Mayberry v. Thompson, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 121 (1847)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Mayberry v. Thompson, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 121 (1847)
Full caption
Jacob S. Mayberry, Plaintiff in error, v. James H. Thompson, Defendant.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1847
Jacob S. Mayberry, Plaintiff in error, v. James H.
Thompson, Defendant.
Under the acts of 1839, chap. 20 (5 Statutes at Large, 31a), and 1840, chap. 43 (5 Statutes at Large, 392), where a ease was carried from the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Alabama, and the Circuit Court reversed the judgment of the District Court, it was not a proper mode of proceeding to bring the case to this court upon such reversal.
The judgment of the District Court having been reversed, the plaintiff should have taken the necessary steps to bring his case to a final decision in the Circuit Court, in the same manner as if the suit had been originally brought there. This court could then have reexamined the judgment of the Circuit Court, if a writ of error were sued out.
This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Cir cuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama.
It was originally brought by Mayberry in the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama. Mayberry was a citizen of Mississippi.
The action was brought at the May term, 1841, and was an action of trespass to recover damages from Thompson, for forcibly taking, seizing, and carrying away certain goods, wares, and merchandise of the plaintiff, at Warsaw, in Sum ter county, Alabama.
At the November term, 1842, the cause came on for trial, when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at S3,709.94. On the trial, the defendant’s coun sel filed the following bill of exceptions.
Be it remembered, that, in the trial of this cause, the plain tiff in the first instance introduced testimony tending to show that some time in February or March, 1841, he sent cotton and drafts to Mobile, and received the proceeds thereof, about 83,200, and that he went with the same, and with letters of recommendation, to the city of New York, for the purchase of goods, and there purchased sundry bills of goods, of dif ferent houses, for which he paid to each house about one half of the price of each purchase in money, the proceeds of the cotton and drafts aforesaid, and gave his own notes r#ioo *to said several houses for the residue of the purchase money, maturing at different dates, which said notes still re main unpaid, and that the sellers of said goods knew no per sons in the transaction except the plaintiff; that said goods were marked in the name of the plaintiff, and sent forward to his address for Cooksville, in the State of Mississippi, but that, before reaching their destination, they were seized by [p. 144] the defendant, at Warsaw, in the State of Alabama, and by him sold.
The defendant then introduced testimony, conducing to show that a fraudulent and collusive arrangement had been entered into between the plaintiff and one James Randalls, some time in June, 1840, for the purpose of screening the property of said Randalls from claims of his creditors, by which a certain stock of goods and other property, which said Randalls then had, were collusively passed to said plain tiff, and the business of said Randalls thereafter, until after the seizure of said goods by defendant, was carried on in the name of said plaintiff; but that said business, including the sending of said cotton and drafts to Mobile, the raising of said money, and the purchase of said goods in New York, though done ostensibly by said plaintiff, and in his name, was really done by said Randalls, acting by and through said plain tiff, and in his, the plaintiff’s, name, and that said goods, seized and sold by the defendant, were by him seized and sold as an officer on process in his hands against said Randalls, as his, the said Randalls’s, property, and for his debts; and also that the plaintiff had little or no cotton at or about the time said cotton was forwarded to Mobile as aforesaid.
The plaintiff then introduced the said Randalls as a wit ness, and asked him the single question, whether he had interest in said goods seized, at the time they were seized and sold; to which question the witness answered that he had not. The defendant then, on cross-examination, for the pur pose of contradicting said Randalls by the testimony of other witnesses, if he answered in the negative, and thus impeach ing his testimony, inquired of him whether he had stated to an individual, at about the time said cotton was sent to Mobile, that he, the said Randalls, had succeeded in sending cotton to Mobile, so that the same had not been attached; but the plaintiff’s counsel objected to the witness answering the question, and the court ruled that the inquiry was of matter collateral and irrelevant, and that the witness need not answer the question propounded, and he did not answer the same. The defendant, also, for the same purpose last expressed, proposed to inquire of said Randalls, whether he had not stated to a certain individual, at or about the time said plaintiff left for New York, for the purchase of said goods, that he, the said Randalls, had sent said plaintiff for goods; but it was ruled by the court that it would not be competent for the defendant to discredit said witness by showing that he had made statements when out of court.
and not on oath, different from *his testimony given f^gg in court; and the question was not permitted to t be put.
