Burr v. Des Moines R.R. & Navigation Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 99

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Burr v. Des Moines R.R. & Navigation Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 99
Full caption
Burr v. The Des Moines Railroad and Navigation Company.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Burr v. The Des Moines Railroad and Navigation
Company.
. Although this court will give judgment, on error, upon an agreed statement of facts or case stated, if it be signed by counsel and spread upon the record at large, as part thereof, yet it will not do so, except upon that which is professionally and properly known as a case stated ; that is to
®ay, upon a case which states facts simply; not one which presents, instead of facts, evidence from which facts mayor may not be inferred, egal presumption being in favor of a judgment regularly rendered, the court, where it does not reverse, nor dismiss for want of jurisdiction, might, in regard to a case which it refused to consider on evidence adduced, affirm simply. However, a case being before it, and having
een argued on its merits, where counsel on both sides erroneously supposed that they had brought up a case stated, when in'fact they rought up nothing but a mass of evidence, and where they erroneously
_ supposed, also, that they would obtain an opinion and judgment of this
Qom Earsons °n Contracts, 485-6; Cort et al. v. The Ambergate Railway Wendany’qn.EnSlish L&W and E(luity Reports, 287; Hanna v. Mills, 21
4
East 147. ’ ^ne^a'rt ”• Clwine, 5 Watts & Sergeant, 157; Mussen v. Price, + p’ u^on v- Solomonson, 3 Bosanquet & Puller, 582. t ussell on Arbitration, 135.
C\y .
court on the<cas>e as, by^OTrimon consent, they presented it,—the court benignajri?Q>“ dismi^seir* it only ; so leaving the parties at liberty to put tbSfyase, if they could, by agreement below, in a shape where it could be here f'eyiewed. But the dismission was with costs.
CW. .
This was^a writ of error, in an action of ejectment, to the Circui'^Court for the District of Iowa; the plaintiff in error having been also plaintiff below.
The record (or document so called), which was brought before the Supreme Court, after reciting the pleadings, and that the parties had appeared and waived a jury, showed that the following judgment had been rendered by the court
11 The evidence having been seen and examined hy the court, and the arguments of counsel heard, it is now considered and adjudged that the court do find the issue in favor of the defendant, and that the plaintiff take nothing by his petition. Whereupon it is ordered that the defendant recover of the plaintiff his costs in this behalf expended, taxed, &c., and that he have execution therefor.”
Then came a certificate of the clerk to the record, certifying that what preceded the certificate contained “a true, full, and perfect copy of the plaintiff’s petition and replication, of the defendant’s answer, and of all the proceedings of the court in the above-named cause.”
After this followed thirty-six pages of printed matter, annexed to which was another certificate of the clerk, certifying, “ that the foregoing twenty pages of print and writing are a true copy of the agreed statement of facts filed in the foregoing cause, as the same remains on file, it being all the evidence upon which the cause was submitted.”
This “ agreed statement of facts” consisted of acts of Congress and statutes of Iowa; of opinions of Attorneys-General of the United States; of decisions of the Secretaries of the Treasury and Interior Departments, and numerous letters between those officers and members of Congress, and other persons interested in the several land grants made by Congress to the State of Iowa for purposes of internal improvement; of various matters admitted by the one party and the [p. 101] other; the whole constituting a perplexing mass of law and evidence. At the close of “the record” was the following statement:
“ If, upon the whole case, the title*of the plaintiff to said lands has not failed, but, under the defendants’ deed to him, and the subsequent legislation by Congress, he has acquired a good title to said lands, the defendants are entitled to judgment and to costs of suit.
“ This cause is submitted, without a jury, upon the foregoing agreed statement of facts; but it is expressly agreed that the matters and things herein stated are only to be taken for what they are legally worth; arid that all objections on account of immateriality or irrelevancy are reserved by the parties respectively; and may be urged and considered by the parties, and by the court, upon the argument and in the decision.”
Notwithstanding the reservation of the right to do so, it appeared that no objection had been taken on the trial to the materiality or relevancy of any of the mass of testimony above described, nor to any ruling of the court on the law arising on the facts. The paper just quoted was not signed by counsel, nor entered on the record of the court, nor made a part of the record of the case by bill of exceptions, or in any other manner. In fact, no bill of exceptions was taken in the suit.
The case was argued here, on the large mass of testimony brought up, on its merits and as if the record had been in form, by Mr. Gilbert for the plaintiff in error, and by Messrs. Mason and Tracy on the other side.
Mr. Justice MILLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court:
It is very clear that a paper not signed by counsel, nor entered on the record of the court, nor made part of the record of the case by bill of exceptions, or in any other manner, cannot be considered by this court as the foundation on which it is to affirm or reverse the case. It is probable, from e language of the closing paragraph, that the parties con-
61 eret^ it as an agreed statement of facts, on which the court [p. 102] below might decide the law, and on which this court would review that decision. And it is quite true that this court has decided, in the case of The United States v. Eliason^ and in several cases since that one, that this may be done.
But in order to bring such a case properly before this court, two things are essential, which are wanting in the present case.
1. The agreed statement of facts must, in some manner in the court below, be made a part of the record of the case. The case of The United States v. Eliason shows, that it was strongly urged upon this court that it had been laid down by Sir Wm. Blackstone in his Commentaries, and by Stephen in his Treatise on Pleadings, that error did not lie on such a statement. The court, however, said that the reason for this was, that in the English, practice, the agreed statement was not like a special verdict entered on the record, and the appellate court could not therefore notice it. But that in the practice of our courts such agreements are signed by “ the counsel, and spread upon the record at large as part thereof.” And thus they'become technically a part of the record, into which the appellate court look, with the other parts of it, to ascertain if there be error, f
2. The statement of facts on which this court will inquire, if there is or is not error in the application of the law to them, is a statement of the ultimate facts or propositions which the evidence is intended to establish, and not the evidence on which those ultimate facts are supposed to rest. The statement must be sufficient in itself, without inferences or comparisons, or balancing of testimony, or weighing evidence, to justify the application of the legal principles which must determine the ease. It must leave none of the functions of a jury to be discharged by this court, but must have all the sufficiency, fulness, and perspicuity of a special verdict. If it requires of the court to weigh conflicting testimony, or to balance admitted facts, and deduce from these the propositions of fact on which alone a legal conclusion can rest, then
it is not such, a statement as this court can act upon. The paper before us “ is evidence of facts, and not the facts themselves as agreed or found.”* It is obvious that if the whole of this paper were presented by a jury as a special verdict, it would be objectionable, as presenting the evidence of facts, and not the facts themselves, which must determine the issue.
Cases of a character nearly allied to this have been frequently before this court, and although the opinions delivered are not always reconcilable in every respect, it is believed that they speak but one language as to the two propositions here laid down.f
The paper which we have been considering being rejected, there is nothing before the court by which it can determine whether the judgment of the court below is right or wrong.
The legal presumption is in favor of the correctness of that judgment, but as the parties here have all considered the case as turning on the evidence which we have refused to consider, and have so argued it, and as it was, no doubt, prepared with a view to obtaining the opinion of this court on the case there stated, we have determined to dismiss the writ of error, thus leaving the parties at liberty, if they can do so by a proper agreement in the court below, to remove the difficulties which now prevent this court from reviewing the case.
Case dismissed with costs.
* Graham v. Bayne, 18 Howard, 62. 300 PThn°Trk ’’ Dialogue’ 2 Peter^ 1; The United States v. Eliason, 16 Id., 12 Id qm nited States v. King et al., 7 Howard, 844; Bond v. Brown, GrsC n Weems v- George, 13 Id., 190; Arthurs v. Hart, 17 Id., 7; vranam v. Bayne, 18 Id., 60.
United States v. Sepulveda.
1. Previous to the act of Congress of June 14th, 1860, the District Courts of the United States for California had no jurisdiction to supervise and correct the action of the Surveyor-General of California, in surveying claims under Mexican grants confirmed by the decrees of the Board of Commissioners created by the act of March 3d, 1851. They possessed no control over the execution of the decrees of the board.
2. Where Mexican grants were by metes and bounds, or where proceedings before Mexican authorities, such as took place upon a juridical delivery of possession, had established the boundaries, or where, from any other source pending the proceedings for a confirmation, the boundaries were indicated, it was proper for the board to declare them in its decrees.
3. Where a survey, made by the Surveyor-General of California, of a confirmed claim under a Mexican grant, previous to the act of June 14th, 1860, does not conform to the decree of the Board of Commissioners, the remedy must be sought from the Commissioner of the General Land Office before the patent issues, and not in the District Court.
By acts of Congress, of March 3d, 1851,* and of August 31st, 1852,f the District Courts of the United States for California, were authorized, on appeal from the Board of Land Commissioners,—which body was empowered to settle anj claim to land in California that any person might set up by vir - tue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government,—“ to decide upon the validity of the said claim. One of the statutes J proceeded to enact for “ all claims finally confirmed by the said commissioners, a patent shall issue to the claimant upon his presenting to the land office an aut en-tic certificate of such confirmation; and a plat or survey o the said land duly approved by the Surveyor-Gerwral of California, whose duty” the act goes on to say, “ it shall be to cause all private claims which shall be finally confirmed, to be accurately surveyed and to furnish plats of the same. y a act,-the act of June 14th, 1860,§-new powers were give to the District Courts of California, and they now receive authority to order into court “any survey” of private clai, and to decide on it. ___
+ Stat, of March 3d, 1851, ? xui.
*
g viii, &c., 9 Stat, at Large, 631. g 12 Stat, at Large, 33, % 2. j- g xii, 10 Id., 99.
But this act did not in any express terms, perhaps in no terms at all, extend to surveys made prior to its passage, except they happened to be il surveys previously made and approved by the Surveyor-General, which had been at the passage of the act returned into the District Court, or in relation to which proceedings Avere then pending for the purpose of contesting or reforming the same; ” a class of surveys within which the present one did not come.
In 1852, Sepulveda and others presented their claim to the board of commissioners for confirmation of a grant which had been made to them under the Mexican government. In 1853 the board adjudged the claim to be valid, and entered a decree for its confirmation. The case having been removed by appeal to the District Court, the attorney-general gave notice that the appeal would not be prosecuted; and upon motion of the district attorney, in pursuance of such notice, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and that the claimants have leave to proceed upon the decree of the commissioners as upon a final decree. The land, the claim to which was thus confirmed, was now7 surveyed by direction of the Surveyor-General of the United States for California (as one of the statutes already mentioned directs that in such case it may be), and in 1859 the survey was approved by him. In 1860, the District Court, upon the suggestion of the district attorney that the survey did not conform to the final decree, ordered the Surveyor-General to return into court (as the statute of 1860 plainly gave the court authority to do by a certain class of surveys) a plat of this survey. The court, on hearing, held that there was error in part of the survey, and decreed that certain corrections should be made by a new survey. rom this decree the case was now brought here by appeal: t e principal question raised by the appeal beingj of course, t e right of the District Court, under the act of June 14th, , to order the correction of a survey made prior to the passage of the act.
Mr' Wills, in favor of the right, relied on United States v. [p. 106] Fossatt* in this court, as being in point. A motion was made in that case—one similar, in many respects, he remarked, to the present,—to dismiss an appeal; the ground of the motion being that the decrees of the board of commissioners relate only to the question of the validity of the claim, and that by the term “ validity” is meant “ authenticity,” “ legality,” and in some cases, “ interpretation,” but not in any case, “ location,” “ extent,” or “ boundary.” The court asks, “ What are the questions involved in the inquiry into the validity of a claim, to land?” and it answers thus: “It may present questions of the genuineness and authenticity of title, and whether the evidence is forged or fraudulent, or, it may present an inquiry into the authority of the officer to make the grant...................or, it may disclose questions of the capacity of the grantee to take, or whether the claim has been abandoned or is a subsisting title. But tn addition to these questions upon the vitality of title, there may arise questions of the extent, quantity, location, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of the claim.” The District Court was accordingly ordered “ to ascertain the external lines of the land.”
