Case details
Bluebook Citation
Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 1
Full caption
Dermott v. Jones.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Dermott v. Jones.
1. Performanc£*6f a^contrqc^w nuild a house for another on the soil of such person,and that the Vprk shall be executed, finished, and ready for use andw^ifation^and^e delivered over so finished and ready to the owner ,-M'tii6 soil, at^xlay named, is not excused by the fact that there was a patent d0fe0 in the^oil, in consequence of which the walls sank and cracked, ¿nd the-J&use, having become uninhabitable and dangerous, be taken down and rebuilt on artificial foundations. 2,'^y8iile a special contract remains executory the plaintiff must sue upon it. d’’ "When it has been fully executed according to its terms, and nothing remains to be done but the payment of the price, he may sue either on it, or in indebitatus assumpsit, relying, in this last case, upon the common counts; and in either case the contract will determine the rights of the parties.
3. When he has been guilty of fraud, or has wilfully abandoned the work, leaving it unfinished, he cannot recover in any form of action. Where he has in good faith fulfilled, but not in the manner nor within the time prescribed by the contract, and the other party has sanctioned or accepted the work, he may recover upon the common counts in indebitatus assumpsit.
4. He must produce the contract upon the trial, and it will be applied as far as it can be traced; but if, by fault of the defendant, the cost of the work or material has been increased, in so far the jury will be warranted in departing from the contract prices. In such case the defendant is entitled to recoup for the damages he may have sustained by the plaintiff’s deviations from the contract, not induced by himself, both as to the manner and time of the performance.
Jones, a mason and house-builder, contracted with Miss Dermott to build a house for her, the soil on which the house
was to be built being her own. The house was to be built
VOL. II. 2 [p. 2] according to very detailed plans and specifications, which the “ architect” of Miss Dermott had prepared, and which were made part of the contract. In the contract, Jones covenanted that he would procure and supply all matters requisite for the execution of the work “ in all its parts and details, and for the complete finish andfitting for use and occupation of all the houses and buildings, and the several apartments of the house and buildings, to be erected pursuant to the plan of the work described and specified in the said schedule; and that the work, and the several parts and parcels thereof, shall be executed, finished, and ready for use and occupation, and be delivered over, so finished and ready,” at a day fixed. Jones built the house according to the specifications, except in so far as Miss Dermott had compelled him,—according to his account of things,—to deviate from them. Owing, however, to a latent defect in the soil, the foundation sank, the building became badly cracked, uninhabitable, and so dangerous to passersby, that Miss Dermott was compelled to take it down, to renew the foundation with artificial “ floats,” and to rebuild that part of the structure which had given way. This she did at a large expense. As finished on the artificial foundations the building was perfect.
Jones having sued Miss Dermott, in the Federal Court for the District of Columbia, for the price of building, her counsel asked the court to charge that she was entitled to “recoup” the amount which it was necessary for her to expend in order to render the cracked part of the house fit for use and occupation according to the plan and specifications; an instruction which the court refused to give. The court considered, apparently, that even under the covenant made by Jones, and above recited, he was not responsible for injury resulting from inherent defects in the ground, the same having been Miss Dermott’s own; and judgment went accordingly. Error was taken here. Some other questions were presented in the course of the trial below, and referred to here; as, for example, How far, when a special contract has been made, a plaintiff must sue upon it ? how far he may recover in a case where, as was said to have been the fact
Argument for the builder.
here, the plaintiff had abandoned his work, leaving it unfinished? how far “acceptance,”—when such acceptance consisted only in a party’s treating as her own a house built on her ground,—waives non-fulfilment, there being no bad faith in the matter ? and some questions of a kindred kind. The most important question in the case, however, was the refusal of the court to charge, as requested, in regard to the “ recoupmentand the correctness of that refusal rested upon the effect of Jones’s covenant to deliver, fit for use and occupation, in connection with the latent defect of soil upon which the foundation was built.
Messrs. Carlisle and Davidge far the builder: In all cases of locatio operis faciendi, where a workman undertakes to incorporate his work and materials with the property of another, and loss is sustained in consequence of some inherent defect in the property, the loss falls upon the employer. The maxim of res perit domino applies. Pothier, according to Story,* thus declares the law of France. It is also Scotch law. By it, if the workman is employed in working the materials, or adding his labor to the property of the employer, the risk belongs to the owner of the thing with which the labor is incorporated.! The employer, by the code of France, is the guarantor of the thing upon which the work and materials of the workman are to be expended: the code of Louisiana adopts the same rule: and the common law is the same. “ If the loss in bad execution,” says Kent,| “ is not properly attributable to the fault or unskilfulness of the undertaker, or those employed by him, but arises from the inherent defect of the thing itself; in such a case the loss is to be borne by the employer, unless there is some agreement by which the risk is taken by the undertaker.”
Undoubtedly the plaintiff might have assumed the extraordinary responsibility alleged; but, unless it be clearly shown that he did so, the presumption is that he contracted
*
Bailments, g 426. f 1 Bell, 456, Sth ed. J 2 Commentaries, § 40.
Argument for the owner of the soil.
for no more than the sort and degree of skill and diligence belonging to his trade. His covenant is not the stipulation of an insurer of anything, but is a stipulation to give his own skill, fidelity, and diligence in the prosecution of work undertaken in pursuance of prescribed specifications and plans. Miss Dermott purchased, by the contract, the skill and diligence of Jones, in supplying the work and materials stipulated, and also his judgment, so far as involved in the work and materials. But she never bought his judgment, as regarded the plans and specifications. He was never consulted about them. On the contrary, they were prepared by her architect, and put in his hands to work by. If he deviated from them, he was guilty of a breach of contract, for which he was responsible. His business was to work by, not to override them.
It is thus apparent that the present case is not one where an architect, employed to furnish plans and specifications, is guilty of neglect, and of not exercising that degree of skill and judgment which the employer prays; but is a case where a mechanic is employed to supply work and materials according to plans and specifications which he is bound to follow. The rule of law is that a party is responsible for the ordinary degree of skill belonging to his trade or profession. But Jones was not an engineer or architect, but, as the case states, “ a mason and house-builder.” Nor did Miss Dermott treat with him in any other character than that of a mechanic, competent, not to plan, but to carry out her plans. She employed an architect, by whom the plans and specifications were prepared. Her remedy, then, for any defects in the plans and specifications, was by suit against the architect, not by recoupment against Jones. The architect should have ascertained, if necessary, by boring or otherwise, whether they were practicable.
Messrs. Poe and Brent contra: The counsel of the other side do not cite one adjudged case in support of their view. The speculations of Pothier, the dicta of Story, or even the ab-
Argument for the owner of the soil.
stract opinions of Bell and Kent, are not “ authority” anywhere, and ought not to be cited.
The theory of the other side makes the proprietor of the ground an insurer to the builder of the stability and solidity of the soil on which such builder contracts to build work. We might deny the soundness of such a doctrine in any case of a contract to build a.house, where the payment of the price is to be made when the work is done; because a man cannot be said to build anything which falls down before he completes it. But, whatever may be the general rule, we rely, in the case here, upon the contract that this plaintiff will furnish every material and thing requisite to complete and finish these buildings fit for use and occupation. He does not merely covenant (as contended on the other side) to execute these specifications, but he superadds the contract that he will, over and above executing these, furnish everything necessary to complete it fit for use and occupation, and will deliver it finished and ready for occupation. The law, in cases like this, is settled and reported law from at least A.D. 1670, and from the leading case of Paradine v. Jayne, given us by the old reporter Alleyn, in 23d Charles H. The defendant there had taken a lease, covenanting to pay rent. He pleaded “ that a certain German prince, by name Prince Rupert, an alien born, enemy to the king and kingdom, had invaded the realm with a hostile army of men, and with the same force did enter upon the defendant’s possession and him expelled, whereby he could not take the profits.” On demurrer, the court resolved “ that the matter of the plea was insufficient,” and that “ he ought to pay his rent.” “ And this difference,” says Alleyn, ‘ was taken: that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, and hath no remedy over, there the law will excuse ...... But where a party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract. And, therefore, if the lessee covenant to repair a
Argument for the owner of the soil.
house, though it be burnt by lightning or thrown down by enemies, yet he ought to repair it;” and the report ends by declaring that where there is a covenant to pay, “ though the land be surrounded or gained by the sea, or made barren by wild-fire, yet the lessor shall have his whole rent;” and judgment went accordingly. This case has been always followed in England. American decisions are to the same general purpose, to wit, that a man must fulfil covenants deliberately made. Without citing earlier ones, or quoting at large even a late one in New York,* we refer to one of the very latest, where the best cases, both English and American, are collected. We mean School Trustees v. Bennett,in New Jersey, a case which, like our own, was the case of building a house. This case is specially in point, or at least specially strong, for the house was -there twice destroyed by natural causes. In the first instance, when it was half way towards completion, “ a violent gale of wind arose suddenly, without any of the usual premonitory signs of a storm, and prostrated the building:” afterwards, and when rebuilt, “ it fell, solely on account of the soil having become soft and miry;” though, at the time the foundations were laid, the soil was “ so hard as to be penetrated with difficulty by the pickaxe,” and its defects were latent; the softness having arisen, as was suggested, by the rising of springs; at any rate from “ natural causes wholly beyond the control of the contractors.” The court, however, was resolute, and decided that “ if a person contract with the owner of a lot to build and complete a building on a certain lot, and, by reason of a latent defect in the soil, the building falls down before it is completed, the loss falls upon the contractor;” and decided even, as in the case in New York, that the owner of the soil may recover back payments which he has made on account. The court reviewed the authorities from Paradine v. Jayne, in old Alleyn, down; and say, finally, “No matter how harsh and apparently unjust in its operation the rule may occasionally be, it cannot be denied that it has its foun-
*
Tomkins v. Dudley, 25 New York, 272. •J- 3 Dutcher, 515.
Opinion of the court.
dation in good sense and inflexible honesty. He that agrees to do an act should do it, unless absolutely impossible. He should provide against contingencies in his contract............. The cases make no distinction between accidents that could be foreseen when the contract was entered into, and those that could not have been; they all rest upon the simple principle, * such is the agreement,’ clear and unqualified, and it must be performed, no matter what the cost, if performance be not absolutely impossible.”
Mr. Justice SWA YKE delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant in error insists that all the work he was required to do is set forth in the specifications, and that, having fulfilled his contract in a workmanlike manner, he is not responsible for defects arising from a cause of which he was ignorant, and which he had no agency in producing.
Without examining the soundness of this proposition, it is sufficient to say that such is not the state of the case. The specifications and the instrument to which they are annexed constitute the contract. They make a common context, and must be construed together. In that instrument the defendant in error made a covenant.* That covenant it was his duty to fulfil, and he was bound to do whatever was necessary to its performance. Against the hardship of the case he might have guarded by a provision in the contract. Kot having done so, it is not in the power of this court to relieve him. He did not make that part of the building “ fit for use and occupation.” It could not be occupied with safety to the lives of the inmates. It is a well-settled rule of law, that if a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties, however great, will not excuse him.f
*
See supra, p. 2. f Paradine v. Jayne, Alleyn, 27; Beal v. Thompson, 8 Bosanquet & Puler, 420; Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wendell, 500; 3 Cornyn’s Digest, 93.
The application of this principle to the class of cases to which the one under consideration belongs is equally well settled. If a tenant agree to repair, and the tenement be burned down, he is bound to rebuild.* A company agreed to build a bridge in a substantial manner, and to keep it in repair for a certain time. A flood carried it away. It was held that the company was bound to rebuild.! A person contracted to build a house upon the land of another. Before it was completed it was destroyed by fire. It was held that he was not thereby excused from the performance of his contract. | A party contracted to erect and complete a building on a certain lot. By reason of a latent defect in soil the building fell down before it was completed. It was held (School Trustees v. Bennett,§ a case in New Jersey, cited by counsel), that the loss must be borne by the contractor. The analogies between the case last cited and the one under consideration are very striking. There is scarcely a remark in the judgment of the court in that case that does not apply here. Under such circumstances equity cannot interpose.||
The principle which controlled the decision of the cases referred to rests upon a solid foundation of reason and justice. It regards the sanctity of contracts. It requires parties to do what they have agreed to do. If unexpected impediments lie in the way, and a loss must ensue, it leaves the loss where the contract places it. If the parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the rule of law gives none. It does not allow a contract fairly made to be annulled, and it does not permit to be interpolated what the parties themselves have not stipulated.
We are of opinion that the plaintiff below was entitled to recover, but that the court, in denying to the defendant the right of recoupment, committed an error which is fatal to the judgment.
*
Bullock v. Dommett, 6 Term, 650. f Brecknock Company v. Pritchard, Id. 750. J Adams v. Nickols, 19 Pickering, 275; Bumby v. Smith, 3 Alabama, 123, is to the same effect. § 3 Dutcher, 513. || Gates v. Green, 4 Paige, 355; Holtzaffel v. Baker, 18 Vesey, 115.
We might here terminate our examination of the case; but as it will doubtless be tried again,—and the record presents several other points to which our attention has been directed,—we deem it proper to express our views upon such of them as seem to be material.
While a special contract remains executory the plaintiff must sue upon it. When it has been fully executed according to its terms, and nothing remains to be done but the payment of the price, he may sue on the contract, or in indebitatus assumpsit, and rely upon the common counts. In either case the contract will determine the rights of the parties.
When he has been guilty of fraud, or has wilfully abandoned the work, leaving it unfinished, he cannot recover in any form of action. Where he has in good faith fulfilled, but not in the manner or not within the time prescribed by the contract, and the other party has sanctioned or accepted the work, he may recover upon the common counts in indebitatus assumpsit.
He must produce the contract upon the trial, and it will be applied as far as it can be traced; but if, by the fault of the defendant, the cost of the work or materials has been increased, in so far, the jury will be warranted in departing from the contract prices. In such cases the defendant is entitled to recoup for the damages he may have sustained by the plaintiff’s deviations from the contract, not induced by himself, both as to the manner and time of the performance.
There is great conflict and confusion in the authorities upon this subject. The propositions we have laid down are reasonable and just, and they are sustained by a preponderance of the best considered adjudications.*
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
*
Cutter v. Powell, 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 1, and notes; Chitty on Contracts, 612, and notes.
Hawthorne v. Calef.
A State statute repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stockholders in a chartered company liable to the corporation's debts, is, as respects creditors of the corporation existing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and void. And this is so, even though the liability of the stock is in some respects conditional only ; and though the stockholder was not made, by the statute repealed, liable, in any way, in his person or property generally, for the corporation’s debts.