The court instructed the jury, that if they believed that the goods purchased by the plaintiff in New York were pur chased with the money of the said Randalls, and that the plaintiff acted merely as a shield for said Randalls, to pro tect the said goods from Randalls’s creditors, that the said goods were to be considered as the goods of Randalls, and were lawfully attached by the defendant on an execution against Randalls; but that when the goods were purchased ‘hr said Randalls in part with the money of Randalls, and in part upon the credit of plaintiff, he giving his note to the several New York mercantile houses from which the pur chases were made, and they being ignorant of any fraud between the plaintiff and said Randalls, then the said goods thus purchased could not lawfully be sold by the defendant on execution against said Randalls; that the remedy of cred itors of Randalls, when the goods were purchased in part with the money of Randalls, and in part upon credit of plain tiff, was in a court of equity, where the interest of all con cerned might be apportioned and adjusted.
The defendant thereupon requested the court to instruct the jury, that if they should find for the plaintiff, they might, in making up their verdict, deduct from the amount the money and lawful interest thereon, in all cases where said goods were purchased in part with the money of Randalls, and in part upon the credit of the plaintiff; which charge the court refused to give.
And the defendants took exception to the beforementioned ruling and charge of the court, and the refusal to charge as requested, and prayed that his said exceptions might be signed, sealed, and allowed, and the same is done accord ingly-
The defendant, Thompson, sued out a writ of error, and carried the case to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, under the act of 1839, ch. 20 (5 Stat, at L., 315).
At March term, 1843, the Circuit Court passed the follow ing order:—■“This day came the parties, by their attorney, and this cause coming on to be heard upon the transcript of the record, and the matters assigned for error being heard by the court, and mature deliberation being thereupon had, it is considered by the court that there is error in the record and proceedings of the said District Court; whereupon, it is ordered and adjudged by the court there that the judgment [p. 146] (if the District Court be reversed and annulled, and that the said plaintiff recover his costs.”
From which judgment Mayberry sued out a writ of error, and brought the case up to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Brockenbrough and Mr. Sherman, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Dargan, for defendant in error. *1241 *The third point of the counsel for the plaintiff in
J error was the one upon which the opinion of this court turned, and is therefore the only one inserted. It was as follows:—
III. As to the venire facias de novo and an absolute rever sal.
There can be no doubt that if the Circuit Court was clear, from the record, that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and was not entitled to recover in any event, under the facts, that that court was right in absolutely reversing the judg ment. But if the Circuit Court considered the District Court correct in its judgment as to the illegality of the levy and sale, but wrong as to the question of evidence in the cross-examination of Randalls only, then it should not have reversed the judgment absolutely, but have remanded it with a venire de novo, that the plaintiff might have the bene fit of his meritorious right of action, and the defendant not be deprived of his full rights in the cross-examination.
But as we contend the District Court was right in both points, we ask to set aside the reversal, and set up the judg ment of the District Court.
But if this court thinks the District Court did not err upon the main question, but did err on the question of the cross-examination, then this court will reverse the decision of the Circuit Court, with the proper directions; because that court did not award a venire facias de novo.
The counsel for the defendant in error noticed this point as follows:—
The act of Congress that established the Middle District of the State of Alabama, and allowed appeals and writs of error from that court to the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judi cial Circuit, does not by any express words make it obliga tory on the Circuit Court to award a venire de novo, but is silent on the subject, therefore we must look to the general rules of practice on this subject. I admit that the Circuit Court may award the venire de novo on reversing the judg ment of the District Court, but I deny that an omission to do so can be reached bv a writ of error, unless the party [p. 147] claiming the venire had asked the court below to award it, and the court had refused it. It is a settled rule, that a party complaining of errors must show it affirmatively; he must show that the inferior court erred, and this error was prejudicial to his rights. Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet., 402.
