Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986)
Full caption
CARGILL, INC., ET AL. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 9, 1986
CARGILL, INC., ET AL. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 85-473. Argued October 6, 1986-Decided December 9, 1986
Section 16 of the Clayton Act entitles a private party to sue for injunctive relief against "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." Respondent, the country's fifth-largest beef packer, brought an action in Federal District Court under §16 to enjoin the proposed merger of petitioner Excel Corporation, the second-largest packer, and Spencer Beef, the third-largest packer. Respondent alleged that it was threatened with a loss of profits by the possibility that Excel, after the merger, would lower its prices to a level at or above its costs in an attempt to increase its market share. During trial, Excel moved for dismissal on the ground that respondent had failed to allege or show that it would suffer antitrust injury, but the District Court denied the motion. After trial, the District Court held that respondent's allegation of a "price-cost squeeze" that would severely narrow its profit margins constituted an allegation of antitrust injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondent's allegation of a "price-cost squeeze" was not simply one of injury from competition but was a claim of injury by a form of predatory pricing in which Excel would drive other companies out of the market.
Held:
1. A private plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under §16 must show a threat of injury "of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 489. Pp. 109-113.
2. The proposed merger does not constitute a threat of antitrust injury. A showing, as in this case, of loss or damage due merely to increased competition does not constitute such injury. And while predatory pricing is capable of inflicting antitrust injury, here respondent neither raised nor proved any claim of predatory pricing before the District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting respondent's allegations as equivalent to allegations of injury from predatory conduct. Pp. 113-119.
3. This Court, however, will not adopt in effect a per se rule denying competitors standing to challenge acquisitions on the basis of preda-
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 105
104 Opinion of the Court
tory-pricing theories. Nothing in the Clayton Act's language or legislative history suggests that Congress intended this Court to ignore injuries caused by such anticompetitive practices as predatory pricing. Pp. 120-122. 761 F. 2d 570, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and MARSHALL, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 122. BLACKMUN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Ronald G. Carr argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert F. Hanley, Alan K. Palmer, and Phillip Areeda.
Deputy Solicitor General Cohen argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cannon, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Catherine G. O'Sullivan, Andrea Limmer, and Marcy J. K. Tiffany.
William C. McClearn argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James E. Hartley, Elizabeth A. Phelan, and Marcy G. Glenn.*
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under§ 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 737, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 26, private parties "threatened [with] loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws" may seek injunctive relief. This case presents two questions: whether a plaintiff seeking relief under § 16 must prove a threat of antitrust injury, and, if so, whether loss or damage due to increased competition constitutes such injury.
*Thomas B. Leary filed a brief for the Business Roundtable as amicus curiae urging reversal.
David L. Foster and Kim Sperduto filed a brief for Royal Crown Cola Co. as amicus curiae.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
I
Respondent Monfort of Colorado, Inc. (Monfort), the plaintiff below, owns and operates three integrated beef-packing plants, that is, plants for both the slaughter of cattle and the fabrication of beef.1 Monfort operates in both the market for fed cattle (the input market) and the market for fabricated beef (the output market). These markets are highly competitive, and the profit margins of the major beef packers are low. The current markets are a product of two decades of intense competition, during which time packers with modern integrated plants have gradually displaced packers with separate slaughter and fabrication plants.
Monfort is the country's fifth-largest beef packer. Petitioner Excel Corporation (Excel), one of the two defendants below, is the second-largest packer. Excel operates five integrated plants and one fabrication plant. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cargill, Inc., the other defendant below, a large privately owned corporation with more than 150 subsidiaries in at least 35 countries.
On June 17, 1983, Excel signed an agreement to acquire the third-largest packer in the market, Spencer Beef, a division of the Land O'Lakes agricultural cooperative. Spencer Beef owned two integrated plants and one slaughtering plant. After the acquisition, Excel would still be the second-largest packer, but would command a market share almost equal to that of the largest packer, IBP, Inc. (IBP).2
1
As the District Court explained, "'[f]abrication' is the process whereby the carcass is broken down into either whole cuts (referred to as 'primals', 'subprimals' and 'portions') or ground beef." 591 F. Supp. 683, 690 (Colo. 1983). Whole cuts that are then vacuum packed before shipment are called "boxed beef"; the District Court found that "80% of all beef received at the retail supermarket level and at the hotel, restaurant, and institutional ('HRI') level" is boxed beef. Ibid.
2
The District Court relied on the testimony of one of Monfort's witnesses in determining market share. Id., at 706-707. According to this testimony, Monfort's share of the cattle slaughter market was 5.5%, Excel's share was 13.3%, and IBP's was 24.4%. 1 App. 69. Monfort's
Monfort brought an action under §16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §26, to enjoin the prospective merger.3 Its complaint alleged that the acquisition would "violat[e] Section 7 of the Clayton Act because the effect of the proposed acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in several different ways ...." 1 App. 19. Monfort described the injury that it allegedly would suffer in this way:
"(f) Impairment of plaintiff's ability to compete. The proposed acquisition will result in a concentration of economic power in the relevant markets which threatens Monfort's supply of fed cattle and its ability to compete in the boxed beef market." Id., at 20.
Upon agreement of the parties, the District Court consolidated the motion for a preliminary injunction with a full trial
share of the production market was 5.7%, Excel's share was 14.1%, and IBP's share was 27.3%. Id., at 64. After the merger, Excel's share of each market would increase to 20.4%. Id., at 64, 69; 761 F. 2d 570, 577 (CAlO 1985).
3
Section 16 states: "Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of subtitle IV of title 49, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In any action under this section in which the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to such plaintiff." 15 U. S. C. § 26.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
on the merits. On the second day of trial, Excel moved for involuntary dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that Monfort had failed to allege or show that it would suffer antitrust injury as defined in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477 (1977). The District Court denied the motion. After the trial, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order enjoining the proposed merger. The court held that Monfort's allegation of "price-cost 'squeeze'" that would "severely narro[ w ]" Monfort's profit margins constituted an allegation of antitrust injury. 591 F. Supp. 683, 691-692 (Colo. 1983). It also held that Monfort had shown that the proposed merger would cause this profit squeeze to occur, and that the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton Act.4 Id., at 709-710.
On appeal, Excel argued that an allegation of lost profits due to a "price-cost squeeze" was nothing more than an allegation of losses due to vigorous competition, and that losses from competition do not constitute antitrust injury. It also argued that the District Court erred in analyzing the facts relevant to the § 7 inquiry. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in all respects. It held that Monfort's allegation of a "price-cost squeeze" was not simply an allegation of injury from competition; in its view, the alleged "price-cost squeeze" was a claim that Monfort would be injured by what the Court of Appeals "consider[ed] to be a form of predatory pricing in which Excel will drive other companies out of the market by paying more to its cattle suppliers and charging less for boxed beef that it sells to institutional buyers and consumers." 761 F. 2d 570, 575 (CAlO 1985). On the § 7 issue, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court's decision was not clearly erroneous. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1049 (1985).
4
Section 7 prohibits mergers when the "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," 15 U. S. C. § 18.
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 109
II
This case requires us to decide, at the outset, a question we have not previously addressed: whether a private plaintiff seeking an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury. To decide the question, we must look first to the source of the antitrust injury requirement, which lies in a related provision of the Clayton Act, §4, 15 U. S. C. § 15.
Like § 16, § 4 provides a vehicle for private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Under § 4, "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . , and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U. S. C. § 15. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., supra, we held that plaintiffs seeking treble damages under § 4 must show more than simply an "injury causally linked" to a particular merger; instead, "plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful." Id., at 489 (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs in Brunswick did not prove such injury. The plaintiffs were 3 of the 10 bowling centers owned by a relatively small bowling chain. The defendant, one of the two largest bowling chains in the country, acquired several bowling centers located in the plaintiffs' market that would have gone out of business but for the acquisition. The plaintiffs sought treble damages under § 4, alleging as injury "the loss of income that would have accrued had the acquired centers gone bankrupt" and had competition in their markets consequently been reduced. Id., at 487. We held that this injury, although causally related to a merger alleged to violate § 7, was not an antitrust injury, since "[i]t is inimical to [the antitrust] laws to award damages" for losses stem-
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
ming from continued competition. Id., at 488. This reasoning in Brunswick was consistent with the principle that "the antitrust laws . . . were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.'" Ibid., quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original).
Subsequent decisions confirmed the importance of showing antitrust injury under §4. In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465 (1982), we found that a health-plan subscriber suffered antitrust injury as a result of the plan's "purposefully anticompetitive scheme" to reduce competition for psychotherapeutic services by reimbursing subscribers for services provided by psychiatrists but not for services provided by psychologists. Id., at 483. We noted that antitrust injury, "as analyzed in Brunswick, is one factor to be considered in determining the redressability of a particular form of injury under § 4," id., at 483, n. 19, and found it "plain that McCready's injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of the antitrust laws." Id., at 483. Similarly, in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983), we applied "the Brunswick test," and found that the petitioner had failed to allege antitrust injury. Id., at 539-540.5
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in part that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss
5
A showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish standing under §4, because a party may have suffered antitrust injury but may not be a proper plaintiff under § 4 for other reasons. See generally Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1483-1485 (1985) (distinguishing concepts of antitrust injury and antitrust standing). Thus, in Associated General Contractors we considered other factors in addition to antitrust injury to determine whether the petitioner was a proper plaintiff under § 4. 459 U. S., at 540. As we explain, n. 6, infra, however, many of these other factors are not relevant to the standing inquiry under § 16.
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 111
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws " 15 U. S. C. § 26. It is plain that§ 16 and§ 4 do differ in various ways. For example, § 4 requires a plaintiff to show actual injury, but § 16 requires a showing only of "threatened" loss or damage; similarly, § 4 requires a showing of injury to "business or property," cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251 (1972), while§ 16 contains no such limitation.6 Although these differences do affect the nature of the injury cognizable under each section, the lower courts, including the courts below, have found that under both § 16 and § 4 the plaintiff must still allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.7 We agree.
