Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 11, 1975
CONNECTICUT v. MENILLO
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT
No. 74—1569. Decided November 11, 1975
Connecticut statute making criminal an attempted abortion by “any person” held to remain fully effective against performance of abortions by nonphysicians after Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179. Certiorari granted; 168 Conn. 266, 362 A. 2d 962, vacated and
remanded.
Per Curiam.
In 1971 a jury convicted Patrick Menillo of attempting to procure an abortion in violation of Connecticut’s criminal abortion statute. Menillo is not a physician and has never had any medical training. The Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless overturned Menillo’s conviction, holding that under the decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), the Connecticut statute was “null and void.” As we think the Connecticut court misinterpreted’ Roe and Doe, we grant the State’s petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment.
The statute under which Menillo was convicted makes criminal an attempted abortion by “any person.”1 The Connecticut Supreme Court felt compelled to hold this statute null and void, and thus incapable of constitu-
1
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §53-29: “Any person who gives or administers to any woman, or advises or causes her to take or use anything, or uses any means, with intent to procure upon her a miscarriage or abortion, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life or that of her unborn child, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned in the State Prison not more than five years or both.”
Per Curiam 423 U. S.
tional application even to someone not medically qualified to perform an abortion, because it read Roe to have done the same thing to the similar Texas statutes. But Roe did not go so far.
In Roe we held that Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1196, which permitted termination of pregnancy at any stage only to save the life of the expectant mother, unconstitutionally restricted a woman’s right to an abortion. We went on to state that as a result of the unconstitutionality of Art. 1196 the Texas abortion statutes had to fall “as a unit,” 410 U. S., at 166, and it is that statement which the Connecticut Supreme Court and courts in some other States have read to require the invalidation of their own statutes even as applied to abortions performed by nonphysicians.2 In context, however, our statement had no such effect. Jane Roe had sought to have an abortion “ ‘performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions,’ ” id., at 120, and our opinion recognized only her right to an abortion under those circumstances. That the Texas statutes fell as a unit meant only that they could not be enforced, with or without Art. 1196, in contravention of a woman’s right to a clinical abortion by medically competent personnel. We did not hold the Texas statutes unenforceable against a nonphysician abortionist, for the case did not present the issue.
Moreover, the rationale of our decision supports continued enforceability of criminal abortion statutes against nonphysicians. Roe teaches that a State cannot restrict
2
See, e. g., State v. Hultgren, 295 Miim. 299, 204 N. W. 2d 197 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 454 Pa. 429, 312 A. 2d 13 (1973). The highest courts of other States have held that their criminal abortion laws can continue to be applied to laymen following Roe and Doe. E. g., People v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524, 208 N. W. 2d 172 (1973); State v. Norflett, 67 N. J. 268, 237 A. 2d 609 (1975).
CONNECTICUT v. MENILLO 11
9 Per Curiam
a decision by a woman, with the advice of her physi-
cian, to terminate her pregnancy during the first tri-
mester because neither its interest in maternal health
nor its interest in the potential life of the fetus is
sufficiently great at that stage. But the insufficiency
of the State’s interest in maternal health is predicated
upon the first trimester abortion’s being as safe for the
woman as normal childbirth at term, and that predicate
holds true only if the abortion is performed by medically
competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum
safety for the woman. See 410 U. S., at 149-150, 163;
cf. statement of Douglas, J., in Cheaney v. Indiana, 410
U. S. 991 (1973), denying certiorari in 259 Ind. 138, 285
N. E. 2d 265 (1972). Even during the first trimester
of pregnancy, therefore, prosecutions for abortions con-
ducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of
personal privacy secured by the Constitution against
state interference. And after the first trimester the ever-
increasing state interest in maternal health provides addi-
tional justification for such prosecutions.
As far as this Court and the Federal Constitution are concerned, Connecticut’s statute remains fully effective against performance of abortions by nonphysicians. We express no view, of course, as to whether the same is now true under Connecticut law. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for its further consideration in light of this opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice White concurs in the result.