Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 291
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 291
Full caption
Van Hostrup v. Madison City.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Van Hostrup v. Madison City.
1. An authority to a city to take stock in any chartered company for making “a road or roads to said city,” authorizes taking stock in a road between other cities or towns, from the nearest of which to the city subscribing there is a direct road; the road in which the stock is taken being in fact a road in extension and prolongation of one leading into the city. 2. Where authority is given to a city to take stock in a road, provided the act be “on the petition of two-thirds of the citizens,” this proviso will be presumed to have been complied with where the bonds show, on their face, that they were issued in virtue of an ordinance of council of the city making the subscription ; the bonds being in the hands of bond fide holders for value. In the case before the court the minutes of council recorded that the citizens, “ with great unanimity,” had petitioned.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana. The suit was brought in the court below against the city of Madison, in Indiana, for moneys due upon coupons attached to certain bonds issued by the city authorities, signed by the mayor and the city clerk, and to which was affixed the seal of the corporation, by which the city acknowledged, that in virtue of an ordinance of the Common Council, passed 2d September, 1852, it owed and promised to pay the president of the Columbus and Shelby Railroad Company, or bearer, $1000, redeemable on the 1st of November, in the year 1872,
with interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum, semi-annually, on the first days of May and November of each year, from the date of the bonds, at the banking house of Winslow, Lanier & Co., in the city of New York.
These bonds were negotiated and put into circulation by the Columbus and Shelby Railroad Company, and purchased in the market by the plaintiffs, bona fide, and for a valuable consideration. They had been issued to the railroad company for stock subscribed in that company by the city of Madison, aforesaid.
As respected the authority of the city to subscribe, it appeared that one section of its charter * authorized it “ to take p. 292stock in any chartered company for making a road or roads to said city, provided, that no stock shall be subscribed, &c., unless it be on the petition of two-thirds of the citizens who are freeholders, &c., and provided, that in all cases where stock is taken, the Common Council shall have power to borrow money,” &c.
*
§ viii, subdivision 38.
At the time when the subscription to the Columbus and Shelby road was made and the bonds issued, a railroad called the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad, a road leading from
Indianapolis, m the interior ot tne otare, < INDIAN APOUS to Madison, was in operation, and brought down from one part of the in-
\ ^^SHEIBWIUE terior where Indianapolis is, to Madi-
son, on the Ohio River, the products oi
the State. This road passed through
Columbus. The Columbus and Shelby
V&OLUMBUS Company (the company to which the
subscription was made), was organiz-
\
\ ed to construct a road from Columbus
\ to Shelby County, terminating at Shelbyville. But Columbus was forty-si) miles from Madison; Shelbyville being
MADISON
about twenty-three north of it. Througl
Columbus, and by means of the connection with the Madison and Indianapolis road, the Columbus and Shelby road did lead to Madison and nowhere else; though if regarded as an independent and isolated road, and as one between Shelby and Columbus only, it could not be said to be a road to the city designated. The diagram will elucidate the matter.
As respected the required “ petition of two-thirds of the citizens,” the matter rested apparently upon an entry on the minutes of the City Council, which stated that “ the freeholders of the city of Madison, with great unanimity, had petitioned,” &c.
The defences set up by the city, were “ that the bonds were issued to the Columbus and Shelby Railroad Company, to pay for a subscription by the city to the capital stock o the said railroad company, and for no other consideration,
Argument for the City.
that the said Columbus and Shelby Railroad Company was not a chartered company for the purpose of making a road to the city of Madison aforesaid, but to make a road from Columbus to Shelbyville, the nearest terminus of said road being forty-six miles distant from Madison.”
2. That the bonds were issued without the petition or memorial of two-thirds of the freeholders of said city requesting the Common Council to take the stock and issue the bonds.
The court below gave judgment in the case, which was upon the pleadings wholly, for the city. On error here, the validity of the defences—as in the court below—were the points in issue.
Jfr. Johnson, for the city of Madison: If these bonds were issued, as alleged, to the Columbus and Shelby Railroad Company;—a company not chartered to make a road to Madison, but to other points,—they were void in the hands of said railroad company when delivered to it.* They appear on their face to be issued to such company, and every person must take notice of the charter of that company, and must know that it is a chartered company to make a road to Madison, because such charter is a part of the law of the land, and because it is the very thing that is required to exist to enable the city of Madison to act. Parties dealing with a corporation must know that the facts exist upon which its power to act is founded. The city of Madison, without special authority from the legislature, has no power to subscribe for stock in railroad companies. It cannot compel the citizens to become parties or stockholders in private corporations, nor pledge or incumber the individual property of the citizens in speculative undertakings. Its powers are only coextensive with its duties. The Common Council ftiay borrow money for the special purposes of the trust and authority intrusted to them, and may’levy taxes to raise money for these purposes, but none other.f
Commonwealth v. Erie, &c., Railroad, 27 Pennsylvania State, 339.
T Beatty®. Knowler, 4 Peters, 153; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill N. Y., 87:
Argument for the creditor.
If the city of Madison may subscribe to a road whose nearest terminus is forty-six miles away from it, because another road leads from that terminus to the city, it may subscribe not only to a road in parts of Indiana the most distant from Madison, but to roads in the most distant parts of the United States. It may build a roid between any towns in California, provided only, that any other road or series or concatenation of roads exists by which a traveller can get from either terminus of that California road by rail, to Madison. It is easy to see how capable of abuse is such a power.
There is no sufficient evidence of a “ two-thirds ” petition. The expression, “ great unanimity,” is loose. It is impossible to say, in reference to the population of a city, what it means. Whatever it may mean, it is no record of that fact which the act authorizing the subscription declares must pre-exist, and is therefore valueless.
Messrs. Porter and Roelker, contra:
1. In La Fayette v. Cox (5 Indiana, 38), it was held that the city had no power, under any circumstances, to subscribe for railroad stocks. In City v. West (9 Id., 74), that city had a power as this one has, “ to take stock in any chartered company for making roads to the city.” The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company was chartered to make a road between Lawrenceburgh and Vincennes, and to extend east to Cincinnati, and west to St. Louis. The city of Aurora, some five miles below Lawrenceburgh, on the Ohio River, was not mentioned in the charter; but the road was located through Aurora, and it was held that the city might subscribe for its stock as a road to the city. The court say, “ This case is entirely different from that of Lafayette v. Cox. There the charter did not confer the power to take stock, but it was attempted to be inferentially derived. Here the power is expressly granted, and the question is merely whether the road in which the stock was subscribed is one contemplated by the charter:
The geographical facts within the cognizance of the court,
Graves®. Otis, 2 Hill N. Y., 466; People v. Goodwin, 1 Selden, 568: La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Indiana, 38; Bex v. Sutton, 4 Maule & Selwyn, 546. p. 295will not enable it to say, that the judgment of the people of Madison, in attempting to make the counties with which this road brought them into direct connection, tributary to the commercial and manufacturing interests of their city, was erroneous.
The city would undoubtedly have been authorized to take stock in a company for building a road from Shelbyville directly to the city line. But this would have secured her no greater commercial advantages, and would have involved a useless outlay of capital, since two-thirds of such a road must have run alongside the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad, already in operation. May not the city use the economical discretion that a natural person might ? Must she pay three dollars instead of one, that the road to which she subscribes may fall within the literal description of the roads to which her privilege extends ? Hills of solid rock surround the city of Madison. Did the legislature contemplate that the city should aid in making no roads except such as unnecessarily cut through them ?