6
Standing analysis under § 16 will not always be identical to standing analysis under § 4. For example, the difference in the remedy each section provides means that certain considerations relevant to a determination of standing under § 4 are not relevant under § 16. The treble-damages remedy, if afforded to "every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation," Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465, 476-477 (1982), or for "all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation," Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S., at 263, n. 14, would "open the door to duplicative recoveries," id., at 264, and to multiple lawsuits. In order to protect against multiple lawsuits and duplicative recoveries, courts should examine other factors in addition to antitrust injury, such as the potential for duplicative recovery, the complexity of apportioning damages, and the existence of other parties that have been more directly harmed, to determine whether a party is a proper plaintiff under § 4. See Associated General Contractors, 459 U. S., at 544-545; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977). Conversely, under § 16, the only remedy available is equitable in nature, and, as we recognized in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., "the fact is that one injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions are no more effective than one." 405 U. S., at 261. Thus, because standing under § 16 raises no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, some of the factors other than antitrust injury that are appropriate to a determination of standing under § 4 are not relevant under § 16.
7
See Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F. 2d 1325, 1334 (CA7 1986); Midwest Communications, Inc. v. Minnesota Twins, Inc., 779 F. 2d 444, 452-453 (CA8 1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1163 (1986); Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F. 2d 1354, 1358 (CA6), cert. dism'd, 469 U. S. 1200 (1985); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F. 2d 205, 210-211 (CA3 1980).
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
The wording concerning the relationship of the injury to the violation of the antitrust laws in each section is comparable. Section 4 requires proof of injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"; § 16 requires proof of "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." It would be anomalous, we think, to read the Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure an injunction against a threatened injury for which he would not be entitled to compensation if the injury actually occurred.
There is no indication that Congress intended such a result. Indeed, the legislative history of§ 16 is consistent with the view that § 16 affords private plaintiffs injunctive relief only for those injuries cognizable under § 4. According to the House Report:
"Under section 7 of the act of July 2, 1890 [revised and incorporated into Clayton Act as § 4], a person injured in his business and property by corporations or combinations acting in violation of the Sherman antitrust law, may recover loss and damage for such wrongful act. There is, however, no provision in the existing law authorizing a person, firm, corporation, or association to enjoin threatened loss or damage to his business or property by the commission of such unlawful acts, and the purpose of this section is to remedy such defect in the law." H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 21 (1914) (emphasis added).8
8
See also S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 17-18, 50 (1914). Although the references to § 16 in the debates on the passage of the Clayton Act are scarce, those that were made are consistent with the House and Senate Reports. For example, in this excerpt from a provision-by-provision description of the bill, Representative McGillicuddy (a member of the House Judiciary Committee) stated: "Under the present law any person injured in his business or property by acts in violation of the Sherman antitrust law may recover his damage. In fact, under the provisions of the law he is entitled to recover threefold damage whenever he is able to prove his case. There is no provision Under this most excellent provision a man does not have to wait until he is ruined in his business before he has his remedy. Thus the bill not only protects the individual from loss or damage, but it relieves him of the tremendous burden of long and expensive litigation, often intolerable." 51 Cong. Rec. 9261 (1914) (emphasis added). Representative Floyd described the nature of the § 16 remedy in these terms: "In section 16 ... is a provision that gives the litigant injured in his business an entirely new remedy. "... [S]ection 16 gives any individual, company, or corporation ... or combination the right to go into court and enjoin the doing of these unlawful acts, instead of having to wait until the act is done and the business destroyed and then sue for damages. . . . [S]o that if a man is injured by a discriminatory contract, by a tying contract, by the unlawful acquisition of stock of competing corporations, or by reason of someone acting unlawfully as a director in two banks or other corporations, he can go into court and enjoin and restrain the party from committing such unlawful acts." Id., at 16319.
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 113
104 Opinion of the Court
Sections 4 and 16 are thus best understood as providing complementary remedies for a single set of injuries. Accordingly, we conclude that in order to seek injunctive relief under § 16, a private plaintiff must allege threatened loss or damage "of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick, 429 U. S., at 489. We therefore turn to the question whether the proposed merger in this case threatened respondent with antitrust injury.
III
Initially, we confront the problem of determining what Monfort alleged the source of its injury to be. Monfort's complaint is of little assistance in this regard, since the injury
under the present law, however, to prevent threatened loss or damage even though it be irreparable. The practical effect of this is that a man would have to sit by and see his business ruined before he could take advantage of his remedy. In what condition is such a man to take up a long and costly lawsuit to defend his rights?
"The proposed bill solves this problem for the person, firm, or corporation threatened with loss or damage to property by providing injunctive relief against the threatened act that will cause such loss or damage.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
alleged therein-"an impairment of plaintiff's ability to compete" - is alleged to result from "a concentration of economic power." 1 App. 19. The pretrial order largely restates these general allegations. Record 37. At trial, however, Monfort did present testimony and other evidence that helped define the threatened loss. Monfort alleged that after the merger, Excel would attempt to increase its market share at the expense of smaller rivals, such as Monfort. To that end, Monfort claimed, Excel would bid up the price it would pay for cattle, and reduce the price at which it sold boxed beef. Although such a strategy, which Monfort labeled a "price-cost squeeze," would reduce Excel's profits, Excel's parent corporation had the financial reserves to enable Excel to pursue such a strategy. Eventually, according to Monfort, smaller competitors lacking significant reserves and unable to match Excel's prices would be driven from the market; at this point Excel would raise the price of its boxed beef to supracompetitive levels, and would more than recoup the profits it lost during the initial phase. 591 F. Supp., at 691-692.
From this scenario two theories of injury to Monfort emerge: (1) a threat of a loss of profits stemming from the possibility that Excel, after the merger, would lower its prices to a level at or only slightly above its costs; (2) a threat of being driven out of business by the possibility that Excel, after the merger, would lower its prices to a level below its costs.9 We discuss each theory in turn.
A
Monfort's first claim is that after the merger, Excel would lower its prices to some level at or slightly above its costs in order to compete with other packers for market share.
9
In its brief, Monfort also argues that it would be injured by "the trend toward oligopoly pricing" that could conceivably follow the merger. Brief for Respondent 18-20. There is no indication in the record that this claim was raised below, however, and so we do not address it here.
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104 Opinion of the Court
Excel would be in a position to do this because of the multi-plant efficiencies its acquisition of Spencer would provide, 1 App. 74-75, 369-370. To remain competitive, Monfort would have to lower its prices; as a result, Monfort would suffer a loss in profitability, but would not be driven out of business.10 The question is whether Monfort's loss of profits in such circumstances constitutes antitrust injury.
To resolve the question, we look again to Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, supra. In Brunswick, we evaluated the antitrust significance of several competitors' loss of profits resulting from the entry of a large firm into its market. We concluded:
"[T]he antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed here. At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration. The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors,' Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S., at 320. It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed here." Id., at 488.
The loss of profits to the competitors in Brunswick was not of concern under the antitrust laws, since it resulted only from continued competition. Respondent argues that the losses in Brunswick can be distinguished from the losses alleged here, since the latter will result from an increase, rather than from a mere continuation, of competition. The range of ac-
10
In this case, Monfort has conceded that its viability would not be threatened by Excel's decision to lower prices: "Because Monfort's operations were as efficient as those of Excel, only below-cost pricing could remove Monfort as an obstacle." Id., at 11-12; see also id., at 5, and n. 6 ("Monfort proved it was just as efficient as Excel"); id., at 18; 761 F. 2d, at 576 ("Monfort would only be harmed by sustained predatory pricing").
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
tions unlawful under § 7 of the Clayton Act is broad enough, respondent claims, to support a finding of antitrust injury whenever a competitor is faced with a threat of losses from increased competition.11 We find respondent's proposed construction of § 7 too broad, for reasons that Brunswick illustrates. Brunswick holds that the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. The kind of competition that Monfort alleges here, competition for increased market share, is not activity forbidden by the antitrust laws. It is simply, as petitioners claim, vigorous competition. To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share. The antitrust laws require no such perverse result, for "[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price competition." Arihur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S. E. Johnson Co., 729 F. 2d 1050, 1057 (CA6), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1036 (1984). The logic of
11
Respondent finds support in the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 for the view that Congress intends the courts to apply § 7 so as to protect the viability of small competitors. The Senate Report, for example, cites with approval this Court's statement in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U. S. 270, 275 (1966), that "the basic purpose of the 1950 Geller-Kefauver Act [amending § 7 of the Clayton Act] was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business." S. Rep. No. 94-803, p. 63 (1976). Even if respondent is correct that Congress intended the courts to apply § 7 so as to keep small competitors in business at the expense of efficiency, a proposition about which there is considerable disagreement, such congressional intent is of no use to Monfort, which has conceded that it will suffer only a loss of profits, and not be driven from the market, should Excel engage in a cost-price squeeze. See n. 10, supra.
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Brunswick compels the conclusion that the threat of loss of profits due to possible price competition following a merger does not constitute a threat of antitrust injury.
B
The second theory of injury argued here is that after the merger Excel would attempt to drive Monfort out of business by engaging in sustained predatory pricing. Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long run.12 It is a prac-
12
Most commentators reserve the term predatory pricing for pricing below some measure of cost, although they differ on the appropriate measure. See, e. g., Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ. 289 (1980) (reviewing various proposed definitions). No consensus has yet been reached on the proper definition of predatory pricing in the antitrust context, however. For purposes of decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986), for example, we defined predatory pricing as either "(i) pricing below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of cost." Id., at 585, n. 8. Definitions of predatory pricing also vary among the Circuits. Compare Arthu'I' S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S. E. Johnson Co., 729 F. 2d 1050, 1056-1057 (CA6) (pricing below marginal or average variable cost presumptively illegal, pricing above such cost presumptively legal), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1036 (1984), with Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 698 F. 2d 1377 (CA9) (pricing above average total costs may be deemed predatory upon showing of predatory intent), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 955 (1983). Although neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals explicitly defined the term predatory pricing, their use of the term is consistent with a definition of pricing below cost. Such a definition is sufficient for purposes of this decision, because only below-cost pricing would threaten to drive Monfort from the market, seen. 9, supra, and because Monfort made no allegation that Excel would act with predatory intent. Thus, in this case, as in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., supra, we find it unnecessary to "consider whether recovery should ever be available ... when the pricing in question is above some measure of incremental cost," 475 U. S., at 585, n. 9, or whether above-cost pricing coupled with predatory intent is ever sufficient to state a claim of predation. See n. 11, supra.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
tice that harms both competitors and competition. In contrast to price cutting aimed simply at increasing market share, predatory pricing has as its aim the elimination of competition. Predatory pricing is thus a practice "inimical to the purposes of [the antitrust] laws," Brunswick, 429 U. S., at 488, and one capable of inflicting antitrust injury.13
The Court of Appeals held that Monfort had alleged "what we consider to be a form of predatory pricing ...." 761 F. 2d, at 575. The court also found that Monfort "could only be harmed by sustained predatory pricing," and that "it is impossible to tell in advance of the aquisition" whether Excel would in fact engage in such a course of conduct; because it could not rule out the possibility that Excel would engage in predatory pricing, it found that Monfort was threatened with antitrust injury. Id., at 576. t
Although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly define what it meant by predatory pricing, two interpretations are plausible. First, the court can be understood to mean that Monfort's allegation of losses from the above-cost "price-cost squeeze" was equivalent to an allegation of injury from predatory conduct. If this is the proper interpretation, then the court's judgment is clearly erroneous because (a) Monfort made no allegation that Excel would act with predatory intent after the merger, and (b) price competition is not predatory activity, for the reasons discussed in Part III-A, supra.
