Case details
Bluebook Citation
Hutchins v. King, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 53
Full caption
Hutchins et al. v. King.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Hutchins et al. v. King.
1. Growing timber constitutes a portion of the realty, and is embraced by a mortgage of the land. When it is severed from the freehold without the consent of the mortgagee, his right to hold it as a portion of his security is not impaired.
2. When the amount due according to the stipulation of the mortgage is paid, the lien of the mortgage upon the timber thus severed is discharged, and the property reverts to the mortgagor, or any vendee of the mortgagor. Any sale of the timber by the mortgagee, or assignee of the mortgage, after such payment, is a conversion for which an action will lie by the mortgagor or his vendee.
8. By the law of New Hampshire, the interest of a mortgagee is treated as real estate only so far as it may be necessary for his protection, and to
* The Steamboat Narragansett, Olcott Adm. R., 255; The Iron Duke, 9 Jurist, 476; The Monticello v. Mollison, 17 Howard, 155; Fretz et al. v. Bull et al.; 12 Id., 466; Sedgwick on Damages, 3d ed., 469; Mer. Shipp, by Maclachlan, 280; Hay v. Le Leve, 2 Shaw’s Appeal Cases, 395; The Petersfield, MS. Cs. temp. Marriott.
give him the full benefit of his security: he holds the timber growing on the land as a portion of the security only, and does not become its absolute owner when it is severed from the land.
This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court for New Hampshire; the case being thus:
In September, 1853, Dunn and his partner having bought timber land in New Hampshire, of Goodall, mortgaged it back to him, as security for the payment of the purchase-money; the purchasers having given their notes for the money; and the mortgage being intended to secure their payment. One of the notes was payable September 1st, 1854; another, September 1st, 1855; and a third, September 1st, 1856: all of them with interest from an anterior date, to wit, from June, 1853. The first note was paid at maturity, but the second was not paid until five months after maturity; while neither on it nor on the third note, was any interest paid until two years after it became due. It was then collected by process of law.
The mortgage contained a stipulation that the mortgagors might enter and cut timber to the value of ten hundred dollars, and afterwards as fast as they made the several payments designated in the mortgage, but if they failed to make any one of the payments designated, they were “ to cease cutting, and to yield possession ” until the amount was paid; “ we to cut timber”—was the language of one part of the mortgage—“ as fast as we pay the notes, and no faster. ” During the time that the mortgagors were thus in default by non-payment of the second note, and of interest on both it and the third, they entered and cut timber, and in June, 1856, sold it to one King. In September, 1856, two persons, named Hutchins and Woods, who had succeeded by assignment to the rights of Goodall, the mortgagee, took possession of the timber thus cut, sold it, and appropriated to themselves the proceeds; the sale of the timber by them being, as it appeared, after the unpaid interest had been collected.
In 1859, King, who had purchased from the mortgagors, brought an action on the case against Hutchins and Woods, to recover the value of the timber which they had thus taken
Argument for the mortgagee.
possession of and sold. And among several questions raised on the trial was this—the only one considered by this court—whether the assignees of the mortgage, Hutchins and Woods, were liable to King, the vendee of the mortgagors, for the value of the timber which they had sold after they had received the principal and interest due to them.
The court below ruled that they were not; and the correctness of this ruling was the chief point now in issue here.
The record had no proper bill of exceptions. The bill, so called, gave the rulings of the court, but did not show that exceptions to these rulings were taken, by either party. No objection was, however, made to the record on this ground by counsel on the argument; and the associate justice of this court who presided at the circuit where the cause was tried, informed the court that an exception to the ruling on the material point considered, had been in truth taken, and that the omission of the bill to state the fact was a clerical error.
Messrs. Hutchins and Carpenter for the plaintiff in error:
1. It will be admitted that a mortgagor has no right in general to cut timber from mortgaged premises; and if he does so he is liable to the mortgagee in trespass or trover. If he sells the timber so cut, his vendee is liable to the mortgagee in like manner. The mortgagee’s rights in this respect are not affected by the fact that there has been no breach of the condition of the mortgage; for the mortgagee, as against the mortgagor, is the owner of the land, and indeed if there is no stipulation, either express or implied, to the contrary, he is entitled to the possession, and may sue for and recover it immediately upon the execution of the mortgage.
2. But this case has special strength. The stipulation contained in the mortgage gave the mortgagors a right to cut timber from the premises only as they paid the mortgage debt “ and no faster; ” that is to say, until such time as they niight fail to pay an instalment of principal or interest when lie and payable, and no longer. Upon the happening of
f at event, z.e., a failure to pay, they were, by the terms of [p. 56] the deed, to “ cease cutting, and yield possession,” &c., until payment of another note.
The conclusion is unavoidable that the mortgagors had no right to cut timber from the mortgaged premises while in default either for principal or interest.
Moreover, when the timber was severed it became the personal property of the assignees of the mortgagee, as it was before their real property. It could no longer pass with the land, and was no longer covered by the mortgage. By a recovery of the land in a suit on the mortgage, the assignees would not have recovered the severed timber, nor could the mortgagors recover it or gain title to it by redemption of the mortgage and recovery of the land.
3. The reception by the mortgagees of the money due on the mortgage debt could not operate as a waiver of any right which had accrued to them through the default of the mortgagors. They were bound by law to receive, or suffer the loss of interest. Their right to collect and receive payment of the debt secured, was independent of their rights to the timber under the mortgage and had no connection with them.
Mr. Wells for the defendant in error.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court:
The stipulations in the mortgage to Goodall provided, as we construe them, that the mortgagors should have the right to enter upon the mortgaged premises and cut timber, at first to the value of ten hundred dollars, and subsequently as they made the several payments designated, to the value of the sums paid; but that in case they failed to make any one.of the payments designated, they were to cease cutting and to surrender possession until the amount due was paid. The timber, for the conversion of which the present action is brought, was cut after the interest on some of the notes secured had become due, and whilst it remained unpaid, and the greater portion of it was cut after the principal of one of the notes had matured and was also unpaid.
Tn June, 1856, after the note which had matured was paid [p. 57] but whilst a suit for the interest on the other notes was pending, the mortgagors sold the timber cut to King, the plaintiff below, the defendant in error in this court. The defendants below, Hutchins and Woods, who had succeeded by assignment of the notes and delivery of the mortgage, to the rights of the mortgagee, in September, 1856, took possession of the timber cut, and subsequently disposed of it, and appropriated the proceeds. In November following, the interest due on the unpaid notes was collected. It does not appear from the record at what precise period the defendants disposed of the timber, but we assume from the argument of counsel that this was done after their collection of the interest. In 1859, the present action was brought to recover the value of the timber alleged to have been thus converted.
The defence rested mainly upon a claim of ownership in the property by the defendants. The position taken by their counsel in the court below, and urged in this court, was substantially this: that between the parties to the mortgage, the mortgagee was the owner of the land, and as such was clothed with all the rights and privileges of ownership; that the license to cut timber contained in the stipulations of the mortgage ceased upon the first failure to meet one of the payments designated; and that after default the defendants succeeding to the interests of the mortgagee had the absolute right to all the timber cut from the land, without liability to account to any one. We do not state the position of the defendants in the precise language of their counsel, but we state it substantially.
A mortgage is in form a conveyance, vesting in the mortgagee upon its execution a conditional estate, which becomes absolute upon breach of the condition. At law it was originally held to carry with it all the rights and incidents of ownership. The right of the mortgagee to be treated as owner of the mortgaged premises could only be defeated upon the performance of the conditions annexed by the day designated. Subsequent performance only gave a right to the mortgagor to resort to a court of equity for relief from the forfeiture arising upon breach of the conditions. Such is [p. 58] the law at this day in some of the States of the Union. But in a majority of the States the law in this respect has been greatly modified by considerations drawn from the object and intention of the parties in executing and receiving instruments of this character. The doctrine established by courts of equity, looking through the form to the real character of the transaction, that a mortgage is a mere security for a debt, and creates only a lien or incumbrance, and that the equity of redemption is the real and beneficial estate in the land, and may be sold and conveyed in any of the ordinary modes of transfer, subject only to the lien of the mortgage, has to a great extent, “ by a gradual and almost insensible progress,” as Kent observes, been adopted by the courts of law.* To such a degree has this equitable view prevailed that the interest of the mortgagee is now generally treated by the courts of law as real estate, only so far as it may be necessary for the protection of the mortgagee and to give him the full benefit of his security. Although, in the absence of stipulations as to the possession, he may enter upon the premises, his interest is widely different from that of owner. He cannot by conveyance transfer any interest in the premises without a transfer of the debt secured; f his interest is not subject to attachment or seizure on execution; | he cannot remove the buildings on the premises, nor the fixtures attached; nor can* he subject the premises to any uses but such as may furnish the means for the payment of the debt secured without impairing the value of the estate.
In few States is the equitable doctrine respecting mortgages more clearly asserted than in ISTew Hampshire, where the mortgage was executed upon which the rights of the parties to the present action arise. Thus, in Southerin v. Mendum^ the Supreme Court of that State, in considering the nature of the interest which a mortgagee possesses, said: il In order to give him the full benefit of the security, and appropriate remedies for any violation of his rights, he is treated as the owner
* 4 Kent, 160.
g 5 New Hampshire, 429.
