Cheston v. Appeal Tax Ct., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Cheston v. Appeal Tax Ct., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845)
Full caption
James Cheston, Plaintiff in error, v. The Appeal Tax Court.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1845
James Cheston, Plaintiff in error, v. The Appeal Tax Court.
The charter of a bank is a franchise, which is not taxable, as such, if a price has been paid for it, which the legislature accepted.1 [p. 148] But the corporate property of the bank is separable from the franchise, and may be taxed, unless there is a special agreement to the contrary.2
1
Cited. Home of the Friendless 5 Ohio St., 444; Bose County Bank v. y. Bouse, 8 Wall. 438; Salt Co. v. Lewis, 5 Id., 447; Farmers' Bank v. ast Sagmaio, 13 Id., 376; Erie B’y Commonwealth, 6 Bush, (Ky.), 126; oo. v Pennsz/Zrama, 21 Id., 498. LeBoy v. East S. C. B. W. Co., 18 k r-n nrjM6 in state court, see Mich., 233; Mechanics’ Bank v. De» (Md.), 231. When a certain bolt, 1 Ohio St., 591; s. c. 18 How., °r+ annual charge is paid or 380; State v. Commissioners, 8 Vr. at.Ja„cte?t° be paid, as the consider- (N. J.), 240; State v. Commercial + or grant °f a franchise, the Bank, 7 Ohio, 125 ; Jefferson Bank v. f 11S a “^tation upon the tax- Skelly, 9 Ohio St., 606; s. c. 1 Black, n?nSer’ and no further tax can be 436; Matheny v. Golden, 5 Ohio St., is a upon the franchise. Any tax 361. Contra. Toledo Bank v. Bond, naid 52. adddlon to the price 1 Ohio St., 622; Exchange Bank v. Attomp-,, n use7 tbe privilege. Hines, 3 Id., 1; Sandusky Bank v. lottP Bank Char- Wilbor, 1 Ohio, 481. v. p w os, ^T. C.), Eq., 287; Minot A stipulation in the charter that the (U Si Q9Q. B’ " Abb. property of the corporation shall be Phil iPa \ ^aH., 206; 7 exempt from taxation bars all right to B R Cn’a nm’ B‘ assess or levy a tax thereon. Washing-And wW? h ’ (M?-h 288- ton University v. Bouse, 42 Mo., 308; that th?^ charter stipulates s. c. 8 Wall., 439. taxes annuamHn°r SliaP cert,ain A mere reservation in a charter of a ■which it wont J eu taxes to sum to be paid annually does not con-the amonT^ tain an implied contract that no furlUentlyS^ ther tax shall be imposed. State v. iy increased. State v. Auditor, Betway, 2 Jones, (N. C.), Eq., 396; /^nC’ Cases, 12 Gill & J. Mayor n. Proprietors, 7 Md., 517; ci / ’ not toe dividends, Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, State v. Petway, 2 Jones (N. C.) Eq., 50 Mo., 155. Tn M . . When the stock is exempt from Rani- v. Commercial taxation, no tax can be levied on a thiii th? (La.), 151, it is held branch road which the corporation not ova ^“Pt10» of the, capital does legally builds. See Hewitt v. New Bnt IS- 6 company’s property. York & Oswego Midland R. R. Co., the corporation from 12 Blatchf., 452. welt aP its property as 8 Applied. Jefferson Branch Bank Amhmi p iraiichises. Camden & v. Skelly, 1 Black, 446. Followed. 3 Harr /KT t \ %V' Commissioners, Ohio Life Ins. &c. Co. v. Debolt, nriviWo tav n » so eatted 16 How., 429; Farrington v, Ten-Co. Gulf & P. B. R. nessee, 5 Otto, 690. Not in con - land is pvpmn/ti, ithe flict. People v. The Commissioners, upon it a™th+e b^ddinSs erected 4 Wall., 259. Cited. Planters' Bank v. ««4, 6 How., 832.
Minot v. P. W. <6 B. B. B. Co. 2 B. B. Co. v. Cass, 53 Id., 17; Living-Abb. (U. S.), 323: Erie B. B Co. v. ston n. H. & St. J. B. B. Co., 60 Id., Commissioners, 3 Brewst. (Pa.), 368; 516; Lexington v. Ault, 30 Id., 480; Delaware B. B. Tax, 7 Phil. (Pa.), but in New Jersey and Mississippi it 555; s. c, 18 Wall., 206; State v. is held that the state cannot authorize Parker, 3 Vr. (N. J.), 426; Evans- a municipality to levy a tax it cannot ville IL & N. B. B. Co. v. Common- itself levy. Camden & Amboy B. B. wealth, 9 Bush, (Ky.), 438; Louisville Co. v. Hillegas, 3 Harr. (N. J.), 11; C. & L. B. B. Co. v. Commonwealth, Same v.Commissioners,Id.,11', O’ Don-10 Id., 43. nell v. Bailey, 24 Miss., 386; so in
A provision fixing the particular Virginia, City of Bichmond n. B. & mode in which taxes are to be assessed D. B. B. Co., 21 Gratt., 604; and in does not preclude changing the mode. Maryland, Mayor v. B. & O. B. B. State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph B. B. Co., 6 Gill, 288 ; and North Carolina, Co., 60 Mo., 143. Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5
If there is no consideration for the Ired., 516; and in South Carolina, exemption of the tax the clause of ex- State Bank v. Charleston, 3 Rich., emption may be repealed. Hospital 342. v. Philadelphia, 24 Pa. St, 229; Holly 2 Disapproved in dissenting opin-Springs S. <fc I. Co. v. Marshall, 52 ion. State Bank of Ohio v. Knapp, Miss., 281; State v. County Treasurer,, 16 How., 401, (see Ibid,,336). Cited. 4 Rich., (S. C.), 520; People n. Com- West Biver Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 missioners, 47 N. Y., 501; s. c. 53 How.. 542. Barb., 70; St. Louis, I. M. & S. B. Co. When the charter exempts propv. Loftin, 30 Ark., 693; Sandusky erty used for the actual and necessary Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St., 481. purposes of the corporation, a tax may
When property is given to a corpor- be levied upon land leased to others, ation for a certain purpose and there which is not used for the purposes o± then exists a statute enacting that the corporation. State v. Love, 8 V r. property so given shall be exempt (N. J.), 60; but if used conjointly from taxation, it cannot be taxed as with others, it cannot be. State v. long as it is applied to the purpose for Betts, 4 Zab. (N. J.), 555. It con-which it was given; for the statute is veyed with a reservation ot annual a contract with the donors under rent, the property taxa1b^-. which the property was given, and no New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn., io, subsequent legislation can divert the Brainard v. CoZc/iester, 31 Id., • right thus vested in the society. At- Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Id., Ho. water v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn., 223; The exemption of the propertyreta Osborne v. Humphrey,! Id., 335; corporation includes all which is ooviLandon v. Litchfield, 11 Id., 251; ously appropriate and convenient to Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Id., 481; carry the franchise grantedinto effect. Parker v. Bedfield, 10 Id., 490. Con - State y. Hancock, b Vr. (B. J.), bál, tba. Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt.. s. c. 4 Id 315; State v Wood,u^
525; Brainerds Colchester, 31 Conn., Vr. (N. J.),94; b^/nly to these pur 407; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Id., 116. poses State v 2
If a tax is to be levied only upon (N. J.), 519, s. c. 1IA, 31^ . the happening of a certain event, no State, 4 Vr. (N.J.), 7, • tax can be levied prior to that time, lector, 9 Vr. (N. J.), , State v McGavishv. State, 5 Vr. (N. J.), 509. Collector,7' Vr (N. J. ,519, State v.
An exemption of the capital of the Powers, 4 -d ’ piaveu corporation extends to additional capí- Blundell, Id., R (fa tai, although increased under subse- Id., 370; Vermont Central. K
quent vote? State V. N. & W. B. B. % Ffik ‘S’o® 423 An 30 Conn 290 Georgia B. B. & B. Co., 04 w
In Missouri it is said that an ex- The corporation State einption from state, , _ tt n°ÍJh8 Vr^N^JJ, 240.
nof
v. Farmers' Bank, 30Mo., oto, Jracyic jy [p. 149] The legislature of Maryland, in 1821, continued the charters of several banks to 1845, upon condition, that they would make a road and pay a school tax. This would have exempted their franchise, but not their property, from taxation.
But another clause in the law provided, that upon, any of the aforesaid banks accepting of and complying with the terms and conditions of the act, the faith of the state was pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during the continuance of their charters under the act.
This was a contract relating to something beyond the franchise, and exempted the stockolders from a tax levied upon them as individuals, according to the amount of their stock.8
These were kindred cases, brought up by writ of error from the Court of Appeals of the state of Maryland, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The first case depended upon the constitutionality of a tax imposed by the legislature of Maryland in 1841, it being alleged to be in violation of a contract made by the legislature in 1821; and the second depended upon the same circumstance, with the addition that the plaintiff in error was entitled to the benefit of the same contract, by virtue of an act of the General Assembly, passed in 1834.
The facts in the case were these ;—
At November session, 1804, the legislature of Maryland incorporated the Union Bank of Maryland. Samuel Gordon,
renew the exemption unless expressly An exemption from taxation ex$o stated. State n. Bank, 2 Houst. empts the corporation from assess(1^1.), 99. ments for damages and expenses in
Exempting the corporation does not opening streets assessed without regard exempt its bonds. State v. Bronin, 3 to benefits. State v. Newark, 8 Vr. Zab. (N. J.). 484; but the shares of the (N. J.), 185; see St. Paul & Pac. R. stockholders are exempt, Id.; State v. R. Co. v. St. Paul, 21 Minn., 526. powers, 4 Zab. (N. J.), 400: State v. But it has been held that the exempn ’ $ > ’ bas been tion from taxation and assessments nela that if the stock is exempt the does not apply to assessments of bene-property of the company is also, fits for opening streets. State Home v' Central & Co., 40 Ga., Society v. Mayor, 6 Vr. (N. J.), 157; 64b; New Haven v. City Bank, 31 City v. Society, 4 Zab. (N. J. , 385; [p. 150] the plaintiff in error in the first case, was, at the institution of the suit below, a stockholder in this bank. No bonus was required to be paid to the state, but five thousand shares were reserved for the use and benefit of the state of Maryland, to be subscribed for by the state, when desired by the legislature thereof. The charter was to last until 1816.