2. The City Council was the proper judge whether or not the required number of resident freeholders had petitioned for a subscription to the stock of the company to which the bonds were issued.* Conceding that the entry was not in the precise language of the proviso, we nevertheless submit, that the plain implication is, that a greater proportion than two-thirds had petitioned. The entry is, that “ the freeholders of the city of Madison, with great unanimity, had petitioned,” &c.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court:
One point of objection to the bonds is that the Columbus and Shelby Railroad does not, by the terms of its charter or in fact, terminate at the city of Madison ; and hence, that e road is not within the description of one in which the mty was authorized to take stock.
0£ v. The City of Jeffersonville, 24 Howard, 287 ; Commissioners
noxCo. v. Aspinwall et al., 21 Id., 539 ; The Evansville, &c., Railroad • »• The City of Evansville, 15 Indiana, 395
The words are, “ to take stock in any chartered company for making a road or roads to the said city.” It is supposed that the authority to subscribe is tied down to a chartered road, the line of which comes within the limits of the city; and that the words are to be taken in the most literal and restrictive sense. But this, we think, would be not only a very narrow and strained construction of the terms of the clause, but would defeat the manifest object and purpose of it.
The power was sought and granted, with the obvious idea of enabling the city to promote its commercial and business interests, by affording a ready and convenient access to it from different parts of the interior of the State, and thus to compete with other cities on the Ohio River and in the interior which were or might be in the enjoyment of railroad facilities. This object and purpose, we think, should be kept constantly in view in giving a construction to the clause in the charter. For while it will operate to prevent a narrow and fruitless interpretation, it will have the effect of guarding against any abuse or unreasonable extension of the power.
We think it quite clear, a subscription to a road wholly unconnected with roads leading to the city, would not be within its fair meaning and intent, but are equally satisfied that a subscription to a road in extension and prolongation of one leading into the city is within it.
It will be admitted if a railroad had been chartered, originally, from the city of Madison to Shelbyville, by the way of Columbus, a subscription to the stock would have come within the very words of the charter, and what difference, in good sense or principle, or with reference to the object and purpose of the clause, is there between that case and the one before us ? The object of the subscription in the first was to extend the facilities of railroad communication through the interior between the two towns, the termini of the road. In the second, as a road had already been made to Columbus, and in operation, the intercommunication is accomplished by a subscription to a line from Columbus to Shelby. The p. 297difference between the two cases is simply a dispute upon words.
The terms of the clause do not limit the subscription to one road or to one company,“ road or roads in any chartered company.” The argument, therefore, against the power rests exclusively upon the effect to be given to the concluding words, “to said city.” We have already considered and given our construction of them.
It was strongly argued, that upon this construction great abuses may be committed by the city corporation in subscriptions of stock to remote companies, in which it would have but little, if any, interest or advantage. In the construction of the grant of powers, extreme cases may be suggested against it, which it is difficult to answer. But in the present and kindred cases, something may be trusted to the wisdom and integrity, as well as the interest, of the body appointed to execute the power.
Another objection taken is, that the proviso requiring a petition of two-thirds of the citizens, who were freeholders of the city, was not complied with. As we have seen, the bonds signed by the mayor and clerk of the city recite on the face of them that they were issued by virtue of an ordinance of the Common Council of the city, passed September 2d, 1852. This concludes the city as to any irregularities that may have existed in carrying into execution the power granted to subscribe the stock and issue the bonds, as has been repeatedly held by this court. . Our conclusion upon the whole case is, that full power existed in the defendants to issue the bonds, and that the plaini s are entitled to recover the interest coupons in question, ven if the case had been doubtful, inasmuch as the city authorities have given this construction to the charter, and onds have been issued and in the hands of bond fide purc sers for value, we should have felt bound to acquiesce m it. n
Judgment reversed with costs, and cause remanded, &c.
Miller v. Tiffany.
In an action for the price of goods which the purchaser by his own agents examined and selected, and which he himself afterwards received and kept without objection, it is no defence that the price as agreed on was above that of the market; there having been neither fraud, misrepresentation, nor warranty in the case.
A person contracting for the payment of interest may contract to pay it either at the rate of the “place of contract,” or at that-of the “place of performance,” as one or the other may be agreed on by himself and the creditor; and the fact that the rate of the place at which it is agreed that it shall be paid is higher than the rate in the other place, will not expose the transaction to the imputation of usury, unless the place agreed on was fixedfor the purpose of obtaining the higher rate, and to evade the penalty of a usurious contract at the other place.
Tiffany filed a bill against Miller and wife, in the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, to foreclose a mortgage which the last-named persons had given to Palmer, a merchant of New York, and Wallace, an attorney at law of Cleveland, Ohio, as assignees of two insolvent firms; which mortgage they, the said Palmer and Wallace, had assigned to him, the complainant.
The facts of the case were essentially these: Two mercantile firms, closely connected with each other and in part composed of the same persons—one in Cleveland, Ohio, and one in New York City—being unfortunate in business, had made an assignment of their effects, dry goods chiefly, to these two persons, Wallace and Palmer; Palmer being a large creditor of the firms. About $50,000 worth of the goods were at Cleveland under Wallace’s charge, and about $73,000 worth in New York, under Palmer’s.
In this state of things, Miller, a German trader, resident at Fort Wayne, in Indiana, who had a valuable, unincumbered real estate in that State, but who was largely in debt and much embarrassed for ready money, employed two peisonal friends, Turner and Rufner, to go to New York and raise him money. They went there in February, 1858, and after making, according to Rufner’s account, “ desperate efforts, for at least four weeks, by publication in the Herai p. 299and Tribune,” fell in with a broker, named Anthony, who introduced them to Palmer. The result was, that Palmer entered into a treaty to sell Miller $20,000 worth of that part of the assigned goods in New York, at six months’ credit, and to receive in payment for them a mortgage on Miller’s real estate in Indiana, payable in five years; the mortgage to provide, however, that if there should be any default in paying the interest, the principal should become due at once. Palmer wrote, on the 15th of February, 1858, to Wallace at Cleveland what he had agreed on, requested him to go to Fort Wayne in Indiana, examine the property and title, and if satisfied with both to have the papers prepared; after which the goods should be delivered to Miller or his agents. Wallace, accordingly, went to Fort Wayne, in Indiana, and being satisfied with the security, a note for the term mentioned was given by Miller, with interest at ten per cent., payable, not in New York, where Palmer lived, and where the goods were bought, nor yet in Fort Wayne, the residence of Miller, but in Cleveland (at the Commercial Branch Bank there), the residence of Wallace, with the current rate of exchange on New York.* Matters being thus concluded, Rufner, the friend of Miller, went to New York and selected the goods out of the assigned stock there. They were then shipped to Fort Wayne, where Miller received them.
Six per cent., it is necessary to state, was apparently the lawful rate of interest in Indiana. Ten was allowable in Ohio, under a statute of 14th March, 1850, at that time in p. 300force. Whether on a sale of goods ten was in New York, was not so clear. On the loan of money it was not.
