Livermore v. Jenckes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 126
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Livermore v. Jenckes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 126
Full caption
Edward M. Livermore and David B. Sexton, Appellants, v. Thomas A. Jenckes, Alexander Farnum, and Stephen Wa terman.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Edward M. Livermore and David B. Sexton, Appellants, v. Thomas A. Jenckes, Alexander Farnum, and Stephen Wa terman.
The laws of Rhode Island allow an assignment to be made by a failing debtor, for the benefit of certain preferred creditor^, and for the exclusion of those who should refuse to execute releases from their respective claims. The laws of New York do not permit such assignments.
Where an assignment with the above reservation was made in Rhode Island by a person and to persons residing there, which conveyed to trustees certain prop erty in Rhode Island, and also property in New York, it was proper for the Circuit Court of New York to dismiss a bill filed by creditors residing there, provided there was no fraud in fact in the assignment.
The complainants never acquired nor ever had any lien upon the property in New York, so as to subject it legally or equitably to their demand against the failing debtors, either before or after it was carried into judgment in the Su preme Court of New York.
This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York, sitting in equity.
Livermore and Sexton, who filed the bill, were citizens of New York, and Jenckes, Farnum, and Waterman, citizens of Rhode Island.
The complainants claimed to set aside an assignment made on the 19th of April, 1854, by Waterman, to Jenckes & Far num, upon the ground that the assignment was to enure to such of Waterman’s creditors who should sign a release. Thia, provision, it was admitted, was valid by the laws of Rhode Island, where the assignment was executed, but invalid by the laws of New York, where the property in question was situa ted. Livermore and Sexton had become judgment creditors after the assignment was made; and if it could be set aside, the property would be open to execution upon their judg ments.
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The defendants all answered the bill, and much evidence was taken. After the cause was heard upon the pleadings and proofs, the Circuit Court passed the following decree:
“This cause having been heretofore brought on to be heard at final hearing on pleadings and proofs, and having been ar gued by Mr. A. J. Willard on the part of the plaintiffs, and by Mr. T. A. Jenckes and Mr. C. A. Seward on the part of the defendants, now, on consideration thereof, it is found and decided by the court, that the property in the State of New York, assigned by the defendant Waterman to the defendants Jenckes & Farnum, by the assignment mentioned in the pleadings herein, was taken into possession by said assignees, and converted into money, and the proceeds transferred to the State of Rhode Island, prior to the filing of the bill in this cause, and that the plaintiffs have no lien on said property, and that there was no fraud in fact in the making of said as signment; and it is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the bill in this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed, with costs to the defendants against the plaintiffs to be taxed, and that the defendants have execution against the plaintiffs for such costs, according to the course and practice of this court.”
The complainants appealed from this decree.
The cause was submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Morrell for the appellants, and Mr. Jenckes and Mr. Clarence A. Seward for the appellees.. *
The arguments upon both sides covered a great deal of ground.
It will be seen by the decree above recited, which was af firmed by this court, that the broad question of whether the law of Rhode Island or that of New York should govern, was not decided by either court, but that the decree was founded upon the three following circumstances :
1. That the property was converted into money, and trans ferred to Rhode Island.
2. That the plaintiffs had no lien on the property.
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3. That there was no fraud in fact in the assignment.
In noticing the arguments upon the general proposition, whether the lex loci contractus or the lex fori.should govern, the reporter can give only an outline.
The first point of Mr. Morrell was the following, viz:
First Point.—The Circuit Court erred in not deciding that the assiernmento from Waterman to Jenckes & Farnum-was fraudulent and void as affecting the complainants below, and the other creditors of Waterman residing within the State of New York at the time of the assignment, so far at least as the assignment affected the estate of the assignor within the State of New York, at the time of its execution and delivery.
