U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973)
Case details
Citation
413 U.S. 508
Full caption
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ET AL. v. MURRY ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
June 25, 1973
Vote
5-4
Majority
Douglas (Justice), joined by Brennan (Justice), Stewart (Justice), White (Justice), Marshall (Justice)
Concurrence
Stewart (Justice)
Concurrence
Marshall (Justice)
Dissent
Rehnquist (Justice), joined by Burger (Chief Justice), Powell (Justice)
Dissent
Blackmun (Justice)
Concurrence
Douglas (Justice)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL-
TURE ET AL. V. MURRY ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 72-848. Argued April 23, 1973-Decided June 25, 1973
Appellees challenge the constitutionality of § 5 (b) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended in 1971, providing that "[a]ny household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program ... during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after the expiration of such tax period." This provision was generated by congressional concern over nonneedy households participating in the food stamp program, and abuses of the program by "college students" and "children of wealthy parents." The District Court held the provision unconstitutional, finding that it went far beyond the congressional goal, and operated inflexibly to deny stamps to households, containing no college students, that had established clear eligibility for stamps and remained in dire need, only because a member of the household 18 years or older is claimed by someone as a tax dependent. Held: The tax deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in a prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives, and the administration of the Act allows no hearing to show that the tax deduction is irrelevant to the need of the household. Section 5 (b) therefore violates due process. Pp. 511-514.
348 F. Supp. 242, affirmed.
DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., post, p. 514, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 517, filed concurring opinions. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opin.ion, post, p. 520. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and PowELL, J., joined, post, p. 522.
Keith A. Jones argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Walter H. Fleischer, and William Kanter.
Ronald F. Pollack argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Roger A. Schwartz.
MR. JUSTICE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq., as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, has been applied to these appellees so as to lead the three-judge District Court to hold one provision of it unconstitutional. 348 F. Supp. 242. We noted probable jurisdiction. 410 U. S. 924. Appellee Murry has two sons and ten grandchildren in her household. Her monthly income is $57.50, which comes from her ex-husband as support for her sons. Her expenses far exceed her monthly income. By payment, however, of $11 she received $128 in food stamps. But she has now been denied food stamps because her ex-husband (who has remarried) had claimed her two sons and one grandchild as tax dependents in his 1971 income tax return. That claim, plus the fact that her eldest son is 19 years old, disqualified her household for food stamps under § 5 (b) of the Act.1 Appellee Alderete is in p. 510comparable straits because her ex-husband claimed the five children, who live with their mother, as tax dependents, the oldest being 18 years old. Appellee Beavert's case is similar. Appellee Lee is the mother of five children, her entire income per month being $23 derived from public assistance. Her five children live with her. Her monthly bills are $249, of which $148 goes for food. Her husband is not a member of her household; he in fact deserted her and has supplied his family with no support. But he claimed the two oldest sons, ages 20 and 18, as tax dependents in his 1971 tax return, with the result that the wife's household was denied food stamps. Appellee Nevarez is in comparable straits.
1
Section 5 (b) of the Act provides in part: "Any household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program established pursuant to this chapter during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such tax period...." 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (b). (Emphasis added.) The Regulations provide: "'Dependent' for the purpose of § 271.3 (d) of this subchapter, means a person claimed as a dependent for Federal income tax purposes by a parent or guardian and living apart taxable year of the taxpayer begins is less than $750, or "(B) who is a, child of the taxpayer and who (i) has not attained the age of 19 at the close of the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, or (ii) is a student... _,,- And the term "dependent" is defined as meaning "any of the following individuals over half of whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer . . . : "(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer ...." 26 U. S. C. § 152 (a) (1).
Appellee Joe Valdez is 18 years old and married; and he and his wife have a child. He lives wholly on public
from the household of such parent or guardian." 7 CFR § 270.2 (q).
"Any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependent for Federal income tax purposes by a member of a household which is not certified as being eligible for food assistance shall be ineligible to participate in the program during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of 1 year after expiration of such tax period." 7 CFR § 271.3 (d).
The relevant exemption provision in § 151 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 26 U. s.-c. § 151 (e)(l) (1970 ed. and Supp. I), reads:
"An exemption of $750 [shall be allowed] for each dependent (as defined in section 152)-
" (A) whose gross income for the calendar year in which the p. 511assistance and applied for food stamps. His application was rejected because his father Ben claimed him as a tax dependent in his 1971 income tax return. Joe receives no support from Ben because Ben is in debt and unable to help support Joe.
Appellee Broderson is 18 and married to a 16-year-old wife and they have a small child. Their monthly income is $110 consisting of his wages at a service station. He cannot get food stamps because his father claimed him as a tax dependent. The father, however, gives him no support.
Appellee Schultz is 19 years old and she resides with a girl friend and the latter's two children. Appellee Schultz has no income of any kind but received food stamps for the household where she lived. Food stamps, however, were discontinued when her parents claimed her as a tax dependent but refused to give her any aid. She soon got married, but she and her husband were denied food stamps because her parents had claimed her for tax dependency.
These appellees brought a class action to enjoin the enforcement of the tax dependency provision of the Act; and, as noted, the three-judge court granted the relief.
