the circumstances just stated ? .
We are of opinion that it does.
We have already shown that the effect of giving the bond was to make defendants principals in the transaction, and that so far as the action of the sheriff after that was a trespass, it was directed by them, and was for their benefit. With a just appreciation of their relations to each other in the transaction, he called on them, when sued, to assume the defence; and they did so. They were defending their own acts, although the suit was in the sheriff’s name. They had full right to make all defence there, which they could make here. They could adduce witnesses, and cross-examine those of plaintiff, and could have taken an appeal. The case is wanting in none of the elements so happily stated by Mr. Greenleaf,* as rendering a former judgment conclusive in a second suit. “Justice requires,” he says, “ that every cause be once fairly and impartially tried; but the public tranquillity demands that, having been once so tried, all litigation of that question, and between the same
* 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, | 522-3.
parties, should be closed forever. It is also a most obvious principle of justice, that no man ought to be bound by proceedings to which he is a stranger; but the converse of this rule is equally true, that by proceedings to which he was not a stranger, he may well be bound. Under the term parties, in this connection, the law includes all who are directly interested in the subject-matter, and had a right to make defence, or to control the proceedings; and to appeal from the judgment. This right involves, also, the right to adduce testimony, and to cross-examine the witnesses adduced on the other side. Persons not having these rights are strangers to the cause. But to give full effect to the principle by which parties are held bound by a judgment, all persons who are represented by the parties, and claim under them, or in privity with them, are equally concluded by the same proceedings.” “ The ground, therefore, upon which persons standing in this relation to the litigating party are bound by the proceedings to which he was a party is, that they are identified with him in interest; and wherever this identity is found to exist, all are alike concluded.” The authorities cited by the learned author fully sustain these propositions.
The present case comes within them, and must be governed by them. In addition, various cases have been examined, which affirm the condusiveness of former judgments, under circumstances which we are unable to distinguish, in principle, from the one before us, and in several instances the analogy in the facts is perfect. They are presented in the note below.*
This last question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative.
As the rulings of the Circuit Court were in accordance with the principles here decided, the judgment of that court must be
Affirmed, with costs.
*
Ferris v. Arden, Cro. Eliz. 667 ; Kennedy v. Cope, Douglas, 517; White v. Philbrick, 5 Greenleaf, 147 ; Roberts v. Prince, 4 Hill; 19; Calkens v. Allerton, 3 Barbour S. C. 173; Glass v. Nichols, 35 Maine, 328; Castle v. Noyes,
14
New York, 329; Warfield v. Davis, 14 B. Monro, 41.
The Plymouth.
1. Where a damage done is done wholly upon land, the fact that the cause of the damage originated on water subject to the admiralty jurisdiction does not make the cause one for the admiralty. 2. Hence, where a vessel lying at a wharf, on waters subject to admiralty jurisdiction, took fire, and the fire, spreading itself to certain store-houses on the wharf, consumed these and their stores, it was held not to be a case for admiralty proceeding.
The steam-propeller Falcon, employed by its owners in navigating our great northern lakes, anchored beside the wharf of Hough & Kershaw, in Chicago River; “ navigable water.” Upon the wharf large packing-houses were built, and these, at the time, were filled with valuable stores. Owing to the negligence of those in charge of the Falcon, the vessel took fire; and the flames, stretching themselves to the wharf and packing-houses, set these last on fire, which with their stores were wholly consumed. Hough & Kershaw filed, accordingly, in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, a libel in admiralty, for cause of damage, civil and maritime, against the owners of the Falcon, and attached a vessel of theirs called the Plymouth.
The District Court, regarding the case as not one for the Admiralty, dismissed the libel for want of jurisdiction. The Circuit Court, on appeal, considered that the dismissal was rightly made. The case was now here for review.
It is necessary to say that, by act of Congress,* the District Courts of the United States possess admiralty jurisdiction “ in matters of contract and tort arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats or other vessels,” on our great northern lakes, the same as they do in cases of the like steamboats, and other vessels' employed in navigation and commerce on the high seas and tide-waters.
*
Act of February 26, 1845; 5 Stat, at Large, 726.
Mr. A. W. Arrington, in favor of the jurisdiction:
The question is, has a court of admiralty, jurisdiction to decree compensation for the damage done by the Falcon ?
The question, as respects instance at least, is one primes impressionis. We can adduce no precedent identical in its circumstances. Two reasons exist for this:
1. Until a recent period the admiralty jurisdiction was repressed and hindered from attaining its appropriate extension by the jealous interference of the common law courts, in England, and by the servile adoption of the English rule, without comment or qualification, in America. That rule excluded the jurisdiction, not only from all waters unaffected by the ebb and flow of the tide, but even from tide-waters within the body of a county. Hence, during the prevalence of such a rule, no case like the present could arise; because, ships could not be the means of setting fire to wharves or houses, without penetrating the body of some county, and then, ipso facto, admiralty jurisdiction would be excluded by the English rule.
2. The local distance betwixt the sites of houses and the possible anchorage of vessels, in most parts of the world, prevents, ex necessitate, the existence of an occurrence like the one in controversy. It is only at Constantinople, in the Golden Horn; in the harbor of Chicago; and in a few other favored ports of the world, that, in the beautiful language of Gibbon, “ ships may rest their prows against the houses, while their sterns are floating in the water.”
But the objection that this case is the first of its kind, must be pronounced invalid, in the light of leading decisions of this court. The same objection was urged, with all the weight which learning and eloquence could give it, against those very adjudications which have now become fixed in admiralty law, and was urged in vain; while, at the same time, those adjudications overruled the supreme authority of prior cases, and cases seemingly established among the most permanent doctrines of Federal jurisprudence. Thus, in the Thomas Jefferson,* in 1825, this court held that the
admiralty jurisdiction was confined “ to the sea, or waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.”