As it regards the invalidity of the assignment, 'the essential facts are briefly as follows:
Waterman being insolvent, and indebted, among others, to the complainants, and holding property and choses in action in the State of New York, assigned to J. & F., giving certain preferences, and directing the residue to be paid to such of his creditors at large as should release their demands within six months, reserving to himself the dividends of such creditors as should refuse to release.
We contend that such an assignment is adjudged fraudulent as to creditors, by the laws of the State of New York. That, as to property situated within the State of New York and the claims of resident creditors, the laws of the State of New York are paramount, and do not yield to the laws of the domicil of the debtor.
First. This case is one of State jurisdiction. It has arisen out of the conflict of the laws of the States of New York and Rhode Island. These laws relate to matters of internal admin istration, over which Congress, under the Constitution, has no control whatever. The States have not seen fit to lodge in Congress power to harmonize the conflict of their internal sys tems. Such a power, if lodged in the Federal Government, would necessarily involve the right to carry the laws and sys tems of polity prevailing in one State within the territorial limits of another. It would aim a blow at the integrity of the State sovereignties. Whatever may be thought of the neces
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sity or wisdom of such, an accession of authority to the Union, it is undisputed that no such grant has been made by the Fed eral Constitution.
Story’s Conflict of Laws, sec. 18.
Previous to the Constitution, the States possessed the abso lute dominion common to all independent sovereigns over all persons and property within their territorial limits. They de termined for themselves the laws by which real and personal property within their limits should be held and transmitted. If they recognised the dispositions of property made by foreign States, it was on a principle of comity alone, and not an ac knowledgment of any inherent vitality in the laws of the for eign State within their own territories.
That body of opinion called the law of nations had no practi cal existence or positive efficacy, except so far as it had become embodied in and formed a part of some local system of laws.
The Constitution created the Federal sovereignty, and in vested it with certain specified powers; but neither by express grant nor by necessary implication has the power been conferred to communicate vitality to the laws of one State within the I limits of another.
Wherever it was deemed desirable that a harmonious sys tem should exist throughout the Union in regard to a particu lar subject, the Constitution, in regard to that subject, con ferred supreme legislative power on Congress, in some instances excluding the States from all legislative control over the sub ject, and in others permitting local legislation to a certain ex tent, but subordinating it to the paramount authority of Con gress.
The power vested in Congress to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankrupt cies, is an instance of this kind.
The system of laws adopted by Congress in such cases dis place State legislation on the same subjects altogether. It was no part of the intent of the Constitution that Congress should leave the conflicting laws of the States in such cases in force, I and adopt merely a system of rules by which the conflict arising out of these jarring provisions should be determined.
vol. xxi. 9
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Such a principle would blend the national and local legisla tion into an inextricable maze. It would be impossible to define the limits of either. The line of demarcation once destroyed, the stronger of the antagonistic powers would gradually absorb the weaker, and the balance of the Union ultimately be destroyed.
It is not necessary to consider whether the power granted to Congress in regard to the establishment of bankrupt laws could be so exercised as to make the disposition of the estates of insolvents depend wholly and exclusively on the laws of Congress. Until Congress exercises the power, no such question can arise. The defendants rest their case upon the authority of the laws of the State of Rhode Island, and not upon those of Congress.
The power, then, of determining what disposition may be made by insolvents of their property within the State of New York, rests with that State to determine, free from any con trol in Congress, under existing laws.
If Congress cannot define a system of rules to determine controversies growing out of the conflict of the laws of the States, it is clear that the Federal courts cannot, independ ently of the States, compose and enforce such a system.
The adjudications of the Federal courts must, in every in stance, rest upon the express or the implied authority of either the National or State Legislatures.
The language used by Mr. Justice Grier in Caskie v. Web ster (2 Wallace, jun., 131) would, on a cursory examination, appear to imply that it was a part of the duty of the Federal courts to - apply to controversies of this character a sort of modified jus gentium, adapted to harmonize with the objects and purposes of the Union of the States. He says: “ We do not think that the different States of this Union are to be re garded, as a general thing, in the relation of States foreign to each other; especially ought they not to be so regarded in regard to questions relating to the commerce of the country, which ié co-extensive with the whole land, and belongs, not to the States, but to the Union.” A careful examination of that case will show that such was not his intent.