+ Jackson v. Willard, 4 Id., 41.
of the land. But for other purposes the law looks beyond the mere form of the conveyance to the real nature of his interest, and treats his estate in the land as a thing widely different from an estate in fee simple.” In that case it was held that the interest of the mortgagee in the land was a mere chattel, and passed by a simple delivery of the note secured as an incident of the debt. And in Ellison v. Daniels,* the same court said : “ The right of the mortgagee to have his interest treated as real estate extends to and ceases at the point where it ceases to be necessary to enable him to avail himself of his just rights, intended to be secured to him by the mortgage.” In that case the demandant in a writ of entry was mortgagor, and the tenant claimed under the mortgagee through various mesne conveyances executed after the law day, and it was held that nothing passed to the tenant, the court observing that to enable the mortgagee to sell and convey his estate was not one of the purposes for which his interest is to be thus treated; that there was no necessity that it should be so treated, as the sale could be equally well effected by the transfer of the note secured by the mortgage.
With these views of the nature of the interest of the mortgagee, under the law of New Hampshire, the question presented in the case at bar becomes one of easy solution. The timber growing upon the land mortgaged constituted a portion of the realty. It was embraced in the pledge of the land as security. As the assignees of the mortgage held the land, so they held the timber upon it both before and after it was cut, as a portion of their security. They could not sell it, any more than they could pass, by their conveyance, the fee of the land.
The mortgagors had, it is true, no right to cut the timber after default made in any of the payments designated in the mortgage. They could do nothing to diminish the value of tbe estate. The right to cut the timber rested upon the icQnse contained in the stipulations of the mortgage. Their cutting, except in pursuance of such license, might have been
* 11 New Hampshire, 274.
restrained, upon proper application, by a court of equity. * The sale by them, after it was cut, did not divest the lien of the assignees of the mortgage; the purchaser took the timber subject to their paramount rights. The assignees could follow it and take possession of it, and hold it until the designated amounts due at the time were paid. When these were paid, their rights over it ceased, and the vendee of the mortgagors became invested with a complete title. The subsequent detention of the timber by the assignees was wrongful, and the sale of it a conversion, for which they were liable to the purchaser.
Some other positions were pressed by the plaintiffs in error upon the attention of the court on the argument, but we do not notice them; because what is termed in the transcript a bill of exceptions,” does not show that any exception was taken to the rulings of the court. The bill simply shows that certain positions were urged by the parties, and that certain rulings were made. We have, however, considered the material question argued, because no objection was taken to the record on the argument, and because the associate justice of this court, who presided at the circuit where the cause was tried, informs us that an exception was in truth taken, and that the omission of the bill to state the fact is a mere clerical error. We do not intend, however, to allow this case’to be drawn into a precedent. To authorize any objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or to the giving or refusal of any instructions to the jury, to be heard in this court, the record must disclose not merely the fact that the objection was taken in the court below, but that the parties excepted at the time to the action of the court thereon.
Judgment affirmed.
* Brady v. Waldron, 2 Johnson’s Ch., 148.
Dermott v. Wallach.
Where a lease at $3000 a year, payable in monthly instalments, stipulated that if the tenant underlet or attempted to remove any of the goods on the premises without the landlord’s consent, then, at the sole option and election of the landlord, the term should cease, and moreover, in either of said cases, “one whole year’s rent, to wit, the rent of $3000 over and above all such rents” as have already accrued, shall be and is hereby reserved and shall immediately accrue and become due and owing, and shall and may be levied on by distress and sale of all such goods as may be found on the premises: Held,—in a case where a removal and consequent levy had been made while the lease had yet more than a year to run—that although the clause in the lease was obscure, the $3000 was “rent,” intended to be secured in advance and in a gross sum instead of in the monthly shape, and was not a penalty above and independent of the other and usual rents.
Mrs. Dermott leased to Dexter a hotel, for three years from 1st October, 1855, to be extended to five, at the option of the tenant. The rent was $3000 a year, payable in monthly sums of $250. It was expressly stipulated between the parties, and made a condition, that if the tenant should assign or underlet the premises without the written consent of the landlord, or should remove or attempt to remove any of his goods or chattels (except the same be replaced of equal value) from the premises without a like consent, then, and in either case and event, at the “sole option and election” of the landlord, the term should cease, and the landlord might immediately re-enter upon the premises and expel the tenant, and more - over, m either of said cases, or the happening of the events, “ one whole year’s rent, to wit, the rent of $3000 over and above dll such rents (that is to say, all such of the rents hereinbefore reserved to be paid on the first day of each month during the said term...................as shall have then already accrued) shall be and by these presents is reserved to be paid by the said Dexter to the said Dermott, and shall immediately thereupon accrue and become due and owing from him to her, and shall dnd may be levied by distress and sale of all such goods and chattels as may be found on the premises.”
Dexter the tenant took possession, and afterwards executed [p. 62] two deeds of trust of the goods and chattels in the hotel to the defendant, Wallach, to secure certain promissory notes. One of the notes not being paid at maturity, Wallach advertised the goods and chattels for sale, and was proceeding with the sale when Mrs. Dermott levied a distress upon them for $3000. This was on the 18th of May, 1857, about a year andfive months before the lease would expire. The ordinary rent had been all punctually paid to the Isi of May, the month in which the distress was made ; so that no rent of the ordinary kind was due at the time of the distress. Wallach having replevied the goods seized, the defendant avowed; setting up, by way of justification for the taking, the attempt to remove them from the premises, and alleging that by such removal one year’s rent had accrued. There were two pleas to the avowry. I. No rent in arrear. II. No demand for the rent.
The substantial question was whether this $3000 was “ rent,” or was a penalty, that is to say, whether the clause meant that in the event of a removal, or attempted removal, Mrs. Dermott might get a year’s rent in advance, or whether it meant that she should have a sum of money equivalent to a year’s rent “ over and above ” all rents, by way of penalty.
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in which the case arose, gave judgment for the plaintiff. On error here, the question was the same as below and as already stated.
• Messrs. Carlisle and Coxfor the trustee, the defendant in error:
1. The authorities show that whenever it is doubtful what the intent of the parties was, or where there may be breaches of the agreement of different degrees of importance, and a gross sum is payable for any breach, however unimportant, or where the damage is capable of being certainly known, the sum will be treated as a penalty, whatever the parties may have called it. Calling the thing rent will not make it so. On the other hand, where it is impossible to estimate the damage, or a rate of forfeiture proportioned to the damage is reserved, it is considered liquidated damages, or, sometimes, an increased rent, or penal rent.*
*
See the cases cited in 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 258 and 259.
Argument for the tenant.
The present comes within the first class of cases. The removal of the most trifling articles of furniture, and that; but a week before the expiration of the lease, would, according to the terms of the instrument, entail upon the tenant the forfeiture of the whole sum of $3000, as well as of his lease, equally with the removal of the whole contents of the house at the commencement of the term. The removal may be repeated a dozen times, and the right of Mrs. Dermott accrues as often as the removal takes place. It is apparent, too, in this case, that the utmost damage which the plaintiff in error could have suffered was the loss of about two months’ rent, for which she claims a whole year’s.
2. If this was a case of penalty, the plaintiff in error had no right to distrain for it.
Before the statute 8 and 9 William HI,* a party might, obtain judgment at common law, for the whole amount of the penalty of a bond. But even then the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages was known; and in the former case, courts of equity would restrain proceedings at law, and direct an issue of quantum indemnificatus. And now, in the common law courts, a judgment can only be had for the actual damage.!
If a party cannot obtain judgment for a penalty, d fortiori, he cannot distrain for it. The right of distress, which is a right to take the law into one’s own hands, is exceptic^ial, and not to be favored. It is of the essence of this right that the rent or service distrained for should be certain in amount and time of payment, and therefore distress was never allowed where the services due were uncertain, in either respect. | Nor can agreement of the parties make any difference in this respect. No case can be found in which a distress for a penalty has been sustained.
3. By the common law, where a nomine poence is given for non-payment of rent, the lessor must demand the rent before e can be entitled to the penalty; and where a right of distress is given by agreement, a demand is necessary to entitle a
C. 11, g 8. f See Cornyn, Landlord and Tenant, 571, Bk. IV, ch. 2.
+ Bradby on Distress, 17.
party to distrain. This is ancient law. Grobham v. Thornborough, in Hobart’s Reports,* is in point. Grobham there brought debt of £100 against Thornborough, on a lease, £60 being for rent, and £40 “ a nomine poence of 8 shillings a day for non-payment,” for a hundred days. Judgment was given for him for the £60 rent. “ But,” says Lord Hobart, “ for the £40 pain, it was adjudged against the plaintiff, because he laid no actual demand, without which a pain is not forfeited.”
By parity of reasoning, even if a right of distress existed in this case, there must have been a previous demand, either to replace the goods alleged to be removed, or to pay the $3000. The tenant was entitled to a reasonable time to replace the goods. Until such time elapsed without their being replaced, and until demand made, no right accrued.
Mr. Brent, contra.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court:
The case turns mainly upon the question whether the $3000 mentioned in the lease, accruing on the happening of this event, is rent or a penalty.