*
The note was in these words: $2(W- Cleveland, O., February 22, 1850. Five years after date, for value received, I, George Miller, of Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana, promise to pay Courtland Palmer and Frederick Wallace, assignees, or their order, twenty thousand dollars, with interest at t rate of ten per centum per annum, payable semi-annually, after six months from the date hereof, and on failure to pay said interest when due, the whole of said note to become due and collectable; the above note, interest, and principal, negotiable and payable at the Commercial Branch Bank, Clevet nd, Ohio, with the current rate of exchange on New York, and without relief from valuation or appraisement laws of the State of Indiana. George. Miller.
The interest not being paid, and the present bill filed to foreclose the mortgage, Miller set up two principal defences:
1. That the goods were not worth anything like the sum at which they had been sold to him.
2. That the contract for ten per cent, was usurious and void.
As respected the value of the goods, the testimony was conflicting. Evans, a trader of Fort Wayne, who on Miller’s invitation had looked through the goods, “ without any special motive, but the same as he would look through any other stock of goods in town, to see what I had to compete with,” when interrogated as to their value replied, “ This is a difficult question to answer, one in which, perhaps, no two men would agree. Their value to any man depends upon his facilities for getting rid of them. I should estimate their value to me, considering the fact that the stock was an old stock of goods, a great portion of them out of style, being poorly assorted, a large quantity of goods of a particular kind, and few or none of other kinds necessary to make up an assortment in proportion to the whole amount of stock, at from sixty to sixty-five per cent, of the invoices.”
Walker, another resident of Fort Wayne, who had been “ engaged in trading goods for about seven years, railroading some, and a part of the time engaged in outside trading, confirmed this estimate between invoice and cash values, adding, “ the principal objections to the stock were, that the goods were badly selected; large amounts of some kinds, and a few or none of others to make them saleable. A considerable quantity of them were out of style, which is a bad objection in selling goods. Part of the goods were worth more than the invoice price, and a part of them less, making the average value about two-thirds invoiced price.’
Gilford, who was a clerk of Miller, when the goods arrive at Fort Wayne, thought that “ the general character of the goods was not very good. The goods were principally o styles, and was a hard stock to sell, and the majority of them p. 301were billed to Miller at too high prices for retailing purposes. They were worth, in my opinion, about sixty cents on the dollar.”
vis respected the matter of usury. It appeared that Mr. Hough, an attorney of Fort Wayne, where Miller lived, was employed by Wallace, on his visit to Fort Wayne, to draw the papers in the case. In giving an account of the circumstances under which the note was made payable, Hough’s testimony was, that on the morning of the day when the note was drawn, Miller introduced him to Wallace. The witness stated as follows : “ The note and mortgage were drawn up in my office on the 22d of February, 1858. I first wrote a note payable in New York for the amount specified, with ten per cent, interest, upon which some conversation ensued be-, tween Wallace and Miller, when Miller remarked in substance that he would rather pay it to Wallace : ‘ I know you, Wallace; you are a clever fellow; I would rather pay you, as I don’t know Palmer;’ and asked if it could not be paid in Cleveland, adding that he expected to trade there, and it would be easier for him to pay it in Cleveland. Upon the request of Miller, Wallace wrote a note, and made it payable at the Commercial Branch Bank at Cleveland, which was and is the residence of Wallace.”
There was no evidence to contradict this, except so far as it might be found in a correspondence between Palmer in New York and Wallace in Cleveland. Palmer, after concluding the negotiation with Rufner and Turner (Miller’s agents in New York), gave Rufner, then on his way through Cleveland to Fort Wayne, an open letter to Wallace—the one already mentioned, and dated 15th February, 1858—and to be delivered by Rufner to him. It ran thus :
‘ This will be handed to you by Mr. Rufner, one of the paries who have been negotiating with me for the purchase of part of our stock of goods here; the purchase-money to be secured y mortgage on Mr. Miller’s property at Fort Wayne. My proposal to them is, to sell $20,000 of our goods, at our regular prices to the country, at six months’ credit, and to receive in pay erefor, a bond and mortgage on Mr. Miller’s p. 302property,—provided it affords satisfactory security for the amount, and the title is undoubted; the mortgage to be thetirst lien on the property, and payable on or before five years, bearing ten per cent, semi-annual interest; the first interest to be payable in twelve months from the date of the delivery of the goods here; the principal and interest to be payable here,” etc.
On the 22d February, 1858, Wallace, who, in pursuance of this letter, went, as already mentioned, to Fort Wayne, in Indiana, having, as he says, “ concluded the business for which I came here,” writes to his co-assignee Palmer, from that place, late in the evening and when il tired,” a long letter and “ in full,” “ howT he found things and what he had done.” He gives an account of some accidents on the wray, his being detained by “a blockade of snow,” how he had examined the property thoroughly with Mr. Hough, a full account of the character and value of the property, &c., and after amention of some other things proper enough to be reported to his co-assignee or principal, his letter contained this sentence, the only one having any reference whatever to the place where the interest on the mortgage-note was to be paid, or as to why Palmer’s instructions on that point had been departed from :
“ I have taken the liberty to vary from your instructions in reference to the place where the note is made payable. Seven per cent, being, as I understand, the legal rate of interest in New York, and six per cent, being the rate in Indiana, the note would seem to be open to the plea of usury both here and in New York if made for ten per cent. So, to avoid this, I made it payable in Ohio, and dated it there, where ten per cent, is the legal rate with exchange on New York, which results the same.”
Wallace, who was himself examined as a witness, gave this account. After confirming Hough’s statement that the note was originally drawn so as to make interest payable in New York, and that it was by Miller’s request that it was finally made payable in Cleveland, Wallace continued :
“ Upon this request of Mr. Miller, I consented that I would take his note, payable as he had desired, with exchange on New York;
to which he agreed; and the note in suit was thus drawn up by myself, and executed by Mr. Miller. The note was so executed by Miller, and received by me in the utmost good faith, on my part, as to the place where it was dated and made payable, and mainly for the reason expressed by Miller, that it would enable him to pay it in his home currency. Perhaps another reason which induced me to consent to the change proposed by Miller was, that I understood that by the laws of New York seven percent, was the legal rate of interest; and as Mr. Palmer had informed me that the note was to draw ten per cent, interest, it occurred to me that perhaps the contract might upon its face be opened to the plea of usury if payable in New York; and not having time to examine the question, and as the laws of my own State allowed parties to contract for ten per cent, interest, and beliveing that I had the same right to make the note payable at my place of resi-. dence (as we were joint assignees in both New York and Cleveland), as at the domicile of Mr. Palmer, I thought it would remove that apparent objection upon the face, if the note was made payable at my residence in Ohio.”
A sharp cross-examination got no very different result. The witness said:
“I regarded my knowledge as very imperfect upon the subject, for I had no knowledge of the construction of the statute of hew York. I only had queries in my mind in reference to it, and fears that the contract might be regarded upon its face as usurious. I knew that the legal rate of interest in New York was seven per cent., and at the same time I had that confidence m Mr. Palmer’s experience as a business man that he must know the statute of his own State in respect to interest upon all contracts, that he would not have bargained blindly for an illegal rate. Hence my doubts as to whether or not it was usurious upon its face. I regarded the contract as important, and I had a good deal of interest; but I had less personal anxiety in regard to it, and did not investigate questions connected with it as I should have done, had I not known that Palmer, before consummating the sale, would consult his lawyer in New York, Mr. Charles Tracy.”