At the session of 1812, the legislature passed an act, entitled “An act to incorporate a company to make a turnpike *1341 road leading to Cumberland, and for the extension of J the charters of the several *banks in this state, and for other purposes.” It proposed to extend the charters of the banks to 1835, upon condition, that they would subscribe for as much stock as would raise a fund necessary and sufficient to finish and complete the road, and upon the further condition, should bind themselves to pay into the Treasury the sum of 820,000 for each and every year that the charters should continue; the fund being pledged for the support of common schools.
The 12th section was as follows:
“ That upon any of the banks in this state complying with the conditions of this act, the faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or bonus on the said banks during the continuation of their charters under this act.”
This act was not accepted by any of the banks.
At the session of 1813, the legislature passed another act, which was entitled a supplement to the aforegoing., The 1st section incorporated a company to make the road. The second was as follows: “ And for the purpose of raising a fund to make and complete said road: Be it enacted, That the charters of the several banks, &c., shall be, and they are hereby continued and extended to the 1st day of January, 1835, and to the end of the session of the General Assembly next thereafter, upon condition of the said several banks subscribing, in proportion to their respective capitals actually paid in at the time of such subscriptions, for as much stock,as is necessary and sufficient to finish and complete said road, &c., &c.
The 7th section enacted, that every bank should pay annually into the Treasury the sum of twenty cents on every hundred dollars of the capital stock actually paid in; and it this were neglected for six months after it was due, the bank so neglecting should forfeit its charter.
The 8th section continued the charters of such banks as complied with the act until 1835.
The 11th section ran thus: “ That upon any .of the aforesaid banks accepting of and complying with the terms and [p. 151] conditions of this act, the faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during the continuance of their charters under thia act; and in case of the acceptance of and compliance with the provisions of this act by the several banks hereby required to make the aforementioned road, the faith of the state is further solemnly pledged to the several existing banks in the city of Baltimore, not to grant a charter of incorporation to any other banking institution to be established in the city or precincts of Baltimore before the 1st day of January, 1835.”
At the session of 1815, an act was passed, “declaring the continuation and extension of the charters of the several banks therein mentioned.” It recited, that several banks, and amongst them the Union Bank, had accepted the act of 1813, and then declared, that their charters were extended to 1835.
*At the session of 1821, another act was passed, en- r*iqc titled “ An act to incorporate a company to make a k turnpike road from Boonsborough to Hagerstown, and for the extension of the charters of the several banks in the city of Baltimore, and for other purposes.” The preamble was as follows: “ Whereas it is to the interest of the state that a turnpike road should be made, leading from Boonsborough to Hagerstown, in Washington county, and it is represented to the legislature, that the banks hereinafter mentioned are willing to make the same, if an extension of their several charters be granted to them, as they were heretofore extended by an act entitled a supplement to the act entitled, an act to incorporate a company to make a turnpike road, leading to Cumberland, and for the extension of the charters of the several banks in the city.of Baltimore, and for other purposes, passed at December session, 1813: Therefore, Be it enacted,” &c.
The 1st section incorporated a company to make the road.
The 2d section was as follows: “ And for the purpose of raising a fund to make and complete said road, Be it enacted, hat the charters of the several banks aforesaid shall be, and ey aie hereby, continued and extended to the 1st day of anuary, 1845, upon condition of the said several banks subscribing, in proportion to their respective capitals actually pan in at the time of such subscriptions, for as much stock as ^necessary and sufficient to finish and complete said road,”
The 6th section was as follows: “ That if the said company shall not commence the making of the said turnpike road wiuun two years from the passage of this act, and shall not niP e e the same in four years thereafter, the right of the
said company to the said road shall revert to the state of [p. 152] Maryland., and the charters of the said banks are hereby declared not to be continued or extended by virtue of this act.”
The 7th section enacted, that the banks should annually pay to the treasurer the sum of twenty cents on every hundred dollars of the capital stock of each bank actually paid in; and in case of neglect, the bank was to forfeit its charter.
The 8th section renewed and continued the charters of the complying banks until 1845, and the session of the General Assembly next thereafter.
The 11th section was as follows: “ That upon any of the aforesaid banks accepting of and complying with the terms and conditions of this act, the faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during the continuance of their charters under this act; and in case of the acceptance of and compliance with the provisions of this act by the several banks hereby required to make the aforementioned road, the faith of the state is further pledged, to the aforesaid banks in the city of Baltimore, not to grant a charter of incorporation to any other banking institution to be established in the city or precincts of Baltimore before the 1st day of January, 1845.”
J-ooJ *The 12th section was as follows: “ That the said banks, specified in the 7th section of this act; should they elect so to do, shall be, and they are hereby, exempt from the payment of the annual tax hereby imposed, upon condition of their paying to the treasurer of the Western Shore of Maryland, on or before the 1st day of January, 1823, the sum of $100,000, to be appropriated in the manner herein before provided for.”
The Union Bank, as was admitted in the court below, duly accepted and complied with the terms and conditions of this act of 1821.
At the session of the legislature of December, 1834, an act was passed (chap. 274) to “extend the charters of several banks in the city of Baltimore,” by which, amongst other enactments, the charter of the Union Bank was extended to the end of the year 1859. It introduced some new provisions into the charter, required the payment of the school tax and a proportionate share of $75,000; but contained no stipulation like that of the 11th section of the act of 1821. , At the session of December, 1835, the Farmers and Planters Bank was incorporated. It was required to pay a bonus and
school tax, but the charter contained no exemption trom taxatl0At the same session, viz., December, 1835, an act (chap. 142) was passed, reciting that whereas, by the 11th section or [p. 153] the act of 1821, the faith of the state was pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon certain banks, and it was equitable that other banks should stand on equal footing, and enacting that the faith of the state was pledged not to impose any further or other tax on banks incorporated since the year 1821 than might be imposed on the banks which had complied with the terms of that act.
The 3d section was as follows: “ And be it enacted, That in the said act of 1821, it was not, nor is it now, the intention of the General Assembly of Maryland, to exempt from taxation and equitable contribution to the common burdens for state purposes, the property, stock, or dividends severally held in or derived from any bank in this state, by any person or persons whatever; but that the true intent and meaning of the pledge given by the said act of Assembly was, to limit the taxation upon the franchises only of the banks therein mentioned.” . In April, 1841, an act was passed “for the general valuation and assessment of property in this state, and to provide a tax to pay the debts of the state.” It directed, amongst other things, that “ all stocks or shares owned by residents of this state in any bank, institution, or company incorporated in any other state or territory: all stocks or shares in any bank, institution, or company incorporated by this state,” &c., should be assessed, and a tax imposed upon this and all other species of property, of twenty cents, or one-fifth of one per cent, on every hundred dollars of assessable property. It also provided for an Appeal Tax Court, whose decisions should be carried to the Court of Appeals.
*In the. trial of the cause in the Court of Appeals, the following agreement was filed:— L
“ It is agreed, that the appellant banks, to wit, the Union ank of Maryland, the Bank of Baltimore, the Mechanics’
Bank of Baltimore, the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank of j Marine Bank of Baltimore, and the Farmers’ and Merchants’ Bank of Baltimore, commonly called the old banks, were chartered previous to the year 1821; and that the new banks, to wit, the Merchants’ Bank of Baltimore, the aimers and Planters’ Bank of Baltimore, the Citizens’ Bank
o a timore, and the Western Bank of Baltimore, were char-ere smce the year 1830; the respective periods of the incortheirchat aforeg°ing banks appearing by reference to
readmitted, that the old banks have duly accepted and 2 w1? the terms and conditions of the act of 1821, P* , the manner of which acceptance appears by the [p. 154] paper marked A, herewith filed; and have also accepted and complied with the provisions of the act of 1834, chap. 274: and it is also admitted, that taxes have always, since the incorporation of said banks, been levied and assessed upon their real and personal property in all the cities and counties of this state, in the same manner as upon property of the same kind belonging to individuals, and that said taxes have always been paid by said banks up to this time. And it is further admitted, that said banks did not, at the time of the enactment of the act of 1841, chap. 23, nor have they at any time since, paid or redeemed their notes or other obligations in specie.”
The Court of Appeals decided, that the tax imposed by the act of 1841 was not a violation of the contract between the state and the banks, which was effected under the act of 1821, and to review this opinion the writ of error was brought.
Meredith and Dulany, for the plaintiffs in error.
Nelson, attorney-general, and Steele, for the defendants.
In the case of Samuel Gordon, the counsel for the plaintiff in error contended,
1. That the Union Bank of Maryland having accepted of and complied with the terms and conditions of the act of 1821, chap. 131, a contract was created by the 11th section thereof, on the part of the state, “ not to impose any further tax or burden upon said bank during the continuance of its charter under the 8th section of said act;” and that this exemption from taxation extended to all the property of said bank, real and personal.
2. That the 1st and 45th sections of the act of 1841, chap. 23, imposed upon the said bank “ a further tax and burden, in violation of the said contract, and was therefore void as against the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. , .
And in the case of James Cheston, plaintiff m error,
-* v. The Appeal *Tax Court, who was a stockholder in the Farmers’ and Planters’ Bank of Baltimore, one of the new banks chartered since 1830, the counsel for said Cheston contended,
That if the aforesaid assessment law of 1841, so tar as it imposes a further tax upon the stockholders of the old banks, should be declared void for its repugnance to the Constitution of the United .States, then, that it is equally void, so tar as it imposes an additional tax upon James Cheston, a stoc io er of one of the new banks, as it thereby deprives the new banks of the immunity from further taxation granted to them y e
v JANUARY TERM, 1845. 138
1st section of the act of 1835, chap. 142, which immunity is itself a franchise, granted, for a valuable consideration, and cannot, therefore, be taken away.
Dulany, for the plaintiffs in error, said, that he would not stop to cite authorities to show, that the law was void, if it impaired the obligation of a contract, but would refer to two cases which were analogous to the present: 7 Cranch, 154; 4 Peters, 561.
He then entered into a detailed examination of the charter of the Union Bank with its several supplements, and asked the court to compare the 11th section of the act of 1821 with the act of 1841, and he thought it would be found, that the latter took away what the former gave. It was admitted, that there was an exemption of some kind in the act of 1821, and the only question in the case was, what kind of exemption was it?