Second, the Court of Appeals can be understood to mean that Monfort had shown a credible threat of injury from below-cost pricing. To the extent the judgment rests on this ground, however, it must also be reversed, because Monfort
13
See also Brunswick, 429 U. S., at 489, n. 14 ("The short-term effect of certain anticompetitive behavior-predatory below-cost pricing, for example-may be to stimulate price competition. But competitors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the market and competition is thereby lessened").
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did not allege injury from below-cost pricing before the District Court. The District Court twice noted that Monfort had made no assertion that Excel would engage in predatory pricmg. See 591 F. Supp., at 691 ("Plaintiff does not contend that predatory practices would be engaged in by Excel or IBP"); id., at 710 ("Monfort does not allege that IBP and Excel will in fact engage in predatory activities as part of the cost-price squeeze").14 Monfort argues that there is evidence in the record to support its view that it did raise a claim of predatory pricing below. This evidence, however, consists only of four passing references, three in deposition testimony, to the possibility that Excel's prices might dip below costs. See 1 App. 276; 2 App. 626, 666, 669. Such references fall far short of establishing an allegation of injury from predatory pricing. We conclude that Monfort neither raised nor proved any claim of predatory pricing before the District Court.15
14
The Court of Appeals may have relied on the District Court's speculation that the merger raised "a distinct possibility ... of predatory pricing." 591 F. Supp., at 710. This statement directly followed the District Court's second observation that Monfort did not raise such a claim, however, and thus was clearly dicta.
15
Even had Monfort actually advanced a claim of predatory pricing, we doubt whether the facts as found by the District Court would have supported it. Although Excel may have had the financial resources to absorb l()sses over an extended period, other factors, such as Excel's share of market capacity and the barriers to entry after competitors have been driven from the market, must also be considered. In order to succeed in a sustained campaign of predatory pricing, a predator must be able to absorb the market shares of its rivals once prices have been cut. If it cannot do so, its attempt at predation will presumably fail, because there will remain in the market sufficient demand for the competitors' goods at a higher price, and the competitors will not be driven out of business. In this case, Excel's 20.4% market share after the merger suggests it would lack sufficient market power to engage in predatory pricing. See Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L. J. 284, 292 (1977) (60% share necessary); Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 Yale L. J. 1337, 1348 (1978) (60% share not enough). It is possible that a firm with a low market share might nevertheless have sufficient excess capacity to enable it rapidly to expand its output and absorb the market shares of its rivals. According to Monfort's expert witness, however, Excel's postmerger share of market capacity would be only 28.4%. 1 App. 66. Moreover, it appears that Excel, like the other large beef packers, operates at over 85% of capacity. Id., at 135-136. Thus Excel acting alone would clearly lack sufficient capacity after the merger to satisfy all or most of the demand for boxed beef. Although it is conceivable that Excel could act collusively with other large packers, such as IBP, in order to make the scheme work, the District Court found that Monfort did not "assert that Excel and IBP would act in collusion with each other in an effort to drive others out of the market," 591 F. Supp., at 692. With only a 28.4% share of market capacity and lacking a plan to collude, Excel would harm only itself by embarking on a sustained campaign of predatory pricing. Courts should not find allegations of predatory pricing credible when the alleged predator is incapable of successfully pursuing a predatory scheme. Seen. 17, infra. It is also important to examine the barriers to entry into the market, because "without barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time." Matsushita, 475 U. S., at 591, n. 15. In discussing the potential for oligopoly pricing in the beef-packing business following the merger, the District Court found significant barriers to entry due to the "costs and delays" of building new plants, and "the lack of [available] facilities and the cost [$20-40 million] associated with refurbishing old facilities." 591 F. Supp., at 707-708. Although the District Court concluded that these barriers would restrict entry following the merger, the court's analysis was premised on market conditions during the premerger period of competitive pricing. Ibid. In evaluating entry barriers in the context of a predatory pricing claim, however, a court should focus on whether significant entry barriers would exist after the merged firm had eliminated some of its rivals, because at that point the remaining firms would begin to charge supracompetitive prices, and the barriers that existed during competitive conditions might well prove insignificant. In this case, for example, although costs of entry into the current competitive market may be high, if Excel and others in fact succeeded in driving competitors out of the market, the facilities of the bankrupt competitors would then be available, and the record shows, without apparent contradiction, that shut-down plants could be producing efficiently in a matter of months and that equipment and a labor force could readily be obtained, 1 App. 95-96. Similarly, although the District Court determined that the high costs of building new plants and refurbishing old plants created a "formidable" barrier to entry given "the low profit margins in the beef industry," 591 F. Supp., at 707, this finding speaks neither to the likelihood of entry during a period of supracompetitive profitability nor to the potential return on investment in such a period.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
IV
In its amicus brief, the United States argues that the "danger of allowing a competitor to challenge an acquisi-
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 121
104 Opinion of the Court
tion on the basis of necessarily speculative claims of post-acquisition predatory pricing far outweighs the danger that any anticompetitive merger will go unchallenged." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. On this basis, the United States invites the Court to adopt in effect a per se rule "denying competitors standing to challenge acquisitions on the basis of predatory pricing theories." Id., at 10.
We decline the invitation. As the foregoing discussion makes plain, supra, at 117-118, predatory pricing is an anticompetitive practice forbidden by the antitrust laws. While firms may engage in the practice only infrequently, there is ample evidence suggesting that the practice does occur.16 It would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing to a party seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely because such injuries rarely occur.17 In any case, nothing in
16
See Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); Miller, Comments on Baumol and Ordover, 28 J. Law & Econ. 267 (1985).
17
Claims of threatened injury from predatory pricing must, of course, be evaluated with care. As we discussed in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the likelihood that predatory pricing will benefit the predator is "inherently uncertain: the short-run loss [from pricing below cost] is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the competition. . . . [and] on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain." 475 U. S., at 589. Although the commentators disagree as to whether it is ever rational for a firm to engage in such conduct, it is plain that the obstacles to the successful execution of a strategy of predation are manifold, and that the disincentives to engage in such a strategy are accordingly numerous. See, e. g., id., at 588-593 (discussing obstacles to successful predatory pricing conspiracy); R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 144-159 (1978); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ., at 291-300; Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
STEVENS, J., dissenting 479 u. s.
the language or legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests that Congress intended this Court to ignore injuries caused by such anticompetitive practices as predatory pricing.
V
We hold that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under §16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury, and that a showing of loss or damage due merely to increased competition does not constitute such injury. The record below does not support a finding of antitrust injury, but only of threatened loss from increased competition. Because respondent has therefore failed to make the showing §16 requires, we need not reach the question whether the proposed merger violates §7. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting.
This case presents the question whether the antitrust laws provide a remedy for a private party that challenges a horizontal merger between two of its largest competitors. The issue may be approached along two fundamentally different paths. First, the Court might focus its attention entirely on the postmerger conduct of the merging firms and deny relief
U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 939-940 (1979). As we stated in Matsushita, "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." 475 U. S., at 589. Moreover, the mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing-lowering prices-is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition; because "cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition ... [;] mistaken inferences ... are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." Id., at 594.
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 123
104 STEVENS, J., dissenting
unless the plaintiff can prove a violation of the Sherman Act. Second, the Court might concentrate on the merger itself and grant relief if there is a significant probability that the merger will adversely affect competition in the market in which the plaintiff must compete. Today the Court takes a step down the former path;1I believe that Congress has directed us to follow the latter path.
In this case, one of the major firms in the beef-packing market has proved to the satisfaction of the District Court, 591 F. Supp. 683, 709-710 (Colo. 1983), and the Court of Appeals, 761 F. 2d 570, 578-582 (CAlO 1985), that the merger between Excel and Spencer Beef is illegal. This Court holds, however, that the merger should not be set aside because the adverse impact of the merger on respondent's profit margins does not constitute the kind of "antitrust injury" that the Court described in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477 (1977). As I shall demonstrate, Brunswick merely rejected a "novel damages theory," id., at 490; the Court's implicit determination that Brunswick forecloses the appropriate line of inquiry in this quite different case is therefore misguided. In my view, a
1
Whether or not it so intends, the Court in practical effect concludes that a private party may not obtain injunctive relief against a horizontal merger unless the actual or probable conduct of the merged firms would establish a violation of the Sherman Act. The Court suggests that, to support a claim of predatory pricing, a competitor must demonstrate that the merged entity is "able to absorb the market shares of its rivals once prices have been cut," either because it has a high market share or because it has "sufficient excess capacity to enable it rapidly to expand its output and absorb the market shares of its rivals." Ante, at 119-120, n. 15. The Court would also require a competitor to demonstrate that significant barriers to entry would exist after "the merged firm had eliminated some of its rivals .... " Ante, at 120, n. 15. Indeed, the Court expressly states that the antitrust laws "require the courts to protect small businesses ... only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws." Ante, at 116 (emphasis added). By emphasizing postmerger conduct, the Court reduces to virtual irrelevance the related but distinct issue of the legality of the merger itself.
STEVENS, J., dissenting 479 u. s.
competitor in Monfort's position has standing to seek an injunction against the merger. Because Monfort must compete in the relevant market, proof establishing that the merger will have a sufficient probability of an adverse effect on competition to violate § 7 is also sufficient to authorize equitable relief.