On the other hand, there were some indications in the evidence that the whole business, so far as Miller was p. 304concerned, was a scheme of his, and perhaps of Rufner’s, to get the goods by fraud, and without paying anything to anybody for them. It appeared, at least, that after Wallace, late at night—near midnight—had written his letter to Palmer of 22d of February, 1858, a copy of it—either at his request and because he was tired, or at the request of Rufner, and for some purpose, honest or dishonest, of his—had been taken by Miller’s clerk; and that copiy, containing the remark as to the yeason why the interest had been made payable at Cleveland, was now produced accordingly. Rufner also swore that when he and Turner were making the treaty or negotiation with Palmer, in New York, for the goods, nothing was said about the rate of interest: that he expected it was to be seven per cent., the New York rate; and that the first intimation he had to the contrary, was Palmer’s open letter to Wallace, given to him, Rufner, to be delivered. Giving an account further on of the report, which, on getting to Fort Wayne, in Indiana, he had made to his principal and friend Miller, Rufner said:
“ I did report to Mr. Miller the terms as were written to Mr. Wallace, it being the only evidence in writing that we had in relation to the whole transaction up to that time. Mr. Miller swore that by * * * * ten per cent, would eat him up; he might as well surrender at once, and that .the idea of his wife joining in a mortgage and note was a thing he had never been called upon to do, and he could not consent to accept such a ****** proposition, and that he had better let his business go to * * * *. I told him of course he was the judge in the matter; that these were the terms; I knew they were hard, but it was the best and on y thing I could do with Mr. Palmer, and that, in my opinion, if he objected to any portion of Palmer’s written instruction to Mr. Wallace, he might as well abandon the whole; that I had understood Jfr. Wallace had no power to act in the matter. Ism I thought that the contract with ten per cent, interest was a usurious one.”
This conversation was just before Wallace arrived in Fort Wayne to examine and conclude matters, and at Miller s re quest changed the place of paying the interest.
Argument for the mortgagor.
It appeared that immediately after the mortgage was executed and forwarded to Palmer at New York, Rufner, who now went to New York to select the goods, wrote, on the 25ZA of February, to Miller, about the subject of his business there. The contents of his letter were to be inferred from the reply. Miller writes back on the 2d of March, 1858, that is to say, ten days after the conclusion of matters at Fort Wayne, between himself and Wallace, thus:
“ Friend Rufner: Yours of the 25th February was received this morning, and contents particularly noticed, and in reply, have but little to say, knowing that your good judgment will enable you to see and do things for me and yourself far better at this late day than I could suggest, being so far from the place of action, and knowing so little of the surroundings and influences under which you will have to act, in order to accomplish the object of your visit to New York............... Be sure you preserve a copy of Mr. Wallace's letter to Mr. Palmer.”’
And he adds in a postscript:
“P. 8. In regard to the ten per cent, matter, let the Palmer party do all the talking themselves, and keep perfectly cool and shady on that subject. Don’t let Turner see this letter.”
The court below made a decree of foreclosure, and from that decree the present appeal was taken; the questions here being the same as below.
Mr. Evarts and Mr. Gilettefor Miller and wife? the appellants:
1. The testimony shows that the goods were not at all worth the prices charged. They were unmarketable goods, the residuum, after the season of sales, of a bankrupt firm. Palmer was a heavy creditor of the firm, nursing its assets from interest, as much as he was bound to nurse them from duty. The goods were bought before they were really seen. . he selection took place after the mortgage was. executed and ln possession of Palmer.
2. The negotiations and the transactions were commenced and completed in the city and State of New York. Palmer vol. i. 20
Argument for the mortgagor.
having for sale in the city of New York a stock of dry goods belonging to the assigned estate of a bankrupt firm of that city, treats there with Miller’s agents, and concludes all the terms of the bargain, leaving open merely an inquiry into the value of Miller’s property to be mortgaged. Upon the report of his agent in this inquiry, Palmer received the securities, now in suit, from Miller’s agents in the city of New York, and there delivered the goods which formed the subject of the bargain. The circumstances and the motives under which the note, instead of being dated at Fort Wayne, Indiana, where it was made and signed, was dated at Cleveland, Ohio, and made payable there, instead of at New York, refute the pretension that it was an element or ingredient of the contract between the parties, and one upon which its terms were adjusted, that the price of the goods sold in New York was to be paid in Ohio. Palmer in his letter states the terms of the bargain to be, that the bond and mortgage were “ to be drawn payable on or before five years, bearing ten per cent, semi-annual interest, the first interest to be payable in twelve months from the date of the delivery of the goods here; the principal and interest to be payable here; and Wallace gives the whole reason of thepfece of payment being varied, on the face of the securities, as follows: “ 1 have taken the liberty to vary from your instructions m reference to the place where the note is made payable. Seven per cent, being, as I understand, the legal rate of interest in New York, and six per cent, being the rate in Indiana, the note would seem to be open to the plea of usury, both here And in New York, if made for ten per cent.; so, to avoid this, I made it payable in Ohio, and dated it there, where ten per cent, is the legal rate, with exchange on New York, which results the same.” The charge of “ exchange on New rorlc being added to the face of the price, thus to be paid at Cleveland, shows that New York remained the place of payment in the intent of both payer and payee, and as a term of the bargain, notwithstanding the formal change in the tenor of the note.
The validity of the transaction, then, depends on the law of New York, the true “ place of the contract;” and Cleve-
Argument for the mortgagee.
land having been made the “ place of performance,” not as a substantive item of the agreement, but only as one in evasion of the “ place of the contract,” cannot furnish the rule for the exposition or government of what was done.
[3. The counsel contended, under this head, that by the statute of New York the contract was usurious, whether it was regarded as a sale, with a note and mortgage given in payment, or whether considered in the light, which was its true one, of a loan, under the guise of a sale; the purpose being that Miller should sell the goods en masse at auction.]
Mr. Coombs, on the other side:
1. The defence set up from failure of consideration breaks down completely. The first witness produced to sustain it, disproves it. The value of the goods, he says, is matter of opinion; a question, “ in which, perhaps, no two men would agree.” It would depend, he swears, on the party’s “ facilities for getting rid of them.” “ The goods were badly selected,” says a second witness. But who selected them ? Miller’s own agents. Moreover, what did this witness, who had been engaged in “ railroading some,” and in <c railroading ” as much as in trade, know on the subject ? A third witness considered that they were “ billed ” too high; but is every man who has goods “ billed ” too high to him to set up successfully, failure of consideration, after he has inquired the price, received the goods and disposed of them for himself? Trade would not flourish under such a rule.
2. The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place to be executed in another, is well settled. They are to be governed by the laws of the place of performance, and if the interest allowed by the laws of the place of performance is higher than that permitted at the place of the contract, the parties may stipulate for the higher interest without incurring the penalty of usury.*
We admit that there is one exception to-this general rule, and that where the note is made payable at a place foreign p. 308to the residence of either of the parties, and to the subjectr matter of the contract, for the purpose of obtaining a higher rate of interest than the laws of the place of contract allow, with intent to evade said law, the contract will be usurious, if the rate of interest specified exceed the rate allowed by the lex loci contractus. Nor shall we dispute the proposition, that where the note is made payable at a place other than the residence of either of the parties, and foreign to the subject-matter of the contract, and a higher rate of interest is stipulated for than the laws of the place of contract permit, the parties will be presumed to have intended a fraudulent evasion of those laws. This presumption, however, can never arise when the note is made payable at the place of the domicile of one of the parties, especially when it is done at the request of the payor, and for his accommodation. In the case at bar, it will be hard to show any good reason, in law or in morals, why Wallace had not as good a right to require that the note should be made payable at the place of his domicile, as Palmer had to require its payment in New York; even if the payor had been indifferent, instead of desiring that it should be made payable at Cleveland, in preference to New York.