Now, the defendant in error in the Circuit Court (who is plaintiff here) could have demanded a venire de novo, but he did not; the (Circuit Court, therefore, did not deny him the right of the writ of venire, nor act on it. How did this action of the Circuit Court leave the rights of the plain tiff in error ?
The judgment of the District Court was reversed, and held for nought. The parties were put by this judgment in the same situation they occupied before the suit was brought; and the *plaintiff in error in this court could have issued a new writ. In Bank of the United States v. ^ Bank of Washington, 6 Pet., 8, the Supreme Court held, that a party who had derived a benefit from a judgment which had been reversed, must make restitution; that is, the rever sal of the judgment puts the parties in statu quo. So in 2 Gall., 216, it is held, that a judgment reversed is no bar to an action on the same subject-matter. So in 1 Root (Conn.), 421, it is decided that, if a judgment on a note is reversed the note is revived; to the very same effect see 10 Mass., 433 ; 5 Id., 264; 3 Johns. (N. Y.), 443.
These authorities, I think, settle the point that Mayberry, on the reversal of the judgment by the Circuit Court, could have brought a new suit in the State or federal courts, or he could have demanded a venire de novo. But he had the option to do the one or the other; he did not inform the court which remedy he chose. Can he now complain of error that the court left him to select for himself ? Can he complain that the court did not grant him a remedy which he did not apply for, when he had the power to select between two remedies ? This view will show that the court did him no injury,—the court was merely passive; it did not decide on any tight, nor act on any. Will error lie, therefore, in such a case ? If so, may I not well ask, in what did the court err ?
Again. The motion for the venire must be made in the court below. I think it plain that the party cannot come here by writ of error, and, for the first time, move for the venire in this court; the object of the writ of error being merely to make such a motion.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon looking into the record, in this case, we find that there was no final judgment in the Circuit Court, and conse quently no writ of error will lie from this court.
It appears that the plaintiff in error brought an action of trespass against the defendant, in the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, for taking and carrying away certain goods and chattels alleged to be the property of the plaintiff, and recovered a judgment for $3,709.94 and costs.
A bill of exception was taken by the defendant to the rul ings of the court upon several points raised at the trial, and the case removed by writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Alabama, where the judgment of the District Court was reversed with costs. And upon this judgment of reversal, without any further proceedings in the Circuit Court, the plaintiff sued out a writ of error from this court.
The writ of error to remove the case to the Circuit Court is given by the act of 1839, ch. 20, § 9; and as this law con tains no special provision in relation to the judgments of the Circuit Court in such cases, the decisions of that court must *1op i be reexamined here, *in the manner and upon the prinJ ciples prescribed in the general laws upon that sub ject.
The judiciary act of 1789, § 24, provides, that where the judgment of a District Court is reversed in the Circuit Court, such court shall proceed to render such judgment as the Dis trict Court should have rendered. Under this act, however, the judgment of a Circuit Court upon a writ of error to a District Court could not be reexamined in this Court; no writ of error in such cases being given. And so the law stood until the act of July 4th, 1840, ch. 43, § 3, which pro vides that writs of error in such cases shall lie, upon the judgment of a Circuit Court, “ in like manner and under the same regulations, limitations, and restrictions as were there provided by law for writs of error on judgments rendered upon suits originally brought in the Circuit Court.’ And, under the 22d section of the act of 1789, writs of error on judgments rendered in a Circuit Court upon suits originally brought there will lie only in cases when the judgment is a final one, and the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs.
It is evident that the judgment of the Circuit Court now before us is not a final one. It does not dispose of the mat ter in dispute. And if it was affirmed in this court, it would [p. 149] still leave the matter in dispute open to another suit; and might result in another writ of error to remove it to the Cir cuit Court, and then again to this court. The act of Con gress certainly never intended to sanction such fruitless and inconclusive litigation; and therefore directed that the Cir cuit Court should give such judgment as the District Court ought to have given, that is to say, a final judgment upon the matter in dispute. Instead of suing out a writ of error upon the judgment‘of reversal, the plaintiff should have taken the necessary steps to bring his ease to a final decision in the Circuit Court, in the same manner as if the suit had been originally brought there. And if lie supposed any of the rulings or instructions of the court at the trial to be erro neous, he would have been entitled to his exception, and this court could then by writ of error have reexamined the judg ment of the Circuit Court, and finally decided upon the mat ter in controversy in the suit.