In Dwarris on Statutes, 51, 9 Law Library, it was said, that every word of a statute must have its effect; that it was better to observe what the legislature said than what they are supposed to have meant. Apply this to the paragraph, coupled with the doctrine that in Maryland property is not taxed, but persons are. 1 Maxey’s Laws, 12, Declaration of Rights, article 13, shows this. The exemption was then a pledge given to a person, viz., the bank. Why should it be limited, as contended for by the opposite side, to an exoneration of the franchise merely from taxation ? The construction ought to be in favor of the banks, because it was the intention of the legislature to invite them to accept the law. If you narrow it down now, it is not the spirit in which the offer was made. It is easy to see what that spirit was. The two objects of promoting internal improvement and fostering public schools were great public objects, and it was very desirable to encourage them without resorting to direct taxation. The banks were e invited party, and the act was to be laid before the stocko ders for approval or rejection. Of course, the terms would e closely looked at. The proposition was, that no “ further ” tax should be imposed. The word “further” refers to the preceding section, m which the tax for the road and schools is provi led. It is true, that the act of 1841 imposed a tax upon e property; but the tax for road and schools fell upon the very same property, and, as it happened, was of just the r*ion same amount. A further tax of the *same character 139 mît °^Ject to which the money is to be applied clir • m the character of the tax. The clause is aX? -8eJf’ We are not t0 look t0 the preamble, as a & ° m ention, unless there is some ambiguity. Dwarris [p. 156] on Stat., 19. And if we look to the preamble, it will not enlighten us, because it only refers to the road, without saying any thing about schools. If the exemption related only to the franchise, it was worth nothing, because whether the tax should be laid on the franchise or the property of the bank, the same people would pay it in either case. The legislature could have derived the same amount by taxing property as if they taxed the franchise; and to hold, that they were at liberty to do so, of course, renders the exemption of the franchise worthless. There are two decisions upon similar words: 2 Harr. (Ky.), 78, 79, 80 ; 7 Dana (Ky.), 342.
True, the banks have heretofore paid taxes upon their real property, but the amount was trifling, and the stock was not taxed as now. Besides, their consent does not furnish a rule by which we are to construe the law.
It is said, on the other side, that the contract of exemption was made with the bank and not the stockholders; and by the act of 1841 only the latter are taxed. But what is a corporation ? Only the union of certain persons, with power to sue, &c. 4 Pet., 552 ; Angell & Ames on Corp. 1, 3, 5.
The name is only the legislative baptism of the stockholders. Natural persons are the substratum of the corporation; they receive all its benefits. They pay the taxes, and yet we are told, that a contract for the benefit of the corporation does not reach them. They were the persons who accepted the law in a general meeting, and not the bank, acting as a corporation. What is the difference between taxing them in the gross and taxing them individually ?
As to the case of Cheston. He is a stockholder of the Farmers’ and Planters’ Bank, one of what are called the new banks, chartered in 1836. The act of March, 1836, chap. 142, puts these on the same footing with the old banks. The 3d section, it is true, says that the exemption relates only to franchises; but the legislature had no right to deprive, by law, the banks of a benefit which they had already acquired under a contract. And the words “ without violation,” &c., show that the legislature did not intend to take away any such benefit.
The tax of 1841 clashes with the exemption. It is laid on every thing which constitutes the property of the bank, because in a schedule every thing, even the franchise, goes to make up the aggregate value of the stock, and the tax is laid on the cash value of the stock. By the 17th section, the assessors are directed to value it at the market price. But the market price is governed by the value of all the different species of property held by the bank, including even the franchise, because a purchaser looks at all these, when abou o [p. 157] *invest. It is impossible to separate that portion of the tax which falls upon the franchise, and as the legislature has covered the whole, the entire tax must fall.
Steele, for the defendants in error, contended,
1. That the contract between the State of Maryland and the Union Bank of Maryland, created by the act of 1821, chap. 131, and continued by the act of 1834, chap. 274, exempted from taxation, not the property of said bank, nor the shares of its stock in the hands of individual stockholders, but its corporate franchises, and their exercise during the continuance of its charter.
2. That the tax imposed by the act of 1841, chap. 23, being a tax upon the shares of stock owned by individual stockholders, was not a violation of the contract between the state and the bank, and was, therefore, not unconstitutional.
In the case of James Cheston, a tax was imposed and assessed under the same act of 1841, chap. 23, on the shares of stock owned by the plaintiff in error in the Farmers’ and Planters’ Bank of Baltimore—a bank chartered since 1830, and not included in the provisions of the act of 1821, chap. 131, and the act of 1834, chap. 274.
In this case, the counsel for the defendant in error contended,
That the plaintiff in error was entitled to no immunity from taxation upon his shares of stock in said Farmers’ and Planters Bank of Baltimore, either under the acts of Assembly, herein before mentioned, or under the act of 1835, chap. 142.
Mr. Steele said, the Appeal Tax Court is the nominal defendant only; the real one is the state of Maryland. The act of 1841, chap. 33, is a general tax upon all property; not on banks alone, but every species of property. The Court of Appeals decided that it did not conflict with the act of 1821. Is it not a rule that this court will adopt a state’s construction of its own laws ?
In this case it is not correct to construe the contract favoray to the banks.. . On the contrary, the rule is to construe
s nctly any provision which imposes a limit upon the taxing power. 4 Pet., 503, Prov. Bank v. Billings, 11 Pet., 546-^ 548, carries the rule still further.
Such a rule is necessary to protect the community from improvident legislation. Another rule is, that where there are 1 X°+c.or!s^ruc^ns’ that one is adopted which will produce the in„% ln^u^‘ It has been said that our construction, exempt*
^P^18®8 renders the whole nugatory, because the WW would have been s^fe from taxation without such [p. 158] exemption. But not so. Being the creatures of law, they are peculiarly appropriate for the taxing power. 4 Wheat., 699 ; 12 Mass., 252 ; 4 Pet., 526.
A charter makes a bank a person to carry on a business; but it must be carried on in the same way that other persons *1411 Suppose a pre-existing law had taxed banks, would
-■ a subsequent charter have *been exempt ? No—because the laws would not conflict with each other. Nor do they conflict when the charter is passed first.
It has been said that the exemption is clear. But the section itself refers to the preceding part of the law, and the legislature, twice, in 1835 and 1841, put the same construction on it as we do. The 7th section and all preceding ones provide for an extension of charters. It was right to exempt the franchises, because the legislature was dealing with that subject; but why should they go beyond that, and exempt private property to an extent that they were not aware of? The state was not in want of money, nor was there a motive in the banks to purchase such an exemption as that contended for. No one then anticipated what has since come to pass. Taxes were light, and always paid. The act of 1813 contains the same clause, when there did not exist any system of taxation. Up to 1841, the state had never taxed bank stock or choses in action, and the taxes upon real or other property did not amount to the fourth part of 20 cents. A proposition, therefore, to exempt stock which had never been taxed at all, upon the payment of four times the amount which other .property paid, would have been considered a strange one. The tax of 20 cents must have been imposed upon the franchise. The compensation for extending the charters was that the banks would make the road, and for future exemption of the franchise was that they should pay 20 cents towards the school fund. The word “ further ” means another tax like that one; and if the tax imposed was upon the franchise, a further one upon the same thing was all that was intended to be prohibited.
Look at the cotemporaneous exposition of the law by both parties. County and city taxes were paid by the banks; and not only so, but a small state tax, levied in 1822 upon real property, was paid by them also. Other banks were incorporated in 1833. 1834, and 1835, which pay the 20 cents wit - out any thing being granted except the charter. The act oi 1835 gives the new banks an exemption upon the franchise, and nothing more. In the case in 2 Harr. (Ky.), the woids were “further or other tax.” Exemptions have been stnc y construed. 11 Johns. (N. Y.), 77; 8 T. R., 416. The penalty for not paying the 20 cents, shows upon what the tax was
Gordon v. Appeal Tax C< urt.
imposed, for it provides that the charter shall cease if the tax is not paid. It was therefore a bonus for the charter.
But suppose that the contract was made as contended for by the other side. By their own showing, it was made with the bank as a person, and the individual stockholders cannot avail themselves of it. If the corporation were to purchase a house, one of the members could not claim an interest in the purchase. They have an interest which is distinct from that of the corporation, because they may sue it, or sue each other. If the contract here be not to tax the bank, it is not equivalent to an agreement not to tax the stockholders. The difference is shown by supposing the tax to be laid before [-*-149 the bank *commenced operations, and laid afterwards. 1 In the first case it would diminish the capital of the bank, but in the latter it would not. If the individual stockholders can claim the benefit of the exemption, they must also be liable to the state for the payment of the tax which is the price of the exemption. But if Samuel Gordon were sued for the 20 cents stipulated in the act, no one can suppose that he would be bound to pay it. The difference between taxing banks and stockholders is shown in 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.), 527; 4 Wheat., 436; 2 Pet., 459; 2 Bay (S. C.), 654, 672, 683.
Who pays the tax of 1841 ? If the bank does not, there is no violation of the contract with the bank, and the bank does not, in fact, pay it.
As to Cheston's case and the new banks, it has been said that they are on the same footing as the old. The best reply to this is to read the law. The legislature expressly say, that they intend to exempt only the franchises.
Nelson, attorney-general, on same side.
Ihere are two propositions to be examined:
1. The nature of the contract of 1821.
2. Whether the act of 1821 was in force at all in 1841.
1. We admit there was a contract in 1821, and that it is protected by this court. But what is its natui•e and extent?
e onginal charter of the Union Bank contained no exemption, and, therefore, according to the doctrine in the Providence Bank v. Billings, the state could tax it. The charter was passed in 1804, and contained no clause imposing a school?x‘ utthls might have been imposed at any time after the charter, without asking the consent of the bank. The only poin upon which the assent of the bank was required, in any sequent legislation, was that its charter should be continS • W?8 t0 exPire 1816. In 1812 an act was passed P posing to extend the charter on certain conditions, but [p. 160] these were not accepted. In 1813 another act was passed extending the charter to 1st January, 1835, which was accepted.
(Mr. Nelson here went into a detailed examination of the several acts.) All the acts show that the legislature had in view the making of the road, and the banks the extension of their charters. The pledge not to incorporate any other banks shows that it was only the franchise which was intended to be protected. The contract was made with the banks as such. They were the contracting party in their corporate capacity. What does the act of 1841 do ? It imposes no tax on the capital stock of any bank, but on individual interests. No bank is plaintiff in error here, complaining of a violated contract. The 9th section of the act directs the mode of making the assessment, which was upon the stock in the hands of individuals at its cash value. But this is not the same i4rfJ with its *nominal value, which would have been the guide if the bank had been taxed. As laid, it is nothing more than an income tax, and cannot a legislature lay that without regard to the source from which revenue comes ? The distinction between a tax upon a bank, as such, and a tax upon its property, is clearly recognized in the case of McCulloch v. State of Maryland, where the court say that one may be taxed but not the other. The identity between a bank and its stockholders is shown not to exist, when we consider that the bank, as a corporation, could not become one of its own stockholders. Application had to be made to the legislature for peimission for the bank to purchase its own stock. It is true, as said on the other side, that the act of 1821 was accepted by the stockholders in general meeting, but this was a corporate act, and not one proceeding from individual interests. If it had been the latter, whence would the majority have derived the right to bind the minority? TT •
2. The act of 1834, chap. 274, was accepted by the Union Bank, and by virtue of it the charter was extended to 18&9. The acceptance of this new law is a merger of the old, and in the new there is no limitation of the power to tax.