The Constitution of the United States ordains that “ no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracte.” With this provision in force, the State of Maine, on the 1st April, 1836, incorporated a railroad company; the charter providing that “the shares of the individual stockholders should be liable for the debts of the corporation.” “ And in case of deficiency of attachable corporate property or estate” the provision went on to say, “the individual property, rights, and credits of any stockholder shall be liable to the amount of his stock, for all debts of the corporation contracted prior to the transfer thereof, for the term of six months after judgment recovered against said corporation; and the same may be taken in execution on said judgment, in the same manner as if said judgment and execution were against him individually; or, said creditor, after said judgment, may have his action on the case against said individual stockholder; but in no case shall Xheproperty, rights, and credits of said stockholder be taken in execution, or attached as aforesaid, beyond the amount of his said stock.” Another section provides, that if sufficient corporate property to satisfy the execution could not be found, the officer having the execution should certify the deficiency on the execution, and give notice thereof to the stockholder whose property he was about to take; and if such stockholder should show to the creditor or officer sufficient attachable corporate property to satisfy the debt, “ his individual property, rights, and credits shall thereupon be exempt from attachment and execution.”
The plaintiff, Hawthorne, who had supplied the corpora-
Argument for the creditor.
. tion, then embarrassed and insolvent, with materials to build its road, having obtained judgment as a creditor against it, and being unable to get from it satisfaction (the company having, in fact, no property), sued the defendant, Calef, who was a stockholder, both at the time when the debt was contracted and when judgment for it was rendered; and no transfer of whose stock had been made. A few months after the debt was contracted, the legislature of Maine passed a statute repealing the “ individual liability” clause of the charter. •
On a question before the Supreme Court of Maine,—the highest court of law in that State,—whether such repeal was or was not repugnant to the clause, above cited, of the Constitution, that court held that it was not; that the original provision,—not making the stockholder personally liable in any way,—did not constitute a “ contract” between the creditor and him, within the meaning of the Constitution; and that, while, but for the repealing act, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover of the stockholder individually to the extent of his stock, this repealing act had taken away and destroyed such right. /
Judgment being given accordingly, by the said court, in favor of the State statute, the correctness of such judgment was now, on error, before this court.
Mr. Curtis, for the creditor, Hawthorne: A charter is a contract between the State and the corporation; but not necessarily between them only. If it contain provisions on which third persons are invited to give credit, and which hold out assurances to them that if they will give credit a certain fund, or certain persons, will become responsible, such assurances, when accepted and acted on, become a contract, the obligation of which is protected by the Constitution. Thus in Woodruff v. Trapnaif a charter contained the assurance that the bills of a bank would be accepted in payment of public dues. This was held to create a contract with all
Argument for the creditor.
persons who should receive the bills while the assurance, remained unrepealed. So in Curran v. The State of Arkansas,* the charter of a bank contained an assurance that a certain fund should be responsible for the debts of the bank, and this was held to amount to a contract with creditors not to divert that fund from the payment of their debts. It has been held by the courts of New York, that such an act of incorporation as this is leaves the stockholders to stand as original contractors, and liable, as such original contractors, for the debts of the corporation; and the fact that the legislature has required the remedy against the corporation to be exhausted before proceeding against the stockholder does not vary the nature or ground of his liability. In Corning n. McCulloughf the court say:
“ The original stockholders, by their acceptance of the charter, and subsequent purchasers in becoming members, assented and agreed to the terms and conditions of the act of incorporation. The defendant in this suit, in common with the other stockholders, by his acceptance of the charter, agreed to its terms, and especially to that feature of it so strongly marked, of the individual liability of the stockholders, equally with that of the corporate body, for the debts of the company. It is a liability which every stockholder must be understood to assume and take upon himself, and to be under to those who deal with the company. Dealers contract with the corporation on the faith of that security for the performance of the contract. The credit they give is given, and they trust as well to the personal liability of the stockholders, as to the responsibility of the corporation, for the fulfilment of the engagement; and each stockholder incurs that liability to the creditor the moment the contract of such creditor with the company is consummated.”
In Conant v. Van Schaickf the question now under consideration arose; and it was held that a law repealing the liability of stockholders was inoperative as to existing creditors, because it would impair the obligation of their contracts.
Even if it should be held that no contract existed with
* 15 Howard, 304. f 1 Comstock, 47. J 24 Barbour, 87.
Argument for the creditor.
the plaintiff, save his contract with the corporation; still, the law in question did impair the obligation of that contract. When the debts were contracted the plaintiff had two remedies: one against the corporation, the other against the stockholders. The former was, and was known to be, wholly useless; the latter was sufficient and effectual; and the law in question has destroyed this sole efficient and effectual remedy, and substituted no other in its place. Such a law impairs the obligation of the contract, to enforce which the remedy was given. The principle which is decisive of this case, was laid down in Green v. Biddle* That principle is, that a law, which so changes the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights of the creditor, impairs the obligation of his contract.
In Bronson v. Kinzierf the State law restrained the creditor from cutting off the right of redemption of mortgaged property, by a sale under a power contained in the mortgage; and gave twelve months, after such sale, to redeem the property. It did not affect the plaintiff’s right of action against the debtor to recover the debt. It did not release the property held as collateral security for the debt; but it encumbered the remedy of the creditor upon his collateral security, so as materially to impair it. Far this reason the law was held invalid.
In the case at bar, while the law in question does not affect the plaintiff’s right of action against an insolvent corporation which contracted the debt, it deprives him of all recourse to his remedy on the property of the stockholders, which the charter had made liable for the debt. The difference between the two cases is, that, in the case decided, the collateral remedy for the debt was only materially impaired; in the case at bar it is destroyed.
In McCracken v. Hayward^ it was decided that a law prohibiting property from being sold on execution for less than two-thirds of its appraised value, so impaired the remedy as to be invalid, upon the ground that, when the contract was
* 8 Wheaton, 1. fl Howard, 311. f 2 Howard, 608.
Argument for the stockholder.
made, the creditor had the absolute right to levy his execution and sell the property of the debtor. Now in the case at bar, the charter of the corporation and the law of the State had conferred on the creditor the right to levy his execution on the property of the stockholders, or to subject their property to the payment of the debt by an action on the case. These laws of the State had, in the language of the court, created this right, and attached it to the contract; it was part of its obligation. As was said by the court, in Curran v. The State of Arkansas, “ The obligation of a contract, in the sense in which these words are used in the Constitution, is that duty of performing it which is recognized and enforced by the laws. And if the law is so changed, that the means of legally enforcing this duty are materially impaired, the obligation of the contract no longer remains the same?
Mr. Shepley, contra, for the stockholder, Calef: There was no privity of contract between the creditors of the corporation and the individual members. They are, therefore, not personally liable, unless this liability is expressly imposed by statute. “ Such liability,” says Shaw, C. J., in Grayv. Coffin,* “is a wide departure from the established rules of law, and is, therefore, to be construed strictly, and is not to be extended beyond the limits to which it is carried by positive provisions of the statute.”
Then the provisions relied on to give this personal responsibility recognize the corporation as an entity, capable of contracting debts; and these are its debts, and not the debts of any other party. No other person is made liable for them; nor is even any other thing made liable forthem, originally, or absolutely, or wholly, or permanently. “ The shires of individual stockholders shall be liable for the debts of the corporation.” And only in case of deficiency of attachable corporate property, the individual property, rights, and credits of any stockholder shall be liable, to the amount of his stock,
Argument for the stockholder.
This property might be taken on the execution, which had been issued on the judgment against the corporation, to which the stockholder was no party; or, the creditor might have his action on the case, on the statute; manifestly to reach, by the process of foreign attachment, the “ rights and credits,” which could not be reached by the execution against the corporation. But in no case could property, rights, and credits of a stockholder be taken in execution or attached, beyond the amount of his stock. And the stockholder could exempt his property entirely from the execution and attachment, by disclosing and showing sufficient attachable corporate property.
In all this, there is no recognition of any contract on the part of the stockholder, or liability under contract. The remedy, to enforce whatever liability the statute creates, excludes the theory of contract. It is a statute remedy, to enforce a statute burden against the property of the stockholder.
What, then, the plaintiff had, was a remedy created by statute. And the legislature has power to take away by statute that remedy which statute alone gave. The exception is, that it may not take away vested rights. But the rights of a party, when they exist only to the extent of statute remedy, are not vested until after judgment.
It will be conceded that the legislature might take away and destroy all legal process for compelling the corporation to perform its contract, and still leave the liability of the stockholder’s property, and the creditor’s statute right against that, unimpaired. So it may take away and destroy all power to enforce any rights against the stockholders, or their property, and leave the obligation of the corporation’s contract unimpaired.
The obligation of the maker of a promissory note is different from that of the indorser or guarantor of the same note. But the holder has two remedies,—one against the maker, the other against the indorser or guarantor. A law which should take away the remedy against the indorser or guarantor, would not impair the obligation of the maker’s
Argument for the stockholder.
contract expressed in the note,—though it would impair the obligation of the contract with the indorser or guarantor. If, now, the liability of the indorser or guarantor, instead of arising from a contract, were arbitrarily imposed by a statute, which declared, that whenever a promissory note was made for a good consideration, certain relatives of the maker, or neighbors, or religious, or literary, or political, or business associates of his, should be liable, as guarantors or indorsers of such note, who would be bold enough to contend, that the repeal of such statutory liability would impair the obligation of the contract between the maker and the payee of such note ? It would^add no strength to an argument in support of such a proposition, to say, that when the payee of the note parted with the consideration for it, he trusted to this liability which the statute imposed; or that the maker was insolvent, and the remedy against him was insufficient and useless, and that the repeal of the statute liability of the other persons had taken away and destroyed the only sufficient remedy which the payee had.
As respects the authorities cited by Mr. Curtis: Woodruff v. Trapnal, and Curran v. The State of Arkansas, were both decisions on the same charter, that of an Arkansas bank, and both rested upon special facts.
The legislature of Arkansas had chartered a banking corporation, of which the State was the sole owner; and in the charter had declared that the bills of this bank, which was nothing but an agent of the State itself, should be received in payment of debts due to the State. The bank, by its charter, was simply a convenient agent of the State to negotiate between the State and third parties, and its bills were substantially bills of the State of Arkansas.
Speaking in another case* of its own decision, in Woodruff v. Trapnal, this court has said:
“We held that the charter constituted a contract between the State and the holder of the bills of the bank; that the pledge of the State to receive the notes of the bank, in payment of debts,
Argument for the stockholder.
was a standing guarantee, which embraced all the paper issued by the bank until the guarantee was repealed: and that this construction was founded upon the fact, that the bank belonged exclusively to the State, was conducted by its officers, and for its benefit. That, in this respect, the obligation of the contract applied to a State equally as to an individual; and that as to the binding force of a similar guarantee by an individual, there would seem to be no ground for doubt.”
To make the case at bar analogous to this, the stockholders of our railroad company should be the supreme power which chartered the company; so that the charter, instead of being a contract between the State and the stockholders, should be a contract between the stockholders who created it, and the community who accepted and acted upon its guarantees, voluntarily inserted in it by these stockholders. The State of Arkansas had, in the cases relied on, promised to receive the bills of their bank, expressly, by its charter, made by the State. The stockholders of this railroad company simply submitted to “liabilities and duties,” to which the legislature compelled them to be “ subject.”
The New York decisions furnish still less support to the plaintiff’s counsel. The passage from the opinion in Coming v. McCullough, in its reasoning, does, indeed, primot facie, sustain this position; and if, as the counsel affirms, this reasoning were predicated upon “ such an act of incorporation” as that which incorporated the railroad company in Maine, it would have some weight, though it would not, to this court, be an authority. But the language of the charter there was, “ that the stockholders of the corporation shall be, jointly and severally, personally liable for the payment of all debts and demands contracted by the corporation.” By their charter, those stockholders were liable for the payment of all debts and demands, not of the corporation, but contracted by the corporation. They were the stockholders’ debts, as well as the debts of the corporation,—contracted by the corporation, as if it were the agent of the stockholders. The stockholders were liable; not the “ property, rights, and credits” of the stockholders, nor their “shares,”
VOL. n. 2
Reply for the creditor.
but the men themselves. They were liable for the payment of all debts and demands; not to the amount of their stock or shares which they severally owned, only. They were liable in the first instance, at the very creation of the debt or demand; not only in case of deficiency of corporate property. They were liable permanently; as long as the debt remained a debt; not for a year only after the transfer of their stock, or six months after judgment recovered against the corporation, on a suit brought within such year; but forever, if the debt was kept alive; without any power of exonerating themselves by showing corporate property.
When Conant v. Van Schaick—the other New York case relied on—was decided, a general statute of the State had created certain corporations, by language precisely identical with that in the charter considered in Corning v. McCullough; and the liability of stockholders of one of these corporations was, on the authority of Corning v. McCullough, held to rest on a contract, at common law, and, therefore, a statute repealing such liability was held to impair the obligation of a contract.
Reply: The only question is, whether, when the repealing law destroyed the existing right of action by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover from him the amount of the debt due to him from the corporation, it impaired the obligation of a contract ? One argument of the other side is, that the right of the plaintiff was created by statute; that the legislature have power to take away by statute what was given by statute, except vested rights; and that the right of a party when it exists only by statute, does not become vested till after judgment. But this is erroneous doctrine when applied to this case.
1. The right of the plaintiff was not created by statute, and did not exista only by statute.” It is true there was a statute in existence which enacted that if the plaintiff should sell merchandise to a corporation which should fail to pay for it, he should have a right of action against any one of its stockholders to recover its price, to the amount of his stock.
Reply for the creditor.
But this law did not create the plaintiff’s right. This plaintiff parted with his merchandise to an insolvent corporation on the faith of this liability which the defendant, by taking stock, had assented to be subject to. The only effect of the law was to apprise thé parties that if such a sale should be made, the defendant would come under a legal obligation to the plaintiff to pay the debt, and to create that legal obligation upon the sale; just as the law apprises the vendee of goods, that he will come under a legal obligation to the vendor for the price, and creates that legal obligation on the sale. The right in neither case is created by the law alone ; but in both cases the law does create the legal obligation ; and in one case just as entirely as in the other. It may be true that a statute may take away what a statute has given, except vested rights. But the question still remains whether this plaintiff had not a vested right to the obligation of the defendant, and to some adequate remedy to enforce that obligation. In McCracken v. Hayward the right of the plaintiff’ to sell the defendant’s property on execution was given by a State law. Yet it could not be taken away or impaired by a State law, because the creditor had a vested right to some adequate remedy, such as existed when his contract was made. This plaintiff sold his property to an insolvent corporation on the faith of the obligation of the defendant to pay for it, and of the remedy the law then allowed him to enforce the obligation of the defendant to perform the contract.