The argument on behalf of the tenant is, that by the true construction of the lease, the landlord, on the happening of the event, may at his option consider the term as ended, and re-enter, and in addition distrain for the $3000, and hence the term having ended, or it being in the power of the landlord to end it, the sum reserved cannot be regarded as rent, but as a penalty, as the relation of landlord and tenant has ceased.
We do not agree to this construction. Although the wording of the clause occasions some obscurity and hesitation, yet, regarding the sense and substance of it, there can be little doubt about its meaning. It will be observed, that if the tenant assigns or underlets, the term ceases at the option of the landlord. So in the event of the removal or attempt to remove the goods. Now the words, “ at the sole option [p. 65] and election ” of the landlord, are superfluous, if intended to be limited to this breach of the covenant. All that was necessary was the inhibition to assign, underlet, or remove the goods, and the right of re-entry in case of breach. Without giving the option or election, the landlord had the right to waive the forfeiture. Receiving rent with knowledge of the breach is a waiver. So, levying a distress for the rent, or in any other way consenting to a continuance of the term. These words, we are of opinion, are entitled to an influence in the construction of this part of the lease beyond these covenants of forfeiture, and may aid in the construction and meaning of the clause which provides for the payment of the year’s rent in advance. And the true meaning we think is, that the landlord may at his option consider the term at an end, and re-enter in the events mentioned, or may at his option (understood), have the year’s rent in advance.
*
Page 82.
We do not think the word “ moreover,” in the connection found, necessarily means the rent in advance, in addition to the previous remedies mentioned, but rather an alternative remedy.
These covenants are inserted in a lease for the better security of the rent. The one in question simply makes the rent payable in advance, instead of by instalments, on the happening of the event stated. It would have been not only strange but unreasonable to have made this stipulation as contended for on the part of the plaintiff, to take effect at the moment the term ceased, or might be put an end to by the landlord. The words should be very clear and controlling to lead to such an interpretation.
It is argued that the reservation of this $3000 rent in advance should be regarded as a penalty, for the reason that the event would happen on the removal of a single article of goods, and that the remedy is out of reasonable proportion to the injury. But the answer is, the covenant against removal necessarily embraced all the goods on the premises that furnished security for the rent, and it is not for the tenant to set up as a defence to its enforcement, that the breach is not as great as it might have been. The removal of a single
VOL. I. 5
article is a wrong which, he is not permitted to take advantage of, and besides, there is no hardship in the case, for if he desired to remove any particular article, the covenant permits it on replacing goods of equal value.
The removal of the goods took place on the 18th of May, 1857, some year and five months before the expiration of the lease, so that practically the reservation of the rent in advance, on the event in the lease happening, works but simple justice to all parties. It became the substitute for the rent reserved payable monthly. If the tenant had brought about the event by the removal of the goods within a year of the termination of the lease, whether or not he might have had a remedy to abate the excess, we need not discuss.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a venire de novo.
Ryan v. Bindley.
1. Where a declaration claims a sum not sufficiently large to warrant error to this court, but where the plea pleads a set-off of a sum so considerable that the excess between the sum claimed and that pleaded as a set-off would do so,—the amount in controversy is not the sum claimed but the sum in excess, in those circuits where by the law of the State adopted in the Circuit Court, judgment maybe given for the excess as aforesaid.
For example: A declaration in assumpsit claimed one thousand dollars damages,—a sum insufficient to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction: more than two thousand being required for that purpose. The plea pleaded a set-off offour thousand, and by the laws of Ohio, adopted in the Federal courts sitting in ^hat State, judgment might be given for the three thousand in excess, if the set-off was proved. Held, that three thousand, and not one thousand, was the amount in dispute; and accordingly, that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court attached.
2. The rules of evidence prescribed by the laws of a State being rules of decision for the Federal courts while sitting within the limits of such State, they must be obeyed even though they violate the ancient laws of evidence so far as to make the parties to the action witnesses in their own cause; herein adopting a practice in opposition to a specific rule by the Federal court for the circuit.
The Judiciary Act provides * that final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in a Circuit Court, when [p. 67] the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, may be re-examined and reversed or approved in the Supreme, Court. With this law in force, Bindley had sued Ryan in assumpsit in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and laid his damages at one thousand dollars. Ryan, however, put in a plea, insisting that Ryan owed him four thousand dollars, which sum he claimed a right to set off against Bindley’s demand, and to have judgment against Bindley for the excess: a sort of defence and judgment allowed by the laws of Ohio and the practice of the Circuit Court of the United States for its districts, which herein by rule of court had adopted the practice of the State tribunals. The verdict found $575.85 for the plaintiff.
In the course of the trial the defendant offered himself as a witness; not being competent of course by the general laws of evidence which prevail in the Federal courts, and indeed being, by rule of the Circuit Court where the case wTas tried, made, as a party, specifically incompetent, but claiming to be competent by virtue of the Ohio code of civil procedure; one section of vdiich* declares that “No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil action or proceeding by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise.”
The Circuit Court, holding to its own rule, rejected the witness; and on error here two questions were raised.
1. Did.the sum involved exceed $2000 in such a sense as that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction?
2. Was the defendant in this suit rightly rejected as a witness ?
Messrs. Lee and Fisher for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court:
1. The allegation in the declaration must be taken, generally, as fixing the amount or value for the purposes of jurisdiction. But the subsequent pleadings may so change the original character of the suit as to involve an amount or [p. 68] value in excess of two thousand dollars, and when this is done, the judgments and decrees of the court below are subject to be reviewed here.*
In this case Ryan interposed a notice of set-off, and insisted that Bindley owed him four thousand dollars, for goods sold •and ‘money lent, which he claimed the right to set off against Bindley’s demand, and to recover against Bindley a judgment for the excess. By the laws of Ohio such a defence is permitted, and if the defendant succeeds in proving his set-off, and it is larger than the plaintiff’s claim, he is entitled to a judgment for the excess. The parties are concluded by the judgment, and cannot again litigate the same subject-matter, unless the judgment should be reversed, on appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court. This law of set-off, or counter claim, and the practice under it, has been adopted as a rule of court, by the Circuit Court of the United States for the districts of Ohio. The plea in this case was therefore proper, and after it was interposed the matter in dispute rightfully exceeded the sum of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, and as the plaintiff had judgment, it is plain that the defendant had the right to sue out his writ of error.
2. A reversal of the judgment is claimed, because the Circuit Court refused to permit the defendant to testify as a witness. In Ohio a party to the suit is a competent witness on his own behalf. The rules of evidence prescribed by the laws of a State are rules of decision for the United States courts, while sitting within the limits of such State, under the 34th section of the Judiciary Act.* The court having rejected the witness, when he was competent, the judgment below must be reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
Judgment accordingly.
* Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black, 430; Wright v. Bales, 2 Id., 535.
Statement of the case.
Ex parte Dubuque and Pacific Railroad.
When this court, under the 24th section of the Judiciary Act, reverses a judgment on a case stated and brought here on error, remanding the case, with a mandate to the court below to enter judgment for the defendant, the court below has no authority but to execute the mandate, and it is final in that court. Hence such court cannot, after entering the judgment, hear affidavits or testimony and grant a rule for a new trial; and if it does grant such rule, a mandamus will issue from this court ordering it to vacate the rule.
Litchfield sued the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Iowa, for a tract of land in that district. The cause of action was set forth by petition, according to the mode of proceedings prescribed by the code of Iowa. It alleged that the plaintiff had a title in fee, and the right of possession; which land was withheld from him by the defendant, who was in possession. The answer of the defendant denied that the plaintiff had any title to the premises sued for. On this issue the parties went to trial before the District Court, at October Term, 1859. The court found, and entered judgment, that the plaintiff had right to the land claimed, and the right of possession thereof. The facts had been agreed on in writing, and filed on stipulation, in the District Court, on which agreed statement the finding andjudgment proceeded. On the facts thus presented to the court below, the cause was brought to this court by writ of error, was re-examined, and after an elaborate opinion, reported among the decisions of December Term, 1859, the judgment below was reversed; and it was ordered that the District Court enter judgment for the defendant below. *
A mandate went down, and was entered of record, and the District Court entered judgment that the plaintiff Litchfield had no title, and that he pay costs. This was done at October Term, 1861, and immediately thereafter (affidavits of ability to show new facts having been filed) a new trial was moved for on behalf of Litchfield, and granted by the court. To
Argument against the motion.
this step the railroad company excepted, and it now moved for a writ of mandamus commanding the court below to vacate the order granting the new trial.*
Mr. Mason against the motion: The judgment having been entered in the court below, became its judgment, possessing the same qualities as if it had been originally entered there. One of these qualities or incidents was, that it was liable to be vacated, and a new trial granted, in a proper case, in the discretion of the court below; a discretion with which this court will not interfere, as it has declared in many cases, and notably in Eberly v. Mooref
1. This power and duty exists under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The court in the case just cited says: “ The jurisdiction has been conferred by acts of Congress upon the courts of the United States, so to supervise the various steps in a cause as to prevent hardship and injustice, and that the merits of a cause may be fairly tried. It has been uniformly held in this court that a Circuit Court could not be controlled in the exercise of the discretion thus conceded to it.”