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court:
The jurisdiction of the District Court to supervise and correct the action of the Surveyor-General in this case is not derived from the act of June 14th, 1860. That act applies to surveys subsequently made, with certain exceptions, within which the present case does not fall. The exceptions embrace only those surveys previously made and approved by the Surveyor-General, which had been, at the passage of the act, returned into the District Courts, or in relation to' which proceedings were then pending for the purpose of contesting or reforming the same. The jurisdiction is asserted independent of the act of 1860, upon the authority of the decision of this court in the case of the United States v. Fossattj In that case the decree had been
rendered by the District Court, and it was held that the jurisdiction of the court extended not merely to the determination of questions relating to the genuineness and authenticity of the grant presented, and its efficacy in transferring the title, but also to questions relating to its location and boundaries; and that for the settlement of these latter questions, the power of the court over the case did not terminate until the issue of the patent conformably to its decree.
Previous to the act of 1860, the jurisdiction of the board and of the District Court, on appeal, was derived entirely from the act of March 3d, 1851, and the act of August 31st, 1852; and when the claims presented were adjudged valid and confirmed, the duty devolved upon the Surveyor-General to cause them to be surveyed. “For all claims finally confirmed,” says the statute, “by the said commissioners, or by the said District or Supreme Court, a patent shall issue to the claimant upon his presenting to the General Land Office an authentic certificate of such confirmation, and a plat or survey of the said land, duly certified and approved by the Surveyor-General of California, whose duty it shall be to cause all private claims which shall be finally confirmed to be accurately surveyed, and to furnish plats of the same. ” The action of the surveyor in this respect was not in terms made subject to the control of the board or court; it was only made returnable to the Commissioner of the General Land cq at Washington, who was invested, by the previous egislation of Congress, with a general supervision over the acts of all subordinate officers charged with making surveys.
atever jurisdiction the District Court may have possessed o en orce the execution by the Surveyor-General of its own ecrees, it possessed no control over the execution of the decrees of the board. d It is true that for the determination of the validity of the th ,n18 Presente<I some consideration must have been had of clai eX^en^’ l°cati°ii, and boundaries. The petitions of the
831 8 niU8^ nece88arily have designated, with more or precision, such extent and location. And where the [p. 108] grants were by metes and bounds, or where proceedings before Mexican authorities, such as took place upon a juridical delivery of possession, had established the boundaries, or where from any other source pending the proceedings for a confirmation the boundaries were indicated, it was proper for the board to declare them in its decrees. And such was the course adopted in numerous instances. But in the majority of cases the grants of the Mexican governors were for a certain specified quantity of land lying within exterior boundaries embracing a much larger tract, and in relation to which no proceedings were ever taken by the former government for its measurement and segregation. In such cases, a confirmation of the claim was only a judicial determination of the right of the claimant to have a specific quantity set apart to him out of a general tract. And the duty of the board was discharged by a confirmation of the claim in the general terms of the grant, leaving the specific quantity designated to be surveyed and laid off by the proper officers of the government, to whom the subject of surveys was intrusted. "With the surveys following the decrees of the board the District Court had nothing to do.
The surveys of confirmed Mexican grants, particularly when they are for quantities lying within exterior boundaries embracing larger tracts, involve the consideration of various matters, not properly the subject of judicial inquiry. In numerous instances, the location of the quantity con firmed, whether it shall be on one or the other side of the general tract, may depend upon the past or intended action of the government with reference to the surplus. Portions of the general tract may be required, and, therefore, be properly reserved from the location, for public purposes. Ihe act of 1860 creates a new jurisdiction in the court, w ic cannot be assumed independent of the act, an un‘ er * should be exercised only in cases coming clearly within
decree of the District Court revising the action of the Surveyor-General and correcting his survey, must, thereto. , he reversed, and the-court directed to dismtss the proceed- , [p. 109] ings for want of jurisdiction. If the survey does not conform to the decree of the board, the remedy must be sought from the Commissioner of the General Land Office before the patent issues, and not in the District Court.
Decree accordingly.
‘ The State of Minnesota v. Bachelder.
1. Neither the Act of Congress of 3d March, 1849—the organic law of the Territory of Minnesota, which declared that when the public lands in that Territory shall be surveyed, certain sections, designated by numbers, shall be and “hereby are" “reserved for the purpose of being applied to schools”—nor the subsequent act of February 26th, 1857, providing for the admission of that Territory into the Union—and making the same reservation for the same object—amounts so completely to a “dedication,” in the stricter legal sense of that word, of these sections to school purposes, that Congress, with the assent of the Territorial legislature, could not bring them within the terms of the Pre-emption Act of 1841, and give them to settlers who, on the faith of that act, which had been extended in 1854 to this Territory, had settled on and improved them. ■ The decisions of the receiver and register of lands for the Territory of innesota are not of conclusive efficacy. They may be inquired into and declared inoperative by courts.
8. Error will lie to the Supreme Court of a State, under the 25th section of in i Act, where a statute of the United States is technically
ssue in the pleadings, or is relied on in them and is decided against y ru mgs asked for and refused, even though the case may have been isposed of generally by the court on other grounds.
^IS was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State innesota, and was taken under the 25th section of the ja iciary Act of 1789, which gives a writ of error here in ease where is drawn in question any clause of the Constitu-Unit a treaty’ or siatuie, or commission, held under the e tates, and the decision is against the right, title, priparty6 °r exemP^on specially set up or claimed by either or on UU- SUCh c^ause °f the Constitution, treaty, statute or commission. ISnfc l.TJT thu8:. the act of Mar<* 3d, 1849, the or-
0 t e Territory of Minnesota, was enacted “ that [p. 110] when the lands in said Territory shall be surveyed, sections 16 and 36 shall be and the same hereby are reserved for the purpose of being applied to schools.” A subsequent act, that of February 26th, 1857, providing for the admission of this’Territory into the Union, repeats this enactment, declaring that these same numbered sections of the public lands (and in case either of said sections or any part of them has been sold or otherwise disposed of, other lands. equivalent thereto and as contiguous as may be), shall be granted to said State for the use of schools.
Notwithstanding this intended devotion to purposes of education of these sections Nos. 16 and 36, Congress, by an act of 1854,* declared that the provisions of what is known as the Pre-emption Actf of 1841, should extend to lands in Minnesota. The result was that great numbers of persons settled all over the State, and not unfrequently settled, in different townships, upon tracts which, when the tracts came to be surveyed, proved to bear the numbers 16 and 36. In consequence of this state of things, the Territorial legislature of Minnesota presented^ a memorial to Congress for a remedy. The memorial stated, that by reason of the extension of the Pre-emption Act to Minnesota, many settlershad settled and made improvements by the erection of costy buildings and otherwise upon farms, which, when the govern ment surveys were made, were found to be included wit in the school sections, and that it would be unjust to compe these persons to repurchase or lose their improvements t made in good faith and with the expectation of a pre-emption of the lot, and recommended the passage of a law w c should meet the hardship of such cases. According y, on the 3d of March, 1857, that is to say, after the above-mentioned act, providing for the admission of the* Tem^”L the Union, but before the acceptance of that act y Convention of the State, and so before the actual incorP tion of the State into the Union, Congress passed s. join resolution, which provided, that where any settlem y
+ Feb. 26th, 1856.
| Act of Sept. 4th, 1841.
* August 4th.
Dec. 1863.] The State of Minnesota v. Bachelder. Ill
the erection of a dwelling-house, or the cultivation of any portion of the land, shall have been or shall he made upon these 16th or 36th sections, before the said sections shall have been or shall be surveyed, &c.; and if such settlers can bring themselves within the Pre-emption Act, then the right of preference to such sections or portions of them so settled and occupied shall be in them, the same as if such sections had not been previously reserved.
The present suit arose accordingly out of this condition of the law, and was an ejectment for a tract numbered 16, by the State of Minnesota, in behalf of its schools, against one Bachelder, the defendant, who claimed under the rights given by the joint resolution just above set forth. Bachelder set up as his defence pre-emption certificates and a patent, dated August 15th, 1857, to two persons of the name of Mills,—L. and J. Mills,—from whom he showed title to himself.
To this the plaintiff replied, that these had all been obtained by fraud and misrepresentations; that the Millses did not settle on the premises, did not build a house there, nor make any improvements prior to the government survey of the sections; that in granting the papers which he had granted, the register and receiver had been deceived as well by misrepresentations of the Millses as by the false oath of one George Dazner, whom they produced to swear to facts which did not exist, but whose existence was necessary to bring the parties within the Pre-emption Act. But the court, neither on a demurrer by the State of Minnesota to a replication by Bachelder, nor on its offers to prove these facts before a jury, considered them as making a reply to the case of the defendants, as exhibited by his certificates and patents; ruling in effect that the decision of the register and receiver could not be reviewed nor inquired into by the court, and that the remedy of the State was through the commissioner of said office or the Secretary of the Interior.
he statutes of the United States devoting the sections to school purposes were put technically in the pleadings; their mding. force relied on by counsel and pressed upon the
Argument for the plaintiff.
court, and rulings under them asked for and refused, and the refusal excepted to; but although, by being set out in the pleadings and exceptions, and by rulings against them, they were technically drawn in question and decided against, yet the actual ground of the decision was as just stated rather than specially against the statutes.
The correctness of the view taken by the court below, as to the effect of the register and receiver’s acts, as also the right of the State to have a writ of error from this court to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, when the statutes of the United States had not been otherwise drawn in question than as mentioned, were now the questions here; the former question being made by the plaintiff in error, the State of Minnesota, and the latter by the other side.
Mr. Cole, A. Gr., of Minnesota, for the plaintiff: The joint resolution of Congress is void. It cannot divest a title which the United States had previously granted. The organic act of the Territory constituted a dedication to public uses, perpetual and irrevocable, and whatever might have been its effect upon the naked fee, at least divested Congress of all power of disposition over the subject-matter, so far as such disposition should tend to impair the public rights created by that act. The doctrine of dedications was first announced in Strange’s Reports, A.D. 1725, and applied to highways. Since then it has been vastly extended. The donations of magnificent domains, by Congress, for the promotion of learning and the liberal arts in the rising communities of the West, afford instances not the least striking and interesting of such extension, and have induced more liberal views. Thus the doctrine has in New York been applied to a public square.* So it has also in Vermont.f In the former State it has been extended to a gift for religious purposes while in Pennsylvania it reaches any property devoted to purposes of general education. §
*
Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510. f State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vermont, 480. j Hartford Baptist Church v. Witherell, 3 Paige, 296. $ Witman v. Lex, 17 Sergeant & Rawle, 88, 91.
Argument for the defendant.
If dedicated, the power of Congress over it was gone. In Wilcoxv. Jackson (13 Peters, 498), the court say: “Whenever a tract of land shall have been once legally appropriated to any purpose, from that moment the land thus appropriated becomes reserved from the mass of the public lands, and no subsequent law or proclamation, or sale, would be construed to embrace it or to operate upon it, although no reservation were made of it.” And in the same case the court signify that “ the same principle will apply to any land which by authority of law shall have been severed from the public mass.”