Meredith, for plaintiffs in error, in reply and conclusion. Let us inquire, , 9 \1. What was the nature and character of the contract. 2. Has it been impaired ? . , Mr. Meredith reviewed the charter of the Union Bank and its supplements, and said, that in 1821, some years before. the charter was to expire, the legislature was desirous of.ma g a road. It was a fact of universal notoriety that turnpi roads were not profitable. Individuals could not be persuaded
JANUARY TERM, 1 8 4 5. 143
to subscribe and make this one. The cost to the Union Bank was $161,000, nearly ten per cent, upon a capital of $1,800,000. It is conceded that for this the state has relinquished a portion of the power of taxation; but then it is said to be only a partial exemption. We agree that to make out a total exemption, the language must be so strong as to leave no reasonable doubt; and we say it is so. What are the words? “Not to impose any further tax or burden on the banks.” There are two important words: “any” and “further.” What is the meaning of “any?” In its popular acceptation it’would include all kinds of taxes in whatever form they might be laid. According to lexicographers, the word is of unusual and indefinite signification. “ Any ” tax must mean “ every tax,” of every nature or description whatsoever. Then, there is the word “further,” which refers to something which has been done before and additional. The other side wish to limit the meaning to an addition of the same nature ; but no dictionary or example can be found to justify this restriction. *(Mr. Meredith here read from Richardson’s Diction- . ary, title Further.') The two words together are as L 144 comprehensive as language could be used. They are quite as strong as those used in 2 Harrison. In the act of 1835, when the legislature intended to put the new banks upon a footing with the old, they say “ further or other ” in the 3d section. i qoi Preped^nS section, the words are the same as those in 1821, which shows that they were supposed to be equivalent. Ihe case cited from 11 Johnson was not that of a tax; it was an assessment for opening a street; and the case in 8 T. R., was decided on two grounds: 1. That the property did not elong to the occupier, and 2. • That the statute had been repealed.. Neither case is in point. In South Carolina, seven ou of eight banks are exempted under a clause exempting banks from taxation. The case in Nott & McCord, decided that words of exemption did not extend to the franchise only, but all taxation. J
If the words of a statute are plain and definite, it is dangerous to depart, &c. . Dwarris on Stat., 3 Law Lib., 48. 1891 construction of the other side be given to the act of 4« u_ V e 44, section is of no use; because without it the nf 19 Au W°U4 ?^Ve been safe from taxation. In the cases tn 1m aSS' 4 -Peters, the right was maintained, it is true, thorp Pose a tax on existing banks, but in neither case was exoont n^uishment of the taxing power, express or implied, ced?tVXkhe^ of the charter. We may con-
Vot ttt °f both. But here the banks paid a high v on. in.—it t o
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
price for their renewed charters, and the legislature could not have taxed the franchise any further. If so, the operation of the 11th section must be extended beyond the franchise.
(Mr. Meredith then entered into a critical examination of the acts of 1812 and 1813, and argued that the first act was not accepted, because it did not go as far in protecting the banks as that of 1813; and that the latter would have been rejected if it had not been supposed to exempt them entirely from taxation.)
Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question raised in this case by the agreed statement of facts upon the record, is, Does the act of Maryland of 1841, chap. 23, so far as it imposes a tax upon the shares of stock held by stockholders in the Union Bank of Maryland and the other banks mentioned in the statement, impair the obligation of a contract ?
The banks are classified in that statement as the old and the new banks. The old are those which were chartered previous to the year 1821; the new, those which were chartered after the year 1830.
Their exemption from the tax imposed by the act of 1841 is claimed under the acts of Maryland of 1821, chap. 131, and that of the 19th March, 1835, chap. 274, called the act of the session of 1834.
admitted that the old banks accepted and have complied with the.terms and conditions of the act of 1821; that they also accepted and have complied with the provisions of 1834; and that taxes have always, since the incorporation of the banks, been assessed and levied upon their real and personal property in all the cities and counties of the state, in the same manner as upon property of the same kind belonging to individuals, and that they have always been paid by the banks up to this time.
The question, however, which this court is called upon to decide, and to which our decision will be confined, is, Are the shareholders in the old and the new banks liable to be taxed, under the act of 1841, on account of the stock which they own in the banks?
The statement given by the reporter of the acts of the legislature of Maryland, by which the charters of the banks have been extended at different times, makes it unnecessary to refer to them in detail here.
Are the old banks' in Baltimore and their stockholders exempted from further taxation during the continuance or their charters under the act of 1821, chap. 131, by force of the
JANUARY TERM, 1845. 1,5
, Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court.
11th section of that act? Can the old banks, after the year 1845, the time to which their charters were extended by the ' act of 1821, and the new banks, claim any exemption from taxation under the act of 1834, chap. 274, unless it be a tax upon their franchise of banking?
It appears, from the acts of 1812, 1813, and 1821, that the legislatures which passed them had in view the construction of the Cumberland and Boonsborough turnpike roads, and the establishment of a school fund. That they designed to accomplish those objects by making some of the banks construct the roads, and all of them contributors to the school fund, as the price for their charters. A round sum, or an annual charge, with or without reference to capital stock, may be asked by a legislature for such a franchise. It may be more convenient to the banks to have such a consideration or bonus distributed through the years of their corporate existence, than to pay its equivalent in advance. This option was given to the old banks. Being so given, it is conclusive that the legislature intended the annual tax or charge upon the capital stocks of the banks to be the bonus or price, or part of the price as to some of them, that they were to pay for the prolongation of their franchise of banking. When the banks accepted the acts, by choosing to pay the annual charge instead of the stipulated alternative, it is plain that they thought so too, and that they understood in that way the contract between themselves and the state. Either was a condition, to be accepted and complied with before the charters were to be extended, buck a contract is a limitation upon the taxing power of the egislature making it, and upon succeeding legislatures, to
impose any further tax upon the franchise. But why, when bought, as it becomes property, may it not be taxed, as rjM land is taxed which has *been bought from the state, L was repeatedly asked in the course of the argument? The reason is, that every one buys land, subject in his own appref t0? „ ?eat law of necessity, that we must contribute rom it and all of our property something to maintain the state,
for th ±ranc7^ for banking, when bought, the price is paid wouldwhilst it lasts, and any tax upon it the h™ h^Ht^hy be an addition to the price.1 But whether the canihd t* iranchise is paid by an annual tax upon the IpS °C?’ °r lr\any °ther waY’ k is in the discretion of ins- tcHt« Q T6 i° caPital stock as an aggregate, according to its actual value, or the stockholders on account of their
0BITEB> Minot v. Philadelphia, &c., R. R. Co., 2 Abb. [p. 164] separate ownership of it, or the dividends in the aggregate, or the stockholders on account of their portions of them. The limitation and the power to tax, as both have been just expressed, was substantially conceded by counsel on both sides of this cause. We did not understand the counsel for the appellants as contending, that the shareholders in the old banks were exempted from the tax imposed upon them on account of their stock, except by the force of the 11th section of the act of 1821. Their argument was, though the franchise might be taxed separate from the stock of a bank, whether the annual tax paid by the banks upon their capital stock was a tax upon their franchises or not, that the banks were exempted from further taxation; the old banks by force of the 11th section of the statute of 1821, and all of the banks in Baltimore by force of the act of 1834. The argument of the counsel for the defendant in error was, that the annual tax paid by the banks was a tax upon their franchises, and that the 11th section did not give to the stockholders any exemption from being taxed as persons on account of their stock. Whether or not the exemption given by that section is extended to the old and the new banks in virtue of the act of 1834, is another question, to which a separate answer must be given in the course of this opinion.
Has such an exemption been given to the old banks ? The language of the 11th section of the act of 1821 is: “And.be
it enacted, That, upon any of the aforesaid banks accepting
and complying with the terms and conditions of this act, the
faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further
tax or burden upon them during the continuance or
charters under this act.” This is the language of grave delib-
eration, pledging the faith of the state for some purpose-
some effectual purpose. Was that purpose the protection of
the banks from what that legislature and succeeding legisla-
tures could not do, if the banks accepted the act, or from what
they might do, in the exercise of the taxing power. Ine
terms and conditions of the act were, that the banks should
construct the road and pay annually a designated charge upon
their capital stocks, as the price for the prolongation oftheir
franchise of banking. The power of the state tc»lay any
further tax upon the franchise was exhausted. That is tne
contract between the state and the banks. It follows, 147J then, *as a matter of course, when the legis1^® $ out of the contract, proposing to pledge its faith, if the,bank
shall accept the act, not to impose any further tax or bu upon them, that it must have meant by those ^°^s an exemp tion from some other tax than a further tax upon the franc [p. 165] of the banks. The latter was already provided against. To confine the pledge to any further tax upon the franchise, surrenders the whole clause as a substantive enactment, to a supposed needless declaration of the legislature, that it would not do what it had stipulated by its contract not to do. The faith of states is never pledged but for some substantial end, within the competency of their legislative power; and it is not for us to suppose that of Maryland was given in the act of 1821, with a less grave intent. “Not to impose any further tax or burden,” when used in reference to some tax already imposed, means no other tax besides that to which reference is made. Those words, so used, cannot be limited by a refinement upon the etymology of the word “any,” out of or beyond its meaning in common discourse, to any like; and the words “any further tax,” used with relation to some other tax, will, by common consent, as it always has been, be intended to mean any additional tax besides that referred to, and not any further like tax.