I
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, 38 Stat. 731, and expanded in 1950, 64 Stat. 1125, because Congress concluded that the Sherman Act's prohibition against mergers was not adequate.2 The Clayton Act, unlike the Sherman Act, proscribes certain combinations of competitors that do not produce any actual injury, either to competitors or to competition. An acquisition is prohibited by § 7 if "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U. S. C. § 18. The legislative history teaches us that this delphic language was designed "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1950).3 In Brunswick,
2
"Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not covered by the act of July 2, 1890 [the Sherman Act], or other existing antitrust acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
3
This Court has described the legislative purpose of § 7 as follows: "[I]t is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency. Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 317-318 (1962) (footnote omitted).
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 125
104 STEVENS, J.' dissenting
supra, this Court recognized that§ 7 is "a prophylactic measure, intended 'primarily to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil . . . ."' 429 U. S., at 485 (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 597 (1957)).
The 1950 amendment to § 7 was particularly concerned with the problem created by a merger which, when viewed by itself, would appear completely harmless, but when considered in its historical setting might be dangerous to competition. As Justice Stewart explained:
"The principal danger against which the 1950 amendment was addressed was the erosion of competition through the cumulative centripetal effect of acquisitions by large corporations, none of which by itself might be sufficient to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. Congress' immediate fear was that of large corporations buying out small companies. A major aspect of that fear was the perceived trend toward absentee ownership of local business. Another, more generalized, congressional purpose revealed by the legislative history was to protect small businessmen and to stem the rising tide of concentration in the economy. These goals, Congress thought, could be achieved by 'arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.' Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, [370 U. S.,] at 317." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U. S. 270, 283-284 (1966) (dissenting).
Thus, a merger may violate § 7 of the Clayton Act merely because it poses a serious threat to competition and even though the evidence falls short of proving the kind of actual restraint that violates the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. The language of § 16 of the Clayton Act also reflects Congress' emphasis on probable harm rather than actual harm. Section 16 authorizes private parties to obtain injunctive re-
STEVENS, J., dissenting 479 u. s.
lief "against threatened loss or damage" by a violation of §7.4 The broad scope of the language in both§ 7 and §16 identifies the appropriate standing requirements for injunctive relief. As the Court has squarely held, it is the threat of harm, not actual injury, that justifies equitable relief:
"The evident premise for striking [the injunction at issue] was that Zenith's failure to prove the fact of injury barred injunctive relief as well as treble damages. This was unsound, for §16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 26, which was enacted by the Congress to make available equitable remedies previously denied private parties, invokes traditional principles of equity and authorizes injunctive relief upon the demonstration of 'threatened' injury. That remedy is characteristically available even though the plaintiff has not yet suffered actual injury; . . . he need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or recur." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 130 (1969) (citations omitted).
Judged by these standards, respondent's showing that it faced the threat of loss from an impending antitrust violation clearly conferred standing to obtain injunctive relief. Re-
4
Section §16 states, in relevant part: "Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue ...." 15 U. S. C. § 26.
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 127
104 STEVENS, J., dissenting
spondent alleged, and in the opinion of the courts below proved, the injuries it would suffer from a violation of§ 7:
"Competition in the markets for the procurement of fed cattle and the sale of boxed beef will be substantially lessened and a monopoly may tend to be created in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act; "Concentration in those lines of commerce will be increased and the tendency towards concentration will be accelerated." 1 App. 21. More generally, given the statutory purposes to protect small businesses and to stem the rising tide of concentration in particular markets, a competitor trying to stay in business in a changing market must have standing to ask a court to set aside a merger that has changed the character of the market in an illegal way. Certainly the businesses - small or large-that must face competition in a market altered by an illegal merger are directly affected by that transaction. Their inability to prove exactly how or why they may be harmed does not place them outside the circle of interested parties whom the statute was enacted to protect.
II
Virtually ignoring the language and history of § 7 of the Clayton Act and the broad scope of the Act's provision for injunctive relief, the Court bases its decision entirely on a case construing the "private damages action provisions" of the Act. Brunswick, 429 U. S., at 478. In Brunswick, we began our analysis by acknowledging the difficulty of meshing § 7, "a statutory prohibition against acts that have a potential to cause certain harms," with§ 4, a "damages action intended to remedy those harms." Id., at 486. We concluded that a plaintiff must prove more than a violation of § 7 to recover damages, "since such proof establishes only that injury may result." Ibid. Beyond the special nature of an action for treble damages, § 16 differs from § 4 because by its terms it requires only that the antitrust violation threaten
STEVENS, J., dissenting 479 u. s.
the plaintiff with loss or damage, not that the violation cause the plaintiff actual "injur[y] in his business or property." 15 U. S. C. §15.
In the Brunswick case, the Court set aside a damages award that was based on the estimated additional profits that the plaintiff would have earned if competing bowling alleys had gone out of business instead of being acquired by the defendant. We concluded "that the loss of windfall profits that would have accrued had the acquired centers failed" was not the kind of actual injury for which damages could be recovered under §4. 429 U. S., at 488. That injury "did not occur 'by reason of' that which made the acquisitions unlawful." Ibid.
In contrast, in this case it is the threatened harm-to both competition and to the competitors in the relevant market-that makes the acquisition unlawful under §7. The Court's construction of the language of § 4 in Brunswick is plainly not controlling in this case.5 The concept of "antitrust injury," which is at the heart of the treble-damages action, is simply not an element of a cause of action for injunctive relief that depends on finding a reasonable threat that an incipient disease will poison an entire market.
A competitor plaintiff who has proved a violation of §7, as the Brunswick Court recognized, has established that injury may result. This showing satisfies the language of§ 16 provided that the plaintiff can show that injury may result to him. When the proof discloses a reasonable probability that competition will be harmed as a result of a merger, I would also conclude that there is a reasonable probability that
5
In Brunswick, we reserved this question, stating: "The issue for decision is a narrow one.... Petitioner questions only whether antitrust damages are available where the sole injury alleged is that competitors were continued in business, thereby denying respondents an anticipated increase in market shares." 429 U. S., at 484 (footnote omitted). Nor did we reach the issue of a competitor's standing to seek relief from a merger under § 16 in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983). Id., at 524, n. 5.
CARGILL, INC. v. MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC. 129
104 STEVENS, J., dissenting
a competitor of the merging firms will suffer some corresponding harm in due course. In my opinion, that reasonable probability gives the competitor an interest in the proceeding adequate to confer standing to challenge the merger. To hold otherwise is to frustrate § 7 and to read §16 far too restrictively.
It would be a strange antitrust statute indeed which defined a violation enforceable by no private party. Effective enforcement of the antitrust laws has always depended largely on the work of private attorney generals, for whom Congress made special provision in the Clayton Act itself.6 As recently as 1976, Congress specifically indicated its intent to encourage private enforcement of§ 16 by authorizing recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee by a plaintiff in an action for injunctive relief. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1396 (amending 15 U. S. C. § 26).
The Court misunderstands the message that Congress conveyed in 1914 and emphasized in 1950. If, as the District Court and the Court of Appeals held, the merger is illegal, it should be set aside. I respectfully dissent.
6
15 U. S. C. §15. This Court has emphasized the importance of the statutory award of fees to private antitrust plaintiffs as part of the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 130-131 (1969), the Court observed: "[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws." See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U. S. 495, 502 (1969); Hawaii v. Standard oa Co., 405 U. S. 251, 262 (1972).
Syllabus 479 u. s.
R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO. v. DURHAM COUNTY,
NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 85-1021. Argued October 6, 1986-Decided December 9, 1986* Appellant, a New Jersey corporation with its principal office and only man-
ufacturing facilities located in North Carolina, blends tobacco imported from foreign countries with domestic tobacco in producing finished tobacco products virtually all of which are consumed in the United States. Upon importation, the foreign tobacco is placed under customs bond given by appellant, and is stored in one or more of the customs-bonded warehouses owned and maintained by appellant in appellee Forsyth and Durham Counties, N. C., usually for a 2-year period to permit aging. Appellant pays the required customs duties upon withdrawal of the tobacco from the warehouses. Under North Carolina statutes, tobacco present in the State on January 1 of each year is subject to a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax levied and collected by counties and municipalities. In listing its taxable personal property for 1983 in appellee counties, appellant claimed that, under the ruling in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S. 145, its imported tobacco in customs-bonded warehouses was immune from state taxation on federal constitutional grounds. The counties' tax supervisors denied the claim, and the denials were upheld on administrative appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting appellant's contentions that the tax violated the Import-Export and Due Process Clauses, and distinguished Xerox, reasoning that it prohibited state taxation only of imported goods stored under bond and awaiting export, not of those destined for domestic manufacture and consumption. Appellant filed with the North Carolina Supreme Court both a notice of appeal and a petition for discretionary review. The court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of a substantial constitutional question and denied appellant's petition. Appellant then filed with this Court an appeal from the North Carolina Supreme Court and another appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
*Together with No. 85-1022, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, North Carolina, et al., on appeal from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
130 Syllabus
Held:
1. This Court has appellate jurisdiction as to the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment, under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), which extends such jurisdiction to review a "final" judgment "rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had ... where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity." Pp. 136-139.
(a) Appellant properly challenged on federal constitutional grounds the validity of North Carolina's ad valorem property tax, and there was a final judgment in favor of validity. Cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434. Pp. 136-138.
(b) The appeal from the North Carolina Supreme Court, not the North Carolina Court of Appeals, is the proper one under § 1257(2). A North Carolina statute gives a litigant an appeal of right to the State Supreme Court from any Court of Appeals decision that "directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States." In the absence of positive assurance to the contrary by the North Carolina Supreme Court, its grant of appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial federal constitutional question constitutes a decision on the merits affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment, not a determination that the State Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Pp. 138-139.