*
Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 78.
3. Under this head, the counsel replied to the argument on the New York statute; contending that the transaction was a sale, not a loan; and that being so it was protected by the case of Cutler v. Wright,* which recognized the English case of Beete v. Bidgood.f
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court: Two defences to the mortgage are relied upon :
1. That the goods sold to the defendant, which formed the consideration of the note secured by the mortgage, were worth largely less than the amount for which the note was given. It is claimed, therefore, that there has been a partial failure of consideration.
The evidence upon the subject is conflicting. It has failed
* 8 Smith, 472. f 7 Barnewall & Creswell, 453.
to establish to our satisfaction the fact alleged. Fraud or misrepresentation by the vendor is neither averred nor proved. It is in proof that the goods were carefully examined by the agents of Miller before they were bought, and that they were selected when the purchase was made. They were sold at the regular prices of the establishment. It does not appear that Miller made any objection, either to the prices or quality, when he received them; or that he ever made any objection, until it was set up in his answer in this case, more than a year after the goods were delivered to him.
The objection comes too late. The sanctity of contracts cannot thus be trifled with. The common law, unlike the civil law, does not imply a warranty from a full price. Where there is neither fraud nor warranty, and the buyer receives and retains the goods, without objection, he waives the right to object afterwards, and is finally concluded. In such cases the rule of caveat emptor applies.*
2. The defence chiefly relied upon is usury. The result of our inquiry upon that subject must depend upon the lex loci that governs the contract.
Palmer and Wallace, the payees of the note, were the assignees of an insolvent firm' which did business under one name in New York, and under another at Cleveland, Ohio. Palmer resided at New York and Wallace at Cleveland. About $50,000 worth of the goods, covered by the assignment, were at the former city, and about $75,000 worth at the latter. The negotiation for the sale was commenced by Palmer and concluded by Wallace. The note is as follows: [His Honor here read the mortgage-note, already described.!] Miller lived in Indiana. The note and mortgage were executed in that State. The mortgaged premises are situated there. Wallace was present at the execution of the securities. They were transmitted to Palmer, at New York, and the goods were thereupon shipped thence to Indiana, he note and mortgage have been assigned to the appellee. We lay out of view the imputation upon Palmer and p. 310Wallace, of a fraudulent purpose to evade by shift or device the usury statute of Indiana or New York. It is wholly unsupported by the evidence. They were acting in a fiduciary character, and could have had no motive to engage in such a transaction. There is no reason to believe that such a conception entered into their minds. On the other hand, we are by no means satisfied that it was not the deliberate purpose of Miller, when the arrangement was made, to involve them in the toils of this defence, and if possible to escape with the goods without paying anything for them. Our business, however, is to ascertain and apply the law of the case. We shall not discuss the evidence bearing upon the ethics of his conduct.
“ The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place to be performed in another is well settled. They are to be governed by the law of the place of performance, and if the interest allowed by the law of the place of performance is higher than that permitted at the place of contract, the parties may stipulate for the higher interest without incurring the penalties of usury.”* The converse of this proposition is also well settled. If the rate of interest be higher at the place of the contract than at the place of performance, the parties may lawfully contract in that case also for the higher rate, f
These rules are subject to the qualification, that the parties act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction is not adopted to disguise its real character. The validity of the contract is determined by the law of the place where it is entered into. Whether void or valid there, it is so everywhere.!
When these securities were executed the statute of Ohio of the 14th of March, 1850, upon the subject of interest, was p. 311in force. According to its provisions parties might lawfully contract for any rate of interest not exceeding ten per cent, per annum. The contract of Miller was therefore valid.
*
Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 77, 78; Curtis et al. v. Leavitt, 15 New York, 92 ; Berrien v. Wright, 26 Barbour, 213. f Depeau v. Humphrey, 20 Howard, 1; Chapman v. Robinson, 6 Paige,
634
| Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 78; Mix et al. v. The Madison Ins. Co., Indiana, 117; Corcoran & Riggs v. Powers et al., 6 Ohio State, 19.
Decree affirmed with costs.
United States v. D’Aguirre.
Where from a tract of land known by a particular name grants of two parcels had been made, and a petition for a grant of the surplus remaining was presented to the Governor of the Department of California, and to the description of the land solicited, these words were added, “the extent of which is about five leagues more or less”—Held, that these words were not a limitation upon the quantity solicited, but a mere conjectural estimate of the extent of tlje surplus.
The case distinguished from The United States v. Fossat (20 Howard, 413), and Yontz n. The United States (23 Id., 499).
Appeal by the United States from the District Court for the Southern District of California; the case being thus :
D Aguirre, in right of his wife Donna Maria Estudillo, claimed a tract of land in California under a grant from the Mexican Government. The tract was parcel of a larger tract, known as the “Rancho of Old and New San Jacinto.” Two grants had been made of parts from this general tract; the surplus embracing, in fact, about eleven leagues, being that which was claimed by the respondent.
Having presented a petition to the Board of Commissioners, appointed by act of March 3d, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in California, for a confirmation of his claim, D’Aguirre’s title as it appeared before the board was thus:
His original petition to the prefect for the land, made in t ehalf of his wife, set forth “ that there was remaining a sobrante,’ or surplus,” in the tract or rancho of San Jacinto, and that his wife “ requiring the said remnant, .... solicited t e prefect’s assistance to obtain the mentioned land, the exnt of which was about five leagues” within the limits of the own rancho of San Jacinto, the general plat of which is p. 312in the office of the Secretary of State, and shown in its total extent that it is bounded thus; north by the rqnchos of Jurupa and San Bernardino, south by Temecula, west by Unapia, and east by Gorgonin.” The petition continued: “Your honor will also cause previous observations to be taken.”
The petition to the prefect was followed by the report of that officer to the governor upon it. The report, says: “ The land petitioned for is that remaining vacant from the land of the Old and New San Jacinto, and which is bounded by the lands mentioned in the petition; and the copy of the plat, which I have under my eyes, proves to be correct with the original which exists in the government.” The document proceeds: “ Inasmuch as it does not appear to be strange property, that which is claimed as part overplus, and never to have been the same declared, &c., it seems to me that there can result no obstacle to this concession. Notwithstanding that which is represented, your excellency, with more prudence, will resolve upon that which becomes its superior will.”
Next followed,—
The Concession of the Governor, Pio Pico.
Angeles, May 9,1846.
Having seen the petition with which commences this espediente, the report, &c., with the rest that has been reported, and finding the whole in conformity with the laws and regulation, &c., I declare to Donna Maria Estudillo d’Aguirre the property in fee of the land remaining in Old and New San Jacinto, conformably as shows -the general map, which agrees with all the antecedents. Let the respective title be delivered to the claimant, and let this espediente be reserved to submit to the approbation of the most excellent Assembly, &c.