In Peyroux v. Howard* this doctrine of the former case was approved; the court deciding that if one terminus of a voyage was above the flow of tide-water, the mere fact precluded the exercise of jurisdiction. The law of these cases was followed by all the district and circuit courts. The firmness of an enduring principle seemed to have been obtained. In truth, the structure wanted but one thing to insure its permanence,—rational accordance with the spirit of the age and nation, as developed by the characteristics of the physical geography of America.
In 1848, in Waring v. Clarke,the Supreme Court took its first step in a path divergent from the via trita of the ancient English rule, by adjudging that admiralty had jurisdiction in a case of collision, though happening infra corpus comitatus. This was the germination of a new idea. But the full development of reason was reserved for the year 1851, when, in the G-enesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,$ this same tribunal shook off the yoke of English authority forever, by declaring that “ tide-water” constituted no proper test of admiralty jurisdiction. That case has been succeeded by a series of judgments, which established the true criterion of jurisdiction as being “ navigable water” per se, in contradistinction to water not navigable, and to nothing else. Now, the case of the Genesee Chief was the first of its kind. There had been nothing like it, either in England or America, since the days of Lord Coke. It was not only a novelty, but one in clear contradiction of all previous authority.
The objection, therefore, has been overruled in advance.
It must be noted, in limine, that the present case, although new in the instance, is not so in principle. On the contrary, the inference we seek to deduce is the logical result of doctrines as old as the common law; and is confirmed, besides, by the analogy of adjudged cases.
First. Let the court consider the nature and character-
* 7 Peters, 324. f 5 Howard, 441. J 12 Id. 443. p. 23istics of the two things concerned in the case of damage,—the object injured, and the agent causing the injury.
I. The. object, or part of the object, injured—the wharf—was unquestionably a maritime thing. A wharf is the necessary terminus, a quo and ad quern,, of every voyage, in certain lines of trade; and becomes thus indispensable tocom* - merce and navigation. It is an instrument of navigation. And it has been decided that the lien of a wharfinger appertains to the jurisdiction of the admiralty.* It has even been adjudged that the owner of a shipyard, who employs a railway cradle and other fixtures for hauling vessels out of the water, can sue in the admiralty for his services, though the repairing may be done by other parties.f
II. The agent producing the damage, the vessel which communicated fire to the wharf, was a maritime thing. That fact is -conceded.
Hence, since both the object and the agent were maritime things, and within the admiralty jurisdiction, would it not shock common sense to exclude from that jurisdiction the injury received by one from the other, in a case of manifest and admitted tort ?
IH. The locality was maritime. The ship, the maritime agent, in the very act of committing the injury, was moored in a maritime place, namely: in “navigable water.” And this court has determined that “ navigable water” is the test of admiralty jurisdiction, in cases of tort.J
IV. Another legal principle, in connection with the preceding, covers the case.
The principle is this: That the incident, or that which is accessary, always follows, or is drawn to, the principal thing in a given combination of circumstances. Or, as the maxim is announced by Lord Coke,§ “ accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale.”
The maxim has been applied to the admiralty jurisdiction p. 24in cases reported by Croke, Levinz, Comberback, Saunders, and others,* and always to this effect: “ That when the principal cause is within the jurisdiction, there is also jurisdiction over the incidents.”
*
Johnson v. The McDonough, Gilpin, 101. f 2 Parsons on Maritime Law, 639. J Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 Howard, 301, 302.
2
Coke Littleton, 152 a.
. In a case in Siderfinf a suit was sustained in the admiralty for beaconage, of a beacon standing on a rock in the sea, for the reason that the admiral had jurisdiction of beacons, although the rock was part of the earth and appertained to the inheritance.
All these are common law cases, running back, too, to the cradle of the system; and they all concur to establish the point ruled, at a later period, in Le Caux v. Eden: J “ That when the admiralty has jurisdiction of the original matter, it ought to have jurisdiction of everything incidental.”
Hence, the question is, what was the principal matter or thing in this case of damage ? What was the original, or, in the language of the schoolmen, the efficient, cause of the injury? The answer is: The original cause was the ship; or, rather, the ship in action, and performing a wrongful deed to the damage of others. The composition or chain of causes and effects is simple, being constituted by six links:
1. The ship, a maritime thing, and within the admiralty jurisdiction.
2. The inception of the fire, through the negligence of the master and crew, a maritime wrong, and also clearly within the jurisdiction.
3. The wharf, a maritime thing, and alike within the jurisdiction.
4. The communication of the fire to the wharf.
5. The communication of the fire to the packing-house.
6. The destruction of both the wharf and the packing-house.
Such was the series implexa causarum, in logical as in p. 25chronological order. The ship, or the tortious act of the ship, we repeat, was “ the original matter, the principal thing,” the efficient cause, in the case of damage; and the destruction which followed, in natural sequence, was the incident. If this be so, then, according to all the authorities, the whole case is within the admiralty jurisdiction.
*
Radley v. Egglesfield, 2 Saunders, 259 e; S. C. 2 Levinz, 25; 1 Ventris, 173, 174; Anonymous, Id. 308; Anonymous, Croke Elizabeth, 685; Tremoulin v. Sands, Comberback, 462. f Crosse v. Diggs, p. 158. j Douglas, 580.
This conclusion, too, is in harmony with scientific theory. It is a law of positive philosophy, that every action in nature derives its specific character and denomination from the agent or principal cause, and not from the object or mere passive thing affected by the action. In a philosophical sense an action is a mere abstract idea, and, in the concrete, means nothing more than an agent acting in a particular manner.