2. It exists, also, under the statute of Iowa; which by the Judiciary Act of 1789$ is the “rule of decisions in trials at common law.” Courts in Iowa are compelled to grant new trials, on cause shown, on the application of a party, for any “ cause affecting materially the substantial rights of such party,” specified in the law; in which case, the “ former report, verdict, or decision, shall be vacated, and a new trial granted” § It is to be presumed that the court had grounds which justified it in granting as it did the new trial under the above provisions.
In actions for the recovery of real property in Iowa, under its code a new trial may be granted, without any cause being shown, in the discretion of the court, on application within
*
The parties had stipulated that no rule should be required on the Circuit Court where the cause now was by transfer, to show cause why a peremp tory mandamus should not issue as prayed for in the petition, if this cour could rightfully order the writ. _ f 24 Howard, 147. J § 34. § Code, Revision of 1860, 11 ’
Argument in favor of the motion.
two years after the determination of the former trial.* And this may he after the first judgment has been executed; for the code authorizes a writ of restitution to restore the possession of the property to the party who shall succeed on the new trial, f
Of course the court below cannot, directly or indirectly, question, or attempt to overthrow the law. as settled by the judgment of this court. But the plaintiff submits that this court will not interfere with the allowance of a new trial, where he can prove facts upon which his rights depend, and where the affidavits show that, without fault on his part, the merits of the cause have not been fairly tried; which showing he assumes is proved, or must, from the fact of a new trial having been allowed, be here presumed.
Mr. Platt Smith contra: There are no new facts. Admitting that the plaintiff can prove all his affidavits, we assert that he does but make out the old case stated; and on which this court, after patient hearing, has ordered a judgment to be entered below.
When the case was brought by appeal to this court, the whole case was removed from the court below. When it was remanded, the court below could only take jurisdiction for the specific purpose of executing the judgment of this court, in accordance with the mandate and opinion. The 24th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enacts, that on reversals in this court, the court “shall proceed to render such judgment or pass such decree as the District Court should have passed, except where the reversal is in favor of the plaintiff, or petitioner; and the damages to be assessed or matter to be decreed are uncertain; in which case they shall remand the cause for final decision.” The statute of Iowa, authorizing new trials, does not apply to cases that have been removed to this court by writ of error or appeal, and remanded to the court below for the mere purpose of execution. In Ex parte Sibbald^ this court says: “ When the Supreme Court have executed their power in a cause before
*
Id. § 3, 584. f Id. § 3, 588. J 12 Peters, 492.
Argument in favor of the motion.
them, and their final decree or' judgment requires some further act to be done, it cannot issue an execution, but shall send a special mandate to the court below to award it. Whatever was before the court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The inferior court is bound by thd decree as the law of the case; and must carry it into execution, according to the mandate. They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it upon any matter decided on appeal for error apparent; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded. After a mandate, no rehearing will be granted. It is never done in the House of Lords; and on a subsequent appeal, nothing is brought up but the proceeding subsequent to the mandate. If the special mandate directed by the 24th section is not obeyed or executed, then the general power given to t all the courts of the United States to issue any writs which are necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law,’ by the 14th section of the Judiciary Act, fairly arises, and a mandamus or other appropriate writ will go.”
The court below treats the case as though it had never been removed. But the judgment of that court is reversed and held for nought. The District Court does not pretend to overturn its own original judgment; that was, in the opinion of that court, all right,—it was in favor of the plaintiff. This court overturned that judgment, and ordered the District Court to enter judgment for the defendant. The District Court reversed and set aside the judgment of this court, and seeks to re-establish its original judgment. If the facts of the case required another trial, this court would have issued an order for a trial de novo in the court below; a peremptory mandate to enter judgment for the defendant is quite another thing.
Mr. Justice CATRON, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court; Mr. Justice MILLER, who had been of counsel in the case, not sitting in it here.
In granting the new trial the District Court seems to have been governed by two reasons: First, because the statutes of Iowa prescribed that a second trial may be had of course in actions brought for the recovery of real estate; and Secondly, because the court below had the power, after the cause was presented there by a mandate from this court and the judgment of reversal entered, to hold that the cause stood on the same footing that it would have done, had the District Court entered the judgment for the defendant before the cause was brought up to this court. And in that case it is true the District Court could have granted a new trial at its discretion.
The 24th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 governs the practice in cases brought up and reviewed in this court. It is bound to give such judgment as the court below ought to have given, and the law directs that a mandate shall be sent down to have the judgment entered as final in the lower courts, when it is for the defendant below, as here. The District Court had no power to set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court, its authority extending only to executing the mandate.*
W e order that a writ of mandamus do issue to the Circuit Court of the District of Iowa, commanding it to vacate and erase the order granting a new trial in the aforesaid cause; and that a judgment be entered in conformity to the mandate of this court.
Order accordingly.
Orchard v. Hughes.
Id. v. Id.
• It is no defence to a suit for debt that the debt arose from the receipt of the bills of a bank that was chartered illegally and for fraudulent purposes, and that the bills were void in law, and finally proved worthless m fact; the bills themselves having been actually current at the time the defendant received them, and they not having proved worthless in Ais hands, nor he being bound to take them back from persons to whom he had paid them away.
*
Ex parte Sibbald, 12 Peters, 492.
2. When a bond is given for appeal in a bill of foreclosure of mortgage, the condition of the bond being simply that the appellant shall pay costs and damages, it does not operate to stay a sale of mortgaged premises already decreed. 3. Independently of a rule of court, execution cannot issue in a decree for foreclosure of a mortgage in chancery for the balance left due after a sale of the mortgaged premises (Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black, 499, recognized) ; and this (by opinion, however, of but a majority of the court), applies to the Territorial Court of Nebraska, as much as to the courts of States organized under the Judiciary Act of 1789.
These were, in form, two causes; though in fact, two branches of one case, which were heard and disposed of together; both of them coming here on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Nebraska, to which tribunal they had been taken by appeal from the District Court for the same Territory.
A suit had been brought by Hughes, the appellee in this court, against Orchard, the appellant, to foreclose a mortgage. Orchard set up by way of answer, that a part of the consideration of the mortgage consisted of the bills of the Bank of Tekama, of the Territory of Nebraska; that this bank, though chartered by the legislature of that Territory, had never been approved of by Congress, as was necessary that it should be, in order to be legally chartered; that the bank was never organized; that it was a device to deceive the public; that its notes were fraudulently issued and put in circulation without authority of law, and were of no validity or value whatever. But the answer showed that the bills were current and in circulation at the time they were received by him, and did not state in any sufficient way that they had proved worthless in Orchard’s hands, or that they had ever been tendered back either to or by him. On the contrary, it set forth that many of them had been paid away to his creditors; some to a certain Davis, and that they had turned out to be worthless in his hands. To this answer there was a demurrer, upon which the District Court gave judgment for the complainant, so deciding that the defence set up was insufficient. A sale of the premises was accordingly decreed. After this decree Orchard gave bond for an appeal to the Supreme
Court—the condition of the bond being that “ he shall diligently prosecute said appeal, and shall pay all costs and damages that may be awarded against him.” The sale went on under a master’s direction, and on the coming in of his report, Orchard filed several exceptions to it. Most of these were on matters which were the subject of discretion with the court below, as that the sale had not taken place at the exact hour advertised, but an hour or more afterwards. The Supreme Court considered none of the exceptions of force, and confirmed the proceedings. Among the proceedings con-finned, was the master’s report, which showed that the mortgaged premises sold for $519.23 less than the mortgage debt; and the decree of the District Court, which ordered that execution should issue for this amount and interest.
On appeals here the following among other points were raised:
1. How far the illegal character of the bank, and the final worthlessness of its notes, were a defence to the bill of foreclosure.
2. Whether the sale was properly proceeded with in the District Court after Orchard had given a bond for appeal.
3. Whether an order for execution for the balance ($519.23) due on the mortgage was rightly made; and whether the act that the Supreme Court of Nebraska Territory, which made it, was so organized under the organic law, by the egislature of the Territory, and not by the Judiciary Act of 1789, that a precedent binding courts established by the act, i not apply to one like the Supreme Court of the Territory aforesaid.
essrs. Woolworth and Kernan for the appellant, Orchard; Messrs. Redick and Carlisle, contra.
^•Justice KELSON" delivered the opinion of the court: th i ^e^Ct both the answer and the proofs is, b a? a every allegation against the legality of the bv^h C, ar^er’ an^ the worthlessness of the paper issued h an^’ ^rc^arc^’ the maker of the note and of the mortge? as not been the sufferer. The bills constituting a [p. 76] portion of the consideration of the note, he used in payment of his debts, while they were current in the community, and he has not taken them back, either, voluntarily, assuming that he might have done so, and set up the fact as a defence to the note; nor has he been subjected to the repayment of the debts he discharged by the use of them; and even were he permitted to succeed in reducing the present demand by rebating the bank bills received by him, it does not appear that he is under any obligation to account for that amount to the creditor or creditors to whom he paid them. The defendant, therefore, is not in a condition to contest the several questions raised and discussed on the argument in respect to the power of the legislature to charter the bank, or the conduct of the parties concerned in its organization, or in keeping up its credit for the purpose of imposing upon and defrauding the community by means of the circulation of its paper. The decree, therefore, of the court below was right, and should be affirmed.