If A. is under a complete legal obligation to B. to perform the contract of C., which B. can enforce by an action against A., and which contract B. made on the faith of A.’s obligation to, perform it, has not B. a vested right to have A. perform the contract? and can A.’s obligation be released bylaw without impairing the obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the Constitution ? It is A.’s duty to perform the contract. That duty is recognized and enforced by the law. The law is so changed that this duty can no longer be enforced. The obligation of the contract which A. was under is released. Is it any answer that C., an insolvent debtor, is yet
Reply for the creditor.
under the obligation of the contract? The contract created two perfect and complete and several obligations,—one of A., the other of C. One is as much the obligation of the contract as the other.
It is an unfounded assumption that the obligation of a contract can be incumbent only on the party that makes the promise.
The obligation of a contract is a duty of performing it recognized and enforced by the laws. An executor or administrator, though he has made no promise, is under a legal duty to perform the contracts of the deceased; the obligation of the contract is incumbent on him; and a State law releasing him would as clearly impair the obligation of the contracts of the deceased as a law releasing the living debtor. So a husband is bound to perform the contracts of his wife before marriage. Without making any promise, he takes on himself the legal duty of performing these contracts of hers, by voluntarily entering into the marital relation at a time when and place where the law made this duty incumbent on him. Could he be released without impairing the obligation of such contracts ? For still stronger reasons was the obligation of this contract incumbent on the defendant. He voluntarily entered into such relations with this corporation as created a perfect legal obligation to pay this debt when it was contracted, and the plaintiff parted with his property to an insolvent corporation on the faith of this legal obligation incumbent on the defendant.
The defendant’s counsel has pointed out a supposed distinction between the cases cited from the New York reports and this case. It is that, in those cases, the charters made the stockholders jointly and severally liable for all the debts and demands contracted by the corporation. But the defendants were not contractors. The contracts were made by a third person, viz., the corporation. The relation of the stockholders to the contracts was not created by the contracts themselves, but by the law, as in this case; and the obligation of this defendant to perform this contract is as complete and perfect, [p. 21] and arises from the same causes as the obligations of the defendants in the cases in New York.
In those cases, as in this case, there was a liability created by law, and made incumbent on one person to perform the contracts of another person. If that liability could not be discharged without impairing the obligation of a contract, how can this liability be discharged without a similar violation of the Constitution ?
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
The question upon the provisions of the charter of the railroad company—in connection with the sale of the property by the plaintiff to the corporation, out of which this debt accrued—is, whether a contract, express or implied, existed between him and the stockholder ?
It is asserted, in behalf of the latter, that a contract existed only between the creditors and the corporation; and that the obligation of the stockholder rests entirely upon a statutory liability, destitute of any of the elements of a contract.
Without stopping to discuss the question upon the clause of the statute, we think that the case falls within the principle of Woodruff v. Trapnal* and Curran v. State of Arkansas^ heretofore decided in this court.
In the first of these cases, the charter of the bank provided that the bills and notes of the institution should be received in all payment of debts due to the State. The bank was chartered 2d November, 1836. On the 10th January, 1845, this provision was repealed, and the question was, whether or not, after this repeal, the bills and notes of the bank, outstanding at the time, were receivable for debts due to the State. The court held, after a very full examination, that the clause in the charter constituted a contract with the holders of the bills and notes on the part of the State, and that the repealing act was void as impairing the obligation of the contract.
In the second case, the charter of the bank contained a pledge or assurance that certain funds deposited therein should be devoted to the payment of its debts. It was held by the court, that this constituted a contract with the creditors, and that the acts of the legislature withdrawing these funds were void, as impairing the obligation of the contract.
Now, it is quite clear that the personal liability clause in the charter, in the present case, pledges the liability or guarantee of the stockholders, to the extent of their stock, to the creditors of the company, and to which pledge or guarantee the stockholders, by subscribing for stock and becoming members of it, have assented. They thereby virtually agree to become security to the creditors for the payment of the debts of the company, which have been contracted upon the faith of this liability.
This question has been repeatedly before the courts of the State of New York, and they place the obligation of the stockholders upon two grounds. The first is that of contract. In Corning v. McCullough Chancellor Jones, then in the Court of Appeals, observes that the liability of the defendant, upon which the action is grounded, is for the payment of a debt of the company incurred by the purchase of merchandise of the plaintiffs, for the use and benefit of the company, and wherein the defendant, as one of the members, was interested, and for which he thereby, and under the provisions of the charter, became and was, concurrently with the company, from the inception of the debt, personally liable. It is, he says, virtually and in effect, a liability upon a contract and the mutual agreement of the parties; not, indeed, in form an express personal contract, but an agreement of equally binding obligation, consequent upon and resulting from the acts and admissions or implied assent of the parties. The second ground is upon the view that the legislature, by subjecting the stockholders to personal liability for the debts of the company, thereby removed the corporate protection
* 1 Comstock, 47, 49.
from them as corporators, and left them liable as partners and associates as at common law.*
There is another view of the case, involving a violation of the principal contract between the creditors and the corporation, which we think equally conclusive against the judgment of the court below. This view rests upon a principle decided in Bronson v. Kinzierf and the several subsequent cases of this class. There Kinzie executed a bond mortgage to Bronson, conditioned to pay $4000 on the 1st of July, 1842, and covenanted, that in case of default, the mortgagee should sell the premises at public auction, and convey them to the purchaser. Subsequently to the execution on the mortgage, the legislature passed a law that mortgagors on a sale of the premises, under a decree of foreclosure in chancery, should have a right to redeem them at any time within twelve months from the day of sale. By another law it was provided, that when the premises were offered for sale, they should not be struck off unless at two-thirds of a previous valuation. The court held that these acts so seriously affected the remedy of the mortgagee as to impair the obligation of the mortgage contract within the meaning of the Constitution, and declared them void. Now, applying the principle of this class of cases to the present one, by the clause in the charter subjecting the property of the stockholder, he becomes liable to the creditor, in case of the inability or insolvency of the company for its debts, to the extent of his stock. The creditor had this security when the debt was contracted with the company over and above its responsibility. This remedy the repealing act has not merely modified to the prejudice of the creditor, but has altogether abolished, and thereby impaired the obligation of his contract with the company.
We are of opinion, upon both of the grounds above recited, that the court below erred.
Judgment reversed.
Drury v. Foster.
A paper, executed, under seal, for the husband’s benefit, by husband and wife, acknowledged in separate form by the wife, and meant to be a mortgage of her separate lands, but with blanks left for the insertion of the mortgagee’s name and the sum borrowed, and to be filled up by the husband, is no deed as respects the wife, when afterwards filled up by the husband and given to a lender of money, though .one bond fide and without knowledge of the mode of execution. The mortgagee, on cross-bill to a bill of foreclosure, was directed to cancel her name.
Foster, of Minnesota, being about to engage in some enterprise, and wanting money, asked his wife, who owned, in her separate right, a valuable tract of land in that State, to mortgage it for his benefit. What exactly was said or promised did not appear. However, Foster afterwards went to a notary, who exercised, as it seemed, the business of a scrivener also, and directed him to draw a mortgage of the property, with himself and wife as mortgagors, but leaving the name of the mortgagee, and the sum for which the land was mortgaged, in blank. This the magistrate did. Foster acknowledged the deed, at the magistrate’s office, in this shape, and the magistrate then took the instrument to Mrs. Foster, at her husband’s house, that she might sign and acknowledge it in the same shape. When the magistrate took the mortgage to her thus to execute, Mrs. Foster said, “ she was fearful that the speculation which her husband was going into would not come out right; that she did not like to mortgage that place, but that he wanted to raise a few hundred dollars, or several hundred dollars, or something to that effect,”—the magistrate, who was the witness that gave the testimony, did not recollect the’ exact expression which she used,—“ and that she did not like to refuse him, and that so she consented to sign the mortgage.” Mrs. Foster, having signed the instrument in this blank shape, the notary, under his hand and seal, certified, in form, that the husband and wife, “the signers and sealers of Wie foregoing deed,” had personally appeared before him, “ and acknowledged the signing and sealing thereof to be their voluntary act and deed, for the uses
Argument for the mortgagee.
and purposes expressed;” and that the wife, “being examined separate and apart from her said husband, and the contents of the foregoing deed made known to her by me, she then acknowledged that she executed the same freely, and without fear or compulsion from any one.” Such form of separate acknowledgment, it may be well to say, is required by statute, in Minnesota, to give any effect to a feme covert’s deed. After taking the wife’s acknowledgment, the notary gave the instrument to her husband. He, finding the complainant, Drury, willing to lend as much as $12,800 upon the property, himself filled up the blanks with the name of Drury, as mortgagee, and with the sum just mentioned as the amount for which the estate was mortgaged. In this form the instrument was delivered to Drury, who, knowing nothing of the facts, advanced the money in good faith, and put his mortgage on record. There was no evidence that the wife derived any benefit from the money advanced, or that she ever knew that such a large sum was advanced.
On a bill of foreclosure brought four years afterwards by Drury against Foster and wife, in the Federal Court for Minnesota, the defence was, that the mortgage was not the wife’s deed; a defence which the court below thought good as to her. It accordingly dismissed the bill as regarded her, giving a decree, however, against the husband. The correctness of its action as regarded the wife was the question, on appeal, here.
Jfr. Peckham for Drury, the mortgagee: All will admit that it is not easy to conceive of a case addressing itself more to a sense of equity. Drury, without a circumstance to excite suspicion, and relying upon a mortgage regular upon its face, advanced a large sum in perfect good faith. He supposed, too, as was natural, that the mortgagors were acting in equal good faith. Mrs. Foster deliberately, and with understanding, put it into the power of her husband to obtain the loan. Will she be permitted, at this late day, in conjunction with her husband, to disavow her acts, and thus, m effect, defraud an innocent third party whom she has been
Argument for the mortgagee.
chiefly instrumental in bringing into his present position ? Even if Mrs. Foster were entirely innocent in the premises, and was the victim of the fraud of her husband, yet either she or the plaintiff must suffer loss in the present case; and no principle is better settled than that where loss must fall upon one of two innocent parties, it must be borne by that one who is most in fault. There is no reason for exempting the wife from the operation of this rule. On the contrary, in transactions between the husband and wife and third parties, there is the strongest reason for applying the principle. It would be against public policy, and expose transactions relative to real estate to hazard, to allow a married woman to screen herself from the consequences of her own acts under the circumstances of the present case. Such a doctrine would subordinate all other interests to those of married women.
Viewed on legal principles, the conclusion is to the same effect. It is of no pertinence to cite, in this day and this country, “ technical dogmas,” as Grier, J., calls them,* out of Shepherd’s Touchstone, or Perkins. These old books may, indeed, declare, “ that if a man seal and deliver an empty piece of paper or parchment, albeit he do therein withal give commandment that an obligation or other matter shall be written in it, and this be done accordingly, yet this is no good deed.”f But such doctrines have been exploded, even in England, these two hundred years. Certainly the contrary, as respected a bond, was adjudged in Zouch v. Claye, 23 and 24 Charles II, in the days of Korman French and of black-letter law. Levinz thus reports the case
“ Det sur obligation. Le case fait tiel. A. and B. seal and deliver le bond a C., et puis per le consent de touts les parties le nom et addition de D. fuit interline, et il auxy seal 1’obligation et ceo deliver. Et si 1’obligation per cest alteration fuit faet void vers A. and B. fuit le question. Etper Hale et totam curiam adjudge que nemy.”
*
Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 1 Wallace, 85. f Shepherd’s Touchstone, 54; Perkins, § 111; Co. Lit. 171. | 2 Levinz, 35.
Argument for the mortgagee.
“ Debt on bond. The case was this. A. and B. seal and deliver a bond to C.; and then, with the consent of all parties, the name and addition of D. was interlined; and he also sealed the bond and delivered it. The question was whether, owing to this alteration, the bond was void as respected A. and B. And by Hale, and the whole court adjudged that it was not.”
Texira v. Evans, cited in Master v. Miller, and reported by Anstruther,* A. D. 1793 (Lord Mansfield’s time), did but affirm this old adjudication. There, Evans wanted to borrow .£400, or so much of it as his credit should be able to raise. For this purpose he executed a bond, with blanks for the name and sum, and sent an agent to raise money on the bond. Texira lent ¿£200 on it, and the agent accordingly filled up the blanks with the sum and Texira’s name, and delivered the bond to him. On non est factum pleaded, Lord Mansfield held it a good deed.
The principle was early enunciated in America. Chief Justice Parsons, in delivering the judgment in Smith v. Orooker,^ where a bond had been executed by a surety before his name had been inserted in the body of the instrument, and his name being afterwards inserted therein in his absence, holding the instrument valid, remarks: “ The party executing the bond, knowing that there are blanks in it to be filled up by inserting particular names or things, must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may be thus filled after he has executed the bond.” Ex parte Kerwin^ is a later case, one in New York. It was there held, that an appeal bond drawn in blank as to the recital of the judgment, and executed by the appellant and his surety, the former giving parol authority to his surety to ascertain from the justice the amount of the judgment, and fill up the blank accordingly, and deliver the bond for both, and which was done, was a good bond. This is similar to the case at bar, m the respect that the agent for the insertion of the blanks and delivery of the instrument was one of the co-obligors.
*
Vol. 1, p. 228. t 5 Massachusetts, 539. J 8 Cowen, 118.
Argument for the mortgagee.
Many other American cases are to the same point.* This relaxation of ancient technicality is universal in our new Western States. There people deal with lands as they do with oxen; and pass a fee simple to a hundred acres with as much facility as they do the title to a plough or a cart.f We assert, and the cases just cited prove, that a paper under seal, executed with blanks, becomes, when those blanks are filled up, and the instrument is afterwards delivered, the party’s deed. And it is difficult to see why a contrary view should be entertained. Parol authority is confessedly sufficient for the mere delivery of a deed. But delivery is the act of acts. It is the act by which each and all of the other acts necessary to the execution of the deed become operative and effectual. By it the signing, the sealing, and the acknowledgment take effect. If, therefore, delivery can be made under parol authority, why may not blanks be filled in, and alterations and interlineations made in deeds before their delivery by like authority ? Neither of these things constitute the execution of a deed, but are merely acts necessary to be performed in the execution thereof; acts consummating and giving effect to the execution.