Having determined that the clause in question was not meant as a pledge against further taxation upon the franchises of the banks, but that it was a pledge against additional taxation, what is the extent of exemption given by it, or to what "Pes it apply ? Does it exempt the respective capital stocks of he banks, as an aggregate, and the stockholders from being taxed as persons on account of their stock? We think it does both. The aggregate could not be taxed, without its having 6 effect upon the parts, that a tax upon the parts,
would have upon the whole. Besides, the legislature, in prop°slng the terms and conditions of the act, use the word anks with reference to the consent or acceptance of the ac. given by the stockholders, according to a fundamental article of their charters. The acceptance of the act S l°nly be made by the stockholders. They did accept, 11 e recoSnise(i it as the act of the stockholders. It whv .ve. been given or been recognised in any other
¿^x,8’ Yben accePted and recognised, it became a tho i C iW1jb tbe ^^s- But its becoming a contract with wWnk determines of itself nothing. We must look in traot °r by whose assent it was to become a conturp L? i- state’to ascertain the intention of the legislabail pl®d^e’ “that upon any of the aforesaid tions of th;? an/- c°mplyiug with the terms and condito imnoup a ^aitb tbe state *8 hereby pledged not contimrnwpHf+?rtbeiutax or burden upon them during the continuance of. their, charters under this act.” * senses in which the words bank or banks are used, [p. 166] occur every day in conversation, and are understood by every one. But *the sense in which they are intended to be used, is determined by their connection with what is said besides. When we speak of an act to be done by a bank or banks, we mean an act to be done by those who have the authority to do it. If it be an act within the franchise for banking, or the ordinary power of the bank to contract, and it is done by the president and directors, or by their agent, we say the bank did it, and every one understands what is meant. If, however, an act is to be done relative to the institution, by which its charter is to be in any way changed, the stockholders must do it, unless another mode to effect it has been provided by the charter. In one sense, but after it has been done, we may say the bank did it, but only so because what the stockholders have done, became a part of the institution, which it was not before. The act to be done in this instance was relative to the institution. The legislature knew it could only be done by the stockholders, and it uses the word banks in reference to the act being accepted by the stockholders. The act was accepted by them. When, then, the legislature says, “ that upon any of the aforesaid banks accepting of and complying with the terms and conditions of this act, the faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during the continuance of their charters under this act,” the relative is as broad as the antecedent, comprehending all that the latter referred to. It cannot be said, then, that the stockholders in the old banks are not exempted by the 11th section of the act of 1821 from being taxed as persons, on account of their stock in those banks, during the continuance of their charters under that act. .. ,
Such was manifestly the intention of the legislatures wmci passed the acts of 1813 and 1821, from their language. It is confirmed by the attendant circumstances. Each of those legislatures were anxious to have a certain road constructed, which they thought the convenience and intercourse of the citizens of Maryland required; and they were also anxious to raise an adequate school fund for every county in the state. Thev determined that both should be accomplished by incor porating certain banks, with the obligation upon them to make the roads, and to make all the banks in the state pay an annual tax upon their respective capitals, tor a school fund, as the conditions upon which their charters were to be extended. By the act of 1813, chap. 122 every incorporated bank in the state was required to pay the annual tax [p. 167] twenty cents upon every hundred dollars of its capital stock, as the condition upon which its charter was to be extended.
When the legislature, in 1821, incorporated the Boonsborough Turnpike Company, and proposed to extend the charters of those banks which, by the terms of the act, were to subscribe for stock enough to complete the road, it renewed upon those banks the school tax which had v • x 4M been imposed upon them in common with the *other L banks, by the act of 1813. The 11th sections in both acts are identical. In what spirit were those acts offered to the acceptance of the banks? In what spirit was it that the banks viewed and accepted these acts? It was an unusual way of providing means for the construction of turnpike roads. The tolls might turn out to be enough to compensate them for the expenditures. They might not. Though the legislature thought the construction of the roads and paying the school-fund tax were no more than an adequate price for an extended franchise, it is very certain that the stockholders may have thought, that the incorporation of the banks into turnpike companies, with an obligation upon them to withdraw so much money from their business operations as was sufficient to finish the roads, presented only a contingent possibility that they could be remunerated by tolls from the roads. When the act of 1821 was proposed, they had some experience of what had been the result of the construction of the Cumberland road. Is it not possible, then, that when the acts of 1813 and 1821 weie in preparation, or as they were being enacted, that the 11th section was introduced as an inducement to the stockholders to accept those acts ? Whether the tolls from the road ave ever compensated the banks for the expenditure upon Wem’, not appear in the case. But it^vas natural that the stockholders, knowing as they did that a tax upon the lancluses of the banks would not exempt them from other axa ion, stipulated in both instances that a provision should. e introduced into the acts surrendering the state’s right to tax them further than they were about to be by those acts. In whatever way we examine the acts of 1813 and 1821, we are tn tia^ aPPears from the 11th sections in those acts,
^een * ie intention of the legislatures which passed aopmi <° ^“Pt ^e stockholders from taxation as persons on avph °f St°ck which theX owned iu the banks. This l°n’ h?wevei\i« limited to the old banks in Baltimore tj. • chai‘tered before 1821, during the continuance of 11th S U?Ìer the act of 182L U is founded upon the 1841 ph?0^^ ^a^ an(^ it. our opinion that the act of
’ p. 3, in so far as it imposes a tax upon the [p. 168] stockholders in those banks, on account of their stock, does impair the obligations of a contract, and is void by the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States.
The act of 1834 does not extend to the old or the new banks an exemption from the tax imposed by the act of 1841, chap. 23. It is an act to extend the charters of the several banks in Baltimore. The second section prescribes the terms upon which the franchise for banking is extended. Those terms are the payment annually of twenty per cent, upon every hundred dollars of the respective capitals of the banks, and their proportional parts of 875,000, in two yearly instalments, com*1 Pufed from the passage of the act, according to the com-
J. bined rates of their respective capitals paid in, *and of the time for which their charters are respectively continued beyond the first day of January, 1845.
Upon a failure of any bank to pay either the annual charge or its proportional instalment, its charter is declared null and void. The annual charge and the instalment make the bonus to be paid by each bank for its continued franchise. It was urged for the old and the new banks, that the annual tax which they were required to pay by the second section of the act of 1834 being upon their respective capitals, a tax upon the stockholders on account of their stock would be equivalent to an increase of the price which had been given for the franchise. The effect upon the stockholders would be the same, as they pay both, but that is because they agreed to pay an annual tax upon the capital stock, for their franchise, without any stipulation by the state that were not to be taxed as stockholders, on account of their stock, as was the case in the eleventh section «of the act of 1821. The franchise is their corporate property, which, like any other property, would be taxable, if a price had not been paid for it, which the legislature accepted, as the consideration for allowing them to use the franchise during the continuance of their charters. The capital stock is another property—corporately associated, for the purpose of banking—but in its parts is the individual property of the stockholders in the proportions they may own them. Being their individual property, they may be taxed for it, as they may for any other property they may own. ~ This js not only the case in Maryland. A franchise for banking is m every state of the union recognized as property. The banking capital attached to the franchise is another property, owned in its parts by persons, corporate or natural, for which they are liable to be taxed, as they are for all other property, tor the support of government. | ,
We are of opinion that the stockholders m the old banks [p. 169] are exempt from the tax imposed by the act of 1841, chapter 23, during the continuance of their charters under the act of 1821, but that the stockholders in the old and new banks are liable to be taxed by the act of 1841, or that they can claim no exemption under the act of 1834, by which their charters were further extended.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the cause will be remanded, with directions to enter up a judgment for the plaintiff in error.
*
William Searight, Commissioner and Super - r«« INTENDENT OF THE CUMBERLAND ROAD, WITHIN *- 101 the State of Pennsylvania, Plaintiff in error, v. William B. Stokes and Lucius W. Stockton, who HAVE SURVIVED RlCHARD C. STOCKTON, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR. Under the acts of Congress ceding to Pennsylvania that part of the Cumberland road which is within that state, and the acts of Pennsylvania accepting the surrender, a carriage, whenever it is carrying the mail, must he held to be laden with the property of the United States, within the true meaning of the compact, and consequently exempted from the payment of tolls.1 But this exemption does not apply to any other property conveyed in the same vehicle, nor to any person travelling in it, unless he is in the service of the United States and passing along in pursuance of orders from the proper authority. Nor can the United States claim an exemption for more carriages than are necessary for the safe, speedy, and convenient conveyance of the mail.2 This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania, and involved the right of the plaintiff in error, acting juicer the authority of the state of Pennsylvania, to collect tolls from the stage-coaches which carried the mail of the United States. . circumstances under which the question arose were these: On the 30th of April, 1802, and 3d of March, 1803, acts of ongiess were passed, the effect of both of which taken oge er was, that three per cent, of the amount received for & ”S V’ Rockton, 2 Watts in stopping a coach carrying the United gate' keenpr decided that a toll- States mail, for the refusal to pay toll. National PRoadPwh-tilat part of the 2 Compare, Neil v. Ohio, post, PennsvlUn^wnim11 P?TS though *720, 742, 745; Achison v. Huddleston, be justified 12 How., 293. uy me act of the 13th of June, 1836, eep it in repair. There was no reservation in favor of the mail.
Seariglit v. Stokes et al.
the sales of public land in Ohio, should be expended in making roads within the said state, and two per cent, of said fund be also expended in making public roads leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the Ohio river, upon certain conditions, which were accepted by Ohio.
On the 29th of March, 1806, Congress passed an act to provide for laying out the road by commissioners, and directed the President to pursue such measures as in his opinion should be proper to obtain the consent for making the road, of the state or states through which the same may have been laid out; the expense of the road to be charged to the two per cent. fund.
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland all gave their assent. Pennsylvania passed her law on the 9th of April, 1807, and gave power to those who were to make the road to enter upon land, dig, cut, and carry away materials, &c. The road was laid out from Cumberland, in Maryland, to Wheeling, on the Ohio river, and made; but a great difficulty having arisen, on the part of the United States, in keeping it in repair, the road fell into decay, and a new system of legislation was adopted to attain this object.
On the 4th of February, 1831, the state of Ohio passed a law for the preservation and repair of the United States road. It provided, that whenever the consent of Congress should be *1521 obtained, the governor of the state should take the road J under his care, erect gates *and toll-houses, appoint a superintendent, collectors of tolls, &c., with this proviso amongst others: “ Provided, also, That no toll shall be received or collected for the passage of any stage or coach conveying the United States mail, or horses bearing the same, or any wagon or carriage laden with the property of the United States, or any cavalry or other troops, arms, or military stores belonging to the same, or to any of the states comprising this union, or any person or persons on duty in the military service of the United States or of the militia of any of the states.”
The law contained the necessary provisions for the preservation of good order upon the road, and also a stipulation that the tolls should be neither below nor above a sum necessary to defray the expenses incident to the preservation and repair of the same.