2. Consistent with the Supremacy Clause, a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored in a customs-bonded warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale. The holding in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, supra, is limited to its factual situation, that is, where taxed imported goods in customs-bonded warehouses are intended for transshipment in foreign commerce. North Carolina's taxation of appellant's goods does not contradict the purposes of the federal statutory scheme governing customs-bonded warehouses to promote foreign commerce and to aid certain sectors of American economic life. To invalidate the North Carolina tax would place domestic tobacco, which is subject to the ad valorem property tax while aging, at a distinct disadvantage to the imported tobacco; domestic producers and local taxpayers would "subsidize" the growers of imported tobacco. Nor does the taxation here conflict with the central purpose behind customs-bonded warehouses: to ensure that federal customs duties are collected. The federal statutes and regulations that guide monitoring the movement of imported goods and the warehouse proprietor's conduct with respect to such goods both guarantee the collection of federal revenues and are not so comprehensive as to leave no room for North Carolina's assessment of ad valorem taxes. Pp. 139-152.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
3. Application of the North Carolina tax to appellant's imported tobacco does not violate the Import-Export Clause. The focus of Import-Export Clause cases is on the nature of the tax at issue, not the nature of the goods as imports. North Carolina's tax does not offend the policies behind the Clause: concern that a state tax might interfere with federal regulation of foreign commerce; fear that on account of such state taxation the Federal Government will lose an important source of revenue; and a desire to maintain harmony among the States, which would be disturbed if seaboard States could tax goods merely flowing through their ports to other States not so favorably situated. Cf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276. Pp. 152-155.
4. North Carolina's tax does not violate the Due Process Clause. A state tax comports with the Clause if the taxing power exerted by the State bears a "fiscal relation" to protection, opportunities, and benefits given by the State. In light of the police, fire, and other services provided to appellant's imported tobacco by North Carolina counties and cities, such a "fiscal relation" clearly exists in this case. P. 156.
No. 85-1021, 314 N. C. 540, 335 S. E. 2d 21, affirmed. No. 85-1022, appeal dismissed; reported below: 73 N. C. App. 475, 326 S. E. 2d 911.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for appellant in both cases. With him on the briefs were Bob C. Griffo, Hugh Calkins, Kathleen B. Burke, John C. Duffy, Jr., James W. McGrath, Thomas L. Kummer, and John A. Cocklereece, Jr.
Rex E. Lee argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, S. C. Kitchen, Thomas Russell Odom, P. Eugene Price, Jr., Jonathan V. Maxwell, and John G. Wolfe III. t
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case1presents the narrow but important question whether a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored under bond in a cus-
t Benna Ruth Solomon and Beate Bloch filed a brief for the National Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
1
Although there are two appeals (by the same appellant), there is but one case. See Part II, infra.
130 Opinion of the Court
toms warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale.
I
Appellant R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office in Winston-Salem, N. C. Reynolds manufactures finished tobacco products for sale to distributors and other authorized purchasers. App. to Juris. Statement 26a. Virtually all its products are consumed in the United States. Id., at 31a. Its only manufacturing facilities are in Winston-Salem, where it blends imported tobacco with domestic tobacco in its manufacturing process.2
The foreign tobacco is shipped to a port of entry in the United States and is placed under customs bond given by Reynolds to secure the payment of federal import duties. See 19 U. S. C. § 1555 (1982 ed., Supp. Ill). The tobacco is then transported by truck or rail to one or more of the 88 customs-bonded warehouses owned and maintained by Reynolds in Forsyth and Durham Counties, N. C.3 Because
2
The imported tobacco comes from Bulgaria, Syria, Lebanon, Brazil, and a few other places. App. to Juris. Statement 29a.
3
Pursuant to federal regulation, a private party may have a building or part of a building designated as a customs-bonded warehouse for the purpose of storing imported goods. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 1555-1565 (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill); 19 CFR §§ 19.1-19.12 (1986). A customs officer supervises the operation of the warehouse, although labor on the stored merchandise is performed by the proprietor. The regulations prescribe, among other things, the manner in which goods enter and leave the warehouse, § 19.6, the records the proprietor must keep, § 19.12, and the supervision the customs officer is to perform, § 19.4. Customs warehouses are divided into eight classes. § 19. l(a). Reynolds has two types, Class 2 and Class 8. Its Class 8 warehouses are storage sheds for the cleaning, sorting, and repacking of tobacco. See § 19. l(a)(8). Its Class 2 warehouses are used exclusively for the storage of tobacco. See § 19. l(a)(2). It is customary for Reynolds in the course of its manufacturing process to move imported tobacco from storage in its Class 8 warehouses to its Class 2 warehouses located in Reynolds' manufacturing areas. App. to Juris. Statement 30a. Reynolds owns these warehouses and the land thereunder, is their sole user, and pays all maintenance expenses and property taxes on them. Id., at 30a, 32a. Goods may remain in a customs-bonded warehouse for up to five years from the date of importation without payment of customs duties. 19 U. S. C. § 1557(a). Once goods are withdrawn, however, duties are due unless the goods are to be exported. Ibid. When Reynolds is ready to use imported tobacco, its practice is to pay the duty and to move the tobacco out of the Class 2 areas in order to process it with domestic tobacco. App. 90. When this move has been made, the imported tobacco is incorporated in the finished tobacco products within two weeks. Id., at 91.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
nearly all imported tobacco requires aging, it is usually in the warehouses for two years. Reynolds pays the required customs duties upon withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouses. Reynolds stores its domestic tobacco in nonbonded warehouses in the same two counties. It receives identical city and county police, fire, and other public services at its customs-bonded and nonbonded warehouses. App. to Juris. Statement 32a.
Tobacco present in North Carolina on January 1 of each year is subject to an ad valorem property tax in the amount of 60% of the rate generally applicable to other property.4 See N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-277(a) and 105-285 (1985). Counties and municipalities are authorized to levy and collect property taxes, but they must do so in a manner uniform throughout the State. See § 105-272. In listing its taxable personal property for 1983 in Durham and Forsyth Counties, Reynolds claimed that, under this Court's ruling in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S. 145 (1982), its imported tobacco in customs-bonded warehouses was immune from taxation on federal constitutional grounds. App. 4-13. The tax supervisors for the respective counties denied this claim, and the County Boards of Equalization and Review upheld the denials. Id., at 15-23.
Reynolds then filed appeals (consolidated for hearing) with the North Carolina Property Tax Commission, sitting as the State Board of Equalization and Review. Reynolds again
4
There is no equal protection issue in this case.
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contended that the taxation of the imported tobacco was at odds with Xerox. The Commission, however, found Xerox distinguishable because the warehoused goods under consideration in that case were destined for foreign markets and were lodged only temporarily in customs-bonded warehouses in this country, whereas Reynolds' tobacco was not so destined and had "nothing temporary about its existence in this country." App. to Juris. Statement 35a-36a. The Commission, id., at 36a, likened the Reynolds facts, instead, to those of American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969), appeal dism'd, 396 U. S. 273 (1970), where a nondiscriminatory tax on imported goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses and destined for domestic consumption was upheld.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 73 N. C. App. 475, 326 S. E. 2d 911 (1985). The court first rejected Reynolds' contention that the tax violated the Import-Export Clause, because the tax was clearly not an impost or duty. Id., at 478-480, 326 S. E. 2d, at 914-915. The court then distinguished Xerox, reasoning that it prohibited state taxation only of goods stored under bond and awaiting export, not of· those destined for domestic manufacture and consumption. 73 N. C. App., at 482-483, 326 S. E. 2d, at 916-917. Following the California Court of Appeal's conclusion in American Smelting that customs-bonded warehouses were not meant to create a "warehouse enclave" for foreign goods destined to be sold and consumed in domestic commerce, the North Carolina court observed that it would be unfair to "exempt imported tobacco aging in customs bonded warehouses from property taxation while imposing these taxes on domestically-grown tobacco aging in ordinary warehouses." 73 N. C. App., at 483-484, 326 S. E. 2d, at 917. Finally, the court dismissed Reynolds' due process claim, finding that the appropriate test was "'whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection,
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
opportunities and benefits given by the state."' Id., at 485, 326 S. E. 2d, at 918, quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940). Because there was no dispute that the imported tobacco received the benefit of local services, the imposition of the ad valorem tax did not constitute a due process violation. 73 N. C. App., at 485-486, 326 S. E. 2d, at 918.
Reynolds then filed with the North Carolina Supreme Court a notice of appeal and a petition for discretionary review. The Supreme Court granted the counties' subsequent motion to dismiss for lack of a substantial constitutional question and denied Reynolds' petition. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 314 N. C. 540, 335 S. E. 2d 21 (1985).
Reynolds appealed to this Court.5 We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 475 u. s. 1009 (1986).
II
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1257, appellate jurisdiction lies in this Court to review a "final" judgment "rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had ... (2) ... where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
A
The initial jurisdictional question presented here is whether Reynolds properly challenged the validity of North Carolina's ad valorem property tax and whether there was a final judgment in favor of validity. Because the North Carolina Court of Appeals sustained the tax against Reynolds' claim that, as applied to its imported tobacco, the tax was repugnant to the Import-Export, Supremacy, and Due Process
5
Reynolds took care to file one appeal (No. 85-1021) from the North Carolina Supreme Court and another (No. 85-1022) from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See App. to Juris. Statement 39a, 41a.
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Clauses, and the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that no substantial constitutional question was raised by the appeal, our appellate jurisdiction would seem to be assured. Appellees contend, however, that jurisdiction under § 1257(2) has not been established because Reynolds failed to make "'an explicit and timely insistence' " in the North Carolina courts that the State's tax statute, as applied to it, violated the Federal Constitution. Brief for Appellees 12, quoting Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellees argue that Reynolds challenged merely the assessment or levy of the tax by North Carolina authorities, a situation where appellate jurisdiction does not lie. We find the argument unpersuasive.
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979), this Court was faced with a similar challenge to appellate jurisdiction. Appellees in that case asserted that Japanese shipping companies had been denied only a constitutional immunity from taxation for their shipping containers and that the California courts had not sustained the tax statute against federal constitutional attack. See id., at 440. Contrary to that suggestion, this Court found that the appellants had challenged the constitutionality of the tax statute, as applied, and that the California courts had sustained the statute's validity. Id., at 441. We further observed that "a state statute is sustained within the meaning of § 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds." Ibid.
The situation presented by the present case is like that in Japan Line: Reynolds explicitly drew the ad valorem property tax, as applied to its imported tobacco, into constitutional question, and the North Carolina courts upheld the validity of the tax. See also Xerox Corp. v. County ofHarris, 459 U. S., at 149; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 219, n. 12 (1981). Thus, under § 1257(2), there was a final state-
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
court judgment in favor of the validity of the tax, and Reynolds properly challenged it.