The fact that the party making this deed was a feme covert is unimportant. What an ordinary person may do without examination, a feme covert may do when separately examined. If an ordinary person, without examination, may execute a deed with blanks, a feme covert may execute a similar deed, provided she be separately examined, know fully what she does, and it be plain that it was such a deed she wished and meant to execute. Why not ? Certainly she could convey her whole estate, if it were conveyed by deed, whose blanks were filled. Why may she not convey a portion whose extent remains undefined, if she has*wished and meant so to do ? Her real wishes, her perfect knowledge of what she is
*
Sigfried v. Levan, 6 Sergeant & Rawle, 308; "Wiley v. Moore, 17 id-439; Ex parte Decker, 6 Cowen, 59 ; Anderson v. Lewis, 1 Freeman’s (Mississippi) Chancery, 178. t See what is said by Miller, J., post, Miles v; Caldwell.
Argument for the mortgagee.
doing, her entire freedom from the husband’s coercion and compulsion, these are the points to which the law looks; and these being settled, her capacity is as great as if dis-covert. In this case, when separate and apart from her husband, Mrs. Foster gave her voluntary consent to a sealed instrument, with blanks; in that same manner, she authorized these blanks to be filled at the discretion of her husband, to whom she knew it would be handed over.
But even if not her deed, Mrs. Foster is estopped from asserting that she did not execute the mortgage. The mortgage in question was duly signed, sealed, acknowledged, and certified to, with the name of the grantee and the amount of the mortgage debt in blank, and was, when so signed, sealed, and acknowledged, well known to both grantors to contain these blanks. The conclusion, therefore, is, that the blanks were designedly left by both grantors to facilitate the negotiation of the loan, which was the avowed object of the execution of the mortgage, well known to and understood by Mrs. Foster, as appears by her own declarations made to the notary public at the time, and because the amount and terms of the loan which her husband might succeed in effecting, and the party of whom he might make it, were at the time unknown to either grantor. The mortgage having been thus deliberately, and with understanding, executed in such form and for such purposes by both parties, was, with the full knowledge and deliberate consideration of Mrs. Foster, delivered by her to the notary, to be by him delivered to'the other grantor, her husband, which was accordingly done; and this mortgage, with all the blanks filled in, and in all respects perfect, was delivered by Foster to Drury, the complainant. The doctrine of estoppel in pais, thus laid down by Lord Denman,* applies to such a case: “ The rule of law is clear, that where one, by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act ou that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the
*
Packard v. Sears, 6 Adolphus & Ellis, 469.
Argument for the wife.
former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.”
There is yet another ground why this decree, as respects the wife, should he reversed. Evidence was introduced by Mrs. Foster, for the purpose of showing that, at the time of the signing, sealing, and acknowledgment of the mortgage, there were blanks in it; and this evidence was introduced upon the theory that, there being such blanks at such time in the mortgage, this deed was no deed, at least so far as defendant, Mrs. Foster, was concerned. This evidence tended to contradict, and was introduced for the purpose of contradicting, the certificate of acknowledgment, and showing the same to be false; whereas, on the highest ground of public policy, such certificates are held to be conclusive evidence of the matters they contain, and they can neither be aided nor disproved by parol testimony, except, perhaps, in cases of fraud or imposition. In Jordan v. JordanJ Tilghman, C. J., recognizing this principle, said: “ There would be no certainty to titles if that kind of evidence were permitted. The law directs the magistrate to make his certificate in writing, and he has made it. To that the world is to look, and to nothing else.” The case of Jamison v. Jamison,subsequently decided by the same court, is nearly parallel to the one at bar. It was the case of a mortgage executed by husband and wife, of the separate estate of the wife to secure the debt of the husband; and in which there was an offer to prove, by the testimony of the justice of the peace before whom the acknowledgment was taken, that his certificate thereof was false. The court held that the certificate of the judge or justice to the acknowledgment of a deed by a married woman, is to be judged of solely by what appears on the face of the certificate itself; and that parol evidence of what passed at the time of the acknowledgment is not admissible for the purpose of contradicting the certificate.
Mr. Carlisle, contra: Whatever interest the husband had, passed, we concede, by the decree. What we assert is, that
9 Sergeant & Rawle, 268. f 3 Wharton, 468.
Argument for the wife.
Mrs. Foster’s estate in the land was never conveyed. She never executed any deed in the premises. She signed, sealed, and acknowledged, but never delivered, a blank form of a deed of mortgage, containing no name of the grantee, or mortgagee, no statement or recital of the sum of money to be secured, or the time of payment; or, in short, of any of the matters indispensable to make the deed operative, except the names of the grantors and the description of the property. It was an instrument which conveyed nothing, because there was no grantee. It was an unfinished mortgage in form; but it was no mortgage at all, because there was no mortgagee and no debt, recited, described, or in any manner indicated. It consists, in natural reason, as well with Mrs. Foster’s declaration at the time she signed it, that it was intended to be a security for “ a few hundred dollars,” as with the complainant’s claim for $12,785; and it might as well have turned out a mortgage for a million of dollars. And because it was thus absolutely wanting in certainty, and might be anything, or nothing, when it was signed and acknowledged by Mrs. Foster, it was not, and could not become, her deed in law.
To say that Mrs. Foster is estopped from denying that she executed the mortgage, because she signed, sealed, and executed it, is a petitio principii, simply.
The fact that Mrs. Foster was a married woman does make a potential element of the case. Observe the statement of the case! 11 She was fearful that the speculation which her husband was going into would not come out right: she did not like to mortgage that place;” her paternal property, perhaps, the home of her own childhood. il But he”—her husband—wanted to raise money, and “ she did not like to refuse him, and so she consented to sign.” The case is an affecting illustration of the extent to which a woman becomes, in marriage, “ subdued to the very quality of her lord.” Her woman’s fears had foreseen what her husband’s intelligence never suspected; but like a woman, lovely and confiding, she yielded everything to him. This court will surely remember the language of Marshall, C. J., in Sexton v. Whea-
Argument for the wife.
ton:* “All know and feel the sacredness of the connection between husband and wife. All know that the sweetness of social intercourse, the harmony of society, the happiness of families, depend upon that mutual partiality which they feel, or that delicate forbearance which they manifest towards each other.” Does any one doubt, if this magistrate—the great offender in the case—had done the duty which the laws of the State from which he derived his commission put upon him; that is to say, had refused to take any acknowledgment till the blanks in the deed were filled with $12,800, and its contents, in fact and in truth and spirit made known to the lady—that however Mrs. Drury might have “so consented,” not “ liking to refuse him’’ the magistrate could never have certified that she executed it “ freely.” This separate examination, if faithfully made—this certificate, itself a certificate of quasi judicial approbation to what she does—if conscientiously given; given, as with the body of our higher magistracy we may hope that it only is given; is the protection with which the law hedges the gentle nature of a woman—her crowning grace and glory—from the dangers, and perhaps the ruin, which, without the law’s protection, it is certain in many cases to bring upon her. The argument which treats her as an independent person, and would approximate her actions to those of our own sex—which would say that all that a man may do without examination, she may do if examined —violates the central germ of truth upon the subject, the law of the inherent moral differences of our natures; the true and fine conception of the case, which gives to characters, thoughts, passions, sentiments, and all things within, their sex. A certificate in blank is an absurdity, as respects a married woman, if we look to the wise reasons of the law. By law, such a woman has no power to convey her estate at all. The law gives it to her on condition that she be examined separately, and consent fully and freely to the exact thing which she does. The certificate must have been in fact, and when made a true certificate; and everything certified
to have been done by the feme covert must have been exactly and specifically done.
It is objected that the parol proof tends to contradict the official certificate of acknowledgment, and cases are -cited in support of this objection. But they have no application. Here is no attempt to aid a defective certificate of acknowledgment, as in some of the cases cited. Nor is it an attack, by parol proof, upon a perfect certificate. It is simply proof of what the instrument was which was so acknowledged and certified; that it was not then the instrument which is produced by the complainant.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
By the laws of Minnesota, an acknowledgment of the execution of a deed before the proper officers, privately and apart from her husband, by &feme covert, is an essential prerequisite to the conveyance of her real estate or any interest therein. And she is disabled from executing or acknowledging a deed by procuration, as she cannot make a power of attorney. These disabilities exist by statute and the common law for her protection, in consideration of her dependent condition, and to guard her against undue influence and restraint.
Now, it is conceded, in this case, that the instrument Mrs. Foster signed and acknowledged was not a deed or mortgage; that, on the contrary, it was a blank paper; and that in order to make it available as a deed or mortgage, it must be taken to have been signed and acknowledged with the design to have the blanks filled by the husband, or some other person, before the delivery. We agree—if she was competent to convey her real estate by signing and acknowledging the deed in blank, and delivering the same to an agent, with an express or implied authority to fill up the blank and perfect the conveyance—that its validity could not well be controverted. Although it was, at one time doubted whether a parol authority was adequate to authorize an alteration or addition to a sealed instrument, the better opinion, at this day, is that the power is sufficient.
VOL. ii. g
But there are two insuperable objections to this view in the present case. First, Mrs. Foster was disabled in law from delegating a person, either in writing or by parol, to fill up the blanks and deliver the mortgage; and, second, there could be no acknowledgment of the deed within the requisitions of the statute until the blanks were filled and the instrument complete. Till then there was no deed to be acknowledged. The act of the feme covert and of the officers were nullities, and the form of acknowledgment annexed as much waste paper as the blank mortgage itself, at the time of signing.
It is insisted, however, that Mrs. Foster should be estopped from denying that she had signed and acknowledged the mortgage. The answer to this is, that to permit an estoppel to operate against her would be a virtual repeal of the statute that extends to her this protection, and also a denial of the disability of the common law that forbids the conveyance of hef real estate by procuration. It would introduce into the law an entirely new system of conveyances of the real property of feme coverts. Instead of the transaction being a real one in conformity with established law, conveyances, by signing and acknowledging blank sheets of paper, would he the only formalities requisite. The consequences of such a system are apparent, and need not be stated.
There is authority for saying, that where a perfect deed has been signed and acknowledged before the proper officer, an inquiry into the examination of the feme covert, embracing the requisites of the statute, as constituting the acknowledgment, with a view to contradict the writing, is inadmissible; that acts of the officer for this purpose are judicial and conclusive. We express no opinion upon the soundness of this doctrine, as it is not material in this case. The case before us is very different. There is no defect in the form of the acknowledgment, or in the private examination. No inquiry is here made into them. The defect is in the deed, which it. is not made the duty of this officer to write, fill up, or examine, and for the legal validity of which he is no way responsible. The two instruments are distinct. The [p. 35] deed may be filled up without any official authority, and may be good or bad. The acknowledgment requires such authority. The difficulty here is not in the form of the acknowledgment, but that it applied to a nonentity, and was, therefore, nugatory. The truth is, that the acknowledgment in this case might as well have been taken and made on a separate piece of paper, and at some subsequent period attached by the officer, or some other person, to a deed that had never been before the feme covert. The argument in support of its validity would be equally strong.
Our opinion is that, as it respects Mrs. Foster, the mortgage is not binding on her estate.
We may regret the misfortune of the complainant from the conclusion at which we have arrived; but it seems to us impossible to extend the relief prayed for by the bill of foreclosure, without abrogating the protection which the law for ages has thrown around the estates of married women. Losses of the kind may be guarded against, on the part of dealers in real estate, by care and caution; and we think that this burden should be imposed on them, rather than that a sacrifice should be made of the rights of a class who are dependent enough in the business affairs of life, even when all the privileges with which the law surrounds them are left unimpaired.
Decree affirmed.
N. B. A decree made below, on a cross-bill ordering the mortgagee to cancel the wife’s name on the mortgage, was affirmed here. The cross-bill set up, substantially, the facts disclosed in the answer to the original bill; and the proofs taken in each case were the same.
Miles v. Caldwell.
■ The established rule, that where a matter has been once heard and determined in one court (as of law), it cannot be raised anew and reheard in another (as of equity), is not confined to cases where the matter is made patent in the pleadings themselves. Where the form of issue in the trial, relied on as estoppel, is so vague (as it may be in an action of ejectment), that it does not show precisely what questions were before
the jury and were necessarily determined by it, parol proof may be given to show them. 2. The reasons which rendered inconclusive one trial in ejectment, have force when the action is brought in the fictitious form practised in England, and known partially among ourselves; but they apply imperfectly, and have little weight, when the action is brought in the form now usual in the United States, and where parties sue and are sued in their own names, and the position and limits of the land claimed are described. They have no force at all in Missouri, where the modern form is prescribed, and where, by statute, one judgment is a bar. 3. A State statute, enacting that a judgment in ejectment—provided the action be brought in a form which gives precision to the parties and land claimed—shall be a bar to any other action between the same parties on the same subject-matter, is a rule of property as well as of practice, and being conclusive on title in the courts of the State, is conclusive, also, in those of the Union.
Miles brought ejectment against Caldwell, in the Circuit Court of Missouri; the action being brought, not in the fictitious form, still sometimes used in the United States, but in the form now more frequent with us, in which the parties actually suing appear in their proper names, as Thomas Miles against William Caldwell, and where the land claimed is described as by metes or bounds, or by both; the action being entitled, in Missouri, “ trespass in ejectment.” Both parties in the present suit claimed under one Ely, who, in 1837, and prior to that time, was owner of the land; Caldwell claiming under a mortgage made by Ely to Gallagher in that year; and a subsequent release by Ely;* Miles, under a mortgage of 1838, by Ely to Carswell and McClellan, and a foreclosure and sale founded on it. The defendant, Caldwell, in that ejectment, contended that his own title, under the mortgage to Gallagher, was good; and that the title of Miles, under the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan, was bad, as having been made in fraud of creditors. Miles, the [p. 37] plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the mortgage to Gallagher had been satisfied; and that his own mortgage was not fraudulent, but given for a valid debt. Both these points—that is to 'say, the point whether Gallagher’s mortgage had or had not been paid, and whether that of Carswell and McClellan was fraudulent or was good—were submitted to the jury, who, on instructions from the court, passed upon them, finding a verdict for the plaintiff, Miles. Indeed, as to the question of fraud, there was an express agreement, now before this court, that the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan was, in the action of ejectment, impeached for fraud; and the record of that suit also established the fact that the question, whether the mortgage to Gallagher had been paid off in full, was submitted to them. But neither of these points were points put in issue by the pleadings themselves; nor, indeed, was it practicable so to put them in issue in the action,—that of ejectment.
*
The mortgage to Gallagher was never foreclosed. The mortgagee had obtained a judgment against Ely on a note which the mortgage was given to secure, and under an execution issued on that judgment the land was sold, and by several mesne conveyances the complainant became invested with such title or claim as that sale • could confer. Having some doubts of the validity, under the laws of Missouri, of this title, Caldwell procured from Ely, the mortgagor, the release above mentioned.
