Hogan v. Page, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 605
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Hogan v. Page, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 605
Full caption
Hogan v. Page.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Hogan v. Page.
1. A patent certificate, or patent issued, or confirmation made to an original grantee or his ‘ ‘ legal representatives, ” embraces representatives of such grantee by contract, as well as by operation of law; leaving the question open in a court of justice as to the party to whom the certificate, patent, or confirmation should enure.
2. The fact that A., many years ago, did present to a board of commissioners appointed by law to pass upon imperfect titles to land, a “claim” to certain land, describing it as “formerly” of B., an admitted owner; the fact that the board entered on its minutes that A., “ assignee” of B., presented a claim, and that the board granted the land to “ the representatives” of B.; and the fact that A., with his family, was in possession of the land many years ago, and cultivating it, are facts which tend to prove an assignment; and as such, in an ejectment where the fact of an assignment is in issue, should be submitted as evidence to the jury.
Error to the Supreme Court of Missouri; the case being thus:
After the cession, in 1803, by France, of Louisiana, to the United States, Congress passed an act* establishing a board of commissioners at St. Louis, for the purpose of settling imperfect French and Spanish claims. The act provided that any person who had, for ten consecutive years prior to the 20th December, 1803, been in possession of a tract of land not owned by any other person, &c., “should be confirmed in their titles.”
In 1808, one Louis Lamonde presented a claim for a tract of one by forty arpens, “ formerly the property of Auguste °nd6.” The minutes of the board, of November 13th, 1811, disclosed the following proceedings:
Louis Lamonde, assignee of Auguste Cond6, claiming one by Qrty acres, situate in the Big Prairie district of St. Louis, pro- p. 606606 Hogan v. Page. [Sup. Ct.
*
Act of 3d March, 1807, 2 Stat, at Large, 440.
Argument for the plaintiff and defendant.
duces a concession from St. Ange and Labuxiere, Lieutenant-Governor, dated 10th January, 1770.* The board granted to the representatives of Auguste Conde forty arpens, under the provisions of the act of Congress, &c., and ordered that the same be surveyed, conformably to possession, &c.”
The minutes did not record the fact that any assignment of this land from Conde to Lamonde had been presented to the board, or that other proof was made of such conveyance.
This decision of the board, among many others, was reported to Congress, and the title made absolute by an act of 12th April, 1814. In 1825, Lamonde obtained from the recorder of land titles a certificate of the confirmation.
Hogan, claiming through Lamonde, now, A. D. 1850, brought ejectment at St. Louis against Page for a part of this land. Lamonde was an old inhabitant of St. Louis, who had died some ten years before the trial at a very advanced age; and there was some evidence on the trial that he and his family cultivated this lot in the Grand Prairie at a very early day, before the change of government under the treaty of 1803; and evidence that by the early laws of the region these interests passed by parol.
The court below decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to tecover upon the evidence in the case.
' Mr. Grantt, for the defendant here and below, in support of this ruling, insisted here that, as no assignment or transfer of Conde’s interest in the concession was proved before the land board or at the trial, the confirmation could not enure to the benefit of Lamonde, so as to invest him with the title, and that, in the absence of the assignment, the confirmation “ to the representatives of Auguste Cond£” enured to the benefit of his heirs.
Messrs. Browning, Hill, and Ewing, argued contra for the plaintiff, that, as Lamonde presented his claim to the boar,
* This concession, about which there was no dispute, was to Condi.
Dec. 1864.] Hogan v. Page. 607
as assignee of Cond6, and as such set up a title in his notice of the application, the act of the board should be regarded as a confirmation of his right or claim to the land; and the cases of Strother v. Lucas* Bissell v. Penrose, f and Landes v. Brant,X in this court, were referred to as supporting this view of the confirmation.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
On looking into the cases cited on the part of the plaintiff, it will be seen that the confirmations which there appeared were either to the assignee claimant by name, or in general terms, that is, to the original grantee and u his legal representatives and when in the latter form, it was the assignee claimant who had presented the claim before the board, and had furnished evidence before it of his derivative title, and which had not been the subject of dispute. The present case, therefore, is different from either of the cases referred to.
A difficulty had occurred at the Land Office, at an early day, in respect to the form of patent certificates and of patents, arising out of applications to have them issued in the name of the assignee, or present claimant, thereby imposing upon the office the burden of inquiring into the derivative title presented by the applicant. This difficulty, also, existed in respect to the boards of commissioners under the acts of Congress for the settlement of French and Spanish claims. The result seems to have been, after consulting the Attorney-General, that the Commissioner of the Land Office recommended a formula that has since been very generally observed, namely, the issuing of the patent certificate, and even the patent, to the original grantee, or his ^gal representatives, and the same has been adopted by the several boards of commissioners. This formula, “ or his legal representatives,” embrace representatives of the original grantee in the land, by contract, such as assignees or grantees, as well as by operation of law, and leaves the
question open to inquiry in a court of justice as to the party to whom the certificate, patent, or confirmation, should enure.
Now, upon this view of the case, we think the court below erred in ruling, as matter of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The question in the case is, whether or not the evidence produced by the plaintiff on the trial before the jury tended to prove that there had been an assignment by the one of forty arpens from Condd to Lamonde, prior to his notice of the claim before the board of commissioners in 1808 ? If it did, then it should have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact, and not of law. The transaction was ancient, and of course it could not be expected that the evidence would be as full and specific as if it had occurred at a more recent period.
The piece of land is but a moiety of the original concession to Condd; and it appears that previous to the change of government, and while Cond6 was living, Lamonde and his family were in possession cultivating the strip, in the usual way in which these common field lots were occupied and improved. And very soon after the establishment of a board at the town of St. Louis, for the purpose of hearing and settling these French and Spanish imperfect grants, we find him presenting this claim before the board, setting up. a right to it as his own, and asking for a confirmation; and in the proceedings of confirmation, the board speak of it as a claim by Lamonde, assignee of Conde.
The title did not become absolute in the confirms whoever that person might be, till the passage of the act of 1814; and in 1825, Lamonde, for he appears to have been then alive, procured from the recorder of land titles the cer tificate of confirmation.
We are of opinion that these facts should have been su mitted to the jury, for them to find whether or not there had been an assignment or transfer of interest in this strip of one by forty arpens from Condd to Lamonde. Especia y do we think that the question should thus have been su mitted, as it appears that at this early day and among t ese p. 609simple people, a parol transfer of this interest was as effectual as if it had been in writing.
Judgment reversed with costs, and cause remanded with directions to issue
New venire.
Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company.
1. Where a bill in equity is necessary to have a construction of the orders, decrees, and acts made or done by a Federal court, the bill is properly filed in such Federal court as distinguished from any State court; and it may be entertained in such Federal court, even though parties who are interested in having the construction made would not, from want of proper citizenship, be entitled to proceed by original bill of any kind in a court of the United States.
In such a case the question will not be, whether the hill filed is supplemental or original in the technical sense of equity pleading; but whether it is to be considered as supplemental, or entirely new and original, in that sense which the Supreme Court has sanctioned with reference to the line that divides jurisdiction of the Federal courts from that of the State courts.
2. A railroad company, owning the whole of a long railroad, and all the rolling stock upon it, may assign particular portions of such rolling stock to particular divisions,—certain cars, for example, to one division; the residue of the rolling stock to another,—and mortgage such portions with such divisions, so as to attend them. Whether the company have so mortgaged their rolling stock is a question of intention. In the present case it was decided that they had.
• tyan: Whether a marshal’s sale is valid in any case, unless supported by a judicial order previously made. It is not valid where made under the marshal’s wrong interpretation of an order which the court did in fact make; not valid in such a case even where the court confirmed of record the marshal’s sale; the court’s attention not being specifically directed to the marshal’s mistake, nor any issue raised as to what the court really meant, nor decision made, on such issue raised, that the marshal’s act should remain firm.
The La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company was c artered by the legislature of Wisconsin to build a road across that State from Milwaukie to La Crosse, and began vol. n. 39 p. 610610 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
to build at Milwaukie, proceeding westward. The legislature also gave the company the right to mortgage, for the purpose of raising money, any particular division of their road separately. Under this provision of the statute, and for the purpose apparently of mortgaging them separately, the company divided the main road into two divisions, nearly equal in length, called the Eastern Division and the Western Division; the Eastern Division extending from Milwaukie to Portage-City, ninety-five miles, and the Western from Portage to La Crosse, one hundred and five miles. Upon each
of these divisions of the road, as well also as upon the entire road, and upon the rolling stock, either of each division, or o the entire road,—this exact matter of whether the rolling stock mortgaged did belong to the road as a whole, or to i in its divided character, being one of the questions in t is suit,—it gave certain mortgages; among them these:
ON THE WESTERN DIVISION. ON THE EASTERN DIVISION.
1856, December 31.—A mort- 1854, June 30.—A mortgage gage to Bronson, Soutter and to Palmer, sometimes called t e
Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 611
Knapp, commonly called the First, and sometimes the Palmer
Land Grant Mortgage. This Mortgage.o o
mortgage conveyed also a road, The descriptive part of the
not important to be here spoken mortgage was as follows:
of, from Madison, &c.
“ All their said road, from its east-
The descriptive part of this
ern termination, in the city of Mil-
mortgage was as follows:
waukie, to Portage City, being ninety-five miles in distance, constructed,
“ All and singular the several
and to be constructed, together with
tracts, pieces, or parcels of land which
all and singular the railways, land
now are, or may hereafter be, or con-
procured or occupied, or so to be, for
stitute the site of the roadway, turn-
right of way within the limits afore-
outs, engine-houses, workshops, de-
said, together with bridges, fences,
pots, and other buildings, and all the
privileges, rights, and real estate
other lands and real estate which now
owned by said company for the pur-
constitute, or may hereafter consti-
poses of said road, or which may
tute, or be a part of the roads of said
hereafter be acquired or owned by
railroad company from Madison, &c.,
them within the limits aforesaid; and
and from Portage City to La Crosse;
all the tolls, income, issues, and pro-
and also all and singular the super-
fits to be had from the same, and all
structure of said roads, whether now
lands used for and occupied within
made, or to be made hereafter, and
the limits aforesaid by depots and sta-
all the engine-houses, workshops,
tions, with all buildings standing
depots, and other buildings, and all
thereon, or which shall be procured
the other improvements on or per-
therefor, together with all locomotives,
taining to said roads, whether now
engines and tenders, passenger cars and
built and made, or to be built and
freight cars, shop-tools and machinery,
made hereafter; and also all and sin-
now owned or hereafter to be acquired
gular the locomotive engines and other
by said company, and in any way being stock, and all other equipments
longing or appertaining to said railroad,
°f every kind and description which
now constructed or to be constructed already been, or may hereafter be,
within the limits aforesaid, including
procured for or used on said roads, or
all its property, real and personal,
either of them; and all the materials,
pertaining to said railroad, within
l°ols, implements, utensils, and other
said limits, and all its rights, credits,
personal property which have been,
and franchises thereunto appertain-
or may hereafter be, procured for or
ing.”
used in connection with said roads, or either of them; and also all and
singular the rights, liberties, privi- The mortgage went on—after
ges, and franchises of said railroad the descriptive part above given <fmpuny, of every kind and descrip-
—to say:
on> elating to said roads.”
“But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the said company from selling, hypothecating, or otherwise disposing of any lands or other property of said p. 612company not necessary to be retained for the roadway, depots and stations, nor required for the construction or convenient use of that part of said road, nor from collecting moneys due said company on stock subscription or otherwise; nor shall anything herein contained be so construed as to prevent the said parties of the first part from collecting and appropriating towards the construction, use and repair of the remaining parts of said road westward towards the Mississippi River, all stock subscriptions, donations, or loans of money, lands or other property which may have been, or may hereafter be, made for that purpose; but said parties of the first part shall have full right so to proceed, without let or hindrance from said party of the second part. And the remaining portion of the said railroad which, by the said parties of the first part, may be constructed, shall be held in use by the said parties of the first part, to their own benefit and behoof forever, so far as the claims of the said party of the second part, or his successor, might otherwise be construed as in conflict therewith. It being distinctly understood that the conveyance made by this indenture is only for so much of the present or hereafter to be acquire rights, interest and property of the said company, parties of the first part, as are or shall be vested, or belong or appertain to that part of said railroad extending from Milwaukie to Portage City aforesaid, and being in distance ninety-five miles?’
1857, August 17.-A mortgage to G. C. Bronson and T. J. Scatter, commonly called the Seoon Mortgage. This mortgage a conveyed the Eastern Division and a road not important to be p. 613here spoken of, from Watertown to Midland. Its language was thus:
“ And also, all and singular the locomotive engines, and other rolling stock, and all the other equipments of every kind and description, which have already been or may hereafter be procuredfor, or used on, said railroads, or either of them; and alt the materials, tools, implements, and utensils, and other personal property, which have been or may hereafter be procured for or used in connection with said railroads, or either of them; and also all and singular the rights, liberties, privileges, and franchises of said railroad company, so far as they relate to said railroads from Milwaukie to Portage City, and from Watertown, by way of Columbus, to Midland aforesaid; and it is hereby declared to be the intention of the parties to convey to and vest in said parties of the second part all the property, real and personal, of said railroad company, to be acquired hereafter, as well as that which has already been acquired, together with all the rights, liberties, privileges, and franchises of said railroad company, in respect to said railroadfrom Milwaukie to Portage City, and from Watertown, by the way of Columbus, to Midland, as fully and amply as the same might be conveyed if said railroads had already been fully constructed and equipped.”
OVER THE WHOLE ROAD.
1858, June 1. A Mortgage to W. Barnes.—This mortgage conveyed the whole road from Milwaukie to La Crosse, and all the rolling stock, personal property, franchises, choses in action, and property of the debtor company, real, personal, and mixed. Its escriptive part need not be more fully given.
The Barnes mortgage, though given last, was first fore- p. 614614 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
closed. Sale under it was made in May, 1859. The purchasers organized themselves into a company, as the statutes of Wisconsin allow in like cases, and took the name of the Milwaukie and Minnesota Railroad Company; often, for brevity, styled the Minnesota Company simply; conceiving and asserting that they had succeeded to all the rights, property, and franchises of the old company,—subject, of course, to prior mortgages.
In December, 1859, Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, the trustees in the Land Grant mortgage on the Western Division, filed a bill in the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, having Circuit Court powers to foreclose their mortgage, making the mortgagor company, the Minnesota Company, and others, defendants.
At the same time, that is, in December, 1859, Bronson and Soutter, trustees in the second mortgage (on the Eastern Division), proceeded, in the same court, to foreclose their mortgage, making the same defendants.
All the mortgagees in each of these mortgages, the first, or Palmer; the second, or Bronson and Soutter; and in the Land Grant, or Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, were citizens of the State of New York, and were entitled, therefore, to sue, as they did sue, their mortgagor company in the Federal courts.
In 1860, the District Court, in a creditor’s suit in favor of one Howard against the old company, appointed Hans Crocker receiver of the whole road and rolling stock, and he entered into possession under this appointment. In the Western Division foreclosure suit, the same person was appointed receiver of the Western Division and rolling stock pertaining thereto; and afterwards, in the Eastern Division suit, an order was made appointing him also receiver of the road from Milwaukie to La Crosse, and all the rolling stock and franchises, “ subject, nevertheless, to a previous order o court appointing him to be the receiver of the western portion of said road, from Portage City to La Crosse.”
The two foreclosure suits—of the Land Grant on the Western Division, and of the second mortgage on the Eastern-—progressed in the District Court to final decrees, and e
Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 615
orders and. proceedings were as follows, the judge who made them having delivered an opinion that the rolling stock was a fixture of the road:
ORDERS OF REFERENCE.
(March 11, 1861.)
WESTERN DIVISION CAUSE. EASTERN DIVISION CAUSE.
“That the masters ascertain and “That the masters ascertain and report the whole amount of rolling report the whole amount of rolling stock on the road, and that they spe- stock on the whole road, and that cify the quantity thereof that is co- they specify the quantity thereof that vered by and included in this mort- is covered by and included in the first gage, and also in the first and second mortgage, and also in this mortgage, mortgages respectively.” and in the mortgage of Bronson,
Soutter, and Knapp’ ’ [i. e., the Land Grant mortgage, or mortgage on the Western Division].
REPORTS OF MASTERS. (September 1, 1861.)
WESTERN DIVISION CAUSE. EASTERN DIVISION CAUSE.
“We have ascertained the whole “We have ascertained the whole amount of rolling stock cn the whole amount of rolling stock on the whole road at the cost price. The amount road. The amount thereof, at the thereof was, at the date of the filing cost price, was, at the date of filing of the bill in this cause, $569,635.78; the bill of complaint in this cause, and an additional amount of $53,600 $569,635.78; and an additional has been purchased since the filing of
amount of $53,600 has been pur-
this bill, making the whole amount
chased since the filing of the bill,
to $623,235.78.
making the whole amount now on
“ And we have ascertained and re- the road $623,235.78. port that of the said rolling stock, “And we have ascertained, and do forty box cars, amounting, at the cost
further report, that of the said roll-
price thereof, to $31,979.64, and num- ing stock, forty box cars, amounting, bered 330 [the numbers of forty cars
at the cost price thereof, to $31,979.64,
were here given, up to No. 408], &c., and numbered 330 [the numbers of are covered by and included in the forty cars were here given, the same mortgage executed to the complain- cars as mentioned in the left hand ants [Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp] column], &c., are covered by and in-as set forth in the bill, the said cars cluded in the mortgage of Bronson, having been purchased by the pro-
Soutter, and Knapp, and no other;
ceeds of a portion of the bonds to
and all the remainder of the said roll-
which this mortgage is collateral;
ing stock is covered by and included
and all the remainder of the said roll-
in the first mortage upon the said
lng stock is covered by and included
railroad, and in the complainants’ p. 616616 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct
in the first [i. e., the Calmer] mort- mortgage specified in the bill of comgage upon the said railroad, and in plaint.” the mortgage upon the said railroad executed to Bronson and Soutter on the 17th day of August, A. D. 1857.”
These reports, therefore, which found the amount and cost of the rolling stock, gave forty cars, designated by numbers, to the Western Division and to the Land Grant mortgage, and the residue to the Eastern Division and the mortgagees of it. The complainants in both suits were apparently dissatisfied. The parties seeking to foreclose on the Eastern Division wanted not only all that the masters gave them, but the forty cars that were allowed to the Western Division ; while the parties seeking to foreclose on the Western Division wanted not only the forty cars allowed them, but all the other rolling stock; with some exceptions which they stated. The respective complainants accordingly filed
EXCEPTIONS TO THE MASTERS’ REPORTS.
WESTERN DIVISION CAUSE. EASTERN DIVISION CAUSE.
“4th. For that the masters have ‘ ‘ For that the masters have certicertified that all the rolling stock on fied that of the rolling stock forty said road (except forty box cars, box cars, amounting, at the cost price which are specially named in their thereof, to $31,999.64, and numbered report) was covered by and included in 330, 332, &c., &c., are covered by and the first mortgage upon the said rail- included in the mortgage to Bronson, road, and in the mortgage upon the said Soutter, and Knapp, and no other; railroad executed to Bronson and Sout- whereas, the said masters should have ter, bearing date on the 17th day of certified that the said rolling stock was covered by and included in the mortgage
August, A. D. 1857.
“Whereas, the masters ought to of the complainants in this action. have certified that all the rolling stock on said road (except that purchased by the receiver since the commencement of this suit, amounting to the sum of $53,600) was covered by and included in the mortgage given to the said complainants, and described in the bill of complaint in this cause; and that said mortgage was a first and prior lien on said rolling stock, superior to all other liens;
and that, as to the rolling stock purchased by said receiver above mentioned, 105-200ths thereof was covered by the mortgage described in the complaint; and that, to that extent, the complainants’ said mortgage was a first lien thereon.”
The court, having heard the parties, made the following
ORDERS ON THE EXCEPTIONS.
WESTERN DIVISION CAUSE. EASTERN DIVISION CAUSE.
“Ordered, that the fourth exception “Ordered, that the report of the of complainants be overruled, except masters, allowing forty box cars to as to the forty box cars which are co- be covered by the Land Grant mortvered by this mortgage. gage of said company to Bronson, “ And further ordered, that on said Soutter, and Knapp, be confirmed. exception the said report be so modi- “And that the said report be so fied that all the other stock that was on modified that all the other rolling said road when the receiver was ap- stock that was on said road when the pointed, except the said forty box cars, receiver was appointed, except the w covered by and included in the First said forty box cars, is covered by and Mortgage of the road from Milwaukie included in the first mortgage of the to Portage City; and that all the roll- said company from Milwaukie to ing stock on said road that has been Portage City. purchased or procured since the court “ And that all the rolling stock on has held possession by its receiver, said road that has been purchased or costing $147,943.62, be applied to the procured since the court has had posswlfirst'mortgage and the mortgage in session by its receiver, be applied pro this bill, in proportion to the net reve- rata, in proportion to the revenues nues on such portions of the road of the road, to the first said mortgage said mortgages respectively covered, and the said Land Grant mortgage.” since the appointment of the receiver.”
In January, 1862, final decrees of foreclosure and sale were made in both causes, as well the one relating to the Eastern Division, as the other relating to the Western.
In the Western Division, the decree says:
“ The description of the property authorized to be sold under and by virtue of this decree, so far as the same can be ascerained from the mortgage above referred to, or from the bill of complaint in this cause, is as follows, viz. (Here follows the p. 618618 Minn es ota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
description of premises quoted from the mortgage.) “ With forty-box cars, numbered 330, &c. (the numbers being all set out), and such portion or share of rolling stock purchased and procured by the receiver, costing one hundred and forty-seven thousand nine hundred and forty-two dollars and sixty-three cents, as the net revenues of the portion of road covered by this mortgage bears to the balance or other end of the road since the appointment of the receiver. The remaining rolling stock is subject to prior mortgages.”'1’^
In the Eastern Division cause, the Bronson and Soutter mortgage, the decree quoted the description of the premises from that mortgage, as given before, but added no direction to sell any rolling stock.
After the decree in the Western Division cause, the marshal advertised that division, and also all the rolling stock on the whole road; the forty box cars, and the proportion of rolling stock purchased by the receiver, mentioned in the decree, to be sold absolutely; and the remaining rolling stock “ subject to prior mortgages.” The sale took place as advertised,—two persons, Pratt and White, citizens of Wisconsin, becoming the nominal purchasers. The sale as made, that is to say, with the remaining rolling stock sold, “ subject to prior mortgages,” was reported to the District Court, and confirmed by that court as reported. Nothing, however, in the record showed specifically, that the attention of the court was called to the fact that the marshal had attempted to .sell the whole rolling stock. After the confirmation of this sale, Pratt and White organized—as under the laws of Wisconsin it was lawful for them to do—the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company; sometimes for brevity called the St. Paul Company, simply; and this company applied by petition to the District Court, in the Land Grant case, showing the purchase by Pratt and White at the foreclosure sale, the organization by them of said company, and asserting that this company had acquired the right to work t e
•____ p. 619Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 619
*
This sentence in italics and between the indices—or the exact orm of it—was the cause of one main difficulty in the case.
Eastern Division as well as the Western, and to exercise all the franchises of the debtor company, “in running, operating, and controlling said railroad in its entire length, from the city of Milwaukie to the city of La Crosse, and that such right so to run, operate, manage, and control the same, is prior and superior to the rights of any of the defendants in this cause, and prior and superior to the rights of the mortgagees in the mortgage to said Bronson and Soutter, on the Eastern Division, under which said Crocker is acting as receiver, inasmuch as the said mortgage to the said complainants is prior in date and lien to the mortgage to said Bronson and Soutter.”
Upon this petition the court, May 7th, 1863, made an order, directing the receiver to deliver to the St. Paul Railway Company, the Western Division of said railroad and appurtenances between Portage City and La Crosse, “and th rolling stock and property specially described in the decree and ordered that the receiver take perfect inventory of all rolling stock other than the forty box cars specially mentioned in the decree, and of all personal property belonging to the debtor company, and report the same to the court.
On the 12th of June, 1863, the court made orders in the two causes, as follows,—the reasons for them being stated by the judge who made them, to be a duty which the court owed alike “to the public and the parties, to secure the use of a continuous route without interruption or deviation of trade w travel between the termini,” Milwaukie and La Crosse.
WESTERN DIVISION CAUSE.
EASTERN DIVISION CAUSE.
‘ On consideration of the petition
After reciting the petition of the
of the Milwaukie and St. Paul Rail-
St. Paul Co., &c. &c.,
way Company, it is ordered by the
“Ordered by the court, that the
court that there be delivered over to order appointing a receiver in this t e said company, all and singular
case be modified in the manner fol-
“e railroad between the city of La
lowing, subject to any further or other
rosse and Portage City, its road- order rescinding, altering, or modifying
and track, with its depots, station
this order now here made: That the
owes, engine houses, and all other
receiver let the said Milwaukie and
property belonging to said railroad
St. Paul Railway Company into the
Statement
between the said points; and the forty box cars mentioned and de scribed in the decree.
“And also the share or proportion of the rolling stock and personal property purchased by the receiver, as mentioned in the decree.
“ And also, subject to other or previous liens or claims, the possession of the rolling stock on hand when the receiver took the same under the order of the court.
“And it is further ordered by the court, that the said receiver be and hereby is discharged as such from the management and control of the said Western Division of said railroad under the appointment in this case, subject, however, to the final settlement of his accounts, and subject to the orders made or to be made in this case, and in the other cases in which he was appointed or may hereafter be appointed.”
of the case.
possession of the Eastern Division of - the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad from Portage City to Milwaukie, with the appurtenances and property and rolling stock thereto belonging. And that the said railway company, subject to the further order or orders of the said court, operate said Eastern Division of said railroad in connection with the said Western Division thereof, so that one continuous line of railroad between La Crosse and Milwaukie may be operated and conducted as directed in the original charter of the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Co., without hindrance, interruption, or diversion, the same as if the whole line of road continued to be in one company, in pursuance of said charter, and not otherwise.”
[The St. Paul Company was ordered to let the receiver see the accounts continually; keep the Eastern Division and its rolling stock in order; pay over to the receiver, at stated times, balances, &c., and give bond to abide orders, &c.]
Under these orders of June 12,1863, all the rolling stock of the whole road was delivered to the St. Paul Company, who, in consequence, took a general control of all things.
The orders in the Eastern Division cause were brought before this court, December, 1863, and declared void, as having been made after a statute had taken away from the District Court the powers which in making them it exercised. Still, however, the St. Paul Company kept possession; and a new line of railroad having been made between Milwaukie and Portage City, by way of Watertown (see diagram at page 610), it was obvious that it might carry business and trave through from La Crosse to Milwaukie completely well an yet ruin the Minnesota Company in the process.
*
Bronson v. La Crosse Railroad, 1 Wallace, 405.
Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 621
This last-named company now filed a bill on the equity side of the Federal court for Wisconsin, in which, or in the predecessor in law of which, the Land Grant mortgage had been foreclosed against the St. Paul Company,—White and Pratt the purchasers, and Soutter and Knapp (Bronson being dead), to have matters rectified, as it conceived, both generally and particularly.
The bill set forth the different mortgages, the foreclosure of that of Barnes, the Minnesota Company’s now ownership, thereunder, of the equity of redemption of all the road, rolling stock, and franchises of the old La Crosse and Milwaukie Company, the foreclosure of the Land Grant mortgage (stating that the Minnesota Company had not answered, though made defendants therein), the marshal’s sale and confirmation of it, as already mentioned. It alleged that the Land Grant mortgage left unmortgaged over half a million of dollars in value of this rolling stock, that the decree of the court did not order it to be sold, and that the District Court only placed it in possession of the St. Paul Railway Company, as it did the Eastern Division of the road, for the purpose of enabling that company to run the road from Milwaukie to La Crosse as one road. That notwithstanding this, the Milwaukie and St. Paul Company were building and would soon complete a railway from Milwaukie, by way of Watertown, to Portage City (see again the diagram at page 610), independent of and to be used in competition with the said Eastern Division, now owned by the Minnesota Company, complainants in the bill; that they gave out that, by the purchase of Pratt and Wliite, and subsequent organization, they had acquired a right to separate and disconnect the said railroad from Portage City to La Crosse from the said Eastern Division from Portage City to Milwaukie, and on the completion of the road by Watertown would transfer the rolling stock from the Eastern Division to this southern connecting line; and by so connecting Milwaukie and La Crosse and diverting the rolling stock, render the roadbed of the Eastern Division wholly useless until restocked, which could he done only at great expense; all this being in fraud p. 622622 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
of the rights of the Minnesota Company and to their great and irremediable injury.
It stated the character of these two foreclosures, that of the Land Grant on the Western Division, and of the second or Bronson and Soutter mortgage on the Eastern Division, as follows:
“ Your orator shows that in the suit to foreclose the mortgage upon the Western Division, no persons or corporations were made parties defendant, except those having or claiming to have an interest in the said Western Division; and that in the suit commenced to foreclose the mortgage upon the Eastern Division, no persons or corporations were made parties, except those having or claiming to have some interest in the said Eastern Division; and that in neither of the said suits did the said complainants therein pray or claim any relief as against the complainants in the other suit; but the said two foreclosure suits were in all respects, and in every particular, separate and independent suits, as the respective mortgages, which they respectively were exhibited to foreclose, were separate and distinct mortgages upon separate and distinct premises.
“ Your orator further shows that neither the said mortgage upon the Western Division, nor the said mortgage upon the Eastern Division, pretended to specify or particularly describe the amount of rolling stock intended to be thereby conveyed; and that in neither of the suits commenced to foreclose said respective mortgages, did the bill of complaint pretend to enumerate or describe the precise rolling stock, or amount of rolling stock included or intended to be included in and conveyed by the mortgage which it was exhibited to foreclose, or which belonged thereto at the time said bill was exhibited. But your orator, as owner of the equity of redemption of the said Western Division, and the rolling stock and franchises pertaining thereto, was made a party defendant to the said bill of complaint, which was exhibited to foreclose the said mortgage on the Western Division; and your orator in the said Western Division mortgage foreclosure suit, and as against the complainants in that suit, was the owner of and entitled to reserve, claim and have all t e railroad rolling stock and franchises which had belonged to sai debtor company, except that which was included in and encum bered by the said Western Division mortgage. And your orator, p. 623Dec, 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 623
as the owner of the equity of redemption of the said Eastern Division, and rolling stock and franchises pertaining thereto, was made a party defendant to the bill of complaint in the suit commenced to foreclose the said Eastern Division mortgage; and in that suit, and as against the complainants in that suit, your orator was the owner of and entitled to claim, reserve and have all the railroad, rolling stock and franchises, which had belonged to the said debtor company, except that which was encumbered by and included in the Eastern Division mortgage.”
The bill also charged that no proceedings had ever been had in the Land Grant cause or otherwise, to ascertain the relative proportions, of the net earnings of the Eastern and Western Divisions, so as to determine what proportion of the rolling stock purchased by the receiver passed under the Land Grant sale; that the St. Paul Company, being in possession of the whole road and rolling stock, claimed ownership of all the rolling stock, or nearly all, and were asserting title and employing their possession, to the great injury of the Minnesota Company.
It has been already mentioned that Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, the mortgagees in the Land Grant mortgage (as in fact was the case with all the mortgagees), were citizens of New York; they therefore properly foreclosed their mortgage, in which corporations of Wisconsin were the parties in interest as defendants, in the Federal court. The present bill, however, being filed by the Minnesota Company, a corporation of Wisconsin, against the St. Paul Railway Company, another corporation of that same State, and against White and Pratt, citizens of it, as well as against Soutter and Knapp, survivors, stood on a different ground. As an original bill, it would plainly have not lain, under the rules which regulate this subject in the Federal courts.