Then, if a tort be perpetrated by a maritime agent, through the instrumentality of a maritime thing, and in a maritime place, must not the tort itself be maritime ? To hold otherwise would not only render the law discordant with the beauty of scientific thought, but absurd to common apprehension.
Finally, under this head, it has been determined by this court, that it is sufficient for the agent or principal thing to be maritime, to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, although the other thing concerned did not appertain to such jurisdiction. In Fretz v. Bull* it was decided that the jurisdiction attached as against a steamer, by the fault of which a flatboat (of itself, not the subject of admiraltyjurisdiction), was sunk in the Mississippi.
Second. This case is a mixed one; and in “ mixed cases,” arising partly on land and partly at sea, or upon “navigable waters,” admiralty has jurisdiction.f Here the wrongful action of the maritime agent commenced upon “ navigable water,” and was continued to its consummation upon the shore.
Third. The same inference is supported by the analogy of prize cases, in which, even in England, “the jurisdiction
depends, not on locality, but on the subject-matter.”* The reason of the difference between the respective jurisdictions of the prize and instance courts, in England, arose from the fact that the judges of common law never attempted to restrain the jurisdiction of the admiralty prize court, as to the
land; nor to control it by the principle of locality.
Fourth. We claim no more, in this case, than belonged
to the admiralty before the jealousy of the common law
courts had curtailed its jurisdiction. This, in the language
of the commissions to the admiralty judges, comprised “ all
injuries done upon public rivers,” and “upon the shores
and banks adjoining them.”j* In the time of the Common-
wealth, the jurisdiction included “ all cases of prejudice to
the banks of navigable rivers,” or to “ the docks, wharves,
quays,” or anything whereby shipping may be endangered.^
Fifth. The jurisdiction of our colonial vice-admiralty
courts was equally extensive, including “ all trespasses and
injuries, between owners of ships and other persons, done
upon the shores of public rivers. ”§
Sixth. The general maritime law of continental Europe
regards only the character of the transaction, and therefore
extends to all cases of service, contract, tort, or accident,
“ relating to ships, shipping, and marine commerce.”||
Can a reason be assigned why the jurisdiction of the
American admiralty should not be as broad and beneficial
as that of any system of cultivated justice? We are not
bound in fetters, by the constitution, to the English rule.
If we break the constitution by departing-from the English
rule, we have already broken it into atoms. We broke it
when we suffered the jurisdiction to penetrate into the body
of a county. So we broke it when the limit of tide-water
was discarded, with the sovereign arbitrament of the moon.
And we broke it again, when admiralty jurisdiction was
applied to revenue cases.
*
Brown’s Admiralty, 208. f De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallison, 452 n. J Benedict, § 107. § Id. g 151. || Id. g 211.
On the other side, there is but one thing to be said, namely, “ that in cases of tort, the jurisdiction depends on the locality of the act done, and that it must be done on navigable water.” This is properly denominated the “rule of locality.”
Now we submit that a bare inspection of the terms comprising the rule shows it to be ambiguous. It may mean that the agent acting must be on navigable water, or that the object must be on navigable water; or that both the agent acting and object acted upon must be on navigable water, and that the total effect must be there too.
But no case has ever so defined the rule of locality as to restrict it to the two latter suppositions. No lawyer ever intimated that both the agent and object must be on navigable water at the time when a tort is committed.
The truth is, that all general rules, all definitions in sciences, other than the mathematical, are what logicians call dicta secundum quid; in other words, are postulated with a qualification. It is only in the strict mathematics that the subject can take the place of the predicate, and vice versd, by the change of simple conversion. And especially all legal propositions are secundum quid with respect to the cases upon which they are founded.
Let us then see what are the cases adduced in support of the rule of locality.
In Thomas v. Lane* a circuit case, the libel was for a tort committed by the master of a vessel upon a mariner. And it was decided that the admiralty had no jurisdiction, because the libel did not allege the trespasses to have been committed on tide-water; while a part of the charge, to wit, the imprisonment, was expressly stated to have been on shore, in the port of Havana. In delivering the opinion, Story, J., 'said: “ In regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty has not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have, any jurisdiction over
* 2 Sumner, 9.
torts, except such as are maritime; that is, such as are committed on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.”
Here we have the “ locality of the act” as the test of jurisdiction, and the circumstance that such act must “ be committed on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide,” as the explication of the test.
But what were the facts of the case which called for the application of the rule ? The case was, that both the agent of the wrong and the object that suffered it were on the shore. The imprisonment was on the shore. The entire act of causation, as well as the entire effect, was on the shore.
If the master, in Thomas v. Lane, had stood on the deck of his ship while the mariner was chained on the adjacent shore, and had scourged his victim with a long whip, the case would be analogous to ours. But, in such a case, would any court of admiralty in the civilized world have refused to entertain jurisdiction ?
But what is the locality of an act? The term needs a definition, and this court must supply the need; for you will search the books in vain for anything approximating the desideratum. Where, then, is the locality in question ? Is it where the agent acts? Or is it where the object is affected? According to science and common sense, it is both conjointly, and neither exclusively. The locality of an act embraces the entire space occupied by the agent and the object, and the spatial distance passed over by the causal influence in accomplishing the effect. Who shall declare the locality of a battle ? Is it at the spot where the cannon stands? Or at the spot at which the ball that issues from it strikes' its victim ? In neither. The locality is the entire field. Where is the locality of the sunbeam ? In the mighty orb from which it parts ? or in the boundless track through which it passes ? or on the earth which it animates with life, and health, and warmth ?. In no one, assuredly, alone. All are but parts of one stupendous whole; spreading undivided, and which operates unspent.