2. The appeal from the decree of the court below directing a sale of the mortgaged premises, did not operate to stay the proceedings, as the bond given was simply a bond for costs. The complainants below, therefore, proceeded to execute the decree by a sale of the land, under the direction of a master, and on the coming in of his report of the sale, certain exceptions were taken to the report and overruled, and a decree of confirmation entered. An appeal was taken by the defendants below from that decree, and has been argued in connection with the appeal from the previous and principal one. This second appeal seems to be a necessity from a very early decision of this court in the case of a foreclosure of a mortgage, that the decree in favor of the complainant, adjudging a sale of the mortgaged premises, was a final decree within the meaning of the Judiciary Act^authorizing an appeal. We have accordingly looked into the second record in connection with the first, and are satisfied that there is no well-gioun e objection to the report of the master, and that the court below was right in confirming it. . . .
But there is a clause in this decree that is in conflict with [p. 77] a recent decision of this court. According to the report of the master, the sale of the mortgaged premises did not cover the debt, but left a balance of $519.23. The decree of confirmation orders execution to issue for this amount with interest.
It was held by this court in Noonan v. Lee* in an appeal from a decree in a foreclosure of a mortgage in chancery by the District Court of Wisconsin, with Circuit Court powers, in which execution was directed for the balance of the debt, that this part of the decree was erroneous, inasmuch as the equity courts of the United States, under the Constitution, are governed by the practice of the Court of Chancery in England, modified by acts of Congress and the rules of the Supreme Court: and as no execution could issue according to the practice in the English Chancery for this balance, and no rule had been adopted in this court authorizing it, this part of the decree was reversed.
The decree in the present case was rendered in a territorial court, and it has been contended that this court is not a court under the Constitution, nor organized under the Judiciary Act of 1789, but by the legislature of the Territory under the organic law, and whose jurisdiction is regulated by that law, and therefore that the decision in the case of Noonan v. Lee does not apply, j- Of this opinion are Messrs. Justices Swayne, Eield, and myself. But a majority of the court are of opinion that the case is governed by the previous one. This part of the decree is therefore reversed, and the residue affirmed. |
Decree accordingly.
* 2 Black, 499-501. t American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters, 546.
y rule of court, adopted since this decision, execution may now issue, oee ante, p. iii. J
Eames v. Godfrey.
"Where a patent is for a combination of distinct and designated parts, it is not infringed by a combination which varies from that patented, in the omission of one of the operative parts and the substitution therefor of another part substantially different in its construction and operation, but serving the same purpose.
Godfrey sued Eames in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, in an action on the case for infringing a patent for a new and useful improvement in boot-trees, of which patent he, Godfrey, was the assignee. The defendant pleaded Not Guilty, and gave notice of special matters of defence. The case was tried by a jury, who found the defendant guilty, and assessed the damages at $2177.50.
The patent was for a combination of mechanical powers for a new and useful improvement in boot-trees, and included a certain mechanism for distending the leg of the boot-tree. The plaintiff did not claim that the defendant had used the same mechanism that he did for distending the leg of the boot-tree, but that the defendant had used all the other parts of his combination, and that the mechanism which the defendant used, although differing in construction and operation from that described in the patent, yet performed the sarM function. The defendant contended, that not having used the mechanism described in the patent for distending the leg of the boot-tree, although he had used the other parts of the combination, he was not guilty of infringing the patent, and requested the court so to rule. The court refused to rule as requested, but instructed the jury, “ that to make out an infringement of the claim for combination, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the mechar nism for distending used by the defendant and its mode o operation were the same with that described in the plainti 8 patent for the purpose of distending the boot-tree, and t a if said mechanism for distending the leg, &c., used by the defendant, was not the same mechanism, operating m same manner as that described in the plaintiff s patent [p. 79] the same purpose; still if there were in the defendant’s machine a mechanism performing the same function as that performed by plaintiff’s distending mechanism, and if this was combined with the other parts in the manner in which the distending mechanism described in the plaintiff’s patent was combined, it was an infringement of said patent, and the defendant would be liable therefor.”
The defendant excepted to the instructions given, and the refusal of the court to instruct as prayed for.
On error here, the instructions and refusal, as aforesaid, were the points before this court.
Jfr. F. A. Brooks for the plaintiff in error; Mr. Causten Browne, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court:
The patent in controversy was for a combination of mechanical powers to effect a useful result, and such a patent differs essentially in its principles from one where the subject-matter is new.
The law is well settled by repeated adjudications in this court and the Circuit Courts of the United States, that there is no infringement of a patent which claims mechanical powers in combination unless all the parts have been substantially used. The use of a part less than the whole is no infringement.
In Prouty $ Mears v. Buggles,* the law is well considered. The patent there was for the combination of certain parts of a plough, arranged together so as to produce a certain effect. he suit was for an infringement. The court below had charged the jury, that unless the whole combination was substantially used in the defendant’s plough it was no violation of t e plaintiff’s patent. Chief Justice Taney, in deciding the case, said: “ None of the parts referred to are new, and none are claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination ess t an the whole claimed as new, or stated to produce any given result. The end in view is proposed to be accom-
* 16 Peters, 341.
plished by the union of all, arranged and combined together in the manner described. The use of any two of these parts only, or of two combined with a third, which is substantially different in form or in the manner of its arrangement and connection with the others, is, therefore, not the thing patented. It is not the same combination if it substantially differs from it in any of its parts.”
Testing this case by these principles, the court erred in charging the jury as it did, and in refusing to instruct as asked by the defendant. There is nothing in the record that shows in what manner the mechanism used by Eames, in distending the leg of the boot-tree, differed from that claimed in the patent. It is stated that the mechanism used by Eames was different in its construction and operation, but how far the difference extended we are left to conjecture. It is fair to presume, in the absence of proof, that it was essentially different. If, however, the mechanism used by Eames was not substantially different in its form or the manner of its arrangement from the mechanism used by Godfrey, there was an infringement; but this was a question that should have been left to the jury to pass on. The court laid down a broad rule without qualification, that although Eames’s mechanism for distending the leg of the boot-tree did differ in its construction and operation from that patented, yet if it performed the same functions as the mechanism in the combination, there was an infringement. This view of the law was wrong on principle and authority. Eames had a right to use any of the parts in Godfrey’s combination, if he did not use the whole; and if he used all the parts but one, and for that substituted another mechanical structure substantially different in its construction and operation, but serving the same purpose, he was not guilty of an infringement.
Judgment reversed and venire awarded.
Gaylords v. Kelshaw et al.
1. In a bill to set aside a conveyance as made without consideration and in frauds of creditors, the alleged fraudulent grantor is a necessary defendant in the bill; and if being made defendant his citizenship is not set forth on the record, the bill must be remanded or dismissed. 2. In such cases of remandment or dismissal, costs are allowed to a co-defendant, being the person charged with having received the fraudulent conveyance.
The Gaylords, appellants here, had filed their bill in chancery in the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, against the defendants Kelshaw and Butterworth, charging that they had an unsatisfied judgment at law in one of the Indiana courts against Kelshaw, and that some short time before the judgment was recovered, Kelshaw conveyed to Butterworth a valuable piece of real estate without any consideration; and with an intent fraudulently to hinder and delay them, the said Gaylords, in the collection of their debt. The bill prayed that the conveyance might be set aside, and the property sold in satisfaction of their debt.
The complainants alleged themselves to be citizens of Ohio, and Butterworth to be a citizen of Indiana, but no allegation was f^de in any part of the record as to the citizenship of Kelshaw. The record showed, however, that he was found within the district, and had appeared and. answered. The court below dismissed the bill on merits.
Coming here, the case was argued by Mr. Henderson for t e. complainants, who asked a reversal on merits, which he argued had been misunderstood below, and by Messrs. Ketcham « Bunn, contra. The arguments need not*be given, since n court considered the question not a question of merits but one
•Whether, there being no allegation of Kelshaw’s citizens ip, jurisdiction existed under that clause of the Judiciary Act which gives the Federal courts jurisdiction in suits Jeen citizens of different States? and,
jurisdiction did not exist, what was proper to be
vol. I. „ [p. 82] done; that is to say, whether the decree was to be reversed, or the bill dismissed, or the case remanded with directions, &c. ?
Mr. Justice MILLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court:
It is clear, that neither the court below, nor this court, has jurisdiction of the case as between plaintiffs and Kelshaw.
But as the court might, under some circumstances, proceed to adjudicate on the rights of the parties properly before it, we must look into the case, so far as to see if it is one in which relief may be decreed, as between plaintiffs and Butterworth, without regard to Kelshaw.
Without referring to the numerous cases in this court and others, on the necessity of having all the proper parties before the court, in a suit in equity, and the circumstances under which the court will proceed in some cases, without persons who might well be made parties, it is sufficient to say that, in the present case, we think Kelshaw is properly made a defendant to this suit. It is a debt which he owes which is sought to be collected. It is his insolvency which is to be established, and it is his fraudulent conduct that requires investigation.
If the conveyance to Butterworth shall be decreed to be set aside, and the property conveyed to him, subjected to the payment of plaintiffs’ debt, it’is proper that Kelshaw should be bound by the decree; and to that end he ought to be a party.