B
Reynolds draws our attention to a jurisdictional detail that is unresolved. It has not been made clear which North Carolina court, in circumstances like those present here, is the "highest court" from which an appeal lies under §1257. North Carolina, with exceptions not pertinent here, gives a litigant an appeal of right to its Supreme Court from any decision of its Court of Appeals that "directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State." N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 (Supp. 1985). As Reynolds explains, the grant of appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial federal constitutional question by the North Carolina Supreme Court could be interpreted as a decision on the merits affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment, or it could be viewed as a determination by that court that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. See Brief for Appellant 11. Depending upon how the dismissal is to be characterized, appeal here would properly lie from the Supreme Court or, on the other hand, from the Court of Appeals.6
We have resolved that we should decide this jurisdictional question so that practitioners may be certain of their ground. In the absence of positive assurance to the contrary from the North Carolina Supreme Court, we consider that court's dismissal of Reynolds' appeal to be a decision on the merits. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1037-1044 (1983). With no such contrary assurance in the present record, we
6
Although Reynolds has informed this Court that the Clerk of the North Carolina Supreme Court advised it that a dismissal "for lack of a substantial constitutional question is not regarded by that Court as a decision on the merits," Reynolds observes that there is no reported decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that discusses the effect of such a dismissal. Brief for Appellant 11, n. 8.
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conclude that it is the appeal from that court that is the proper one under § 1257.
When confronted with a comparable situation arising from Ohio, this Court ruled that the appeal lies from the Ohio Supreme Court and not from that State's Court of Appeals. See Matthews v. Huwe, 269 U. S. 262, 265 (1925); Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, 265 U. S. 384, 386 (1924). See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 515 (1927).7 In Matthews, Chief Justice Taft, an Ohioan writing for the Court, explained the appropriateness of the appeal from the Ohio Supreme Court:
"It is one of those not infrequent cases in which decision of the merits of the case also determines jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, not because the court was really without jurisdiction, for it could have taken it, but because the question was regarded as frivolous, which is a different thing from finding that the petition was not in character one which the Court could consider." 269 U. S., at 265.
This reasoning is applicable to the present case: there is no question that the North Carolina Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear Reynolds' appeal, but it determined not to do so in light of its conclusion that the appeal raised no substantial constitutional question.
We therefore regard the appeal in No. 85-1021 (from the Supreme Court of North Carolina) as the proper one, and we dismiss the appeal in No. 85-1022 (from the North Carolina Court of Appeals) for want of jurisdiction.
7
We acknowledge that this Court, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), allowed certiorari to issue to an Ohio Court of Appeals after the Ohio Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. See id., at 616. The "highest court" requirement, however, was not addressed in that case. We note that treating the North Carolina Supreme Court's summary dismissal as a decision on the merits accords with this Court's view of its own summary dispositions. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 (1975).
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
III
On the merits, the crucial issue is whether Congress has exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause to pre-empt ad valorem state taxation of imported goods that are stored in customs-bonded warehouses and that are destined for domestic markets. Under this Clause the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. In determining whether Congress has invoked this pre-emption power, we give primary emphasis to the ascertainment of congressional intent. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). This may be manifested in several ways. Ibid.; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355 (1986). Chief among the indications of an intent to pre-empt is where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra. Pre-emption may also be found where state legislation would impede the purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). In undertaking this analysis, however, we must be mindful of the principle that "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117, 127 (1973) ("So here, we may not overlook the body of law relating to the sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignties"). See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 500-501 (1984).
In Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S. 145 (1982), this Court recently dealt with the issue of pre-emption of state
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taxation on imported goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses. It there examined the narrow question "whether a state may impose nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property taxes on imported goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse and destined for foreign markets." Id., at 146.8 At the outset of its pre-emption analysis, the Court in Xerox, examined the legislative history of the Warehousing Act of 1846, 9 Stat. 53, the forerunner of the present statutory scheme, in order to uncover the objectives behind the customs-bonded warehouse. The Court observed: "The Act stimulated foreign commerce by allowing goods in transit in foreign commerce to remain in secure storage, duty free, until they resumed their journey in export." 459 U. S., at
150. The Court further noted that making this country a center of world commerce was a desired and conceivable goal in light of our favorable geographic location between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that would facilitate the "transshipment of goods." Id., at 150-151. Moreover, for the drafters of the Act, the promotion of foreign commerce went hand in hand with the growth of American shipping and mercantile industries. Id., at 151. The Court concluded: "To these ends, Congress was willing to waive all duty on goods that were reexported from the warehouse, and to defer, for a
8
The facts in Xerox reinforce the narrowness of the question examined: the imported goods, Xerox copiers, were plainly designed for sale in Latin America, inasmuch as the operating instructions were in Spanish or Portuguese, the machines, as constructed, would not function on the type of electric current that is standard in the United States, it would have cost $100 to convert each machine for domestic sale, and none of the copiers was ever sold in the United States. 459 U. S., at 147-148. In fact, when Texas authorities began to assess ad valorem personal property taxes on the copiers, Xerox immediately shipped them to a foreign trade zone, from which it continued to send the machines to Latin America, and exhibited no intention to convert them for domestic use. Id., at 148. Accordingly, in Xerox the bonded goods were destined to be shipped abroad, unlike Reynolds' tobacco, which is destined for domestic markets.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
prescribed period, the duty on goods destined for American consumption." Ibid.
The Court, therefore, had to determine whether state taxation of the copiers destined for export would contradict the purpose of promoting foreign commerce and the related goal of aiding certain sectors of American economic life. It limited its pre-emption analysis to whether taxation would impede the congressional objectives. It particularly relied upon its earlier decision in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414 (1940), where it had found that the federal warehouse scheme pre-empted a New York City sales tax on oil imported under customs bond, refined in a customs-bonded warehouse,9 and sold as ships' stores for vessels destined for abroad. As the Court in Xerox noted, the tax at issue in McGoldrick would detract from the benefit American refiners received in their freedom from customs duties on the oil and thus undermined the advantage they gained in the competition with their foreign counterparts. 459 U. S., at 152 (citing McGoldrick, 309 U. S., at 429). Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the Xerox Court concluded that the waiver of customs duties benefited those merchants who used American ports "as transshipment centers," gave them a competitive advantage over importers using storage facilities in other countries, and thus promoted foreign commerce to the United States. 459 U. S., at 153. Because the waiver so clearly furthered the Act's purposes, any attempt to remove its benefit, such as would occur through state taxation, was incompatible with these goals. The Court thus ruled that state property tax on the copiers was pre-empted.10
9
The warehouses with which McGoldrick was concerned were of Class 6, see 309 U. S., at 422, defined in the present regulations as those "for the manufacture in bond, solely for exportation, of articles made in whole or in part of imported materials or of materials subject to internal-revenue tax." 19 CFR § 19. l(a)(6) (1986); see also 19 U. S. C. § 1311.
10
The Court remarked that the factual distinctions between McGoldrick and the case before it-namely, that in McGoldrick the oil could be sold only as ships' stores and the tax assessed was a sales tax, whereas Xerox could have paid the duty and withdrawn the copiers for domestic sale and was subject to a property tax-were "distinctions without a legal difference." Xerox, 459 U. S., at 153. According to Reynolds, this remark reveals that the Court was unconcerned in its analysis with whether the goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses were destined for domestic markets or for export. Taken in context, however, the Court's comment suggests the opposite to us: that Xerox had the option to sell the copiers domestically was not significant, given its clear intention to ship them to Latin America; thus, the copiers were as much destined for transshipment in foreign commerce as was the oil in McGoldrick. The difference in the types of taxes in the two cases was of no importance, for imposition of either tax would detract from the benefit accruing to the importer from the waiver of the duty. That the Court in Xerox was concerned solely with goods destined for transshipment in foreign commerce is further demonstrated by the other case upon which it principally relied, District ofColumbia v. International Distributing Corp., 118 U. S. App. D. C. 71, 331 F. 2d 817 (1964), where the Court of Appeals proscribed a District of Columbia excise tax on the sale of beverages to foreign embassies while the beverages were still in a customs-bonded warehouse. Although this Court, 459 U. S., at 154, cited language from International Distributing Corp., 118 U. S. App. D. C., at 73-74, 331 F. 2d, at 819-820, to the effect that customs-bonded warehouses were "federal enclaves free of state taxation" and goods housed therein were outside the taxing jurisdiction of the District until removed, the case appeared to turn on the fact that international law, recognized by Congress, granted diplomatic personnel the right to import goods duty free and tax free for their own use. Id., at 74, 331 F. 2d, at 820. Arguably, then, the beverages at issue in International Distributing Corp. were still in foreign commerce. The Court's additional quotation from Fabbri v. Murphy, 95 U. S. 191, 197-198 (1877), see 459 U. S., at 154, is not inconsistent with this reading of McGoldrick and International Distributing Corp. See n. 24, infra.
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In a summary of its holding, however, this Court rather broadly stated that "state property taxes on goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse are pre-empted by Congress' comprehensive regulation of customs duties." Id., at
154. Reynolds would conclude from that sentence that the holding in Xerox precludes state taxation of any goods in a customs warehouse, regardless of their destination.11 As is
11
Reynolds also notes that counsel for both Xerox and the state taxing authorities expressed the opinion, in response to questions at oral argument in the Xerox case in this Court, that the holding would apply either to goods destined for foreign commerce or to those earmarked for domestic use. Reynolds therefore argues here that the Court did intend its broad language to cover both types of goods. Brief for Appellant 17; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. Although the questioning at oral argument in Xerox suggests that the Court may well have been inquiring into a situation different from the facts before it-not an infrequent occurrence at oral argument-the Court limited the analysis in its opinion to goods in transshipment.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
clear from what has been said above, however, we accept Xerox's holding and the quoted sentence as limited to the factual situation presented in that case, that is, where the goods are intended for transshipment.