Neither is the case helped by the memorial from the Territorial legislature. The organic act (§ 18), indicates an intention to consecrate these lands for the benefit of the generations who should in future inhabit the State; and while divesting Congress of all power of disposition over them, to withhold it from any other body then in existence. They are reserved “ for the purpose of being applied to schools in said Territory, and in the States and Territories hereafter to be erected out of the same.” They were not granted to the Territory, and were in no sense its property.
For the defendant: The error of the argument is in assuming t"s to be a “ dedication” in the legal meaning of the word.
Post v. Piersoil,* long since the time of Strange, the Supreme Court of New York decided that a dedication must e confined to a highway. It may have been much extended since, but this is not within the legal meaning of the word.
o writ of error lies here from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, for no statute of the United States has been drawn W guestion and decided against. The court ruled that it could n° go behind the acts of the register and receiver, and so disposed of the case. The fact that the statutes of the United tes were presented in the pleadings and were disposed of a verselyby a judgment which was based on other grounds, e argument from the statutes falling, in fact, only with the a®® generally, is not enough.
VOL. I.
Reply: Crowell v. Randall (10 Peters, 368), decides, “ that it is not necessary that the question should appear on the record to have been raised, and the decision made in direct and positive terms, but that it is sufficient if it appear by clear and necessary intendment that the question must have been raised and must have been decided in order to have induced the judgment.” Neither is it necessary that the treaty or act of Congress under which the party claims shall be specially pleaded or spread upon the record. Hickey v. Starke (1 Peters, 94).
The converse of the rule holds also true. Here the statutes were drawn in question, by being on the record and issue so taken to them, or by being made the subject of a request for rulings not given; a fact apparent in the bill of exceptions. When judgment was given against the State, or the rulings refused, they were decided “ against,” in the most exact and authoritative form of legal understanding.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court:
It is not important to inquire as to the power of Congress to pass this law independently of any application from the Territorial legislature, as the assent of the people through their convention, by coming into the Union as a State, upon the terms proposed, must be regarded as binding the State. The right of the State to the school sections within it must, therefore, be subject to the modification contained in the joint resolution, and that modification is, that in case a person shall have made a settlement upon any school section, by the erection of a dwelling-house on the same, or the cultivation of any portion of it before the survey; and further, can bring himself within the provisions of the Pre-emption Act of 184, he shall be entitled to the section thus improved, in preference to any title of the State.
This was the state of the law in respect to these school sections in Minnesota, at the time of the application of L. an J. Mills to the register and receiver for the pre-emption of the premises in question, and of the issuing of the patent certi cates by them, August 15th, 1857.
.As we have seen, the defendant, who claims under L. and J. N. Mills, relies on these patent certificates and the patents issued in pursuance thereof.
To these the plaintiff replies that they were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation; that L. and J. Mills did not settle on the premises, nor erect a dwelling-house thereon, nor make any improvements on the same, previous to the survey of the sections by the government; and besides their false representations to the register and receiver, they procured one George Dazner to make a false affidavit as evidence of the settlements, erection of the dwelling-houses and improvements before these officers. The court below refused to give any effect to these facts as set forth in the pleadings, or as offered to be proved on the issues of fact before the jury, and the ground taken to uphold these rulings is, that the decision of the register and receiver and certificates issued were conclusive upon the court, and not revisable or to be inquired into; and that the remedy of the party aggrieved was by an application to the Commissioner of the Land Office or Secretary of the Interior.
These questions have been so often before this court, and were so fully considered in the last case {Lindsey et al. v. Hawes et al.}* where the authorities are collected, that it would be a waste of time to re-examine them.
A court of equity will look into the proceedings before the register and receiver, and even into those of the land office or other offices, where the right of property of the party is involved, and correct errors of law or of fact to his prejudice. The proceedings are ex parte and summary before these officers, and no notice is contemplated or provided for by the pre-emption laws as to parties holding adverse interests, nor o they contemplate a litigation of the right between the applicant for a pre-emption claim with a third party. The Question as contemplated is between the settler and the government, and if a compliance with the conditions is shown o the satisfaction of the officers, the patent certificate is granted.
* 2 Black, 254, 557, 558. See also O’Brien v. Perry, 1 Id., 139.
The court below, therefore, erred in their rulings on the demurrer, and also on the trial of the issues in fact.
A point is made under the 25th section of the Judiciary-Act, that this court has no jurisdiction to reverse the judgment of the court below. But the right of the State to these school sections rests upon acts of Congress, which were set up and relied on in this case, and the decision of the court below against it.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment overruling the demurrer to plaintiff’s replications, and to issue venire de novo, &c.
Judgment accordingly.
The Bridge Proprietors v. The Hoboken Company.
1. Where a statute of a State creates a contract, and a subsequent statute is alleged to impair the obligation of that contract, and the highest court of law or equity in the State construes the first statute in such a manner as that the second statute does not impair it, whereby the second statute remains valid under the Constitution of the United States, the validity of the second statute is “drawn in question,” and the decision is “in favor” of its validity, within the meaning of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This court may accordingly, under the said section, re-examine and reverse the judgment or decree of the State court given as before said. The case distinguished from The Commercial Bank v. Buckingham's Executors (5 Howard, 317). Grier, J., dissenting.
2. A party relying on this court for re-examination and reversal of the decree or judgment of the highest State court, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, need not set forth specially the clause of the Constitution of the United States on which he relies. If the pleadings make a case which necessarily comes within the provisions of the Constitution, it is enough. , , < 3. The statute of the legislature of New Jersey, passed A. D. 1790, by whic that State gave power to certain commissioners io contract with anj persons for the building of a bridge over the Hackensack River, and y the same statute enacted that the ‘ ‘ said contract should be valid on the par ties contracting as well as on the State of New Jersey;" and that it shou not be “lawful” for any person or persons whatsoever to erect any other bridge over or across the said river for ninety-nine years, is a contract, whose obligation the State can pass no law to impair.
4. A railway viaduct, if nothing but a structure made so as to lay iron rails thereon, upon which engines and cars may be moved and propelled by Steam, not to be connected with the shore on either side of said river, except by a piece of timber under each rail, and in such a manner, as near as may be, so as to make it impossible for man or beast to cross said river upon said structure, except in railway cars [the only roadway between said shores and said structure being two or more iron rails, two and a quarter inches wide, four and a half inches high, laid and fastened upon said timber four feet ten inches asunder], is not a “bridge” within the meaning of the act of New Jersey, passed A. D. 1790, and just mentioned; Catron, J., dissenting. And the act of Assembly of that same State, passed A. D. 1860, authorizing a company to build a railway, with the necessary viaduct, over the Hackensack, does not impair the obligation of the contract made by the aforesaid act of 1790.
The Judiciary Act (§25) provides, that a final decree in the highest court of equity in a State, “ where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of................... any State on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such validity, may be re-examined and reversed” in this court. And the Constitution of the United States provides, that “ no State shall pass any .............. law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
With these provisions in force, the State of New Jersey passed, A. D. 1790, an act creating a turnpike company, from Newark to Powles Hook (near New York), and authorizing commissioners to fix suitable sites for building bridges over the rivers Passaic and Hackensack, $nd to cause to be erected a bridge over each river, with a right to take toll from classes of persons and things enumerated in the act, and which may be summed up shortly as persons on foot, animals and vehicles crossing the bridge. The statute enacted, “ that it should be lawful for the commissioners to contract with persons who would undertake the same for such toll, or for so many years, and upon such conditions, as in their discretion should appear expedient; ” and further, “ that the said contract should be valid and binding on the parties contracting as well as on the State of New Jersey, and as effectual, to all intents and, purposes whatever, as if the same, and every part, covenant, and condition therein contained had, been particularly and, expressly set forth and enacted in this law.” It was further [p. 118] enacted, “ That it should not be lawful for any person or persons whatsoever to erect, or cause to be erected [within certain limits specified], any other bridge or bridges over or across the said river; provided always, that if the said commissioners shall refuse or neglect, for the space of four years, to cause to be erected the said bridges, in pursuance of this act, or when erected, to maintain and support them, then it shall and may be lawful for the legislature of this State to repeal or alter this act, and to enact such other law or laws touching or concerning the premises herein enacted, as to them, in their wisdom, shall appear equitable and expedient.”
In 1793, the commissioners contracted with one Ogden and others his associates, for the erection of the bridges authorized, and demised them to.the said Ogden and his associates until November 24th, A. D. 1889, with a right to levy tolls as fixed in the contract. In 1797, the legislature of New Jersey created the said Ogden and his associates a corporation, which corporation the complainants below, the present plaintiffs in error, now were.
In 1860, the legislature of New Jersey, by statute, authorized another company altogether, to wit, the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, the defendants in this case, to construct a railroad from the same town Newark to Hoboken (opposite New York), and to build the necessary “viaducts” over these same Passaic and Hackensack Rivers. And the statute enacted that if unable to agree with the parties owning or claiming them, it should be lawful for the company to “ take and appropriate, use, and exercise, or cause to be taken and appropriated and exercised, so much of all rights, privileges, franchises, property, and bridges or viaducts, or such parts thereof as may be necessary to enable the said company to construct said railroad and branches, first making, or causing to be made, compensation therefor, as hereinafter provided. Provided, that nothing in this act shall authorize or empower the said company to construct more than one bridge over each of the rivers Hackensack or Passaic, and the bridge [p. 119] over the Hackensack to be twelve hundred feet, river measure, from any other bridge.”*
Under the authority of the act of 1860, the Hoboken Company now began to erect their “structure” for carrying their railway across the Hackensack River, and inside of those limits within which the bridge proprietors considered that the act of 1790 gave them exclusive privilege of bridges. [p. 120] This was done without the consent of the bridge proprietors, and without condemning the value of their right of franchise.
*
As respected “compensation” for rights, &c., used, a matter relied on in the dissenting opinion of one member of the court, Grier, J., in this case, the statute provided that in case the Hoboken Company could not agree with the corporation owning the right, &c., application should be made by the company to the Chief Justice of New Jersey for the appointment of commissioners in the matter. Notice of the intended application for them, of not less than ten days, was to be given to the parties interested. A particular time was to be assigned for the appointment, and the appointment made only after the Chief Justice had satisfactory evidence of the service or publication of the notice. The statute then proceeded to say that the Chief Justice should appoint three disinterested freeholders such commissioners; and they, having first taken oath impartially to examine the matter and to make a true report, should meet at a time and place to be appointed by said judge, and proceed to examine the matter and the route of the railroad, so far as the same should be located, and report in writing what rights, &c., were necessary to be taken and appropriated for the purposes of the act, and should make a just appraisement of the value of the said rights, &c., and an assessment of such damages as should be paid by the company for them; which report, it was enacted or in case of appeal, the verdict of the jury and judgment of the Supreme Court thereon—shall (the damages being first paid to, or if they refuse the same, or are unknown, “or labor under any disability, then deposited for the owner or owners in the Supreme Court) at all times be considered as plenary evidence of the right of the said company to take, have, old, use, occupy, possess, exercise, appropriate, and enjoy so much and such parts of said rights, &c., so necessary to be taken, appropriated, &c.” t was further enacted in substance, that in case either the company or the claimants of the said rights, &c., should be dissatisfied with the report, either might appeal to the Supreme Court of the State by petition, the ing of which should give the court power to direct an issue, and to order and a V^ew roa(l> an<i that the jury should assess the value of e rights. There was an enactment giving a right to collect by execution e amount awarded, with a proviso, that the appeal from the commissioners the Supreme Court “shall not prevent the company from taking and appropriating, exercising, using, and enjoying the said rights, privileges, ranc ises, and property, or so much thereof as said commissioners shall assess and appraise, upon the filing of the aforesaid report, and paying the essment and appraisement aforesaid, or making tender thereof, and deitmg the same in the said Supreme Court for the owner or owners thereof. ”
The proprietors of the bridges over the rivers, &c., hereupon filed a bill in the Court of Chancery, praying an injunction and general relief. The Bill set out the act of 1790, authorizing the commissioners to lease out the privilege of building, and the bridge when built, for a term of years, and that it enacted that no person, during 99 years, should erect any other bridge over the river within the limits in question; that the commissioners had leased their privilege for 99 years to Ogden and his associates, who had built the bridges; the incorporation, &c. It then proceeded to insist thus:
“ That the said act and said lease, and all the stipulations and provisions and enactments in them, and either of them, contained, became a contract between the State and said party of the second part to said lease, who are now represented by your orators; and by the same the State became held and bound to and contracted with said party of the second part, and are now, by force of such contract, held and bound to your orators, as provided in the act, that no persons whatever should erect any other bridge or bridges than that erected by laid lessees, and now belonging to your orators. And your orators insist that the State cannot, by any law, violate, void or impair said contract, even upon providing and making compensation for the damages sustained thereby.”