It is not necessary to decide in this case, whether if Kelshaw were, in the language of the act of February 28,1839, “ not an inhabitant of, or found within the district where the suit is brought,” the court could proceed without him; for the record shoyys that he was found within the district, an served there with process, and has answered the bill. or is it necessary, for the same reason, to inquire if the court could dispense with him as a party under the 47th rule pre scribed by this court for the courts of equity of the United States. It is simply the case of a person made a defen an by the bill, who is also a proper defendant, according to the principles which govern courts of chancery as to parties, an who has been served with process within the district an [p. 83] answered the bill; but whose citizenship is not made to appear in such a manner that the court can take jurisdiction of the case as to him.
Under these circumstances, the court is of opinion that instead'of a decree dismissing the bill on the merits, it should have been dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The case will be remanded to the court below with leave to plaintiffs to amend their bill generally, and if they shall fail to do this it shall be dismissed without prejudice. Butterworth is entitled to his costs in this court.
Decree accordingly.
Mercer County v. Hacket.
1. Where a county issues its bonds payable to bearer, and solemnly pledges the faith, credit and property of the county, under the authority of an act of Assembly, referred to on the face of the bonds by date, for their payment, and those bonds pass, bond fide, into the hands of holders for value, the county is bound to pay them. It is no defence to the claim of such a holder that the act of Assembly, referred to on the face of the bonds, authorized the county to issue the bonds only and subject to certain “restrictions, limitations, and conditions,” which have not been formally complied with; nor that the bonds were sold at less than par, when the act authorizing their issue and referred to by date on the face of the instrument, declared that they should, “in no case,” nor “under any pretence,” be so sold.
2. Corporation bonds payable to bearer, have, in this day, the qualities of negotiable instruments. The corporate seal upon them does not change the case.
3- Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall (21 Howard, 539), and Woods ^• Lawrence County (1 Black, 386), affirmed. Diamond v. Lawrence County (37 Pennsylvania State, 358), denied.
y act of Assembly, passed in 1852, the legislature of Penney vania authorized the commissioners of Mercer County in
at State to subscribe to the stock of the Pittsburg and Erie and herf ’ which road, if built, would pass through their county enefit it. The act, however, contained this proviso:
fcwi that the subscription shall be made subject to the fol-
3restrictions, limitations, and conditions, and in no other manner [p. 84] or way whatever, viz.: all such subscriptions shall be made by the county commissioners, and shall be made by them after, and not before, the amount of such subscription shall have been designated, advised, and recommended by a grand jury of said county; and such bonds shall in no case, or under any pretence, be sold, assigned, or transferred by the said Railroad Company at less than the par value thereof: And provided, further, that the acceptance of this act by the said company shall be deemed also an acceptance of the provisions of the act passed the 11th day of March, 1851, entitled An act fixing the gauges of railroads in the County of Erie.”
Rightly or wrongly—with authority or without it—the bonds to the extent of several thousands of dollars were issued. The instruments were elegantly engraved, with such external indications as were calculated to arrest the eye, and through it to inspire confidence. They were signed by the commissioners of Mercer County, attested by their clerk, and authenticated by the county seal conspicuously put. At the head of the bonds it was announced that they were issued for stock in the Pittsburg and Erie Company, and were payable in twenty years from their date in the city of New York. The words in the obligatory part of the instrument were as follows:
“ Know all men by these presents, that the County of Mercer, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is indebted to the Pittsburg and Erie Railroad Company in the full and just sum of one thousand dollars, which sum of money said county agrees and promises to pay, twenty years after the date hereof, to the said Pittsburg and Erie Railroad Company, or bearer, with interest, at the rate of six per centum per annum, payable semi-annually on the first Monday of January and July, at the office of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, in the city of New York, upon the delivery of the coupons severally hereto annexed: for which payments of principal and interest, well and truly to be made, the faith, credit and property of the said County of Mercer are hereby solemnly pledged, under the authority of an act of Assembly of this Commonwealth, entitled A supplement to the act incorporating t e Pittsburg and Erie Railroad Company, which said act was approved the 21st day of April, A.D. 1846, and which said supplement became a law on the 4th day of May, 1852.
A number of the bonds having got, bona fide and for value paid, into the possession of one Hacket, a citizen of New Hampshire, and the coupons,—themselves also payable to •bearer,—being due and unpaid, he sued the County of Mercer upon them, in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Having put the bonds and coupons in evidence, the county now offered to prove that no such recommendation as was required by the act was made by the grand jury, but that the jury signed a paper, in which they state that they “ would recommend the commissioners of Mercer County to subscribe to the capital stock of the company to such an amount, and under such restrictions as may be required by the act of Assembly authorizing them' to subscribe stock to said road, to an amount not exceeding $150,000.” The county proposed further to prove, that while by the provisions of the act the railroad company was required to accept “ an act fixing the gauges of railroads in Erie County,” before it should be entitled to the benefit of said act authorizing counties to subscribe to the capital stock of said company, the company, by a resolution of the stockholders, had refused to accept those provisions, and had declared it to be inexpedient to accept subscriptions made by counties. All this being offered for the purpose of showing that the commissioners of Mercer County acted illegally in making the subscription, and in issuing bonds in payment t ereof; and that they issued the same without authority of aw, so that the bonds are not binding upon the county. . county proposed to prove further, “ that the bonds issued were paid out by the railroad company to contractors at about sixty-six and two-thirds cents on the dollar; all this or the purpose of showing that the bonds were procured rom the County of Mercer by misrepresentation and fraud, an were not binding upon her, and after being thus ob-me were disposed of at less than their par value, in violal°n of the provisions of the act authorizing the county to subscribe
. and also for the purpose of showing want f-nd failure of consideration.”
he court below refused to let such evidence be given;
Argument for the county.
and the suit having accordingly gone against the county, the correctness of the ruling was the point now considered here.
J/r. Stewart for the county: If the bonds were not issued in accordance with the requirements of law, which authorized the commissioners to make a subscription and issue bonds in payment therefor, they are void. In Mercer County v. The Railroad Company,* where the subscription to this same road by this same county came in question, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that there was such a failure on the part of the grand jury to perform the duty imposed upon it by the act of the legislature, passed the 4th day of May, 1852, as rendered the act of the commissioners, in making the subscription and issuing the bonds, illegal. The court accordingly rescinded the subscription, and ordered the bonds in possession of the railroad company to be surrendered. In that case it is decided, that by a proper and necessary construction of the act all discretionary power was vested in the grand jury and withheld from the commissioners, and that the grand jury not having designated, advised and recommended the amount to be subscribed, the commissioners had no authority to make a subscription,—the performance of the duty enjoined upon the grand jury having been a prerequisite to vest authority in the commissioners. The act of Assembly requiring certain things as conditions precedent to the issue of the bonds, and of course to their validity, is specifically referred to by name and date in the face of the instruments. This is the same as if it was set out at length. .
If the bonds were issued without legal authority, no subsequent transfer can render them valid. Even a note, strictly negotiable, made by an assumed agent who acts without authority, acquires no increased obligation upon the principal by passing from hand to hand. There was n authority proceeding from the principal to put it upon
* 27 Pennsylvania State, 389.
Argument for the creditor.
course, and be it long or short, it imparts to it no increased virtue. The inquiry always addresses itself to every one, Is it the contract of the party whose name it bears ? The responsibility of a correct reply to this inquiry is imposed upon every one who gives it currency.
Bonds were never recognized by the lex mercatoria as commercial paper. The distinction between specialties and simple promises is defined by the common law. The remedies for their enforcement have always been different, and these lines of distinction have never been obliterated by any general system of jurisprudence, in this or any other country, with which we have any juridical comity, either as to their nature or the means of enforcing them. The same equities which exist between the original parties remain and follow specialties into whatever hands they may go, without regard to supervening equities. In no State has this ancient and salutary rule of law become so fixed as in Pennsylvania. Diamond v. Lawrence County* is a strong case, and almost in point. The bonds apparently were in the hands of bond fide holders for value. But the court adverts to the shocking frauds which had prevailed, in obtaining the issue, and declared that the county was not bound for more than the railroad had received. The law of the place where the contract is made, and the obligation there assumed, govern its construction. Every one making a contract is presumed to make it with reference to its legal effect, whether direct or incidental, in the State where it is made; and if this court were to act on any other principle, our system, political and judicial alike, would be deranged.
■Mir. Loomis for the bondholder: All the elegance of the engraver s art, all the plighted “ faith, credit and property,” of modern finance, all the strength and assurances of language, ave hore been used to allure the purchaser. Reference is made on the face of the bond to an act of Assembly—not to put him on his guard, lest the preliminary requisition may not
* 87 Pennsylvania State, 358.