It is difficult, moreover, to believe that the purposes in forming the customs-bonded warehouse scheme identified by the Court in Xerox would be disserved by the imposition of ad valorem property taxes on Reynolds' imported tobacco. It makes sense to conclude that state property taxation may discourage an importer whose goods are destined for transshipment in foreign commerce from using American ports and facilities, particularly when the same importer is granted an exemption from customs duties on all goods exported. Similar taxation would hardly deter an importer who, like Reynolds, stores goods in customs-bonded warehouses for up to two years for domestic manufacture and consumption, the storage period arguably being part of the manufacturing process because the tobacco requires aging.12 Unlike Xerox,
12
Because Reynolds' only manufacturing facility is in Forsyth County, there is no suggestion that Reynolds will discontinue its importation of foreign tobacco if the tax is allowed to stand, and that the tax thus will affect foreign commerce adversely. In fact, Reynolds has been importing foreign tobacco into North Carolina for approximately 25 years. See App. 88-89. Reynolds has been paying the North Carolina ad valorem property tax on its imported tobacco at least since this Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276 (1976), abandoned the "original package" doctrine that had barred property taxes on imported inventory retained in its original package in the hands of the importer. That doctrine had prevented state taxation on Reynolds' imported tobacco. See Reply Brief for Appellant 7, n. 9. It may be noted, however, that Reynolds has filed suit in state court seeking refunds of property taxes it paid on imported tobacco for 1980, 1981, and 1982, has paid under protest the taxes for 1984 and 1985, and has claimed-and been denied-an exemption for 1986. See Brief for Appellees 7, n. 8.
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moreover, Reynolds is not completely free of import duties on its goods but simply has them deferred.13 Thus, rather than being a charge that detracts from the absolute benefit of the waiver of duties, the state tax here is in addition to the payment of duties and might well be considered as nothing more than an expected cost of doing business. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 156 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Furthermore, while the tax on goods destined for foreign markets would have harmful effects on American industry and workers by discouraging importers from using American ships and ports, to invalidate the North Carolina tax would place domestic tobacco, which is subject to the ad valorem property tax while aging, at a distinct disadvantage to the imported tobacco. Domestic producers and local taxpayers would thus "subsidize" the growers of imported tobacco. 14 See In re R. J. Reynolds, 73 N. C. App., at 484,
13
14
North Carolina does grant domestic tobacco (and other "farm products") an exemption from taxation for the year following the one in which the product is grown if it is in "an unmanufactured state" and "owned by the original producer." 2D N. C. Gen. Stat. § 105-275(4) (1985). Although this tends to equalize competition between imported and domestic tobacco, it is not clear from the record that Reynolds' domestic tobacco is eligible for the benefit of § 105-275(4). Even if all of Reynolds' tobacco received the benefit of that provision, it would still not be on an equal competitive footing with imported tobacco, which would be exempt from property taxes for up to five years as long as it is stored in customs-bonded warehouses. See 19 U. S. C. § 1557(a). There is no indication in the legislative history of the Warehousing Act that one of the goals of the customs-bonded warehouse system was to benefit imported goods in their competition with domestic goods. In fact, when the bill was debated in the Congress, legislators expressed concern store here and allowed to remain for a limited period without paying duty, it is in no better condition, so far as cost is concerned, than it would have been if it had been kept in store in the country where it was produced, unless storage here is cheaper, and this is questionable." Id., at 795. Senator Dix noted that some benefit might accrue to importers of foreign goods because of the deferral of duties (i. e., interest on the amount for the duties during the deferral period), but he considered that to be immaterial and, in any event, more than offset by the promotion of foreign commerce. Id., at 795-796. Thus, rather than believing that the Act improved the competitive position of foreign goods and their importers, Senator Dix disavowed this purpose and discounted any such effect.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
326 S. E. 2d, at 917 ("Also, since this imported tobacco receives the same local governmental services, such as police and fire protection, as domestic tobacco, local taxpayers
that the deferral of duties would benefit the foreign merchant at his domestic counterpart's expense: "The foreigner could warehouse his goods, safely and cheaply, for three years, without being compelled to pay the duties. He can sell the goods out as he finds customers; and by continuing the practice of invoicing his goods at a cheaper rate than the American merchant can, he will always place himself in a more advantageous position, and the effect would be to drive the latter out of business." Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1042 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Huntington). See also Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 1166 (1846) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
In response to these criticisms, Senator Dix, one of the sponsors of the bill in the Senate, explained that deferral of duties would not give foreign importers and goods such a benefit: "Whether goods are stored in the countries where they are produced, or in our own cities, is of no consequence so far as the question of competition with our domestic products is concerned, unless it can be shown that in the latter case (storing in our own cities) they will be brought into the domestic market at a cost materially less. This, it is believed, cannot be readily shown. Whether stored at home or abroad, the expense of bringing merchandise into the domestic market must be nearly the same. In either case it has the same processes to perform. It must be transported from the factories or workshops where it is produced, to the sea; it must be shipped, carried across the ocean, brought into our ports, and before it can enter into the domestic market to be sold, the impost or duty must be paid. The charges and exactions are the same in both cases. If it is placed in
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would be forced to provide a subsidy in excess of a million dollars to Reynolds"). Permitting imposition of a tax thus leads to equal treatment for imported and domestic tobacco.
One of the Warehousing Act's major goals, manifested in its scheme of deferral and waiver of duties, was to promote the importer's flexibility with respect to his goods. Under the system in place prior to the Warehousing Act, an importer was required to pay the duties in cash when the goods were unloaded from the vessel; if no duties were paid, interest on them would immediately accrue and would have to be satisfied, or the customs officials would sell the goods for the charges. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 790 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix).15 What this meant for the merchant who did not have a ready source of funds was that he would be forced to part with a portion of his goods, often in an unfavorable market, in order to raise money to pay the duties. Id., at 792; see also H. R. Rep. No. 411, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1846). Moreover, an importer who was unsure about the ultimate destination of the goods would be penalized by keeping them in warehouses in this country, for he would lose the benefit of the use of the money that had been paid for the customs duties. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 792 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix). By permitting an importer to defer duties for a set period of time and to have a waiver of duties on reexported goods, the Warehousing Act enabled the importer, without any threat of financial loss, to place his goods in domestic markets or to return them to foreign commerce and, by this flexibility, encouraged importers to use American facilities.16
15
The pre-Warehousing Act system, which required payment of a cash duty as high as 40% of the value of the goods, see H. R. Rep. No. 411, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1846), was itself a response to an earlier system that had allowed importers to defer payment of customs duties for as long as nine months. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 790 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix).
16
Although there were efforts in both the House and the Senate to require a merchant to designate at the outset which portion of his goods was intended for reexport or for domestic use, such attempts were rejected. See Journal of the Senate, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 406-407 (1846); Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1178 (1846). Rejection of such amendments suggests that Congress intended to give maximum flexibility to the importer who was unsure of the ultimate destination of the goods.
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
It is difficult to discern how imposition of an ad valorem tax will affect an importer's flexibility in a situation where, as here, goods are destined for domestic markets. Given that the tobacco is aging in the customs-bonded warehouses in preparation for domestic manufacture and sale in this country, Reynolds does not occupy the position of an importer looking for the best market, domestic or foreign, in which to place the stored goods.17 In any event, Reynolds clearly benefits from the flexibility created by the Warehousing Act. By being allowed to defer customs duties on the imported tobacco for up to five years, Reynolds is able to decide how much imported tobacco to use in its manufacturing process at any given time, depending upon the demand for its products in the domestic market.
Nor is there any suggestion that taxation here would conflict with the central purpose behind the customs-bonded warehouses: to ensure that federal customs duties are collected. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 155 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Not only is the present statutory and regulatory framework sufficient to permit customs officials to monitor the entrance and removal of goods from warehouses and thus to guarantee collection of federal revenue, but Reynolds does not explain how, on the facts of this case, imposition of the North Carolina tax will prevent cus-
17
We make no determination with respect to warehoused goods that are not, as are those here, destined for the domestic market. We leave for another day such questions as what degree of probability of shipment to foreign markets must be shown to invoke the tax exemption, and whether, with regard to goods for which that showing has been made, state taxes may nevertheless be annually assessed but not collected until release into the domestic market occurs.
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toms officials from receiving the duties.18 See n. 3, supra. And the present statutes and regulations that guide this monitoring and the warehouse proprietor's own conduct with respect to the imported goods are not so comprehensive as to leave no room for North Carolina's assessment of ad valorem taxes. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S., at 230; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U. S., at 370. Although the regulations are not themselves controlling on the pre-emption issue, see Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 152, n. 8, where, as in this case, Congress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute, see 19 U. S. C. § 1556, as part of the pre-emption analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field completely. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153-154 (1982). Pre-emption should not be inferred, however, simply because the agency's regulations are comprehensive. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 716-718 (1985). In this case, the current regulations, while detailed, appear to contemplate some concurrent state regulation and, arguably, even state taxation.19
18
Although Reynolds suggests that practical problems may arise for an importer whose goods are subject to state taxation and who must decide which goods to designate for domestic use, Brief for Appellant 25, this case presents no such practical difficulties. Here, all the goods are destined for domestic manufacture. As has been noted, Reynolds has paid the tax in question for several years without, apparently, experiencing any serious difficulty. See n. 12, supra.
19
For example, an applicant for the proprietorship of a bonded warehouse must estimate the "maximum duties and taxes" that will be due on goods stored therein at any one time. 19 CFR § 19.2(a) (1986). Under this regulation, state taxation is entirely consistent with the supervisory control over stored goods exercised by customs officers. Pursuant to § 19. 7, moreover, warehoused goods shall be "liable for the expenses of labor and storage . . . and for all other expenses accruing upon the goods." Expenses might be read here to include state ad valorem property taxes. Under § 19.12(b)(3), to maintain the security of the merchandise a ware-
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
Finally, we agree with the North Carolina Court of Appeals that this case presents a factual situation similar to that in American Smelting and that the California Court of Appeal's reasoned decision is therefore pertinent.20 The Court of Appeal considered whether metal-bearing ores and concentrates to be treated in a customs-bonded smelting and refining warehouse,21some to be reexported and others to be used in domestic markets, were subject to a local property tax. Relying upon McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414 (1940), the Court of Appeal concluded that the refined materials destined to reenter the exportation stream were exempt from local taxation. 271 Cal. App. 2d, at 481, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 601. With respect to similar materials intended for domestic consumption, however, the court concluded that "neither the laws, nor the regulations, nor the precedents . . . show a congressional intent to interfere with the right of the state to tax goods which have been imported for, and
house proprietor is to comply with Treasury Regulations, but in the event of a conflict between them and "any local, state or Federal standard," the latter shall control. This suggests that dual federal and state regulation of customs-bonded warehouses is not only possible but contemplated under the regulations.
