Rivera-Sanchez v. Reno, No. 99-20051 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Rivera-Sanchez v. Reno, No. 99-20051 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999)
Full caption
FELIX RIVERA-SANCHEZ v. JANET RENO
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided
Dec. 30, 1999
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
m 99-20051 Summary Calendar
FELIX RIVERA-SANCHEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, VERSUS
JANET RENO, United States Attorney General; RICHARD B. CRAVENER, District Director, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
December 30, 1999
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and
PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Felix Rivera-Sanchez (“Rivera”) appeals the
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The district court dismissed because it
concluded that Rivera had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
We review de novo the district court’s legal
determinations, including those concerning
jurisdiction. See Requena-Rodriguez v.
1999). Because Rivera is the party seeking to
invoke federal jurisdiction, he bears the burden
of demonstrating that the exercise of that
jurisdiction was proper. See Stockman v. court lacked jurisdiction over Rivera’s habeas
Federal Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 petition because IIRIRA did not operate to bar
(5th Cir. 1998). him from bringing a petition for review in this
court. According to the government, Rivera’s
Because Rivera’s deportation proceedings
began before April 1, 1997, and ended more
than thirty days after September 30, 1996, this
case is governed by the uncodified judicial
review transitional provisions found in
§ 309(c)(4) of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).
Under this transitional regime, “habeas
jurisdiction continues to exist under IIRIRA’s
transitional rules in cases involving final orders
of deportation against criminal aliens, and []
habeas jurisdiction is capacious enough to
include constitutional and statutory challenges
if those challenges cannot be considered on
direct review by the court of appeals.” Id.
at 305.
The government argues that the district p. 2criminal offenseSSaiding and abetting an
alien’s entry at an improper time and place in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)SSis not one of
the offenses referenced in IIRIRA
§ 309(c)(4)(G), the provision that forecloses
our jurisdiction to review petitions filed by
aliens who are deportable because they have
committed certain offenses. See Nguyen v.
Rivera asserts merely that he has committed a
covered offense; he does not respond to the
government’s jurisdictional argument.
Under IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G),
there shall be no appeal permitted in the
case of an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense covered in
241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)[2] of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (as
in effect as of the date of the enactment
of this Act), or any offense covered by
section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii)[3] of such Act
(as in effect on such date) for which
both predicate offenses are, without
regard to their date of commission,
otherwise covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(i)[4] of such Act (as so in
effect).
216 (5th Cir. 1998). The IJ concluded that
Rivera’s offense constituted an aggravated
felony pursuant to the terms of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(N), which states that an
aggravated felony is “an offense described in
paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of
this title (relating to alien smuggling).”
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),
noted the IJ, an alien who commits any
aggravated felony after admission is
deportable.
The government contends that the IJ was
mistaken in concluding that Rivera’s
conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) qualifies
as a conviction of an aggravated felony. It
notes that since Rivera filed his habeas
petition, the BIA has held that the offense
described in § 1325(a) is not an aggravated
felony. See In re Alvarado-Alvino, Interim
Decision (BIA) 3391, 1999 WL 322973 (BIA
1999). In Alvarado-Alvino, the BIA held that
by its plain language, § 1101(a)(43)(N)
includes only convictions under § 1324(a), not
1101(a)(43)(O) does include § 1325(a)
convictions as aggravated felonies, but only
when “committed by an alien who was
previously deported on the basis of a
conviction.”
We agree with the BIA’s analysis. Rivera’s conviction of violating § 1325(a) is outside the ambit of § 1101(a)(43)(N), which is explicitly confined to convictions under § 1324(a). Likewise, because Rivera did not violate § 1325(a) after being previously deported, he did not commit an aggravated felony as defined in § 1101(a)(43)(O).
As we have stated, under IIRIRA’s transitional rules, habeas jurisdiction exists only where “challenges cannot be considered on direct review by the court of appeals.” Requena-Rodriguez, 190 F.3d at 305. Section 309(c)(4)(G) of IIRIRA denies us jurisdiction to consider petitions for review only when an alien has committed a referenced criminal offense. Because Rivera’s conviction for violating § 1325(a) does not qualify as an aggravated felony that would trigger IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G), and because none of the other classes of offenses listed in § 309(c)(4)(G) is applicable to him, we have jurisdiction to review directly a deportation order entered against Rivera. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Rivera’s habeas petition. See Requena-Rodriguez, 190 F.3d at 305.
Accordingly, the judgment is VACATED, and a judgment of dismissal for want of jurisdiction is RENDERED.