Argument for the creditor.
have been complied with—but to attract him by evidence that the instrument is issued under the highest sanction. It had that effect, and the paper passed readily into the hands of a confiding holder in the distant State of New Hampshire, as a safe and secure investment. How can the county now, with the proceeds of the bond in its treasury—with riches which the railway will bring to its people in enjoyment—set up the defence it does, and proclaim to the nations, “Base is the slave who pays ? ”
The recommendation of the grand jury was sufficient to warrant the subscription. If it were not, the county is concluded by Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, decided in this court,* from denying the sufficiency. The act, no doubt, required the amount to be designated by the grand jury. But the jury signed a paper in which they stated that they “ would recommend ” the commissioners to subscribe “ to such an amount and under such restrictions as may be required by the act of Assembly authorizing them to subscribe stock to said road to an amount not exceeding $150,000.” This is a substantial compliance. Even if there were an irregularity in not designating the precise amount to be subscribed, no decided case renders the subscription void. This question was before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Mercer County v. The Railroad Company, and was left undecided; Woodward, J., concurring in the opinion given by Lewis, J., that a subscription made, without any designation by the grand jury, was without competent authority and therefore void, Lowrie, J., not concurring, Knox, J., dissenting, and Black, C. J., absent. This case is not an authority for anything. The controversy was between the county and the railroad company only. The court directed the bonds ($84,900), remaining in the possession of the company, to be surrendered to the county. The remaining $65,100 having been paid to Johnson & Co., on account of work under their contract, the court refused to take action in relation to these bonds, a portion of which was purchased and are now held by the plain-
Argument for the creditor.
tiff. It declares that it leaves undisturbed the question how far innocent holders of the bonds already negotiated might be protected. In the County of Lawrence v. The Northwestern Railroad Company,* a subscription made by the county to the stock of the Northwestern Railroad Company, was annulled and set aside, “ without prejudice, however, to any rights which third persons may have lawfully acquired as purchasers of the bonds issued on payment of the said stock.” And this ground is tenable. It is that which the Federal court for the second circuit (Grier, J.) has always taken. It has said (i), that it could not understand on what ground the constitutionality of acts authorizing these subscriptions could be maintained. But that the State court had maintained it, and that this was enough; (ii), that though the courts might, from a variety of causes, restrain an issue not yet made, still when the bonds were once issued and in the hands of innocent holders for value, that the county was bound to pay them. The distinction is one entirely obvious.
The bonds in this case import upon their face a compliance with the law. According to Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, the purchaser was not bound to look further for evidence of a compliance with the conditions of the grant of the power. The security was sold in a distant market. To require the purchaser to ascertain, at his peril, from an examination of the records of the county, whether facts authenticated by its proper officers and the seal of the county were rue or not, would involve him in unreasonable trouble and expense, greatly impair the value and diminish the currency
°t such securities.
he act of Assembly did not require the company to accept e provisions of the gauge law at all. It simply declared in a ^ovi8<b that the acceptance of this act (May 4th, 1852) by e sai company shall be deemed also an acceptance of the visions of the act fixing the gauge of railroads in the j t.ne acceptance was not made a condition
ent to the right to receive the benefit of the act autho-
* 32 Pennsylvania State, 152.
Argument for the creditor.
rizing counties to subscribe, but the acceptance of the act of 1852 involved an acceptance of the gauge law. The act of 1852 was accepted by the company’s receiving the subscription of the county and the bonds issued in payment reciting a full compliance with the requirements of the law. This would have involved an acceptance of the provisions of the gauge law, had that law continued in force. It was, however, repealed before the construction of the railroad was commenced. A particular fact here requires to be stated: The report of Mercer County v. The. Railroad Company, shows that I was of counsel for the company. On the trial of a subsequent cause against the company, I asserted that the case was decided upon a mistake of fact; the gauge law having been accepted by the company, evidence of which was before the court at the time the decision was made, and I read from the paper book before the court at the time of the decision, and furnished by the counsel of Mercer County, a resolution adopted at said meeting of stockholders, of the 24th of December, 1851, which proved what I asserted.* When that resolution was read, one of the judges, Mr. Justice James Thompson, who resided at Erie, where the meeting of stockholders was held, and who had a profoundly intimate knowledge both of the facts and the law of these cases, remarked, that there was no doubt about the acceptance of the gauge law. The remaining judges acquiesced in silence. And thus the only support upon which the decision in that case rested was withdrawn. That case, having been so decided, is not an authority foi anything.
It is true that in Diamond v. Lawrence County the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared, “ We have said, on several occasions, that we will not treat these bonds as negotia e securities.” The court admits, however, that“ on this ground we stand alone. All the courts, English and American, are against us.” Ko reader of modern law will question the truth o
*
The resolution was thus: t , pnTn. “.Resolved, That the stockholders of the Pittsburg and Erie “ r°ound by pany here convened, do hereby accept, and do hereby g f ranroah the provisions of the act aforesaid, being an act fixing the gauge ot in the County of Erie, approved the 11th day of March, 1851.
Argument for the creditor.
sentences italicized.* But that case was exceptional. The community, in a state of intoxication about railroad subscriptions, had become wild. The voices of men of sense were not heard in an hour where madness ruled. The court determined to withstand this folly; the ardor civiumpravajubentium. In taking a position, the judge, it is true, gives a “ flash of his cimeter” sufficiently alarming. But he did not mean to place his court in opposition to all the tribunals which the world most respects; nor, construing his announcement in a reasonable way, does he do so. At the moment when the transfer of the bond in suit was made there was a bill in equity pending, to restrain the transfer of all bonds of that sort; and his chief reliance was on this fact.f Bona jides was scarce predicable in law of the transaction involved. And the language of the judge himself, in one part of his opinion, shows how little the dictum relied on by the other side entered into the grounds of the decree. It was but an answer to the argument, too much pressed at the bar, of what some courts in other States had done, and it meant no more than that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would not decree plain injustice upon the example of any or of all the courts of Christendom. After all, however, the court did not declare the bonds void. It allowed a recovery for what the railway company had actually received. The disrespect wrongly supposed to have been here expressed for precedent, and the apparent disregard of vested interests, [p. 92] destroyed with the profession everywhere the value of a case which, if the assumption of the court that bona fides did not exist was true, was itself rightly decided. The case was not well received in Pennsylvania when it was reported, and the clearer sense of the court is expressed in subsequent decisions, which, if Diamond v. Lawrence County decided what some have supposed, certainly overrule it. In the case of The Commonwealth v. The City of Pittsburgh it was declared that “ the holder of bonds, made payable to bearer, has a right to presume that they wrere issued and transferred in the mode agreed upon by the original parties; that he is not affected by any agreement between the obligor and obligee, that the latter should provide for the payment of the interest thereon.” This case goes almost the length of that of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, as to the presumptions that arise in favor of the holder of this species of paper.
*
See 1 American Leading Cases, note to Overton v. Tyler; 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, note to Miller v. Race. t It is manifest from this statement,” says Woodward, J., in giving that part of the opinion which is at p. 355, “.that the bond now in suit was trans-erred by the company in contempt of the authority of this court. After the service of the subpoena in the equity suit, the company had no authority, un er any pretence whatever, to part with a bond. ...... Considering e extraordinary notoriety which attended the equity suit against the rai road company, we think the rule is applicable here without that limita,/>n’ according to that rule, the suit was notice to all the world, of all e acts alleged in the pleadings; so that this plaintiff stands in no better selve^10n f°r en^orc^nS the bond against the county than the company themBtate <^°U^ 8tan<L” Diamond v. Lawrence County, 37 Pennsylvania * 34 Pennsylvania State, 496; and see Commonwealth v. Commissioners of Alleghany County, 37 Id., 237; Same v. Same, 32 Id., 218.
Why shall such instruments not be regarded as having the qualities of negotiable paper ? When issued by corporations, as they always are, they are necessarily under seal; but they do not from that fact alone become specialties. A corporation, if speaking or acting in form, can speak or act only by the medium of a seal. It is the way in wdiich as an artificial person it acts, or expresses itself; as natural ones express themselves by handwriting simply.
Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court:
The bonds declare on their face that the faith, credit, and property of the county is solemnly pledged, under the authority of certain acts of Assembly, and that in pursuance of said act the bonds were signed by the commissioners of the county. They are on their face complete and perfect; exhibiting no defect in form or substance; and the evident offered is to show the recitals on the bonds are not true; not that no law exists to authorize their issue, but that the bon s [p. 93] were not made “ in pursuance of the acts of Assembly” authorizing them.
We have decided in the case of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall* that where the bonds on their face import a compliance with the law under which they were issued, the purchaser is not bound to look further. The decision of the board of commissioners may not be conclusive in a direct proceeding to inquire into the faqts before the rights and interests of other parties had attached; but after the authority has been executed, the stock subscribed, and the bonds issued and in the hands of innocent holders, it would be too late, even in a direct proceeding, to call it in question.
The case of Mercer County v. The Railroad} has been cited as governing this case. But on examination it will be found not to contradict the doctrine we have just stated. That was a bill in equity, praying an injunction against the issuing of a portion of the bonds not yet delivered over to the company, or negotiated by them. It charged that the commissioners had not pursued the conditions, limitations, and restrictions of the act that authorized their issue; that, by the act, “ all such subscriptions shall be made after and not before the amount of such subscriptions shall have been designated, advised, and recommended by a grand jurywhereas the grand jury only “ recommended that the commissioners of Mercer County subscribe to the capital stock of the ittsburg and Erie Railroad, to such amount and under such restrictions as may be required by the act of Assembly, by authorizing them to subscribe, to an amount not exceeding 150,000. The bill charged also most gross frauds perpetrated by the company, which fully justified the decree ° fh 6 C°Ur^’ without resorting to the very ingenious and a er astute criticism of the phraseology of the grand jury.