In United States v. Coombs* the rule of locality was announced, by this court, with a qualification. The indictment was for stealing a quantity of merchandise belonging to a ship cast away on the shore of New York. The goods were taken above high-water mark on the beach in Queen’s County. The indictment was sustained under the constitutional power to regulate commerce. But the court denied that it could be sustained as falling within the admiralty jurisdiction. Of course, they denied that; because both the agent and object were on the shore. The thief stole the goods on the shore above high-water mark. Story, J., delivering the opinion, said: “ Our opinion is, that in cases purely dependent upon the locality of the act done, admiralty jurisdiction is limited to the sea, and to tide-waters as far as the tide flows, and that it does not reach beyond high-water mark. Mixed cases may arise, and, indeed, often do arise, where the acts and services done are of a mixed nature; as where salvage services are performed partly on tide-waters and partly on the shore, for the preservation of the property saved; in which the admiralty has constantly exercised jurisdiction to the extent of decreeing salvage.” And he adds: “If the libel is founded on one single continued act, which was principally on the sea, though a part of it was upon the land, as if the mast of a ship be taken upon the sea, though it be afterwards brought ashore, no prohibition lies.”
Now, as we have already submitted, ours is a mixed case. The efficient cause was on navigable water. The negligence was there. The act of wrong was committed there. Whatever power for injury the ship possessed originated there, and was exerted there. The ship did not go on shore, the master and mariners did not go on shore, to commit the offence. The principal thing, the act of negligence, the destroying agency, was on navigable water, was within the admiralty jurisdiction; and only the incidental effect was produced on the shore.
United States v. Davis,* a case like Thomas v. Lane, of circuit ruling only, and not authoritative therefore, may be thought to be opposed to our view. The facts were these. A gun was fired on an American ship lying in the harbor of one of the Society Islands, by which a person on board a schooner belonging to the natives was killed. 11 Held, that the act was, in contemplation of law, done on board the foreign schooner where the shot took effect; and that jurisdiction of it belonged to the foreign government, and not to the courts of the United States* under the Crimes Act of 1790.”
A similar case is that of United States v. McGill.^ The facts were, that the prisoner, the mate on the brig Rover, in the harbor of Cape François, g'ave the deceased a mortal stroke with a piece of wood. The latter was carried on shore alive, and died the following day. The prisoner’s counsel made the point, that both the death and blow must happen on the high seas, to give the court jurisdiction under the act of Congress. The court so decided, for the reason that the act of Congress applied only to murder on the high seas, and because thç term murder, ex vi termini, implied death.
Both these were criminal cases, and the decisions are in accordance with the technical distinctions of the ancient common law. For under that, by a strange absurdity, “ if an offence was commenced in one county, and consummated in another, the venue could be laid in neither, and the offender went altogether unpunished.” And so if the blow was given on the land, and the death happened on the sea, and vice verset, neither the courts of common law, nor the admiral’s court had any jurisdiction of the crime.J
This ridiculous non sequitur resulted, according to Blackstone, from the technical formula prescribed for the grand jury, since they were only to inquire pro corpore comitatus. Thus, if the blow happened in county A., the grand jury of county B. could not inquire of that; and if the death happened in B., the grand jury of A. could not inquire of that.
* 2 Sumner, 482. f 4 Dallas, 426. | 1 Chitty’s Criminal Law, 177, 180.
And the same logic applied with equal force to the land and sea.
This species of reasoning, or rather, this reductio ad absurdum of the reasoning process itself, was in perfect accord with the philosophy of the age. It was the age of the scholastic philosophy—an age of dicta and contradicta—an age when the highest human ingenuity was perverted to inquiries respecting the eternal puzzles that lie beneath the basis of all finite knowledge; when the mightiest minds sought to postulate the difference between entities and quiddities; when the all-engrossing questions were, whether angels existed in or out of space ? And, if in space, how many angels could dance on the point of a needle ? And whether the Deity loved an actual entity of the lowest grade better than a possible entity of the highest ?
This was the philosophy in vogue when the common law distinctions as to venue were fabricated. And the law always derives the methods of its logic from the philosophical character of the time when it is elaborated. ,
The reasoning of the early English courts on the subject of venue was nearly akin to the old Eleatic demonstration as to the impossibility of motion. “ If a body moves at all,” argued Zeno, “ it must either move where it is, or where it is not: but it cannot move where it is; and surely it cannot move where it is not; eryo, it cannot move at all.” And the only answer to the logic that all antiquity could make, was given by Diogenes, who got out of his tub, and walked.
By the same process of reasoning that the English courts employed to exclude the jurisdiction when the blow was struck in one county, and the death happened in another, it is easy to prove that the man was not killed at all. Thus, if this man was killed at all, he must have been killed at some particular place: but he was not killed at any particular place; therefore, he was not killed at all. Or thus: If a man is killed at all, he must be either killed on the land or sea; but this man was not killed on the land, because the mortal blow was not given there, but on the sea; and he was not killed on the sea, because he did not die there, but p. 3282 The Plymouth. [Sup. Ct.
on the land: therefore, he was not killed at all. There you have as good a demonstration as the schoolmen ever uttered.
And that is the precise argument, mutatis mutandis, that is urged against the admiralty jurisdiction in the present case.
But is this a case, is this an age, is this the court, for the prevalence of such parodies on all scientific ratiocination ? Contrariwise, is not this rather a case for the exercise of that kind of logic which appertains more to the enlarged policy of the most enlightened and liberal statesmanship than to the technical quibbles of puerile and perverted dialectics ? For, whatever reasons justify the admiralty jurisdiction in any case, must justify it in this. Upon what reason is the jurisdiction founded ? Is it the necessity for process as speedy as the hoisting of the sails; that shall go at once velis levatis, as Lord Mansfield worded it? That reason exists in such a case as this. Or is it the necessity for a tribunal thoroughly versed in maritime laws and usages? That reason exists here. And as we have shown, there is nothing opposed to the jurisdiction in this case, but a false and preposterous construction of the rule of locality, and which has not the sanction of a single authoritative case.