But upon the judgment of reversal only, which leaves the dispute between the parties still open, no writ of error will lie, and the writ issued in this case must therefore be dis missed.
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and ad judged by this court that this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.
*
John G. Nelson, Charles G-. Carleton, Wil- r^p^ ham H. Stewart (Partners in Trade under L -“ the Name of Nelson, Carleton, & Co.), Henry Parish, Daniel Parish, John R. Marshall, John B. Seaman, Thomas Parish, Leroy M. Wiley (Part ners in Trade under the Name of Parish, Mar shall, & Co.), Appellants, v. John J. Hill, John P. Lipscomb, Absalom Hardin, Lorenzo I. Sexton and Ann R. Sexton (his Wife), and James Gray, De fendants. It is not irregular for two mercantile firms to unite as complainants in equity in a creditor’s bill.1
1
If there is a common liability and ity in the defendants and a common a common interest,—a common liabil- interest in the plaintiffs, — different Myl. & C., 623; Attorney-General v. tion, on the hearing, make the ob Cradock, 3 Id., 85. If the interests of jection. Greenwood v. Churchill, 1 the plaintiffs are the same, although Myl & K*, 559; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 the defendants have not a co-exten- How., 333* sive common interest, but their in 8 Applied, Lewis v* United States, terests are derived under dilierent 2 Otto, 622. And see Comins v. Cul instruments, if the general object of ver, 8 Stew. (N. J.), 96; Throve v. the bill will be promoted by their Jackson, 2 Younge & Coll., 553; Ham-being united in one suit, the court, ersley v. Lambert,2 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch., will allow it. Ib.; Attorney-General 508; Belknap v. Abbott, 11 Ohio, 411; v. St. John’s College, 7 Sun., 241; see Bx parte Clegg, 2 Cox*s Cas., 372; Gaines v. Chew, 2 How., 619. Camp v, Grant, 21 Conn., 41; Lewis v. United States, 14 Bank. Reg., 64,69; - The objection to multifariousness cannot be raised at the hearing. Ward United States v. Lewis, 13 Id., 38. v. Cooke, 5 Madd., 122: Wynne v. the case of Groves v. Slaughter, and enforces contracts made between the two days above mentioned, although the courts of the State of Mississippi have, since the decision in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, declared such contracts to be void.1 176, 181. Distinguished. Jessup v. 1 Re-affirmed. Truly v. Wanzer, post, *141; Sims v. Hunhley, 6 How., Carnegie, 80 N. Y., 448. See also Moore v. Clopton, 22 Ark., 125, 128; I, 6. Followed. Talcott v. Town Opinion of the Judges, 58 N. H., 685. ship of Pine Grove, 1 Flipp., 120, 128, 1 Applied. Pease v. Peck, 18 How., 2 Applied. Ohio Life Ins. ^'c. Co. 599. Distinguished. Nesmith v. Shel- v. Debolt, 16 How., 432. Approved. don, 1 How., 818 ; Gelpcke v. Citi/ of Douglass V. County of Pike 11 Otto, Dubuque, I Walt, 214. Cited, r.uther 686. DistiNOUISHED. Fair/eM County v. Gorden, 7 How., 58. And sue Dred v. Gallatin, 10 Otto, 55. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 603.
An objection that a bill Is multifarious must be made before answer, and can be tested only by the structure of the bill itself.2 The creditor of a partnership may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving partner or go, in the first instance, into equity against the repre sentatives of the deceased partner. It is not necessary for him to exhaust his remedy at law against the surviving partner before proceeding in equity against the estate of the deceased.3 Where there were two mercantile firms and some of the members common to both, a creditor’s bill was not multifarious when filed against the personal representatives of two of the deceased partners of the two firms and also against the surviving partner of one of the firms.
This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama.
The suit originated in the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama, from which it was carried, by appeal, to the Circuit Court, and thence was brought to this court.