It next set out several statutes, which it charged recognized these rights, and then the act of 1860, and alleged that thereby the defendants were authorized to construct a railroad, and to erect viaducts or bridges over the Hackensack River, and to take and appropriate property, rights, franchises, &c., necessary to construct the railroad. It further set out the sections providing compensation for the franchises taken (see ante, p. 119, note), and that one section of the act, the first, recognized the complainants’ right as still ex isting. The bill set forth further, that the defendants had commenced to build a bridge within the prohibited limits, and that the complainants had not given their consent to [p. 121] this; nor the defendants tendered any compensation for the violation of their contract with the State.
It insisted, “ that there exists no such public necessity for building a bridge within the prohibited limits as warrants or requires the violation of the contract,—even had the State the power to pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract: that there exists no public necessity for the construction of the defendants’ railroad, such as to authorize the taking of the property and franchises of other persons or corporations.”
It submitted, that there does not exist that kind of public necessity which requires or justifies taking private property for public use, or the abrogation of a contract.”
As respected the contract, the bill charged on the defendants as follows:
“And they sometimes give out and pretend that the State is not held and bound, by any contract to or with your orators, that no other bridge shall be erected within said limits, whereas your orators charge the contrary to be true, and that the State is held and firmly bound to your orators by their contract that no bridge shall be erected within said limits before the 24th day of November, 1889.”
The bill prayed the defendants might be restrained from building the bridge commenced; and for general relief and injunction.
The Answer, admitting that V of course the obligation of no contract can be impaired,” declared “ that the defendant does not pretend that any public necessity requires the violation of any contract,” and it set up several defences.
1. That by the act of 1790, the State did li not contract,” and therefore the defendant “ denied” the allegation that it had done so; adding an admission, “ that the said lease was a contract by which the State was bound,” and an allegation that “ this defendant is advised and insists, that it is the only contract between the State and the said lessees, or their alienees (if any), and was by said law declared to be the contract by which the State was to be bound.”
2. That the prohibitory language, “ it shall not be lawful for any persons to erect any other bridge,” &c., in the act of 1790, was not in restraint of the legislature.
3. That any contract in the act of 1790 was discharged by a non-performance of the conditions precedent contained in the act.
4. That the structure of the defendant is not a bridge in the sense that the word “ bridge” is used in the act of 1790; that it would differ from a bridge in these particulars :
a. 11 It will not,” the answer averred, “ be connected with the shore on either side of the river, except by a piece of timber under each rail, and must necessarily be made so as to make it impossible for man or beast to cross said river, upon the viaduct, except in defendant’s cars.”
b. u The only roadway,” it was further asserted, “between said shores and said structure, will be two or more iron rails, each of the width of two and one-quarter inches, and of the height of about four and one-half inches, laid and fastened upon timber, said rails being at a distance offour feet asunder.”
c.' “ It will be impossible,” it was finally said, “for any vehicle or animal, which can cross the river upon the bridge of complainants, to cross the same upon the railroad of defendant, and no foot-passenger can cross the same with safety; nor is it intended that any foot-passenger shall, but on the contrary, the said railroad across the said river shall and will be so constructed, and this defendant intends to construct the same in such manner that no vehicle can cross the said river on the said road or viaduct of the defendant, except locomotive engines and railroad cars resting, and which must necessarily move, upon iron rails, and cannot move upon any bridge which was known or used in the year 1790, or up to the time of the incorporation of the complainants, and long after; and in such manner, that no foot-passenger or animal can cross said river on the railroad viaduct of the defendant.”
5. The answer asserted, that any contract in the act of 1790 was discharged by the non-performance of conditwns subsequent.
6. That the complainants had no assignment of the lease, [p. 123] i.e., had not a particular evidence of the right to claim the benefit of the act of 1790.
7. That the exclusive franchise conferred by the prohibition contained in the act of 1790 had been destroyed by the complainants’ own acts, admitted in the bill, in consenting to other bridges within the prohibited limits.
8. That a court of equity would not restrain by injunction the making of a bridge like that which the Hoboken Company proposed to make, and on which railroad cars alone could pass, if the complainants had an exclusive right and would not exercise it.
The case was argued below, as it was here also, on bill and answer only.
The opinion of the chancellor below, which, however, was no part of the record nor strictly in evidence here, was given at length. In stating what he considered the points before him to be, he said,
“ The material issues are—
“1. Whether the complainants have, by virtue of a contract with the State, the exclusive franchise of maintaining a bridge across the Hackensack River, &c. ?
“2. Whether the structure which the defendants are engaged in erecting is a violation of the complainants’ franchise?”
After an argument on the first point, he concluded:
*1 am of opinion, therefore, that the proprietors of the bridges over the Rivers Passaic and Hackensack have, by contract with the State, the exclusive franchise of maintaining said bridges, and taking tolls thereon, and that such contract is within the protection of that provision of the Constitution, which declares that no aw shall be passed impairing the obligation of contracts/’
And he adds:
“ The remaining inquiry is, whether the structure which the e endants are erecting is a violation of the complainants’ right?”
After an argument on this, the second point, to show that a viaduct, such as the defendants proposed to construct, was [p. 124] npt a “ bridge,” within the meaning of the act of 1790, he concludes:
“Applying to this contract the ordinary rules of interpretation, having regard to the subject-matter of the contract itself, considering that it related solely to the travel upon ordinary 'highways by methods then known and used, and that the complainants’ franchise extended only to such travel, the construction of a railroad bridge for the sole accommodation of railroad travel cannot be deemed an infringement of the complainants’ right.”
In the Court of Errors and Appeals, where only one or two of the judges spoke, the course of argument was much the same as with the chancellor.
The decree in the Court of Chancery was a simple dismissal, thus: “ The chancellor being of opinion that the complainants are not entitled to restrain the defendants from building the bridge or structure complained of,” therefore it is ordered, &c., that the bill be dismissed.
The decree in the Court of Errors and Appeals was a simple affirmance; the language being, that “ the cause coming on to be heard, and the matter having been debated, &c., and the court having advised, &c.,it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the decree of the chancellor be in all things affirmed, with costs.”
On appeal to this court from the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey—“ the highest court of equity” in that “ State,”—the questions were:
I. Whether this court had jurisdiction? that is to say, whether there had been drawn in question, in the State courts of New Jersey, the validity of a statute of that State on the ground that it violated the obligation of a contract ? the decision being in favor of the statute.
II. If the court had jurisdiction, and so could re-examine and reverse the decision below, whether there was any groun for the reversal of the same ? the points raised under the
second being, + 11 ?
1. Whether there was ever meant to be any contract at all.
If so,
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
2. Whether it was a contract such as bound legislatures of this day ? If so,
3. Whether a “ viaduct,” such as was here proposed, was a “ bridge ” within the meaning of that contract ?
Mr. Bradley and Mr. Gilchrist for the Hoboken Company:
I. 2 s respects jurisdiction. The case was decided on bill and answer. Hence the allegations of the answer are to be taken as true; and those of the bill are not to be taken as true, except so far as admitted by the answer. How what is it that the pleadings put in issue ? The answer, admitting the inviolability of contracts, sets up eight defences in confession and avoidance. They are already stated.* What are they? We must be excused for recapitulation.
1. That by the act of 1790, the State did not make a “ contract.” This defence involves simply the construction of the act
o/179O.
2. That the language of the act, “ it shall not be lawful,” &c., was not in restraint of the legislature. This defence also did but involve the construction of this act.
3. That if the act of 1790 was a contract originally, it was one on conditions precedent, and that the omission of the parties who claimed the benefit of it to perform those conditions precedently, operated to dissolve whatever contract there was. This involved the construction of the act, a question offact, and perhaps a question of general State law.
4. That the defendants were not building a “bridge,” within the meaning of the act of 1790. This also involved but the interpretation of the act and a question of fact.
5. That any contract was discharged by the non-performance of certain conditions subsequent named in the act. Here again was only a question of construction, a question offact, and perhaps a question of general State law.
6. That the complainants showed no transfer to themselves of the rights originally given by the act. This invoved nothing beyond a question of fact, and the general rules regulating the transfer and devolution of property.
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
7. That the exclusive franchise given by the act of 1790 had been destroyed by the complainants’ own acts, as admitted in the bill, in consenting to other bridges within the prohibited limits. This involved the construction of the act of 1790, and the law regulating the nature of incorporeal hereditaments.
8. That equity would not restrain by injunction the making of a railway bridge like the defendants’, if the complainants had the exclusive right and would not exercise it. In this defence there was nothing but a question of equity practice.
The decree of the chancellor was in four lines. That of the Court of Errors and Appeals in f[ve. The former was a dismissal without reasons assigned. The latter an affirmance of the same kind. Though the opinions of the chancellor and the arguments of the judges in the higher court, as delivered, are not part of the record nor in evidence, we know as a fact that the bill was dismissed, and that this dismissal was affirmed, because all the tribunals considered that a viaduct was not a “ bridge,” within the intent of the act of 1790. The whole matter turned, therefore, on a construction of that act. The constitutionality of the act of 1860 was not in question, nor was its meaning discussed.
It is not true that the entire subject of contracts, like that of foreign commerce, and commerce between the States, is placed under the regulation of the Federal Government. Were it so, then, in every case where a State court should adjudicate upon a contract, its decision ought to be subject to revision by Federal authority. On the contrary, to give to this court jurisdiction over a decree of a State court, supposed to decide in favor of the validity of a State statute, by the very words of the Judiciary Act,—
1st. The validity of the State statute must have been drawn in question; and the statute must have been in 11 dispute.
2d. There is but one ground on which the validity must have been drawn in question, i. e., the ground that the s tute was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
3d. The decision of the Court must have been in favor o “such” its validity, with respect to the Constitution.
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
And it makes no difference whether the contract alleged to be impaired is an ordinary contract between private citizens, or a contract made by the State with citizens. State contracts, in this regard, are of no greater validity, and have no greater sanctity, than other contracts, whether they are in the shape of statutes, or charters, or grants of land, or franchises, or otherwise. In our case, the contract relied on is the act of 1790. The only law which is pretended to have impaired its obligation is the act of 1860, authorizing the defendants to construct their railroad and bridges. Does this law of 1860 impair the obligation of the alleged contract, contained in the act of 1790, giving to that contract any construction we choose ? If it does not, then, although the courts of New Jersey may not have correctly construed that contract, this court has no jurisdiction, and cannot reverse their decision, any more than it could reverse the decision of the State court in any other case, however erroneous. The Commercial Bank v. Buckingham’s Executors,* in this court is in point.