20
Reynolds contends that in light of the decision in Xerox the summary dismissal in American Smelting is entitled to no precedential value. Reply Brief for Appellant 8. Given the limited focus in Xerox, we do not think that the decision in that case is at odds with American Smelting or affects the precedential weight, albeit limited, of the summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question. See American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 396 U. S. 273 (1970); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S., at 344.
21
It is irrelevant that the warehouses in American Smelting were Class 7 customs-bonded warehouses designed "for smelting and refining imported metal-bearing materials for exportation or domestic consumption," 19 CFR § 19.1(7) (1986); see also 19 U. S. C. § 1312(a), and different from the Class 2 and Class 8 warehouses at issue here. We note that McGoldrick, which the Court considered as precedent for its decision in Xerox, concerned Class 6 warehouses, designed for the manufacture of articles destined solely for exportation and not of the type used by Xerox. See n. 9, supra.
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have been appropriated to, processing for domestic consumption." Ibid. The Court of Appeal could see no reason why state taxation on such goods would interfere with the primary benefit to be given the importer-deferral of the duties, and the Federal Government's concern with collecting its customs duties. It thus concluded that there was no reason why this taxation should depend upon when the goods were withdrawn from the warehouses. Id., at 469-470, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 593-594. A customs-bonded warehouse was not to become an "enclave of foreign commerce," id., at 470, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 594, nor was it to give the operator of the smelter a "bounty" that would enable it to prevail in its competition over "domestic smelters refining domestic ores." Id., at 474, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 596-597. So also here, regardless of the imposition of the North Carolina ad valorem tax, Reynolds will be able to defer payment of the customs duties; the Federal Government will receive its customs revenue; and domestic producers of tobacco will not suffer in their competition with the imported tobacco.22
22
Reynolds also argues that the legislative history of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, which, among other things, amended the Foreign Trade Zones Act, ch. 590, 48 Stat. 998, codified, as amended, at 19 U. S. C. §§ 81a-81u (1982 ed. and Supp. III), shows that Congress understood the Xerox holding to be broad, i. e., as prohibiting local taxation on all goods stored in customs warehouses. That legislation provides a statutory exemption from state and local property taxes for goods held in a foreign trade zone. While foreign trade zones are more difficult to establish than customs-bonded warehouses, they do permit a wider range of operations. See 19 U. S. C. § 81c (1982 ed., Supp. III); 1 R. Sturm, Customs Law & Administration§ 18.1, pp. 45-52 (1986); Note, 17 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 555, 564-565 (1983). Reynolds buttresses its argument with statements in the legislative history to the effect that, by passing this amendment, Congress was bringing the prohibition of taxation of imported goods in foreign trade zones in line with a similar prohibition in customs-bonded warehouses. See, e.g., 129 Cong. Rec. 14501 (1983) (statement of Sen. Tower); H. R. Rep. No. 98-267, p. 35 (1983); S. Rep. No. 98-308, p. 36 (1983). Just as in the case of imported goods in customs-bonded warehouses, those stored in foreign trade zones are subject to import duties only when they are withdrawn for domestic consumption. See 19 U. S. C. §81c (1982 ed., Supp. III). Such statements given in the context of a different piece of legislation dealing with a different part of the customs scheme are not persuasive as to congressional purpose with respect to customs-bonded warehouses. See Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980) (congressional statements explaining intent of previous legislation are entitled to less weight than the statute's language and its legislative history before enactment). Moreover, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 had a narrow focus: the legislators from Texas sought to pre-empt state taxation of goods in foreign trade zones because Texas, alone among the States, permitted this taxation and thus busjnesses were discouraged from locating such zones in that State. See 12-9 Cong. Rec. 14501 (1983) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen) ("The Bentsen-Tower bill addresses a very narrow problem dealing with foreign trade zones in the State of Texas"). Foreign trade zones are valued because they actually promote domestic industry and create jobs. Ibid. Given that the taxation of goods in foreign trade zones could arguably harm domestic industry, while exemption from taxation of the imported goods in the present case would serve to discriminate against domestic producers, there appears to be a sufficient justification for the difference in state taxation with respect to these customs entities. There is no evidence that Reynolds also uses foreign trade zones for the purpose of aging its imported tobacco. Cf. Xerox Corp. v. County ofHarris, 459 U. S., at 148 (when threatened with local taxes, Xerox immediately shipped its copiers to a foreign trade zone).
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
We therefore hold that, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored in a customs-bonded warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale.
IV
We turn to Reynolds' remaining constitutional arguments that the North Carolina ad valorem property tax violates the Import-Export23 and Due Process Clauses. The Court has stated that its decision in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276 (1976), "adopted a fundamentally different ap-
23
"No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except ...." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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proach to cases claiming the protection of the Import-Export Clause." Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U. S. 353, 359 (1984); see also Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 752-754 (1978). We explained this approach, and its distinction from the earlier analysis, in Limbach:
"To repeat: we think it clear that this Court in Michelin specifically abandoned the concept that the Import-Export Clause constituted a broad prohibition against all forms of state taxation that fell on imports. Michelin changed the focus of Import-Export Clause cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the nature of the tax at issue. The new focus is not on whether the goods have lost their status as imports but is, instead, on whether the tax sought to be imposed is an 'Impost or Duty."' 466 U. S., at 360.
In Michelin, we concluded that a Georgia nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax, which had been assessed upon imported tires and tubes stored in a warehouse, was not the kind of tax prohibited by the Import-Export Clause, inasmuch as it did not offend the policies behind the Clause: concern that an impost or duty might interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of commercial relations with foreign governments; fear that on account of such state taxation the Federal Government would lose an important source of revenue; and a desire to maintain harmony among the States, which would be disturbed if seaboard States could tax goods "merely flowing through their ports" to other States not so favorably situated. 423 U. S., at 285-286.
The nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax at issue here seems indistinguishable from the tax in Michelin in terms of these policies. The North Carolina tax does not interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce, for, as we have seen, it falls on imported and domestic goods alike and does not single out imported goods for unfavorable treatment. See id., at 286. Having concluded
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
that the tax does not impede the collection of customs duties, it follows that it neither impairs an important source of revenue for the Federal Government nor replaces the federal duty with one of its own. Ibid. Rather, the property tax is nothing more than a means "by which a State apportions the cost of such services as police and fire protection among the beneficiaries according to their respective wealth." Id., at 287. Ifimposition of the tax happens to have the "incidental effect," ibid., of discouraging some importation of foreign goods, prohibiting this result is not a function of the Import-Export Clause. Finally, in light of the services provided in exchange for this tax, it hardly constitutes the kind of exaction by the seaboard States on goods destined for inland States that the Framers sought to prevent by the Clause. Id., at 288. A failure to assess the tax would shift the tax burden from Reynolds and the ultimate consumers of its tobacco products to the local taxpayers of North Carolina-a result completely at odds with Michelin. See id., at 289. Accordingly, we conclude that the application of the tax to Reynolds' imported tobacco does not violate the Import-Export Clause.
This Court has observed that in Michelin it limited its holding to the imported goods "'no longer in transit."' Washington Revenue Dept., 435 U. S., at 755 (quoting Michelin, 423 U. S., at 302). Reynolds contends that, because goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses are by definition "in transit," this case does not fall within the scope of Michelin's holding.24 This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive.
24
For this argument, Reynolds particularly relies upon the Xerox Court's favorable citation of International Distributing Corp. to the effect that the goods in customs warehouses were outside the District of Columbia's jurisdiction, 459 U. S., at 154 (citing 118 U. S. App. D. C., at 73-74, 331 F. 2d, at 819-820), and the Court's remark that"'Congress did not regard the importation as complete while the goods remained in the custody of the proper officers of customs,"' ibid. (quoting Fabbri v. Murphy, 95 U. S., at 197-198). In our view, such reliance is misplaced. The Court in Xerox declined to reach the Import-Export Clause issue and was con-bonded warehouses, as we observed above, see n. 10, supra, the decision turned on reciprocity in permitting diplomatic personnel to bring in goods duty and tax free and did not deal with the Import-Export Clause issue. Reynolds' reliance on Fabbri is not helpful either, because that case involved a dispute over whether an importer would be required to pay interest on the customs duty, in addition to the duty itself, when imported goods were withdrawn over a year after they had been stored. 95 U. S., at 193. Once again, no Import-Export Clause issue was raised in the case, and the remark from Fabbri specifically addres:3es the appropriateness of the interest charge: that interest was to be paid so long as the goods were in customs officials' custody. Id., at 197-198.
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The imported tobacco here, we repeat, has nothing transitory about it: it has reached its State-indeed, its county-ofdes-tination and only the payment of the customs duty, after the appropriate aging, separates it from entrance into the domestic market. More importantly, an automatic "in transit" status for goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses can be inferred only if Congress intended to confer it upon all goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses. See Xerox Corp. v. County ofHarris, 459 U. S., at 157 (POWELL, J., dissenting). As we have seen, state taxation of such goods destined for domestic markets is contrary to none of the purposes for which Congress established the customs-bonded warehouse scheme. It strains reason to think that, although Congress could have directly pre-empted state taxation in this situation by declaring it to be in conflict with the purposes of customs-bonded warehouses or by directing the United States Customs Service to issue regulations governing taxation of stored goods, Congress decided to achieve the same effect in a more roundabout fashion by giving the goods the talismanic "in transit" status.
cerned only with the possible pre-emption of state taxes in the limited context of goods destined to reenter the export stream. Thus, the citations are consistent with Xerox's restricted conclusion that such goods should not be subject to ad valorem property taxes.
By themselves these cases do not give any significant weight to Reynolds' present contention. Although there is language in International Distributing Corp. concerning the locality's jurisdiction over goods in customs-
Opinion of the Court 479 u. s.
We also find no merit in Reynolds' due process claim. As noted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, it is well settled that a state tax comports with the Due Process Clause if "the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state." Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S., at 444; see 1 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 13.2, p. 669 (1986). In light of the police, fire, and other services provided to Reynolds' imported tobacco by the North Carolina counties and cities, such a "fiscal relation" clearly exists in this case. Although Reynolds contends that goods located in customs-bonded warehouses are outside the taxing jurisdiction of the State because of their "in transit" status, for the reasons given above this argument no more succeeds in the due process context than it does when addressed to the Import-Export Clause analysis.
In No. 85-1021, the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is affirmed. The appeal in No. 85-1022 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.