In this state of the facts, Caldwell, wishing, as he represented, to have his title “ quieted,” filed his bill on the equity side of the court, where the judgment at law had been obtained, to enjoin execution on the judgment, and to prevent Miles’s taking possession of the land.
The grounds of the complainant’s application were these:
1. That his title was good and valid, founded on the senior mortgage; and, being the true legal title, should prevail.
2. That the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan was fraudulent, because made for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors; and that a court of equity should decree it to be void, and prevent its being used to the injury of complainant.
3. That he had made valuable improvements, in good faith, on the land, supposing it to be his own, for which he was entitled to compensation before it was taken from him.
It is necessary here to say, that in Missouri one of the Revised Statutes enacts, that in ejectment, as in other actions authorized by it, a judgment, except one of nonsuit, “shall be a bar to any other action between the same parties, or those claiming under them, as to the same subject-matter.”
The court below granted the injunction, and an appeal came here.
Jfr. Green, in support of the decree: Caldwell, being in posses sion, under a senior mortgage, had a right to stay. Even if the judgment on the note did not foreclose the mortgage, he had a release from Ely which gave him the equity of redemption. Admitting that the question of the payment of Gallagher’s mortgage, and the good faith of that of Carswell and McClellan were in issue on the trial at law, what is there to prevent their being passed on here ? The action was ejectment; a proceeding in which it is matter of common knowledge that one judgment never binds. Moreover, it is a rule that nothing will be held as concluded by the verdict which is not put in issue by the pleadings. Outram v. Morewood,* confines the conclusiveness to questions expressly so put.
[On the third ground assigned for relief—valuable improvements put on the land—Mr. Green made no remarks.]
' Mr. Gantt, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
1. The complainant’s first proposition—that his title is good, founded on the prior mortgage, and, being the true legal title, should prevail—contains no element as it is stated, or in the facts which go to make up his title, that calls into action the powers of a court of chancery. If under the proceedings which took place in regard to the mortgage of Gallagher,! the complainant acquired the legal title to the real estate in question, a court of law would notice that title, and is as much bound to respect it as a court of equity. If he did not really obtain the legal title, but having the possession, was entitled to be treated as a mortgagee in possession, a court of law is bound to protect him in that possession against any title, not paramount to the mortgage under which he held.
* 8 East, 846. f See supra, p. 36, note.
We cannot perceive that there is any circumstance connected with the title of complainant, which brings his case within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Although it is true that in the practice of the English courts, and in those States of the Union where the fictitious action of ejectment is still in use, chancery will interfere where there have been repeated verdicts in favor of the same title to prevent further litigation, it is not true that chancery will interpose in favor of the unsuccessful party in the first trial, upon the sole ground that he has the legal title, and, therefore, ought to have succeeded in the action at law. It would be a novelty that a court of chancery, which in proper cases quiets a title which has been established by several verdicts and judgments at law, should reverse its course of action to quiet a title strictly legal, with no impediment to its assertion in a court of law, where it had been defeated in the only action in which it had been thus set up.
2. The second proposition, in respect of which complainant asks relief,—that the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan is fraudulent, made to hinder creditors, &c.,—is one of the common grounds of equity jurisdiction. To relieve against fraud, and to set aside and cancel fraudulent conveyances, are among the ordinary duties of courts of chancery. Courts of law, however, have concurrent jurisdiction of questions of fraud, when properly raised; and, although they cannot cancel or set aside fraudulent instruments of writing, yet when they are produced in evidence by a party claiming any right under them, their fraudulent character may, under proper circumstances, be shown, and their validity in the particular case contested.
It is a general rule, growing out of the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of law and chancery over this subject, as well as a variety of others, founded also upon the principle that it is the interest of the public, that there should he some end to litigation, that when a matter has once been heard and determined in one court, it shall not be subject to re-examination in another court between the same parties. The defendant in this suit invokes the benefit of this rule as [p. 40] regards the question of fraud in the mortgage from Ely to Carswell and McClellan, and also as to the fact charged by him that the Gallagher mortgage had been fully satisfied, and was no longer of any force; alleging that both questions were submitted to the jury and decided against complainant in the action of ejectment, the judgment in which is now sought to be enjoined. Of the fact of such submission and finding there can, in this case, be no doubt. Under the instructions of the court, which are in proof in this record, if the jury found either of these issues in favor of Caldwell, the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict. The plaintiff, however, did get a verdict. It thus appears conclusively that the jury found that there was no fraud in the second mortgage, and that the first had been satisfied.
The complainant, however, seeks to evade the force of the general principle on the ground that the verdict and judgment in actions of ejectment have not that conclusive effect between the parties which they have in other actions, either in courts of law or equity. It must be conceded that such is the general doctrine on the subject, as applicable to cases tried under the common law form of the action of ejectment.
One reason why the verdict cannot be made conclusive in those cases is obviously due to the fictitious character of the action. If a question is tried and determined between John Doe, plaintiff, and A. B., who comes in and is substituted defendant in place of Richard Roe, the casual ejector, it is plain that A. B. cannot plead the verdict and judgment in bar of another suit brought by John Den against Richard Fen, though the demise may be laid from the same lessor, for there is no privity between John Doe and John Den. Hence, technically, an estoppel could not be successfully pleaded so long as a new fictitious plaintiff could be used. It was this difficulty of enforcing at law the estoppel of former verdicts and judgments in ejectment, that induced courts of equity (which, unrestrained by the technicality, could look past the nominal parties to the real ones) to interfere, after a sufficient number of trials had taken place, to determine fairly the validity of the title; and by injunction, [p. 41] directed to the unsuccessful litigant, compel him to cease from harassing his opponent by useless litigation.
There was, perhaps, another reason why the English common law refused to concede to the action of ejectment, which is a personal action, that conclusive effect which it gave to all other actions, namely, the peculiar respect, almost sanctity, which the feudal system attached to the tenttre by which real estate was held. So peculiarly sacred was the title to land with our ancestors, that they w’ere not willing that the claim to it should, like all other claims, be settled forever by one trial in an ordinary personal action, but permitted the unsuccessful party to have other opportunity of establishing his title. They, however, did concede to those solemn actions, the writ of right and the writ of assize, the same force as estoppels, which they did to personal actions in other cases.
The first of the above reasons, for the inconClusiveness of the action of ejectment, does not exist in the case before us. That is not the old fictitious action, but is a suit by Thomas Miles against William Caldwell, in which the former complains of the latter “ in a plea of trespass and ejectment,” and sues for the possession of the land and for damages for its detention. If Caldwell should sue Miles to regain possession after the latter had obtained it under his judgment, there exists no technical reason to prevent Miles from pleading the former judgment, and alleging that it involved the same subject-matter as that for which the second suit was brought.
How far the peculiar sanctity attaching to titles to real estate is still a reason, if it were ever one, for taking judgements in ejectment out of the general rule of conclusiveness, we will consider hereafter. At present we proceed to inquire into a qualification of the rule which is alleged to apply in all cases where the action relied on as an estoppel was in tort, namely, that nothing will be held as concluded by the verdict which was not put directly in issue by the 1 ngs. If this principle is a sound one, the plea in this case being the general issue of not guilty, no parol proof can [p. 42] be received to show what questions of fact were submitted to the jury under that issue. * The case of Standish v. Parker* would seem to countenance this doctrine. But, after a careful examination of the authorities, we do not think that the rule is sustained, nor do we believe it to be founded on sound principle. No reason is perceived why parol proof should be admitted to show what facts were proved, or were put in issue, under the general issue in assumpsit, that would not be equally applicable to the same issue in trespass. Yet it is quite clear, from numerous authorities, that the facts put in issue in assumpsit may be shown in another action by parol, f The case of Outram v. Moorewood is a leading case on the subject. It is there decided that the action of trespass is conclusive on all questions put expressly in issue by the pleadings. But there is nothing in the opinion touching the introduction of parol proof, for the pleas in that case rendered it unnecessary, the facts in dispute having been set forth in a special plea. In Kitchen v. Campbell,X the former action was trover for the conversion of goods; and the same plain tiff having afterwards sued in assumpsit for their value, his defeat in the former suit was held to be a bar to his recovery in the second action. Although it is not stated in the case what was the plea in the action of trover, there is no reason to suppose that it was other than not guilty; nor does it seem that any importance was attached to the form of the plea. In Burt v. Sternburgh,§—an action of trespass quare clausum fregit,—the plaintiff was allowed to introduce the record of a former recovery between the same parties in an action of trespass, and then to prove by parol that the locus in quo was the same, and that the title relied on by defendant in the action then on trial, was the same title which had been set up and defeated in the first action. In Boty v. Brown,U the action was replevin for oats, hay, &c. The case
* 2 Pickering, 20. f Washington Steam Packing Co. v. Sickles, 24 Howard, 333. J 3 Wilson, 304. g 4 Cowen, 559. || 4 Comstock, 71.
turned on the validity of a bill of sale, which was alleged to be fraudulent and void as to creditors. The defendant relied on a judgment of a justice of the peace in a former suit, between the same parties, for the conversion of a part of the goods covered by the same bill of sale. The justice was allowed to testify that he had rendered his judgment in favor of defendant on the ground that the bill of sale was fraudulent as to creditors; and this was held conclusive in the Court of Appeals of New York.
We are of opinion that the prevailing doctrine of the courts at present is, that whenever the form of the issue in the trial relied on as an estoppel is so vague that it does not determine what questions of fact were submitted to the jury , under it, it is competent to prove by parol testimony what question or questions of fact were before the jury, and were necessarily passed on by them. In the case under consideration, the record leaves no doubt on that subject.
Reverting now to the question of policy, grounded on the supposed sanctity of land titles as affecting the conclusiveness of judgments in trespass or ejectment, we remark that it is the settled doctrine of this court in reference to all questions affecting the title to real estate, to permit the different States of the Union to settle them each for itself; and when the point involved is one which becomes a rule of property, we follow the decisions of the State courts, whether founded on the statutes of the States or their views of general policy.
As regards the particular question before us, there is a great difference in the different States in the value attached to real estate, and to the title by which it is held, as compared with other species of property. But no doubt is entertained that in all of them the feeling is far removed from that which formerly prevailed in England, or which prevails there even now. While some of our older States still uphold many of the safeguards of the common law, with its complicated system of conveyancing, operating as a strong drag upon the facility and frequency of transfers of real property. our Western people traffic in land as they do in horses [p. 44] or merchandise, and sell a quarter-section of land as readily and as easily as they do a mule or a wagon. The laws of the people correspond with their habits. Deeds of conveyance are, by statute, rendered exceedingly simple and effectual, the main safeguard being a well-digested system of registration. In consonance with this general facility of traffic, it is their policy to prevent those endless litigations concerning titles to lands, which, in other countries, are transmitted from one generation to another. The rapid settlement of a new country requires that a title once fairly determined shall not be again disturbed as between the same parties.
The Revised Statutes of Missouri of *1855, concerning the action of ejectment, say: “Ajudgment, except of nonsuit, in an action authorized by this act, shall be a bar to any other action between the same parties, or those claiming under them, as to the same subject-matter.” We hold this enactment to be binding on the Federal courts as well as those of the State.. It is a rule of property. It concerns the stability of titles to land, and it would be highly improper to adopt in the Federal courts a rule tending to increase litigation and unsettle those titles, which is in conflict with the one prescribed by the law-making power of the State. It is a matter which involves something more than a mere rule of practice. It is a question whether a matter, which is conclusive of the title to land in the State courts, shall have the same effect in the Federal courts. It is our opinion that it should.
3. As regards the claim for improvements made in good faith by complainant, the matter is not alluded to by his counsel in this court at all. It is barely mentioned by the counsel for appellant, and no importance seems to have been attached to it either here or in the court below. Such a right must depend wholly upon the statutes of Missouri, and none are cited to us. We are unwilling to enter upon an investigation of the law and the facts both under such circumstances. Besides, without deciding the point, we may [p. 45] remark that upon an examination of the statute of Missouri on that subject, and looking to the policy which dictated it, it does not seem probable that it was intended to give this kind of relief to an unsuccessful defendant in ejectment, while he was still contesting the title of the plaintiff*. As to this point, we incline to rule-that the bill shall be dismissed without prejudice.
*
Page 695, ch. 58, ? 33.
GRIER, J., expressed his concurrence, adding as another reason why the bill should have been dismissed, that even if the mortgage given to Carswell and McClellan had been fraudulent,—which his Honor, after examining the testimony, said it was not,—the complainant, who was not a creditor, had no equity to found his bill.
Decree reversed, with costs; case remanded to the court below, with directions that there the bill be dismissed with costs; the dismissal, however, to be without prejudice to any remedy of the complainant for compensation for improvements on the land made in good faith.
Tool Company v. Norris.
1- An agreement for compensation for procuring a contract from the Government to furnish its supplies is against public policy, and cannot be enforced by the courts. 2. Where the special and general counts of a declaration set forth the same contract, and an instruction directed to the legality of the contract, is refused with reference to the special counts, it is unnecessary, in order to bring up to this court for consideration the writing thereon, to ask the instruction with reference to the general counts to which it is equally applicable, although upon the special counts the verdict passed for the plaintiff in error.
In July, 1861, the Providence Tool Company, a corporation created under the laws of Rhode Island, entered into a [p. 46] contract with the Government, through the Secretary of War, to deliver to officers of the United States, within certain stated periods, twenty-five thousand muskets, of a specified pattern, at the rate of twenty dollars a musket. This contract was procured through the exertions of Norris, the plaintiff in the court below, and the defendant in error in this court, upon a previous agreement with the corporation, through its managing agent, that in case he obtained a contract of this kind he should receive compensation for his services proportionate to its extent, Norris himself, it appeared,—though not having any imputation on his moral character,—was a person who had led a somewhat miscellaneous sort of a life, in Europe and America. Soon after the rebellion broke out, he found himself in Washington. He was there without any special purpose, but, as he stated, with a view of “ making business—anything generally;” “ soliciting acquaintances;” “getting letters;” “ getting an office,” &c. Finding that the Government was in need of arms to suppress the rebellion, which had now become organized, he applied to the Providence Tool Company, already mentioned, to see if they wanted a job, and made the contingent sort of contract with them just referred to. He then set himself to work at what he called, “ concentrating influence at the War Department;” that is to say, to getting letters from people who might be supposed to have influence with Mr. Cameron, at that time Secretary of War, recommendifig him and his objects. Among other means, he applied to the Rhode Island Senators, Messrs. Anthony and Simmons, with whom he had got acquainted, to go with him to the War Office. Mr. Anthony declined to go; stating that since he had been Senator he had been applied to some hundred times, in like manner, and had invariably declined; thinking it discreditable to any Senator to intermeddle with the business of the departments. “ Yon will certainly not decline to go with me, and introduce me to the Secretary, and to state that the Providence Tool Company is a responsible corporation.” “ I will give you a now, said Mr. Anthony. “ I do not want a note,” was the reply; “ I want the weight of your presence with me. I wani [p. 47] U influence of a Senator.” “Well,” said Mr. Anthony, 11 go to ■ towns.” By one means and another, Norris got influenI tial introduction to Mr. Secretary Cameron, and got the I contract, a very profitable one; the Secretary, whom on I leaving he warmly thanked, “ hoping that he would make I a great deal of money out of it.”