In 183-1, the appellants, consisting of two mercantile houses in New York, became the creditors of two firms in the State of Alabama, namely, the firms of Whitsett, Gray, & Co. and of Whitsett & Gray ; the former composed of William H. Whit sett, Thomas Gray, John J. Hill, the latter of William H. Whitsett and Thomas Gray.
The debts of these Alabama houses to their New York cred itors set forth as follows:—
Whitsett, Gray, & Co. to Nelson, Carleton, & Co., a note dated May 17th, 1831, for £1,061.36, at 9 months; Whitsett, Gray, & Co. to Parish, Marshall, & Co., two notes, one dated May 10th, 1834, for $1,470.95, at 9 months, and one, same date, for $1,470.95, at 11 months; a bill of exchange drawn by Whitsett, Gray, & Co. on John C. Sims & Co. for $1,901.56,
claims to the property may be united Calender, 1 Russ., 293; Whaley v. in one suit, at least if the subjects are Dawson, 2 Sch. & L., 370; Denson v. such as may be joined without incon Hadfield, 4 Hare, 32. venience. Campbell v. MacKay, I But the court may, of its own mo [p. 151] at 4 months; and a note to White, Brothers, & Co., by Whitsett, Gray, & Co., for $331.46, at 12 months.
Of the individuals composing the two Alabama firms, Wil liam H. Whitsett died in October, 1835, and administration of his estate was committed to Lipscomb & Hardin. Thomas Gray died in 1835, and administration of his estate was granted to James Gray and Ann R. Gray, the widow of Thomas, who afterwards intermarried with Lorenzo Sexton.
*Upon three of the above notes, judgments were ob- r#i og tained in December, 1835, against Hill, as surviving ' partner of Whitsett, Gray, & Co. In January, 1840, a bill was filed on the equity side of the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama by the New York firms, which, in August, 1841, was amended. The amended bill included, as defendants, James Gray, Lorenzo Sexton and Ann R. Sexton (formerly Ann Gray), administrators of Thomas Gray, deceased, Absalom Hardin, John P. Lipscomb, and Joseph J. Hill, administrators of Wil liam H. Whitsett, deceased.
The bills recited the above fact; stated that execution had been sued out against Hill, but that no property could be found; that the estate of Whitsett had been reported to the County Court as insolvent, but that the estate of Gray was fully able to pay the debts of the partnerships; praying for a discovery and payment, &c.
Lipscomb and Hardin answered the bills, denying generally the merits of the claim.
Hill answered separately, and concluded his answer with denying the right of the complainants to unite their claims in one suit.
Gray filed a separate demurrer, assigning therefor the fol lowing causes:—
I. That the said complainants have not by their said bill and amended bill made such a case as entitles them in a court of equity to any discovery from this defendant or any relief against him as to matter contained in the said bill and amended bill, &c.
H. That the complainants have joined in their bill and amended bill distinct matters which, according to law and the practice of this court, ought not to be joined, Ac.; that is to say, have joined matters against the late firm of Whit-
& ^raJh composed of Win. H. Whitsett, deceased, and Ihomas Gray, deceased, with matters against the late firm of " hitsett, Gray, & Co., composed of the said Whitsett & Gray and one John J. Hill, the said John J. Hill having no interest in the matter against the said late firm of Whitsett & Gray. [p. 152] 1-28 SUPREME COURT.
They have joined matters of debt against said late firm, Whit sett & Gray, created by note, payable to certain persons using the name and style of White, Brothers, & Co., to which debt the said complainants, or either of them, have not any in terest, as far as appears by their said bill or amended bill, and in which the said defendant, Hill, is in no wise interested, nor in any wise liable, &c.
III. The complainants’ bill and amended bill do not show that complainants had exhausted their remedy at law before coming into this court in such manner as to entitle them to the aid of this honorable court as a court of chancery, &c. Wherefore, for the foregoing causes, and for divers other causes of demurrer appearing in the said bill and amended bill, this defendant doth demur thereto; and he prays the judgment *1291 '^ ^his honorable court whether he shall *be compelled J to make further and other answers to the said bill; and he humbly prays to be dismissed from hence with his reasonable cost in this behalf sustained.