If a land proprietor, without any State legislation, had erected a bridge across the Hackensack River for his own use, within the prohibited limits, and the plaintiffs had sued him in the State courts as for an infringement of their franchise, could this court have reversed the decision of the State courts in the case ? Certainly not. And why not ? Because the case specified in the Constitution did not arise. No law was passed impairing the obligation of a contract. The decision of the State court on the validity and construction of the alleged contract would have been final. And so in this case, if no law has been passed impairing the obligation of the contract, the decision of the State court, though based on a construction of the contract, is final. If, indeed, a State court so interprets a State law as to make it operate to impair the obligation of a contract, that must be received here as the true reading of the law, and this court will then acquire jurisdiction. But, in this case, as we have said, the State
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
court has not put any construction upon the act of 1860 to render it obnoxious to this objection. The act of 1790 it was which was considered; but even it was not drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and there neither was nor could have been a decision that it was not so repugnant. As a result, indeed, of the construction put on the act of 1790, the act of 1860 may be to be regarded as constitutional; so may other acts of the legislature, or the bridge-building on the Hackensack of private individuals not under State authority. But the act of 1860 has not been drawn in question, nor ever considered. It was outside of what was involved, and might have sat down by itself to look calmly on the conflict which it had raised between the act of 1790 and the courts of New Jersey, who were about to strangle that act’s extravagant pretensions. If this is so, then the whole question is a domestic one, which belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts; and they may construe the contract of 1790 as they please, just as they might any other contract in litigation before them.
Undoubtedly where the only title of a plaintiff is a State statute, the decision of the suit in his favor is a decision in favor of the validity of the statute. Such were cases which the court will recall: Smith v. Maryland, (6 Cranch, 286;) Willson v. Blackbird Greek, (2 Peters, 245;) Craig v. State of Missouri, (4 Id., 410;) Martin v. Hunter’s lessee, (1 Wheaton, 304.) So, where the title of the plaintiff is good, unless a State statute under which the defendant claims, gives the defendant a title, and the defendant has no other defence, a decision of the suit in the defendant’s favor would seem to be a decision in favor of the validity of the latter statute. But where many defences are set up, and the defendant’s acts are attributed to a State statute, how is the court to determine that the vah dity of the statute was drawn in question, as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that the mere decision of the suit against the party raising the questions ot validity, is a decision in favor of the validity of the statute, and not a decision entirely independent of that question.
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
For such cases the court have from time to time settled rules.
i. The State statute complained of must be stated in the record.* *§ Here it is merely referred to.
ii. It must be averred in the pleadings that the statute is void, f This averment nowhere appears.
in. The particular clause of the Constitution of the United States must appear by the record to have been specified by the plaintiffs in error in the State court; it is not enough to show that the question was involved, and might and ought to have been considered.]; Here the Constitution of the United States is not even mentioned in the record.
iv. Any general charge of unconstitutionality of the statute, will not be considered as referring to the Constitution of the United States, but to the State Constitution.§
The point insisted on, that the State cannot impair the contract, and other references to this incapacity of the State, are not so definite in the reference to a constitutional repugnance as the third exception in Maxwell v. Newbold, decided by this court, || and must be referred to the State Constitution, if referable to any constitution.
v. If it appears by the record that the cause might have been decided on the construction of a State statute not im- • peached, which admits of a construction consistent with the decision—without deciding in favor of the validity of the statute impeached—this court will not take jurisdiction.
That the decision in the principal case may be fairly referred to a construction of the act of 1790 alone, and to the courts’ olding that a railroad viaduct is not a bridge, in the sense that t e word “ bridge” is used in the act of 1790, is manifest by e that the same decision of that question has been dade in numerous cases; ** and in the opinions of the chan-
61
* Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 Howard, 515, § Porter v. Foley, 24 Howard, 415. || 18 Id., 514, 516. •V commercial Bank v. Buckingham Executors, 5 Id., 317. 'ted port, in the opinion of the court, ad Jinem. V°L t. 9
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
cellor and Court of Errors in the principal case, which are not cited to show what the decision was, but that the case will admit of such decision without deciding on the validity of any statute. This we have already said.
vi. Nor, as we have said also already, and in our general remarks, will the court take jurisdiction, if they see that, on a view of the case that might have been taken by the State court, it is a question depending on general principles of State law, as one or more of the defences do in the principal case. In other words, a controversy which turns entirely upon the interpretation of State laws is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State courts, if they first acquire jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of the United States has no appellate power over them.*
vii. Nor will the court take jurisdiction, when the court below decided the cause on a question of practice.!
The last defence against the relief prayed, is that a rule of practice in equity will prevent an injunction; and that rule is, that where the owner of a franchise (as of a ferry), neglects to exercise it (provide proper boats, &c.), the court will not interfere by injunction to protect the franchise from invasion. In the principal case, the structure complained of was a railroad bridge or viaduct, and the complainants had not provided such a bridge, although they claimed a right to pi ex ent its construction^
H. How stands the case as respects contract ?
1. Is there any contract in the case ? The act of 1790 is a mere act of legislation; a measure by which the State, for t benefit of all, carries on a public work. The commissioners were vested with a portion of political power. There was no consideration for any contract with them. In a coun y where there is less indisposition to the granting of mon?J)O|. lies than in ours, Sir Wm. Scott says, with profoundWnq.
*
Congdon v. Goodman, 2 Black, 574; Heirs of Poydras de La Lande v. Louisiana, 18 Howard, 192. f Matheson v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 7 Howard, 2bU. J The Elsebe, 5 0. Robinson, 155.
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
“A general presumption is, that government does not mean to divest itself of a universal attribute of sovereignty, unless it is so clearly and unequivocally expressed. The wise policy of our law, which interprets grants of the crown in this respect, by other rules than those which are applied in the construction of grants of individuals, must be taken in conjunction with the universal presumption. Against an individual, it is presumed he meant to convey a benefit, with the utmost liberality his words will allow. It is indifferent to the public in which person an interest remains, whether in the grantor or grantee. With regard to the grant of the sovereign it is far otherwise. It is not held by the sovereign as private property; and no alienation shall be presumed, except that which is clearly and indisputably expressed.”
2. But, if the legislature had directly contracted with the bridge proprietors, that for ninety-nine years no other bridge within these limits should be authorized or built, would such law be valid to bind future legislatures as a contract ? The power to make roads and build bridges is a governmental power. It is always a part of the sovereign or legislative power, and the duty to provide them is correlative. In New Jersey, now, as in 1790, all legislative power is in the Senate and Assembly, elected periodically by the people. No legislature can rest it or any part of it in any other body, or place it beyond the control of the next elected legislative body. Their only power is to exercise^ not to alien their powers. The grant of a power or a franchise is a grant of property; it is an act of legislative power, not an abdication of such power. But if the franchise or power attempted to e granted is not property, but part of the legislative or sovereign power, the grant is void; it is revolution, or constitution-making, not legislation. The legislature could not grant away nor limit the power of future legislatures to punish crimes, to establish courts, to regulate succession to property, or to suppress drunkenness, in the whole State or lia^11^ 8ec^°n of it. These are not more properly or pecuar y legislative powers, than the power of making and reatmg roads or bridges. If the legislature were to incor-
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
porate a prison discipline society, or juvenile reform society, and to enact that it should not be lawful without their consent to punish capitally any one under seventeen years of age, either in the State, or in the county where such institution was,this aslaw,while unreppaled, would be good, but as a contract it would not take away the power of future legislatures. An act incorporating a law school, with a provision that no Supreme Court judge should be appointed in this State, except from its pupils; or, incorporating a large hotel at the seat of government, with a provision that it should not be lawful for any legislature afterwards to prohibit the sale of ardent spirits in any quantities, and that no taverns should ever afterwards be licensed; or incorporating a bank, with provisions that no future legislature should allow any other power or corporation to transact any banking business,—are examples of the same kind of legislation as the grant of the monopoly, if any monopoly ever was granted, which we deny. On the theory of the complainants, a legislature of any peculiar views on vexed questions of government, could by a section in a charter bind all future legislatures from exercising legislative powers, and fix the law forever. All will agree that such acts would be void.
This bridge act, preventing the legislature for ninety-nine years exercising a clear governmental or legislative power needed for the public prosperity and protection, is of the same kind; the same as if it had been enacted that murdei there should never be punished with death; or selling of liquor should be forever free.
If one power of legislation may be parted with or placed under the veto of a private corporation, not to be resumed, so may every power successively be and by degrees, and future legislatures may be such in name only. The govern ment controlled by corporations would not be the republican government guaranteed by the Constitution.
This company can have no property or grant of property in the river, except in the length occupied by their own bridge. They have paid nothing to the public or to landowners above or below for this incumbrance or incu us
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
upon them that they should be for ninety-nine years deprived of the benefits of legislative protection.
3. Is the contract, admitting one, impaired ?
The act of 1860 provides compensation for every right, privilege, franchise, or property which might be necessary to be exercised, used, appropriated, or taken in the construction of the railroad or bridges of the defendants. The exclusive right here claimed is a franchise. That such a right of franchise may be taken or extinguished for public purposes on compensation given, is settled at the present day.* A contract is property, but is no more sacred than other property. Its obligation is not impaired, but is recognized, when compensation is provided for its infringement.
HI. The structure is not a bridge within the meaning of the a< t of 1790. Such a structure as the defendants propose to build, it had not, in 1790, entered into any man’s mind to conceive of. He would have been regarded as a dreamer, or insane, who at that time had spoken seriously of such a fabric as is described in this ease.f Now there are certain rules for the construction of grants, long established in the law. They come to us with the common law of England, are very ancient, and very settled. They may be found in the oldest reporters. One of them is thus enunciated in Lord Hobart’s reports: “ Words in grants shall be construed according to a reasonable and easie sense; not strained to things unlikely or unusual; | and this rule, the great chief justice of King ames I, illustrates by a case more ancient than his own day;
? a decision from 14 Henry VHI, “ that if a man grant is„woods and trees, apple-trees do not pass.” “ Every grant,” says another old reporter, Croke,§ “shall be ex-1 un ed <zs the intent was at the time of the grant; as if I grant £ annBlt7 to J. until he be promoted to a competent bene^ce, and at the time of the grant he was but a mean person,
*
West River Bridge ®. Dix, 6 Howard, 529. T Ante, p. 122. Hewot The Collegiate Church of Southwell, Hobart, 303; and seo Painter’ 1 Bubtrode, 175. 2 ndmay v. Standish, Croke Eliz., 35.
Argument for the Hoboken Company.
and afterward is made an archdeacon, yet, if I offer him a competent benefice, according to his estate at the time of the grant, the annuity doth cease.”
As respects royal or government grants, it is an equally settled rule, that nothing passes by general words or by implication. The reasons are set forth by Sir William Scott, in the passage already cited.* Hence we gather from Plowden (Case of the Mines') f that if the King grants lands and the mines therein contained, it will pass only common mines, not mines of gold or silver; for the words in their common sense are satisfied by the passing of the more usual ones. So Sir John Davies, Chief Justice of Ireland in the time of James I, reports, that where the King granted to Sir R. M. all the territories adjoining a river, and all the fisheries within it, except three parts of the Fishery of Banne, the fourth part did not pass to him, for the King’s grants pass nothing by implication.J The same doctrine is declared in Rolle’s Abridgment, under the head of “Prerogative Le JRoyP§
The special character of the structure, and its want of resemblance to a bridge, is set forth in the defendants answer.|[ Neither man nor beast can cross on it, save in the defendants’ cars. The viaduct is for a kind of vehicle which no bridge known in 1790 can carry. It is wholly open. The only roadway is two or more iron rails, separated by a dis tance of four feet asunder. It is in fact no more a bridge than a sieve is a bucket.