Pio Pico.
Jose Matias Moreno, Secretary.
Coming after this document of “ Concession” was, what is called the Grant, a document from the same governor, Pio Pico, in substance reciting that D’ Aguirre, in the name of his wife, had solicited for her, “ the overplus land resulting from t rancho of Old and New San Jacinto, concerning which, t investigations being previously made n the governor procee s to p. 313say, “ I have decreed this day that it be conceded to her, the mentioned land, declaring to her the property of the same in fee by these present despatches.” The document continues:
“She shall solicit the respective judge to give her juridical possession in virtue of this decree, thereby establishing the boundaries with the necessary landmarks.
“ The land of which donation is made to her, is that which remains as overplus in the ranchos of Old and New San Jacinto, as will appear by the' general map of both ranchos, and which corresponds with their espedientes.
“ The magistrate who shall give the possession shall have it surveyed conformably to the ordinanza. commencing the surveys from the boundaries of Jose Antonio Estudillo and of Don Miguel de Pedrorena, and he will advise the government of the number of (sitos de ganado mayor') square leagues it contains.”
Next came the report of the Committee on Vacant Lands, which, declaring that D’Aguirre’s petition in relation to the tract remaining as overplus, having been granted to him in conformity with the laws on the subject-matter, the said concession “ of the tract which remains as overplus from the ranchos of Old and New San Jacinto is approved.” An approval by the “ most excellent Departmental Assembly of the foregoing decree” concluded the title of D’Aguirre.
The surplus which D’Aguirre had asked for, representing its extent as being about five leagues, more or less, contained in fact, as already mentioned, about eleven leagues.
The question was, of course, as to the amount embraced by the grant; that is to say, whether D’Aguirre’s representation in his petition for the 11 surplus,” that its extent was * five leagues, more or less, would confine the grant to a surplus containing but five leagues, or whether the grant would carry the entire “ surplus” in its full meaning, though that surplus contained eleven. The board of commissioners considered that it only carried five, and rejected D’Aguirre’s claim for the entire surplus of eleven. But on appeal, the istrict Court was of a different opinion, and confirmed the
c aim; giving to D’Aguirre the surplus remaining within the oundaries of the general tract, to the extent of eleven square
Argument for D’ Aguirre.
leagues, unless there was less than eleven within such boundaries, in which case of such less quantity the confirmation was limited to it. It was from this decree that the United States took the present appeal.
Jfr. Wills, for the United States ; There has been here, to say no more, such plain misconception on the part of the Mexican government as to what it was granting—that misconception being brought about by misrepresentation offacts on the part of D’Aguirre—that the court will withhold its aid. Certainly the quantity of land which the government would convey entered largely into its determination, whether it would or would not convey it all; and when D’Aguirre represented that the “ sobrante” or surplus contained five leagues or perhaps less, when in fact it contained more than double the amount of five, there is such error as the court will relieve against. The surplus is but the subject of the grant, and justice will be done by giving five leagues in the surplus described.
In The United States v. Fossat,* this court decided that where there is no natural boundary or descriptive call for the termination of lines of a tract of land, and the quantity called for in the grant is “ one league of the larger size, a little more or less,” the survey must include only a league. The words “a little more or less must be rejected.” It is also decided, in Yontz v. The United. States,^ that the generality of the grant may be sustained by the words of the petition; that the petition and the concession must be taken as one act, and the extent of the grant limited by the prayer of the petition. In that case the grant was limited to the two leagues prayed for in the petition.
Mr. Williams, contra: The papers in the case iterate and reiterate that the grant is for the surplus. There is not in one of them, except in the petition itself, which also is for the “ surplus,” an allusion to quantity; and the petitioner re-
f 23 Id., 498.
quests the Mexican government to take “ observations” previously to granting. Every part of the case shows also, that the government proceeded not less advisedly than it did in every case.
The cases cited do not apply. The decision in The United States v. Fossat was, that the call in the grant for “ one league, a little more or less,” must be taken as “ one league” when located and surveyed by the United States. In the case at bar no quantity is named in the grant, and the only limitation is that prescribed by the colonization law, namely, eleven leagues.
In Yontz v. The United States, the petitioner confined his application to “ two leagues, a little more or less.” The grant named no quantity, but reserved -the surplus. The surplus of what ? Clearly of the two leagues applied for. But there is no reservation of the surplus in the grant to D’Aguirre. On the contrary, the petition was for the surplus, which surplus he estimated at five leagues, a little more or less. The distinction is plain.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court:
The only question for consideration in this case relates to the quantity embraced by the grant to the claimant. The District Court confirmed her title to lands lying within certain designated boundaries, not exceeding in extent eleven square leagues, if any surplus over that quantity existed. The United States seek to restrict the confirmation to five square leagues, and base their appeal on the language of the petition upon which the grant was made. It appears from the record that two previous grants had been issued for land situated within a tract known as the “Rancho of Old and New San Jacinto,” and that a surplus still remained. For this surplus the petition was presented, and to the description of the land which it gives, these words are added: “the extent of which is about five leagues, more or less.” It is upon these words, as showing that the petition was only for ve leagues, that the counsel of the government rely. But 1 is evident that they constitute a mere conjectural estimate p. 316of the extent of the surplus. The petition is for the grant of a specific tract, not for any particular quantity. The report of the prefect, to whom the petition was in the first instance presented, to be forwarded to the governor, describes the land “ as that remaining vacant from the Old and New San Jacinto,” and does not mention its extent. The concession of the governor declares to the claimant, “the property in fee of the land remaining in Old and New San Jacinto,” and does not designate any quantity. The formal grant issued recites that the claimant has solicited “ the overplus land resulting from the rancho of Old and New San Jacinto,” and the third condition annexed describes the land “ of which donation is made,” in similar terms.
It is clear upon the face of the papers that the original concession and formal grant were for the entire surplus remaining within the designated boundaries, subject only to the limitation imposed by the colonization law of 1824, upon the power of the governor. As he could only cede to the extent of eleven square leagues, the grant could only convey that quantity whatever the amount of the overplus.
The case of The United States v. Fossat* and the case of Yontz v. The United States,^ have no application. In the Fossat case the grant was in terms restricted to one league, and it provided for the measurement of the quantity granted and the reservation of the surplus. In the case at bar no quantity is named, and the only limitation is that prescribed by the law of 1824. In the Yontz case the grantee expressly confined his application “ to two leagues, more or less,” according to certain designated boundaries. The grant did not mention any quantity, but provided for the measurement of the tract and the reservation of the surplus. The court in deciding the case very justly observed, that if the boundaries were conclusively defined in the grant, no surplus could be thrown off by a survey, and therefore construe the grant in connection with the petition, and held that the two leagues mentioned in the petition were to be surveyed within the larger tract; in this way only was the conditiona
+ 23 Id., 499.
** 20 Howard, 413.
clause as to measurement and surplus made consistent with the previous language of the grant. The case at bar is entirely dissimilar. Here the grant mentions no quantity, and reserves no surplus, but on the contrary the third condition expressly requires the magistrate who gives possession to advise the government of the number of square leagues the tract may contain.
Decree affirmed.
Godfrey v. Eames.