The bill accordingly represented itself as “ supplemental” to the Land Grant foreclosure bill, and claimed the benefit of the proceedings in that cause; praying that the Minnesota ompany might be decreed to be the owner of all the rolling 8 ock on the road at the time of the appointment of the receiver, except the said forty box cars; that an account p. 624624 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the appellee.
might be taken to ascertain the relative net earnings of the two divisions; and that thereupon, according to the principle of, and basis fixed by said Land Grant decree, it might be adjudged and definitely determined and declared by this court what proportion of rolling stock purchased by the receiver really and equitably belonged to the Minnesota Company and to the St. Paul Company respectively; and that a separation of said stock purchased by the receiver might be ordered, or that it should be sold, and the avails paid over to the respective companies according to their proportions. It prayed also a proper allowance for rent for the use of their rolling stock on the Western Division, and that the avails might be applied to the interest due on the mortgage. It prayed finally an injunction on the appointment of a receiver, and for other and general relief.
To this bill the St. Paul Company demurred, assigning for cause, want of jurisdiction, want of equity, &c., the fact that the bill was not supplemental, and that the parties were citizens of the same State. The court below having sustained the demurrer, two questions were now presented here:
1. Was this bill, in any sense, supplemental or ancillary, so that it could attach itself to the original proceeding, and thus, according to the practice of the Federal court, be entertained; though in itself and independently,—from want of proper and differing citizenship in the parties,—not capar ble of being thus treated.
2. If it was, did the complainant present any case calling for equitable relief?
Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, for the appellee.
I. As to the Jurisdiction. The complainant is a corporation organized under the laws of Wisconsin and situated in t at State. The St. Paul Railway Company, one of the defen ants, is in like manner a corporation of that State, and Pra and White, and other defendants, are also citizens of m consin. It is obvious that from want of proper citizens ip in the parties, the suit cannot be maintained in the Fe era p. 625Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 625
Argument for the appellee.
court as an original suit. The appellant accordingly relies on the subject-matter of his bill—its character as a supplemental bill—to bring the case within the jurisdiction. Is the bill then a supplemental bill. Plainly not, we think. It does not seek to alter or reverse the original decree; to add to or vary it. It states a new cause of action. It asserts that the St. Paul Railway Company has been guilty of trespass or conversion of certain personal property which the complainant owns, and that it sets up a claim to that property and to the Eastern Division of the La Crosse Railroad, which pretence and claim the complainant insists is unfounded. It therefore asks the aid of the court, in effect, Jirst, to declare, settle, and quiet its title to said property; second, to have a settlement and compensation by way of damages; and, lastly, that the wrong-doer shall be restrained in future. Are not the grievances for which remedy is here asked, the subject of original bill—all of them ? The fact that the St. Paul Railway Company was formed by the purchasers at a sale under a decree of the United States court, does not make the company a ward of that court. The company has no special privileges there, and owes that court no peculiar allegiance. John Doe, of Wisconsin, might have committed the same wrongs against the complainant that are alleged against this defendant. Would it in that case be contended that he could be punished, or that those wrongs could be redressed except by an original suit ? If by an original suit, confessedly, on account of the citizenship of the parties, it could not be in the Federal court. So in this case. If the St. Paul Company have no title to this rolling stock, as the complainant alleges, it is liable to an action at law for the taking.*
The pleader has, indeed, styled his bill a “ supplemental” p. 626626 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct
*
Mr. Cary stated as an incidental fact in the controversy, that the complainant had brought an action of trespass on the case for this property in t e Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin, which was now pending ere; an action not against the St. Paul Company, because the citizenship ® t e companies would not allow that, but against certain non-resident sectors of that company, who had directed the taking. vol. n. 4q
Argument for the appellee.
one; but styling it supplemental, does not make it so; nor is it a “supplemental bill” when tested by any of the definitions which settle the different sorts of equity bills, or when compared with any precedents in books of equity pleadings. The court is, of course, familiar with and will apply them. By settled equity practice, a defendant in an original suit cannot prosecute a supplemental bill. Such a bill can be brought only by the complainant, or by those who stand in his place. Moreover, by equity practice, a supplemental bill cannot be entertained in any case where the decree in the original action has been completely executed, which this decree has been; for the foreclosure suit is ended: Bronson, Soutter and Knapp have performed fully their writ. There can be no supplemental action to a thing which has been completely finished. In short, such a use of equity mechanism as it is here attempted to make, we venture to assert would never have been thought of by counsel possessed of less resources and devotion to his clients than the able one—subtle, bold, and strong alike—opposed to us.
Again. The St. Paul Railway Company, and Pratt and White, are new parties; they have never litigated this question; consequently, as to them, the bill is original, and the court cannot take jurisdiction. The point we here make was raised in a very early case in this court.* Certain aliens had obtained judgment against a citizen of Georgia, and proceedings had been instituted on the equity side of the court to reach his property in the hands of several parties, and a decree entered directing its sale. Subsequently a supplemental bill was filed against Elizabeth Course to reach property in her hands. The supplemental bill did not describe her as a citizen of the State of Georgia. In the Supreme Court it was objected that the court had not jurisdiction as to her for that reason. And in answer to this objection, counsel, in support of the bill, said, aryw^0; t is not necessary to describe the parties in the supplements suit, which is merely an incident of the original bill, an
Argument for the appellee.
must be brought in the same court.” But the court held the objection well taken, and reversed the decree. In Cross v. De Valle* the same doctrine was recognized no longer ago than the last term.
II. Ms to merits. There are certain facts inferable enough from the case as stated; facts, not in any way denied by the bill, and which go far to settle the question. They are thus:
The La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company was but one corporation, had but one legal existence, and as one entity, owned all its property, both real and personal. Moreover, it was originally chartered to build, and in fact did build, but one line of road, that from Milwaukie to La Crosse; and at the time when the receiver took possession, the road so built was used and worked, and always had been used and worked, as one “through” and continuous line of road; all belonging to one company and all belonging in the same right. All of the company’s rolling stock was purchased for and owned by this unit company, and it was all purchased for and used on the entire length of road without any division or separation. It is not alleged in the bill—and truth would be violated if it were—that there was ever any division of the road for any purpose whatever, except that the company, for convenience of raising funds, made their first mortgage of the east 95 miles, and subsequently mortgaged the west 105.
The general unity and entirety of the road is admitted; and the fact that a railway company’s rolling stock is common to its whole line, and does not belong to a particular part thereof, is a matter of common observation and knowledge, of which the court will take notice, as the common rule in all cases of a continuous and unit way.
Now, all the mortgages cover in express terms the rolling stock of the road. The language in each mortgage is much the same, literally. In spirit and legal effect it is all the same, exactly. There can be no doubt that the descriptions
628 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the appellee.
were copied the one from the other, and that in making the several mortgages the same identical rolling stock was intended to be conveyed, to wit, the rolling stock of the La Crosse and Milwaukie Company used on its road.* The argument of the other side must assume, of necessity, that the rolling stock of this one great company—this integer and unit route — was divided and subdivided; clamped down and affixed to meted and bounded parts; to parts, rather, fractured and severed from a proper whole. How can this assumption be truly made in the case of a great “through route,” worked rapidly, night and day, with “Lightning” and “ Express” as with other trains,—where speed and “ no change of cars” is an object of first importance ? How can you—in the case of a road two hundred miles in length, a road which is one of the great roads of the Continent, one on which rolling stock must, of course, be used in values of hundreds of thousands of dollars—assert that but forty box cars belong to its Western and largest division, while all the rest are attached as a fixture fastened down immovably to its Eastern ? Can counsel tell us how these forty box cars, without a single locomotive, are propelled ? Or in what way, with no rolling stock but the forty box cars themselves, the mighty traffic of this road, giving, as a former ease exhibits, $800,000 of receipts,! is’ carried on with expedition and success ? Certainly, we are to observe the language of the mortgage deeds; but we are not to strangle all justice and sense in the meshes of a technicality as unmeaning as verbose.
We, therefore, insist,—
1st. That each one of these several mortgages covered and included all the rolling stock belonging to the La Crosse an Milwaukie Company, and which had been procured tor o p. 629Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v.- St. Paul Co. 629
*
Mr. Cary stated, as a fact in the case, and one which, he observed, was inferable enough from the language of the Land Grant mortgage itse, that at the time it was executed no part of the line of road described in i was built. The rolling stock mortgaged could, he thus argued, app y 0 n stock but that in use on the Eastern Division. f See supra, p. 514.
Argument for the appellee.
used on said railroad from Milwaukie to La Crosse; and that there is no sufficient ground to say that it is a fixture to any specific portion.
2d. That these several mortgages became a lien upon the said rolling stock from the date of their execution, and that said liens have priority now in the order of time of their execution.
3d. That the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company, after giving these mortgages, cannot dispute the right of any one of the mortgagees to all of this rolling stock; and as the mortgage to Barnes is made subject to the other mortgages, the Minnesota Company stands in no better position than would the La Crosse Company; and is, therefore, estopped to dispute our title.
We, therefore, infer, and, inferring, insist that the question before the court below was one—not of the extent of the Land Grant mortgage—but one of the priority of liens. Viewed as we thus view the matter, the expression of the decree of sale, which in the statement of the case (p. 618) is signalized by index hands, and which has been the subject of different constructions,—■“ the remaining rolling stock is subject to prior liens,”—becomes both clear and reasonable. The history of the case, then, stands thus: The court below made its decree of foreclosure and sale in the Land Grant case, and directed a sale of all the rolling stock on the road, as described in that mortgage. After giving the description as contained in that mortgage, and especially describing this portion, which, by the reference to masters, the Land Grant had been found to be a first lien upon, it followed this with the adjudication that “ the remaining rolling stock is subject to prior mortgages.” It made, in other words, a decree to sell all the rolling stock specially described, free from incumbrance; for the court had decreed that, as to that, our mortgage was a first lien, and all the remainder of the rolling stock subject to incumbrances prior in date. Thus understanding it the marshal proceeded. His advertisement °r sale so expressly stated it. The sale was so made, and reported to the District Court, setting forth that the portion p. 630630 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the appellee.
of rolling stock specially named was sold free from all incumbrance, and all the remainder subject to the lien of prior mortgages. The sale was afterwards, on hearing, confirmed as made. The deed of the marshal to the purchaser, and from the purchaser to the St. Paul Railway Company, was of the property as sold. Can any history be more plain, more probable or apparently just? We think not; and we add that none can be more conclusive. The court must perfectly have known whether the marshal had rightly understood and rightly executed its decrees of sale; and by confirming the sale, it declares that he had rightly done both; rightly understood as well as rightly executed them.
But even if the court—in originally making the order of sale, and at the time when it made them—did not mean that this other rolling stock should be sold, “ subject to prior mortgages,” but meant, on the contrary, that it should be excluded from sale altogether as being the subject of other mortgage ownerships—admitting this for argument’s sake, the only way in which we admit it at all—what is the effect, in law, of the marshal’s action, subsequent to the orders, upon the property, his return of that action to the court, and the court’s confirmation of it? The case thus supposed is this: The court gives the marshal an ambiguous order; an order capable of two interpretations. The marshal reads it in one way, one natural enough; and proceeds, on this interpretation, to execute it. He reports to the court exactly how he has executed it; and the court, in form, confirms his act. We say nothing about the immense weight which this act of the court, in confirming the order as the marshal interpreted and executed it, has in showing what the court meant originally. That point, for argument’s sake, we have here abandoned. We are here arguing as to the effect of an interpretation subsequent to and confessedly different from the original. Why may not such a train of thought as this have passed perfectly well through the court’s mind ? “ The marshal, it seems, has misunderstood us. But we did not express ourselves well. His mistake was natural. Our language may mean either of two things,—what the marshal assumed us to p. 631Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 631
mean, as well as or better than anything else. Moreover, on reflection, we see that for the true interests of all parties, and for the public interests also, it is best that we should have meant this. We will ratify the marshal’s interpretation, and so affix the meaning which others have taken as the most natural, and which we ourselves now think would have been the best, had we expressed it.” What is there unjudicial, or in any way irregular, in a mental process such as this? What the court did mean was in its own breast; in petto wholly. No record is violated; nor anything done but simply interpret an obscure sentence. And if such a process was had, is there not an end of the question? That the operation was had, seems proved by what the court finally did; by the fact, to wit, that in the orders of June 12th, 1863, it did deliver the whole rolling stock to the St. Paul Company, “ subject,” in effect, only to “ prior mortgages;” precisely, in fact, as if it had originally meant, that it should thus be sold. Such is our case.
Under this order, subsequently so made, the St. Paul Railway Company took possession of the Western Division, of the forty box cars, of their proportion of the rolling stock purchased by the receiver, and also of all the rolling stock on the road when the receiver took possession of the same as purchaser. That said division, the forty box cars and the proportion so purchased by the receiver, they took free and clear from all incumbrances. As to the residue of the rolling stock, they took it, they admit, subject to mortgages previously given by the La Crosse and Milwaukie Company; the “prior mortgages” of the decree of sale. They have ever since so held and do now hold it, as they suppose; and they submit that the appellant is not at liberty to question their title so here asserted.
Carpenter, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question raised by the demurrer relates to jurisdiction.
632 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
For the purposes of this question we are to take the facts set up by the bill [his Honor had stated the main ones] and demurred to, as true, and consider whether they make a case for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the District of "Wisconsin, which has become successor of the District Court in that district.
The present suit grows immediately out of and is a necessity which arises from the suit, by Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, to foreclose the Land Grant mortgage; under the decree in which suit the Western Division of the La Crosse and Milwaukie Road was sold, and also all the rolling stock of the company belonging to both divisions, to the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company. The present suit is really a continuation of that one. The rights of the parties depend upon the construction which is placed upon the acts of the court in it; and the present bill is necessary in order to have a declaration of what was intended by the orders and decrees made in that suit, and to enforce the rights which were established by it.
The road and rolling stock, which are the subject-matter of this controversy, were placed in the hands of a receiver in the progress of that suit; and he was in possession of the rolling stock when, by an order of the District Court, made June 12, 1863, in that suit, and a similar order of the same date, in another suit, it was all delivered to the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company.
At the last term of this court,* we decided that, by the act creating the Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin, the District Court lost its power to make such orders, an that they were void. The consequence of this ruling is, t at in contemplation of law, this property is still in the han s of the receiver of the court. If in the hands of the receiver of the Circuit Court, nothing can be plainer than that any litigation for its possession must take place in that com, without regard to the citizenship of the parties.] Lt been taken illegally from the custody of the receivei, it is p. 633Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 633
*
equally clear that the court has not lost thereby the jurisdiction over the property, or the right to determine where it shall go; so far as that right is involved in that suit. This is the very object of this bill, and it is rendered all the more necessary by that which the court has done, as well as that which it has failed to do. In the case of Randall v. Howard,* these principles are fully stated as applicable to a proceeding in a State court, and are given as reasons why the Federal court would not interfere; although the parties had the right, so far as citizenship could give it, to litigate in the courts of the United States.
It is objected that the present bill is called a supplemental bill, and is brought by a defendant‘in the original suit, which is said to be a violation of the rules of equity pleading; and that the subject-matter, and the new parties made by the bill, are not such as can properly be brought before the court by that class of bills.
But we think that the question is not whether the proceeding is supplemental and ancillary or is independent and original, in the sense of the rules of equity pleading; but whether it is supplemental and ancillary or is to be considered entirely new and original, in the sense which this court has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal courts from that of the State courts. No one, for instance, would hesitate to say that, according to the English chancery practice, a bill to enjoin a judgment at law, is an original bill in the chancery sense of the word. Yet this court has decided many times, that when a bill is filed in the Circuit Court, to enjoin a judgment of that court, it is not to be considered as an original bill, but as a continuation of the proceeding at law; so much so, that the court will proceed in the injunction suit without actual service of subpoena on the defendant, and though he e a oitizen of another State, if he were a party to the judgment at law. The case before us is analogous. An unjust vantage has been obtained by one party over another by
* 2 Black, 585.
634 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
a perversion and abuse of the orders of the court, and the party injured comes now to the same court to have this abuse corrected, and to carry into effect the real intention and decree of the court, and that while the property which is the subject of contest is still within the control of the court and subject to its order.
It is objected that Pratt and White and the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company were not parties to that suit, and cannot therefore be compelled to yield their right to litigate with a citizen of Wisconsin in the courts of that State.
Pratt and Wliite are mere nominal parties, who were the agents and attorneys of the corporators composing the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company, and purchased the property at the marshal’s sale for them. They and the company may both be considered as purchasers at that sale; and it is in their character of purchasers, and on account of the possession which they obtained on petition of the company, and the rights they claim under that purchase, that they are now brought before the court. If the court has jurisdiction of the matters growing out of that sale, and order of possession, as we have already shown that it has, then it has jurisdiction to that extent of these parties without regard to their citizenship. It would, indeed, be very strange if these parties can come into court by a petition, and get possession of that which was the subject of litigation, and then when the wrong they have done by that proceeding is to be corrected, they shall be permitted to escape by denying that they were par ties to the suit. In the case of Blossom v. The Milwaukie a Chicago Railroad Company,* this matter was fully discusse >, and it was there held, that a purchaser or bidder at a master s sale, subjected himself quoad hoc to the jurisdiction o e court, and became so far a party to the suit by the mere ac of making a bid, that he could appeal from any subsequen order of the court affecting his interest, f
* 1 Wallace, 635. Suits in f De la Plaine v. Lawrence, 10 Paige, 602; Calvert on Par les Equity, pages 51, 58, and note to page 61.
Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 635
The objection to the jurisdiction must therefore be over - ruled.
We next proceed to inquire whether the bill makes a case calling for relief.
This involves the consideration of the mortgage of complainants in the original suit, and of several orders and decrees of the District Court, all of which are the subject of conflicting constructions by the parties and their counsel.
In reference to the roadbed which is covered by these various mortgages, there is no diversity of opinion; but in reference to the rolling stock, it is contended by appellees that these several mortgages were successive liens on all the rolling stock of the company, and by appellant that they are liens only on the rolling stock belonging to, or in some way identified with, that part of the road included in each mortgage respectively. At first blush it would seem that in a road used continuously as one road, there could be no such definite relation between any particular division of the road and any particular portion of the stock. But as it was competent for the company which owned all the road and all the stock to assign certain stock to one division, and certain other stock to the other division, when the roads were divided for the purpose of making mortgages, we cannot assume as a fact that there was no such allotment of the rolling stock; but must look to the language of the mortgages themselves, to see if any such intention is expressed. If it is not, then obviously the other view prevails, and the mortgages are successive liens on the whole stock.
The language in the descriptive part of the Palmer mortgage, and that in the corresponding part of the mortgage on e Western Division, when considered in reference to the ro stock alone, may not be free from doubt as to its construction.* But when we consider it in reference to the clear purpose of the parties to make the mortgages distinct, and erent as to everything else conveyed by them, we con-Bee them con-columned, at page 611; the former in the right column, flatter in the left.-REP.
636 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
elude that it was intended that the rolling stock covered by each mortgage was that which was properly appurtenant to each particular division of the road.
It is not so important that we be right in this, however, as we are satisfied that the District Court in the foreclosure suit decided this question; and as that decision is in full force and unreversed, it must conclude the parties to the present suit, all of whom claim under the decree of the court.
The complainants in the original foreclosure suit made defendants of all the judgment creditors of the company who had liens subsequent to themselves, and made the Milwaukie and Minnesota Company defendant, who held under the subsequent mortgage to Barnes, with a view to cut off their equity of redemption; but they did not make defendants of Bronson and Soutter, who held a subsequent mortgage on the Eastern Division, and a subsequent lien on the rolling stock, which complainants would also desire. to extinguish, if they had believed it covered the same rolling stock which theirs did. By omitting these mortgagees they show their own construction that their mortgage, and that of Bronson and Soutter, did not cover the same stock; which could only be because it was appurtenant to the Eastern Division.
About the time that foreclosure suit was commenced, a suit was instituted in the same court to foreclose the second or Bronson and Soutter mortgage on the Eastern Division; but the holders of the Palmer mortgage were not made defendants to either suit. The two suits progressed pari passu to a final decree; but while the Western Division went to sale, an appeal stayed proceedings in the Eastern Division case, and no sale has yet been made under that decree. Very shortly after these suits were commenced, the court made an order of reference in each of them to masters in chancery, who were the same masters in both cases. These references were for the purpose of ascertaining the amounts due on the bonds, the amounts due certain judgment creditors, and the amount of rolling stock on the whole road, an the amount included in each mortgage. The language o
.•
the order of reference on this latter point in the original suit in this case is as follows:
“And it is further ordered that said masters ascertain and report the whole amount of rolling stock on the road, and that they specify the quantity thereof that is covered by this mortgage, also in the first and second mortgages respectively.”
The reference in the other case is in language almost identical.
Now it is argued that the object of this order was to ascertain and settle the priorities between these different mortgages. No such inference can be made from its language, for it says nothing about priorities in date, or superiority of lien. There was no occasion or reason for ascertaining: those priorities in that suit, for the respective parties were not before the court, and could not be bound by its decree. It would not even bind complainants, because there would be no mutuality in the estoppel. It is an impeachment of the legal attainments of the court and of the counsel to suppose that they would make a reference to a master to ascertain a fact which could have no influence on the suit, and if passed upon by the court, could affect nobody’s interest in the slightest degree.
But the language of the order clearly implies a different thing. The object is to ascertain, what is covered by one mortgage to the exclusion of the other; an object which had manifest pertinency to’the duty which the court was called upon to discharge. The judge who made these orders deivered an opinion at the trial, in which he decides that the lolling stock of a railroad is a fixture; and if we suppose im to have considered that which was mortgaged to Palmer and to Bronson and Soutter as a fixture on the Eastern Division, and that which was mortgaged to Bronson, Soutter, an Knapp, as a fixture on the Western Division, we have a cear idea of what he wished to ascertain, in view of the e^lees was to make in the two suits.
e have next the report of the masters on this subject, Ohisas follows:
638 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct
“We have also ascertained the whole amount of rolling stock on the whole road at the cost price. The amount thereof was, at the date of the filing of the hill of complaint in this cause, $569,635.78, and an additional amount of $53,600 has been purchased since the filing of the bill of complaint, making the whole amount $623,235.78.
“And we have ascertained, and do further report, that of the said rolling stock, forty box cars, amounting, at the cost price thereof, to thirty-one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine dollars and sixty-four cents, and numbered 330, &c. [giving the numbers], are covered by and included in the mortgage executed to the complainants as set forth in the bill of complaint in this cause, the said cars having been purchased, and by the proceeds of a portion of the bonds to which this mortgage is collateral; and all the remainder of the said rolling stock is covered by and included in the first mortgage upon the said railroad, and in the mortgage upon the said railroad executed to G. C. Bronson and J. T. Soutter, and bearing date on the seventeenth day of August, A. D. 1857.”
In the foreclosure suit of the Eastern Division, these same masters reported on the same day:
“We have ascertained and do further report, that of said rolling stock, forty box cars, amounting, at cost price thereof, to $31,979.64, and numbered 330, &c., are covered by and included in the mortgage of Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, and no other
and then adds, that the remaining rolling stock is covere by the mortgage to Palmer, and to Bronson and Soutter, that is, the mortgage on the Eastern Division.
It is impossible in examining these reports to doubt that the commissioners understood that they were directed to ascertain what rolling stock was covered by each mortgage, in order that only such might be sold under the decree in that case, and that they reported that of all the rolling stoc on the road, forty box cars alone were subject to the mo gage in the present case, and that all the other stock was subject to the mortgage in the other suit. At all even, p. 639Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 639
they were directed to ascertain what was subject to the mortgage in this suit, and they reported the forty box cars, and did not report any more. This much is beyond dispute from the language of the report in this case.
Counsel for complainant excepted to this report. His fourth exception is that instead of certifying as they did, the masters should have reported,
“ That all the rolling stock on said road was covered by and included in the mortgage given to said complainants, and described in their bill of complaint in this cause, and that said mortgage was a first and prior lien on said rolling stock superior to all other liens.”
This exception was overruled by the court, and the report of the masters confirmed so far as this branch of the subject is concerned.
We regard this as a judicial decision, that complainant’s mortgage did not cover the rolling stock which was covered by the previous mortgage to Palmer, and that it only covered the forty box cars, and such proportion of the rolling stock purchased by the receiver as the net earnings of the Western Division bears to the net earnings of the Eastern Division. This order modifying and confirming the report of the masters settled the rights of the parties, and by that de-
cision, they must stand until it is reversed on appeal, or set aside by some direct proceeding for that purpose. The final decree ordering the sale proceeds upon the same
view of the rights of the parties. After ordering a sale of the property mortgaged, and copying the language given in the mortgage as descriptive of what was mortgaged, the decree adds:
‘ With forty box cars, &c., and such portion or share of the r° ling stock purchased and procured by the receiver, costing 7,942.63, as the net revenues of the portion of the road covered by this mortgage bears to the balance or other end of e road, since the appointment of the receiver. The remaining
r° ling stock is subject to a prior mortgage.”
640 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
That is to say, having decided that what is covered by the other two mortgages is not covered by this; it is not subject to sale in this suit.
The marshal, however, who was directed to make the sale instead of a master commissioner, did sell all the rolling stock, and that sale was confirmed by the order of the District Court of May 5,1863.
It is too clear for argument, that a sale by the marshal, unauthorized by the decree, is without any validity. Does the order of the court confirming the sale make it valid?
Upon principle the question is by no means free from difficulty. We are clear that a sale without a decree to sustain it would be a nullity, and we doubt if a court can make it valid by a mere general order of confirmation. If, however, an issue had been made by exceptions or other proper pleading, as to the question whether any particular piece of property had been included in the decree, or order of sale, and the court had decided that it was so included, it might be an adjudication upon the construction of the decree which would bind the parties. Nothing of the kind occurred here. There is every reason, on the contrary, to believe, that the court had no suspicion that the marshal had sold more than the decree authorized.
On the 7th day of May, two days after the order of confirmation, the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company, presented their petition for the discharge of the receiver, and for possession of the property which they had purchased. The court thereupon made an order “that the receiver deliver over to said Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company, the said road and appurtenances between Portage City an La Crosse, and the rolling stock and property specially describe in the decree.” The only rolling stock specially described in the decree was the forty box cars, and the proportion o stock purchased by the receiver. The fact that this was ordered to be delivered to the purchasers and no more, is almost conclusive of two things: first, that the judge un er stood his decree and previous rulings as we have interpre e them; and, second, that he had no idea that he had con p. 641Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 641
firmed a sale of all the rolling stock on the road, to the purchasers at the sale. It is true that over a month later, he ordered the Eastern Division of the road and the remainder of the rolling stock into the possession of the same company, But this was done to enable them to run the whole road as a through route, on the principle of public policy, and that it was better for all parties concerned. This he declared in an opinion delivered at the time, and it is substantially indicated in the orders themselves.
In the light of these facts, we cannot give to the order of confirmation in this case the effect of making valid the marshal’s sale, however the rule might be on that subject in other cases. But we do not mean to intimate that in any case a sale by a marshal, or master in chancery, can be valid, when there is no decree to support it. Cases in this court* would seem to decide that it cannot.
The order of June 12, 1863, delivering possession of this property to the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company, has been declared by this court to be void for want of jurisdiction, and has been set aside by the court which made it. It therefore affords no support to defendants in this claim to the rolling stock in dispute.
We have thus examined with care and patience the mortgage, and the various orders and decrees of the District Court, on which the claim of the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company to the ownership of this property depends. There is in all of them some want of clearness and precision, including the mortgage itself. Before the court ordered the sale, it should have made clear all these ambiguities. It evidently attempted to do so, and we think if it has not in cases effected that purpose fully, it has furnished the criteria by which it can be done. And although the language of its orders is not always free from doubt, we have een able to satisfy ourselves of the court’s intentions.
The title of appellant is clear on the record, unless it has ~— .. ____
Shriver v. Lynn, 2 Howard, 43 ; Brignardello v. Gray, 1 Wallace, 627. vol. ii. 41 p. 642642 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
Nelson, Clifford, and Field, JJ., dissenting.
been divested by these proceedings. We think that they do not confer title to the rolling stock on the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company, nor divest the appellant, except as to the forty box cars, and the proportion of the stock purchased by the receiver, which the net earnings of the Western Division bore to the net earnings of the Eastern Division, and that they also decide that the mortgage under which they claim, did not include any more.
Order of the Circuit Court sustaining the demurrer to complainants’ bill, and the decree of the court dismissing it, reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice NELSON, in whose opinion concurred CLIFFORD and FIELD, JJ., dissenting.
The complainants in this bill, who set up a right to the equity of redemption in the Bronson and Soutter mortgage, insist that the whole of the rolling stock on the old La Crosse and Milwaukie Road, with a trifling exception, is subject to the lien of this mortgage on the Eastern Division, the foreclosure of which is pending; and that a proper allowance of rent for the use of it on the Western Division should be made, and the avails applied to the interest due on the mortgage; and further, that the question involved was litigated and so decided in the foreclosure suit on the mortgage of the Western Division.
We have looked into the position of the counsel for the complainants, and have come to the conclusion that it is not maintained. .
For aught that appears, all the rolling stock of the o company was purchased by it for the use and benefit o e whole of the road, out of the common funds of the company» and a lien was given upon it in each and all of the mo gages of that company on the two divisions, the Eastern an Western, and also upon it in the mortgage of the w o road to the complainants. These liens would take e ec as matters of law according to priority. Any other disposi ion p. 643Dec. 1864.] Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 643
Nelson, Clifford, and Field, JJ., dissenting.
of them would be unjust and in violation of good faith to the bondholders, for the security of the payment of whose bonds the mortgages were given.
The District Court, however, seems to have entertained the idea, that any of the rolling stock purchased by the proceeds of the bonds of a particular mortgage should be exclusively subject to the lien of that mortgage, and made a reference for this purpose; and on the coming in of the report, acting upon this idea, decided that some forty box cars purchased by the proceeds of the bonds of the first mortgage on the Western Division, should be sold and the proceeds applied exclusively to this mortgage, and that all the rest of the rolling stock on the road (meaning the whole road), when the receiver was appointed, was covered by the first mortgage of the road from Milwaukie to Portage (meaning the Palmer mortgage), and all purchased since the appointment of the receiver be applied to this first mortgage, and the mortgage in the bill of foreclosure, in the proportion therein mentioned.
The decree of foreclosure, after describing the property to be sold, and particularly the forty box cars and the share of the stock purchased since the appointment of the receiver, adds, “The remaining rolling stock is subject to prior mortgages.”
In the report of the sale by the marshal, he states, that he sold of the rolling stock the forty box cars, and the share of the stock purchased since the receiver was appointed, free and clear of all incumbrances; but the remainder of the rolling stock was sold, subject to the lien of mortgages prior m, ^ie lnortgage under which the sale was made. This report of the sale by the marshal was excepted to, but after argument the exceptions were overruled, and the sale confirmed, and although the complainants here were party e en<Iarits in that suit of foreclosure, no appeal was taken rom the decree of confirmation.*
e are °f opinion, therefore, that the question as to the p. 644644 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. [Sup. Ct.
*
Blossom v. Milwaukie, &c., R. R. Co., 1 Wallace, 666-7.
Nelson, Clifford, and Field, JJ., dissenting.
ownership or the liens upon the rolling stock in question were not adjudicated by the court below in the foreclosure suit on the mortgage upon the Western Division, and that the question is open for this court to determine.
We agree that the rolling stock upon this road covered by the several mortgages, and as respects any other valid liens upon the same, is inseparably connected with the road; in other words, is in technical language a fixture to the road, so far as in its nature and use it can be called a fixture. But it is a fixture extending over the entire track of the road from Milwaukie to La Crosse. It is not a fixture upon any particular division or portion; but attaches to every part and portion. It was purchased, as we have before said, for aught that appears, by the common funds of the old La Crosse and Milwaukie Company, and which were derived from its various resources,—subscriptions of stock, sale of bonds secured by mortgages, earnings of the road after a part or the whole line was fitted for the running of the cars; and the mortgages or other incumbrances on the road made by the old company, whether on a portion or on the whole line, take effect according to the priority of lien. These liens, so far as respects the rolling or moving stock, attach to them a right to have the cars run upon the road, upon its entire line, as the value of the lien depends upon this use of the property. The lien was acquired in contemplation of this use, for without it a mortgagee or lienholder of the commonest observation must have seen the security would be next to worthless. The great value of the road and rolling stock, as a security, consists in the use and operation of the same as a railroad line in the carriage of passengers and freight; it is the combined use maintained and enforced that enables the lien creditor to realize the security contemplate when the credit was given.
Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the mortgagees of e Eastern line have by virtue of the liens of their mortgages such an interest in the rolling stock, as to entitle them the appropriate use of it in running the road for the carriag of passengers and freight; and that the Milwaukie an
Note.
Paul Company, by reason of their tijle under the mortgage foreclosed on the Western Division, acquired the same right; and also, that the complainants by virtue of their title under the mortgage foreclosed, acquired a similar right, and that neither has acquired an exclusive right or title to any portion of the rolling stock. We say nothing as to the persons or parties who may be entitled to liens on their property, as these questions are not before us; nor the evidence that would enable us to determine the same, nor could they be determined under this bill. Our conclusion is that the decree below should be affirmed.
Note by the Reporter.
It will be seen in the foregoing report that one of the questions decided in the inferior court was, that rolling stock is a fixture. The question was argued in this court with ability on both sides. But though the decision here is not inconsistent with that idea, but on the contrary, as the reporter supposes, rather affirmative of it, the point was apparently one not necessary to be specifically passed upon, and is not discussed in the opinion. The matter is, however, one of such practical and ■ncreasing importance that the reporter supposes he will gratify Ao profession by giving in this collateral way an extract from ^ef of the appellant’s counsel, Mr. Carpenter, who endea-Tored to support the modern view.
Is Rolling Stock a Fixtube ?
fixture was early seized upon by legal writers to supply a deficiency in their technical terminology; but was not entirely reclaimed from popular use and fixed in that strictness and uniformity of meaning re-ti 81 n sc^en^c certainty; and as used by legal writers, it has, con-
a y fluctuated between a technical and a popular use. We have, to ore> many kinds of fixtures; and many exceptions and qualifications fsrent^ ^x^ure i® one thing between landlord and tenant; a dif ■ ^®t t ing between vendor and vendee; is one thing, in the economy of ftose ’ an°^er th® purposes of agriculture. Originally, the term denoted
Movable things which had become immovable by connection with the
Note.
freehold. But presently it came to mean those things, which although attached to the freehold, could, under certain circumstances, be removed. In its popular use it meant something affixed or fastened to the freehold; and in the early cases, and many of the later ones, we find the popular definition of the term sweeping everything before it. An article was held to be a fixture or not, from the presence or absence of a screw fastening it to the floor.
By the great majority of cases, ancient and modern, there is no doubt that a fastening was essential to constitute the thing in question a part of the freehold; and nothing kept in place by mere gravitation was held to be a fixture. It is not less true that from the first we have the doctrine of constructive annexation equally well established. In Liford's Case,* it is said to have been decided in the fourteenth year of Henry VIII, that a millstone, removed from a mill to be picked, was nevertheless constructively a part of the freehold, and passed by deed conveying the mill. In England, title deeds have been held to be fixtures; and deer in a park, and fish in a pond, to pass with the estate.
The right to remove articles as fixtures has been carried farther in favor of tenants and to encourage trade than in any other cases; yet this right has been somewhat limited; and it has been held that where an engine, in no way attached to the freehold, could not be removed without injury to the building in which it was set up, that the tenant could not remove it. There are cases in England of more recent date, still farther tending to put this subject upon a reasonable, as distinguished from a philological ground, and to hold that a thing is to be regarded as real or personal property, according to its relation to, and connection in use with, the freehold, rat er than from the manner in which that connection may be accomplished. An it has been expressly decided that actual fastening is not necessary to make a thing part of the estate.
In the United States we have three different rules established by different States.
1. The thing must be so fastened to the estate that its removal wou seriously injure the freehold, beyond the loss of the thing removed.
2. If the chattel is essential to the use of the real estate, and actua y, though slightly attached, it will pass with the freehold.
3. If the thing be essential to the use of the real estate, and has uniform y been used with it, then it passes, though not fastened to it.
As an original proposition, the third rule seems the most satis ac ry Take for instance a manufacturing establishment. The building is con structed to receive the various machines necessary for carding wool, sP1^nin, yarn, weaving and dressing cloth, and this business is carried on in the ui ing. One machine is so light, or its motion so violent, that it must e s by some fastening to the floor; the next is heavy enough to keep in P by its own weight. Now there is no reason in saying that one mac will, and the other will not, pass with the freehold. Both are essen ia
* 11 "Reports, 50, b.
Note.
the same business, one is useless without the other, and both are in the mind of the purchaser when he buys the establishment. It seems absurd to say that, to be sure of getting all the machinery, he must nail it down to the floor, when perhaps fifty men could not start it a hair. The purpose for which the thing was constructed, and the manner in which it was enjoyed in connection with the freehold, should determine whether it is real or personal estate. Following this view, it was held, in Farrar v. Stackpole,* that where machinery was essential to the purposes for which the building in which it was used was erected, that this fact alone constituted it real estate, whether it was nailed down or whether only held down by the laws of gravitation. Other casesf are to the same effect; although a far greater number of cases could be cited to the contrary, both from England and American reports. In Walker v. Sherman,\ actual fastening was held essential; but in a more recent case, Snedeker et al. v. Warring,% this distinction is overruled, and the law of fixtures put upon sensible ground and according to the doctrine in the above cases. In the latter case, a statue and sun-dial were held part of the real estate. The court say, “If the statue had been actually affixed to the base, by cement or clamps, or in any other manner, it would be conceded to be a fixture and to belong to the realty. But as it was, it could have been removed without fracture to the base on which it rested. But is that circumstance controlling? A building of wood, weighing even less than this statue, but resting on a substantial foundation of masonry, would have belonged to the realty. A thing may be as firmly affixed to the land hy gravitation as by clamps or cement. Its character may depend much upon the object of its erection. Its destination, the intention of the person making the erection, often exercises a controlling influence; and its connection with the land is looked at principally for the purpose of ascertaining whether that intent was that the thing in question should retain its original chattel character, or whether it was designed to make it a permanent accession to the lands.”
We come now to give this law of fixtures an application to the present subject-matter. Suppose a corporation created by law to build, equip, and work a railroad, uu for no other purpose. It mortgages its roadbed, between certain nuts, all its depots and station buildings, its right of way, and all appurtenances between those limits; and all the franchises, privileges, and rights 0 t e company of, in and to, or concerning the sama. The road is useless wit' out the rolling stock. Here is a case then falling fully within the principeof earlier cases ;|| the real estate worthless without the rolling stock,
* 6 Greenleaf, 157. (8^fiaWtOn V 8a’mon’ 1 Henry Blackstone, 259; Fairis v. Walker, 1 Bailey, 541 • •), Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 116; Pyle v. Pennock, Id. 390; Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill, 142. t 20 Wendell, 636. § 2 Kernan, 170.
arrar v. Stackpole; Voorhis v. Freeman; and Pyle v. Pennock.
Note.
which has been used only upon the road; and the rolling stock, so essential to the use of the road, utterly worthless for any other or different use. We have already seen the senseless fiction of fastening done away with; and we have but to apply the principles of the cases cited, and we shall come to the result that the rolling stock is in the nature of a fixture; and as such must be conveyed by the mortgage conveying the estate. It has not, indeed, exactly the same connection with the realty that the statue had in Snedeker •&. Warring; it is not held or kept in one place by fastenings, or by its weight." But this circumstance is of no consequence if thé principle deducible from the cases above cited is to govern. If a billiard table were fastened to the floor so as to be conceded a fixture, would not the balls and cues pass also? A bucket in a well may be detached, and it is movable, running from top to bottom of the well, yet it is a fixture by common consent. A shuttle in a loom is thrown from place to place by the motive power of the machinery, yet it is an essential part of the machine.- It is not inconceivable that rails and cars might be so constructed as that the car should be held upon the rail by certain material contrivances, and yet be propelled from one station to another; from one end of the road to another, by steam power. In such a case none would doubt that the cars were a fixture. Can it be said that the manner of accommodating and adjusting the cars to the rails can make any difference ? ‘ ‘ The railroad, like a complicated machine, consists of a great number of parts, a combined action of which is essential to produce revenue. And as well might a creditor claim the right to levy on and abstract some essential part from Woodworth’s planing machine, or any other combination of machinery, as to take from a railroad its locomotive and passenger cars. Such an obstruction would cause the operations to cease ir. both cases.”*
Then, again, following the principle of Snedeker v. Warring, the destination of the rolling stock, the intention of a company to pass it, will have an influence in determining whether such stock is real or personal property. This consideration would be as conclusive in regard to the furniture of a railroad as it was in regard to the statue, where it was presented; and even more so. The statue might have been sold by the sculptor for the adorning o any residence; though in fact it was made for the particular use. T e right to buy and own rolling stock is a franchise, and can only be exercised as an accessory to the operation of a railroad. Any buying or selling of cars, engines, &c., by the company, for the mere purpose of speculation, would be unauthorized and illegal. Here, then, is a consideration showing that a company intends the rolling stock to be used only for t e road, or, in other words, to become a permanent accession to the real estate of the company. The intention of the owner, the use for which the property was designed, the connection between the road and the cars, and t e essential relation between them, for the purposes of revenue, all combine to declare the rolling stock real estate. ,
In Pierce v. Emery, f the Portsmouth and Concord Kailroad Company
f 32 New Hampshire, 484.
* McLean, J., in Coe v. Pennock et. als.
Syllabus.
mortgaged all their property, real and personal, and all their franchises. The court held that the rolling stock acquired subsequently to the execution of the mortgage belonged to the mortgagee. The court say, “The object of the act being to give the bondholders a substantial and available security for their money, and a preference over other creditors not previously secured, can only be answered by so construing the law authorizing the mortgage as to give the bondholders security upon the road itself, as the general subject-matter of the mortgage, and upon the changing and shifting property of the road as part and parcel, by accession, of the thing mortgaged.”
In Phillips v. Winslow, in Kentucky, it was held that, in equity, the rolling stock acquired subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, passed as an accession or fixture.
In Redfield on Railways,* it is said, indeed, that rolling stock is an accessory, though not a fixture. The distinction is, perhaps, one of words. In the strict technical sense of the word, as used in the old cases, rolling stock is not a fixture; but within the reason and philosophy of the modern cases it would seem to be so. If it must not be called a fixture, in deference to the old cases, it is yet an accessory of that sort, which has every element of one; and to be regarded accordingly, however named.
The conclusion is, that rolling stock, put and used upon a railroad, passes with a conveyance of the road, even without mention or specific description.
The Fossat or Quicksilver Mine Case.
1. An appeal lies to this court from a decree of the District Court for California, in a proceeding under the act of 14th of June, 1860 (12 Statutes at Large, 33), commonly called the Survey Law.
2. If no appeal from such a decree be taken by the United States, they may appear in this court as appellees, but cannot demand a reversal or change of the decree.
3. If a California land claim has been confirmed by a decree of the District Court under the act of 3d of March, 1851 (9 Statutes at Large, 631), and the decree of confirmation fixing the boundaries of the tract stands unreversed, a survey under it is the execution of that decree, and must conform to it in all respects.
4. The Survey Law of 14th of June, 1860, gives the District Court no power to amend or change the decree of confirmation.
* Page 576, note.
drawn, was not true at all to scale, and that on it the line strikes two ranges of mountains in such a way as to leave certain unnamed elevations on the draft, which, with more or less plausibility, it was conjectured, but only conjectured, were meant to represent certain peaks in nature well known, more to the east or west than by reference to other objects on the draft they in nature hold.
About fifteen miles south from the southern end of the Bay of San Francisco, and separated from it by irregular mountain slopes, lies a vale, called the Cañada de los Capitanclllos, or Valley of the Little Captains.* The northern limit of this valley is an elevation called the Pueblo Hills; hills picturesque enough; with nothing else, however, as yet, specially to mark them. Descending or turning these, the traveller is in the vale.
Along the south edge of the valley runs a ridge of hills, range of mountains, or Sierra; for by each of these terms, as by several others, the elevation might properly or improperly be named. A value different from that of the Pueblo Ridge belongs to these. These are filled with cinnabar of unrivalled purity and richness. Here is the Almaden Mine; a mine, that with others near it, the Guadalupe, San Antonio, &c., is estimated at $20,000,000,—the gem of quicksilver mines in the Hew World, perhaps of the entire earth. This range we call the Mining Range, or Mining Ridge. The opposite map may assist a comprehension.f
Immediately south of, or behind this Mining Range, and detached from it, for the most part, by a steep, narrow, p. 651broken, and irregular depression, gorge, or valley, rises a ridge, range, or Sierra, different, as it was generally regarded,
*
According to Mexican traditions, the valley was occupied in early days by two Indians of very diminutive stature, whose bravery, however, was so noted that each was the chief of his tribe. The name of “Little Captains,” came from them. f The reader must be particular to note, that both on this map and on the two more rough topographical sketches given in the case, the ordinary rule of position in regard to maps is reversed. The top of the map as the reader looks at it, or in the cases of the diseños at pp. 654, 656, as he turns the book round to read what is on them, is the south; the bottom north; the right the west, and the left the east. The two rough Mexican diseños were thus originally made; and conforming other maps to them has been found more convenient than to adopt the more usual method. The compass on the sketch at p. 654, shows the thing.
SOUTH.
NORTH.
from the other, though by some persons regarded as the main part of the same range. This elevation we designate as the Azul Range, or Azul Ridge.*
*
The portion between these two ranges, marked on the map “ Ridge,” •oust be distinguished both from the Azul and the Mining Ridge or Range, as stated directly, is a low, connecting ridge.
The northern limit of the valley we have said is the Pueblo Hills. The top of these is about 1000 feet above the level of San Francisco Bay, and 400 above the lowest part of the valley immediately south of them.
The Mining Ridge at its greatest elevation rises several hundred feet higher than the Pueblo Hills in front of it, across the valley. The Almaden Peak, one peak of this ridge, at its eastern extremity, is 1500 feet above this level; but the elevations of the ridge generally, as they extend towards the west, diminish in height, and are broken by various depressions, which permit easy access from the valley on the north to the foot of the depression or valley at the base of the Azul Range. The Azul Range, behind, rears its head suddenly up, far above the Mining Range before it, to the height of 4000 feet above the level of the sea.
The Mining Range extends from east to west, and parallel with the Azul Range. It runs about five miles. On its slopes, as well on that towards the valley on the north, as on that which makes one side of the ravine upon the south, the best and most permanent grazing of the region is to be found. At its widest place it is more than a mile and a half from base to base, measuring directly through; and it slopes off gradually at both ends. It is connected with the Azul Range by a ridge four hundred feet lower than itself, and tjoenty-four hundred lower than the Azul Range. It is a water-shed, on one side of which are the sources of the Capitancillos and on the other those of the Alamitos. The one stream runs between the two ranges, and turns to the north at the western end of the Mining Range. The other flows eastward, and turning the eastern end of the range as the other had done the western, crosses the valley till its course is arrested by the Pueblo Hills. Here, turning its course to run along their base, it runs westward till it meets the other stream, and forming with it the Guadalupe River, the two discharge their waters through its channel into San Francisco Bay.
At the place where the Alamitos strikes the Pueblo Hills, p. 653Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 653
it is joined by a mountain stream called the Arroyo Seco** a point which the reader must observe.
Nearly in the centre of this valley stands a little hill,—Loma, as it is called in Spanish,—its side or skirt sloping irregularly by a series of graceful undulations towards the plain; its descending curve thus forming that which it required no great imagination to call a “lap.”
Such is the valley, its boundaries and its features, as they strike the eye.
In the eastern part of it, an old Mexican, Sergeant Don José Reyes Berreyesa, fixed himself, about 1834, by-leave of Governor Figueroa. Adjoining him on the west, and holding the western part, was another Mexican, Leandro Galindo. They both built their houses and made their chief improvements at the base of the Pueblo Hills; that is to say, opposite and away from the Mining and the Azul Ranges, their exposures to the south. Neither of them had any title but such provisional ones as were usual in California while it yet belonged to Mexico, in anticipation of a final grant. In time Galindo went away, and was succeeded by Justo Larios, who continued his improvements at the foot of the Pueblo Hills, and granted a small piece of land, at the western extremity of the hills and near the junction of the Capitancillos and Alamitos, far off from the southern ridges, to a certain Foster, j* Larios and Berreyesa, however, got along less amicably than had done Galindo and his military neighbor. Berreyesa complained to the Governor that Larios claimed land that was his, and had actually removed his house and set it on the dividing line. Larios, he said, had “room to extend himself outside of the Cañada;” while he, Berreyesa, “had absolutely nowhere to enlarge.” Larios, about the same time presented his petition,
—------------ .---- _______________ p. 654654 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
*
The meaning is a dry creek; this sort of arroyo being common in a country of hills and plains; sometimes filled with water from the mountains, and sometimes a mere stony bed or “gulch.” In this case we have two arroyo secos; one of them, however, always designated as the “ arroyo teco on the side of Santa Clara.” t Marked F. on the map at p. 651.
Statement of the case.—Diseño of Berreyesa.
complaining of Berreyesa as overbearing, and disposed to be rapacious. The matter disturbed the happy valley, and threatened to become a feud. Governor Alvarado referred p. 655Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 655
both petitions to the Prefect, the highest judicial officer in his department, and directed him to call the parties before him, to confront them with one another, hear their proofs, and to report the result of his investigation. The Prefect did this. The parties came before him, and he succeeded in conciliating them. Berreyesa produced a diseño, and with that before them they agreed upon a division-line as follows:
“A straight line (una recta, &c.), from the angle which the Alamitos forms with the Arroyo Seco, direction southward, passing by the eastern base or over the eastern skirt, or lap (the meaning was not clear), of the loma* (rumbo al Sul la Falda de la loma), in the centre of the valley to the Sierra.”
Upon this diseño the Prefect traced a dotted line, which showed what had been agreed upon. He then reported the whole matter to the Governor; and the map, with the dotted line or “ L-i-n-d-e-r-o” upon it, went to the archives. A copy is opposite.
The controversy being settled, Larios petitioned the Governor for a grant. Alvarado made it. Thus it ran:
“I declare Justo Larios owner of the tract called ‘Los Capitaneillos,’ bounded by the Sierra, by the Arroyo Seco on the side of Santa Clara, and by the tract of Berreyesa, which has for boundary a line running from the junction of the Arroyo Seco and the Alamitos, southward to the Sierra,'passing by the eastern base, or over the eastern skirt or lap (rumbo al Sul la Falda ) of the loma, in the centre of the valley.”
The grant was subject to these ordinary conditions:
“2d. He shall solicit the proper judge to give him juridical possession in virtue of this decree, by whom the boundary shall be marked out, &c.
“3d. The land herein referred to is one league of the larger 812e, a little more or less. The judge who shall give the possession shall have it measured in conformity to law, leaving the p. 656656 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
*
Called indifferently “ loma1' and “ lomita."
Statement of the case.—Diseño of Larios.
surplus which remains to the nation for the purposes which may best suit him.”
The diseño submitted by Larios appears on the page opposite.*
About this same time Berreyesa applied for a grant. His petition prays for a grant of two sitos, to extend from the dwelling-house of Larios up to the matadero,f “ with all the lomas (hills'), that pertain to the Canada.” The dispute having been in the meantime settled, the Governor (August 20, 1842) made the concession. The grant recites the petition of Berreyesa for a part of the place called the Cañada de los Capitancillos, bounded on the north by the lomas bajas of the Pueblo San José; on the south by the Sierra; on the west by the rancho of Larios, which has for boundary the angle formed by the Arroyo Seco, and that of the Alamitos course south, the base (or skirt) of the hill situated in the centre of the Cañada until arriving at the Sierra: (el cual tiene por lindero en ángulo que forma el Arroyo Seco y el de los Alamitos, rumbo Sur, la falda de la loma, situada en el centro de la Cañada.)^
To the reader who has been able to get before his mind the topographical nature of this place, it will be obvious that questions might arise on the language of the grant to Larias. There were two ridges, or two parts of one ridge; either of which ridges, or parts of a ridge, might be styled a Sierra. Sierra means a saw, and is a term applicable, in some sense, to any range or ridge of hills, serrated as every one naturally is. In certain aspects—geologically, perhaps, or possibly, topographically may be as well—the Mining Range was part of the Azul Range. Was it so within the meaning of the Governor and grant ? And bearing on this question p. 658658 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
*
The diseSo of Berreyesa is a very good one; better than forty-nine in fifty of the Mexican diseHos. That of Larios is less good, and justifies the title of “daub” given by Grier, J., supra, p. 448, to Mexican disenos in general. The arroyo, or stream called Alamitos, on the map, at p. 651, is on this called Capitancillos, as indeed it sometimes was; and the Arroyo Seco, on the side of Santa Clara, called simply “Arroyo Seco,” is made the west boundary. t Slaughter-house. J The diseflo is supra, at page 654. vol. ii. 42
of philology would come perhaps another like it: “What meant in law the word Cañada?” Los Capitancillos was a cañada. But did this mean a valley so pure and simple that no elevation whatever could break its plain ? or might it hold the Mining Ridge and let the vaster Azul Heights overtop the whole, and leave both plain and mine to insignificance below ? These were questions which the United States might have to litigate against Berreyesa and Larios both united.
Then assuming the Mining Ridge to be part of the valley, and the United States to be thus disposed of, there might come another question—a question for Larios and Berreyesa, after disposing of the Government, to litigate between themselves. What did falda truly mean ? It was a term the very favorite of poetry; and with a sense elegantly answered—answered with truth as well—by our English “ lap,” or “ skirt,” or “ fold.” Was this the sense in which the old Mexican soldier and his lately litigious neighbor understood it, when making peace for themselves, they made one of the greatest lawsuits which the world has seen for others ?
Even conceding falda to mean the base of the hill, and that the parties had meant to pass it, another question might still arise upon the very lindero and map which at first seemed so plain as to render question impossible. The line was to pass the base; but did the diseño of Berreyesa, on which it was traced, not show that it also meant to pass the Mining Ridge (on this map plainly marked, and bearing the name of lomas bajas'), so as to leave much its greater part with him. In nature could any line drawn from the junction of the creeks south, past the base, do this ? Then on his diseño certain elevations were marked, both on the Mining Ridge and on the Azul Ridge behind. One on the Mining Ridge was especially prominent at its eastern end. Were there any known peaks, in nature, on these ridges ? If so, cou any line drawn as we have mentioned be made and leave them in that relative position where the diseño seemed to place them ? The difficulty may be comprehended by any p. 659Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 659
reader who compares the map at p. 651, a map of the actual related topography, wTith the diseño of Berreyesa, which gives the parts, but in positions less relatively true.
On these niceties of language—on such constructions of rude drafts—depended, in part, the question, whether this Mine of the Almaden—the glory of the Cuchilla de la Mina, or Cuchilla de la Mina de Luis Chabolla—should belong to a few citizens or to a whole republic; to the representatives of Justo Larios, to those of “ the sergeant Berreyesa,” or to the United States as national domain.
The grant wTas of the valley. The point of departure was confessedly the junction of the creeks Alamitos and Arroyo Seco. A line running “ southward” “ to the Sierra” Azul, ended the rights of the United States in the matter. A line running “ southward” at the base of the loma, as distinguished from one which should be sustained in its curving folds, ended Berreyesa’s also. If, therefore, the line was to be run to the Sierra Azul, and at the base of the loma, south and straight from the union of the creeks, the mine belonged to Larios, or to whoever might be his fortunate successor.
The question^ were worth a controversy.
By 1852, California was a State of the American Union, and three-quarters of the property granted to Larios had become vested in one Fossat; the remaining fourth (which was in the direction of the mission property of Santa Clara, and at the extreme west of th,e valley) being owned by the Guadalupe Mining Company.* Fossat now presented his petition to the land commissioners appointed by the act of Congress of March 3,1851, to settle the respective rights of the United States and claimants under the former Government to lands in California, for a confirmation of his claims derived from Larios. The board decided in favor of it, and the United States appealed to the District Court; Berreyesa, however, being no party to the specific proceedings.
The quarter of a league conveyed to the company, is indicated on the maP at Page 651, in shade.
660 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
That court, saying nothing whatever in its opinion on the question of where the line meant to be fixed on by Larios and Berreyesa would strike the Azul Range (if prolonged to that extent) as respected the Almaden Mine, and as respected the now known and actual topography, went into an argument to show that it must at least come somewhere to that range, and over the Mining Range; in other words, that the west portion of the Mining Range, whatever that portion might be, did not belong to the United States.
The court accordingly decided that the grant was good for the place known as Los Capitancillos, bounded and described on the south by the Azul Range, as distinguished from the lower hills or Mining Ridge; on the west (about which there was no question) by Arroyo Seco on the side of Santa Clara. The decree, then, went thus as respected the eastern line :
“ On the east by a line running from the junction of a certain other rivulet, called Arroyo Seco, and the Arroyo de los Alamitos, southward to the aforesaid main Sierra, passing by the point or part of the small hill situated in the centre of the Canada, which is designated in the expedientes and grants of Justo Larios and José Reyes Berreyesa as ‘ la falda de la loma,’ and crossing the range of hills designated above as the Cuchilla de la Mina, or Cuchilla de la Mina de Luis Chdbolla, and in which are situated the said Guadalupe, San Antonio, and New Almaden Mines, and which is the same range of hills designated ‘ Lomas Bajas on the diseño or map in the aforesaid expediente of José Reyes Berreyesa, the said eastern line herein described being intended to be the same line agreed upon as the line of division between t e lands of Justo Larios and José Reyes Berreyesa, as expressed in the respective expedientes and grants of said Justo Larios an José Reyes Berreyesa, and delineated by the dotted line on the said diseño or map in the expediente of José Reyes Berreyesa; in the location of the said line reference to be made to the de scription thereof in the said expedientes and grants, and the delineation thereof on the said diseño or map in the expediente of José Reyes Berreyesa, which expedientes, grants, and diseno, or map, are on file and in evidence in this case.”
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 661
The northern boundary of the tract was declared to be that shown in the diseño or map of Larios; which was in effect the stream, marked on his draft as the Arroyo Capitancillos, but on the map styled the Alamitos.
Confirmation was thus made of the whole tract granted to Larios, with the exception of the two adjacent parcels thereof lying on the westerly end of said tract, and claimed by the Guadalupe Mining Company. This gave him a tract of about a league and three quarters.
The court in its opinion noted, indeed, that only three of the boundaries were designated in the grant, the southern, the western, and the eastern; but inclined to think that the description of the tract by name, as Los Capitandllos, a known valley, and the delineation on the diseño of Larios of the two ranges of hills within which it was contained, sufficiently indicated the location of the northern boundary, the mention of which was omitted in the grant; especially as the call was for a league pocos mas o minas,—a league more or less.
From this decree the United States appealed to this court.* This court considered that there was more weight in the last point which the court had noted than the court itself gave to it, and reversed that decree; Campbell, J., who gave the opinion, remarking in different parts of it as follows:
“ The District Court confirmed the claim of the appellee to land limited by specific boundaries, and ascertained those boundaries, as they exist on the land, with precision. Under ‘this decree the grant to Larios includes seven thousand five hundred and eighty-eight j9^ acres.f
“We concur in the opinion of the Board of Commissioners and of the District Court, that affirms the validity of the grant of the Governor of California to Justo Larios, and the regularity of the conveyances through which the claimant deduces his title/’
The court here gave an account of the dispute between Larios and Berreyesa, and of the settlement of it, and went on:
“ The Governor granted the land to Larios, to be his property,
20 Howard, 413. j- About a league and three quarters.—Rep.
662 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
subject to the approval of the Departmental Assembly, and to the performance of conditions.*
u The southern, western, and eastern boundaries of the land granted to Larios are well defined, and the objects exist by which those limits can be ascertained. There is no call in the grant for a northern boundary, nor is there any reference to the diseño for any natural object or other descriptive call to ascertain it. The grant itself furnishes no other criterion for determining that boundary than the limitation of the quantity, as is expressed in the third condition. This is a controlling condition in the grant. The delivery of juridical possession, an essential ceremony to perfect the title in the land system of Mexico, was to be accommodated to it. The diseño presented by the donee to the Governor to inform him of his wants represents the quantity to be one league, a little more or less. This representation is assumed to be true by the Governor, and it forms the basis on which his consent to the petition is yielded.
“ He prescribes to the officer to whom he confided the duty of completing the title to measure a specified quantity, leaving the surplus that remains to the nation as preparatory to the delivery of judicial possession to the grantee. The obligation of the United States to this grantee will be fulfilled by the performance of the executive acts which are devolved in the grant on the local authority, and which are declared in the two conditions before cited. We regard these conditions to contain a description of the thing granted, and in connection with the other calls of the grant they enable us to define it. We reject the words, ‘ a little more or less/ as having no meaning in a system of location and survey like that of the United States, and that the claim of the grantee is valid for the quantity clearly expressed If the limitation of the quantity had not been so explicitly declare, it might have been proper to refer to the petition and the diseño, or to have inquired if the name, Capitaneólos, had any significance as connected with the limits of the tract, in order to give effect to the grant. But there is no necessityfor additional inquiries. The grant is not affected with any ambiguity. The intention oft e Government of California is distinctly declared, and there is no rule of law to authorize us to depart from the grant to obtain evidence to contradict, vary, or limit its import.
* Given on page 655.
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 663
------------ A------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
“ The grant to Larios is for one league of land, to be taken within the southern, western, and eastern boundaries designated therein, and which is to be located, at the election of the grantee or his assigns, under the restrictions established for th£ location and survey of private land claims in California, by the executive department of this government. The external boundaries designated in the grant may be declared by the District Court from the evidence on file, and such other evidence as may be produced before it, and the claim of an interest equal to three-fourths of the land granted is confirmed to the appellee.
“The decree of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enter a decree conforming to this opinion.”
The case was again heard below, and on new evidence, tending, most of it, to the subject of the southern boundary. On the 18th of October, 1858, the District Court again gave an opinion, and again made a decree. The opinion was a further argument on the evidence, new and old alike, to show that the Azul Range was the • true south boundary,—“the most important, if not the only point discussed,” the court says, “on the hearing,” and which the court treat as “the question to be determined.” Nothing is argued about the eastern boundary. The decree again decreed that the grant was a valid one. Its southern and western boundaries were in substance as already above set forth. The eastern boundary was thus again disposed of.
“ The eastern boundary is a straight line "commencing at the junction of a certain rivulet, called Arroyo Seco, with the Arroyo de los Alamitos, and thence running southward to the aforesaid main sierra or mountain range, passing by the point or part of the small hill situated in the centre of the Canada, which is designated in the expedientes and grants of Justo Darios and José Reyes Berreyesa as (la falda de la loma,’ and crossing the range of hills designated above as the £ Cuchilla la Mina,’ or 1 Cuchilla de la Mina de Luis Chabolla,’ in which are situated the said Guadalupe and New Almaden mines, and which is the same range of hills designated 1 Lomas Lajas,’ on the diseno or map in the expediente of José Reyes Berreyesa on p. 664664 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
______________________________________________ A_____ file in the case, the said eastern line crossing, also, the said Arroyo de los Alamitos and terminating at the base of said main sierra; and the said eastern line herein described, being intended to be tho same line agreed upon as the line of division between the lands of Justo Larios and José Reyes Berreyesa, as expressed in the respective expedientes and grants of said Justo Larios and José Reyes Berreyesa, and delineated by the dotted line on the said diseño or map in the expediente of José Reyes Berreyesa; and in the location of said line, reference is to be made to the description thereof in the said expedientes and grants and the delineation thereof on the said diseño or map in the expediente of José Reyes Berreyesa, which expedientes, grants, and diseño or map, aré on file and in evidence in this case.”
It was ordered that the fourth line should be run so as to include one league only; and the title was confirmed on that basis.