Such a structure, it has been decided in North Carolina and in New York, is not a bridge. If in Connecticut a
* Ante, p. 130. t Tage 336. + The Royal Fishery of The Banne,. Davies, 157.
g Rolle, speaking of the prerogative, and to what things it extends, says, (page 202), that a charter of exemption of lands of a corporation from ore law, only extends to lands then held, not those after acquired. is a guage is: w et
“Si Le Roy graunt al un evesque quod omnia “aneria et omnes omnia feoda del dit evesque et ses successors inde in PerPet^“’ x as et et quieta de tiel forest del Roy, &c. Evesque alia maneria suM homines suos clamare non potest esse quietade Foresta, qu -coward I, W>- confectionis illius chartce fuerunt in seisina del dit evesque. ( 122> Pari. I. Evesque de Coventry $ Litchfield's case.) o t ' ’8 Law
fl In North Carolina, McRee v. Wilmington Railroad Co., 2 J ones
Argument for the Bridge Proprietors
different decision has been given in the Enfield Bridge case—a case which will be cited and relied on by the other side—it was in a case where the viaduct was planked and railed, which made a secure roadway for man, beast, and vehicles.
J/r. Zabriskie for the Bridge Proprietors :
1. Has this court jurisdiction to revise ? The plaintiffs claim that they are protected by a contract with the State from any bridge being erected within certain limits, and that the State cannot, by law, impair that contract. They complain further that the State had passed such law, and that the defendants were proceeding under it to erect such bridge. The defendants admit the law, alleged to violate that contract, and that they are under it proceeding to erect this bridge. They deny the contract, or that the contract prohibits the erection of a railroad bridge.
The act of 1860 is the only authority the defendants have. No bridge can be erected over a navigable river but by authority of the sovereign. The record shows that the whole right depended on this statute. The decision dismissing the bill and refusing all relief, was in favor of the statute and the authority exercised under it. The validity of the statute of 1860 and the authority exercised under it was therefore drawn in question, as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. This was not done in words so reciting, or pointing out the clause of the Constitution, nt by stating that it was in violation of the contract; in . e words of the Constitution, that “ it impaired the obligation of the contract.” The defence was on the ground that t e act or the bridge did not impair the obligation of the contract, either that there was no contract or that it did not extend to a railroad bridge. The record shows that this 'as t e question raised and argued, and as there could be no act181^11 ^aV°r defendant except by holding the c an authority valid, the record shows by necessary intend-_ this was the decision of the State court. If this
~ "------------- —------------------------------------- Tk,,n, eW York, The Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica Railroad, 6 Paige 564;
pson v. The N. Y. & H. Railroad, 3 Sandford’s Chancery, 625.
Argument for the Bridge Proprietors.
appears, this court has jurisdiction by the uniform current of decisions in this court to this time. Crowell v. Randell? is the leading case. All cases recognize it.f
2. Is there a contract in the case ? This we consider too plain for extended argument. The language of the act is pleonastically full on that subject. It declares that the contract of the commissioners shall bind the State of New Jersey, “ to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as if the same and every part, covenant, and condition therein contained had been particularly and expressly set forth and enacted.”
3. Does the act of 1860 violate this contract ? There is nothing in the act to show that the legislature intended to limit the words which it uses, or to make them inconsistent with the meaning which they have from their natural force. The words are “ any other bridge;” words of the widest import; and which taken in connection with the fact that any kind of bridges would impair the income and value of the bridge erected by the plaintiffs, should settle the question, hio lexicographer confines the meaning of the word to old-fashioned bridges, for old-fashioned coaches; the American “ article” of the specific year of grace, 1790. In encyclopaedias ; in works on railway engineering; in acts of Parliament and of our legislatures authorizing railways; in all works written in the English language, by good authors, in which railway bridges are spoken of, they are called bridges, and the very act of 1860 brought here in question, uses the word “bridge” to designate railroad bridges; so using it seven times in its first section. The tubular iron structure for railroads over the Straits of Menai and over the St. Lawrence at Montreal, are well known wherever the language f is spoken, as the Menai bridge and the Victoria bridge. Neither of them, any more than the defendants bridge or other railway bridges, have a footway; and, though an agi e pedestrian might clamber over any of them, such use wou thwart the purpose of their construction, and be at giea
Argument for the Bridge Proprietors.
peril to life. The subject-matter of the contract was to prohibit any injurious competition by bridges within the prescribed limits. Beyond the limits they were not to be protected; and within the. limits only against. bridges, not against ferries, tunnels, balloons, or any other device. The object was, that all passengers and cattle, and produce and goods, carried in the vehicles on which they had a right to take toll, should have no other way of passing the river on any bridge within these limits but this. This would compel them to cross by plaintiffs’ bridge or to go out of their way, or by an inconvenient and tedious ferry-boat. And the intent of the legislature was, by this covenant, to induce capitalists to expend their money in building bridges which would not at first remunerate them, but by a long monopoly would. The object would not have been effected by protecting them only against a bridge like their own, which, if erected, would only take away one-half’their custom, and allowing a railroad bridge, which would take away nineteen-twentieths of it. Had the act of 1790 contained in the contract against any other bridge, an exception of a railroad bridge, or plank road bridge, or any other bridge which might be used for any improved system of travel thereafter to be brought in use, the persons who built this bridge would never have undertaken it. A toll bridge, or a free ridge, or a bridge, which, like this, is used as part of a railroad line, charging no tolls eo nomine, but a fare for being carried over the whole route, in which compensation for the use of the bridge is included, all are within the object and intent of this prohibition. They all carry passengers, aninia s? and freight, that without them would pass over this o^1 Se °f the plaintiffs and pay tolls. The object and intent.
e legislature coincide with the subject-matter of the bridan<^’Can °.n^ carried out by prohibiting “ any other toU f e' say that the plaintiffs cannot charge to 01 • o^motives, cars, elephants, &c., and are not bound bu’hT1 6 bridg68 f°r them, and, therefore, bridges can be ria accommodate them; and all passengers and caries at should otherwise go over plaintiffs’ bridge, be
Argument for the Bridge Proprietors.
carried on these new bridges. If the contract is clear, and the bridges both within the letter and object of it, the State must adhere to its contract although improvident.
In The Enfield Toll-Bridge Company v. The Hartford and New Haven Railway Company,* the point now before thia court was fully argued in a full bench. Williams, C. J., one of the ablest of the jurists of America, in delivering the opinion of the court speaks as follows. We cite his language as much for its cogency, as we do the judgment for its authority. Thus he speaks for the law. It is impossible that we can speak more potently for ourselves. Let his exposition of law be our argument in the case. We adopt his language as our own:
11 What is a bridge ? It is a structure of wood, iron, brick or stone, ordinarily erected over a river, brook, or lake, for the more convenient passage of persons or beasts, and the transportation of baggage; and whether it is a wide raft of logs floating upon the water, and bound with withes, or whether it rests on piles of wood, or stone abutments or arches, it is still a bridge. The particular manner in which the structure is built is not described, but it is said to be much in the manner common to railroad bridges,—the bottom covered with plank and the sides secured by railing. It is a matter of notoriety that railroad bridges are built upon solid abutments of mason-work and resting on piers Of stone between the abutments, thus giving strength and secu rity to the frame above. It is not easy to see wherein such a structure differs from an ordinary bridge, except that, as it is to endure a greater burden, it is more solid and substantial, is true the planks and rails upon it are laid in a manner mos convenient for the cars which are to pass it, and not convenien for, perhaps not admitting, common vehicles, and not inten e for, though admitting, the passage of foot-passengers.
11 It would seem, therefore, as if this was what woul e or narily called a bridge. But we agree that it is not the nam which is sufficient to designate it. We must then consider the object: What was the intent of this structure? The sa e expeditious passage of persons, whether from greater
* 17 Connecticut, 56.
Argument for the Bridge Proprietors.
distances, over this stream, in the ears or carriages provided for that purpose, together with all baggage or freight intrusted to the care of the company. It may not, and it is not intended to accomplish all the objects of a common bridge, as it is not adapted to the common vehicles in use; but can that fact change its character as a bridge ? A bridge adapted only to foot-passengers would be still a bridge; and it would hardly be claimed that such a bridge might be erected by the side of the plaintiffs’ under the provisions of this act. We find then a structure of the form of a bridge, with the name of a bridge and of the character of a bridge. But go a step further, and see if it is not doing the business of a bridge ? Certain facts are not specifically found, which we all know must exist, such as,—that every passenger in the cars must cross this river upon this bridge, within the limits secured to the plaintiffs. It is constantly doing at least some, if not much, of the business which the plaintiffs had a fair right to expect under their grant.
“We find then this structure with the form of a bridge, with the name of a bridge, with the character of a bridge, doing its work, and in this way doing the very injury to the plaintiffs which this proviso was designed to guard against. We cannot, then, but conclude that it is a bridge.
“ It is said it is not the bridge contemplated in the act, or another bridge.’ It cannot be claimed that by another bridge was intended a bridge exactly like this, or that a bridge of iron or stone would not be within the provisions, or even a bridge of boats; nor can it be claimed that a bridge much safer or stronger would be equally within the prohibitions. Nor is it the improvement in the structure of the bridge, nor the additional safety it affords to travellers, that will give the rights, or constitute it ‘ another bridge.’
It is further claimed, that when the plaintiffs’ charter was granted, railroads were unknown; therefore it cannot be supposed the legislature intended bridges connected with railroads. Rt whether the fact is so or not it can make no difference. Is a grant of this kind, which we here adjudged to be a contract, o e set aside, because an advantage not contemplated at the ditio re8U^ ^rorn violation ? Is there any implied conn 8u°h a grant, that, upon some new improvement being tre t’d ‘6 ^ran^ 8hould be void ? How would such a claim be a e m other cases of great public improvement ? Suppose [p. 140] the city of New York had leased Fulton Ferry for a term of years, when no boats were known but those which were moved by the hand and wind or tide; after the introduction of steamboats, could they have leased the ferry to the persons who would navigate it by steam ? Or could the legislature do this, if they had granted the ferry ? We know of no principle by whieh this case can be distinguished from that.”
This opinion is an answer to all that has been said by the opposite side on the point which it treats of; an answer to which that side can find no reply.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The first point arising in the case is that which relates to the jurisdiction of this court, to review the decision of the State court of New Jersey. This is a question which this court has always looked into in this class of cases, whether the point be raised by counsel or not; but here it is much pressed, and we proceed to examine it.
The suit in the State court was a bill in chancery brought by the present plaintiffs in error, against the defendants. The case was heard on bill and answer alone, and the decree was simply a dismissal of the bill. We must look, therefore, to the pleadings to determine the question of jurisdiction.
The bill sets forth, that in the year 1790, the legislature of New Jersey passed an act appointing commissioners, with powers to contract for the building of one bridge over each of the rivers Passaic and Hackensack, authorizing said commissioners to fix the maximum rate of toll to be taken by the builders, and granting them this right of toll for ninety-nine years. Thfi act also contained a provision, that it should be unlawful for any person or persons to build any other bridge within limits which were defined on each side of these bridges.