If an applicant for a patent choose to withdraw his application for a patent, intending, at the time of such withdrawal, to file a new petition, and he accordingly does so, the two petitions are to be considered as parts of the same transaction, and both as constituting one continuous application, within the meaning of the seventh sections of the Patent Acts of 1836 and 1839. Cliffokd, J., dissenting.
The question of the continuity of the application is a question to be submitted to the jury.
The Patent Act of 1836, provides* that on the filing of an application for a patent, “ the commissioner shall make or cause to be made an examination of the alleged new invention or discovery, and if on any such examination it shall not appear to the commissioner that the same had been ... in public use or on sale with the applicant’s consent or allowanceprior to the application,... it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor, but whenever on such examination it shall appear to the commissioner that... the applicant was not the original and first inventor or discoverer thereof, or that what is claimed as new had before been invented or discovered,... or that the description is defective and insufficient, he shall notify the applicant thereof, giving him briefly such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of renewing his application, or of altering his specification to embrace only that part of the invention or discovery which is new.
In every such case,” the act goes on to say, “ *if the p. 318applicant shall elect to withdraw his application, relinquishing his claim to the model, he shall be entitled to receive back $20, part of the duty required by this act, on filing a notice in writing’ of such election in the Patent Office. . . .• But if the applicant in such case shall persist* in his claim for a patent, with or without any alteration of his specification, he shall be required to make oath or affirmation anew, in manner aforesaid, and if the specification or claim shall not have been so modified, as in the opinion of the commissioner shall entitle the applicant to a patent, he may on appeal, and upon request in writing, have the decision of a board of examiners,” &c.
*
§ 7, 5 Stat, at Large, 119.
A subsequent act—an act of 1839* —provides that those who shall have purchased, sold, or made the thing patented li prior to the application of the inventor or discoverer for a patent, shall be held to possess the right to use and vend to others to be used ” the same; and that “ no patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale, or use, prior to the application for a patent as aforesaid, except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public, or that such purchase, sale, or prior use has been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent.”
With these enactments in force, Godfrey, on the 31st January, 1855, filed an application for a patent for boot-trees. Thia application the commissioner, on the 17th May, 1855, rejected for want of novelty. On the 24th April, 1857, within the time required by the rules, Godfrey submitted his case again. The old application was withdrawn, and a new one filed, simultaneously; the withdrawal fee of $20 going to make part of the new application fee of $30, and not in fact being received by the applicant. These different applications were made through different attorneys, and the description of invention, the claims of novelty, and the models, were in some respects different. It was admitted, however, at t e bar, “ that that which was finally patented might, if it ha been properly introduced, have been engrafted as an amen
*
g 7 ; 5 Stat, at Large, 354.
Argument for the patentee.
ment to the first application.” A patent was issued March 2d, 1858.
It was part of the case “ that the patentee, in the summer and fall of 1854, and since, publicly manufactured and sold boot-trees containing his alleged invention.”
On a suit by the patentee, Godfrey, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, against Eames, for the use of the boot-tree patented, the question was, whether Godfrey had forfeited his patent by more than two years’ public use or sale of his invention, prior to his application. The court below instructed the jury that he had; and accordingly that the plaintiff could not recover. The correctness of this instruction, was the matter now before this court on error.
Jfr. Causten Browne, for the plaintiff in error: The proceeding of Godfrey was in pursuance of a settled practice sanctioned by the Patent Office, and amounting simply to amendment and rehearing, with' $10 additional fee. From the spring of 1855 (only a few months -after the introduction of the invention into use), until the grant of the patent, there was, in fact, never a moment when the inventor was not applying to the commissioner for his patent. The case is one of two consecutive applications (no time intervening) for patent for an invention. Why is the patent declared invalid upon the ground that the latter one—that which immediately preceded the grant—is the only one to which the statute relates ?
There is no sufficient ground for such distinction upon the language of the statute, interpreted with reference to its reason and policy.
The provision of the act has been construed liberally to uphold the patent.* The terms, “ his application for paent, mean not any particular paper application, but his applying; his making an application; his preferring a demand for a patent for his invention as new and useful.
Considered with reference to the policy of this provision,
*
Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters, 18.
Argument for the patentee.
it is still more clear that it will not bear the construction given to it in this case by the court below. This policy was, that at as early a period as possible, having due regard to the rights of the inventor, the public should be put in possession of the best mode of practising the invention, by the deposit in the Patent Office of an open description thereof by the inventor.* This description being lodged, together with demand for patent, the public were secure of the means of practising the invention when the exclusive right of the inventor should terminate, and the inventor was secure of his protection unless he abandoned the pursuit of it. Undoubtedly after an inventor has filed his application for patent, he may so conduct himself as to show an abandonment of it. If rejected, he may allow the rejection to stand so long as to show, itself or with other circumstances, an acquiescence therein and a final relinquishment of his claim. But having once filed an application, given the details of his invention to the public knowledge, and asserted his claim to a patent, he has satisfied the reasons of the law of 1836; and although he should afterwards withdraw that application, and some time should elapse before he renewed it, it is a question for the jury, whether he has abandoned his claim to a patent, on which question the fact of withdrawal is evidence only, to be weighed with other evidence. But in this case, although no time intervened, the court peremptorily directed the jury to find for the defendant.
2. If, indeed, the application was to patent something not existing in the first application, it cannot be considered a continuance of that application. But the fact that he changed his claim, or. other part of his description, does not make it a different application; nor that he submitted new drawings; nor that he submitted a new model: if the drawings and model show a machine substantially the same as before, m construction and mode of operation. The same invention is disclosed in each, and might have been fully described and claimed in the first application; just as a reissue is a patent
*
Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters, 18; Eyan v. Goodwin, 3 Sumner, 518, Sparkman v. Higgins, 1 Blatchford, 208.
Argument against the patentee.
for the same invention as the original patent, if it was disclosed in the original application, and might have been then fully described and claimed. If the patentee in this case could have reissued a patent taken upon his original description and claim, so as to insert the present description and claim, the commissioner could have allowed a like substitution by way of amendment. A patentee is presumed to intend to claim all that is new with him. If it appears that the thing on which a patent was sought, was the same in the two cases, taking the model, description, and drawings together, then it is true that the inventor did, in 1855, put the public in possession of his invention, and of the best mode of practising it, and has ever since persisted in claiming a patent therefor; and the policy of the law, if rightly stated above, is satisfied.
Mr. Brooks, for the defendant in error: The real question presented is, What became of this application for a patent, which had been “ once rejected,” but which was “ entitled to a re-examination ?” Did the applicant “ persist in his claim for a patent, with or without any alteration of his specification ?” “His claim” for a patent must, we suppose, be held to refer to the claim or application then before the Patent Office, and which had been once rejected. None other had been made, and none other could be persisted in. He did not persist in such claim; he did not ask for a “ re-examina-hon of his application (the “ renewing his application” mentioned in the act of 1836); but he took the opposite alternative course authorized by that statute (though not named by the commissioner of patents), viz., he elected to withdraw his application, and receive the return fee of $20.
aving made such election, he, in fact, did withdraw his said application on the 24th April, 1857, under the act of 1836, and did receive back the return-fee; and the “ said applica-then withdrawn has never since been the subject of any action whatever anywhere. . l)roceecling is analogous to a discontinuance by a plain-1 m a court of law, and the commencement of another suit vol. i. 21
Argument against the patentee.
on the same day, in case the claims of invention and the causes of action were in each case the same. In both instances, one proceeding is ended, and another is begun, even though both depended on the same ground precisely. The case is different where only an amendment is made, and the same suit is prosecuted in an amended form, without new process or new papers, or even loss of time.