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The question in that case was as to the validity, in Pennsyl vania, of an assignment valid by the laws of Virginia, where it was made, in its operation upon property situated in Penn sylvania. We shall see hereafter that the case was decided iij strict conformity with the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, and that the principle above cited was intended as an exposi tion of the liberal rules that governed the State of Pennsylvania in questions arising out of the conflict of her laws with those of other States.
The present controversy originated in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, which court had jurisdiction, not only of the subject-matter, but of the parties who had been s^ved with process. It has been removed into this court merely in consequence of the parties being residents of differ ent States.
This court must therefore give the same judgment which the courts of the State of New York would have been bound to give, had they adjudicated the case.
Second. By the laws of the State of New York, an insol vent s assignment, containing the clause requiring creditors to release or forfeit their dividends, and directing them to be paid in that case to the assignor, is fraudulent as to creditors, and is void.
The Revised Statutes re-enact the statute of 13 Eliz., which is an affirmance of the common law.
Third. The assignment being of a nature forbidden by the laws of New York, according to the acknowledged principles governing the jurisprudence of that State, it cannot be asserted there as affecting property within that State, and as against g creditor of the assignor there resident.
do not find that the precise point in question has been adjudicated in that State, but the principles governing thè. , case are well settled.
[Mr. Morrell then examined the following cases : 2 Mason, 157; 12 Wheaton, 25£; Ware, 232; 5 Greenl., 245; 19 Wenell, 15; 3 Dallas, 375, note; 14 Martin, 93, 102; Conflict.
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of Laws, sec. 390; 4 Term Reps., 192; 5 East., Potterr. Brown.]
These authorities go as far as authority can go to establish the principle, that it is not only within the power, but it is the duty, of a State to deny to strangers privileges not permitted to its own citizens. The wisdom of such a rule can find no better illustration than the present case. Waterman estab lishes himself in business in the State of New York, contracts debts due to its citizens, until, finding himself insolvent, he returns to the State of Rhode Island, and there executes an assignment, which, if executed in this State, would have been adjudged fraudulent as against his creditors. If the State of New York should allow so unequal a privilege to strangers, would she not be justly chargeable with neglecting the inter ests of her own citizens ? Would it not, in the language of Judge Ware, be equivalent to surrendering her independence?
Such a doctrine would give rise to great abuses. A citizen of New York, in failing circumstances, wishing to make a disposition of his property forbidden by the laws of his own State, but permitted by another, could, by taking up a resi dence in the latter State, successfully evade the laws of his State.
There is another view of this case still more conclusive. The law of the State of New York, which in the present instance is in conflict with the laws of Rhode Island, is a part of the insolvent system of the State. The greatest diversity exists between the insolvent systems of the different States and for eign countries; all, however, recognise, in greater or less de gree, the right of the State to assume the disposition of the estates of insolvents. In some countries, the system is coer cive ; in others, voluntary; and in some, a mixture of both, but all unite in limiting the power of the insolvent in regard to the absolute disposition of his estate. The laws which have relation to the estates of insolvents, and tend to prevent the unequal or unjust dispositions of suck estates, are a part of the insolvent system of the State.
Whatever relates to the insolvent system of the State de pends exclusively upon the lex fori.
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If the insolvent or bankrupt laws of a foreign country or State are not permitted to have any extra-territorial efficacy, for the reason that every State must determine for itself the best mode of administering the estates of insolvents, with how much more reason should we refuse to permit a citizen of a foreign State voluntarily to make such a disposition of his property in this State, at variance with our insolvent laws?
The cases of insolvency and of administration are similar in principle in this respect.