On the 2d of March, 1831, Congress assented to this act.
On the 4th of April, 1831, Pennsylvania passed an act “for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road. It provided for the appointment of commissioners, who were directed to build toll-houses and erect toll-gates, to collect tolls, with the following exceptions: “ And provided, also,
That nothing in this act shall be construed so as to authorize any tolls to be received or collected from any person or persons passing or repassing from one part of his farm to another, or to or from a mill, or to or from any place of public worship, funeral, militia training, elections, or from any student or child going to or from any school or seminary of learning, or from persons and witnesses going to and returning from courts: and provided, further, that no toll shall be received or collected for the passage of any wagon or carriage laden with the property of the United States, or any cannon or military stores belonging to the United States or to any of the states composing this union.”
The 4th section directed the amount of tolls, after deducting expenses, to be applied to the repairs and preservation of the road, and gave the commissioners power to increase or diminish the rates of tolls, provided that they should at no time be increased beyond the rates of toll“ established by an act incorporating a company to make a road from Harrisburg to Pittsburg, passed in 1806. The toll fixed by this act upon a coach and four horses was twenty cents for every five miles.
The 10th section was as follows: “ And be it enacted, &c., That this act shall not have any force or effect until the Congress of the United States shall assent to the same, and until so much of the said road as passes through the state of Pennsylvania be first put in a good state of repair, and an appropriation made by Congress for erecting toll-houses and toll-gates thereon, to be expended under the authority of the commissioners appointed by this act: Provided, the legislature of this state may, at any future session thereof, change, alter, or amend this act, provided that the same shall not be so altered or amended as to reduce or increase the rates of r o toll hereby *established below or above a sum neces- L sary.to defray the expenses incident to the preservation and repair of said road, for the payment of the fees or salaries of the commissioners, the collectors of tolls, and. other agents. And provided, further, that no change, alteration, or amendment shall ever be adopted, that will in any wise defeat or anect the true intent and meaning of this act.”
On the 23d of January, 1832, Maryland passed an act, which, in its essential provisions, was the same with that of . ennsylvania; and on the 7th of February, 1832, Virginia passed a similar law.
On the 3d of July, 1832, Congress declared its assent to the a ove mentioned laws of Pennsylvania and Maryland in these wor s, “to which acts the assent of the United States is ere y given, to remain in force during the pleasure of Congress,” and appropriated $150,000 to carry into effect the provisions of said acts; and on the 2d of March, 1833, assented to the act of Virginia, with a similar limitation.
On the 24th of June, 1834, Congress passed an act for the continuation and repair of thé Cumberland road, appropriating $300,000 to that object.
The 4th section was as follows: “ And be it further enacted, That as soon as the sum by this act appropriated, or so much thereof as is necessary, shall be expended in the repair of said road, agreeably to the provisions of this act, the same shall be surrendered to the states respectively through which said road passes; and the United States shall not thereafter be subject to any expense for repairing said road.”
On the 1st of April, 1835, Pennsylvania passed a supplement to the act above mentioned, accepting the surrender by the United States, &c., &c.
On the 13th of June, 1836, Pennsylvania passed another act “relating to the tolls on that part of the Cumberland road which passes through Pennsylvania, and for other purposes,” the 1st section of which was as follows: “ That all wagons, carriages, or other modes of conveyance, passing upon that part of the Cumberland road which passes through Pennsylvania, carrying goods, cannon, or military stores belonging to the United States, or to any individual state of the union, which are excepted from the payment of toll by the 2d section of an act passed the fourth of April, anno Domini eighteen hundred and thirty-one, shall extend only so far as to relieve such wagons, carriages, and other modes of conveyance from the payment of toll to the proportional amount of such goods so carrièd belonging to the United States or to any of the individual states of the union: and that in all cases of wagons, carriages, stages, or other modes of conveyance, carrying the United States’ mail, with passengers or goods, such wagon, stage, or other mode of conveyance, shall pay half toll upon such modes of convevance.”
On the 5th APri1’ 1843, another act was passed by 104 J Pennsylvania, *the 39th section of which was as follows: “ That from and after the passage of this act, the commissioner of the Cumberland road shall have power to increase the rate of tolls on all stage-coaches drawn by four or more horses, to any sum not exceeding one dollar, at each gate upon said road within the state of Pennsylvania; and t e said commissioner shall have the same power to enforce t e payment and collection of tolls authorized, by the ac o thirteenth of June, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, relating to tolls on that part of the Cumberland road passing througn 1T2 •
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
Pennsylvania, by stopping such coach or coaches, as is provided by the act of fourth of April, eighteen hundred and thirty-one, for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road; and to exercise all the means and remedies authorized by said acts for the collection of tolls and prevention of fraud on said road; reserving also to the said commissioner the right to sue or maintain any action therefor, as he might or could do at common law, in addition to the remedies herein provided.”
A suit was brought on the 29th November, 1842, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania, by agreement of parties, and a statement of facts, signed by the respective counsel, in the nature of a special verdict, as follows:
“ It is agreed that this case be submitted to the court on the following statement of facts, as if found by a jury.
“The plaintiff is the commissioner and superintendent of so much of the Cumberland or National road as lies within the state of Pennsylvania, duly appointed under and by virtue of the laws of that state in such case provided, and is a citizen of said state. The defendants and Richard C. Stockton, whom they have survived, are and were citizens of Maryland. The defendants, together with the said Richard, whom they have survived, were joint partners in certain contracts for carrying the mail of the United States hereunto annexed. The route described in said contracts extended over so much of the road called the Cumberland or National road as lies within the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Said contracts were duly executed between the postmaster-general of the United States thereto lawfully authorized by the laws of the United States, and said contractors in conformity with law. The mail of the United States was transported by said contractors in accordance with the provisions of said contracts, during the time therein stipulated, in carriages constructed in conformity with the directions and requirements of the postmaster-general; said carriages were constructed and accommodated as well for the transportation of the mail, as for carrying passengers and their baggage, but the number of said passengers was limited so as not to interfere with or impede the transportation of the mail, and in no case was any passenger carried when the transportation of the mail would be thereby retarded or interfered p1 u sa^ National road within the territorial r#1 rr inmts of Pennsylvania was, so far and to such extent L as the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the ennsy^vania, vested the same, the property of the Pni Rotates, and had been constructed under the authority said laws by the United States. The Constitution and [p. 174] laws of the United States, and of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, bearing upon this subject, and the executive proceedings of the same respectively, are to be deemed and considered part of this agreed case. No tolls were paid by said contractors for or upon any vehicle or carriages employed or used by them for the transportation of said mail during the period of the existence of said contracts, notwithstanding said carriages ordinarily as aforesaid carried passengers, and said contractors received the passage money therefor for their own use.
“ Under the laws of the United States and of the state of Pennsylvania, so much of said Cumberland or National road as lies within the limits of the state of Pennsylvania, was ceded by the United States, and accepted by Pennsylvania, upon the terms and conditions expressed and contained in said statutes. Since the year 1835, the state of Pennsylvania has held said road under and by virtue of said laws, and has performed the terms and conditions therein prescribed in every respect, unless the imposition and claim of tolls as herein stated is so far an infraction of the compact created by said laws. Payment of tolls imposed by and under the laws of Pennsylvania, has been demanded of said contractors by the plaintiff and his predecessors in office, for and on account of their carriages so as aforesaid employed in the transportation of the mail with passengers so carried as aforesaid ; such payment of tolls has been resisted and refused by said contractors on the ground that the carriages employed in the transportation of the mail of the United States, on said road, were not under the said compact and laws legally liable to the payment of said tolls.
“ The said carriages employed in the transportation of the mail were four-wheel carriages drawn by four horses each, and they ran over said route and through the six gates which are upon said road within the said state of Pennsylvania, twice daily, being their eastern and western routes. The full rates of toll established by law upon said road in Pennsylvania, for a daily line of four-horse post coaches or stages, were, at each of the said six gates, including the eastern and western routes, daily
From 1 January, 1836, to 1 April, 1837, . . 40 cents.
April, Ï837, to 1839, . . 60 cents.
After 1839, to present time, . . . 100 cents.
“ If, upon the foregoing state of facts, the court shall be of opinion that the defendants are liable to pay tolls for their carriages so employed in the transportation of the mail of the United States, judgment to be entered for the plaintiff for the sum of $6,000. If it shall be of opinion that the said carriages
JANUARY TERM, 1 H5. *156
so employed are not subject *to the payment of said tolls, then judgment to be entered for the defendants.
R. P. Flenniken, for Plaintiffs. Rich’d. S. Cox, for Defendants.”
Upon this statement of facts the court below directed judgment to be entered in favor of the defendant, and to review this decision of the court the writ of error was brought.
Veech and Walker, for the plaintiffs in error.
Coxe and Nelson, attorney-general, for the defendants in error.
(This case was argued at the preceding term of the court by Flenniken and Walker, for the plaintiffs in error, and Coxe, for defendants, but the court ordered a re-argument at the present term.
Veech, for plaintiffs in error,
After reciting the history of the road, said, that if the road was the property of the United States, it might be considered a hardship that the mail could not pass free. But Pennsylvania had only granted the right of way. She was the last of the three states who argued that it should be made, and then stipulated that it should pass certain points.
The United States had no jurisdiction over the soil, and no more power over it than state officers had when they were making state roads. No one thought of making any provision for keeping the road in repair. As soon as ten miles were made, a difficulty arose upon this point. 1 Collection of Surveys, &c., published in 1839, by order of the Senate. Report of Shriver, communicated to Congress by Mr. Gallatin.
Mr. Gallatin said, that “tolls were suggested, but.that could only be done by authority of the state.” Same book, 133, 639.
Mr. Dallas, when Secretary of the Treasury, made a report on the subject, in which he said that provision ought to be made for keeping the road in repair, but that Congress, of itself, had no power in the premises. Doc. No. 59, page 653.
The road continued to decay until 1822, when a bill was Passed to erect gates and collect tolls, which was vetoed by “e President of the United States. Congress then appropria ed a small sum for repairs. Mr. Buchanan moved an amend-providing for a cession of the road to the states through which it passed, on condition that they would collect tolls and
In 1823 the same amendment was offered, without any reservation.
Between 1828 and 1832, the road became so much out of repair that another movement was made. (The counsel here referred to the several acts which were passed by state legislatures and by Congress.) *1^71 *In mean time, Pennsylvania had constructed
J roads leading from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, and the question was, whether she should turn the travel off her own roads to one which passed through only a small portion of the state. The Pennsylvania legislature struck out a part of the Ohio bill, which they had before them. When the Ohio bill was before Congress, Mr. Burnet, a senator from that state, said, that care was taken that the mail of the United States should pass free. 7 Beg. Deb., 287.