Now, it is a familiar principle, that an action at law must be commenced within the period limited for that purpose; and, if not so brought, it is not aided by the fact that another suit had been previously commenced within such time, and had been discontinued or dismissed. Were it otherwise, stale demands might be kept alive forever by means of suits not brought to trial. So in this case, if the doctrine of the plaintiff in error is correct, an inventor has it in his power, after putting his invention into public use, to apply for a patent, and taking care, in case of one rejection, to withdraw, and repeat the experiment toties quoties, he thus may, if finally successful, prolong the period of enjoyment much beyond that prescribed by law. In fact, if this view of the law is sanctioned by this court, it becomes the interest of inventors to delay the grant of patents as long as possible by this very method, in order to prolong the term of enjoyment. It is obvious, however, that the patent here in suit, like all others, was and could be founded upon one application only; and it appears that such application was made (April 24,1857), more than two years after the public use and sale by the inventor of the alleged invention, whereby the said patent was made invalid.
We do not put our defence upon the ground, that the withdrawal of the first application was an abandonment o his invention. It was merely an abandonment of that applwation, and left him at liberty to make other applications as like or unlike that as he pleased; but inasmuch as, in cases of withdrawal, the model and application-papers are retained in the Patent Office, and further proceedings to obtain a patent require new papers, differing from former ones at least in tune of execution and filing, and also perhaps presented to officers
Argument against the patentee.
not before having acted in the matter, a first application cannot, in the nature of things, be the second, nor a second be also the first.
It will not, of course, be claimed that what was done in April, 1857, amounted merely to an amendment of his first specification, by writing it out anew, as is sometimes allowed to be done. For that purpose, no second fee or new petition, oath or model, was necessary; and, in such case, no return of fee could have been allowed.
It is made the duty of the commissioner, by the act of 1836, to issue a patent upon an application duly filed, after due examination, if, among other things, it shall not appear that the alleged new invention had been in public use or on sale, &c., &c., (more than two years) “ prior to the application” “ The application” must mean the one brought before him for examination, and not some previous application never perhaps known to him. The commissioner has no judicial discretion in receiving an application. The power of making one is given absolutely to the inventor. Can it, then, be pretended that the commissioner would or lawfully could have granted the patent in this case, had he known the fact of the public use and sale of the invention in 1854? “ The application” means the several papers required by law to entitle an inventor to an examination of his alleged invention, and which, if the patent is granted, are annexed to the letters-patent to distinguish it and fix its character. In this case, these papers were those filed in 1857, and none other; so that the prior application of 1855 is wholly immaterial, except upon the question of abandonment, which is not raised at all in this case. The applicant voluntarily substituted one application for another, as he says. If both were t e same, his motive could not be one favored by the policy o t e patent laws. If they were not the same, and he elected n give up one for the other, and did so, and got the benefit so doing, he cannot rely now on both. If, as we under? n the law, the specification makes the patent what it is, is manifest that the application of January, 1855, was not patented in the grant made in March, 1858.
[2. The counsel then contended that, in fact the object for which a patent was applied for in 1855, was one so different from that one for which a patent did issue in 1858, that they could not be considered in substance the same thing; a matter involving a question of fact only.]
Mr. Justice SWAYNE, after quoting the statutes of 1836 and 1839, delivered the opinion of the court:*
In this case the patentee filed his application in the Patent Office on the 31st of January, 1855, and from that time it was constantly before the office, until the patent was issued on the 2d of March, 1858, except that on the 24th of April, 1857, it was withdrawn and refiled on the same day with an amended specification. It was admitted and proved 11 that the patentee, in the summer and fall of 1854, and since, publicly manufactured and sold boot-trees containing his alleged invention.” The sales and use as thus shown were less than two years before the first application was filed, and hence, according to the letter of the act of 1839, cannot affect the validity of the patent.
In answer to this, two propositions are relied upon by the plaintiff in error:
1. It is said the original and the renewed application are for patents for different things.
Both specifications are before us, and it is our duty to construe them.
The act of 1836 gives the applicant a right to change his specification after receiving the suggestions of the commissioner. Doubtless, this right exists and may be exercised independently of such suggestions, at any time before the commissioner has given his formal judgment upon the application; and the inventor may “ persist in his application for a patent, with or without any alteration of his specification. A change in the specification as filed in the first instance, or the subsequent filing of a new one, whereby a patent is stil sought for the substance of the invention as originally p. 325claimed, or a part of it, cannot in any wise affect the sufficiency of the original application or the legal consequences flowing from it. To produce that result the new or amended specification must be intended to serve as the basis of a patent for a distinct and different invention, and one not contemplated by the specification, as submitted at the outset.
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Mr. Chief Justice Taney and Messrs. Justices Wayne, Grier, and JW had not been present at the argument.
We are satisfied that there was here such substantial identity in the two specifications as brings the case within the rule thus laid down. This objection cannot be sustained.
2. It is said that the withdrawal of the first application broke the continuity of the claim, and that the case stands as if the only application were the one of the 24th of April, 1857.
This question could not have arisen upon the same state of facts, under the act of 1836. According to that act, and the prior legislation of Congress, the public use or sale by the inventor of the thing invented, at any time before the application, was fatal to his claim for a patent. The act of 1839 relieved him from this consequence and introduced a new and more liberal policy. It gave him the right to apply for a patent at any time within two years after the use and sale of his invention, “ except on proof of the abandonment of such invention to the public.” The provision in the act of 1836, allowing the withdrawal of the application, was intended only to provide for the disposition in such cases of the duty which had been deposited, and to enable the applicant to resume a part of it upon the condition prescribed; it is silent as to everything beyond this, and we do not feel authorized to interpolate into the statute so important a qualification. The new provision in the act of 1839, is wholly independent of the act of 1836; by necessary implication it repeals the conflicting provision upon the same subject in t e earlier act. It must be examined by its own light, and 80 con8frued as to give the fullest effect to the beneficent purpose of the legislature.
In our judgment, if a party choose to withdraw his application for a patent, and pay the forfeit, intending at the time ° such withdrawal to file a new petition, and he accordingly p. 326do so, the two petitions are to be considered as parts of the same transaction, and both as constituting one continuous application, within the meaning of the law.
The question of the continuity of the application should have been submitted to the jury. In directing them to return a verdict for the defendant, we think the learned judge who tried the case in the court below, committed an error.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD dissents.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
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This term expedients is a term of the Mexican land law, and of course not familiar to the reader of law reports in general, though it has now become so to those of the reports of this court. “When complete, an expediente usually consists of the petition, wit t e diseflo annexed; a marginal decree approving the petition, the order of re erence to the proper officer for information; the report of that officer in conormity to the order; the decree of concession, and the copy, or a duplicate of the grant. These several papers,—that is, the petition with the ^annexed, the order of reference, the inform^, the decree of concession, an t e copy of the grant, appended together, in the order mentioned,—onstitute a complete expediente within the meaning of the Mexican law.” United States v. Knight's Admr., 1 Black, 245.