Let us now consider the decisions that have been made on this subject in sister States :
[Mr. Morrell then examined the following cases: Massachusetts: 13 Mass., 146; 6 Pick., 286; 19 Pick., 281; 15 Pick., 11; 19 Pick., 105.
New Jersey: 1 Green, 326.
Missouri: 6 Missouri, 302.
Pennsylvania: The precise point does not appear to be ad judicated, although there are floating dicta adverse to the principle contended for. 3 Harris, 91; 6 Harris, 185; Caskie v. Webster, Wallace, jun.
Maryland : 7 Gill, 446, where the court states the condition of the question upon the State authorities at that time (1848-’9) to be as follows:
The States which had determined against the validity of the releasing clause were stated to be New York, Ohio, North Carolina, Mississippi, Missouri, Alabama, Connecticut, and Illinois.
In favor of the validity, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Car olina, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine.
Virginia: 8 Grattan, 457.
Since the decision in Abbert v. Winn, New Jersey has ac ceded to the States holding such assignments void.
Varnum v. Campbell, 1 Green, 326.
Rhode Island should be added to the States sustaining the cause. At the present time, the States whose systems of jurisprudence forbid such clauses are New York, Ohio, North arolina, Mississippi, Missouri, Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois,
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Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Maine, Maryland, and New Jersey.
On the other side stand Rhode Island and South Carolina, side by side. Virginia is bound, contrary to the opinions of her jurist, to an erroneous course of decision, and thus, on a question of authority, throws her weight against, rather than in favor of, the Rhode Island and South Carolina doctrine.]
Second Point.—The assignment to J. & E. being void by the laws of the State of New York, the appellants were enti tled to a decree in the court below for an account of the prop erty, or the proceeds thereof, which came into the assignee’s hands from the State of New York, such being the remedy allowed by the State of New York, and, consequently, the appropriate remedy to be allowed under their bill.
First. In a case arising exclusively under the laws of the States, and where the Circuit Court obtains jurisdiction solely through the residence of the parties to the controversy, the lex fori is carried into the Circuit Court with the case, and the same remedy is to be allowed, which, by the lex fori, is appro priate to the case.
Second. Had this case been carried to a decree in the New York courts, the appellants would have been entitled to a*n account against the assignees, as above stated. There are two remedies allowed in the courts of equity of that State to a judgment creditor, for the purpose of reaching the estate of his debtor, and applying it in satisfaction of his judgment.
[The other subdivisions are necessarily omitted.]
IV. The conveyance of the proceeds of this sale into the State of Rhode Island does not relieve the assignees from lia bility to the New York creditors. .... e
The removal of the assigned estate beyond the jurisdiction o the courts of the State of New York was in itself an act of ba faith. If the act of Waterman in assigning was an illegal act, that of the assignees in carrying the assets of the estate to Ro e Island was equally illegal. How, then, can the assignees shelter themselves behind an act of .wrong ? They say that the c amis of other creditors have attached to the fund; if so, it is throug their wrong that the complainants have lost their remedy.
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It is quite clear that this would have been no justification, had the assignees been citizens of the State of New York; nor can their citizenship of Rhode Island protect them in New York for an act of wrongful intermeddling with the estate of an insolvent in New York, in fraud of New York creditors.
It is not alleged by the respondents, that, previous to the filing of the bill, they had received of Hill, Carpenter, & Co., more than the notes representing 331 per cent, of the appraised value of the property appertaining to the mill. The presump tion is, that the balance had not been paid. The presumption is, also, that the property transferred to Hill, Carpenter, & Co., consisting of the machinery, goods, and stock, at the Owasco Mills, Auburn, New York, remained in that State until the filing of the bill. These presumptions are not repelled by either allegation or proof to the contrary.
The sale to Hill, Carpenter, & Co., being, as we have seen, colorable, the property remained in the assignees, and must be presumed so to have remained at the filing of the appel lant’s bill.