18 ^Ue recommend only, and have not used the ShO n ^es^na^e an<^ advise” a subscription not to exceed t ’00’ would require no great latitude of construction _ rea^ this, as the commissioners might justly do, as a
+ 27 Pennsylvania State, 389. [p. 94] substantial compliance with the act. But it would be contrary to good faith and common justice to permit them to allege a newly discovered construction of an equivocal power, after they have sold the bonds, and they have passed (as is admitted in this case) into the hands of bond fide purchasers for value. It is proper to state that the construction given has the assent of only two of the judges of that learned court, so that it has not the force of precedent even if it applied to this case. But it is due also to them to say, that they intimate no opinion as to how far the reasons given for enjoining the further issue of the bonds ought to affect their validity in the hands of “innocent holders.”
The proviso to the act authorizing the subscription declares, “ that the acceptance of this act shall be deemed also an acceptance of the provisions of the act passed the eleventh day of May, 1851, entitled ‘An act fixing the gauges of railroads in the County of Erie.’ ” Now it is very plain that the acceptance of the bonds authorized by this act, operated per se as an acceptance of the gauge law. It needed no resolution of the railroad corporation on their minutes. They were estopped by law after receipt of the bonds, until they were afterwards released by statute from the condition. But if that were not sufficient, it may be stated as a matter of history, that on the 24th of December, 1851, the stockholders passed a resolution “ accepting and agreeing to be bound by the provisions of the act aforesaid, being an act fixing t e gauge of railroads in Erie County.” This fact, though overlooked in the case last mentioned, was afterwards broug to the notice of the same court, on the trial of a subsequent cause between the same parties. As any subsequent resolution of the railroad company refusing compliance wi this condition annexed by statute to their acceptance o e county subscriptions would be fraudulent and void, the court did not err in refusing to admit the evidence offered, or permit the defendants to prove that the recitals o
bonds were untrue. . „Q;irnad
2. Can evidence of the fraud practised by the ra [p. 95] company to whom these bonds were delivered, and by whom they were paid to bond, fide holders for value, or the fact that they were negotiated at less than their par value, be received to defeat the recovery of the plaintiff below ?
This species of bonds is a modern invention, intended to pass by manual delivery, and to have the qualities of negotiable paper; and their value depends mainly upon this character. Being issued by States and corporations, they are necessarily under seal. But there is nothing immoral or contrary to good policy in making them negotiable, if the necessities of commerce require that they should be so. A mere technical dogma of the courts or the common law cannot prohibit the commercial world from inventing or using any species of security not known in the last century. Usage of trade and commerce are acknowledged by courts as part of the common law, although they may have been unknown to Bracton or Blackstone. And this malleability to suit the necessities and usages of the mercantile and commercial world is one of the most valuable characteristics of the common law. When a corporation covenants to pay to bearer and gives a bond with negotiable qualities, and by this means obtains funds for the accomplishment of the useful enterprises of the day, it cannot be allowed to evade the payment by parading some obsolete judicial decision that a bond, for some technical reason, cannot be made payable to bearer.
That these securities are treated as negotiable by the commercial usages of the whole civilized world, and have received the sanctions of judicial recognition, not only in this court,* but of nearly every State in the Union, is well known and admitted.
ut we have been referred to the case of Diamond v. Lawrence County,] for a single decision to the contrary. The earned judge who delivered the opinion of the court in that case says, “ We will not treat these bonds as negotiable secun ies. *Qn this ground we stand alone. All the courts, [p. 96] American and English, are against us.* We know the history of these municipal and county bonds, how the legislature, yielding to popular excitement about railroads, authorized their issue; how grand jurors and county commissioners and city officers were moulded to the purposes of speculators; how recklessly railroad officers abused the overwrought confidence of the public, and what burdens of debt and taxation have resulted to the people,—a moneyed security was thrown upon the market by the paroxysm of the public mind,” &c.
*
White V. Vermont Railroad Co., 21 Howard, 575. t 87 Pennsylvania State, 353.
If this decision of that learned court was founded on the construction of the constitution or statute law of the State, or the peculiar law of Pennsylvania as to titles to land, we would have felt bound to follow it. But we have often decided that on questions of mercantile or commercial law, or usages which are not peculiar to any place, we do not feel bound to yield our own judgment, especially if it be fortified by the decision of “ all other English and American courts. These securities are not peculiar to Pennsylvania, or governed by its statutes or peculiar law.
Although we doubt not the facts stated as to the atrocious frauds which have been practised, in some counties, in issuing and obtaining these bonds, we cannot agree to overrule our own decisions and change the law to suit hard cases. The epidemic insanity of the people, the folly of county officers, the knavery of railroad “ speculators,” are pleas which might have just weight in an application to restrain the issue or negotiation of these bonds, but cannot prevail to authorize their repudiation, after they have been negotiated and have come into the possession of bond fide holders.
In the case of Woods v. Lawrence County* as a corollary from the principles stated, we have decided, that in a suit brought on the coupons of these bonds by a bond fide holder, his right to recover is not affected by the fact that the railroa company sold the bonds at a discount, contrary to the pro visions of their charter, which forbids the sale of them at less than their par value.
As the evidence offered, and overruled by the court, could not have established a defence to the case made by the plaintiff’ below, the court did not err in refusing to receive it.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
Bayne v. Morris.
1. Where an award made under submission by parties plaintiff and defendant to that effect, awards that one party shall pay to the other a certain sum on one day specified, another sum on another day specified, and that to secure the payments he shall give a bond in a penal sum, and the party against whom the award is made refuses to do any of the things awarded, an action of debt will lie against him even although the time when both sums of money were awarded to be paid has not yet arrived. The right of action is perfect on the party’s refusal to give the bond. 2. The power of arbitrators is exhausted when they have once finally determined matters before them. Any second award is void.
Bayne & Morris having differences with each other, agreed to refer them to arbitrators, who besides being authorized to determine the amount to be paid, were authorized to award upon what terms, as to time and security, the payment should be made. On the 23d of January, 1858, the arbitrators made an award, and on the 26th of the same month made a second one. Both were received in evidence on the trial below, a though the pleadings were framed solely with reference to east one. This adjudged that Morris should pay to Bayne one sum on the 28th of July, 1858; '’St second sum on the 20th ioz>AanUary’ ’ an(t a third sum on the 20th of January,
, and that to secure the payment of these sums he should give to Bayne a bond with penalty and surety. No bond sa^f ®ayne» on the 28th of January, 1858, that is to Mo’ th6 sums awarded to be paid had fallen due, sued that TAJ11 fian ac^on debt; the declaration setting forth, bond f 6 e^en(^an^ hath not given the said plaintiff the said ofte tir 8ecur^y the payments aforesaid, although nor eret° requested; nor hath he paid the said money wher N thereof, but the same to pay hath refused;
y an action hath accrued to the said plaintiff’ to have vol. i. r [p. 98] the said sums of money or satisfactory security for the pay. ment of the same, to the damage,” &c.
The court below (the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland), instructed the jury that if the suit was brought before either of the sums of money became due, the plaintiff could not recover, and the correctness of this ruling was the point, on error, here.
No considerable objection was taken below to the validity of the second award, that, to wit, of 26th of January.
Jfr. Brent for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Wallis contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court:
The court did not pass on the validity of the award as it should have done; but directed the jury to find against the plaintiff, on the ground that the action was premature, neither of the sums awarded to be paid being due when suit was brought.
It is clear that Bayne instituted his action because Morris would not give the security he was required to by the award. And on principle and authority, he had a right to sue when Morris refused to perform any material part of the award. The parties to the submission chose to say to the arbitrators, « If you order anything to be paid, by one to the other, you must settle how the payment is to be secured.” The arbitrators did decide on the very point submitted to them, and direct the kind of security to be given, and on Morris’s failure to give the* bond as required he was in default, and of action accrued. He had no right to say to Bayne, “ ai until the instalments are due, and then I will elect w e er or not to keep the award.” The provision for security was equally valid as the order for the payment of money, an i may be nearly as important. The right of action was as per feet, on Morris’s refusal to give the penal bond, as i won have been after the credit allowed by the award had expir• Where goods are sold on credit, and the purchaser agr
to give his note for them, and refuses to do so, it as held that an action will lie before the.credit expires, and tn [p. 99] the measure of damages is the price of the goods.* The court below, therefore, erred in charging the jury that the right to sue was in abeyance until the time limited by the award for the payment of the money had expired.
Inasmuch as this case is to be remanded, it is proper to say, that in the opinion of the court, the award of the 26th of January is inoperative and void. Arbitrators exhaust their power when they make a final determination on the matters submitted to them. They have no power after having made an award to alter it; the authority conferred on them is then at an end.f
Bayne can, if so advised, amend his pleadings and test the correctness of the first award; which not being properly in the case has not been considered by the court, and no opinion is therefore given on the question of its validity.
Judgment reversed and venire awarded.
4
East 147. ’ ^ne^a'rt ”• Clwine, 5 Watts & Sergeant, 157; Mussen v. Price, + p’ u^on v- Solomonson, 3 Bosanquet & Puller, 582. t ussell on Arbitration, 135.
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