The complainants allege that the contract thus authorized was made, and the bridges built, and that they are the successors in title and interest of the persons who were the original contractors and builders, and that the act of the New Jersey legislature, and the agreement made undei it, [p. 141] constituted a contract on the part of the State, with complainants. They further allege that until a short time before the filing of their hill, their exclusive right to bridges within the limits prescribed by the act, had been protected by the State of New Jersey, and respected by all.
They then charge, that by an act of the legislature of New Jersey, passed in 1860, the defendants were authorized to build a railroad from Hoboken to Newark, with power to erect and maintain the necessary viaducts over the Passaic and Hackensack Rivers, and that under said act, the defendants claimed the right to build a railroad bridge over the Hackensack, within the limits of the exclusive privilege claimed by plaintiffs, and had in fact commenced the construction of such a bridge, and unless restrained by the court, would soon have it completed and in use. It is charged that such a proceeding will be a violation of the contract of the State of New Jersey with complainants, and an injunction is prayed.
The answer of the defendants, among other things, denies that the act of 1790 and the proceedings of the commissioners under it, constitute any contract on the part of the State, that no other bridge but complainants shall be built within t e designated limits; admits that they are about to run . eir road over the Hackensack River, within said limits, an claims that the act of 1860 authorizes them to do this, an that in doing it they infringe no right of the complain-
hese are, in substance, the allegations of the bill and answer, so far as they are necessary to the consideration of e question of the jurisdiction of this court. a t f8 ^7 plaintiffs in error, that the validity of the ti ° ?^eW Jersey legislature of 1860, is drawn in queSof th^TT C0ntrary 1° that provision of the Constitution
• ,e nited States, which declares that no State shall pass deci HW obligation of a contract; and that the
10n °5 State court was in favor of its validity, and Tnri- •lSe 18 therefore embraced by the 25th section of the Judiciary Act
It is objected, however, by the defendants, that the pleadings do not, in words, say that the statute is void because it conflicts with the Constitution of the United States, and do not point out the special clause of the Constitution supposed to render the act invalid.
It would be a new rule of pleading, and one altogether superfluous, to require a party to set out specially the provision of the Constitution of the United States, on which he relies for the action of the court in the protection of his rights. If the courts of this country, and especially this court, can be supposed to take .judicial notice of anything without pleading it specially, it is the Constitution of the United States. And if the plaintiff and defendant in their pleadings, make a case which necessarily comes within some of the provisions of that instrument, this court surely can recognize the fact without requiring the pleader to say in words: “ This paragraph of the Constitution is the one involved in this case.
Very few questions have been as often before this court, as those which relate to the circumstances under which it will review the decision of the State courts; and the very objection now raised by defendants has more than once been considered and decided.
In the case of Crowell v. Randell* the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was argued at much length by Mr. Webster, Mr. Sergeant, and Mr. Clayton, whose names are a sufficient guarantee that the matter was well considered. The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Story. He reviews all the cases reported up to that time, and lays down these four propositions as necessary to bring a case within the t section of the Judiciary Act.
“ 1st. That some one of the questions stated in that section did arise in the State court. 2d. That the question ya decided by the State court, as required in the same sec ion. 3d. That it is not necessary that the question should app§ on the record to have been raised and the decision made m direct and positive terms, ipsissimis verbis, but that it is s
ficient if it appears, by clear and necessary intendment, that the question must have been raised and must have been decided, in order to have induced the judgment. 4th. That it is not sufficient to show that the question might have arisen or been applicable to the case, unless it is further shown in the record that it did arise, and was applied by the State court to the case.”
In the case of Armstrong v. The Treasurer of Athens County * Judge Catron, in delivering the opinion of the court, said that the question of jurisdiction under the 25th section of the act of 1789, had so often arisen, and parties had been subject to so much unnecessary expense, that the court thought it a fit occasion to state the principles on which it acted in such cases. Referring especially to the manner in which the question on which the jurisdiction must rest shall be made to appear, he lays down six different modes in which that may. be done. The first of these is “ either by express avern^ent or by necessary intendment in the pleadings in the case.” The sixth is, “ that it must appear from the record that the question was necessarily involved in the decision, and that the State court could not have given the judgment or decree which they passed, without deciding it.”
Now, although there are other decisions in which it is said that the point raised must appear on the record, and that the particular act of Congress, or part of the Constitution supposed to be infringed by the State law, ought to be pointed out, it has never been held that this should be done in express words. But the true and rational rule is, that the court must oe able to see clearly, from the whole record, that a certain provision of the Constitution or act of Congress was relied by the party who brings the writ of error, and that the right thus claimed by him was denied.
ooking at the record before us, and applying to it these principles, we find no difficulty in the matter. The defendants o ann, under the act of 1860 of the Mew Jersey legislature, a ng t to build their railroad bridge, or viaduct, over the Hack-
ensack River, inside the limits prohibited by the act of 1790. The plaintiffs say, that to permit this is to violate the contract which they have with the State of New Jersey, and therefore the act of 1860, so far as it confers such authority on the defendants, is made void by the Constitution ofthe United States, because it impairs the obligation of a contract. The State court dismissed the bill on these pleadings alone. It could not have done this, without holding the act of 1860 to be valid, as it was the only authority on which defendants rested their right to build any structure whatever over the Hackensack River. In holding that act to be valid, notwithstanding plaintiffs claim that it was void as impairing the obligation of their contract with the State of New Jersey, a decision was made within the very terms of the 25th section of the act of Congress of 1789.
It is said, however, that it is not the validity of the act of 1860 which is complained of by plaintiffs, but the construction placed upon that act by the State court. If this construction is one which violates the plaintiffs’ contract, and is the one on which the defendants are acting, it is clear that the plaintiffs have no relief except in this court, and that this court will not be discharging its duty to see that no State legislature shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract, unless it takes jurisdiction of such cases.
The case of the Commercial Bank v. Buckingham's Executors,* does not conflict with this view, because that was a case in which the prior and the subsequent statutes were both admitted to be valid under any construction of them, and therefore no construction placed by the State court on either of them, could draw in question its validity, as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or any act oft Congress.
But there is a misconception as to what was construed in this case by the State court. It is very obvious that the statute of 1860 was not construed. No doubt is entertained by this court, none could have been entertained by the State
court, that it was intended by the framers of that act to authorize the defendants to build the railroad bridge which they were building, and which plaintiffs sought to enjoin. The act which was really the subject of construction, was the act of 1790, under which plaintiffs claim. For if that act and the proceedings under it amounted to a contract, and that contract prohibited the kind of structure which the defendants were about to erect under the act of 1860, then the latter act must be void as impairing that contract. If on the other hand the first act and the agreement under it was not a contract, or if being a contract it did not prohibit the erection of such a structure as that authorized by the act of 1860, the latter act was valid, because it did not impair the obligation of a contract. It was then the act of 1790 which required construction, and not that of 1860, in order to determine whether the latter was valid or invalid.
In the case of the Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly* this court says: “ Of what use would the appellate power of this court be to the litigant who feels himself aggrieved by some particular State legislation, if this court could not decide independently of all adjudication by the Supreme Court of a State, whether or not the instrument in controversy was expressive of a contract and within the protection of the Constitution of the United States, and that its obligation should e enforced notwithstanding a contrary conclusion by the Supreme Court of a State ? It never was intended, and cannot e sustained by any course of reasoning, that this court should or could, with fidelity to the Constitution of the United States, o ow the Supreme Court of a State in such matters, when it entertains a different opinion.”
We are therefore of opinion, that the record before us presents a case for the revisory power of this court over the State courts, under the 25th section of the act of Congress of 1789.
ppioaching the merits of the case, the first question that t^8en^ itself for solution, is whether the act of 1790, and agreement made under it by the commissioners with the
vol. I.
bridge builders, constitute a contract that no bridge shall be built within the designated limits, but the two which that statute authorized. This we think to be so very clear as not to need argument or illustration. The parties who built the bridges had the positive enactment of the legislature, in the very statute which authorized the contract with them, that no other bridge should be built. They had a grant of tolls on their bridges for ninety-nine years, and the prohibition against the erection of other bridges was the necessary and only means of securing to them the monopoly of those tolls. Without this, they would not have invested their money in building the bridges, which were then much needed, and which could not have been built without some such security for a permanent and sufficient return for the capital so expended. On the faith of this enactment they invested the money necessary to erect the bridges. These acts and promises, on the one side and the other, are wanting in no element necessary to constitute a contract. Such legislative provisions of the States have so often been held to be contracts, that a reference to authorities is superfluous.
We are next led, in the natural order of the investigation, to inquire if the contract of the State forbid the erection of such a structure as the defendants were authorized to erect, and which they proposed to erect, under the act of 1860.
This question, upon the decision of which the whole case must turn, we approach with some degree of hesitation, t is now over seventy years since the contract was made, period of time equal to three generations of the human race has elapsed. During that time the progress of the world m arts and sciences has been rapid. In no department of human enterprise have more radical changes been made, than in that which relates to the means of transportation of persoi and property from one point to another, including the me^ of crossing water-courses, large and small. The app ica of steam to these purposes, on water and on lan, as P duced a total revolution in the modes in which men an property are carried from one place to another. . e the most remarkable invention of modern times, in
fluence which it has had, and is yet to have, on the affairs of the world, as well as in its total change of all the elements on which land transportation formerly depended, is the railroad system. It is not strange, then, that when we are called to construe a statute relating to this class of subjects, passed before a steam engine or a railroad was thought of, in its application to this modern system, we should be met by difficulties of the gravest character.
On the one hand, we are told that the structure about to be erected by defendants is a bridge: simply that, and nothing more or less; that such is the name by which it is now called, and that it is, therefore, within the literal terms of the act; and that it performs the functions of a bridge, and is, therefore, within the spirit of the act. On the other hand, it is denied that the structure is a bridge, even in the modern sense of that word, since it is urged that the word is. never applied to such a structure, without the use of the word railroad, prefixed or implied; and that it performs none of the functions of a real bridge, as that term was understood in the year 1790.
In all the departments of knowledge, it has been a constant source of perplexity to those who have attempted to reduce discoveries and inventions to scientific rules and classifications, that old terms, with well-defined meanings, have sen applied so often to things totally new, either in their essence or in their combination. It is to avoid the danger o eing misled by the use of a term well understood before, ut which is a very poor representative of the new idea desire to be conveyed, that our modern science is enriched so many terms, compounded of Greek and Latin words, _ parts of words. It does not follow, that when a newly wh^h^^ °r discovere<I thing is called by some familiar word, thi C COme8 nearest to expressing the new idea, that the famiT S° really the thing formerly meant by the imm ‘(f W°rd’. Matters most intimately connected with the The tr13]^ 8U^e?^ °f our discussion may well illustrate this, kr or h °U steam-cars now transport the travel-
18 ProPerty is called a road, sometimes, perhaps [p. 148] generally, a railroad. The term road is applied to it, no doubt, because in some sense it is used for the same purpose that roads had been used. But until the thing was made and 1 seen, no imagination, even the most fertile, could have pictured it, from any previous use of the word road. So we call the inclosure in which passengers travel on a railroad, a coach; but it is more like a house than a coach, and is less like a coach than are several other vehicles which are rarely if ever called coaches. It does not, therefore, follow, that when a word was used in a statute or a contract seventy years since, that it must be held to include everything to which the same word is applied at the present day. For instance, if a Philadelphia manufacturer had agreed with a company, seventy years ago, to furnish all the coaches which might be necessary to transport passengers between that city and Baltimore for a hundred years, would he now be required by his contract to build railroad coaches ? Or, if a company had then contracted with the Government to build and keep up good and sufficient roads, to accommodate mails and passengers between those points, for the same time, would that company be bound to build railroads under that contract? Yet the structure which the defendants propose to build over the Hackensack is not more like a bridge of the olden time than a railroad is like one of its roads, or a rail road coach is like one of its coaches. It is not, then, a necessary inference, that because the word bridge may now be applied by common usage to the structure of the de en dants, that it was therefore the thing intended by the act of 1790. ,
£et us see what kind of structure the defendants proposeu to build.