The United States again appealed to the Supreme Court;* but a motion was made to dismiss the appeal because the decree below was interlocutory. The court did dismiss the appeal, and in the opinion say as follows:
“The court determined (when the case was here before), ‘ that a grant under which the plaintiff claimed land in California, was valid for one league, to be taken within the southern, western, and eastern boundaries designated therein, at the election of the grantee and his assigns, under the restrictions established for the location and survey of private land claims in California by the executive department of the Government. The external boundaries of the grant may be declared by the District Court from the evidence on file, and such other evidence as may be produced before it; and the claim of an interest equal to three-fourths of the land granted is confirmed to the appellee?
“ This motion to dismiss the present appeal is resisted, e-cause the inquiries and decrees of the Board of Commissioners for the settlement of Private Land Claims in California, by t e Act of 3d of March, 1851, in the first instance, and of the courts of the United States, on appeal, relate only to the question o
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 665
the validity of the claim, and by validity is meant its authenticity, legality, and in some cases interpretation, but does not include any question of location, extent, or boundary,—and that the District Court has gone to the full limit of its jurisdiction in the decree under consideration, if it has not already exceeded it?
The court then examining this matter and declaring what the admitted duties of the District Court were, adds.:
“But in addition to these questions upon the vitality of the title, there may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of the claim. In affirming a claim to land under a Spanish or Mexican grant, to be valid within the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the usages of those governments, we imply something more than that certain papers are genuine, legal, and translative of property. We affirm that ownership and possession of land of definite boundaries rightfully attach to the grantee.”
And this court concludes its opinion thus:
“ But, after the authenticity of the grant is ascertained in this court, and a reference has been made to the District Court, to determine the external bounds of the grant, in order that the final confirmation may be made, we cannot understand upon what principle an Appeal can be claimed until the whole of Aie directions of this court are complied with, and that decree made. It would lead to vexatious and unjust delays to sanction such a practice. It is the opinion of the court that this appeal was improvidently taken and allowed, and must be dismissed; and that the District Court proceed to ascertain the external lines of the land confirmed to the appellee, and enter a final decree of confirmation of that land.”
On the filing of this mandate of dismissal, the Surveyor-General of California was ordered to survey the land confirmed in conformity with the decision of the District Court, made 18th October. He made the survey, which was approved by the Surveyor-General, 18th December, 1860, and p. 666666 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct
filed it, with a map, in the court below, 22d January, 1861. The survey and map, as was testified by the deputy surveyor Hays, and one Conway, a clerk in his office, who assisted in making it, was made in conformity with the decree which they had before them. That survey is indicated on the map, at page 651, by a heavy connected line.
It appeared, also, that Berreyesa had at one time caused a private survey to be made of his tract, and this survey showed that the line lay essentially as marked by this heavy connected line. Another made for the Guadalupe Mining Company located it in the same way. A public survey, made by Surveyor-General Hays, in 1855, located it also thus.
Hot lone: before the above-mentioned order of the District Court was made, Congress passed the act of June 14, I860,* commonly called the w Survey Act,” which authorizes the District Court to allow persons not parties to the record to intervene in matters of the survey and location of confirmed private land claims, and to show the true location of the claim. For that purpose they may produce evidence before the court, and on such proof and allegations the court shall render judgment. In regard to appeals, the whole language is simply, “ And no appeal shall be allowed from the order or decree as aforesaid of the District Court, unless applied for within six months.”
The survey was accordingly ordered into court. It made the Azul Range, as distinguished from the Mining Range, the southern boundary. The eastern line was drawn, as the reporter supposes,—for he never saw the plat,—from the junction of the two creeks Seco and Alamitos south, past the base of the loma; so leaving the mine on the land of Larios.
Berreyesa, Foster, and others, who had not been parties to any of the immediate previous proceedings, now excepted to it.
Berreyesa excepted because the western boundary of his land constituted the eastern of that of Larios, “ to wit, a line beginning at the junction of the creeks Alamitos and Seco,
* 12 Stat, at Large, 33.
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 667
and running southerly to the main Sierra and Sierra Azul, crossing the Lomas Bajas in the manner shown by the diseño of the land granted to said Berreyesa; whereas the survey confirmed in this case locates the eastern line so as to include a tract of land within the exterior lines of the land granted to Berreyesa, and not granted to the said Larios.”
Foster excepted because the tract being carried over far to the south, and being confined to one league, his small tract was left out. So, on similar grounds, did other parties who subsequently abandoned their exceptions.
The United States, by the District Attorney, entered a formal appearance, but made no objection to the survey at any stage of the hearing, suggested no argument, and offered no evidence against it.
Fossat, who represented Larios, came in to protect the survey, averring that it was right, and should stand.
The District Court,—considering that no decision had ever yet been made by it as to the eastern boundary; not understanding, apparently, that any supposed decision with regard to that line had been passed on by the Supreme Court in either of the decisions quoted in the preceding part of this statement; conceiving further, it would seem, that under the new act of 1860 (the “ Survey Act,” passed after the second decision in this court was made), the court below might, on the intervention of Berreyesa, then for the first time heard in this particular cause, determine the eastern line, irrespective of any decree obtained by either party in a proceeding which it considered as a proceeding between himself only and the United States,—proceeded to settle the eastern line; and in some degree, it was argued, to treat all things de novo. A great deal of new evidence was taken in regard to this eastern line; evidence bearing also on the southern line. The scope of much of the former was to show entire error of scale in Berreyesa’s diseño, and that regulating the eastern line by certain objects, clearly enough indicated on this diseño, other than the loma, the line could not be drawn south from the junction of the creeks past the loma to the point where that diseño showed that it meant to p. 668668 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
come. The matter will be understood better further on in the case. The result of the whole was that, affirming the Mining Range as the south boundary; that is to say, carrying the tract to the Azul Range, as being the true Sierra, the District Court now made an east line, somewhat such as is exhibited by the light dotted line on the map at p. 651. The line began at the junction of the two creeks, thence ran south to the eastern base of the loma; thence south 55° west to a point where another angle was made; thence south 34° west to the Azul Range. The effect was, that while Larios or his representative got some part of the Mining Ridge, the eastern line was made to reach that ridge at a point so far west that the Almaden Mine, the great object of contest, and the largest portion of the ridge, fell into the tract of Berreyesa.
From this decree the claimants under Larios appealed to this court. So did Foster. The United States took no appeal, and the representatives of Berreyesa, of course, were desirous to maintain the decree.
The whole case was now before this court,—the case as it was presented by all the evidence taken in all the proceedings below. This was the case viewed as an original case.
But on this occasion it was here also, of course, as it might be affected by what had been decided in it on the two different occasions when it was here before on appeal, and when the court had expressed itself, and had given mandates, such as have been previously stated in this report. The effect of the District Court’s own two decisions on its power to decide further was also to be considered; its power, perhaps, under the Survey Law of 1860, to change the decree of confirmation.
As an original case,—the detached parts in which it presented itself below, and on the three different hearings being brought together, and all presented in sequence,—the matter was essentially thus: the diseños of both Larios and Berrey esa, the last with the L-i-n-d^e-r-o upon it, being, of course, parts of the case everywhere.
1. As to the southern boundary: Witnesses were brought o p. 669Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 669
show that the ranges were one sierra, and so that the tract did not include any part of the Mining Ridge. Mr. Veach, a geologist, swore thus:
“ The Mining Ridge is detached from the main mountain by a stream that runs from east to west, making a sharp hill between the higher mountain and the plain; but Zlook upon this as only a bench-like portion of the mountain, which has been separated from it by the gorge cut down by the stream. The reason why I so consider it is the «/on/e-like character of the valley of the little stream, *and the sharpness of the ridge, and the elevation of the bottom of the gorge so considerably above the level of the valley; it is, I should judge, 300 feet above it. From geological considerations, also, I should consider this ridge clearly and distinctly a portion of the mountain. The ridge does not present the spur-like character which would show its detachment from the mountain, for it runs parallel with the general course of the latter.”
Mr. Matheson, engaged in the public surveys of the United States, testified in the same way :
“I do not consider that there is a main sierra separate from any other portion of the sierra. The Mine Ridge is merely a spur, and connected by a ridge with the main sierra. You can travel from the valley right up to the highest point of the ridge.”
Referring to the diseño of Larios (p. 656), it will be noted that his tract, as there indicated, came to a range of hills called Sierra del Encino (“ range of the live-oak,” or, less accu^tely, perhaps, in a grammatical point of view, “ live-oak range.”)*
Oaks, it was shown, grew everywhere about here. “ There are a considerable number of them,” said one witness, “ on the mountains back of the Mine Ridge, and also on the plains north of it. There are also a considerable number of them found generally on the northern slope of the ridge, and presenting a Very beautiful green appearance.”
* The plural would be Sierra de los Encinos.
670 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Then there was on this diseño but one sierra indicated. The tract did not include it by passing over to any other behind it. No second range was marked. No streams of any kind answering to any in nature ran on this diseño at the foot of the range, though streams did, in fact, run at the foot of the Azul Range. At the foot of the Pueblo Hills, where a stream ran, in fact, one ran also on the diseño.
Moreove the residence of Larios—that in which he had succeeded Galindo—was, like the home of Berreyesa, on the north, edge of the tract, at the foot of the Pueblo Hills.* Larios was living in this part of the valley. No tract of one league, not very irregular in shape, could include the Mining Ridge without excluding nearly all the land along the base of the Pueblo Hills. The maps, moreover, reversed the ordinary law which governs the construction of maps, and make the top represent the south, the bottom the north, the right the west, and the left the east; hence, an inference that the point from which everything was viewed was the north edge of the valley. An experiment showed, also, that the diseños of Berreyesa and of Larios were much the same in size; and taking the two, and putting them edge to edge in the manner of “ Indentures,”—fitting the edge which indicated the western side of Berreyesa’s tract against that which indicated the eastern side of that of Larios, the Pueblo Hills, as marked on each, being fitted and made the starting-point,—that the Sierra del Encino of the draft of Larios ranged itself opposite to the Lomas Bajas (the Mining Ridge, undoubtedly) of Berreyesa’s, and not against the Sierra Azul, so plainly, on the draft of Berreyesa, distinguished from it.f
On the other hand, witnesses showed that, in many re- p. 671Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 671
*
On Berreyesa’s diseño, as the reader will see, these hills marked as “ Lomas Bajas, para la parte del plan del Pueblo.” On that of Larios they are styled simply “ L-o-m-a-s B-a-j-a-s.” f From the necessity of getting the whole of both diseños in the page, and so of making the scale of Berreyesa small enough to let in the “Cierra Azul,” this thing is not so well shown by the two diseños given to t e reader. The scale of Berreyesa’s is the smaller.
spects, the two ridges might be considered different, and by many were so; that the separation, if sometimes called a gorge or ravine, was as often, or oftener, called a valley. Then one witness, an American, whq had lived since about 1835 in California, and near the place, testified that the Mining Ridge had been known by the name of Cuchilla de la Mina, and as a thing separate from the Azul Range, often known by the name of Sierra Santa Cruz, the former being connected with the latter only by a ridge at one place. It was shown also, too, that Larios was quite illiterate, “ unable to handle a pen,” and that his diseño had been made for him by a friend of his named Rios, from oral description given him at Monterey, away from the land, Rios himself never having been on the land, nor knowing anything about it. He had not, however, drawn that of Berreyesa. The testimony—that of photography included—showed, moreover, and this past any question, that while the elevations hereabouts, and the plain, also, were fruitful in oaks, there was upon the Azul Range one umbrageous oak of venerable years and extraordinary size, standing on a spur of the mountain, projecting boldly from the mass of the range, and presenting so clear an outline to an observer in certain directions as to be visible for fifteen miles; a prominent feature in the landscape. It was testified, in fact, to be so well known to the people of the neighborhood as to have acquired the name of “Encino Coposo de la Sierra Azul.” Further, on the diseño of Berreyesa the Mining Ridge was styled Lomas Bajas, which means “ Low Hills;” and the term Sierra was given to the Azul Range,—“ Cierra Azul.” Hence, ground for an inference that the term “ Sierra,” in the parlance of that place and time, had become appropriated to the Azul •Range, and that “ Lomas Bajas,” or Low Hills, was the common title of the Mining Range.
The L-i-n-d-e-r-o, it will be observed, crosses the Mining ■Ridge, and goes to the Azul Mountains, here designated Sierra Azul.
2. Then as to the eastern boundary. In favor of the claim p. 672672 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
of Larios, there of course was the L-i-n-d-e-r-o and its history.
On the other hand, and in favor of Berreyesa and of the line as settled by the .decree below, the testimony of Mr. W. J. Lewis, an acute-minded and well-educated surveyor, went to prove that the compass on the diseño of Berreyesa was erroneous to the extent of 45°, the north point being represented that much to the eastward; that the actual position of the loma was much more to the east, and near to the junction of the Alamitos and Se$o than that diseño indicates; that standing at the junction of the creek, and looking south, the range of the Azul did present one peak at the west, Mount Umunhum, higher than any near it; and one peak at the east, Mount Bache, much higher than any near it. and higher even than Mount Umunhum.* Two elevations, answering or not answering this character, are presented, it will be seen, on the diseño of Berreyesa. So in nature at the Mine, which is near the eastern end of the Mining Ridge, there is a peak known as the Mine Peak, and from that peak there is a continuous descent to the Alamitos Creek. On the diseño of Berreyesa, at the eastern edge of the Lomas. Bajas, or Low Hills (meant confessedly to represent the Mining Ridge, in some part, or to some extent), there was or was not, at its east end, such an elevation and descent. Then it was shown by Mr. Lewis who had spent months here, and made surveys and observations of every natural feature of the region—that while indicating different objects very well, the diseño was drawn without any reference to scale whatever; relative position being wholly misrepresented. The house of Larios, for example, which was in fact thirty feet wide, was made to cover a lift of the width of the valley, there a mile wide.
Mr. Lewis, accordingly, thought that he could see in the diseño an intent to represent the three peaks, especially t e p. 673Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 673
*
Mount Umunhum is 3440 feet above the sea; Mount Bache, 3780 fee > or 350 feet more. The position of Mount Bache is not, from want of space, accurately indicated on the map at p. 651. It is sufficiently so, howeve, to explain things. In nature it stood more to the east and south.
two former.* Assuming this to be so, and comparing the diseño with nature, there would be a great error. In nature, less than one mile in length lay eastward of the division based on the L-i-n-d-e-r-o, and over four and a half miles lay to the westward; whereas, the part of the ridge represented on Berreyesa’s diseño as lying to the westward of the line, would be but five-sixths of a mile, and all the rest was east, on Berreyesa’s own land. Hence, the loma, or lomita, not being shown in a position true to scale, an inference that Mount Umunhum—an unmistakable object, and the Mining Peak another—should govern the location in preference to the lomita, nearer the starting-point and less definite, as this surveyor conceived. The difficulty was that, by the terms of the grant, the line was to be drawn at the falda de la loma, which the interests of Larios interpreted u base of the hill.” If the line could cross the hill, going over its “ skirt” or “ lap” to a perfectly ascertained point at the other side of the valley, a decree fixing the eastern line as Lewis fixed it could be supported. The case as to the meaning of falda was thus: one witness being Mr. Hopkins, “ keeper of the Spanish archives in the office of the Surveyor of the United States for California, well acquainted with the Spanish language, and in the habit of translating documents;” who had in fact made .one translation of this grant. ■
Q- You have translated the word “falda” by the word “ skirt;” have you considered well the exact definition of the word “ falda,” and is it exactly expressed by the word used in your translation ?
A. I have carefully examined the definition of the word falda,” as laid down in the standard lexicons of the Spanish ongue. I have examined the word as used by ancient and
modern writers of the Spanish language, and I can think of no word in the English language which more clearly or legitimately
Mount Bache, as Mr. Lewis supposed, was meant to be designated by e elevation over the letter C in “Cierra;” Mount Umunhum being at e right of the same ridge, and the Mine Peak being over the letter L in Lomas Bajas.”
VOL. II. 43 p. 674674 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
expresses the meaning than the word “ skirt.” I arrive at this conclusion from the definitions that I find given to the word in the Spanish lexicons, and from its use by celebrated Spanish writers.
Q. In the sense in which you use the word “ skirt,” to what part of a hill or loma is it to be applied ?
A. It is to be applied to the lower or inferior part of the hill or loma.
Q. Have you made any translation of the definition of the word “falda” given in any lexicon ? if yea, please produce that translation.
A. I have made a translation of the definition of the word “falda” as laid down in the Royal Dictionary of the Spanish Academy, dedicated to Don Felipe V, and printed at Madrid in the year 1732. Here it is:
“ Falda. That part of the long dress from the waist down, as the skirt or blouse of women.
“ ‘Queen Mary promptly dismounted, and, raising the edges of her skirt (falda) and the sleeves of her dress, drew a hunting-knife from her belt, and with her own hands opened the stag.
“ ‘ The great queen was riding on a small ass, with the boy-god (nino dies) in her lap (falda).''
“ Falda. It is very commonly applied to that which drags from the after-part of a dress worn either by a person holding high office, or as a symbol of sorrow by mourners accompanying a funeral.
“ ‘ He carried the train (falda) of Mary, Queen of Scots, the bride of the Dauphin Francis?
“ Falda. By allusion, or metaphorically, is called that part of the hill or mountain which falls or descends from the middle down. Lat. Montis Radix.
“ ‘ They reached the skirt (falda) of a small hill. Naim was a small city situated on the skirt (falda) of Mount Hermon?
“ Perrillo de falda (lap dog). The small pet dog, so called because women are so much attached to them that they usually keep them in their laps (faldas) that they may not hurt themselves.
“ ‘ I waget that you do not know why Apelles painted Ceres, the goddess of com, with a lap dog (perrillo de faldas).'”
Q. Please give such examples of the use of the word “ falda. by Spanish writers as occur to you, and give the translation into English of those passages in which the word is used.
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 675
A. The following I found some years ago:
The first is from Martin, a Spanish poet.
“ Iba congiéndo flores Y quardándo en la falda Mi ninfa para hacér úna Guirnalda,” &c.
The translation of which is:
“My love was gathering flowers, and keeping them in her lap (falda) to make a garden.”
The second is from Jose de Cadalso, a celebrated Spanish scholar and poet:
“ Con pécho humilde y reverente paso
Llegue á la sacra falda del Parnaso;
Y como en sueños vi que llamaban Desde la sacra cumbre, y me alentaban Ovidio y Taso, a cuyo docto influjo Mi numen estos versos me produjo.”
The translation of which is :
“With humble breast and reverent step I reached the sacred foot {falda} of Parnassus, and, as in dreams, heard calling me from the sacred summit, Ovid and Tasso, who inspired me, and under whose wise influence my muse produced these verses.”
The third is a translation made by Juan de Janrequi, I think in the sixteenth century, from an Italian play. The following is an explanation of these four lines: A romantic young shepherd was very much enamored of a beautiful shepherdess, who, perhaps from a spirit of coquetry, treated him with scorn; the young man took the disappointment so much to heart that he madly threw himself from a neighboring precipice; and the lines of the poet are a description given by an old hermit of the condition and place in which he found the young man:
‘ Yo me estaba junto a mi cueva, que vecina al valle, y casi al pie del gran collado yace, do forma falda su ladera enhiesta.”
The translation of which is:
I was at my cave, which lies near the valley and almost at the foot of the great bill where its steep side forms a {falda} skirt."
The fourth is from Jovellanos, a poet of the eighteenth century:
“De la Siniestra orrilla un bosque ombrio
Hasta la falda del vecino monte Se extiende; tan aníeno y delicioso Que le hubiera jazgado el gentilisimo Morada de algún dios, ó a los misterios De las Silvanas Dríadas guadado.”
676 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct
The translation of which is:
‘ ‘ From the left shore shady wood extends as far as the skirt of the neighboring mountain, so pleasant and delicious that the pagan world might have devoted it as the dwelling of some God, or to the mysteries of the sylvan Dryads.
The fifth is from a geological report made by Antonio del Castillo, one of the professors in the Mining College of Mexico, in relation to the quicksilver mine of Pedernal, and is as follows:
“ La loma del Durazo esta unida por la parte del sur a otros de la misma formacion que ella separadas por hondonadas o bajios de corta estension, y limitadas al oriente por el mismo arroyo que pasa por la falda norte de la primera.”
The translation of which is:
“ The hill of Durazo is united on the part of the south to others of the same formation with it, separated by ravines of short extent, and limited on the east by the same arroyo which flows by the northern skirt of the first.”
Cross-examination.
Q. Have you any reason for supposing that the Spanish dictionary mentioned by you—the Royal Dictionary of the Spanish Academy, dedicated to Don Felipe V, and printed at Madrid in the year 1732—is the identical dictionary from which the native Californians obtained their definition of the word 11 falda” or any other words in use by them ?
A. I have no reason for so supposing.
On the other hand, evidence from other poets, other dictionaries, and other prose writers, tended to prove that if falda meant skirt, it meant the edge of the skirt, its extremity as well as its higher folds.
In addition to all this evidence on both sides, of geologists, surveyors, scholars, &c., photography and landscape painting both were largely invoked for the cause of justice; and the judges of this court being unable of course to visit the place, three thousand miles away, which the judge below had actually done, sworn representations, the artists’ oaths accompanying their work, were laid before this bench. To bit these photographs and landscapes as part of the “ case,
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 677
is beyond a reporter’s art, as attained to up to this day. The list below, if not giving to the reader an idea of the topography as it existed in nature, will give him some idea of the very special- features of the case as it was exhibited in this court, and bring excuse to the reporter if, without the reader’s having them before him, the narrator has failed to present the “ case” in its truest and clearest form; and with those impressions from it which, after all, may have influenced the decision. Here they are, photograph and landscape alike,—the landscapes without their colors:
PHOTOGRAPHS.
Exhibit No. 1, Photographic View, taken near the junction of the two creeks, looking westerly.
Exhibit No. 2, Photographic View, taken one-quarter of a mile below the junction, looking southwesterly.
Exhibit No. 3, Photographic View of the eastern hill of the Lomita, taken near the junction of the two creeks.
Exhibit No. 4, Photographic View, showing part of the valley and. Pueblo Hills.
Exhibit No. 5, Photographic View, showing continuation of valley and Pueblo Hills, and part of Mine Eidge.
Exhibit No. 6, Photographic View, taken near the hacienda, looking towards the southwest.
Exhibit No. 7, Photographic View, taken near the hacienda, looking towards the northeast.
LANDSCAPES.
Exhibit No. 1, Landscape View, showing Mine Eidge, a portion of the ueblo Hills, and the valley between, looking towards the east.
Exhibit No. 2, Landscape View, showing Mine Eidge, a portion of the Pueblo Hills, and the valley between, looking to the west.
Exhibit No. 3, Landscape View, taken from the west bank of the Alamitos, south of the hacienda, looking southerly up the gorge through which the Alamitos flows.
xhibit No. 4, Landscape View, taken from the same point as No. 3, and °^nS northerly down the gorge through which the Alamitos flows.
xhibit No. 5, Landscape View, taken from the east bank of the Alamis’ a above the hacienda, looking up the gorge. xhibit No. 6, Landscape View, taken from the south bank of the Arroyo c°> a short distance above the junction of the two creeks, looking southwesterly.
678 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for United States.
On this long case the following questions, in effect, now came up for discussion:
1. Did any appeal lie from the “ Survey Act ?”
2. If so, had the United States, who tiled no objections to the survey as made by the Surveyor-General, nor took any appeal below, a right to ask here for a reversal or any modification of the decree ?
3. After the two decrees of the District Court itself, and the two decisions made in this court, was the matter of this eastern line open below for such action as was taken on it by the District Court the last time ?
4. As an original case and on its merits, what and where were the true east and south boundaries of the tract, the west being settled, and the north run for quantity ?
Messrs. Bates, A. Gr., and Wills, special counsel for the United States, who desired to have the decree reversed, or so modified as to make the Pueblo Hills the north boundary, and to place the league in the valley wholly.
I. No appeal lies to any court from the District Court when proceeding under the Survey Act. The act, so far as it grants powers and imposes duties on the District Court, has no reference to the judicial functions of the court as a part of the constitutional judicial system of the United States. All these powers and duties might better in law, and vastly better in fact, be imposed upon some officer, executive and ministerial simply. Congress had no power, under the Constitution, to grant an appeal, if it had wished. The evidence is doubtful that it did wish. The only language used forbids, except under conditions, that which it nowhere grants at all. The only language used is that, “ no appeal shall be allowed from the order or decree as aforesaid of the said District Court, unless applied for within six months.” Appeals come from implication, if they come at all; and in a matter where the whole subject granted is in derogation of regular judicial functions, the incidents of regular functions are not to be inferred.
n. If an appeal does lie—if the case is properly here the p. 679Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 679
Argument for United States.
United States have a right to come and show the errors of the decree, even though no appeal was taken by them. They were parties to the cause in the court below; they are parties here; brought here. No appeal is needed, and if any were needed, it could yet be taken.
JU. We are not concluded by either of the decisions of this court so largely quoted in the statement. The decision in the first case was, that the grant was not of the valley as a valley, but of one league in the valley; and that as the valley contained nearly two, the whole of it could not pass. The second was a dismissal of an appeal, because made from an interlocutory, and not from a final, decree. The argument on this point, as also on the effect of the first and second decisions of the District Court itself on its third and last, now appealed from by Fossat, representing Larios, will be enlarged upon by the counsel of Berreyesa, or his representatives, who follow us.
IV. As an original casé how stands the law on it?
1. As to the. southern boundary. The case shows that the ridges are one mountain; the two parts connected with each other by a low ridge running transversely across the valley, if you will call it so—depression we style it—which separates them. The testimony of Mr. Veatch is full to this point; that of Mr. Matheson also. Then on the diseño of Larios there is but one ridge; no stream is at its base. On the contrary, the Alamitos* is indicated as coming from behind it. It is not enough to say that the diseño is rude or rough. You must show that it is grossly false. Now the Seco on the side of Santa Clara is laid down; the Guadalupe is laid down; the Alamitos is laid down. That is to say, where there are three streams in nature, three streams are put on the diseño meant to represent nature. When, therefore, there are in addition two other places in nature, one with a stream and one without a stream, and you find the diseño representing a place which must be one of them, and may e one just as well as the other, how are you to decide
* Called, on it, the Capitancillos.
680 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct
Argument for United States.
which place is meant? In this way only: If a stream is marked on the diseño, then the place which has a stream, in nature, is meant to be designated. If no stream is marked, the other.
The fact that the ridge meant to be designated is called Sierra del Encino, does not counterpoise this argument. If, indeed, there were but one oak in the1 region—some one oak as much known as Herne’s in Windsor Forest—then the Sierra del Encino would be indicative. But oaks grew here on the Mining Ridge as on the other. Nothing can be argued from a nice point of grammar,—the point of singular and plural. Larios was an ignorant man.
Then putting that part of the Larios diseño which represents the east in juxtaposition to that part of the Berreyesa which represents the west, it is a noteworthy fact that the Sierra del Encino in the former corresponds with the Lomas Bajas, or Mining Ridge, of the latter. This is demonstration, for the two grants are twins.
An argument for our view is, moreover, found in the fact that the grant was of the valley alone. Berreyesa, indeed, asked for the valley, “ with all the lomas or hills that pertained to it.” Larios was less ambitious. His grant says nothing of hills at all, and is for the land called “ Los Capitancillos,” the name by which the valley was itself familiarly known. The Californians were a primitive and pastoral people. What they most desired were valleys inclosed by hills, so that without fences their cattle could never stray. The mountains themselves were of comparatively little use, if, as we may assume, the valley had pasturage enough. As much valley as possible, and as little mountain as might be, was what Larios wanted and received a grant for. What his representatives claim and get is as much of the mountains as they can, and as little of the valley as possible. Look at the tract as delineated by either the heavy continuous or the light dotted line of the map, at p. 65, and the thing appears. What the purpose of Larios was is obvious by considering where he put his improvements, and where e attempted to sell such provisional rights as he had. This p. 681Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 681
Argument for Berreyesa.
was at the base of the Pueblo Hills. The controlling force which the position of his house must have in fixing his boundaries is acknowledged by the decrees, and the house is kept in all the locations. But if the location made by the Surveyor-General is retained, as Mr. Black will contend that it must be, who ever saw such a shaped tract in California ? The California surveys all go in parallelograms, bodies, and even keep to rectangles as much as practicable. Look at the shape of this tract, as designated by the heavy lines on the map just referred to, and maintain it who can ! This court declared when the case was first here, that Larios was to take his land within the three boundaries at his election, under the restrictions established in California. The external or out-boundaries were fixed, but nothing else, and he should have elected rightly.
2. As respects the eastern line. This concerns us less. We, indeed, prefer a straight line. We think it clear that the east line, as surveyed originally, is right enough when produced so far only as to give a league in the valley. The defence of the eastern necessity of the line we may leave to Mr. Black, accepting his view with the restriction stated,—that it does not pass the Mining Ridge.
Messrs. J. B. Williams and Carlisle, for the representatives of Berreyesa, interested in having the decree confirmed, or left undisturbed.
I. Ms to the right of appeal by Fossat. We are content with the decree as made below. We are content with a dismissal of the ease, and a consequent standing of that decree. Herein, and on this first point, therefore, and so far as it aids us, we accept the argument of the counsel who have just concluded.
II. Ms respects the right of tKe United States to ask reversal, they not having appealed. Our interests and views here coincide with those of Larios, or his representatives. In the defence of the well-founded position, that the United States canot ask a reversal, we may leave our case in the hands of t. Black, who follows. In the defence of a good point, no p. 682682 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Berreyesa.
one will argue more ably. Some other of his positions we shall combat, as not within the category.
III. How stands the case affected by anything decided here or below ? Are we concluded by what that court had done or this one has said ?
When the matter was first before the District Court, the question of the eastern boundary was not considered by it. Its opinion, full on the southern line, says nothing about the other. So far as the case shows, that line was not even in controversy; though it is inferable, perhaps, from the guarded and special language of the decree, that a dispute existed in fact. The decree determines the southern boundary, but only designates or describes the eastern line as marked on the diseño of Berreyesa. It said that the L-i-n-d-e-r-o was the boundary between the ranchos. So we say now. The exceptions of Berreyesa are in this same form. But the question remained, where did the L-i-n-d-e-r-o touch the Azul Mountain ? About that the court said nothing.
The decree was reversed in this court, not on any question of boundary, but because the court below had considered that the whole valley passed as a valley. The case was remanded, with directions “to declare the three external boundaries designated in the grant from the evidence on file, and additional evidence to be taken.” On the return of the cause new evidence was taken, and the case again heard. The court, in its second decree, affirmed its former decision with regard to that line, keeping to the language of the grants, and referring to the L-i-n-d-e-r-o again. The decree, as before, had a guarded form. Certainly, it did not declare or show where the L-i-n-d-e-r-o itself would strike the mountains. All that question—the whole question between Larios and Berreyesa—remained just where it was.
From that decree, too, there was an appeal here; but the appeal was simply dismissed as being from a decree not final. No question of merits was decided nor could be.
After being thus remanded, the Survey Act was passed. Berreyesa and others now came in; and a discussion on the eastern line was for the first time in any order.
Argument for Berreyesa.
The court below may or may not have sufficiently explained itself, in its former decree, as respected this eastern line; and by not excluding conclusions, may or may not have guarded sufficiently against the possibility of misapprehension in distant places. Naturally, perhaps, it did not overlay its decree with this sort of matter. But that the court below meant to locate no line specifically but the southern one, and that the eastern one was left upon the basis of the L-i-n-d-e-r-o, whose course remained yet to be settled by survey, will be obvious, we should think, to any one who examines the evidence, the opinion, and the decrees themselves, as taken, delivered, and made at the different times.
Bearing this history of facts in mind, and reading what this court has said by their light, and by its presumable knowledge and recollection of them, we do not conceive that this court has adjudged anything which prevents our considering the case as an original one, though there are, perhaps, expressions in the opinions of a cast somewhat stiff, and slightly difficult to understand, except on a supposition of misapprehension; a matter most natural in so complex and voluminous and novel a kind of case.