There are other differences between the laws of Pennsylvania and Ohio. The Virginia law is almost a copy of that of Ohio, although, in the spirit of old-fashioned Virginia hospitality, one who is visiting his neighbor is not allowed to be charged with any toll. Maryland copies the law of Pennsylvania. Maryland and Pennsylvania said, that the United States should first put the road in repair and erect toll-houses, whilst Virginia imposed no such restriction. The cost to Congress was about $750,000 in repairing the road and erecting gates. Before this time, the mail was carried in one line of coaches. The contract with the defendants for carrying it in 1835 was to pay them $9,708. In 1837, they were paid $27,600.
Under the present law, half toll is charged upon the coaches which carry the mail and passengers; if there is nothing but the mail they go free. Suppose we admit, that the mail is the prop.erty of the United States, can a coach be said to be “ laden with the property of the United States ” when it has nine passengers in it and only a small mail bag ? Or, could this be affirmed of a wagon laden with flour and one musket ? Such a construction forces words from their true import. But the mail cannot be properly called the property of the United States. All carriers have a special property in their load to protect it from depredations. But what the law means is, that the United States must have an unqualified right of property in the subject matter. It will be necessary for the other side to make out two propositions:
1. That the mail is the property of the United States.
2. That a vehicle can be said to be laden with the mail when it has a single bag in it.
JANUARY-TERM, 1845. 157
Coxe, for defendants in error.
(Mr. Coxe traced the history of the road as it is found in the laws and in 1 State Papers, tit. Miscellaneous, 432, 474, 714, 718, 940, 947.)
The error of the argument on the other side is in supposing that Ohio was the only party interested in the original construction of the road. The United States was a large landed proprietor, and wished to open an easy access to the lands in the west, in order that sales might be increased. Pennsylvania, it is true, did not cede the land over which the road passed, but she was deeply interested in the general result. The r« United States did not claim sovereign power *over it. •- Still they have some interest in it, and we do not claim more than all incorporated companies have over the roads which they make. The Pennsylvania act is different from that of Ohio. But the reason is, that the road was completed in the former state and not in the latter. (Mr. Coxe here reviewed the particular provisions of the several acts.) Is there any ground to suppose, that Congress intended to make a different contract with different states ? The conditions are essentially the same: one exempts the property of the United States, and the other, the mail. The act of Pennsylvania speaks of “ vehicles carrying the United States mail,” thus recognizing the mail as belonging to the government. The mail is one of the most valuable branches of the government, connecting itself closely with the business of the people, and a proportion of the mail matter is absolutely the property of the government, being communications from one public officer to another. The mail is fenced round with protection, by law, from robbery and depredation, and the bags and locks are public property. The act of congress of 1831, throughout, recognizes the mail as being the property of the government. Unless passengers were to go in the coaches, there would have to be a guard; but they are the best guard. The contracts require, that stages shall be suitable for passengers. The right of altering the contract is always reserved to the government, and although there may be three lines now instead of one formerly, yet the letter of the postmaster-general to the governor of Pennsylvania shows, that the mail could not now be carried in one coach. If there can be a toll imposed upon carriages when here are passengers, why not also when there are no passengers. and such an amount may be taxed as will prevent the running of the mail. A question of power cannot be decided th ® greater or lesser exercise of it: 4 Wheat. 327, 351, 387, *17, 426, 429.
Vol. hi.—12 pf [p. 178] 153 SUPREME "COURT.
Nelson^ attorney-general, on the same side.
The question lies in a narrow compass. It is, whether there is a contract between the United States on the one hand and Penns; 1 vania on the other; and if so, what is its nature? The act of 4th April. 1831, is the foundation of the compact. It proposed to provide for the repair of the road. Commissioners were appointed on condition that the United States would repair the road and erect gates. The act was to have no force until Congress assented to it, and appropriated money for toll-houses and gates. Here is a proposal, an offer for a contract The 10th section says, that it shall not go into operation until an appropriation is made, but there is nothing said about ceding jurisdiction. Congress, in 1832. assented, on condition that Pennsylvania would execute her part of the contract and keep the road in repair. The power of Congress over internal improvements is not drawn into the case at all. The United *1 SOI States have a right to purchase the privilege of transJ porting the mail over *any road. If Pennsylvania had said, give us $750,000, and your mail shall pass free, would not such a contract have been within the competency of the parties to make, and have been good? The consideration was a valuable one to Pennsylvania. She cannot now deny the right of the United States to make the road, because she accepted the cession, and actually holds title under the United States. 9 Laws U. S., 232, 233, act of surrender by United States.
There was a power reserved to Pennsylvania to change the regulations of the road, provided the compact was not infringed. But the act of 1836 asserts the authority of the legislature to vary the original terms, and levies half tolls. It cannot be said by the other side, that the two acts do not clash with each other, because the legislature says they do. Ihat the mail is property is too plain to be argued.
What were the circumstances under which the acts were passed? The road had been in use for twelve or fourteen years before 1831. The mail was carried in stages, without paying any toll, in the same description of vehicle as that now taxed. There never was any other species of property of the United States carried on it; at least, the record does not show that there was. Was it a lure, then, to the government to spend $800,000 for the privilege of passing property free which it had never transported on the road, and was not likely o transport? . ,
It has been said, that because Ohio was more specific m nei legislation, therefore Pennsylvania did not mean to exempt thé mail. But of what authority is the act of another state • The object was the same wi h them alh
We have the opinion of the executive and judicial departments of Pennsylvania, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.), 163.
But suppose there was no compact. The act of 1836 would still have been invalid. It is not a general law to collect tolls, but directed specifically against the mail. The property of the contractors is, no doubt, subject to taxation by a state; but a law levelled exclusively against the mail is a different thing. A power to destroy the means implies a power to destroy the thing itself. The case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., was an attempt to tax the means by which the bank carried on its operations. In Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet., 449, the same principle was established. It was held that loans were means to execute the powers of Congress, and to tax the stock would impair the means. So, 15 Pet., 435, 448. It has been said, that if these tolls are not collected the road will go out of repair. But can this be so ? The whole amount charged is only $1200 a year, upon a road on which $800,000 were expended as late as 1835, built at the request of Pennsylvania, and which she pledged her faith to keep in repair. It has been said also that the privilege of passing free may be abused; that one hundred stages may be run upon the road. But the record presents no such case. *The stages are used bona fide by the contractors under L their contract with the postmaster-general.
Walker, for plaintiffs in error, in reply and conclusion.
If the court shall be against us on the interpretation of the compact, we shall have to invite their attention to the following grave questions:
1. That the federal government has no power, under the Constitution, to construct a road within the limits of a state.
2. That the consent of a single state cannot enlarge the powers of the federal government, even within its own limits, and much less within the limits of another state.
3. That the two per cent, fund referred to in the several acts of appropriation, was exhausted before the road reached the Pennsylvania line.
4. Ihat the consent of Pennsylvania, under the law of 9th oi April, 1807, was based upon the appropriation of the two per cent, fund, and that alone, to the construction of said road within her limits.
5. That Congress possessed no power, under the Constitulon, to collect toll upon said road in the state of Pennsylvania. J
That the state of Pennsylvania had jurisdiction of said roa, and the right to collect toll, and possessed this power as [p. 180] one of the rights not delegated in forming the Constitution of the union, and which could only be relinquished by an amendment of the Constitution.
7. That the right to collect toll in this case was never surrendered by the state of Pennsylvania.
The power of the federal government to construct roads has been abandoned for eight years past. The authority to establish post-roads, is merely to designate the road from point to point; and if the United States have no constitutional power, an act of one of the states cannot confer it. If there was no power to make the road, there was none to repair it or collect tolls; and an agreement to repair it was null and void, as being repugnant to the Constitution. The jurisdiction which Pennsylvania had, originally, over the soil of the road, was never surrendered; and if it had been, her legislature had no power to surrender it.
The speech of Mr. Burnet gives the history of this matter. The road was going to ruin, and Congress refused to appropriate. The friends of the road in Ohio obtained the passage of an act there. It was a favorite in that state, but not in Pennsylvania. The latter state had commenced a large system of improvement from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, and knew that this Cumberland road would draw off the travel from her own works. The law of Pennsylvania was, therefore, dissimilar from that of Ohio. Ohio did not require the road to be put in repair before accepting the cession, but Pennsylvania did. #1 q There are many other important differences between the *two laws. Congress hastened to accept the Ohio law before Pennsylvania acted. What reason is there to think that Pennsylvania intended to imitate Ohio ? There is none. If so, why was the phraseology changed? Some words must have been intentionally omitted, and yet this court is now asked to insert them, to change places with the legislature at Harrisburg, and do what it refused to do. Although, in general, the mail may be property, can it be considered so here, where there is a special exclusion ? Every word of a statute must receive a meaning, unless the court are compelled to consider some words synonymous. In the Ohio law, the words “mail” and “property” are not synonymous: it exempts a “stage or coach carrying the mail,” and a “wagon or carriage, carrying property of the United States; ” referring to diffeient vehicles, carrying different things. The “ mail is never carried in wagons. The government recently brought a large copper rock from Lake Superior. This could not have passed free unless under the head of property. Ohio had, therefore, two distinct provisions in her law; Pennsylvania only adopted [p. 181] one of them. The toll on “stages” included the coach carrying the mail, in words and letters. The Ohio law asked her to exempt the mail, but she refused.
But does “ property ” include the mail ? Does a department, when making a schedule of its property, include the contents of the mail? The United States is only a common carrier, and paid as such. If not, then postage is exacted for carrying the property of the United States. It is the property of the persons interested; they can recover it at law. It has been said that because a common carrier has a special property in what he carries, therefore the United States have a property in the mail. But this technical principle was unknown to the farmers and mechanics who passed the act of 1831. Again, what is the meaning of “ laden ? ” it is the bulk of the load. If an officer of the United States puts a single box in a wagon, and the rest of the load is private property, could it be said, with any propriety that the wagon was “ laden ” with the property of the government ? To justify this, other words must be interpolated into the law, viz., “in whole or in part.” But they are not there. If “property” means the “mail,” then the section must read, “laden with the mail; ” and if this be so, a single mail-bag will not exempt the coach from tolls. If the contractors had a steam-wagon conveying 100 passengers and a small mail-bag, would they all go free? It is said that we attack the mail, but we do not. The government pays turnpike gates everywhere else. When companies make roads with their own money, they allow the government to use them on the same terms with every one else. If it can seize upon roads, the postmaster-general would soon get rid of all difficulties with railroad companies. But we deny the right.