But a dispute now arose between Norris and the Tool Company, as to the amount of compensation to be paid.
I I Norris insisted that by the agreement with him he was to I receive $75,000; the difference between the contract price I and seventeen dollars a musket; whilst the corporation, on the other hand, contended, that it had only promised “ a liberal compensation” in case of success. Some negotiation I on the subject was had between them; but it failed to produce a settlement, and Norris instituted the present action to recover the full amount claimed by him.
The declaration contained several counts; the first and second ones, special; the third, fourth, and fifth, general. The special ones set forth specifically a contract, that if he, Norris, procured the Government to give the order to the company, the company would pay to him, Norris, “ for his services, in obtaining, or causing and procuring to be obtained, such order, all that the Government might, by the terms of their arrangement with the company, agree to pay above $17 for each musket.” The general counts were in the usual form of quantum meruit, &c.; but in these counts, as in the special ones' a contract was set forth on the basis of a compensation, contingent upon Norris’s procuring an order from the Government for muskets for the Tool Company; reliance on this contingent sort of contract running through all the counts of the declaration. There was no pretence that the plaintiff had rendered any other service than that which resulted in the contract for the muskets.'
On the trial in the Circuit Court for the Rhode Island strict, the counsel of the Tool Company requested the J court to instruct the jury, that a contract like that declared on m the first and second counts was against public policy, ai*d void; which instruction the court refused to give. The
Argument against the contract.
same counsel requested the court to charge, 41 that upon the quantum meruit count the plaintiff was not entitled in law to recover any other sum of money, for services rendered to the Tool Company in procuring a contract for making arms, than a fair and reasonable compensation for the time, speech, labor performed, and expenses incurred in performing such services, to be computed at a price for which similar services could have been obtained from others.” The court gave this instruction, with the exception of the last nine words in italics. The jury found for the defendant on the first and second—that is to say, upon the special—counts, and for the plaintiff on the others, and judgment was entered on $13,500 for the plaintiff. The case came, by writ of error, here.
Messrs. Payne and Thurston for the Tool Company, plaintiff in error: The general principle that 44 many contracts which are not against morality are still void as being against sound policy,” is one that was distinctly announced so long ago, at least, as Lord Mansfield’s day,* and one which will not be denied. Thus, no recovery can be had upon a contract for the payment of a part of the profits of an office to the former incumbent, in consideration of his resignation of such office;! and the principle has been extended to the case of a contract stipulating merely for the resignation of an office, without any agreement to exert any influence toward the appni ntment, of a successor, and this, too, where the sum agreed to be paid for such resignation was only an equitable return of a portion of a sum of money previously paid by the retiring officer upon a like contract to his successor, who had also been his predecessor in the same office.! In consistency with the doctrine that benefits from the Govern ment ought not to be the result of any corrupting influence, but should be awarded on the principle of detur digniori, it has been held that an agreement on the part of one person to pay a sum of money to another person, as an inducement
*
Jones v. Randall, Cowper, 39. Parsons v. Thompson, 1 Henry Blackstone, 822. J Eddy v. Capron, 4 Rhode Island, 394.
Argument against the contract.
for the latter not to propose to carry the mail upon a certain post-route in opposition to the former, is against public policy and void, although no act whatever was done by the party, to whom the promise was made, to influence the success of the other party’s application, and the applicant was a suitable and responsible man to perform the service.* Similar principles governed the court in the Vermont case of Pingry v. Washburn,f where it refused to sustain an agreement to pay a sum of money for withdrawing opposition to the passage of an act affecting the interest of a corporation. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Boynton v. Hubbard^ remark, in reference to the class of illustrations now being considered : “It is upon this same principle that bargains to procure offices are rescinded, not on account of fraud in either of the parties, but for the sake of the public, because they tend to introduce unsuitable persons into public offices.”
Another, and a large class of cases to which the principle has been applied, relate to agreements for compensation for procuring legislation. All such have, without an exception, been held to be void. In Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,§ this court stated that it was an undoubted principle of the common law that it will not lend its aid to enforce a contract “ which tends to corrupt or contaminate, by improper influences, the integrity of our social or political institutions.” And again: “Bribes in the shape of high contingent compensation must necessarily lead to the use of improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the demoralization of the agent who covenants for them.”
That it is not necessary for the element of sinister or personal influence to be contemplated by the agreement, or to ej in fact, resorted to by the agent, in order to render such agreement for service obnoxious to the law, is directly asserted in other cases. The plaintiff in Harris v. Boofs\* sought to recover in indebitatus assumpsit, and on a quantum*§*
*
Gulick et al. v. Bailey, 5 Halstead, 87. t 1 Aiken, 264. j 7 Massachusetts, 112. § 16 Howard, 314. II 10 Barbour, 489. vol. ii. 4 11 ’
Argument against the contract.
meruit, for his services and expenses in prosecuting before the legislature of New York a claim, in behalf of the defendant, to a certain tract of land derived under an Indian grant. It does not appear from the case that the plaintiff was to observe any secrecy, or that his true representative character was not fully understood. Neither was it suggested that he was expected to employ, or did in fact make use of, any sinister or improper influence with the members of the legislature. It was shown that he appeared at hearings of the committee to whom the same was referred, and that the value of his services to the plaintiff, and the expenses by him incurred during his stay in Albany, were equal to the amount charged, which was not a large sum, he having failed of establishing the defendant’s title. Some question was made whether his compensation was not to be contingent, as was proved to have been the agreement with a former agent of the defendant in the same business. The court, however, use the following language : a Even without any agreement to share in the avails of the claim, we think the claim invalid as against public policy and sound legislation. It certainly would imply a most unjustifiable dereliction of duty to hold that the employment of individuals to visit and importune the members is necessary to obtain justice. Such practices would have a tendency to prevent the free, honorable, and correct deliberation and action of this most important branch of sovereignty. We cannot think it good public policy to require our courts to enforce such contracts. It can neither be necessary or proper for the legislature to be surrounded by swarm s of hired retainers of the claimants upon public bounty or justice. To legalize such a system would, to say the least, be a reflection upon the ability and industry of our legislators.”
The Louisiana case of Grill v. Williams ft Davis,* an another in Massachusetts, Fuller v. Dame,} are in point. The principle to be deduced from the cases is, in its fullest force, applicable to the one at bar. The evil tendencies o
f 18 Pickering, 472.
* 12 Louisiana Annual, 219.
Argument against the contract.
an agreement to procure a favor from one of the departments of the Government for a compensation contingent upon the success of the undertaking, are as great as in the case of an agreement to procure legislation upon a similar consideration. The heads of the several departments exercise by delegation the high duties which, hy law, have been intrusted to them, and are only the executive ministers appointed to carry out the will of the law-making power. The authority to make contracts for arms was derived from the legislature. It would have been competent for Congress to have authorized the making of such contracts through one of its own committees, or by the concurrent action of the two houses of which it is composed, to have settled upon and agreed to the terms of each contract. It follows, therefore, that if the agreement set up by the defendant in error would be condemned if it related to the procurement of legislation beneficial to the plaintiff in error, it must, for the same reasons, fail of support if it relates to the procurement of the same benefit from the Secretary of War, to whom the power of conferring it had been delegated.
If any one ever doubted of the wisdom of such principles as the cases which we have cited a little way back decide, will he doubt it after reading the statement of this case? With a sense of decorum, the reporter will probably suppress some of its salient features,—the tacenda of the case. Its general character he will not dare, even for decorum’s sake, to falsify. “ Wounds cannot be cured without searchlng- This case has been probed, and requires to be laid open.
The transaction is creditable to no one concerned but to Mr. Anthony. Such principles as the court below declared ln regard to the contract are wholly untenable. And the effect is seen in the fact that, for service which any clerk in me employ of the company might have rendered in a single ’ ay, and at a trifling expense, the jury awarded a compensation nearly double what is allowed to one of your Honors or the service of a year upon this bench. May it please this court, a profound thinker of our own
Argument in support of the contract.
country has observed that nothing so base as American politics had become, before the breaking out of our rebellion, had been seen in human history since the Roman Empire was put up at auction. Our politics, it may be hoped, have grown no worse during the honorable contest which our country has been waging. But may it not be feared that what are called the morals of business have been descending to the level of politics rapidly ? No one expects absolute purity in politics or business, especially in time of war. Contractors followed the armies of Wellington as they follow those of Grant. The Treasury was plundered when William Pitt was Chancellor of the Exchequer; and we may doubt, Mr. Chief Justice, whether, when you held a corresponding office, you were able to keep the hands of all your subordinates as clean as you ever kept your own. These are the necessary consequences of the disordered condition in which we now temporarily are. But they are not to be encouraged; least of all are they to have judicial sanction. This court will pronounce, we feel assured, that this agreement for contingent compensation, as the reward of procuring contracts with the Executive Department of the Government, is contra bonos mores, and wholly void.
Mr. Blake, contra.
1. It is not easy to conceive of a more ungracious defence. Confessedly, the contract was procured through the exertions of Norris alone. Of course, he gave his time, spent his money, invoked the aid of acquaintances, solicited influence, waited about the ante-rooms, and went through such operations as persons seeking contracts at Washington generally go through; operations distasteful in the extreme to any man of' independence; impossible, indeed, for such a man to undergo. There is no imputation upon the generally fair character of Mr. Norris, nor allegation that Mr. Cameron acted corruptly. Having got the contract through Norris s labors, having made an immense sum by it, the company now turn round, and plead the illegality of their [p. 53] agreements! Is not this base ? More than this, is it not a case for the maxim, “Nemo allegans turpitudinem suam audiatur?”
The cases cited do not apply. Not one is a case like this. There is no case which says that a corporation may not employ an agent to negotiate with the War Department, for a contract to manufacture arms; or that, if the agent is openly acting as such, the terms of his compensation may not lawfully be whatever the corporation and himself agree on.
2. The refusal of the court to charge that such a contract was unlawful, was expressly directed to the contract between Norris and the Tool Company, as specifically set forth in the first and second counts; that is to say, as set forth in the special counts. In them, Norris set up a specific agreement to give him all above seventeen dollars a musket. But on these two counts the jury found for the Tool Company. Of course, the instruction asked for by the company on these counts, and refused, is not open to consideration here.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
Several grounds were taken, in the court below, in defence of this action; and, among others, the corporation relied upon the proposition of law, that an agreement of the character stated,—that is, an agreement for compensation to procure a contract from the Government to furnish its supplies,—is against public policy, and void. This proposition is the question for the consideration of the court. It arises upon the refusal of the court below to give one of the instructions asked.
A suggestion was made on the argument, though not much pressed, that the instruction involving the proposition cannot properly be regarded, inasmuch as it was directed in terms to the agreement set forth in the special counts of the declaration, upon which the jury found for the defendants. There would be much force in this suggestion, if the general counts, upon which the verdict passed for the plaintiff, did not also aver that his services were rendered in procuring the same contract from the Government. The instruction was directed especially to the legality of a contract of that [p. 54] kind, which having been once refused with reference to some of the counts, it was not necessary for counsel to renew with reference to the other counts to which it was equally applicable. The subsequent instructions were, therefore, directed to other matters.
It was not claimed, on the trial, that the plaintiff had rendered any other services than those which resulted in the procurement of the contract for the muskets. We are of opinion, therefore, that the proposition of law is fairly presented by the record, and is before us for consideration. ’ The question, then, is this : Can an agreement for compensation to procure a contract from the Government to furnish its supplies be enforced by the courts? We have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative. All contracts for supplies should be made with those, and with those only, who will execute them most faithfully, and at the least expense to the Government. Considerations as to the most efficient and economical mode of meeting the public wants should alone control, in this respect, the action of every department of the Government. No other consideration can lawfully enter into the transaction, so far as the Government is concerned. Such is the rule of public policy; and whatever tends to introduce any other elements into the transaction, is against public policy. That agreements, like the one under consideration, have this tendency, is manifest. They tend to introduce personal solicitation, and personal influence, as elements in the procurement of contracts; and thus directly lead to inefficiency in the public service, and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds.
The principle which determines the invalidity of the agreement in question has been asserted in a great variety of cases. It has been asserted in cases relating to agreements for compensation to procure legislation. These have been uniformly declared invalid, and the decisions have not turned upon the question, whether improper influences were contemplated or used, but upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements. Legislation should be prompted sole y [p. 55] from considerations of the public good, and the best means of advancing it. Whatever tends to divert the attention of legislators from their high duties, to mislead their judgments, or to substitute other motives for their conduct than the advancement of the public interests, must necessarily and directly tend to impair the integrity of our political institutions. Agreements for compensation contingent upon success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the contract from its inception.
There is no real difference in principle between agreements to procure favors from legislative bodies, and agreements to procure favors in the shape of contracts from the heads of departments. The introduction of improper elements to control the action of both, is the direct and inevitable result of all such arrangements.*
The same principle has also been applied, in numerous instances, to agreements for compensation to procure appointments to public offices. These offices are trusts, held solely for the public good, and should be conferred from considerations of the ability, integrity, fidelity, and fitness for the position of the appointee. No other considerations can properly be regarded by the appointing power. Whatever introduces other elements to control this power, must necessarily lower the character of the appointments, to the great detriment of the public. Agreements for compensation to procure these appointments tend directly and necessarily to introduce such elements. The law, therefore, from this tendency alone, adjudges these agreements inconsistent with sound morals and public policy.f e Other agreements of an analogous character might be mentioned, which the courts, for the same or similar reasons, retuse to uphold. It is unnecessary to state them particularly;
arris v. Roof’s Executors, 10 Barbour, 489; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pickering, 472.
t Gray v. Hook, 4 Comstock, 449.
it is sufficient to observe, generally, that all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the Government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question, whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements; and it closes the door to temptation, by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country.
It follows that the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; and it is
So ORDERED.
Gregg v. Forsyth.
Error does not lie to a refusal of the Circuit Court to award a writ of restitution in ejectment.