Then as an original question:
1. to the eastern boundary. The evidence is that/aWa does not mean base of anything, but does mean the skirt or fold of some waving object. It is a term applied to the person of the other sex, and means often the lap, the loose part of the dress which may be spread out as a lady sits on which an object may lie; but it never means the feet, the shoes. It is a term peculiarly applicable to the graceful curves of this sloping lomita, but philologically inapplicable to its final base. The line we must hold goes over the lomita.
What do we see then in nature and on the diseño ? Standing at the junction of the creeks we see in nature, as we look across the valley, the great heights of Mount Umunhum on the west, and the greater heights of Mount Bache on the east. They are the great features of the landscape. The p. 684684 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Berreyesa.
way in which they raise their lofty heads will be urged as an argument by Mr. Black why the Azul Range, as distinguished from the inferior hills below them, was the Sierra of the grant. Assuredly they were ever visible over the great landmarks of the valley. The same is true, in a less degree, of the Mining Peak. Now on the diseño of Berreyesa wq see the Azul Range plainly delineated. That no one denies. The Mining Range is plainly delineated. That no one denies. On this delineation of the Azul Range we see two elevations just where the lofty peaks should be; and one elevation where the Mining Peak should be. And the L-i-n-d-e-r-o is drawn so as to leave one of those peaks exactly so far to the west, and the others exactly so far to the east. How are you carrying out the purpose of the line when in nature you reverse this whole disposition of the ridge ? It may be said, in reply to us by counsel who follow us, that the strip between Larios and Berreyesa was the only important part of the land; an argument refuted by what we doubt not will be replied to the counsel of the United States, when contending that Larios never had the hills at all; the reply, to wit, that the Mine Ridge had the best pastures of the whole valley, and that this was what any occupant of the valley would have especially valued.
The whole argument which we 'would make is presented in the opinion of the court below. Compelled, as we are, to curtail and mutilate, and so greatly to weaken and injure it, it still expresses our idea. We may abridge it thus:
“ The diseño of Berreyesa, which the prefect availed himself of as being the more exact, is drawn with unusual accuracy. On a mere inspection of it the location would seem indisputable. But it unfortunately happened that the draughtsman mistook the true position of the loma situated in the centre of the Cañada, and represented it as situated to the eastward of its real place.
“ The question therefore arises, is the direction of this line to be determined by those two calls alone, or should it be controlle by other calls and indications of the diseño of higher dignity, and concerning which a mistake was more improbable.
11 It is evident, from the diseño, that the Cañada de los Capí p. 685Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 685
Argument for Berreyesa.
tañedlos was supposed to run in a direction nearly east and west, as the dispute between Larios and Berreyesa only referred to the mode in which the valley should be divided between them. And it was most natural that a line should be adopted dividing the valley in a direction perpendicular to its length. Such a line was accordingly drawn on the diseño, and described in the grants as running towards the south, i. e.,’nearly at right angles to the general course of the valley.
“The object of Berreyesa was to resist the further encroachments of Larios on lands for which, eight years previously, he (Berreyesa) had obtained a provisional title from Figueroa, while the claim of Larios was derived from a purchase of the house of Galindo, and he had, as observed by Berreyesa to the Governor, ‘ room to extend himself outside of the Cañada/ while the latter ‘ had absolutely nowhere to enlarge?
“ It is therefore improbable that Larios would have claimed, or Berreyesa assented to, a line which running diagonally in a southeasterly direction across the valley, would take from the latter a large tract of land, not only of the angle of the creek and the falda., but also being far to the eastward of Larios’ house, and assign to Larios’ cattle almost the entire range of the Lomas Bajas, expressly solicited by Berreyesa in his petition. It may, at all events, be asserted that had such been the intention of the parties, the universal desire of Californians to bound their ranchos by well-known natural objects would have induced them to fix upon the Alamitos Creek as their common limit, and thus secure a certain and precise boundary nearly coinciding with the imaginary line they are supposed to have adopted.
“ The diseño itself affords evidence of the line to which the parties intended to assent. On it the range of the Lomas Bajas is distinctly delineated. At the eastern extremity of this range is a hill of greater elevation than the rest, which is turned on the east by the Alamitos. This hill is undoubtedly the Mining Peak or Hill of New Almaden. The Alamitos is represented as issuing through a gorge between it and a mass of hills further to the east, and running across the plain diagonally to the junction with the Seco.
“ If on this diseño, the line as claimed by the representatives of Larios, be drawn, it would pass to the eastward of the mining peak, and run in» an east-southeast direction, nearly coinciding with the course of the Alamitos. But the line actually marked p. 686686 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Berreyesa.
by the prefect is different. It is drawn in a nearly southerly direction, and it cuts the range of the Lomas Bajas at about one-fifth the entire distance from their western to their eastern extremity, leaving on the left, i. e., on the eastern or Berreyesa side, not only the Mining Hill, but four-fifths of the entire range. Nor does it at all coincide with the course of the Alamitos; but on the contrary, makes with the general course of that stream an angle of perhaps 45°.
“Again, behind or to the south of the Lomas Bajas, is represented the range of mountains called Sierra Azul. On their western extremity is the peak known as Mount Umunhum; while far to the east, the lofty mountain now called Mount Bache, is distinctly delineated.
“ If the line contended for by the claimants be drawn on the diseño, it would run in the direction and over to the eastward of Mount Bache. The line, as drawn by the prefect, strikes the Sierra at a point less than one-sixth of the entire distance between Mounts Umunhum and Bache, leaving five-sixths of the entire range of those hills on the eastern or Berreyesa side.
“ It is therefore evident that to treat the call for the falda, as determining the course of the entire boundary line, we must sacrifice not only the call for the course of the boundary line as expressed in the grant, but every other indication of the diseño. It does not appear that the prefect visited the Canada before adjusting the dispute. The line was assented to by the parties, who must have been familiar with the natural features of the country. The direction in which their common line should cross the valley—the portions of the disputed tract to be assigned to each—the course of the boundary, whether towards Umunhum, so as to leave the greater part of the Lomas Bajas to Berreyesa, or towards Mount Bache, so as to leave nearly the whole range to Justo Larios—whether it was to cross the Alamitos, making a large angle with the general course of that stream, and leaving the gorge through which it debouches into the valley far to the east, or whether it was to run towards the gorge and in a course not far from parallel with that of t e Alamitos,—all these have points which we must suppose to have been determined, and on which it is highly improbable that the diseño could have erroneously represented the agreement of the parties. ,
“ The question is not whether the calls for the angle of t e p. 687Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 687
Argument for Berreyesa.
creeks and for the falda shall be rejected, for these natural objects were undoubtedly agreed upon as fixing the limits of the two ranchos, but whether we shall allow the subsequent direction of the line to be determined by their relative position, concerning which there was an evident mistake, and give to it, where produced, a course entirely inconsistent with the course specified in the grant, and clearly indicated by natural objects on the diseño.
“ If the position of the falda was to determine absolutely the course of the boundary beyond, the prefect could hardly have supposed that he had removed all cause of dispute.
“ The term ‘ falda’ does not indicate any point on a hill, but a part of it. It signifies the slope or radix montis. It probably applies, in strictness, only to the lower slope, or that part lying between the plain and a line drawn midway between its slope and its summit, though it seems sometimes to be applied to the entire slope. But giving it the more restricted interpretation, it is insufficient to fix the direction of the line with any certainty. The lomita in question is situated at a comparatively small distance from the angle of the creeks. If the boundary is to be the production of a line drawn from the angle to some point on the falda, a variation of the position of the latter of perhaps a few yards will so change the course of the line where produced as to materially alter the dimensions of the tract.
“ The boundary, therefore, would still have been left within considerable limits arbitrary and uncertain. If it be said that the point on the falda intended to be adopted is shown by the diseño, it may be answered that the diseño also shows, by unmistakable natural objects, the direction of the line, and that its course is to be determined by those indications. Notwithstanding that, the parties erroneously supposed and represented on the diseño that the line so drawn would pass by the eastern base of the hill.
“ Compelled, as we are, to resort to the diseño to ascertain the location, we discover the nature of the error into which the parties fell, and discern what was their intention when the line was agreed upon. It was designed to divide the valley between the disputants by a line across or at right angles to its general course. On the north it was to commence at the angle of the creexs. At the south it was to terminate at a point opposite, crossing the Lomas Lajas and striking the Sierra at the points p. 688688 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Larios.
indicated on the diseño. The/aZda of the lomita was also adopted as the western limit of the flat land on the Berreyesa side, and it was supposed erroneously, as now appears, that a straight line could be drawn between the points just mentioned which would cross the eastern base falda.
“ As that is fofmd to be impossible, it has seemed to me that the call for a straight line should be rejected, and the boundary fixed by drawing a line from the angle of the creeks to the falda, and thence across the valley points in the Lomas Bajas, and the Sierra, to which the diseño shows it was intended to be drawn.”
The court below makes a line not straight. We should ourselves have preferred a straight line crossing the loma, as the term/«Ma, we think, was used to allow this. The word was used in distinction to the pie de la loma, or base of the hill. As in a skirt there is a certain looseness, something wavy, so here the precise place was not designated, except as the diseño of Berreyesa designates it. That renders it certain by showing where it passes through the Mining Ridge. If that diseño be nicely measured, it will be seen that t 8^j of the whole length lie to the eastward, and T’08a to the westward of the L-i-n-d-e-ro. The Mining Ridge having a defined length, the point can be ascertained. However, we have no objection to the line as settled by the court below. It comes to the same result essentially as that we desire.
2. As to the southern boundary. Our interests here are identical with those of Larios; and we leave a reply to the Government counsel on this point with counsel who follow.
Mr. Black, with whom was Mr. Cushing, for Fossat, representative of Larios, seeking to reverse the decree, and re-establish the line as run by the Surveyor-General.
. I. The Government doubts and denies the right of any appeal. When a doubt exists about the right of a citizen to appeal, that doubt is always to be resolved in favor of the right. The right of appeal to the highest judicial tribunal of the country is a sacred right, like that of trial by jury in a common law case, which is never denied upon doubt u
Argument for Larios.
construction. Here it is not even doubtful. One argument is made from the special language of the act as regards appeals. But the appeal is given by implication; and what a statute gives by implication it gives as much as if it gave expressly. The law declares that “ no appeal shall be taken, unless applied for within six months.” Does not that imply that an appeal taken before the expiration of six months is valid and good ?* Another argument is, that the duties enjoined by the Survey Act are not judicial at all, but ministerial wholly. Is this clear? The constant, universal, and unhesitating construction given to the law by the District Court, by all the profession in California, by all the counsellors practising in this court, and by this court itself—matters of common knowledge to this court and to the profession—is sufficient to overbalance both arguments; mere doubts, in fact, thrown by the Attorney-General into the other side of the scale.
n. Can the United States now come here with obj&tions ?
The survey was brought into court under the act of 1860. A monition called on all, parties who were interested in it to appear and make objections, if any objections they had. The United States made no objections at all. If the Government had objections to the survey, we had a right to know
The form of this enactment, it may be noted, presents the same sort of sentence which is seen in the provision of the Constitution of the United States relative to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The privilege, &c., shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebelión or invasion, the public safety may require it,” &c. The sentence, says r. Binney, in commenting on it in a recent fine essay, is elliptical. When t e ellipsis is supplied it reads, “ The privilege shall not be suspended, on ess, &c., and then it may be suspended. The clause is a grant of power
conditions it prescribes. The first member of the sentence pro-
18 the power in its general or unconditioned state, and the second mem^r reverses the first so far as to authorize it under essential conditions.
is a well-known idiom of our language and of most languages, and is Jn common use when it is intended to affirm and deny something at the 0^ *n ^^eren* asPects; and this is such a use as the law takes notice ° in t e interpretation of statutes. It is the loquendum ui valgus, which is ^P°Pular and universal right, and held in respect by the law. (The !vi ege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Part I, p. 10, and Part III, p. 29.). vol. II. 44 p. 690690 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct
Argument for Larios.
them then and in that court, so that if they were true we could obviate them by such a modification of the survey as might seem necessary; so that, if they were false, we might produce evidence, to show it; and so that, if the.case should ever come into this appellate court, we might have evidence on record which would prove the truth. To change the survey here upon grounds that were concealed from us in the court below, is to condemn the party without a hearing. To hear us in this court upon a record which does not contain the evidence which might have been given in the court below, is no hearing at all. Independent of which it is certain that the Attorney-General has a right to determine whether the Government will proceed. In this case he did determine. He did not proceed; and that concludes the right of the United States.
ITT. The question of the Unes of this tract is not open as an original question. It has been settled; settled by the court below, settled by this court, and by both more than once. The decree below stands in full force and unimpeachable by virtue of its own inherent and essential force. Even if the grant had been a floating one, the court decreed that it was fo*r a specific league of which it set out the boundaries. This would end things. When, too, the case was first here, it was declared that the land granted to Larios had boundaries on three sides, which were well defined by objects upon the ground, and that the fourth line was capable of being ascertained as fully as either of the other three by the simple process of a survey. After this all that remains is that we ascertain where those boundaries are. We have but to look at the calls of the grant, and to look at the topography of the place, apply one to the other, and the thing is done. Certainly no intimation dropped from this court on either of' the occasions, when the case was here before, that any further judicial act was to be done in the premises. On the contrary, the last opinion says expressly: “ The obligations of the United States to this grantee will be performed y the performance of the executive acts which are devolve y the grant on the local authority.”
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 691
Argument for Larios.
IV. But how is the matter as an original question ?
1. As to the southern boundary. On this side stands the main Sierra,—the Sierra Azul,—which lifts up its head nearly 4000 feet toward the sky. Of course, this mountain forms the great feature of the landscape. It is visible in every direction for nearly fifty miles. There it stands looming up against the background of the southern sky, and limiting the horizon to every eye that is raised in that direction. Of all natural objects, this is the one least likely to be mistaken for any other. By all distinction it is the Sierra, if there be more than one Sierra in the case, a matter which we deny; for one ridge is “ the Sierra,” the' other the Lomas Bajas. An attempt has been made to confound the mountain and the low hills together. The only reason ever given for saying that they are one and the same is, that they are connected together by a low ridge running transversely across the valley which divides them.
But does that connection between the hills and the mountain make them one and the same elevation ? Such connections between different elevations are so common that it seems to be a law. The Laurel Hill and the Alleghany, two parallel ranges of mountains in Pennsylvania, are connected together by the Negro Mountain Ridge, which runs across the valley between them, and divides the waters of the Monongahela from those of the Alleghany River; but nobody has ever thought that the Laurel Hill and the Alleghany are the same mountain for that reason. The same thing occurs with many mountains.
As it is with elevations of the earth’s surface, so it is with bodies of water; they may be connected together without being the same thing. The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea are. connected together at the Straits of Gibraltar; but no system of geography teaches us that the island of Sicily is, therefore, an island in the Atlantic. The Golden Gate connects the waters of the Pacific with the Bay of San Francisco; but suppose a county line, or the line of a land grant, calls for the ocean as its terminus, would any surveyor p. 692692 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Larios.
think he had responded to that call by running to the waters of the bay ?
Mr. Veatch, the geologist, himself says that the two ridges and the mountain are “separated,” “detached;” and Matheson, the other witness, the surveyor, calls the low hills a “ spur,' connected.” These witnesses use words which are a contradiction of themselves. Connection between two things does not imply identity, but diversity. When a man tells you that two things are one and the same thing, because they are connected by a third thing, he talks that peculiar kind of nonsense which even an intelligent man may talk when he does not know what he is talking about.
Even if it were a misnomer to call this separating space a valley, does that make any difference ? The people there understood themselves when they called it so; and for practical purposes it does not matter whether the name was scientifically adjusted to the subject or not. We know what is meant when a person speaks of sunrise and sunset, although it be true, astronomically, that the sun neither rises nor sets. For all the purposes of common life, the whale is called a fish, though natural history tells us that he belongs to another order of animals. If these parties asked for the Canada de los Capitancillos, meaning to include all the land up to the Azul Mountains, and the Governor understood that he was granting all the land to these mountains, it matters not whether, properly, it was all valley land, or all mountain land.
But the fact is that it is a valley, and it is but one valley. It is watered by these two streams, the Alamitos and the Capitancillos, from their sources on each side of the ridge already spoken of, to the point at which they meet and form the Guadalupe River.
Mr. Veatch, a mineralogist, swears that they are geologically one. Does he mean to say that the Sierra Azul is filled with cinnabar? If so, why does the United States make the struggle for the mine? Even if the great range and the small one were one geologically, topographically, and in many other ways, the case of the Government is not helpe p. 693Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 693
Argument for Larios.
The question is, which or what is the Sierra ? Now, Sierra applies only to a range of mountains; a mountain chain. Salva, in his Dictionary of the Spanish Academy, defines it, “ Praerupti montes;” rugged mountains. The term applies specially to a chain of mountain peaks; serrated heights. The low hills and the high hills behind may be one body. Still the former may be the “ Lomas Bajas,” and the latter “the Sierra;” and that is exactly what the diseño of Berreyesa, made at the time of the Larios grant, shows that they were respectively and generally called.
But the counsel of the United States argue that by the diseño of Larios the Sierra del Encino is delineated on the southern side of the tract, and the Pueblo Hills on the northern; while the Lomas Bajas are not laid down at all. What is meant in the nomenclature of that country by the Sierra del Encino cannot be a subject of the smallest doubt. The great oak tree on the side of the main elevation proves itself. When Larios called the mountain depicted on his map by the name of Sierra del Encino, it was impossible to say that he meant the minor range, which was never called by that name.
But the counsel have “ demonstrated” the fact to be otherwise. They take the diseños of Larios and Berreyesa, put them together, and by a little pulling and hauling make the Sierra del Encino, on one map, nearly fit to Lomas Bajas on the other.
Now, if two adjoining tracts of land were both carefully measured by the same person and with the same instruments, and a map of both made upon the same scale, you would expect the different parts to fit one another; but otherwise you would not, and could not, expect any such thing. These two tracts were never measured at all. The maps were made without measurement, by different persons, without concert between them, and without the slightest reference in either to any kind of scale or proportion. The chances that an object delineated upon both would be laid down at places exactly corresponding, do not amount to one in a million.
694 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Larios.
Then it is said that, in this case, the petition, as well as the grant, was for the valley, and the valley extends to the foot of the low hills; that this is the natural boundary of the valley; and the natural boundary of the valley is the legal boundary of the grant: ergo, our limit must be the foot of the low hills, and not the mountain, where we have proved that our line runs. These facts are not true; but assume them to be so, and look at the logic. The proposition means, if it means anything, that the name by which a ranch is called in the grant ought to determine its limits, and not the lines which are expressly given as boundary lines. Let us see how such a rule would work.
All the grants in California, or nearly all, have names. These names are selected arbitrarily, and very often without any regard to the fitness of things. One person calls his rancho by Spanish words which signify “ a willow grove,’ because there are willows on a few acres of it at one corner. According to this new doctrine, he can take nothing but the grove, though his lines may include a hundred times as much. Another has a tract that is called “ Los Picos, because there are several sharp hills in the centre.* Shall he be held to the tops of the hills ? Another is named “ Islet de Santa Rosa,” because a river runs through the tract, and in the river is a little island called “ Santa Rosa;” but the tract itself is five or six leagues in extent, while the island contains not more than three or four acres. A gentleman known to me is owner of a grant named in the title-papers “Rio de los Americanos.” Measuring it by the lines given in the grant, it extends along the bank of the American River four leagues, and has a depth of two leagues. To this he is entitled, if the calls of the grant prevail; but, if the name that the Governor called it by is the only standard, then the bed of the river is all he can take.
The reductio ad absurdum is furnished, however, in this very case. . The grant issued to Berreyesa is named “ Cañada de los Capitancillos.” The grant to Larios is for “Los Capdan-
*
See supra, map facing p. 564.
Argument for Larios.
cilios.” Berreyesa must, therefore, have the Valley of the Little Captains, while Larios can take nothing but the little captains themselves.
But that which is conclusive on this question of the southern boundary is—
i. That the Mexican Government and both its grantees show clearly what range they meant when they spoke of “the Sierra;” and show, moreover, that they meant the Azul Range, or, as they call it, the “ Cierra Azul.”
ii. That they distinctly include the range before it, the Mining Range, as a part of the property owned by the disputants.
The diseño of Berreyesa, in all that concerns the course and termination of the L-i-n-d-e-r-o, was a chart common to Larios, Berreyesa, and the Mexican Government. Now on this the Mining Range is called the Low Hills (Lomas Bajas). The Azul Range is called the Cierra Azul! It is the only thing on any map called a Sierra at all. It is “ the Sierra,” therefore, of the case. How irrelative all evidence about geologic or topographic natures in the face of designations given and fixed by the very parties concerned!
Then a reference to the diseño shows that the L-i-n-d-e-r-o is brought over or through the Mining Range to the Sierra Azul. This dotted line was meant to divide between Larios and Berreyesa land which, between them, they, and not the Mexican Government, owned. It is absurd to suppose anything else. We must presuppose a grant; whether conditional or other, it matters not. Independently of which the Prefect who drew the line was an agent of the Government. The Governor knew what he did, and ratified his act. And when the line is drawn so as to show that the Mining Range id not belong to the Government, who was interested to c a^m it if it did, it operates as explanation for every one, and, as respects the Government, for an estoppel also.
2. As to the eastern boundary. I aver that this eastern ine, which constitutes one chief subject of dispute, is fixed with a certainty that belongs to no other land boundary in a California. What are the facts ? Larios and Berreyesa p. 696696 The Fossat Case. [Sap. Ct.
Argument for Larios.
lived near to each, other, below the foot of the Pueblo Hills, not far from the creek. They cultivated but little land, for the plain reason that they had no land which was fit for cultivation. They lived upon the produce of their flocks, as Job and Abraham and Saul and David. Their wealth consisted in the large flocks of horses and cattle and sheep that roamed over the hills immediately before their residence. Each of them claimed a league of land, but they had no titles which would stand the test of judicial scrutiny. The dividing line between them had never been legally established; they could not prove where it was; neither could assert his right against the other; yet the land that lay between their houses, and upon the hills in front of their houses, was more valuable to them than añy other land claimed by either. It was the portion of their land least likely to be given up without a contest. In these circumstances it was the most natural thing in the world that a dispute should arise between them about the division line. Accordingly you find that in the spring of 1842 something like a quarrel did take place. This waked them up to the necessity of having their domains legally defined. Both of them, almost simultaneously, sent in petitions to the Governor, each asking for a grant to himself by the boundary that he claimed. The petitions and the diseños show ■what was the subject-matter of the controversy. Berreyesa insisted upon a line running directly past the house of Larios, so that Larios could not put his foot out of his own door without becoming a trespasser on the land of Berreyesa. The dispute then was about a narrow strip of land between them, and extending from the Pueblo Hills to the foot of the Sierra. In their circumstances it was worth a struggle.
The history of this line is before us; and it would be one of the strangest events that ever occurred in the history o human affairs if it were true that this line was not, after al, so clearly established as to be indisputable. It ran through a region where natural objects abounded, by which it cou be intelligibly described. The parties were perfectly famihai with the whole face of the land. They knew Mount Umun p. 697Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 697
Argument for Larios.
hum, the Mine Peak, and every peak—though as yet these reared their heads unnamed by modern names—as I know the fingers on this hand. They desired to define their own boundary with perfect clearness. They invoked the aid of the public authorities to assist them. They were satisfied that they had succeeded. The Prefect who advised them was also convinced that he and they both understood where the line was to be, and so did the Governor. Can it be that they were mistaken ? Let us take the description of the line which they agreed upon, and see whether there is any ambiguity about it.
The beginning-point fixed upon is the junction of the two creeks. About that fact there has never been any dispute. What was the course of it ? They said it should run from the starting-point southward. The legal meaning of “ southward” is due south, if there be nothing else to control it. But a natural object was called for, the eastern base of a small hill—loma or lomita—which rises, not far from the forks of the creek, from the midst of the surrounding level land of the valley. The call for a south line and for the eastern base of that hill happen to be precisely consistent. They declared that this' south line, running past the eastern base of the hill, should go straight to its terminus without angle, crook, or bend. It remains that we ascertain what the terminus is. Before them, on the course of the south line, lay the green hills upon which their cattle were feeding at that moment; and in the blue distance behind the hills rose the Azul Mountains, barren, rugged, and bare, two thousand feet higher than the hills. To say that they did-not know the difference between their own pasture-grounds on the hills and the barren mountain beyond the hills, is sufficiently preposterous. It is still more absurd to suppose that they would voluntarily exclude their pasture from the grants they were asking for, and leave the hills vacant, so that the Governor might grant them the next day to some body else, who would drive tneir cattle down upon tue dusty plain, where every horn and hoof of them would starve in a week.
698 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Larios.
This description, considered alone, without reference to the map, makes the line too clear for doubt. They did intend to start at the forks of the creek, to run southward past the eastern base of the loma or lomita, and onward by a straight line over the hills to the foot of the main Sierra.
But the Prefect knew very well that a mere verbal description, which reaches the mind only through the ear, is always liable to perversion. He determined, therefore, that he would leave it to no quibbling argument upon the meaning of words; he would submit it to the more faithful sense of sight; it should be an ocular demonstration. He took the map which had been prepared by Berreyesa, and on which every object referred to in the description of the line was carefully, though rudely, laid down and marked in such a manner as to make it certain what was meant by it. There was the Sierra Azul, the lomas bajas, the loma, or lomita, and the watercourses, with the name of each object written under or over it. The Prefect took this map and drew across it a dotted line, beginning at the forks of the creek, and going straight past the eastern base of the lomita, over the hills to the foot of the mountain. He referred in his report to this map of Berreyesa with the dotted line upon it, and made it a part of his report. It is referred to in both the grants as showing where the true line is.
Every survey, official and unofficial, public and private, has concurred. All agree that the line starts at the spot, is on the course, and terminates at the place where we say it does. No surveyor, with the grants and the diseños in his hand, could fail to find the place of beginning; no one could miss seeing the eastern base of the lomita; nor was it possible for human perversity not to perceive that the terminus of the line was the foot of the great Sierra. The line was marked by monuments which could not and would not be trifled with. The blue mountains, the green hills, and the rolling streams testified to it with a voice which no sophistry could obscure and no perjury could contradict.
On the other side of the question, the principal name that p. 699Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 699
Argument for Larios.
is used is Mr. Lewis, assisted by some of the pastoral and amatory poets of old Spain. You cannot read the testimony of Mr. Lewis without perceiving that he is a man of considerable ability, and of skill in his profession as a draftsman. He has great talents; great, especially, for confusing that which is plain. He was a professional surveyor; and willing to sell his talents to anybody that would pay the price for them. This man was employed for years in doing everything that a surveyor and a draftsman could do, except going upon the ground, running the line in dispute, and saying whether it was at the right place or the wrong one. For months he has been kept running over the hills, measuring every height and chaining every hollow, and making maps and diagrams of all the ranches for fifteen miles around. At one time you hear of him at the top of Mount Umunhum, four thousand feet up toward the sky. The next thing you know, he is down in some dark hollow, measuring away at something else, but always as far as he can possibly get from the line in dispute. One day he is off ten miles to the east of Berreyesa, and then again he is surveying a rancho somewhere north of the Pueblo Hills, clean out of sight of this region.
But Mr. Lewis is not enough. The poets of Spain come to his aid. Refreshing no doubt it is to find ourselves in the poetic literature of that renowned, romantic land. It will enrich a report and encourage a reader. I shall not, how-eyer, go into the profundities of Castilian lore; the more as it is shown that neither Larios, Berreyesa, nor the Prefect probably, had the Spanish dictionary, dedicated to Don Philip V, and printed at Madrid in the year 1732, near them when they settled the L-i-n-d-e-r-o. It is not likely either that they were better acquainted with Martin, Cadalso, or even Jovellanos, charming poets though they all be. Admit thatjfafokz does mean skirt. What then ? What does skirt mean? The great lexicographer of our language, Dr. Johnson, gives us one of its meanings: “ Edge, margin, border, extreme part.” What is the edge or extreme part of a hill but its base ? Richardson says:
700 The Bossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for Larioa.
“ Skirt, from Seyran, to cut, to dissolve, to separate. The part where the continuity is separated; a separate part or portion; the edge, the border, the bound or boundary.”
Illustrations which he gives are these: “ The water’s edge skirted with precipices.”—Anson’s Voyages. « The skirt or outer part of the island .... is woody.”—Dampier's Voyages.
“ Mighty winds,
To sweep the skirt of some far-spreading wood Of ancient growth.”—Cowper’s Task.
But I am not going into these curiosities of etymology; “ the science where consonants signify little, and vowels nothing at all.” The question has slightly to do with these. It is a question of intent, nor wholly even of that, but largely one of law.
Assuming the authority of both—of Mr. Lewis and of the pastoral poets—the District Court made the decree we seek to reverse. The opinion has been partially read. The first noticeable thing in it is, that it concedes to us every fact which we have ever asserted with reference to the division line. The court admit that the true beginning of it is at the forks of the creek; that it runs thence southward by the eastern base of the lomita. It also admits, that the call of the grant is for a straight line upon that course up to the mountain. Why, then, did it not follow the call as the Surveyor-General had done before, as the court itself had done in former adjudications ?
The court say, that when Berreyesa and Larios agreed to that line, they intended it to run, not south, but perpendicularly to the general direction of the valley. I deny this utterly. In their agreement before the Prefect, and in the grants which both afterwards accepted, they declared their intention that it should run south, and not a word is said about perpendicular. But the intention thus expressed by themselves is disregarded, and a different intention imputec to them, without evidence. It is remarkable, too, that the court, after assuming without evidence that their intention was to make a perpendicular line, does not order the line o
Argument for Larios.
be run according to this assumption. It directs the line to be carried southward to the base of the lomita, then makes an angle, and runs fifty-four degrees west for a certain distance, where it makes another angle, and then goes thirty-four degrees west of south to the mountain. Neither of these lines is perpendicular to the course of the valley; for certainly the valley cannot have three perpendiculars.
The court below commits another error of fact when it declares that the position of the lomita was misunderstood by the parties. If there is one thing in this case more striking than another, it is the remarkable accuracy with which the agreement and the grants defined the relative position of that little hill and the beginning-point of the line.
The court below thinks, and in this it is followed by Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Williams, that it can see in the shape of the Sierra Azul, as drawn upon the diseño of Berreyesa, the different portions of the mountain as existing in nature. The court assumes that certain parts of it, which are larger than other parts of it, are intended for Mount Bache and Mount Umunhum, and proposes that the line shall be run so as to strike the mountain at the place where it terminates on the map of Berreyesa, assuming that it knows where that place is. Now, no one can cast even a careless glance upon the figure which Berreyesa called by the name of Sierra Azul, without seeing that it can bear no sort of resemblance to the natural mountain itself. It was not intended to be a picture of the mountain. If one part is higher or lower than the other it was mere accident. All the reasoning upon which this hypothesis proceeds, is based upon the assumption that the different objects delineated upon the map are laid down in their proper proportions to one another, and that the different parts of the same object are also duly proportioned. Admit that assumption to be false, and the whole argument falls. The assumption is false. There is no pretence of proportion about the map. Here is a fact which sets it in a very striking light. The house of Berreyesa is proved to be exactly thirty feet wide, yet it occupies upon the map one-fifth of the space of the whole valley. If the p. 702702 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct
Argument for Larios.
valley is proportioned to the house, it is only one hundred and fifty feet wide. If you take the valley to be, as it is at that place, nearly a mile wide, and the house to be laid down in proper proportion, then that house covers about two hundred acres of ground; and if it be high in proportion to its width, it is ten times as high as all the pyramids in Egypt, piled upon one another. The same logic that proves this to be Mount ITmunhum, and that to be Mount Bache, would have shown with equal certainty that Berreyesa lived in a structure so vast that all the men in America could not have put it up ini half a century.