We do not ask the court to amplify the jurisdiction of the admiral; we but ask it to deduce from his original jurisdiction that which is logically and consequentially involved. If any continent exists entitled to have the jurisdiction amplified to .its full extent it is ours,—a continent which, by distinction from all others, may be called the continent of waters,—a continent covered by mighty rivers and majestic lakes. Though not subjects of admiralty jurisdiction, as once understood here and as still understood in England, we have been compelled «to bring these under such control. It is fitting that the further development should come from the region of these great waters; which has thus already cast the rich hues.of its western sunlight upon the east. The necessity of a power to administer justice speedily and surely is great; and will become greater with the incalculable expansion of trade and commerce on the western lakes and rivers. The vessel which has done the wrong speeds away, p. 33and with, the winds and currents is carried thousands of miles from the scene of the wrong she has done. Why send the injured suitor to a distant State in order to have redress?
The ultimate question reverts. Will you be fettered in the freedom of your judicial action by a fiction of the scholastic ages, or yield to the force of a present reality ? Will you follow the example of the most enlightened continental jurisprudence, and which is in harmony with the physical geography of this grand new world; or will you cling with servile submission to the petty precedents of little England, whose people, beyond all people, are individual and local in their views, and in more senses than one remain the “ penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos
Mr. Spalding, contra.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court:
The court below dismissed the libel for want of jurisdiction; and that question is the only one that has been argued in this court.
It will be observed, that the entire damage complained of by the libellants, as proceeding from the negligence of the master and crew, and for which the owners of the vessel are sought to be charged, occurred, not on the water, but on the land. The origin of the wrong was on the water, but the substance and consummation of the injury on land. It is admitted by all the authorities, that the jurisdiction of the admiralty over marine torts depends upon locality—the high seas, or other navigable waters within admiralty cognizance; and, being so dependent upon locality, the jurisdiction is limited to the sea or navigable waters not extending beyond high-water mark.
In the case of Thomas v. Lane* Mr. Justice Story, in a case where the imprisonment was stated in the libel to be on shore, observed: “In regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty has
* 2 Sumner, 9.
vol. in'. 3 p. 34not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have, any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are maritime torts; that is, torts upon the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.” Since the case of the Genesee Chief, navigable waters may be substituted for tide waters. This view of the jurisdiction over maritime torts has not been denied.
But it has been strongly argued that this is a mixed case, the tort having been committed partly on water and partly on land; and that, as the origin of the wrong was on the water, in other words, as the wrong began on the water (where the admiralty possesses jurisdiction), it should draw after it all the consequences resulting from the act. These mixed cases, however, will be found, not cases of tort, but of contract, which do not depend altogether upon locality as the test of jurisdiction, such as contracts of material-men, for supplies, charter-parties, and the like. These cases depend upon the nature and subject-matter of the contract, whether a maritime contract, and the service a maritime service to be performed upon the sea, or other navigable waters, though made upon land. The cases of torts to be found in the admiralty, as belonging to this class, hardly partake of the character of mixed cases, or have, at most, but a very remote resemblance.*
They are cases of personal wrongs, which commenced on the land; such as improperly enticing a minor on board a ship and there exercising unlawful authonity over him. The substance and consummation of the wrong were on board the vessel—on the high seas, or navigable waters—and the injury complete within admiralty cognizance. It was the tortious acts on board the vessel to which the jurisdiction attached.
This class of cases may well be referred to as illustrating the true meaning of the rule of locality in cases of marine p. 35torts, namely, that the wrong and injury complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have taken place upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction. In other words the cause of damage, in technical language, whatever else attended it, must have been there complete.
*
Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumner, 2; The Huntress, per Ware, J., Davies, 85 ; United States v. Magill, 1 Washington C. C. 463 ; 4 Dallas, p. 345, 2d ed. ; Plumer v. Webh, 4 Mason, 383-4; 1 Kent, 367* and n.
Much stress has been given to the fact, by the learned counsel who would support the jurisdiction, in his argument, that the vessel which communicated the fire to the wharf and buildings, was a maritime instrument, or agent, and, hence, characterized the nature of the tort. In other words, that this characterized it as a maritime tort, and, of course, of admiralty cognizance.
But this, we think, is a misapprehension. The owner of a vessel is liable for injuries done to third persons or property by the negligence or malfeasance of the master and crew while in the discharge of their duties and acting within the scope of their authority. It is upon this principle that the defendants are liable, if at all, to the libellants for the damages sustained. The circumstance that the agents were in the employment of the owners on board the vessel, and that the negligence occurred, while so employed, and which occasioned the damage, gives to the libellants the right of action. But, if they had been employed upon any other structure in the river—on a raft, or floating platform, for work, on the river, and the fire had been communicated to the wharf and buildings on account of their negligence while so engaged, the right of action would have been the same. The jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts does not depend upon the wrong having been committed on board the vessel, but upon its having been committed upon the high seas or other navigable waters.
A trespass on board of a vessel, or by the vessel itself, above tide-water, when that was the limit of jurisdiction, was not of admiralty cognizance. The reason was, that it was not committed within the locality that gave the jurisdiction. The vessel itself was unimportant. The fact, p. 36therefore, of its having taken place on board the propeller Falcon, in the present case, is not an element that imparts any peculiar character to the nature of the tort complained of. This is so in cases of collision, in which the offending vessel may be attached and proceeded against as one of the remedies for the wrong done. The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality—the high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred. Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.