Forsyth had brought ejectment against Gregg in the Circuit Court for Illinois, and obtained judgment for the land sued for. On writ of error taken by Gregg, this court reversed that judgment and remitted the case with directions to issue a venire de novo. Between the time, however, that the Circuit Court gave its judgment of recovery, and that when this court gave its of reversal, Forsyth had been put in possession of the premises by a habere facias, and had collected, moreover, the costs of the suit.
As soon as the mandate of this court reversing the judgment was sent down to the court below, but before it had been filed or a rule entered in pursuance of its directions, Gregg moved the court for a writ of restitution. This motion the court refused to grant. Whereupon, a writ of error—the present writ—was brought.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the facts of this case, it will be seen that at the time the motion was made in the court below, the cause was not then pending in the court. Although the mandate had been [p. 57] eent down to the circuit from this court it had not been filed there, nor had the rule been entered in pursuance of its directions reversing the judgment. The court had not, therefore, obtained possession of the cause, and this was, doubtless, the reason for refusing the motion for restitution. The plaintiffs in error were entitled to restitution both of the premises and costs on the reversal of the judgment, and the modern practice is to apply to the court on the coming down of the mandate from the appellate tribunal and the entry of the judgment of reversal for a writ of restitution, setting forth the facts entitling the party to the remedy and giving notice of the motion to the adverse party. .The earlier and more formal remedy was by scire facias.*
It seems that the writ of restitution may be granted though a new venire has been directed. In Smith’s Lessee v. Trabue’s Heirs,f this court held, that a writ of error would not lie to an order of the Circuit Court awarding a writ of restitution on motion, and -dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The writ in the present case must be dismissed for the same reason. The order is not considered a final judgment within the meaning of the Judiciary Act.
Dismissal accordingly.
Banks v. Ogden.
1- A plat of an addition to a town, not executed, acknowledged, and recorded in conformity with the laws of Illinois, operates in that State as a dedication of the streets to public use, but not as a conveyance of the fee of the streets to the municipal corporation. 2. A conveyance, by the proprietor of such an addition, of a block or lot bounded by a street, conveys the fee of the street to its centre, subject to the public use.
Rex d. Leaven, 2 Salkeld, 558; Sympson v. Juxon, Cro. Jac. 699; 2 ellon s Prac. 387 ; 2 Tidd’s do. 1033, 1188; Safford v. Slevens, 2 Wen-
ell, 164; Close v. Stuart, 4 Id. 95; Smith’s Lessee v. Trabue’s Heirs, 9 eters, 4; Jackson v. Hasbrouk, 5 Johnson, 366; Cassel v. Duncan, 2 Sergeant & Rawle, 57; Russel v. Gray, 6 Id. 208; Ranck v. Backer, 13 Id. 41.
8. When a street of such an addition is bounded on one side by Lake Michigan, the owner of the block on the other side takes only to the centre; while the fee of the half bounded by the lake remains in the proprietor, subject to the easement. 4. When the lake boundary so limits the street as to reduce it to less than half its regular width, the street so reduced must still be divided by its centre line between the grantee of the lot bounded by it and the original proprietor. 5. Accretion by alluvion upon a street thus bounded will belong to the original proprietor, in whom, subject to the public easement, the fee of the half next the lake remains. 6. The limitation of the 8th section of the bankrupt act of 1841 does not apply to suits by assignees or their grantees for the recovery of real estate until after two years from the taking of adverse possession.
This was an ejectment brought to December Term, 1859, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to recover a lot of ground, A A, formed by accretion on the western shore of Lake Michigan. The case was thus:
Kinzie, being owner in fee of a fractional section of land bounded on the east by the said lake, and lying immediately north of the original town of Chicago, made a subdivision of it in 1833, which he called Kinzie’s addition, and deposited a plat of it in the office of the county recorder, where it was recorded in February, 1834: though not in accordance with certain statutes of Illinois, which, it was contended in the argument, give an effect to plats properly made, acknowledged, and recorded, that changes the rule of the common law regarding the streets on which the lots are sold.
The north and south street of the subdivision nearest the lake was called Sand Street; the east and west street nearest the north line of the fraction was named Superior Street. The waters of the lake limited Sand Street on the north by an oblique line extending from a point on its eastern side, about a hundred feet below, to a point on its western side about a hundred feet above Superior Street; as indicated on the diagram opposite. The northeastern block of the subdivision, numbered 54, was bounded, on its eastern side, in part by Sand Street and in part by the lake. Sand Street, therefore, terminated in a small triangular piece of lan,
Diagram.
b, c, d, between, the lake and Block 54. This triangle was less than thirty-three feet wide at its lower or southern end, and diminished to a point at its northern extremity. Upon this triangle, distinctly shown by the plat, new land was formed in 1844-’5—the date must be observed—by accretion; and extended eastwardly, in the direction of the dotted lines, more than two hundred feet. The question was, to whom did this new land belong ?
In 1842, Kinzie had been declared a bankrupt under the bankrupt act of 1841, and his whole property passed of course by operation of law to his assignee.
Under this title the assignee claimed, subject to public use as a street, the eastern half of the triangle, and the newly-formed land as accretion. Acting upon this claim he sold, under petition and order of the District Court, made in 1857, part of the accretion, being the land in controversy, to one Sutherland, who conveyed to Banks, plaintiff in the ejectment. Of course this newly-formed land had not been included in the assignee’s inventory of the bankrupt’s effects.
On the other hand, Ogden, the defendant, deriving title by regular conveyance in 1833 from Kinzie, to that part of Block 54 to which the triangle was adjacent, conceived that the fee of the -whole triangle, subject to the public use, passed to him, with the land bounded by it. His theory was, that Sand Street, which was sixty-six feet wide below its meeting with the lake, continued sixty-six feet wide to its northern termination, and that the whole triangle being everywhere less than thirty-three feet wide, was west of the middle line of the street, and therefore belonged to him as owner of the adjoining land. As the legal result of these propositions he claimed the whole accretion, as formed upon land of which he held the fee.
It is necessary here to state that the bankrupt act, under which Banks, the plaintiff, claimed, enacts, by its eighth section, that “ no suit at law, or in equity, shall, in any case, be maintained by or against the assignee of the bankrupt, touching any property or rights of property of the [p. 61] bankrupt, transferable to or vested in him, in any court whatever, unless the same be brought within two years of the declaration of bankruptcy, or after the cause of suit shall have first accrued.” At what date Ogden, the defendant, went into possession, did not appear. The bankrupt act (§ 10) also enacts that all proceedings in bankruptcy shall, if practicable, be brought to a close by the court within two years after a decree.
Upon this case the court below instructed the jury that the law was for the defendant; and, judgment having been so entered after verdict, the case was now before the court on error.
Mr. Fuller, for Ogden, defendant below and in error.
1. The first question is, whether or not Kinzie had any title remaining in him to any land east of Block 54, after making and recording the plat of Kinzie’s addition, and the conveyance of 1833 ?
By making and recording the plat, Kinzie dedicated all the land which there then was in front of the block; and, so far as it sufficed to make a street, to public use, and as the land increased, by accretion or otherwise, the public was entitled to extend the street in a line with that part of it south of this black. “ Where a city is laid out with streets lunning to the water,” says a California case,* “ such streets should be held to continue on to the high water, if the city font is afterwards filled in, or the space enlarged by accret .on or otherwise. Any other doctrine would be destructive o the interests of commercial communities.” The curved me on Kinzie’s plat, showing the course of the lake opposite the block, was not meant to declare its boundary in all nne on that side. It meant simply to show that along that me was the then course of the water; that there was where e ake came, and to prevent purchasers from supposing at the street held good for its original width of sixty-six ee elow or southward. If it was washed away after that, [p. 62] it was the purchaser’s loss. If it was extended by accretion, his gain. Had a street of full width been there, it would have carried the grant to the middle; but, before the middle was reached, the granted premises touched the waters of the lake; and the purchaser, like Kinzie himself had been, became riparian owner, and entitled to the privileges of such ownership,—one of which is that above stated, of having the whole road.
*
Wood v. San Francisco, 4 California, 194.
Independently of this he may rely on the common law principle of ad medium filum, or to the dividing line. The land in front of Block 54, at its widest part, did not suffice to make one-half the width of the street when the grant of the lot was made; and the conveyance of the block invested the purchaser with the fee, not only of the block itself, but of all the land to the water’s edge. “As between grantor and grantee,” says a recent and leading case in New York,* “the conveyance of a lot bounded upon a street in a city, carries the land to the centre of the street. There is no difference in this respect between the streets of a city and country highways.” This case overrules all the preceding ones in New York which had been supposed to establish a different rule. There is, indeed, no doubt—notwithstanding several dicta and some decisions to the contrary—that the rule, in the broad and imperative way in which it is above asserted—is now rapidly becoming—has in fact become the rule of our courts. They are disposed to regard the matter not as one of intention or of construction at all, but as one of policy; and as in Paul v. Carverf to carry the grant to thé middle line, in spite of words limiting it in the clearest way to the edge4 And this is reason; for, whether the new ground arise from the abandonment of a former street, or from the creation of new soil by accretion, there is no reason for giving it to the old owner. In neither case did he ever expect to have it. In the first he has been [p. 63] paid for it in the price of the adjoining lots made of higher price by being on the street; in the latter he has parted, as he supposed, with every vestige of soil, and should not be allowed to block up and intercept light and view—in this case a view upon a noble lake, itself a matter of value to any residence—by building upon soil so accidentally and unexpectedly obtained, and so to injure persons who supposed, as he did, that they had acquired ownership to the water’s edge. The purchaser is therefore a riparian owner, and is entitled, as such proprietor, to the accretions which have been formed in front of the block. “ The question,” says this court, in one case,* u is well settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water, which changes its course gradually, by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. Ko other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss, by the same means which may add to his territory; and as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain.” This rule was also tacitly recognized in Jones et al. v. Johnston Johnston v. Jones et al.£ here as applicable to accretions formed on Lake Michigan, and at almost the precise place where the accretions in question have been formed. The same rule has elsewhere been held applicable to the Detroit River.§ To the same effect is Seaman v. Smith. ||
*
Bissell v. The New York Railroad Co., 23 New York, 61. f 26 Pennsylvania State, 223. . . + See Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 199*, 6th edition, an the English and American notes to that case.
That this right to the accretion is not divested by the intervention of a public highway between the riparian estate and the water-course, was decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana; a region where, from the nature of their soil, this whole subject of accretion and diminution is specially studied and most wisely settled in the well-considered case of Morgan v. Livingston.^ “ If there be a public road between a field and the river,” says that case, “ still that which is •----- —— _____ _____________________________________________ [p. 64] made by alluvion accrues to the field.” This case was decided in 1819. In 1841 the same question came before the same court in the case of Municipality v. The Orleans Cotton Press;* and the court cited the language used in the former case, with approval, as a correct statement of the law on this subject. It added further, “ that the intervention of a public road between the front tract and the river does not prevent accretion by alluvion, because the road and the levee themselves belong to the front proprietors, subject to the public useand the court, in summing up the points intended to be decided, say:
*
New Orleans v. United States, 10 Peters, 717. t 18 Howard, 150. J 1 Black, 209. § Lorman v. Benson, 8 Michigan, 18. || 24 Illinois, 523. V 1 Louisiana Condensed Reports, 451.
“ We are of opinion that urban property fronting on a water-course is entitled to alluvion, as well as rural estates; and that cities can acquire jure alluvionis only in virtue of a title which would constitute them front proprietors. That the defendants must be considered as owning down to the road last laid out, and that the intervention of the road does not in law prevent their being regarded as front proprietors, and entitled to any alluvion which now exists or may hereafter be formed between the levee and the water, subject to the public use under the administration of the municipal authorities.”
The language first quoted is descriptive of the present case, and that cited last states the rule which should be applied. The principles established by these cases have been affirmed in the later ones.f
The right to accretion is one that belongs to the principal estate, not to the person of the owner, nor to the proprietor of the easement. It does not belong to the latter, because he enjoys a benefit in another man’s property or estate, and the loss or gain of that estate is not his, but the owner’s. “ The right to future alluvion,” says one of the cases cited by us, “ is inherent in the property itself, and forms an essential attribute of it, resulting from natural law in consequence of the local situation of the land, just as much as the natural
* 18 Louisiana, 122. f Mrs. Kennedy v. Municipality No. 2, 10 Louisiana Annual, 54, A. 1855; Remy v. The Second Municipality, 11 Id. 161, A.D. 1856; Barrett v. New Orleans, 13 Id. 105, A.D. 1858. x' [p. 65] fruits of a tree belong to the owner of the land; and that such an attempt to transfer from the owner of the land to the city the future increase by alluvion, would be as legally absurd as if the legislature had declared, that after the incorporation of the city, the fruits of all the orange trees within its limits should belong thereafter to the city, and not to the owners of the orchards and gardens.”*
It cannot be contended, we think, that the medium filum was to the middle of the triangle only. Such a view would be unreasonable. It would be a view first of all extremely technical. It would decide, moreover, that because the purchaser of Block 54 had less than anybody else, less than he needed for the proper enjoyment of his lot, less than was usual and natural, he should have but half of that. Is it possible to suppose that Kinzie meant to reserve one-half the triangle ? Of what use could such a piece of ground be to him ? Of what necessity was it not sure to prove to the purchaser ? A full street is supposed to be equally divided, because the owner on each side needs half; but here there was no owner on the east or lake side. The broad and fathomless Michigan was there. Ownership was not predicable of that side at all, and was predicable of the other side only. Had the road been full sixty-six feet wide, yet we might say that at common law, even then coming to the water’s edge, it was a case where the owner would take it all. In grants on tidal waters the grant is almost universally to low water mark; and this for the obvious reason that, if this mark change, the purchaser may still have as near as possible what was. sold and what was bought. By analogy we may fairly contend that here the purchase is to the water’s edge, even had the street been full, there being nothing to be sold beyond it. That seems to be the doctrine of the Louisiana case; specially, as we have said, worthy of respect in this branch of law.
The case does not show that Kinzie ever asserted or supposed he had any interest left after his deed of 1833. Years
Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 Louisiana Annual, 240. VOL. II. g [p. 66] after he had parted with his interest there, the accretion began to form. It was not inventoried among the assets of his bankrupt estate, because it did not then exist. Fifteen years after that, a “ prowling assignee” asks for, and obtains, an order to sell the demanded premises, which had no existence, either in fact or law, until after Kinzie had been declared a bankrupt, and when he was no longer the owner of the principal estate, or any part of it, to which the right to accretions could attach. The assignee takes no greater interest than the bankrupt had in the estate assigned to him, and we cannot well see how a right to accretions, which is an incident to the principal estate, can arise or exist in favor of one who had no such estate.