But suppose that one or both of the parties, at the time they made that agreement, had actually believed that a straight line, run upon the course which they agreed to, would strike the mountain at a different place, would that be a reason for setting aside the agreement and disregarding the grants, after the acquiescence of all parties for twenty years ? Certainly not. If a surveyor had gone upon the ground, and had run that line, when the grants were not more than a month old, and Larios had said that he was disappointed in the “ outcome ” of the line he agreed upon, could any officer run it contrary to the grant for that reason ? No. The answer would be, “ Your agreement has been executed; the grants have been made to you and to your neighbor both,—to you for the land on one side, to him for the land on the other side,—and it is now too late to repent.”
But this map of Berreyesa does show conclusively that both he and Larios understood perfectly that the straight line which they bargained for would run where it does run, east of the ridge, and east of the mine. The ridge divides the waters of the Capitancillos from those of the Alamitos. The mine is near that ridge. The Alamitos Creek is lai down on Berreyesa’s map. The division line, the line in controversy, as laid down on the diseño itself, runs across the Alamitos Creek, the whole of which is east of the mine, not across the Capitancillos, which is west of it. If the par ties were familiar, as everybody admits that they were, wit
Argument for Larios.
the ground, then the line must have been intended by them to run very nearly, if not exactly, where it does. This fact, showing the place where they intended to cut the creek, is as conclusive upon the subject as any fact of that nature can be, and is absolutely without contradiction.
To reverse this decree is a legal necessity, and you cannot do that without restoring the division-line to the place where the Surveyor-General located it. There is no other place for it. You cannot find, in all this record, any other description of that line which it is possible for you to follow. If you take the exceptions of the Berreyesa party themselves, you find them describing the Surveyor-General’s line as the true one; nor is there a spark of evidence which would justify any court in adopting another.
May it please the court, reverting to the question of the southern line, I have to say that in it the honor of the United States is deeply concerned. The land we are claiming never belonged to this Government. It was private property, under a grant made long before our war with Mexico. When the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo came to be ratified—at the very moment when Mexico was feeling the sorest pressure that could be applied to her by the force of our armies and the diplomacy of our statesmen—she utterly refused to cede her public property in California, unless upon the express condition that all private titles should be faithfully protected. We made the promise. The gentleman sits on this bench who was then our minister there.* With his own right hand he pledged the sacred honor of this nation that the United-States would stand over the grantees of Mexico, and keep them safe in the enjoyment of their property. The pledge was not only that the Government itself would abstain from all disturbance of them, but that every blow aimed at their rights, come from what quarter it might, should be caught upon the broad shield of our blessed Constitution and our equal laws.
*
Clifford, J.
704 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
It was by this assurance, thus solemnly given, that we won the reluctant consent of Mexico to part with California. It gave us a domain of more than imperial grandeur. Besides the vast extent of that country, it has natural advantages such as no other can boast. Its valleys teem with unbounded fertility, and its mountains are filled with inexhaustible treasures of mineral wealth. The navigable rivers run hundreds of miles into the interior, and the coast is indented with the most capacious harbors in the world. The climate is more healthful than any other on the globe; men can labor longer with less fatigue*. The vegetation is more vigorous and the products more abundant; the face of the earth is more varied, and the sky bends over it with a lovelier blue. Everything in it is made upon a scale of magnificence which a man living in such a common-place region as ours can scarcely dream of—
“ Which his eye must see,
To know how beautiful this world can be.”
That was what we gained by the promise to protect men in the situation of Justo Larios, their children, their alienees, and others deriving title through them. It is impossible that, in this nation, they will ever be plundered in the face of such a pledge.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This case has already been twice before the court.* It was very ably and elaborately argued at the bar on both occasions, and fully considered by the court. There is very little, if anything, left that is new to be considered or decided upon the present argument.
The main question in contestation in the two preceding arguments, and which has again been ably and elaborately presented, is that involved in the settlement of the soutnern boundary of the grant, whether or not the foot of the Sierra, the mountain range, or the Lomas Bajas, a range of low hil s north of it, constituted this southern boundary. The Board p. 705of Commissioners adopted the Sierra, and its decree, in this respect, was confirmed by the District Court. On an appeal to this court the same line was fully recognized.
*
The court, after referring to the lines of the grant to Larios, and to the Sierra, as described in the grant to Berreyesa, the west line of which was a line in common between the two ranches, as agreed upon between the parties previous to the issue of either grant by the Governor, say, “ The southern, western, and eastern boundaries of the land granted to Larios are well defined, and the objects exist by which those limits can be ascertained. There is no call in the grant for a northern boundary, nor is there any reference to the diseño for any natural object, or other descriptive call to ascertain it. The grant itself furnishes no other criterion for determining that boundary than the limitation of quantity, as expressed in the third condition.” The decree of the District Court was reversed, for the reason that it confirmed to the claimant a larger quantity of land than was embraced in the grant, and the cause was remitted to that court to enter a decree in conformity with the opinion. As it became necessary to remand the cause for the purpose of locating upon the ground the quantity as limited by the above decision, authority was given to the District Court to fix the boundaries from the evidence on file, and such other evidence as might be produced before it. On filing the mandate in the District Court, the counsel for the United States applied for liberty to furnish further evidence, which application was granted. Several witnesses were examined accordingly, their testimony relating chiefly to the southern boundary of the tract, as described in the grant. The court had suspended the entry of the decree, in pursuance of the mandate, until after this evidence was furnished. The decree was filed and entered October 18, 1858. • It reaffirmed t e Sierra, or mountain range, as the southern boundary, and directed the line to be so drawn as to include the bottom and low lands along the base of this Sierra, and declared the eastern line to be a straight line commencing at the junction o the Arroyo Seco and the Arroyo de Alamitos, and thence vol. n. 45 p. 706706 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
running southward to the aforesaid Sierra, or mountain range, passing by the eastern point of the small hill situated in the centre of the cañada, which was designated in the grants to Larios and Berreyesa, being the same line agreed upon between them as a division-line, and which is delineated by a dotted line on the diseño or map in the expediente of Berreyesa. It declares also the western boundary to be the Arroyo Seco, which is the continuation of a stream known as the Arroyo Capitancillos, and the northern boundary to be a line or lines located, at the election of the grantee, or his assigns, under the restrictions established for the location and survey of private land claims in California, in such manner that, between the northern, southern, eastern, and western lines, there shall be contained one league of land, and no more.
The decree then fixes the western line of Fossat, which is a line between him and the Guadalupe Mining Company, that owns one-fourth of the league granted to Larios, and confirms to Fossat the remaining three-fourths within the lines above declared.
This decree was appealed from by the United States to this court.* The court dismissed the appeal as prematurely brought, the decree below not being* a final decree.
In the opinion dismissing the appeal, it is said, after referring to the case when previously before us,f “ The court had determined that the grant under which the plaintiff claimed land in California was valid for one league, to be taken within the southern, western, and eastern boundaries designated therein, at the election of the grantee and his assigns, and adds, the District Court, in conformity with the directions of the decree, declared the external lines on three sides of the tract claimed, leaving the other line to be completed by a survey to be made. From the decree, in this form, the United States have appealed.”
The court then answers the objections taken to the motion p. 707Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 707
to dismiss, which were, that .the inquiries and decrees of the Board of Land Commissioners and of the District Court could relate' only to the question of the validity of the claim, and not to questions of location, extent, and boundary, and that the District Court had gone in its decree to the full limit of its jurisdiction. These objections, after a full consideration of the acts of Congress, of adjudged cases, and of the principles upon which the court was bound to proceed, were overruled; and the court observe that, in addition to the questions upon the validity of the title, there may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of the claim; and that, in affirming a claim to land under the Spanish or Mexican grants to be valid within the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the usages of these governments, we imply something more than that certain papers are genuine, legal, and translative of property. We affirm ownership and possession of land of definite boundaries rightfully attach to the grantee. And in closing the opinion, it is observed that, “ After the authenticity of the grant is ascertained in this court, and a reference has been made to the District Court to determine the external bounds of the grant, in order that the final confirmation may be made, we cannot understand upon what principle an appeal can be claimed until the whole of the directions of this court are complied with, and that decree made. It would lead to vexatious and unjust delays to sanction such a practice.”
It will be seen, from this opinion, that the reasons for the conclusion that the decree of the District Court was not a final one, were, that the land granted had not been located on the ground by fixed and definite boundaries. A survey of the tract was indispensable in order to locate the northern boundary. That boundary .was not given in the descriptive calls of the grant, and depended upon the limitation of the quantity; and until the survey of the three lines given, namely, the eastern, southern, and western, and the three-fourths of a league of land located within them, the northern p. 708708 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
boundary could not be ascertained or fixed. The location of this line was an essential step to be taken on the part of the District Court, in fulfilment of the duty enjoined by the mandate of this court. In the interpretation of that mandate, this court, in its opinion,* observes, “ The District Court, in conformity with the directions of the decree, declared the external lines on three sides of the tract claimed, leaving the other line to be completed by a survey to be made.” That had not been done.
On the filing of the mandate of dismissal of the appeal in the District Court, an order was made directing the Surveyor-General to proceed and survey the land confirmed in conformity with the decree as entered in that court, and which, as we have seen, was entered on the 18th October, 1858. That survey was made and is found in the record. It was approved by the Surveyor-General 18th December, 1860, and filed in the court below 22d January, 1861. We have also the testimony of Hays, the deputy surveyor, who surveyed the lines on the ground, and constructed the map; also of Conway, a clerk in the office, who assisted him, and of Mandeville, the Surveyor-General, who approved of the map, showing that the survey and map were made in strict conformity with the boundaries of the tract as given in the decree, of which they had a copy, and followed as their guide.
This survey having been made in conformity with the decree of the District Court, entered in pursuance of our mandate, would, doubtless, have closed this controversy, had it not been for the act of Congress passed 14th June, 1860, after the entry of the decree in the District Court, but before the survey of the tract by the Surveyor-General. The act purports to be an act to regulate the jurisdiction of the Dis trict Courts of the United States in California, in regar to the survey and location of confirmed private land claims. It authorizes the court to allow intervenors, not parties o the record, to appear and contest the survey, or in the wor s
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 709
of the act, “ to show the true and proper location of the claim,” and for that purpose to produce evidence before the court, and directs that, “ on the proofs and allegations, the court shall render judgment thereon.” Any party dissatisfied with the decision may appeal to .this court within the period of six months.
Under this act several parties intervened, and much testimony was furnished to the court in relation to the survey and location of the tract by the Surveyor-General, and which is found in the record, embracing some two hundred and twenty pages. And on the 16th November, 1861, the court entered an order reforming the survey, as to the eastern line. Instead of adopting the eastern line of the survey, which had been located as directed in its decree, and which was a straight line from the point of beginning to the termination at the Sierra (the southern boundary), passing by the eastern point or base of the low hill in the centre of the Canada, the court directed that, from the base of the low hill, the line south should be deflected fifty-five degrees west, until it reached a given point or object, and from thence south thirty-four degrees west till it reached the Sierra, or mountain range. Instead of a straight line for the eastern boundary, three lines were directed to be run, at considerable angles to each other, between the starting-point and the termination. This direction of the court not only reformed the survey of the tract as made by the Surveyor-General, but reformed the decree itself of the court, entered on the 18th October, 1858, in pursuance of which the survey had been made. The court assumed that the survey and location of the tract was not to be governed by the decree, but, on the contrary, that it was open to the court to revise, alter, and change it at discretion, and to require the Surveyor-General o conform his survey and location to any new or amended decree; for, certainly, if it was competent to change this eastern line from that settled in the decree, it was equally competent for it to change every other line or boundary as there described and fixed.
ow, it must be remembered, that this decree of the Dis- p. 710710 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
trict Court designating with great exactness this eastern line, with such exactness that the Surveyor-General had no difficulty in its location, was entered in pursuance of, and in accordance with, the mandate of this court, and by which that court was instructed the time of the dismissal of the appeal, that the three external lines declared in it were in conformity with the opinion of this court; and that the other line—the north line—only, remained to be completed by a survey to be made, and that this line was to be governed by quantity, which quantity had been previously determined.
This radical change, therefore, of the eastern line of the tract, involves something more than a change by the court of its own decree; it is the change of a decree entered in conformity with the mandate of this court. But we do not intend to place any particular stress upon this view, for we hold that it is not competent for the court to depart from its own decree in the exercise of the power conferred by the act of the 14th June, 1860. The duty enjoined is not a rehearing of the decree on its merits, it is to execute it, to fix the lines on the ground in conformity with the decree entered in the case. The decree is not only the foundation of the validity of the grant, but of the proceedings in the survey and location of land confirmed. But, independently of this view, which we regard as conclusive, and even if the question was an open one, this alteration is wholly unsustainable. Indeed, the learned counsel for the appellees did not undertake to sustain it on the argument. The fact was admitted that the line was a straight one between the two termini.
An attempt, however, was made to sustain the termination of the line at the same point on the Sierra, or southern boundary, consistent with the line being run straight from the point of starting. This is sought to be accomplished by disregarding one of the descriptive calls in the line, a natural object, namely, the eastern base of the low hill, an objec which must have been visible to the eyes of both Larios and Berreyesa at the time they agreed upon the settlement o the line as their common boundary. But even this departure from the grant will not answer the purpose. There is p. 711still the difficulty of getting at the point of termination at the foot of the Sierra. That point or corner must first be ascertained before a straight line can be extended to it from the junction of the two creeks, the starting-point. The only description in the grant by which this point of termination can be ascertained is by running a line from the junction of the two creeks past the eastern base of the low hill southward to the Sierra. It is the extension of this line, in the manner described, by which this corner on the Sierra is reached and identified. Any one seeking to ascertain it without the use of these means, will find himself without compass or guide.
Now, this corner the learned counsel for the appellees propose to fix arbitrarily or by conjecture, and then by drawing a line from the junction of the two creeks to it, a straight line is obtained, and by this process of ascertaining the corner at the Sierra, it is made easy to select the one reached by the crooked line of the court below. But then, the line, as is admitted, instead of passing by the eastern base of the low hill, would cut it not far from or even west of its centre.
The court below, as is apparent,.yielded to this argument, so far as respected the arbitrary selection of the corner at the Sierra, but refused to depart from the call in the line for the eastern point of the low hill. Hence, the crooked line between that point and the termination. The crooked line has the advantage over the straight one of the learned counsel, as it observes one of the principal calls in the grant. Theirs observes none of them except the starting-point.
There are two objections to this view, either of which is fatal.
The first, the point selected at the foot of the Sierra for a corner, is arbitrary and conjectural, and in contradiction to t e clear description in the grant. And, second, it disregards one of the principal and most controlling calls in it, the eastern base of the low hill.
Our conclusion upon this branch of the case is, first, that t e court erred in departing from the eastern boundary, as p. 712712 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ut.
specifically described and fixed in the decree of the 18th October, 1858. And, second, that irrespective of that decree, the line in the survey and location approved by the Surveyor-General, 18th December, 1860, is the true eastern line of the land confirmed.
The only party that appealed from this order or decree of the District Court, in respect to the survey and location, as appears from the record, is the present claimant. He insists upon the correctness of the first survey by the Surveyor-General, and that the alteration by the court of the eastern line, and consequently of the other lines made necessary by this change, are erroneous.
The United States did not appeal. They are, howAer, a party to the record as appellees, and appeared by counsel on the argument in this court, and took objections to the survey and location, mainly on the ground that the proceedings under the act of 1860 were not judicial, but purely executive and ministerial, and, as a consequence, that the appeal from the order or decree of the District Court, regulating the survey and location, ought not to be entertained; that the courts could only determine the validity of the grant, leaving its survey and location to the Executive Department of the Government. In other words, that the act of 1860 was unconstitutional and void. We need only refer to the opinion of this court, in the present case, the second time it was before us, as presenting a conclusive refutation of these several positions. The fundamental error in the argument is, in assuming that the survey and location of the land confirmed are not peoceedings under the control of the court rendering the decree, and hence not a part of the judicial action of the court. These proceedings are simply in execution of the decree, which execution is as much the duty of the court, and as much within its competency, as the hearing of the cause and the rendition of its judgment; as muc so as the execution of any other judgment or decree rendere by the court.
This power has been exercised by the court ever since t e p. 713Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 713
Spanish and French land claims were placed under its jurisdiction, as may be seen by the cases referred to in the opinion of the court in this case, when last before us,* and in many others to be found in the reports. The powers of the Surveyor-General under these acts were as extensive and as well defined as under the act of 1851. The act of 1860 did not enlarge or in any way affect his powers. They remained the same as before.
The first act of Congress, March 2d, 1805,f amended March 3d, 1806, establishing a Board of Commissioners to settle private ‘ French and Spanish land claims, under the Louisiana treaty, provided for a survey of the confirmed tract by the Surveyor-General, under the direction of the commissioners.
And the act of 26th March, 1824, the first act which placed these land claims under the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts, provided that a copy of the decree of the confirmed claim should be delivered to the Surveyor-General, and that he should cause the land specified in the decree to be surveyed, and which survey, being presented to the Commissioner of the Land .Office by the claimant, entitled him to a patent. Under this act and. other similar acts, the cases referred to in 21 Howard arose, and in which this court entertained appeals from decrees in the District Courts upon the survey and location of confirmed claims. The 13th section of the act of 1851 corresponds substantially with the above provision of the act of 1824. It makes it the duty of the Surveyor-General to cause all confirmed claims to be accurately surveyed, and provides that the claimant, on presenting a copy of the decree of confirmation and a plat of survey to the General Land Office, a patent shall issue. It also confers upon this officer the powers of the registers and receivers, under the 5th section of the act of March 3d, 1831,J which relates simply to the case of interfering confirmed claims.
* 21 Howard, 445. f 2 Stat. at Large, p. 441 ; 6, 7. + 4 Stat, at Large, 494.
714 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
The duly of the Surveyor-General, under all these acts, is to survey and locate the confirmed tract, in conformity with the decree. It is the only guide which is furnished to him; and one of the first instructions from the Land Office is as follows: “In the survey of finally confirmed claims you must be strictly governed by the decree of confirmation; and when the terms of such decree are specific, they must be exactly observed in fixing the locality of and surveying the claim.” This instruction was given under the act of 1851, and in relation to the private land claims of California; and it was in accordance with this instruction that’the survey of the present claim was made and approved by the Surveyor-General, 20th December, 1860, and filed in the court below 22d January following, and which was reformed by the court by the alteration of the eastern line, as already explained. Those who are desirous of putting the Land Office above the decrees of the courts, should at least be satisfied with this instruction of the department, if not with the decrees.
It has been argued, that the lines of the tract, as given in the grant, were out-boundaries, like the case of Fremont and others which have been before the court, and embraced a larger area of land than the one square league, and that the survey and location should not have been controlled by these lines as specific boundaries.
The first answer to this objection is, admitting it to be true, it can have no influence upon the judgment to be given by this court. These lines have been adjudicated and settled, and incorporated in the decree of the District Court, and which decree was entered in pursuance of the mandate of this court, and no appeal has been taken from that decree. It is said, however, that the decree was not in conformity with the mandate. If so, the party aggrieved should have appealed, and this court would have corrected the error. This is common learning, and needs no authority.
The error, it would seem, was not discovered until the survey; but this affords no reason for violating establishe law. The more natural conclusion, we think, is that t e p. 715Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 715
omission to appeal was the result of a conviction the decree was right. It was entered after much testimony taken in respect to it, and full argument on behalf of the very parties who now set up this pretext.
The second answer io the objection is, that the lines in the grant are not out-boundaries in the sense of the cases referred to.
This court said, when the case was first before it, “ The southern, western, and eastern boundaries of the land granted to Larios are well defined, and the objects exist by which these limits can be ascertained. There is no call in the grant for a northern boundary, nor is there any reference to the diseño for any natural object, or other descriptive call to ascertain it. The grant furnishes no other criterion for determining that boundary than the limitation of the quantity as expressed in the third condition.” And the same opinion is substantially expressed by the court when before it the second time. The court say: “ The District Court, in conformity with the directions of the decree, declared the external lines on three sides of the tract claimed, leaving the other line to be completed by a survey to be made.” It should be remembered this was said of the decree now in question, which was then before the court. The observations were made in express reference to it.
But, independently of this, and looking at the question as an original one, there can be no reasonable doubt about it. The eastern line was in dispute between the two adjoining rancheros (Larios and Berreyesa), and which was carried before the public authorities for settlement, and there finally adjusted by the agreement of the parties. A line could hardly be made more specific. A boundary settled and fixed after litigation by the adjoining owners. The western boundary is a well-known natural object, the Arroyo Seco—a creek. The southern, the Sierra, or mountain range; and no boundary on the north. The grant was of quantity, and of necessity this boundary must be determined by the limitation of that quantity between the lines given. p. 716716 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
It is true, in the second condition of the grant it is said, the judge who shall give possession of the land shall have it measured in conformity to law, leaving the sobrante, the surplus, to the nation. But this is a formal condition, to be found, for abundant caution, in every Mexican grant. There is no sobrante here, nor could the judge have measured the grant according to the law or ordinance in a way to have any. Aside, therefore, from the lines being fixed and specific according to the opinion of this court, and of the decree of the court below in pursuance of it, there could be no reasonable doubt upon the question, if an original one.
Much has been said on the argument in respect to the first locations and residences of the claimants on the low lands outside of this northern boundary, and as to the duty of the court to so locate this boundary as to include these possessions. But the answer to these suggestions is obvious. At the time these claimants took possession of the tract, they supposed they were entitled to a larger quantity of land than one league,—nearly two leagues,—which would have carried this line over and beyond these possessions. But this court cut down the quantity to one league, and hence these possessions are, with the exception of the old house of Larios, necessarily excluded. It *is also said that sales were made to third persons in the valley outside of the line, and that their title should be protected. But they are not complaining of the survey or location as made in pursuance of the decree. Some of them appeared before the District Court, and filed objections to it, but have since withdrawn and abandoned them. We do not refer to these objections as entitled to any particular weight or importance, but because the explanations are at hand, for we place the decision of the case upon the ground that the boundaries of the tract have been settled by the final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, and until that decision is got rid of, there is an end of the controversy.
Our conclusion is that the order or decree of the court below, of the 16th November, 1861, which set aside the sur-
Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 717
vey of the tract approved by the Surveyor-General, 18th December, 1860, and which order or decree was directed to be filed nunc pro tunc, as of the 31st October, 1861, and, also, the order or decree of the 16th November, 1861, confirming the new survey, which was filed in court by the Surveyor-General on 11th of that month, be reversed and annulled, and that the cause be remitted to the court below, with directions to that court to enter a decree confirming the survey of the Surveyor-General, approved 18th December, 1860, and filed in court 22d January following.
The only objection that can be made to this survey is, that the tract is not located in a compact body. A comparatively small strip or tongue of land is extended from the main body along the eastern line north to the junction of the two creeks, with a view to reach the starting-point of the description in the grant. This was unnecessary, as we have seen, for the cutting down of the quantity to a league necessarily carried the north line further south than originally supposed. This northern line might have been closed with the eastern direct, instead of adopting the divergence north to the junction of the two creeks. But the quantity of land embraced in this strip is unimportant, is of no interest to any one except the Government, and scarcely any to it, as, if corrected, an equal quantity must be taken to make out the quantity in the grant from some other part of the public lands. Besides, the Government has not appealed.
To remit the case with directions that a new survey be made in conformity with the decree, and for the purpose of correcting this small error, would occasion delay and expense, and benefit no one.
The truth is, since the determination that the southern boundary of the tract was the Sierra, and not the Lomas Bajas, and that the eastern was a straight line, its direction southward to be controlled by the eastern base of the low hills, there is nothing left of this controversy worth contending for—scarcely merit enough to make it respectable.
Decree reversed and the cause remitted, with directions p. 718718 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
to enter a decree confirming the survey approved by Surveyor-General, 18th December, 1860.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD dissenting.
I concur in the opinion that the true division-line between the rancho of Justo Larios and that of José Reyes Berreyesa is a straight line, and consequently that the decree in question should be reversed, but I dissent altogether from the directions given to the court below and from the reasons assigned in support of those directions. Some brief reference to the title-papers and to the facts and circumstances of the case is indispensable in order to a clear understanding of the nature of the controversy and of the grounds of my dissent from the views expressed in the opinion pronounced in behalf of a majority of the court.
I. Appellant, in his original petition to the commissioners appointed under the act of the 3d of March, 1851, prayed for the confirmation of his title to an undivided interest of three-fourths in a certain tract of land lying in the County of Santa Clara, .n the State of California, and known as the Cañada de los t apitancillos, which, as he alleged, was contained within certain natural boundaries. When he presented the petition, he filed with it copies of the expediente and of the original grant under which he claimed, and his representation was that he held the title to the tract through certain mesne conveyances therein mentioned and described. Referring to the expediente, it will be seen that it consists of the petition of Justo Larios, the original donee of the tract, addressed to the Governor, together with the diseño and the usual marginal decree and the concession or vista la petición and the titulo or original grant. Provisiona grant of the land it seems had been made at some ear y period by the Ayuntamiento of the Pueblo of San José Guadalupe to one Leandro Galindo, who built a hoiise on the premises and lived there for many years prior to t e grant of Justo Larios, or to any application by him for e same« House of the occupant was north of the highway an pretty close to the southern base of the Pueblo Hills. rl p. 719Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 719
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
ginal claimant, Justo Larios, in his petition to the Governor, dated at Monterey, on the sixteenth day of June, 1842, represented that he had purchased from the owner of the house all the right he had to the land by virtue of that provisional concession. Such provisional concessions, it is known, were often made, and that it frequently became necessary for a subsequent applicant for a grant of the same tract to purchase the improvements made by the occupant as a means of facilitating his own application. Petitioner describes the tract as a place known by the name of the Cañada de los Capitancillos, and states that the limits of said tract are from the boundaries of Santa Clara to the corral, called the corral of the deceased Macario. Decree of concession recites that Justo Larios is the owner in full proper .y of a part of the land called Cañada de los Capitancillos, bounded by the Sierra, by the Arroyo Seco, on the side of Santa Clara, and by the rancho of the citizen José Reyes Berreyesa, which has for boundary a line commencing at the angle formed by the junction of the Arroyo Seco and the Arroyo de los Alamitos, thence southward to the Sierra, passing the eastern base of the small hill situated in the centre of the cañada.
II. Attention to the description given of the cañada, as contained in the concession, will show, especially when it is taken in connection with the language of the petition, that all of the boundaries of that part not previously granted are either expressly given, or so clearly indicated, as to amount to the same thing, and to leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the granting power. All will agree, I suppose, that the course of the Arroyo Seco, on the side of the church property called Santa Clara, was well known. Properties of that description were usually well defined, and there is not the slightest pretence of evidence in the case to show that this line was ever in dispute. West line of the tract is, therefore, fixed beyond peradventure. East line of it, as agreed on all sides, is the west line of the rancho of José Reyes erreyesa. Controversy arose at one time between the original proprietors of those ranchos as to that division-line;
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
but it was duly settled by competent authority. Nothing need be added upon that subject, as I agree that the line should be a straight one, as assumed in the opinion of the court; but I insist that it commences at the angle formed by the junction of the Arroyo Seco and the Arroyo de los Alamitos, and runs south to the Sierra, wherever that may be. Beginning is at the angle formed by the junction of those two Arroyos, and that angle, as all must agree, is north of the house built by Leandro Galindo, and close to the~base of the Pueblo Hills, on the northern side of the cañada. Larios purchased that house and the adjacent improvements, and was living in the house when he presented his petition to the Governor, and when the grant was made. He asked for the valley, alleging that he had occupied-it “ since the year 1836;” and it was part of the valley which was granted to him, as will presently more fully appear. Rancho of José Reyes Berreyesa lies east of this tract, and of course the west line of that rancho is the east line of the claim under consideration. Grant to José Reyes Berreyesa is the elder grant, and as the tract in question is bounded on that rancho, it is both proper and necessary to refer to the title-papers in that case, and to look at the actual location of that grant upon the land, to aid in the solution of the present controversy. Grantee, in that case, became possessed of a part of the same cañada or valley, in the year 1834, un er a grant from Governor Figueroa, and he continued to occupy it with his family until 1842, and perhaps later. During t a year he complained to the Governor that his neighbor, us o Larios, had disturbed his possessions, and prayed that t ere might be granted to him two sitios of the valley, extent mg from the house of Justo Larios to the matadero or slang ter house, erected by him at the easterly end of the valley, W1 all the hills that belong to the cañada.” Commissioners con firmed his claim for one league, and on appeal the ecree was confirmed by the District Court. Appeal was upon taken to this court, and this court held that t e con cession and titulo described a parcel of land include wi æ natural boundaries, but that the conditions of the gran co p. 721Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 721
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
fined it to a single league in quantity, and affirmed the decree of the District Court, ordering “ the land to be located according to the description, and within the boundaries set out in the original grant, and delineated on the map contained in the expediente.”*
III. All, or nearly all, the improvements made by the claimant in that case also were north of the camino or highway, and close to the Pueblo Hills on the northern side of the valley. He built two houses, and they were and are both situated nearly as far north as the angle formed by the junction of the before-mentioned arroyos. Northern boundary of the cañada, therefore, was evidently understood by the grantees of both these ranchos to be, what it is in truth and faith, the southern base of the Pueblo Hills. Southern boundary of the cañada is described as the Sierra, and much effort is expended in the attempt to prove that by the word Sierra is meant the Sierra Azul, or the main Sierra. Be that as it may, still, in my view of the case, the opinion of the court is clearly founded in error.
But I deny that the cañada, or valley, as described in the title-papers, and as understood either by the respective petitioners, or by the granting power, extended southwardly beyond what are called the Lomas Bajas, or low hills. Those hills, or certain portions of them, are seventeen hundred feet above the level of the Bay of San Francisco, and might well have been regarded by the petitioners and the Governor as the northern base of the main Sierra. Evidence shows that there is no table-land between those hills and the main Sierra, which is called the Sierra Azul, and that they are only separated from the higher range by a narrow, bro-en, irregular gorge, which forms the bed of the Arroyo de los Capitaneólos, through which tumble the waters of that stream on their way from their source in the highlands to the southern skirt of the valley below, which takes its name rom the name of the arroyo by which it is watered. Party t on interested asked for the sobrante of the cañada lying
VOL. II.
722 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
between the Arroyo Seco, on the side of Santa Clara, and the rancho of José Reyes Berreyesa; but the Governor refused to make the grant in that form, but limited it to one sitio de ganada mayor, or to one league of a larger size.
IV. Application was for the sobrante of the canada; but if the quantity of the table-land was insufficient to meet the requirement of the grant, then there would be some show of reason for giving the document a more liberal interpretation, so as to include within the boundaries the quantity granted. No such difficulty, however, arises in the case, because, in any view taken of the subject, the quantity included within the out-boundaries is more than double the quantity to which the claimant is entitled.
Stripped of all side issues, therefore, the only question is, whether the grant which was for the lands of the valley shall be located there or upon the mountain, which is the southern boundary of the valley where the land lies for which the petitioner asked when he made his application to the Governor.
V. Suppose it were otherwise, and that the main Sierra, or Sierra Azul, is really the southern boundary of the valley, still I maintain that the directions given to the court below to enter a decree confirming the survey of the twentieth of December, 1860, are plainly and clearly erroneous. Operation of those directions, when they are carried into effect, will be to locate the principal portion of the claim upon the Lomas Bajas, and to exclude all the table lands except the narrow strip called in the opinion of the court a tongue, which is more than a mile in length, and only from twenty to thirty rods in width, and borders on the west line of the adjacent rancho. Survey apparently was commenced at the main Sierra on the line of the rancho of José Reyes Berreyesa, and runs northwardly on that line entirely across t e valley to the angle formed by the junction of the Arroyo Seco and the Arroyo de los Alamitos, whereas it should have been commenced at the angle formed by those two arroyos, and run north for quantity, so as to have included the valey for which the petitioner asked when he applied to the o p. 723Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 723
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
<ernor for the grant. Having determined to commence south and run north for quantity, it became necessary to make that narrow strip or tongue, else one of two things would follow which must be avoided. Either the tract would not include the house of the claimant, or it would exceed the quantity of one league if it included the quicksilver mine. Apparently it was a sine quâ non that it should include the mine, and it was doubtless thought desirable that it should also include the house of the claimant, because it must have been known that the usages and customs of the country required it in the location of such grants.