But upon whom does the tax fall in this case ? The record says that stages conveying nothing but the mail pass r*-icn free. / It is then *the passengers who pay the tax. The contractors must increase the fare. The government is not a party upon the record, and the postmaster-general has no business to come here by counsel. The whole difficulty has arisen from an effort of contractors to draw custom to their own line from roads where tolls are charged. All opposition stages, too, must be broken down on this road, because those stages will be charged with toll.
It is said that passengers are a guard to the mail. They do not consider themselves as paying their passage money for the privilege of guarding the mail. But, upon this theory, the contractors ought to be bound to carry some always; whereas the stages frequently run without any passengers.
1G2 SUPREME COURT.
Pennsylvania has been charged with violating her faith. But how can this be? She derives no revenue from the road; the whole of the tolls are expended upon repairs, and that too in a case where her own pecuniary interests suffer, because the travel is drawn away from her own roads. The true interest of the United States is to maintain our view of the case; because, if tolls enough are not collected to keep the road in repair, it must go to ruin, and then the contractors will charge • a higher price for carrying the mail, even at a slower pace.
The act of 1836 is only declaratory of that of 1831, and not inconsistent with it. The latter exempts wagons when laden with the property of the United States in the whole; and the former proportions the exemption to the amount of property thus owned. The imposition of half-toll is, in fact, a privilege granted. The whole of the Pennsylvania legislation is one continued series, instead of being separate and inconsistent acts. The law of 1831 accepted the road, when it should be put in repair and toll-houses erected. The act of Congress, making the appropriation, did not pass till 1834; and in April, 1835, Pennsylvania accepted the surrender, and appointed commissioners. Between that time and the first of January, 1836, gates were erected, and the act of 1836, now under consideration, was passed without any loss of time. The case in Watts & Sergeant has been referred to, but here is a certified copy of the record, showing that, from 1836 to 1839, bills were made out quarterly. Before the act of 1836, all the stages, except the fast line, paid tolls. These were therefore collected under the act of 1831. There were only two lines, and the commissioners agreed to excuse one, on condition that the other paid. This was half-toll, and was the foundation of the law.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.
The question in this case is, whether the state of Pennsylvania can lawfully impose a toll on carriages employed in transporting the mail of the United States over that part of the Cumberland road which passes through the territory of that state ?
*The dispute has arisen from an act of the legisla-
J ture of Pennsylvania, passed in 1836, whereby wagons, carriages, stages, and other modes of conveyance, carrying the United States mail, with passengers or the goods of other persons, are charged with half the toll levied upon other vehicles of the like description. The plaintiff in error is the commissioner and superintendent of the road, appointed by the
Searight ». Stokes et al.
state. The defendants are contractors for carrying the mail, and they insist that their carriages, when engaged in this service, are entitled to pass along the road free from toll, although they are conveying passengers and their baggage at the same time. In order to obtain the opinion of this court upon the subject, an amicable action was instituted by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania, for the tolls directed to be collected by the law above mentioned, and the facts in the case stated by consent. The judgment of the Circuit Court was against the plaintiff, and it is now brought here for revision by writ of error.
The Cumberland road has been so often the subject of public discussion, and the circumstances under which it was constructed and afterwards surrendered to the several states through which it passes, are so generally known, that we shall forbear to state them further than may be necessary for the purpose of showing the character of the present controversy, and explaining the principles upon which the opinion of this court is founded.
The road in question is the principal line of communication between the seat of government and the great valley of the Mississippi. It passes through Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio, and was constructed at an immense expense by the United States, under the authority of different and successive acts of Congress: the states contributing nothing either to the making of the road or to the purchase of land over which it passes. They did nothing more than enact laws authorizing the United States to construct the road within their respective limits, and to obtain the land necessary for that purpose from the individual proprietors upon the payment of its value.
After the road had thus been made—although it was constructed with the utmost care, sparing no efforts to make it durable—it was still found to be incapable of withstanding the wear and tear produced by the number of carriages continually passing over it, engaged in transporting passengers, or heavily laden with agricultural produce or merchandize; and that either a very great expense must be annually incurred in repairs, or the road, in a short time, would be entirely broken up and become unfit for use. As no permanent provision had been made for these repairs, applications were made to Congress for the necessary funds; and as these demands upon the public treasury unavoidably increased, as the road was extended or longer in use, they naturally produced a strong feelmg of dissatisfaction *and opposition in those portions *- [p. 184] of the union which had no immediate interest in the road; and the constitutional power of Congress to make these appropriations was also earnestly, and upon many applications, contested by many of the eminent statesmen of the country. It therefore became evident, that unless some other means than appropriations from the public treasury could be devised, a work which every one felt to be a great public convenience, in which a large portion of the union was directly and deeply interested, and which had been constructed at so much cost, must soon become a total ruin.
In this condition of things, the state of Ohio, on the 4th of February, 1831, passed an act, proposing, with the assent of Congress, to take under its care immediately the portion of the road within its limits which was then finished, and the residue from time to time as different parts of it should be completed, and to erect toll gates thereon, and to apply the tolls to the repair and preservation of the road, specifying in the law the tolls it proposed to demand, and containing a proviso in relation to the property of the United States, and. to persons in its service, in the following words: “ That no toll shall be received or collected for the passage of any stage or coach conveying the United States mail, or horses bearing the same, or any wagon or carriage laden with the property of the United States, or any cavalry or other troops, arms, or military stores, belonging to the same, or to any of the states comprising this union, or any person or persons on duty in the military service of the United States, or of the militia of any of the states.” On the 2d of March, in the same year, Congress passed a law assenting to this act of Ohio, which is recited at large in the act of Congress, with all its provisions and stipulations.
The measure proposed by the state of Ohio seems to have been received with general approbation; and on the 4th of April, 1831, Pennsylvania, about two months after the passage of the law of Ohio, passed an act similar in its principles, but varying from it in some respects on account of the different condition of the road in the two states. In Ohio it was new and unworn, and therefore needed no repair, while in Pennsylvania, where it had been in use for several years, it was in a state of great dilapidation. While proposing, therefore, to take it under the care of the state, and to charge the tolls specified in the act, it annexed a condition that the United States should first put so much of it as passed through that state in good repair, and an appropriation be also made by Congress -for erecting toll-houses and toll-gates upon it. The clause in relation to the passage of the property of the United
States over the road, also varies from the language of the Ohio law, and is in the following words: “That no toll shall be received or collected for the passage of any wagon or carriage laden with the property of *the United States, or any cannon or military stores belonging to the United States, or to any of the states composing this union.”
The example of Pennsylvania was followed by Maryland and Virginia, at the next succeeding sessions of their respective legislatures: the law of Maryland being passed on the 23d of January, 1832, and the Virginia law on the 7th of February following. The proviso in relation to the property of the United States, in the Maryland act, is precisely the same with that of Pennsylvania, and would seem to have been copied from it, while the proviso in the Virginia law, upon this subject, follows almost literally the law of Ohio.
With these several acts of Assembly before them, Congress, on the 3d of July, 1832, passed a law declaring the assent of the United States to the laws of Pennsylvania and Maryland, to remain in force during the pleasure of Congress; and the sum of $150,000 was appropriated to repair the road east of the Ohio river, and to make the other needful improvements required by the laws of these two states. No mention is made of Virginia in this act of Congress, because in her law the previous reparation of the road, and the erection of toll-houses and gates, at the expense of the United States, was not in express terms made the condition upon which she accepted the surrender of the road; but the assent of Congress was afterwards given to her law by the act of March 2d, 1833, which, like the contract with the two other states, was to remain in force during the pleasure of Congress.
The. sum appropriated, as above mentioned, was, however, found insufficient for the purposes for which it was intended,
and by an act of June 24th, 1834, the further sum of $300,000
was appropriated; and this act states the appropriation to be
made for the entire completion of the road east of the Ohio,
and other needful improvements, to carry into effect the laws
of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, each of which is
particularly referred to in the act of Congress; and further
directs that as far as that sum is expended, or so much of it
as shall be necessary, the road should be surrendered to the
states respectively through which it passed. But so greatly
had the road become dilapidated, that even these large sums
were found inadequate to place it in a proper condition, and
by the act of. March 3d, 1835, the further sum of $346,188.58
as appropriated; but this law directed th&t no part of it
should be paid or expended until the three states should [p. 186] respectively accept the surrender; and that the United States “ should not thereafter be subject to any expense in relaticn to the said road.” Under this act of Congress the surrender was accordingly accepted, in 1835, and the money applied as directed by the act of Congress, and from that time the road has been in the possession of and under the control of the several states, with toll-gates upon it. This is the history of the road, and of the legislation of Congress and the
J states *upon that subject, (so far as it is necessary now to state it,) up to the time when the road passed into the hands of the states. We shall have occasion hereafter to speak more particularly of the act of Congress last mentioned, because it is the act under which the states finally took possession of the road.
When the new arrangement first went into operation no toll was charged in any of the states upon carriages transporting the mail of the United States; and no toll upon such carriages has ever yet been claimed in Ohio, Maryland, or Virginia. But on the 13th of June, 1836, the state of Pennsylvania passed a law, declaring that carriages, &c., carrying the property of the United States or of a state, which were exempted from the payment of toll by the act of 1831, should thereafter be exempted only in proportion to the amount of property in such carriage belonging to the United States or a state, and. “ that in all cases of wagons, carriages, stages, or other modes of conveyance, carrying the United States mail, with passengers or goods, such wagon, stage, or other mode of conveyance shall pay half-toll upon such modes of conveyance.” And we are now to inquire whether this half-toll can be imposed upon carriages carrying the mail under the compact between the United States and Pennsylvania.
It will be seen from this statement, that the constitutional power of the general government to construct this road is not involved in the case before us ; nor is this court called upon to express any opinion upon that subject; nor to inquire what were the rights of the United States in the road previous to the compacts hereinbefore mentioned. The road had in fact been made at the expense of the general government. It was the great line of connection between the seat of government and the western states and territories, affording a convenient and safe channel for the conveyance of the mails, and enabling the government thereby to communicate more promptly with its numerous officers and agents in that part of the United States west of th^ Alleghany mountains. Ihe object of the compacts was to preserve the road for the purposes for which it had been made. The right of the several states to enter
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