We can give, therefore, no particular weight or influence to the consideration that the injury in the present case originated from the negligence of the servants of the respondents on board of a vessel, except as evidence that it originated on navigable waters—the Chicago River; and, as we have seen, the simple fact that it originated there, but, the whole damage done upon land, the cause of action not being complete on navigable waters, affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction. The negligence, of itself, furnishes no cause of action; it is damnum absque injuria. The case is not distinguishable from that of a person standing on a vessel, or on any other support in the river, and sending a rocket or torpedo into the city, by means of which buildings were set on fire and destroyed. That would be a direct act of trespass; but quite as efficient a cause of damage, as if the fire had proceeded from negligence. Could the admiralty take jurisdiction ? We suppose the strongest advocate for this jurisdiction would hardly contend for it. Yet, the origin of the trespass is upon navigable waters, which are within its cognizance. The answer is, as already given: the whole, or at least the substantial cause of action, arising out of the wrong, must be complete within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends—on the high seas or navigable waters.
The learned counsel, who argued this case for the appellants with great care and research, admitted that it was one of first impression; that he could find no case in the books p. 37like it. The reason is apparent, for it is outside the acknow ¡edged limit of admiralty cognizance over marine torts, among which it has been sought to be classed. The remedy for the injury belongs to the courts of common law.
Decree affirmed.
The Kimball.
1. Stipulations in a charter-party requiring the delivery of the cargo within reach of the ship’s tackle, and providing that the balance of the charter-money remaining unpaid on the termination of the homeward voyage shall be “ payable, one-half in five, and one-half in ten days after discharge” of the cargo, are not inconsistent with the right of the owner to retain the cargo for the preservation of his lien.
2. A clause in a charter-party, by which the owner binds the vessel, and the charterers bind the cargo, for the performance of their respective covenants, is sufficient to repel doubt arising upon the construction of other stipulations not plainly controlling them, as to whether the lien for freight was intended to be waived by the parties.
3. By the general commercial law a promissory note does not extinguish the debt for which it is given, unless such be the express agreement of the parties; it only operates to extend until its maturity the period for the payment of the debt. The creditor may return the note when dishonored, and proceed upon the original debt. The acceptance of the note is considered as accompanied with the condition of its payment. And although in Massachusetts the rule is different, and the presumption of law there is that a promissory note extinguishes the debt for which it is given, yet there the presumption may be repelled by evidence that such was not the intention of the parties; and this evidence may arise from the general nature of the transaction, as well as from direct testimony to the fact.
4. Upon this ground it is not to be presumed that the owner of a ship, having a lien upon a cargo for the payment of the freight, intended to waive his lien by taking the notes of the charterers drawn so as to be payable at the time of the expected arrival of the ship in port. The notes being unpaid, he may return, them and enforce his lien.
The owner of the Kimball chartered her, in July, 1856, to a Boston firm, for a round voyage from New York to Melbourne, Calcutta, and Boston. The charter-party, in most of its provisions, was in the usual form. A portion of the charter-money was to be paid, and was paid, before or p. 38during the voyage; “balance,” the instrument proceeded, “ payable, one-half in five and one-half in ten days, after discharge of homeward cargo.”
The charter-party contained, also, a clause that the cargo should “ be received and delivered within reach of the ship’s tackles at the ports of lading and discharging,” and concluded with the not unusual provision, that for the performance of its covenants the parties bound themselves—the party of the first part, the vessel, her freight, tackle, and appurtenances; the party of the second, the freight and merchandise to be laden aboard—each to the other, in the penal sum of $40,000.
While the ship was yet at sea, the charterers, at the owner’s request, gave him their notes for $10,000. They were drawn so as to be payable near the time when it was expected that the ship would arrive; and it appeared by the testimony of the broker who had been concerned in the matter, that they were given for the accommodation of the owner, and were to be held over or renewed in case they fell due before the ship reached home. The owner, in a receipt for the notes, stated that he had received them “ on account of the charter,” and that it was “ understood that this amount was to be insured by the charterers and charged to the owners of the ship.” The owner used the notes, and obtained money on one of them at a bank where he had an account. The charterers effected insurance on the $10,000, in pursuance of the agreement. The vessel arrived about five weeks before the notes by their terms fell due.
Shortly before the vessel arrived home, and before the notes fell due, the charterers failed. The owner immediately tendered them back their notes, but they would not receive them.
By the terms of the charter-party the cargo was to be deliverable to the consignees, “ they paying freight as per charter-party,” and after the arrival of the vessel, the owners, asserting a lien on the cargo for the unpaid money, and refusing to credit as payment on account, the notes for $10,000, filed a libel in the District Court for Massachusetts to enforce the lien. This libel was filed on the 18th March, 1858; the p. 39notes, which were produced and tendered in court, having fallen due on the 3d preceding. On appeal to this court from the Circuit Court, where the matter went on appeal from the District Court, two questions arose.
1. Whether the ordinary lien of the ship-owner was displaced by anything in the charter-party ?
2. Whether the notes of the charterers were to be considered as payment ?
The Circuit Court, reversing the District Court, had held negatively on both points.
Mr. Thaxter for the owners of the cargo, appellants:
I. In Raymond v. Tyson* it is said, by Wayne, J., that the lien of the ship-owner for freight or hire “ may be considered as having been waived without express words to that effect, if there are stipulations in the charter-party inconsistent with the exercise of the lien, or where it can be fairly inferred that the owner meant to trust to the personal responsibility of the charterer.”
Neither will the subsequent insolvency of the charterer restore a lien once waived or lost. In Alsager v. The St. Katherine Dock Cb.,f a case like this, where insolvency had given rise to the litigation, Chief Baron Pollock said, “ Did the owner intend to abandon his lien and receive payment of the freight two months after the inward report, or did he mean to retain his lien, and keep his right to refuse delivery of the cargo until the freight was paid? If the ship-owner could not have refused to deliver the goods provided the charterer had continued solvent, he cannot maintain that claim now.”