Besides the recital of the concession is, that the rancho of José Reyes Berreyesa has for boundary a line commencing at the angle of the two arroyos before mentioned, and it may be that it was thought proper to have some regard to that recital. But it would not do to take more than a narrow strip of the valley, because if more was taken, either the mine must be excluded or the quantity would be too great, and hence all the residue of the table lands must be excluded. Boundaries in the grant are the same as those given in the concession, and consequently are subject to the same observations. Second condition of the grant is, that the donee shall solicit the proper judge to give him juridical possession in virtue of the decree, by whom the boundaries shall be measured out; and he shall put on the boundaries, in addition to the landmarks, some fruit trees or useful forest trees. Third condition describes the land as one league of the larger size, and the requirement is that the judge who shall give the possession shall have the land measured in conformity to law, leaving the surplus which remained to the nation. Land commissioners confirmed the claim for one league, but on appeal taken by the claimant to the District Court that decree was reversed, and a decree entered confirming the claim as one for the whole tract with specific boundaries. Whereupon an appeal was taken to this court, and this court reversed that decree, and decided that the claim was for one league of land, to be taken within the southern, western, and eastern boundaries designated therein, p. 724724 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
and which was to be located at the election of the grantee or his assigns, under the restrictions established for the location and survey of private land claims in California, by the Executive department of the Government. Plainly this court then decided that the grant in this case was not one by specific boundaries, but was a grant by quantity, to wit, for one league of land. And the court go on to say that the external boundaries designated in the grant may be declared by the District Court from the evidence on file, and from such other evidence as may be produced before it, and the claim of an interest equal to three-fourths of the land granted is confirmed to the appellee. Nothing can be plainer, I think, than the fact that it was the out-boundaries of the Canada that this court authorized the District Court to declare. Decree of the District Court then under revision declared the grant to be one of specific boundaries, and assumed to fix them, but this court reversed that decree and declared that the grant was not one of specific boundaries, but a grant for one league of land, and expressly declared that it was to be taken within the three boundaries named, and was to be located at the election of the grantee or his assigns, under the restrictions established for the location and survey of private land claims in California, by the Executive department of the Government.*
VI. Where there are no guides in the title-papers, and the claimant has made no improvement, nor done any act, as by sale of a part, or otherwise, to influence the decision as to the location, the regulations of the Executive department, as a general rule, allow the claimant an election as to the location within the external or out-boundaries of the tract or place described within the grant, subject to the qualification that he must take the land in a compact form, and as far as practicable, leave the residue in the same condition. But where the title-papers furnish a guide, or where he as built a house, or made other improvements on the claim, or where he has sold a part of his claim, very different ru es p. 725Dec. 1863.] The Fossat Case. 725
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
prevail. Locations under such circumstances are made to conform as near as may be to the intent of the granting power as indicated in the title-papers; always, however, subject to the qualification that it must include the improvements of the claimant, and, as far as is consistent with the public interest, be made to conform to the parts conveyed, so that the location may be in one body, and leave the public lands in the same condition. Reference undoubtedly was made by the court to these rules, when it is said that the location must be made under the restrictions established by the Executive department of the Government. These suggestions are sufficient, I think, to demonstrate beyond cavil, that the boundaries mentioned in the opinion of the court in that case, were the external boundaries, and that it was those boundaries which were to be fixed by the District Court, and not the specific boundaries of the claim, else there would have been nothing to which the restrictions established by the Executive department of the Government could be applied. Taking this view of the opinion in that case, it is clear and consistent, and if it had been followed the case would have been free from all embarrassment. Grant of claimant was declared to be a grant by quantity, to be located within certain out-boundaries, three of which were already ascertained, and it was left to the District Court to ascertain the fourth from the evidence on file, and such other evidence as might be taken by the parties, but the survey and location were to be made under the rules and regulations of the land department. Mandate of this court was that the decree of the District Court should be reversed, and that the cause be remanded with directions to enter a decree in the case in conformity to the opinion of this court, pinion of this court was, as before stated, that an interest equal to three-fourths of the land granted should be conrmed to the claimant, and that the District Court should ascertain the northern boundary of the Canada, and when 1 at was done, that the land department should make the survey and location. Cause was remanded; but the District °urt, instead of following the mandate of this court, on the
726 The Fossat Case. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
eighteenth of October, 1858, entered a decree defining the ; f specific boundaries of the claim.
VH. Appeal was taken to this court by the United States, but this court dismissed the appeal, holding that it was improvidently taken, and remanded the case for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity to the opinion of this court. Decision in effect was that this court had no jurisdiction of the case, and hence the opinion of the court upon any matter connected with the merits of the controversy can hardly be regarded as authority; but it is not necessary to decide that point, as the court, in express terms, reaffirm what had been decided in the first case. Both decisions of this court in this case, therefore, show that the grant is one by quantity, to be located within the boundaries of the Canada, and I entertain no manner of doubt that such is the true construction of the grant. Such a claim should be surveyed and located under the rules and regulations of the Executive department, whether it be made by the Land Office or by the courts. Location as decided in the opinion of the court in this case will be in violation of every one of those rules and regulations, and will also be diametrically opposed to the opinions of this court in the two cases to which reference has already been made. These propositions, as it seems to me, are not refuted in the opinion just pronounced, even if they are not impliedly admitted; but the suggestion is that the District Court, in the decree of the eighteenth of October, 1858, decided that the grant was one with specific boundaries, and proceeded to fix them in the decree, and that the decree then entered is in full force and unreversed, and that inasmuch as the appeal taken by the United States was dismissed and no new appeal was taken, the decree is binding on this court, although it was contrary to the mandate of this court given in the same cause. Considering i® peculiar nature of the jurisdiction in this class of cases, cannot admit* that doctrine. Proceedings in this class o cases are very different from the proceedings in suits at com mon law. Where the grant is of a tract by specific boun a-ries, there would be some force in the argument, because in p. 727Dec. 18R3.J The Fossat Case. 727
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
that class of cases it is incumbent upon the court not only to determine the question of confirmation, but also, if it be decided to confirm the claim, to determine the boundaries of the grant as a part of the original adjudication.
VIII. Such, however, is not the rule, and never was where the claim is what is called a floating claim, or where the grant is one by quantity, to be located within certain out-boundaries, embracing a larger tract than the grant. All the courts have to do in such cases is to decide the question of confirmation, and leave the location to the Executive department of the Government. Attention, however, is called to the act of the fourteenth of June, 1860; but the answer to that reference is, that the provisions of that act have nothing to do with the decree of the District Court, entered on the eighteenth of October, 1858, nearly two years before the act was passed. Opinion of the court undertakes to vindicate the directions given in the cause, not upon the ground that the provisions of that act apply in the case, but upon the ground that the prior decree of the District Court had the effect to determine the controversy, and really that no further survey and location are necessary. Questions of this magnitude cannot be evaded, and ought not to be under any circumstances. Having given the subject all the consideration in my power, I am of the opinion that all that part of the decree of the District Court, rendered on the eighteenth of October, 1858, which attempts and professes to fix the boundaries of the claim in this case, was coram non judice, and utterly void. Reluctant as I am to differ from the majority of the court on this occasion, still I have much satisfaction in reaching that conclusion; because, if twenty millions of property must pass from the United States to those who have no pretence of title to it, I am not willing to cast the blame of such a monstrous result upon the office of the Attorney-General, or to place my decision ln such a cause upon a mere technicality. Patient and thorough investigation has convinced me that the title to the quicksilver mine is in the United States, and it shall never pass into other hands by my vote while that p. 728conviction remains, although I may stand alone. If this great wrong must be done, I would that it could have been done upon some other ground; for it seems that, in the opinion of the court, the case has been pending six years since it was finally and conclusively decided, which is an anomaly, perhaps, never before witnessed in a judicial tribunal. In my view of the case, the decree of the court should be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to order a new survey under the rules and regulations of the Executive department of the Government.
Lowber v. Bangs.
A stipulation in a charter-party that the chartered vessel, then in distant seas, would proceed from one port named (where it was expected that she would be) to another port named (where the charterer meant to load her), 11 with all possible despatch,” is a warranty that she will so proceed; and goes to the root of the contract. It is not a representation simply that she will so proceed, hut a condition precedent to a right of recovery. Accordingly, if a vessel go to a port out of the direct course, the charterer may throw up the charter-party.
Ex. gr. A vessel, while on a voyage to Melbourne, was chartered at Boston for a voyage from Calcutta to a port in the United States. The charter-party contained a clause that the vessel was to “proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch.” Before the master was advised of this engagement, the vessel had sailed from Melbourne to Manilla, which is out of the direct course between Melbourne and Calcutta, and did not arrive at Calcutta either directly or as soon as the parties had contemplated. The defendants refused to load; an upon suit to recover damages for a breach of the charter-party, it was held that the charterers might rightly claim to be discharged.
Bangs & Son being owners of the ship Mary Bangs, then at sea, on her passage from New York to Melbourne, chartered her at Boston, on the 4th June, 1858, to Lowber, who was there, for a voyage from Calcutta to Philadelphia, &c. The charter-party contained the following clauses:
“ Ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch. It is understood that the ‘ Mary Bangs’ is now on her
Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 729
passage from New York to Melbourne (sailed 3d day May last); that the owners will use the most direct means to forward instructions to the master, with copy of this charter, ordering it to be fulfilled; but should it so happen that the ship should arrive at Melbourne before these instructions, and the master should have ■ engaged his ship before receiving them, this charter will be void.”
No provision, it will be observed, was made for the case of the vessel’s having left Melbourne unengaged, or, indeed, for anything but for her arriving at Melbourne, and her engagement before receiving the instructions promised by Bangs & Son, to be sent. The vessel reached Melbourne on the 7th of August; she discharged her cargo, and was ready to sail on the 7th of September. She waited for the mail until the 16th of that month. It was due there on the 5th of September, but by an accident did not arrive until the 14th of October. The voyage from Melbourne to Calcutta, at that time of the year, usually consumed from forty-five to sixty-days. Had the vessel proceeded to Calcutta direct, she ought to have reached there before the middle of November. She went, however, to Manilla, much out of the direct course from Melbourne to Calcutta, and arrived there on the 16th of November. She left Manilla on the 24th of January, and arrived at Calcutta on the 26th of February, more than three months after the time at which she ought to have arrived, if she had gone there directly from Melbourne. The owners addressed to the master five letters, of different dates, advising him of the charter-party, and directed them to Melbourne. The charterers, on the 23d of June, despatched an agent to Calcutta, who arrived there on the 25th of August. As soon as he learned that the vessel had not come direct from Melbourne, he declined loading her under the charter-party. Freights, it may be added, had largely fallen between the date when the charter-party was made, and that of the vessel’s arrival at Calcutta; and, also, that after the arrival of the Mary Bangs, and after she was ready and had offered to receive a cargo, the charterers engaged another vessel, of about the same tonnage, to take her place, p. 730730 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the owners.
and loaded her with a cargo purchased after the arrival of the Mary Bangs, with funds provided for her. The case thus showed that the object of the voyage had not been frustrated.
On error from the Massachusetts Circuit, where the case had come before the court as a case stated, the question presented for the determination of this court was, whether the fact that the ship proceeded from Melbourne to Manilla and thence to Calcutta, instead of going to Calcutta from Melbourne directly, gave the charterers a right to avoid the charter-party; in other words, whether the clause, “ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch,” did or did not make a condition precedent; whether, in short, it constituted a warranty, or merely a representation ? The court below considered that it was not a condition precedent, but an independent stipulation, which gave the charterers a claim for damages on failure of performance by the owners, but did not give them the right to avoid the contract; the object of the voyage not having been wholly frustrated. Judgment was given below accordingly.
Mr. Curtis, for the owners.
1. The meaning of the clause is, that the owners would have the vessel at Calcutta “ seasonably.” She was so there, as is proved by the charterers having got another vessel after the arrival and loaded her. The voyage was not frustrated, nor was even inconvenience felt. The charterers threw up their charter only because freights had greatly fallen, and it was for their interest to do so. The argument which gives to the expression in question its severest meaning is unreasonable. If the master, after receiving his instructions at Melbourne, had stopped unnecessarily for but an hour, had gone to see a friend, had sailed by any but the shortest possible line, had not kept under the utmost press of sail, the charter would be void. The ship would not have proceeded from Melbourne to Calcutta with “allpossible despatch.” The argument makes the obligation to sai dependent, not on the receipt of the instructions, but on her p. 731Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 731
Argument for the owners.
actual ability, at the moment, to sail. Who, on this construction of the instrument, could settle whether the contract had or had not been complied with? It might be confidently affirmed, that on this interpretation of such words no contract containing them ever had been, or ever would be, fulfilled. The more strict you make the construction, the more difficult you make it to be practically settled. You are also drawing within its scope things of no real effect. Can it be supposed that reasonable men, making a contract reaching over half the globe, and having before their eyes the contingencies which were certain to occur in distant seas and ports, could have thus contracted ? Why give to a practical instrument a construction so impracticable ?
2. It has been decided, in a large number of English cases, that such clauses as “ ship to proceed with all convenient speed,” or “ in a reasonable time,” and similar clauses, are not, in charter-parties, conditions precedent, but are merely independent stipulations; and unless the alleged breach goes to the whole root and consideration, it only gives a claim for damages. In Tarrabochia v. Hickle* the charter contained a provision, that the vessel should “ sail with all convenient speed.” The jury found, in an action for refusing to load, that the vessel did not sail with all convenient speed; but the court held that this was no excuse for a refusal to load, because it did not appear that the object of the voyage was wholly frustrated by the breach of the stipulation. In Dimech v. Corlett,] the vessel was described as now at anchor in the port of Malta; and it was agreed that “ she, being tight, stanch, and strong, and properly manned, and every way fitted for the voyage, should, with all convenient speed, proceed in ballast to Alexandria, Egypt.” The ship was not then finished, and did not get ready to sail for more than a month. Held, that the failure to sail “with all convenient speed” was no answer to an action for a refusal to load, because the charterer had not shown that the object of the charter-party was frustrated p. 732732 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
1
Hurlstone & Norman, 183. j- 12 Moore, Privy Council, 199.
Argument for the charterers
by the delay; it not being “ shown that the charterer had taken up any other vessel or declined any cargoes, or in any way altered his position, in consequence of the delay.” In Clipsham v. Vertuef it was held, on demurrer, that a failure to perform a stipulation in a charter-party, to sail “ within a reasonable time,” was no answer to an action for not loading; it not being alleged that the purpose of the voyage was frustrated. In Freeman v. Taylorf the charter contained a stipulation to proceed from the Cape of Good Hope to Bombay 11 with all convenient speed.” The master wilfully deviated, and went to Mauritius, and caused a delay of six weeks. The court directed the jury to find whether the deviation deprived the defendant of the benefit of the contract.
In some cases, it has been held in England that a stipulation in a charter to sail on or before a day certain was a condition precedent; and such stipulations were distinguished from those containing the words, “ all convenient speed,” “within a reasonable time,” and “with all possible despatch.”! Such was Baron Pollock’s idea in Tarrabochia v. Ilickie', but there appears to be no decision in which a clause similar to that in this case has been held to be a condition.
Mr. S. Bartlett, contra.
1. The contract is explicit and clear. “ Ship to proceed from Melbournef—not from Manilla, or any other port in the Eastern seas, where she might at any time be found. •“ With all possible despatch;” that is to say, direct from Melbourne to Calcutta. Do these words leave a doubt that both parties contemplated that the contract should apply only to a vessel at Melbourne ? How could the owners have been willing to bind themselves and their ship by a contract which should take effect after she left Melbourne, wheresoever notice reached the master, without making some provision in that
* 5 Adolphus & Ellis, N. S. 265. t 8 Bingham, 124. t Glaholm v. Hays, 2 Manning & Granger, 257; Ollive v. Booker, 1 Ex chequer, 416.
Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 733
Argument for the charterers.
contract for a probable or possible state of things which might involve them in severe loss ? How could the charterers have been willing, without making some limitation of time, to bind themselves to keep an agent and funds at Calcutta, ready to load a ship under a contract to take effect when notice should reach the master, it may be, in distant seas, and pending or after intermediate voyages ?
2. How stands the case on authority ? In Graves v. Legg* the plaintiffs contracted to import and sell the defendant wools, to be laid down in certain ports of England. The contract recited that it was “to be deliverable at Odessa during August next, to be shipped with all despatch, the names of the vessels to be declared as soon as the wools were shipped.” The breach relied on in defence, as a condition precedent, was that the plaintiff did not notify to the defendant the name of the vessel in which the wool was shipped as soon as it was shipped. The defendant threw up the contract. In the argument and judgment the effect of the clause “to be shipped with all despatch,” as a condition precedent, and forming part of the same clause, was discussed, and the requisition to give notice of the names of the vessels, held to be a condition,—on the ground, among other things, that the terms “to be shipped with all despatch,” in the same clause, clearly constituted a condition precedent. Thus Parke, B., asks, “ Could the plaintiff contend that the shipping the wools with all despatch is not a condition precedent?” and the counsel for the plaintiff substantially admitted that it was. In its judgment, the court say the giving notice of the names of the ships “was a condition precedent, quite as much, indeed, as the shipping of the goods at Odessa, with all despatch, after the end of August.”
Cases have been cited on the other side, where charter-parties have provided that the ship should sail with “all convenient speed,” and in which the provision has been held not to be a condition precedent, entitling the charterer to
* 9 Exchequer, 709.
Argument for the charterers.
repudiate the contract. The reason is that stated in some of those cases, viz., that “what is a convenient speed or reasonable time, must always be a subject of contention. Where terms are so lax and ambiguous as to lead to a difference of opinion, then the stipulation is not a condition precedent.” In the present case, the words “all possible despatch,” are not equivalent to “ reasonable time,” and leave no ambiguity as to the intention of the parties, as is shown by the above case of Graves v. Legg.
The other side relies apparently on the supposed doctrine, that whether a stipulation in a charter-party constitutes a condition precedent or not, may be determined by proof that its violation had or had not the effect to frustrate the voyage, and that, as in this case, the charterers do not show that the voyage was frustrated, they are to be charged. It is not to be denied that some of the cases cited by Mr. Curtis assert the principle as stated. But the conflict in the cases, and the obvious unsoundness of the doctrine, has led to its revision in. the Exchequer Chamber, in Behn v. Burness.* That case will be found to review the preceding cases, and to establish the following propositions:
1st. That whether a descriptive statement in a written instrument. is a mere representation, and so “not an integral part of the contract” (unless fraudulently made), or whether it is a substantive part of the contract, is a question of construction by the court.
2d. That the previous cases turn upon very nice distinctions, but that the true doctrine, as established by principle as well as authority, is, that, “ generally speaking, if such descriptive statement was intended to be a substantive part of a contract, it is to be regarded as a condition, on failure or non-performance of which the other party may, if he is so minded, repudiate the contract in toto, provided it has not been partially executed in his favor.”
3d. That if a party voluntarily receives the benefit of a partial execution, “he cannot afterwards treat the descriptive
* 8 Law Times, 207, April, 1863.
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 736
Reply for the owners.
statement as a condition, but only as an agreement, for breach of which he may bring an action to recover damages.”
4th. That the doctrine of some of the cases relied on by the defendant in error, that a descriptive statement of this kind “ may be regarded as a mere representation, if the object of the charter-party be still practicable, but may be construed as a warranty, if that object turns out to be frustrated,” is unsound, “because the instrument, it should seem, ought to be construed with reference to the intention of the parties at the time it was made, irrespective of events which may afterwards occur.”
Mr. Bartlett referred also to Grlqholm v. Hays* Oliver v. Fielden,] Orookewit v. Fletcher,] and to Ollive v. Booker reading from and relying upon them.
Reply: The case of Behn v. Burness, in the Exchequer Chamber, does not apply. There the words, “ now in the port of Amsterdam,” in a charter-party, were held to be a condition. The court, however, did not question the decisions in Tarrabochia v. Hickie, Bimech v. Corlett, and Clipsham v. Vertue, or question any other cases in which it was held that a stipulation that a vessel will sail with all convenient speed, or within a reasonable time, is only an agreement, and not a condition. The court held only that there was a distinction between “stipulations that some future thing shall be done, or shall happen,” and “statements in a contract, descriptive of the subject-matter of it, or of some material incident thereof.” The decision was based upon the ground that the statement that the vessel “was now in the port of Amsterdam,” was of a definite fact at the date of the contract, and was not a stipulation as to the future. In the charter-party of the Mary Bangs, the clause “ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch,” is merely a stipulation that a future thing should be done, and cannot, according to any of the principles stated
* 2 Manning and Granger, 257. t 4 Exchequer, 135. t 1 Hurlstone & Norman, 912. g 1 Exchequer, 416. 736 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
in the opinion in Behn v. Bumess, in the Exchequer Chamber, amount to a condition.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question is, whether it was a condition precedent, that the ship should proceed directly from Melbourne to Calcutta; or, in other words, whether these clauses constitute a warranty, or are merely a representation.
“ The construction to be put upon contracts of this sort depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the language of the individual instrument. Whether particular stipulations are to be considered conditions precedent, or not, must, in all cases, solely depend upon that intention, as it is gathered from the instrument itself.”* “ All mercantile contracts ought to be construed according to their plain meaning, to men of sense and understanding, and not according to forced and refined constructions, which are intelligible only to lawyers, and scarcely to them. ”f “ The rule has been established, by a long series of adjudications in modern times, that the question whether covenants are to be held dependent or independent of each other, is to be determined by the intention and meaning of the parties, as it appears on the instrument, and by the application of common sense, to each particular case, and to which intention, when once discovered, all technical forms of expression must give way; and one of the means of discovering such intention has been laid down with great accuracy by Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Ritchie v. Atkinson,] to be this : that when mutual covenants go to the whole consideration, on both sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other; but where the covenants go only to a part, then a remedy lies in the covenant to recover damages for the breach of it, but it is not a condition precedent.’^*§ p. 737Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 737
Rules have been elaborately laid down, and discussed in many cases, for determining the legal character of covenants* and their relations to each other; but all the leading authorities concur in sustaining these propositions.
Contracts, where their meaning is not clear, are to be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties when they were made, and the practical interpretation which they, by their conduct, have given to the provisions in controversy.*
This charter-party bears date on the 4th day of June, 1858. The vessel was then on her way to Melbourne. The agreed facts warrant the conclusion, that the owner believed confidently that she would reach Melbourne in advance of the mail, which would carry to her master advice of the charter-party. It was also probable that she might engage her freight before the master could receive the advice. On the other hand, it was improbable that she would have discharged her cargo and have left Melbourne before the mail arrived. Hence, no provision was made by the owners for any other contingency than that she should have become engaged. In that event, they were not to be bound; and the charterers required it to be stipulated, simply, that if not engaged, she should proceed with all possible despatch from Melbourne to Calcutta.
Promptitude in the fulfilment of engagements is the life of commercial success. The state of the market at home and abroad, the solvency of houses, the rates of exchange and of freight, and various other circumstances which go to control the issues of profit or loss, render it more important in the enterprises of the trader than in any other business. The result of a voyage may depend upon the day the vessel arrives at her port of destination, and the time of her arrival *nay be controlled by the day of her departure from the port whence she sailed. We cannot forget these considerations in our search for the meaning of this contract. That p. 738the parties could have intended that when the vessel left ^Melbourne she might wander in any direction over the Indian seas, and that whenever and wherever she should receive intelligence of the contract, she might proceed to Calcutta and claim its fulfilment by the charterers, strikes us as incredible. So to hold, we think, would be to make a new contract for the parties, and not to execute the one they have made. We cannot give any other construction to the language, “ the ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch,” than that she was to proceed direct from one place to the other, and that to this extent, at least, time was intended to be made of the essence of the contract. We lay out of view the state of things at Calcutta when the vessel arrived there. To allow that to control our conclusion, would be to make the construction of the contract depend, not upon the intention of the parties when it was entered into, but upon the accidents of the future.
*
Simpson v. Henderson et al., 1 Moody & Malkin (22 English Common, aw), 313; Hasbrook v. Paddock, 1 Barbour S. C. 635;, French v.. Carhart,.
1
Comstock, 105. vol. ii. 47
We will now advert to the authorities to which our attention has been directed. Tarrabochia v. Hickie, Dimech v. Corlett, Clipsham v. Vertue, and Freeman v. Taylor, are in point for the defendants in error, and seem to sustain the views of their counsel. In these cases it was held, that unless the delay was so great as to frustrate the object of the charterers in making the contract, it was not material to the rights of the parties. In two of them the delay was produced by the deviation of the vessel from the direct course to the port where she was to receive her lading.
The authorities relied upon in behalf of the plaintiffs in error are equally cogent. In Glaholm v. Hays, the language of the charter-party was, “ the vessel to sail from England on or before the 4th day of February next.” This was held to be a condition precedent. Chief Justice Tindal said this language imported the same thing as if it had been ‘ conditioned to sail,” or “warranted to sail on or before such a day.” In Oliver v. Fielden et al., the contract, as set out m the declaration, was that “ the ship called the Lydia, . • • • then on the stocks at Quebec, to be launched and ready to receive cargo in all the month of May, 1848, and guarantee
Dec. 1864. J Lowber v. Bangs. 739
by the owners to sail in all June, A. D. 1848,” &c., should be loaded by the factors of the charterers, &c. It was held that the readiness to receive a cargo in all May was a warranty, and that in an action for not loading the vessel, a plea stating that the ship was not ready to receive a cargo “in all May,” was good on general demurrer. Pollock, Chief Baron, said, “ The stipulation as to the vessel being ready to receive a cargo in May is not mere description, but part of the contract, and forms a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s right to recover.” Crookewit v. Fletcher presented the same point, and was ruled in the same way. In Ollive v. Booker, the vessel was described as “ now at sea, having sailed three weeks ago, or thereabouts.” It was held, that the time at which the vessel sailed was material, and that the statement in the charter-party amounted to a warranty.
The most recent and most important authority brought to our notice is Behn v. Burness. It was agreed by the charter-party, in that case, that the ship then “ in the port of Amsterdam . . . should, with all possible despatch, proceed to Newport, in Monmouthshire,” and there take in cargo. At the date of the contract the ship was not at »Amsterdam, but at another place sixty-two miles distant from there. Being detained by contrary winds, she did not reach Amsterdam until the 23d of October. She discharged her cargo as speedily as possible, and proceeded direct to Newport, where she arrived on the 1st of December. The defendant refused to load her. The plaintiff sued for damages, and the defendant pleaded that the ship was not at Amsterdam at the time of the making of the contract. The Queen’s Bench ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and he recovered. The defendant took the case, by »a writ of error, to the Court of Exchequer, and that court reversed the judgment of the Queen’s Bench. The opinion of the reversing court is characterized by force and clearness, and the leading authorities on the subject are examined. The court say: “ We feel a difficulty in acceding to the suggestion that appears to have been, to some extent, sanctioned by high authority (see Dimech v. Corlett}, that a statement of this kind in a charter-party, which may p. 740740 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
be regarded as a mere representation, if the object of the charter-party be still practicable, may be construed as a warranty, if that object turns out to be frustrated, because the instrument, it should seem, ought to be construed with reference to the intention of the parties at the time it was made, irrespective of the events which may afterwards occur.” Referring to Freeman v. Taylor, Tarrabochia v. Hickie, and Dimech v. Corlett, they say: “But the court did not, we apprehend, intend to say that the frustration of the voyage would convert a stipulation into a condition, if it were not originally intended to be one.” They evidently felt embarrassed by the prior adjudications, which take a different view of the subject, and an effort is made to reconcile them with the decision they were about to pronounce. Here we have no such embarrassment, and we think we shall settle wisely the important principles of commercial law involved in this controversy by following the case of Behn v. Bumess.
Upon reason, principle, and authority, we are of opinion that the stipulation before us is a condition precedent, and not a mere representation, nor an independent covenant, and that it goes io the entire root of the contract.
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity to this opinion.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, dissenting.
I am not able to concur in the judgment of the .court in this case, and inasmuch as the questions presented for decision are of general importance, I think it proper to state the reasons for my dissent.
Present defendants, as the owners of the ^hip Mary Bangs, brought the suit in the court below to recover damages of the charterers for refusing to load the ship as they had covenanted and agreed to do.
Charterers resided in Philadelphia, and the owners of the ship resided in Boston. Charter-party was executed by the defendants at Philadelphia, on the ninth day of June, 1858, and was received by the plaintiffs in Boston on the elevent p. 741Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 741
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
of the same month. Contract was for a voyage from Calcutta to Philadelphia, New York, or Boston, one port only, at charterers’ option; but they were to give the necessary orders upon the subject before the ship sailed from Calcutta. When the contract was made the ship was “ on her passage from New York to Melbourne,” as appears by the introductory recitals of the charter-party.
Voyage is described, as before mentioned, and immediately following that description is the clause which gives rise to the controversy. Ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch.” Owners engaged, among other things, that the vessel should be kept seaworthy, and be provided with men and provisions, and with every requisite during the voyage. On the other hand, the charterers engaged to load the ship, and to provide, as part of the cargo, sufficient saltpetre for ballast, and what «broken stowage the master might require, so that the ship might be loaded full and in a safe and seaworthy manner, and to reasonable draft. Price to be paid for the charter was thirteen dollars per customary ton for whole packages, and half price for broken stowage. Forty running lay days were allowed for loading the ship, and the charterers agreed to pay ninety dollars demurrage for every day the ship should be detained beyond that time, if the detention was by their fault or that of their agent.
Recitals of the charter-party also show that the vessel sailed from New York, on her passage to Melbourne, on the third day of May, prior to the date of the charter, and the parties agree that such a voyage usually occupied from ninety to one hundred and thirty days, and that it would usually require from two to seven weeks for the vessel to discharge her cargo and get ready to sail. Terms of the charter-party required that the owners should use the most direct means to forward instruction to the master, with a copy of the charter, ordering it to be fulfilled, and the agreed statement shows that on the same day they received the charter-party from Philadelphia they complied with that stipulation.
742 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
First instructions were sent by a sailing vessel; but they also sent similar instructions by the overland mail, and in various other ways. Copies of the same instructions were also sent to Singapore and Batavia; and in fact the parties agree that there were no more direct means for forwarding instructions than such as were used by the owners. Steamer carrying the overland mail, which left England in July, 1858, broke down, and the consequence was that the instructions sent to Melbourne did not arrive there so early by a month as was expected by the parties. Vessel arrived at Melbourne on the seventh day of August, 1858, and her cargo was all discharged and she was ready to sail in thirty days after her arrival. Master waited for the mail until the sixteenth of September, but none arrived, and then he sailed for Manilla, seeking business.
Instructions reached the master at Manilla, and on the receipt of the same the master got his vessel ready and sailed for Calcutta to fulfil the charter. Record shows that the vessel arrived there on the twenty-sixth day of February following, and that the master on the same day called on the agent of the charterers, and he declined to load the ship.
I. Two principal positions are assumed by the defendants, to show that the owners of the vessel ought not to prevail upon the merits.
1. They insist that, by the true construction of the charter-party, it was a condition precedent to the covenant or promise to load the vessel, that when the master received the instructions to fulfil the charter the vessel should be found at Melbourne disengaged, and that she should proceed direct from there with all possible despatch to the port specified in the charter.
2. Secondly, they insist that the long period which elapsed before the vessel arrived at Calcutta, although the delay was without fault either of the master or owners, discharged them as charterers from any obligation to furnish a cargo.
Nothing can be more certain than the fact that the two questions presented involve widely different considerations. Obviously, one is purely a question of construction, and mus
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
be determined from the language of the charter-party when applied to the subject-matter, and considered in view of the surrounding circumstances as they existed at the time it was executed; while the other is a mixed question of law and fact, depending in a great measure upon the evidence exhibited in the record. Looking at the subject in that light, it is manifest that any commingling of the question is wholly inadmissible, and can only promote misconception and lead to confusion.