In December, 1841, the cause came before the District Court, which sustained the dumurrer.
The complainants appealed to the Circuit Court, which in March, 1843, affirmed the decree of the District Court. From the decision of the Circuit Court the complainants ap pealed to this court.
The cause was argued by Mr. Dargan, for the appellants, and Mr. Crittenden, for the appellees.
Mr. Dargan.
The decree, rendered on the demurrer of James Gray, dis missed the bill as to all the defendants, and they were adjudged to recover their costs. This was the necessary result upon sustaining the demurrer of James Gray, for he being a joint administrator with Sexton and wife, the suit could not proceed without him. The appeal was taken against all the defendants, and the cause was pending prop erly in this court, when Gray died; his death did not abate the suit or render it defective, for his entire interest survived to Sexton and wife, and the administrator of James Gray has no interest in the suit. Therefore the cause is not out of court or abated by the death of James Gray, nor is it neces sary to make his representatives parties. The only question that can be raised against the bill is, that it is multifarious.
The bill is not multifarious because it is filed in the name of Parish, Marshall, & Co. and Nelson, Carleton, & Co., two distinct firms.
It is well settled that when a creditor seeks the aid of a court of equity to subject the assets of a deceased debtor to the payment of his debt, he may sue for himself and all other creditors who will make themselves parties to the suit, unless his application to a court of equity be founded on a specific lien on a specific chattel, or on particular real estate, as a mortgagee. But in the absence of any specific lien, that would give him an exclusive right as against the thing bound by the lien, he may sue for himself and all other creditors. Story’s Equity Pleadings, §§ 99, 100, and the cases cited.
Indeed, if the bill seeks to subject the real estate of the decedent, it is said the creditor must sue in behalf of all; here two firms sue for themselves and all other creditors who will join in the suit.
The bill is not multifarious because it seeks to obtain satis* faction of debts due Nelson, Carleton, & Co. and Parish, Marshall, & Co. by Whitsett, Gray, & Co., and also debts due Parish, Marshall, & Co. by Whitsett & Gray alone. The debts due the complainants by Whitsett, Gray, & Co. had been sued at law against Hill, the surviving partner, and executions have been returned,—“ no property ”; *of r*23O course the complainants can come into equity against L the assets of the deceased partners on those debts, for they have, done all at law they can do. Now, if it be true that, as to the two debts due by Whitsett & Gray alone to Parish, Marshall, & Co., they have a perfect remedy at law, or if they have as yet no equity, because they must proceed at law first against the administrators of Whitsett, the question will then be raised,—if complainants seek to enforce an equi table right, and in the same bill state a different and legal right, as to which equity will afford no relief, and this is apparent on the bill, will the statement of this legal right and prayer for relief, which by possibility cannot be granted, render the bill defective as to the equitable right? To hold that a bill thus framed would be defective, would be a rigid rule, not perhaps productive of benefit or convenience; would it not go to the full extent, that a complainant must recover on all causes of actions or suits stated in his bill, or he could not recover at all? I have not found a case that goes thus far, and I submit that no case can be found where a bill is held to be multifarious because it states and seeks relief as to a clear equitable right, and also states and seeks relief as to a different and distinct legal right; but relief would be granted as to the equitable right; and so far as it sought relief on a legal title the bill would be dismissed at the hearing. If I am right in this view, the demurrer should not have been [p. 154] sustained, even it' the debts due by Whitsett & Gray alone to Parish, Marshall, & Co. cannot be enforced in equity against the representatives of Gray, or if their remedy‘on these two debts is at law. As to the doctrine of multifariousness, see G-ain.es v. Chew et al., 2 How., 619; Story on Eq. PL, 515-517.