Now, we say that the stipulation in the charter, that the cargo should be delivered within reach of the ship’s taekle, is inconsistent with the right of retaining it to enforce the lien set up; which retention involves the unloading and storing of the cargo.
17 Howard, 59; see also Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moore, Privy Council, 199. J t 14 Meeson & Welsby, 794.
Independently of this stipulation, the credit given for the payment of the balance of the charter-money after discharge at the home port, is inconsistent with the Existence of a lien and the discharge of the ship and the delivery of the cargo according to the usual and customary manner. This clause giving this credit was inserted for the benefit of the charterers. It is not merely a formal part of the charter, but is a living, active provision, having reference to the contract intended to be made, and such a construction must be given to the charter as shall make this clause operate as a beneficial credit.
Again: we think that by the true construction of this charter, the parties intended that the cargo should be discharged and delivered in the usual and customary manner. If, then, the retention of the cargo for the purpose of retaining a lien thereon until the expiration of the credit, will prevent the discharge and delivery of the cargo in the usual and customary way, such retention cannot be authorized.* The usual and customary course is to give notice to the consignee or owner of the goods when his goods are to be discharged, and then to discharge them upon the wharf, when the liability of the carrier as such ceases, and the goods are at the risk of the owner.f But to give full effect to the credit specified, and preserve the lien, the master must have discharged his cargo and stored it, no matter how many different sub-freighters there may have been.
The printed clause at the end of the charter-party,—a clause found in nearly all charter-parties—which agrees to bind the freight and merchandise to be laden on board to a performance of the contract,—has no application to this part of the contract. As was said by Baron Bramwell, in Foster v. Colby * il The true meaning of that clause is, that the owner is to have a lien so far as a lien is possible.” Baron Watson, in the same case, said, in reply to the argument that this clause gave an absolute lien on the cargo, “ It is p. 41impossible there can be a lien for money not due.” And again, “ If the vessel is discharged abroad, the freight is ‘to be paid in cash on right delivery of the cargo.’ The clause giving a lien would attach in that case. The true meaning is, that wherever there can be a lien the ship-owner is to have it,” &c. So in this case, the clause giving a lien would attach to the outward freight and to demurrage.
*
Foster v. Colby, 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 705; Alsager v. St. Katherine Dock Co. , t Richardson v. Goddard, 23 Howard, 28; Houlden v. The General Steam Nav. Co., 3 Foster & Finlason, 170; Black v. Rose, 10 Jurist, N. S., 1009.
The cases of The Volunteer * and of Certain Logs of Mahogany —circuit rulings of the late Story, J.,—might be supposed to militate with our view. But they do not. The former is distinguishable from this. There the freight was payable “within ten days after the schooner’s return to Boston.” It appeared by the duty-collection list that the time for entering at the custom-house w’as such that Story, J., found “that an unlivery could be rightfully postponed beyond the ten days after the return of the ship, when by the terms of the charter-party the freight would become due.”
The case of Certain Logs of Mahogany is peculiar, and can well stand upon the fact that it was agreed that the cargo should be subject to the lien for freight, notwithstanding the provision making the freight payable in five days after her discharge.
II. As respects the notes. We suppose it to be well settled where an advance is made upon freight or charter-money, in money or notes, with an agreement that the advance is to be insured for or by the shipper or charterer, that such advance shall be treated as a pre-payment of freight, at the nsk of the shipper, which, to the extent of it, discharges the lien .J
And whatever may be the doctrine of particular States as to the effect of taking a promissory note on the original debt, yet it is equally true that it will be treated by all courts, everywhere; as payment, where it appears that the parties so intended it: as we think it was intended here.
* 1 Sumner, 570. f 2 Id. 602.
I Hicks v. Shield, 7 Ellis & Blackburne, 633; Jackson v. Isaacs, 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 405; Trayes v. "Worms, 12 Law Times, N. S., 547; Tolmaco v. Simpson, 13 Id. 160.
Whether these notes are to be considered as payment or not, it is well settled that no action could be brought on the original debt until their maturity, and the taking of them was tantamount to an agreement on the part of the owner to give the charterers the credit expressed on their face for that amount of the charter-money.* The notes were not due when the ship arrived and the cargo became deliverable; nor till five weeks afterwards.
Mr. B. JR. Curtis, who argued the case fully on principle and authorities, contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court:
Two questions are presented for determination in this case : first, whether the lien of the owner of the ship upon the cargo for the freight was waived or displaced by the stipulations of the charter-party; and, second, whether the notes given for a portion of the charter-money constituted payment of the same.
It is admitted that the lien of the owner of a ship upon its cargo for freight is favored by the courts; and will not be displaced, so long as the ship-owner retains possession of the cargo, except by express contract, or by stipulations in the charter-party inconsistent with its exercise. The position of the appellants is, that there are such inconsistent stipulations in the charter-party in this case; and two clauses are mentioned in support of this position,—the clause requiring the delivery of the cargo within reach of the ship’s tackle, and the clause providing that the balance of the charter-money remaining unpaid on the termination of the homeward voyage shall be “ payable one-half in five and one-half in ten days after discharge” of the cargo.
There is nothing in these provisions inconsistent with the right of the owner to retain the cargo for the preservation of his lien. The first clause only designates the place where the delivery must be had, which, in this case, is the wharf at which the ship may be lying. The second clause only p. 43prescribes the period in which payment must be made after the discharge of the cargo. The discharge mentioned does not import a delivery of the cargo; it only imports its unlading from the ship. Such is the obvious meaning of the term, and so it has been judicially held.* The clause was intended for the benefit of the charterers. It gives them ample time to examine the goods, and ascertain their condition, and decide whether they will take them and pay the freight, or decline to receive them. They can waive it and take the cargo short of the period designated, if it be ready for delivery.