Province of construction can never extend beyond the language employed as applied to the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances contemporaneous with the instrument.* •
General rule is, that the terms of a contract are to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have, in respect to the subject-matter, as by the known usage of trade, or the like, acquired a peculiar sense; but courts of justice are not denied the same light and informatiqn the parties enjoyed when the contract was executed. On the contrary, they may acquaint themselves with the persons and circumstances that are the subjects of the statements in the written agreement, and are entitled to place themselves in the same situation as the parties who made the contract, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them, and so to judge of the meaning of the words and of the correct application of the language to the things described.!
Substance of the first proposition of the defendants is, that the clause, “ ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta, with all possible despatch,” amounts to a warranty that the ship, when the instructions with the charter should be received by the master, would be found at Melbourne, and that inasmuch as she had left that port before the instructions arrived, and did not proceed from that port direct to the port of lading, they are discharged from all obliga- p. 744744 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
*
Barreda et al. v. Silsbee et al., 21 Howard, 161. t Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & Finnelly, 569; Clayton v. Grayson, 4 Neville & Manning, 606; Addison on Contracts, 846.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
tions under the charter-party. Consequence of the breach of a covenant or promise on one side, which is a condition precedent, undoubtedly is that the proof of the fact is a sufficient excuse for the entire disregard of all the dependent covenants or promises by the other party. Such a construction of a charter-party is never favored by courts of justice. Whether or not a particular covenant by one party be a condition precedent, the breach of which will dispense with the performance of the contract by the other, says Lord Tenterden, is a question to be determined according to the fair intention of the parties, to be collected from the language employed by them; but an intention to make any particular stipulation a condition precedent should be clearly and unambiguously expressed.*
Speaking of this subject, Mr. Parsons, in the last edition of his valuable Treatise on Maritime Law, says that the doctrine of dependent covenants, as at common law, sometimes works great hardship, if not injustice, but adds, that as applied to contracts relating to shipping it is seldom Igid down without a distinct and adequate reference to the intention of the parties and the actualjustice of the case. Indeed, it may almost be said, remarks the same learned author, that there is a presumption of law, for there is certainly a strong disposition of the courts, against such a construction of a covenant or promise as will make it a condition precedent. Reason for the rule, as suggested by the same commentator, is that the construction which disconnects the promises and obliges each party to satisfy the other for so much of his promises as he has kept, saving his right to indemnity for any promises which are broken, will, in the vast majority of cases, do justice, complete justice, to both parties, f Charter-parties, it should be remembered, are commercial instruments, subject to the rules applicable to commercia contracts, where the rule of construction, as universal y acknowledged, is that it shall be liberal, agreeably to the p. 745Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 745
*
Abbott on Shipping (Ed. 1854), 368. f 1 Parsons’s Maritime Law, 272.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
intention of the parties, and conformable to the usages of trade in general, and to the particular trade to which the contract relates.*
Intention unquestionably is the primary consideration, and when that is ascertained, under the rules already suggested, all artificial forms of expression, as was well said in *Stevens v. Cutting,\* must give way. Applying these rules to the present case, it is clear, beyond controversy, that the views of the defendants cannot be sustained. Suppose it were otherwise, however, and that the construction and meaning of the charter-party, instead of being controlled by those liberal and equitable rules, to which reference has been made, and which have been followed for centuries in all commercial jurisdictions, must be determined by the application of the sternest technicalities ever applied in a common law court to a building or other construction contract, still, I am of the opinion that the clause in question cannot be construed to be a condition precedent without doing violence to the language employed by the parties, when rightly applied to the subject-matter of the contract, and justly compared with other parts of the same instrument.
The purpose of the contract was to let and hire the ship for a voyage from Calcutta to a port in the United States. Defendants had no merchandise on hand, and they had not sent out any agent to make the purchases. Time, frequently a long time, is required to purchase large cargoes in that market. Adventure was to be undertaken in a distant port which would involve great expense, and that expense would be greatly increased if the vessel or vessels were sent from the ports of the United States without a profitable outward cargo. Preference, therefore, was given by the charterers to vessels navigating in those seas. They accordingly applied to the plaintiffs; but both parties knew that it was impossible to foreknow on what precise day the vessel would arrive at her port of destination, or how long it would take p. 746746 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
*
Abbott on Shipping, 352. f 3 Bingham’s New Cases, 355.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
her to unload and get ready to sail, or the precise length of time that would be required for the voyage to Calcutta. All these matters were known to be involved in uncertainty, and it is equally obvious that they knew that the owners might not be able to forward the instructions to the master before he would arrive at Melbourne, discharge his vessel, and sail seeking business. Knowing these uncertainties, the parties incorporated into the instrument two special provisions to protect their respective interests, which was all they could safely do without incurring the hazard of defeating the main purpose they had in view.
1. Owners of the ship stipulated to use the most direct means to forward instructions to the master, with a copy of the charter, ordering it to be fulfilled, which was obviously inserted for the benefit of the charterers. Object of the provision was to insure, if possible, prompt notice to the master. But it might happen that the means of transmitting intelligence to him in that distant sea would fail until after he had sailed from the port of destination, and had engaged his ship, and in that event the owners, unless their interests were also protected by some suitable provision, would be liable at law to the defendants, or the last char-' terers, in damages.
2. Special provision was accordingly made, that if it happened that the ship should arrive at Melbourne before the instructions, and the master should have engaged the ship before receiving them, the charter should be null.
Both of these provisions are plainly dependent covenants, and they show to a demonstration, as was well said by Erle, Ch. J., in Seeger v. Duthie* that the parties, when they intended to make a condition precedent, or a dependent covenant, knew how to carry that intention into effect. But they made no stipulation as to the*time when the ship should arrive at Melbourne, nor as to the day when the cargo should be discharged, nor the day she should sail to fulfil the contract, nor the day when she should arrive at Calcutta. Stipu-
* 8 J. Scott, N. S., 65.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
lations upon the several matters mentioned, if made, might defeat the object in view, which both parties desired to avoid, and looking at the surrounding circumstances, it is quite clear that if they had been inserted they would have been of no special importance to the defendants. They had chartered two other vessels to be employed in the same commercial adventure. When this charter was executed they had purchased no merchandise at Calcutta, and the agent they afterwards appointed to make the purchases for the three vessels was still in the United States. Charters for the other two vessels were executed about the same time as that of the Mary Bangs, and the agreed statement shows that one of them at that time was on a voyage from Liverpool to Calcutta, and the other was at Callao waiting orders. Attending circumstances negative the assumption that the interests of the charterers required anything more than ordinary expedition, and there is not a word in the charter-party to favor that view, outside of the clause under consideration.
Some stress is laid, in the opinion of the court, upon the words, “ with all possible despatch,” and the argument is, that they must have the same effect as a stipulation for a day certain. Covenant that the ship shall be at or sail from a certain place on a certain day, and there to receive cargo, says Mr. Parsons, is a condition precedent, and if she is not there on that day the freighter is discharged from all obligation to load her, as the condition, in that state of the case, is not fulfilled.* Such was the case of Glaholm v.
decided in 1841, and referred to in the opinion of the court.
Contract, in that case, was as follows: “ the vessel to sail from England on or before the fourth day of February next;” and it was held, and well held, that the clause was a condition precedent. Where, also, there is a definite statement of a material existing fact, as that“ the ship is now in the port of Amsterdam,” the better opinion is, that it is a
* 1 Parsons’ Maritime Law, 271. f 2 Manning & Granger, 257.
748 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
warranty, and not a mere representation, and consequently is synonymous with precedent condition. Decision of the Exchequer Chamber, in Behn v. Burness* is to that effect, and I have no doubt it is correct. Question presented on the charter-party, say the court in that case, is confined to the statement of a definite fact, and they add that if the statement of the place of the ship is a substantive part of the contract, it seems to us that we ought to hold it to be a condition, unless we can find in the contract itself, or the surrounding circumstances, reason for thinking that the parties did not so intend. But where the stipulation as to time is not of a day certain, or where the statement relied on is not of an existing fact, or is expressed in indefinite terms, the rule is otherwise by all the authorities. Take, for example, the case of Constable v. Cloberiefi which is an early case upon the subject. Covenant was to sail with the first wind, and the covenant was not performed; but the court held that the covenant was not a condition precedent.
Material clause of the charter-party in Bornmanx. TookeJ. was “ to sail with the first favorable wind direct to the port of Portsmouth;” but the ship deviated, and unnecessarily entered another harbor, where she was detained several weeks, by means whereof the charterer was put to additional expense for insurance upon the cargo. Held, that the covenant to sail, as above, was not a condition prece dent, and that the deviation could not be given in evidence in bar of the action.
Origin of the true criterion by which to determine whet er a particular covenant is to constitute a condition preceden or not, is to be found in the case of Boone v. Eyre,§ w 1C was decided by Lord Mansfield. Where mutual covenants go to the whole of the consideration on both sides, sai t e judge, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent o the. other. But where they go only to a part, as w ere a breach may be paid for in damages, there the defendant as
■f Palmer, 397.
* 8 Law Times, N. S., 207.
pH. Blackstone, 273.
t 1 Campbell, 376.
Dec. 1864.] Lowber ' v. Bangs. 749
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
a remedy on the contract, and shall not plead it as a condition precedent. Same rule was laid down by Lord Ellenborough in Ritehe v. Atkinson* decided twenty years later. Stipulation, in that case, was that the ship should, “ with all convenient speed, sail and proceed” to a certain port, and there take on board a complete cargo, and therewith proceed to another port and deliver the same, and the evidence showed that she did not bring home more than half what she could have carried. Judgment was that the covenant was not a condition precedent, but that the master might recover freight for a short cargo at the stipulated rates, subject to the right of the freighter to recover damages for such short delivery.
Ruling of Lord Ellenborough in Havelock v. G-iddes et a?.,f is to the same effect. Covenant of the owner in that case was, that he would “forthwith at his own expense make the ship tight and strong,” and it appeared that the owner was in default. Decision was that the covenant was not a condition precedent, but merely gave the charterers a right in a counter action to such damages as they could prove they had sustained from the neglect. Subsequently the same question was presented for a third time to the same court in Davidson v. Gwynn^ and it was ruled in the same way. Particular phrase in that case was, “to sail with the first convoy,” and the master neglected to do as directed. Seriatim opinions were delivered by the judges, and they all held that it was not a condition precedent, but a distinct covenant, for a breach of which the party injured might be compensated in damages. Nonperformance on one side, in order to justify the conclusion that the stipulation requiring it is a condition precedent, must go to the entire substance o the contract, and to the whole consideration, so that it »lay safely be inferred as the intent and just construction of the contract, that if the act to be performed on the one 81 e is not done, there is no consideration for the stipulation on the other side. Proof of the breach of an express or im-
* 10 East, 295. t 10 East, 555. J 12 East, 381.
750 Lowber v.‘ Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
plied covenant on one side is not sufficient, not even if it is attended with some loss and damage to the other, because if it does not go to the whole consideration, and the loss can be compensated in damages, the construction must be that the stipulation is independent, and the losing party, under such circumstances, is not absolved from performance on his part.* Repeated decisions confirm this rule, and indeed it may almost be said that it is universally approved. Reference will now be made to some of the more modern cases decided in the courts of the parent country. Excuse for that course, if any be needed, will be found in the opinion of the court, which assumes that those cited by the defendants are inconsistent with those cited by the plaintiffs, which in my judgment is error. Plaintiffs refer to Freeman v. Taylor,^ which is regarded as a leading case.
Terms of the charter-party were that the ship should proceed to the Cape of Good Hope, and having there discharged cargo, should “proceed with all convenient despatch to Bombay,” where the freighter engaged to put on board a cargo of cotton for England. Master, instead of conforming to the stipulation, wilfully deviated, causing a delay of six weeks, and in consequence of the deviation the agent of the defendants refused to load the vessel. Case was tried before Tindal, Chief Justice, and he charged the jury that, inasmuch as the freighter might bring his action against the owner and recover damages for any ordinary deviation, he could not for such a deviation put an end to the contract; but if the deviation was so long and unreasonable that, in the ordinary course of mercantile concerns, it might be said to have put an end to the whole object the freighter had in view in chartering the ship, in that case the contract might be considered at an end, and he left it to the jury to decide whether the delay was of such a nature as to have put an end to t e ordinary objects the freighter might have had in view when he entered into the contract. _________ p. 751Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 751
*
Mill-dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pickering, 439; Bennet v. Pixley, 7 Johnson, 249; Smith’s Mercantile Law (6th London ed.), 312, 824. f 8 Bingham, 124.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
Rule nisi, to set aside the verdict, was granted, but the whole court held that the instructions were right. Precisely the same views were expressed by Lord Denman and his associates in Clipsham v. Vertue et al.,* which is admitted to be in point for the plaintiffs. Stipulation in the charter was to load and “forthwith proceed to the port of destination.” Delay ensued and the charterers refused to load. Suit was brought by the owners, and the defendants pleaded that the vessel did not arrive at the port of lading until after an unreasonable delay. Plaintiffs demurred, and the plea was held bad because it did not show that the delay frustrated the voyage.
Reliance is placed by the defendants upon the case of Oliver v. Fielden et al.,~\ which was decided in 1849, by Pollock, C. B., and his associates. Essential clause of the charter-party, dated the 28th of March, 1848, was that the ship, then on the stocks at Quebec, should “ be launched and ready to receive cargo in all May” next following the date of the charter. Action was by the owners for a refusal to load. Plea that 11 the ship was not launched and ready to receive cargo in all May,” as stipulated. Demurrer by plaintiff' and joinder by defendants.
Court held that the readiness to receive cargo in all May was a condition precedent. Beyond question the ruling was correct upon the ground that a definite limitation of time is precisely equivalent in principle to a day certain. Pleadings, therefore, presented a case where the condition precedent was clearly and unambiguously expressed. Authorities cited by the court furnish indubitable evidence that such was the view taken of the case at the time of the decision. They cited Glaholm v. Hays,X and Olive v. Booker,§ where the decision turned upon a statement material in character and of an existing definite fact.
Statement was that the vessel is “ now at sea, having sailed three weeks ago, or thereabouts,” which was a mate-
* 5 Adolphus & Ellis, N. 8., 265. f 4 Exchequer, 135. t 2 Manning & Granger, 257.’ § 1 Id. 416.
752 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
rial statement and wholly untrue, and the court held that it was a warranty, and it is not possible to see how it could have been held otherwise. Unless I am greatly mistaken, these explanations are sufficient to show that the case of Oliver v. Fielden et al., and the cases therein referred to by the court, run entirely clear of the question involved in this case. Should further confirmation of the proposition, however, be needed, it will be found in the case of Terraboehiav. Hickie* decided in 1856, by the same court which seven years previously decided the case of Oliver v. Fielden et al., on which the defendants rely.
Provision of the charter-party was, that the ship “ being tight, stanch, and strong, and every way fitted for the voyage, should, with all possible speed, sail and proceed” to a certain port, and there load a full and complete cargo in the customary manner. Breach alleged was, that the defendants made default in loading the agreed cargo. Second plea was, that the ship did not, with convenient speed, or in a reasonable time in that behalf, sail or proceed to the port of lading, insomuch that by reason thereof the object of the charter-party and of the voyage was wholly frustrated. Issue was joined and the parties went to trial. Jury found—
1. That the vessel did not proceed with reasonable speed and diligence.
2. That the whole object of the voyage was not thereby defeated.
3. That the vessel was not fitted for her voyage when she sailed for the port of lading, but that she was so fitted when she arrived at that port.
Verdict was entered for the defendant, with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict in his favor. Rule to show cause was accordingly granted, and the questions were fully argued. Separate opinions were given by Pollock, C. B., and his associates, and they unanimously decided that the stipulation referred to was not a condition precedent. Opinion of the Chief Baron is a very able one, going over
* 1 Hurlstone & Norman, 183.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
the whole ground and reviewing the principles involved in all the preceding cases. All of the cases decided prior to 1857, when the judgment was given for the plaintiff, were cited at the argument, and it does not appear to have even occurred to the learned Baron that he was guilty of any inconsistency in pronouncing the judgment.
Special reference was made to the remark of Maule, J., in Giaholm v. Hays,* that if the covenant to sail on a day certain was a condition precedent, then it might be said that a covenant to sail in a reasonable time should be held to have the same effect; and the answer to the suggestion, if such the remark can be called, was that the distinction between the two cases was obvious, which in my judgment is a sufficient answer to every argument of the kind.f
Repetition of the explanation as to what the distinction is, it seems to me, is unnecessary, as it has already been stated in language as clear as I can employ. Same distinction is explained by Erle, Ch. J., in Seeger v. Duthie,$ in a manner entirely satisfactory. Principle of the distinction, as explained in the case of Dimech v. Cortlett,§ is that a contract that a thing shall be done on a day named is in itself certain and defined, because it excludes all consideration of future circumstances; and the same remark is equally applicable to a positive statement of a definite existing fact, if it is material to the object of the instrument. But a contract that the thing shall be done with all convenient speed, say the court, necessarily admits a consideration of all the future circumstances; and different minds may plausibly enough come to different conclusions as to what is “ all convenient speed.” Execution of the charter-party in that case was at Malta. Clauses to be noticed are as follows:
1. That the ship is “ now at anchor in this port.”
2. That she shall, “ with all convenient speed, proceed in ballast to Alexandria, in Egypt, and there load a full cargo.”
* 2 Manning & Granger, 263. t Same v. Same, 38 English Law & Equity, 339; Hurst v. Usborne, 18 C. B., 144.
t 8 J. Scott, N. S., 64. g 12 i^oore, Privy Council, 228.
vol. ii.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
Report of the case shows that she was neither at anchor in port nor entirely coppered, but was then in a dry-dock undergoing repairs. Failure to furnish the cargo was the ground of the action, and the decision in the colonial court was against the owner, who prosecuted the appeal. Questions were fully argued, and all the authorities of a date prior to the judgment, which was pronounced in 1858, were reviewed. Conclusion was that neither of the stipulations was a condition precedent, but the decision in respect to the first one turned upon the question of intention, as collected from the whole instrument. Ruling on the second point was undoubtedly correct. Opinion was given by Sir John T. Coleridge. He first stated the propositions submitted by the plaintiff, which were that the failing to sail within a reasonable time or with convenient speed was no answer to the action on the contract, and that the case was governed by the general law of mercantile contracts. Having stated the propositions he proceeds to say: “We agree to both parts of the argument. Parties,” said the judge, “ have not in this case expressly stated for themselves in the charter-party that unless the vessel sailed by a specified day the charter-party should be at an end, and courts ought to be slow to make such a stipulation for them.” Court of Exchequer also recognized the same distinction in the case of Crookewit v. Fletcher et al.,* decided in 1857. Words of the charter-party were, ship “ now in Amsterdam, and to sail from thence for Liverpool on or before the -15th of March next,” and the court held, on the authority of Glaholm v. Hays, Olive v. Booker, and Oliver v. Fielden et al., that the stipulation as to sailing on the day named was a condition precedent, but the court expressly say, “We entirely agree with the judgment of the Lord Chief Baron, in Terrabochia v. Hickie, who clearly points out the distinction between a stipulation to sail on a particular day and any general stipulation as to sailing in a convenient time,’ or other words of the same description. |
* 40 English Law and Equity, 415. f Same v. Same, 1 Hurlstone & Norman, 912.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
Some answer ought to be given to this long and unbroken course of judicial decisions almost unparalleled for their ability and consistency in any other branch of commercial law. Attempt is made to furnish an answer, and what is it ?
1. Suggestion is made that the phrase, “ with all possible despatch,” is more intensified than any of the expressions found in the cases cited by the plaintiffs. Shadowy as the theory appears, still it deserves to be examined on account of the source from which it is suggested. None will pretend, I suppose, that the phrase “ with all possible despatch” is more intensified than the phrase “ as soon as possible,” which is one of daily use; and yet it was held, in the case of Atwood et al. v. Pomeroy * decided in 1856, that the latter phrase means within a reasonable time, regard being had to the surrounding circumstances; and it is not believed that there is a decision to the contrary in any jurisdiction where our language is spoken. Considered in the light of that decision, it is obvious that the suggestion is entirely unsubstantial and without merit. Another suggestion is that the contract was not to attach at all, unless the master received the instruction before he sailed. But the parties inserted no such stipulation into the charter-party, and I think that courts of justice ought to be slow to make such a stipulation for them.f
They provided that if the ship happened to arrive at the port of discharge before the instructions, and the master should have engaged his ship before receiving them, the charter should be null, but they made no other provision for the termination of the charter, and it is confidently believed that the suggestion is utterly inconsistent, not only with the intent of the parties, but with the whole scope and purpose of the instrument. Suppose the vessel had sailed direct for Calcutta, and the day after the vessel left the wharf at the port of discharge she had met the British steamer and the master bad received his instructions, or suppose the ship, instead
* 1 J. Scott, N. S., 110. f Dimech v. Cortlett, 12 Moore, Privy Council, 227
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
of being met on the day after she sailed, had proceeded on her voyage and touched at Singapore or Batavia, and the master had received his instructions at one or the other of those places, or suppose the ship, instead of touching at one of those ports, had proceeded direct to Calcutta, and on her arrival there the master had met his instructions and had immediately tendered the ship, under the charter-party, all would agree, I think, that it would be impossible to hold, if the defendants had refused to load, that they would not have been liable on the covenants of the charter-party. Would any one pretend, in the case last supposed, that if the master, instead of tendering the ship, had refused to fulfil the charter, that the owners would not have been liable? I think not, and yet, if they would have been liable in the case supposed, it can only be upon the ground that the clause in question is not a condition precedent, because the proposition concedes that the charter attached, notwithstanding the ship had sailed.
Defendants also suggested at the argument that the case of Graves v. Legg* decided in 1854, was inconsistent with the rights of the plaintiffs to recover; but I think not, for several reasons.
1. Because it has no application to the case, being an action upon an ordinary written agreement, and not upon a charter-party.
2. Because, if it were inconsistent with the cases cited for the plaintiffs, the later cases ought to be regarded as furnishing the true rule.
3. Because the decision is perfectly consistent with the earlier and later cases to which reference has been made.
Agreement of plaintiff was to sell to the defendant certain merchandise, to be shipped with all despatch, “ and the names of the vessels to be declared as soon as the goods were shipped. Names of the vessels were not notified to the defendants, and they refused to accept the goods. Held that the provision in the contract that the names of the vessels should be
* 9 Exchequer, 709.
Dec. 1864.] Lowber v. Bangs. 757
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
declared as soon as the goods were shipped was a condition precedent to the obligation of the defendants to accept and pay for the goods. Judgment was delivered by Parke, B., and he approved the rule laid down in Boone v. Eyre, as the criterion for determining whether a particular covenant is independent or a condition.
Result of my examination is that I find no inconsistency between the cases cited by the defendants and those cited by the plaintiffs. Supposed difference consists only in the application, and therefore is unreal. Doubts were expressed in Behn v. Bumess, whether the first point ruled in Dimech v. Cortlett was correct, but thè court finally came to the conclusion that their decision did “ not at all conflict” with the decision of the Privy Council, even on that point. First point decided, it will be remembered, was that the statement that the ship is “now at anchor in this port” was not a warranty, which has no application whatever in this case. Second point decided in that case, which is the one applicable here, was not questioned either by the bar or the bench, and is undoubted law.* For these reasons I am of the opinion that the clause in question is not a condition precedent.
H. Second objection is that the delay which ensued before the vessel arrived at Calcutta discharged the charterers from all obligation to furnish a cargo. Moral wrong is not imputed to the plaintiffs, and it is quite clear on the facts that perfect justice is done to both parties by regarding the provision as an independent stipulation. Contrary conclusion is a great hardship, as the master acted in good faith, and employed his best exertions, after he received his instructions, to fulfil the charter. Granting that the provision is not a condition precedent, then the rule is that unless the deviation was of such a nature and description as to frustrate the voyage or to deprive the freighter of the benefit of his contract, he is not discharged from the obligation, but is remitted to his claim in damages for any injury he may have p. 758758 Lowber v. Bangs. [Sup. Ct.
*
Adams v. Royal Company, 5 C. B. N. S. 492.
Opinion of Clifford, J., dissenting.
sustained.* Applying that rule to the case it is quite obvious what the result ought to be.
Agent of the defendants arrived at Calcutta on the twenty-fifth of August, and remained there till the twenty-third of January following. Names of the other vessels were the J. P. Wheeler and the William Cummings. Former arrived on the fourth of November, and the latter on the first of the following month. When the William Cummings arrived the agent had purchased, of certain articles, enough for two ships, but he had not purchased any saltpetre for ballast. Part of the merchandise so purchased Was intended for the Mary Bangs, but it was all sent by the other two vessels. Plaintiffs’ ship arrived, as before stated, and the agent of the defendants refused to load her. Freight at that time had fallen for such a voyage to five or six dollars. Under those circumstances the agent refused to load the ship, but he immediately chartered another vessel of about the same tonnage to take her place, and loaded the vessel so chartered with the funds provided to purchase a cargo for the Mary Bangs, and the parties agree that the whole cargo was purchased after the vessel of the plaintiffs arrived.
Defendants do not venture to suggest that they have suffered any injury, and it is clear that the construction here assumed would, in the language of Mr. Parsons, “ do justice, complete justice, to both parties.” Unless the instructions were received by the master before the vessel sailed seeking business it must have been understood by the defendants that some delay would necessarily ensue in the departure of the vessel; and if, in that contingency, they had been unwilling to accept the contract, the reasonable presumption is that they would have insisted that some more specific provision upon the subject should have been inserted in the charter-party. They understood the nature and effect of a condition precedent, and if they had intended that the contract p. 759Dec. 1864.] Ex parte Fleming. 759
*
Freeman v. Taylor, 8 Bingham, 124; Clipsham v. Vertue, 5 Adolphus & Ellis, N. 8., 265; Seegar v. Duthie, 8 J. Scott, N. S., 45; Terrabochia r. Dickie*, 1 Hurlstone & Norman, 183; Dimech v. Cortlett, 12 Moore, nvy Council, 227.
should be null in case the vessel sailed before the master received advices, it must be assumed that they would have said so, “ in clear and unambiguous terms.”
The truth is, they intended no such thing, but the theory here adopted speaks the true intent and meaning of the contract.
Pursuant to these views I think the judgment should be affirmed.
NELSON, J., also dissented.
Ex parte Fleming.
A party asking this court for a mandamus to an inferior court to make a rule on one of its ministerial officers, as the marshal, must show clearly his interest in the matter which he presents as the ground of his application.
The La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company, a railroad company of Wisconsin, had mortgaged its road and other property to secure certain negotiable bonds which it had issued. The bonds not being paid, a bill of foreclosure was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Wisconsin district, the only Federal court then in that State, and which court had at that time Circuit Court powers. The railroad, &c., was sold by the marshal, who reported his sale to the District Court. The sale was confirmed by that court and the purchaser placed in possession.
About the time, however, when this report and confirmation was made, Congress passed certain acts establishing a Circuit Court for the Wisconsin district, transferring to the new tribunal, with certain reservations and limitations, the powers which had previously been exercised by the District Court. The extent, however, of the reservations and limitations above referred to was a matter not absolutely above Question. However, this court, in a case decided at the last p. 760760 Ex parte Fleming. [Sup. Ct.
term, in reference to a part of the same suit now brought forward, had adjudged that the reservations and limitations were not of as extensive operation as was then contended by counsel that they were, and that certain orders made by the District Court in this same proceeding were void; the right to make them having passed by the acts of Congress to the new tribunal.*
In this state of enactments and decision on them, one Fleming, conceiving that the right to confirm or set aside the sale above mentioned, had also passed to the Circuit Court, petitioned that court for an order on the marshal to report to it the sale which had been made by that officer under the decree of the District Court.
He set forth in his petition that he was the equitable owner of certain of the bonds (describing them by number), to secure which the company had made its mortgage; which bonds he showed that he had bought of one H. G. Weed.
It appeared, however, by documents which he annexed to his petition and referred to, that when the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad was about to be sold under the decree of foreclosure, a number of its creditors formed themselves into a consociation, with a view of buying it in, and of reorganizing the road with a new name, that of the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway. These creditors, acting for themselves and all who should become “ assentents,” and making in writing a scheme of reorganization, to which other creditors might assent,—appointed certain persons, Seymour and others, to act as agents and trustees in the whole matter of all persons who chose to deliver their bonds to them for use in the contemplated purchase. This scheme of reorganization made Seymour and the others agents of all the “ assentents,” giving them power “to do any and all things which they deem for the benefit of the holders as fully as they might do if personally present;” and authorizing them “ in relation to all matters, exigencies and things not herein p. 761Dec. 1864.] Ex parte Fleming. 761
*
Bronson v. La Crosse Railroad Company, 1 Wallace, 405, where t e acts of Congress, &c., may be seen.
Argument for Fleming.
specifically provided for to exercise a liberal discretion, except to oblige us personally for the payment of money.”
TM was an “assentent,” and deposited his bonds, getting in return a certificate of interest in the embryo Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company. The La Crosse and Milwaukie was sold under the decree of foreclosure. The agents, &c.^ purchased it, and it was now reorganized as the St. Paul and Minnesota Railway Company; the managers of that company being put, on confirmation of the sale, into possession of the road. All this, as it was to be collected from Fleming’s petition and the documents annexed to it, was prior to his purchase of the bonds from Weed. In fact, the date of his purchase, as stated by him (September 26, 1863), was after the marshal’s sale and the confirmation by the District Court.
Being dissatisfied with the sale as made by the marshal and confirmed by the District Court, Fleming petitioned the Circuit Court for the order as already mentioned. That court refused the order.
Mr. Carpenter, counsel of Fleming, now moved this court for a mandamus to the judges of the Circuit Court, commanding them to make such a rule on the marshal as had been prayed for and refused. The application to this court set forth that the marshal had sold, or pretended to sell, property belonging to another road, and not decreed to be sold, and that the District Court had pretended to confirm the same; but alleged that the District Court had no jurisdiction over the cause for any purpose whatever, the cause having been transferred to the Circuit Court; that the pretended confirmation of the sale was void; that the sale remained, therefore, in law unconfirmed; and that no steps could be taken to complete the foreclosure of the mortgage and protect the rights of the petitioner as a holder of bonds secured by the mortgage, except by having said sale reported, as it ought to be, to the Circuit Court.
Mr. Cowdrey, as amicus curice, submitted a brief, suggest- p. 762762 Ex parte Fleming. [Sup. Ct.
ing that no proper interest was shown in Fleming to have what he asked for even if he had merits in fact; and arguing that, for various reasons which he set forth, no merits could exist; a matter, however, this last one, which the court, disposing of the case in Umine, did not touch.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered its opinion.
The petitioner does not show that he has such an interest in the matter as would justify the court to permit him to interfere. He describes himself as equitable owner of certain bonds made by the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company. These bonds were secured by a mortgage; and it was in a suit brought to foreclose that mortgage that the sale was had of which he complains. The owner of these bonds, while the foreclosure proceedings were in progress, was Weed, who had deposited them with the agents of a company, which proposed to use them in buying the said road, at the sale under the decree of foreclosure. These agents were invested by Weed with an absolute and full power to use the bonds in any manner, so that no money was required of Weed towards the purchase. The sale was made, and the road purchased as proposed. These bonds were used in the purchase. The sale was confirmed by the District Court and the purchasers placed in possession. Long after all this was done, as the petitioner alleges, by purchase from Weed he became the equitable owner of the bonds. Who was the legal owner, and what were the relative rights of the equitable and legal owners, or how any one could be the owner when the bond had been cancelled or absorbed in paying for the road, we are not informed.
We deem it sufficient to say that the petitioner, who had no interest in the matter at the time of the sale and confirmation, shows no right now to disturb what the parties who were interested have acquiesced in.
Motion overruled.
* See supra, p. 609, Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company