This view is submitted on the supposition, that the court may hold that Parish, Marshall, & Co. have a perfect right at law on the two debts not sued at law, and due by Whitsett & Gray alone to them. But 1 think the rule is now well established, that a creditor may file his bill in the first in stance against the assets of a deceased partner, notwithstand ing the surviving partner may even be solvent. See 1 Myl. & K., 582. This seems to be a well considered case, and maintains this position; also Story on Partnership, § 362, pp. 513, 514; also the case of Devaynes v. Noble, 1 Meriv., 589. I admit that formerly the reverse was held to be the law; but since the decision in the case of Devaynes v. Noble, the rule seems to be settled, that a creditor may go into equity in the first instance against the assets of a deceased partner, although the surviving partner may be solvent. The text writers have adopted this ride without objection. If the court should hold this to be the rule, then Parish, Marshall, & Co. would be entitled to relief against the ad ministrators of Thomas Gray, although no suit was brought against Whitsett’s representatives who had survived Gray; and in that aspect of the case, could Thomas Gray, adminis#131 -| trator, demur, because’Parish, Marshall, & Co. sought J to enforce debts chargeable on the estate, because the deceased was liable on them,—on one jointly with A., the other jointly with B. The estate is bound for both, they are both merely debts, and due to the same complainant. The same authorities show that when a bill is thus filed against tha representatives of the deceased partner, the surviving partner, whether solvent or insolvent, is a necessary party to the bill, although no decree can be rendered against him, for the remedy as against him is at law.
In conclusion, if the remedy on the bill and note to Parish, Marshall, & Co., due by Whitsett & Gray, is at law exclu sively ; or if, as yet, Parish, Marshall, & Co. are not entitled to equitable relief as to these two debts, then the demurrer is too broad, and should not have been sustained. But if they go into equity in the first instance against the assets of Gray, these two debts are merely debts due by Gray; and what inconvenience will result from uniting them with other debts due the same complainant by Gray ? For the reasons above stated, the court erred in sustaining the demurrer.
Mr. Crittenden referred to the complicated nature of the suit, brought by two firms against two other firms, and con tended that it was objectionable on account of multifarious ness, misjoinder- of parties, and causes of action. That a judgment should have been obtained against the surviving partner at law, before resorting to equity. For these prin ciples, he cited 2 Madd. Ch., 294; 2 Anstr., 447 ; Hardr., 337 ; 2 Ves., 323 ; 1 Story on Part., 512-514.
Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court.
Amongst the causes assigned for the demurrer in this case no objection is urged as founded upon the joinder of the dif ferent complainants in the bill and amended bill, unless it be supposed that an objection may be implied in the general language of the first assignment, namely, that the complain ants had not by their bills made such a case as entitled them to relief. From a statement thus vague and indefinite it would be difficult to deduce any one objection rather than another; but could this assignment be understood as point ing specifically to the structure of the bills as multifarious, from the number or relative position of the complainants, it is certain that no valid exception could on either of those grounds be sustained.
These bills are formally, as well as substantially, creditors’ bills, by which the complainants are regularly and properly united in seeking satisfaction from subjects against which, as creditors of the defendants, they can properly claim. As to the nature and regularity of such a proceeding see Mit. Eq. Pl., 166. 107; Story, Eq. Pl., §§ 99, 100, and the authorities there cited.
*From a want of perspicuity in the statements con- pjoo tained in the bill and amended bill, in the former espe- L dally, there might seem at first view some plausibility in the second cause assigned for the demurrer, namely, the multi fariousness of the bills from the joinder of parties as defend ants, who arc supposed to be unconnected in interest and in liability-. The objection of multifariousness is one of which it is said by the authorities a defendant can avail himself by demurrer or exception taken to the pleading only. That being designed for his protection against the vexation and expense of answering to matters irrelevant to the true con troversy existing between him and the complainant, if instead of arresting the irregularity at the commencement and
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claiming the exemption intended for him, he will go on and answer the bill, the reason for the exemption designed by the rule no longer exists; and although at the healing the court may, sponte ma, make an objection for multifariousness, it is no longer in the power of a party, after answer, to do so. See Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & L., 370, and Ward v. Cooke, 5 Madd., 80. From the character of this objection, then, and from the established requisition as to the time and mode of making it by a defendant, it must of course be tested and determined by the structure of the bill alone, and cannot be enforced, explained, or removed by proceedings posterior to the bill and demurrer, nor by the evidence. From some obscurity in the bill and amended bill, as has already been observed, there might seem to be a want of con nection in interest and in liability between the defendants, such as would not warrant their being joined in the same suit. This objection, however, will entirely vanish upon a closer examination of the relative positions of the parties.