*
Belshaw v. Bush, 11 Common Bench, 191; Price v. Price, 16 Meeson & Welsby, 239; Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 Rhode Island, 383.
The cases cited by the appellants do not support their position. In Foster v. Colby the charter-party provided that the remainder due for freight should be paid “ in cash two months from the vessel’s report inwards at London or Liverpool, and after right delivery of the cargo.” The stipulation for the payment after the delivery of the cargo was inconsistent with the existence of a lien. In Alsager v. St. Katherine Dock Cb.,J the charter-party contained two clauses, one providing for the delivery of the cargo on payment of the freight at a stipulated price, and the other providing for the payment of the freight “ two months after the vessel’s inward report at the custom-house.” The court reconciled these clauses by annexing to the first the qualification as to the time of payment contained in the second, and read them together as requiring payment two months after delivery. The payment being thus considered to be irrespective of the delivery, it followed that no lien existed.
There is no doubt that a credit for the freight may be given for so great a period as to justify, in the absence of any provision for the delivery of the cargo, the inference that the ship-owner intended to waive his right to a lien, and to look solely to the personal responsibility of the charterers. It is sufficient, however, that there is no such credit given in the present case. Here the period allowed is only a reasonable one for examining the condition of the cargo.
*
Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumner, 589. t 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 705. J 14 Meeson & Welsby, 794.
But if there were any doubt as to the construction of the provision for the credit, it is dispelled by the concluding clause of the charter-party. By that clause the owner binds the vessel, and the charterers bind the cargo for the performance of all their respective covenants, of which the payment of the charter-money is one. Though the law, in the absence of any stipulations on the subject, ordinarily implies this mutual security in every contract of affreightment, yet its distinct statement, in the charter-party shows that the attention of the parties was called to it, and is an important circumstance to be considered in the construction of other stipulations of the instrument respecting the payment of the freight.
In the case of the Schooner Volunteer* Mr. Justice Story had occasion to consider the effect of a similar clause in a charter-party. In that case the charterers had agreed to pay for the freight “within ten days after the return of the vessel to Boston,” or in case of loss after she was last heard from; and the question was, whether the allowance of the ten days for the payment of the freight amounted to a waiver of the lien? The learned judge held that it did not, and in this connection considered the effect of the clause named. After an extended examination of the authorities, he came to the conclusion that it contained an express contract for a lien; and if it did not, still that it contained enough to repel any notion that the delivery of the goods should precede the payment of the freight, or that the lien of the maritime law for freight was intended to be waived by the parties.
The second question for determination is, whether the notes given for a portion of the charter-money constituted payment of the same ?
The notes were given before the termination of the voyage, and, consequently, before the balance of the charter-money became due. Treating them as an advance of a portion of the freight, they could be recovered back, or their amount, if paid, if the vessel did not arrive. Freight being
* 1 Sumner, 551.
the compensation for the carriage of goods, if paid in advance, is in all cases, unless there is a special agreement to the contrary, to be refunded, if from any cause not attributable to the shipper the goods be not carried.* And there was no such special agreement in this case. The notes were drawn so as to mature near the time of the anticipated arrival of the ship, and according to the statement of the broker who made the arrangement, they were given for the accommodation of the ship-owner, and were to be held over or renewed in case they fell due before the arrival. This statement is consistent with the nature of the transaction, and is sufficient to repel any presumption, under the law of Massachusetts, that the notes were taken in discharge or payment of the claim for the charter-money. The presumption which prevails in that State, that a promissory note extinguishes the debt or claim for which it is given, may be repelled by any circumstances showing that such was not the intention of the parties.
By the general commercial law, as well of England as of the United States, a promissory note does not discharge the debt for which it is given unless such be the express agreement of the parties; it only operates to extend until its maturity the period for the payment of the debt. The creditor may return the note when dishonored, and proceed upon the original debt. The acceptance of the note is considered as accompanied with the condition of its payment. Thus it was said, as long ago as the time of Lord Holt, that “a bill shall never go in discharge of a precedent debt, except it be part of the contract that it should be so.”f Such has been the rule in England ever since; and the same rule prevails, with few exceptions, in the United States. The doctrine proceeds upon the obvious ground, that nothing can be justly considered as payment in fact, but that which is in truth such, unless something else is expressly agreed to be received in its place. That a mere promise to p. 46pay cannot of itself be regarded as an effective payment is manifest.
*
Watson v. Duykinck, 3 Johnson, 335; Griggs v. Austin, 3 Pickering, 20; Phelps v. Williamson, 5 Sandford, 598. t Clark v. Mundel, 1 Salkeld, 124.
The rule in Massachusetts is an exception to the general law; but even there, as we have said, the presumption that the note was given in satisfaction of the debt may be repelled and controlled by evidence that such was not the intention of the parties, and this evidence may arise from the general nature of the transaction, as well as from direct testimony to the fact. Thus, in Butts v. Dean,* where a note was given for a debt secured by the bond of a third person, it was held that it was not to be presumed that the creditor intended to relinquish his security, and, therefore, the note was not to be deemed payment for the original debt. And following this and other like authorities of that State, Mr. Justice Sprague, of the United States District Court, held that alien for materials furnished a vessel built in Massachusetts, a lien given in such a case, by a law of that State, was not displaced or impaired by the creditors taking the notes of the debtor.f
And on like grounds, we think that any presumption of a discharge of the claim of a ship-owner, and of his lien upon the cargo in this case, by his taking the notes of the charterers, is repelled and overthrown.
Decree affirmed.