2. Kinzie was declared a bankrupt in 1842, under the act of August 19, 1841. The petition and order for a sale of the demanded premises were made in 1857. If any interest or estate was left in Kinzie, after his conveyance of 1833, his assignee, and those claiming under him, are barred from maintaining this suit by the 8th section of the bankrupt act. This, like all limitation laws, was intended as a “ statute of repose,” and to insure a prompt settlement of the bankrupt estate; and the public good requires that full effect be given to it by the courts.
It is a practice too common all over the country for assignees to make sales of real and pretended interests in the bankrupt estate down to the present time, and for the purchasers to bring suits upon the titles thus acquired. It cannot be pretended that this is done for the benefit of the creditors. It is now more than twenty years since that law was enacted and repealed, and the interests of the creditors o the bankrupts have, in most cases, passed away, and these proceedings are instituted obviously for speculating and. iti gious purposes. They belong to the class of suits describe by Lord Bacon as “ contentious suits,” which that grea judge declares “ought to be spewed out as the suifeit o courts.”* The act, in express terms, limits the right of t e
Essay of Judicature.
assignee to bring any suit, at law or in equity, against any person claiming an adverse interest touching the property, and rights of property, assigned to him, to two years after the declaration and decree of bankruptcy, or after the cause of suit shall first have accrued. The present cause of action (if there is any) arose fifteen years before the petition for the sale of the demanded premises was filed. The assignee acquired title to them at the date of the assignment, or he never did; and if his right was barred, so was that of his grantee, for it was a limitation against the right to recover these premises, and he could transfer no greater right than he had. This point has been decided in New York.*
Mr. Wills, contra.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court, and, after stating facts, proceeded as follows:
The rule governing additions made to land, bounded by a river, lake, or sea, has been much discussed and variously settled by usage and by positive law. Almost all jurists and legislators, however, both ancient and modern, have agreed that the owner of the land, thus bounded, is entitled to these additions. By some, the rule has been vindicated on the principle of natural justice, that he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs, imposed by the contiguity of waters, ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; by others, it is derived from the principle of public policy, that it is the interest of the community that all land should have an owner, and most convenient, that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the shore itself.
There is no question in this case that the accretion from ake Michigan belongs to the proprietor of land bounded y the lake. The controversy turns on ownership.
n deciding this controversy, we derive no important aid rom the statutes of Illinois, referred to in the argument. [p. 68] The plat of Kinzie does not appear to have been executed, acknowledged, and recorded, in conformity with either of them.* It operated, therefore, only as a dedication; and the law applicable to dedications must control our judgment.
*
Cleveland v. Boerem et al., 24 New York, 613, S. C., 27 Barbour, 252.
It is a familiar principle of that law, that a grant of land bordering on a road or river, carries the title to the centre of the river or road, unless the terms or circumstances of the grant indicate a limitation of its extent by the exterior lines. There is indeed a passage in one of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Illinois which, if taken literally, would exclude grantees of lots in towns and cities from any interest whatever in the streets beyond the common use. The court said: “ In the case of a valid plat,” that is, a plat duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded, “ the title to the ground set apart for public purposes is held by the corporation for the use and benefit of the public; in the case of a dedication by a different mode the fee continues in the proprietor, burdened with the public easement.”'}' This rule would limit the grantee of Block 54 to the lines of the block, and he would take nothing in Sand Street; but the propositions quoted were not essential to the decision of the question before the court, and there are other casesj which seem to warrant a belief that when the operation of an ordinary dedication shall come directly before that tribunal, it will not apply any other principle to its construction than that generally recognized.
We shall assume, therefore, that the owner of the southeast part of Block 54 was the owner of the adjacent part of Sand Street to its centre. But adjacent to that part of the block, Sand Street had been reduced, as the plat clearly shows, to the small triangle already described; and it must follow that it was to the centre line of the street thus reduced that the defendant acquired title. He took, subject to the public use, the westerly half of the triangle and no more.
But Kinzie was the original owner of the whole fractiona [p. 69] section. He retained every part of which he did not divest himself by deed or dedication. By the dedication of Sand Street, he gave to the public the use and only the use of the land within the artificial and natural lines marked on the plat. By the conveyance of Block 54 west of the street, he conveyed the fee of Sand Street within those lines to its centre. On the east side of the street, opposite that block, he conveyed nothing, for he had nothing to convey. The fee, therefore, of the eastern half of the triangle which there formed the street, remained in him. In the words of the Supreme Court of Illinois, clearly just when applied to the land in question, “ the fee continued in the proprietor, subject to the easement.”
*
Jones v. Johnson, 18 Howard, 153. f Manly v. Gibson, 18 ,
1
Canal Trustees v. Havens, 11 Illinois, 557; Waugh v. Leec, 488.
Upon Kinzie’s bankruptcy the fee of this strip of land passed to the assignee. It was about this time, or shortly afterwards, that the alluvion began to form upon it, and continued to increase until the commencement of the suit below. The title to the accretion, thus made, followed the title to the land and vested in the assignee.
It is unnecessary to consider the effect of the accretion, under the dedication, upon the width of the street; for, whatever that effect may have been, the fee of the east half and of the accretion beyond the true width, whatever that width was, remained constantly in Kinzie or the assignee. A part, therefore, of the bankrupt’s estate remained unsold when the order of sale, under which the plaintiff in error claims, was made by the District Court; and the only remaining inquiry is, whether that order was lawfully made.
The eighth section of the bankrupt act of 1841 limited suits concerning the estate of the bankrupt by assignees against persons claiming adversely, and by such persons against assignees, to two years after decree of bankruptcy or rst accrual of cause of suit. There is no express limitation upon sales, nor any limitation upon any action other than suits, by the assignee, except a general requirement in the uth section, that all proceedings shall, if practicable, be fought to a close by the court within two years after decree. AVe are not satisfied that the limitation in the eighth [p. 70] section can be applied to sales of real estate made by assignees under orders of district courts having general jurisdiction of proceedings in bankruptcy. But it is not necessary now to pass upon this point. The limitation certainly could not afiect any suit, the cause of which accrued from an adverse possession taken after the bankruptcy, until the expiration of two years from the taking of such possession; and there is nothing in the record which shows when the adverse possession relied on by the defendant in error commenced, and therefore nothing which warrants the application of the limitation to the petition for the order of sale.
We thyik the court below erred in instructing the jury that the defendant in error, upon the case made, was entitled to their verdict. Its judgment must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to issue a
New venire.
Brooks v. Martin.
1. After a partnership contract confessedly against public policy has been carried out, and money contributed by one of the partners has passed into other forms,—the results of the contemplated operation completed, a partner, in whose hands the profits are, cannot refuse to account for and divide them on the ground of the illegal character of the original contract. 2. Where one partner, who is in sound health, is made sole agent of the partnership by another, who is not, and who relies on him wholly for true accounts, and the party thus made agent manages the business at a distance from the other, communicating to him no information, t e relation of partners, whatever it may be in general, becomes fiduciary, and the law governing such relations applies.
Martin filed a bill in equity in the Federal Court of Wisconsin to set aside a contract of sale which he had made to Brooks of his interest in a partnership venture, and for an account and division of the profits; the ground of the prayer being his own alleged embarrassed condition at the time of the sale; his ignorance of the partnership business, frau on the part of the defendant, Brooks; concealment y Brooks of what he knew; misrepresentation in what he [p. 71] professed to tell; and want of consideration proportioned to the real value of the interest which the complainant had in the concern. The answer admitted the purchase by Brooks, but denied the fraud. The court gave the relief prayed; and from its decree herein an appeal, the present suit, came here.
The case, as proved by the evidence, and as shown and assumed by this court after a very careful examination of an immense mass of testimony,—twelve hundred pages closely printed,—set forth in part in the opinion, but, as involving very voluminously controverted issues of fact, not necessary, nor indeed possible, to be presented here,* was in substance this.
On the 11th February, 1847, the United States, being then at war with Mexico, Congress passed a law by which warrants were directed to be issued to soldiers for a certain quantity of land each; but in order to protect the soldier entitled to the warrant against the rapacity of land brokers and others who would profit of his improvidence, the statute provided, by a ninth section, that any sale or contract going to affect the title or claim to any such bounty made prior to the issue of such warrant, should be “null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever. ”f Just after the passage of this statute, that is to say, in June, 1847, the complainant, Martin (who was a banker in New Orleans), Brooks, the defendant, and a certain Field, entered into a partnership at New Orleans; the ostensible object of the firm being “the purchase and sale of bounty land warrants that may have been or may be issued under the law of Congress,” &c. The purchases and sales were to be conducted by Brooks and ield, and the money was to be furnished by Martin. Brooks was the brother-in-law of Martin, and had been a clerk in his bank^‘house. Field was a stranger. It was, therefore, agreed t at Brooks should, in the actual management of affairs, re’—------------------------------- v The printed record made a book of 1201 pages of long primer, solid; a lisheT* 3’ ^8e^’ lar^er ^an any volume of reports of this court ever pubt 9 Stat, at Large, 125.
present Martin, and have full and exclusive control of the business; an agreement, of course, by which he obtained a preponderating influence in the management of the partnership over Field. The bill, indeed, alleged that Brooks had a power of attorney from Martin, authorizing him, on all occasions, to represent him in the partnership business. This fact was denied in the answer; but the answer admitted that Brooks was authorized by Martin, to control the business. Martin advanced, in cash, over $57,000; and large purchases having been made of soldiers’ claims, the parties closed their operations in New Orleans, where little was done after a few months in the way of purchasing warrants. Brooks then came to Washington to attend to the issue of warrants. Field, with two brothers of his, went to Wisconsin to locate the warrants and sell the lands. Martin still remained in New Orleans, carrying on his business of banker. From the time that Brooks and Field left New Orleans, the management of the entire business fell, apparently, under the direction oj Brooks. None of it was conducted in New Orleans, nor, except five or six, which Brooks bought at the suggestion of Martin, were any further warrants bought there. The accounts were kept in Wisconsin, two thousand miles from where Martin was, and who had no opportunity of hearing anything about the partnership except as it was communicated to him by Brooks or Field, or one of the brothers Field, who were employed as clerks or agents in the business. No reports of the business were made to Martin; and, as the testimony showed, Brooks and Field managed, it entirely without consulting him, irrespectively of his interest. The firm was known indifferently as Brooks & Field, and as Brooks, Field Co.
In the winter of 1847-8, Martin failed in business, an his health, including specially, it seemed, his nervous condition, became considerably prostrated. During the winter just named, and when much embarrassed and absorbe about his business, he applied for information to Brooks, who was then in New Orleans, and who gave him a veiy discouraging account of everything; one, the court as [p. 73] sumed, which might naturally make Martin “ glad to escape with a few thousand dollars which it owed him as acreditor;” an account which the court considered that it was impossible to regard as true.
In June, 1848, Martin, at the invitation of Brooks, went to Pittsburg, in Pennsylvania, to meet Brooks, who then and there, on the 28th June, 1848, bought out his interest in the partnership. Martin, at this time, had never been in the West, and, in fact, knew little or nothing as to the particulars of what had been done there. There was no evidence, indeed; except the answer of the defendant, which was discredited by facts, that Martin ever had a remote conception of the condition of the business. On the contrary, there were letters in the record begging for statements on that subject.
On the other hand, when Brooks and Martin met in Pittsburg, Brooks had just come from Wisconsin, where he saw Field and his brothers, and where he had the partnership books for examination, and spent several days in examining them. That he knew the real condition of the concern, and was fully and minutely informed as to every item of its business, was considered by the court as “ beyond dispute.”
It appeared, in addition, by. letters from Brooks to one George Field, a brother of Field, the partner, written before the sale was made, that Martin had directed that all remittances should be made to him at Washington; showing by allusions in them to a remittance which George Field had proposed to make to Martin, and to certain friends and correspondents of his named Lake & Co., in New York, that Brooks specifically, and apparently with an interested motive, desired that no remittance should thus be made. In one letter, written June 20th, 1848, that is to say, eiglw days before the sale, and after he had invited and was expecting Martin to meet him at Pittsburg in contemplation of the purchase which he there made, Brooks says:
‘ I can hardly express* to you how much I feel obliged to you or the soundness of the judgment that dictated to you to remit directly to me, rather than to New York or any other place, without my direction. I had been rendered somewhat [p. 74] unamiable the day before by a letter from George Field, in which he suggested the propriety of remitting directly to New York. I feared he had so directed you. It would have greatly embarrassed my operation. I want all advice, as well as all remittances, to pass through myself. If Mr. Lake or any one else ask information in relation to our matters, refer him to me, advising me of the circumstance.”
The partnership at this date,—as the court, after a computation made by it on an analysis of the evidence, showed and assumed,—presented clear cash profits,.....................................................$15,000 It had, also, as the court showed, and assumed it to be proved, 45,000 acres of land, which, estimated at Government rates,—a low rate of estimate in view of the fact that they had been carefully selected by Field and his two brothers, one of whom had been sent to examine the land personally before the warrants were located, and who was early in the field and made judicious selections,—gave about............................................ 57,000
Or a total profit of...................................................................... • $72,000
of which Martin’s share, for the partnership, by its terms, was not an equal one, came to $30,000.
The consideration of Brooks’s purchase was an agreement by him to pay all debts of the partnership, about $45,000, and a payment, as he alleged, of $3000 to Martin, though, as Martin asserted, a payment of about one-half a balance due him on another account; which balance, it was evident, that Brooks was bound for. Brooks gave no security for his performance of his agreement to pay these debts.
At the time when this bill was filed, to wit, on the 3d of August, 1857, which was apparently so soon as Martin had examined into the facts of the case, all the claims purchased by the firm had been turned into land warrants, and the warrants had been sold or located. Where the purchase hid been made prior to the date of the warrant granted, assignments were subsequently made by the soldier. A. portion of the lands thus located had been sold, part for cash, partly on mortgage, and the assets of the part nership consisted now almost wholly of cash securities or of lan.
Besides a full denial of the offensive allegations, as made by the bill, the defendant set up as follows:
Argument for Brooks.
That notwithstanding the statement in the articles of partnership that the business of the firm related to the purchase and sale of bounty land warrants and scrip, such was not the true purpose of its formation, nor the business which it really transacted; but that the partners intended, and really did engage in buying up the claims of the soldiers, who were then returning from Mexico by way of New Orleans, for bounty land or scrip, long before any scrip or land warrants were issued by the Government [a fact of which there appeared, indeed, by the evidence, to be no great doubt]; that this was an illegal traffic, forbidden by the act of Congress of February, 1847, above referred to, and against public policy; that, accordingly, the plaintiff could have no relief in a court of equity against his copartner, even if it were made to appear that the latter realized a large sum out of the venture, and defrauded the former of his share of the amount so realized.
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