It is an extension of the iron rails, which compose material part of their road, over the Hackensack ^lveL °
gefh er with such substructure as is necessary to keep in place, and enable them to support the cars which cros them. There is no planked bottom, no roadway or pat, nothing on which man, or beast, or vehicle can Pas®LsaV^, • it is carried over in the cars of the defendants. as [p. 149] kind of thing in the minds of the framers of the act of 1790, or of the commissioners who let the contract? Or would the term bridge as then used by them, or by common usage, have included such a thing? We have no hesitation in answering both these questions in the negative. We are therefore quite clear that the adoption of that word to express the modern invention, does not bring it within the terms of the act, if it is not within the intent of it. We will inquire, therefore, a moment, if it is within the spirit of the act, and the accompanying contract with the commissioners.
There is no doubt that it was the intention of those who framed those two documents, to confer on the persons now represented by the plaintiffs, some exclusive privilege for ninety-nine years. If we can arrive at a clear and precise idea what that privilege is, we shall perhaps be enabled to decide whether the erection proposed by defendants will infringe it
In the first place it is not an exclusive right to transport passengers and property over the Hackensack and Passaic Rivers, within the prescribed limits, for there is no prohibition of ferries, nor is it pretended that they would violate the contract. In the next place, it is not a monopoly of the right to build bridges within the prescribed limits, because they were only authorized to build one bridge over each riverj and the statute enacted expressly, that it was unlawful to uild any other bridge, by any person or persons, without excepting them. Besides, the building of a bridge was not t e privilege, but the duty, of those who had the contract; a uty which constituted the consideration for the privilege which was granted to them.
he right to collect toll of persons and things passing over
011 Ridges, is the privilege or franchise which they have, oth ren(lered valuable by the prohibition to build of Th ridg.eS w^hin the limits designated. This prohibition lar° e* *8 80 far a part of the contract, and only so ofth38* necessary t° enable plaintiffs to reap the benefit eir right to collect toll for the use of their bridges. The o [p. 150] extent to which tolls may be levied by the bridge owners, and the classes of persons and things on which they may be levied, are enumerated distinctly, and fixed by the contract. They may be summed up shortly, as persons on foot, animals, and vehicles, passing over the bridges. If the proposed Structure is essentially calculated to interfere with, or impair the right of plaintiffs to collect these tolls, we are unable to see it. No animal can pass over it on foot. No vehicle which can pass over the bridge of plaintiffs can by any possibility pass over that of defendants. No class of persons, or things, of which plaintiffs can exact toll, can evade that toll by using the structure of defendants.
It may be said, that passengers and property now transported by that railroad, would be compelled to use the bridge of plaintiffs, if there were no such road and no such viaduct. This might be true to a very limited extent, if plaintiffs could annihilate all railroads running in the direction of the road which passes over their bridge. But this they cannot do. And, as to the road of the defendants, if they are not permitted to pass the Hackensack within the limits claimed by plaintiffs, they can with more expense cross it somewhere else. That being done, it is not believed that the number of passengers, or the amount of freight carried in wagons which would cross on the bridges of plaintiffs, in consequence of this change in the location of the railroad viaduct, is appreciable.
As the plaintiffs have no right to build any more bridges, and as the viaduct of defendants does not impair that which is really their exclusive franchise, we do not perceive how the law which authorizes such a structure can impair the obligation of the contract, made in 1790, by the State, wit the bridge owners.
These views are not without the support of adjudged cases, which, if not in all respects precisely such as the one before us, are sufficiently so to show that they were considered, an entered largely into the reasoning upon which the judgmen s of the courts were founded.
In the *Mohawk Bridge Company v. The Utica and [p. 151] Schenectody Railroad Company ** the plaintiffs claimed an exclusive franchise, similar to that held by plaintiffs in this case, which the defendants, as they alleged, were about to violate by erecting a structure for the use of the railroad, over the same stream, within the prescribed limits. The chancellor refused the injunction upon the ground that the grant to plaintiffs was not exclusive, which was at that time a very doubtful question in New York; and also upon the ground that the exclusive right to the toll-bridge would not be infringed by the erection of a railroad bridge, within the limits over which the exclusive right extended.
In the case of Thompson v. The New York and Harlem. Railroad Company,^ where the contest was again between a bridge owner, claiming exclusive rights, and a railroad company seeking to cross the stream within the bounds of plaintiff’s claim, the assistant vice-chancellor refers to the case above mentioned, and says that he refuses the relief on both the grounds therein mentioned.
The case of MeRee v. The Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company,^ was an action at law, by the owner of a bridge, wno set up an exclusive franchise, against a railroad company whose track crossed the stream within the limits of his franchise, for a penalty allowed by statute for any violation of his right of toll. It is true, that the court rests its decision mainly on the ground, that by the bill of rights of the 'fate of North Carolina, no such monopoly as that claimed y plaintiff can exist. But they argue very forcibly, that a bridge is no violation of a franchise for an ordinary o - ridge, and intimate strongly that they would so hold if the case required the decision of the point.
e case of the Enfield Toll-Bridge Company v. The HartW and ^ew Haven Railroad Company,§ has been cited by ounsel and much relied on, as deciding the principle in of th10Q °^er way. And perhaps a fair consideration who 1 an^ line of argument of the learned judge —Servered the opinion, justifies counsel in claiming that
f 3 Sanford, 625.
2 17 Connecticut, 56.
Opinion of Catron, J.
it is in conflict with the views we have here expressed. In that case, however, it was found by special verdict, as one of the facts on which the action of the court was asked, that the defendants’ road and bridge would, to a certain extent, diminish the tolls of plaintiff; a fact which is not found in the case before us, and which, as we have already shown, we cannot infer from its record. What influence this fact may have had in the minds of that court we cannot say. We are, however, satisfied that sound principle and the weight of authority are to be found on the side of the judgment rendered by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in this case; and accordingly that
Judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice CATRON, after stating the case:
1st. I think this court has jurisdiction. In the court below the question was, whether the monopoly granted to the turnpike company bound the State not to allow another bridge to be built within certain limits ? Such is the claim of the bill. The State court held that the contract claimed to have secured the monopoly was not violated. The contract was construed, and the correctness of that construction we are called on to examine.
2d. The State contracted with the turnpike company not to grant to others the privilege of erecting another biidge within the limits covered by the monopoly; and the contract was violated, if the railroad bridge would be a structure within the meaning of the charter of the turnpike company. The main question presented is, whether the legis lature of New Jersey has the power to convey by contract, binding their successors (for ninety-nine years, or foiever) not to exercise the sovereign right of improving the ta e by additional roads and bridges? If so, then the left an of the Delaware and the right bank of the Hudson cou granted by an 'irrevocable contract, whose obligation a. beyond the reach of future legislation.
3d. That the bridge being erected by the railroa com pany is within the meaning of the grant to the turnpi
Opinion of Grier, J., dissenting.
company, and violates it, is to my mind free from doubt. The object was to confer a monopoly of crossing the river by the turnpike bridge only, and that this railroad bridge can, and probably will, engross the carrying of passengers and freight, to the injury and probable ruin of the value of the turnpike bridge, is evident. The legislature, in the railroad charter, has made careful provision that just compensation shall be made for private property taken for the purposes of the road; and as the bridge and abutments are part of the road, it is assumed by the railroad company that the contract set up by the bill can be compensated in money. If the turnpike bridge had been taken by the railroad company, then it is conceded that a right to compensate existed. But the difficulty of dealing with a sovereign right as private property, which is claimed by the old corporation, presents the difficulty lying at the foundation of this controversy. Here are the proprietors of the land on each side of the river, whose right to just compensation is not open to controversy, if their lands are taken; their claim is for private property, and the land is taken by the sovereign right claimed by the turnpike company. It can only come in to be compensated for public property, which the eminent domain clearly is. For the private property taken on either bank of the river, underlying the eminent domain, the new company has already paid. But, for this public sovereign right no second compensation is provided by any constitution; it is only in cases of private property taken for public use,” that just compensation is secured to the owner.
If, however, I am in error in this assumption, then there is a provision, plain and simple, in the railroad charter, securing compensation, which obviates all objection to the erection of the railroad bridge, and on this ground I think it very c ear that the bill was properly dismissed.
Mi. Justice GRIER, dissenting: Mill ° nOt COUCUr the opinion just read by my brother cf I Clues^on ^ie correctness of the judgment e ourt of Appeals of New Jersey; but this court, by
Opinion of Grier, J., dissenting.
affirming their judgment as to the true construction of the act of 1790, have demonstrated that they have no jurisdiction of the case.
The act of 1860, it is clear, is not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. The proposition that one legislature can restrain the power of future legislatures from erecting a bridge for ninety (and if ninety, a thousand) years, for a distance of ten miles (and if ten, a hundred), will hardly be asserted by any one.
That a State may, in its exercise of eminent domain, condemn a franchise as it might lands, cannot now be disputed.
Now, the act of 1860 protects carefully all the rights of the defendants under the act of 1790, and requires compensation to be made them if they are injured.*
The complaint is not that the legislature have passed any act impairing the obligation of the contract, but that the courts of New Jersey have misconstrued the act of 1790, which gives them their franchise. Now, it cannot be pretended that the validity of this act is drawn in question on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution. Their own courts have decided that a railroad viaduct is not a “bridge^ and the aim of the plaintiffs in error, by this writ of error, is to have this court to give a different construction to their charter. If, besides, the plain words and intention of the act of Congress conferring jurisdiction on this court under the 25th section, a decision of this point were necessary to demonstrate the unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction m this case, it will be found in the unanimous opinion ofJins court in Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham.^ a case was decided after very full argument by able counse. It was the unanimous judgment of this court. It i0 Pr® cisely in point, and it may be said in this case as in t a, “If this court were to assume jurisdiction of this case, it is evident that the question submitted for our decisi would be, not whether the statute of Ohio is repugnan the Constitution of the United States, but whether the bu-
*
See ante, p. 119; note. Kep.
Opinion of Grier, J., dissenting.
preme Court of that State has erred in its construction of it. It is the peculiar province and privilege of the State courts to construe their own statutes, and it is no part of the functions of this court to review their decisions, or. assume jurisdiction over them (fn the pretence that their judgments have impaired the obligation of contracts.”
I therefore protest against this decision of the court as usurpation of jurisdiction not given to us by the Constitution or the acts of Congress. It disregards the plain words of the statute and the unanimous ruling of this court. If it be received as a precedent, it will draw to the examination of this court the construction of every act of incorporation or grant of a franchise by a State legislature. The clause of the Constitution which forbids a State to pass any act impairing the obligation of contracts will have to be construed as a general power given to the courts of the United States to restrain the courts of a State from making mistakes in the construction of their own statutes.
The opinion of my brethren of the majority, in order to sustain this assumption of jurisdiction, takes it for granted that, as a franchise is a contract, a State, in the exercise of its right of eminent domain, cannot condemn a franchise by paying its value, as well as the land of an individual. This is directly contrary to frequent decisions of this court. Yet such .is the act of 1860. As I have said, it carefully saves the rights of plaintiffs, and directs compensation to be made in case of any injury to the same. I cannot give my assent o a decision founded on such an assumption, or which may ereafter be quoted to establish such a doctrine.
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