The complainants consist of two sets of creditors. First, the firm of Nelson, Carleton, & Co.; secondly, the firm of Parish, Marshall, & Co. To each of these firms the copart nership of Whitsett, Gray, & Co. became indebted. The debt contracted to the former bouse was evidenced by the note of Whitsett, Gray, & Co. The debts (for there were several in the second instance) due to Parish, Marshall, & Co. were evidenced by two notes of Whitsett, Gray, & Co., by a bill drawn by Whitsett, Gray, & Co. on Sims & Co. (which it is alleged was not accepted), and by a note of Whitsett & Gray, payable to White, Brothers, & Co., and passed in some mode not distinctly set forth by Whitsett, Gray, & Co. to Parish, Marshall, & Co. The firm of 'Whit sett, Gray, & Co. was composed of William H. Whitsett, Thomas Gray, and John J. Hill; that of Whitsett & Gray was composed of William H. Whitsett and Thomas Gray. Thus it appears that Thomas Gray was a member of both firms. The complainants allege the deaths of both Whitsett & Gray, leaving Hill as surviving partner of the firm of Whitsett, Gray, & Co. They aver that Lipscomb & Hardin administered upon the estate of Whitsett, and had reported that estate *to the County Court to be insolvent; that
' J Ann R. Gray, widow of Thomas Gray, and who had intermarried with L. Sexton, had, conjointly with James Gray, taken administration of the estate of Thomas; that upon judgments obtained on the notes of Whitsett, Gray, & Co., against Hill, the surviving partner, executions had been sued out and returned nulla bona. There is, in the next [p. 157] place, charged a belief of frauds and concealment on the part of Hill, and the administrators of Whitsett, and also the per fect solvency of the estate of Thomas Gray; the whole con cluding with a prayer for accounts of the effects of Whitsett, Gray, & Co., of William H. Whitsett, and of Thomas Gray, in the hands of their representatives, and for satisfaction.
It is now a rule of law too well settled to be shaken, that the creditor of a partnership may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving partner, or go in the first instance into equity against the representatives of the deceased part ner. See the several cases on this point collected in Story on Partnership, § 362, note 3. This being conceded, there can be no valid exception to the prosecution of this suit immediately against the representatives of Thomas Gray, and it is to the advantage of his estate, that the representa tives of Whitsett, and the surviving partner, Hill, should both be called in, that they may be required to contribute from any appropriate means in their possession towards the discharge of their joint and several obligations. Here, then, will be perceived the answer to the third cause assigned for the demurrer, namely, that the complainants had not ex hausted their remedy at law befoie going into a court of equity. It is the right also of the representatives of the deceased partner, Whitsett, and that of the surviving part ner, Hill, to participate in settlements in which their inter ests are directly involved; and an omission in the bills to convene these joint parties in interest for this purpose, with the representatives of the other deceased partner, Gray, would have exhibited a palpable and material defect in the proceedings of the complainants.
According to the case made in the bill and amended bill, there are no visible partnership effects, and it may be the fact, that the surviving partner, Hill, and the estate of the deceased partner, Whitsett, are both insolvent. Should this turn out to be true, then the separate estate of the partner, Gray, said to be solvent, must be responsible to the creditors of each of the firms of which he was a member. In order to ascertain the precise extent of Gray’s responsibility, accounts would be proper, not only between the two firms and their respective creditors, but also between these firms themselves. Accounts would likewise be proper of the separate effects of the deceased partners. This view of the case removes the ground set forth in the second assignment of causes of demurrer. We are of opinion that the court could, in equity, properly take cognizance of this cause without the necessity [p. 158] nqoi'' ^ further previous “proceedings at law; that the bill ° J and amended bill of the complainants were not excep tionable for multifariousncss; that the decree of the Circuit Court dismissing those bills for either of the causes assigned for the demurrer is erroneous. The decree is therefore reversed, and this cause is remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to be there proceeded in, conformably with tiie principles here established.
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is ordered and decreed by this court that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed, with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to proceed therein conform ably to the opinion of this court.
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