Appellees are members of households that have been denied food stamp eligibility solely because the households contain persons 18 years or older who have been claimed as "dependents" for federal income tax purposes by taxpayers who are themselves ineligible for food stamp relief. Section 5 (b) makes the entire household of which a "tax dependent" was a member ineligible for food stamps for two years: (1) during the tax year for which the dependency was claimed and (2) during the next 12 months. During these two periods of time § 5 (b) creates a conclusive presumption that the "tax dependent's" household is not needy and has access to
nutritional adequacy.
The Acting Administrator of the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture admitted in this case that:
"[I]n the case of households which have initially been determined to be ineligible for participation in the program on the basis of tax dependency, there are no factual issues to be presented or challenged by the household at such a hearing, other than the issue of whether or not a member of the household has been claimed as a dependent child by a taxpayer who is not a member of a household eligible for food assistance ( a fact the household, in most cases, already will have disclosed in its application). If a household states that it has such a tax dependent member, the household is, in conformity with the Food Stamp Act, the program regulations, and the instructions of FNS governing the program administration by State agencies, determined to be ineligible." App. 83.
Thus, in the administration of the Act, a hearing is denied, and is not available as the dissent implies. As stated by the District Court the Act creates "an irrebuttable presumption contrary to fact." 348 F. Supp., at 243. Moreover, an income tax return is filed, say in April 1973, for the year 1972. When the dependency deduction is filed, the year for which the dependency claim was made has already passed. Therefore the disqualification for food stamps cannot apply to 1972 but only to 1973.
The tax dependency provision was generated by congressional concern about nonneedy households participating in the food stamp program.2 The legislative p. 513history reflects a concern about abuses of the program by "college students, children of wealthy parents."3 But, as the District Court said, the Act goes far beyond that goal and its operation is inflexible. "Households containing no college student, that had established clear eligibility for Food Stamps and which still remain in dire need and otherwise eligible are now denied stamps if it appears that a household member 18 years or older is claimed by someone as a tax dependent." 348 F. Supp., at 243.
2
Household participation is based on current circumstances, not past needs. Food stamp certifications for households on public assistance coincide with their welfare certification periods. 7 CFR §§ 271.4 (a) (1) and 271.4 (a) (4) (ii). For nonpublic assistance households, certification periods last normally only three months. 7 CFR § 271.4 (a) (4) (iii). Longer certification periods are provided only "if there is little likelihood of changes in household status." 7 CFR §§ 271.4 (a) (4) (iii) (b), (c), and (d).
Tax dependency in a prior year seems to have no relation to the "need" of the dependent in the following year. It doubtless is much easier from the administrative point of view to have a simple tax "dependency" test that will automatically-without hearing, without witnesses, without findings of fact-terminate a household's claim for eligibility for food stamps.
Yet, as we re-
cently stated in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656: "[I]t may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case, including Stanley's. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that th~y were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the over-
3
116 Cong. Rec. 41979.
STEWART, J., concurring 413 U.S.
bearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones."
We have difficulty in concluding that it is rational to assume that a child is not indigent this year because the parent declared the child as a dependent in his tax return for the prior year. But even on that assumption our problem is not at an end. Under the Act the issue is not the indigency of the child but the indigency of a different household with which the child happens to be living. Members of that different household are denied food stamps if one of its present members was used as a tax deduction in the past year by his parents even though the remaining members have no relation to the parent who used the tax deduction, even though they are completely destitute, and even though they are one, or 10 or 20 in number. We conclude that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary _ to fact. It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process found wanting in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 452; Stanley v. Illinois, supra; and Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535.
Affirmed.
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring. The food stamp program :was established in 1964 for the twin purposes of promoting the agricultural economy and alleviating hunger and malnutrition among the needy members of "the other America." 7 U. S. C. § 2011. Under this program, currently needy households whose members comply with a work requirement, 7 U. S. C. §§ 2014 (b), (c), are entitled to purchase enough food stamps to provide those households with nutritionally p. 515508 STEWART, J., concurring
adequate diets. In 1971, Congress became concerned with the possibility that nonneedy households were receiving food stamps, and its response was the enactment of Pub. L. 91-671. While the curbing of abuses in the administration of a government program is assuredly a legitimate purpose, that statute has given rise to constitutional questions in the present case and its companion, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, post, p. 528.
The challenged provision in the present case is § 5 (b) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (b), as amended, 84 Stat. 2049. That section renders ineligible for food stamps any household that includes a member over 18 years of age who has been claime~ as a tax dependent by a taxpayer who is not himself eligible for the stamps. What little legislative history there is suggests that the sole reason for enactment of this section was to prevent the receipt of food stamps by the sons and daughters of more affluent families. 116 Cong. Rec. 41979, 41981, 41993, 42021; cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,
483-484.
Rather than requiring an individualized determination that a particular household linked to a relatively more affluent household by a claimed tax dependency was not in fact needy, Congress chose instead to utilize a conclusive presumption. The simple fact that a household member has been claimed as a tax dependent by a non-indigent taxpayer resul~s in the complete termination of benefits for that entire household in the relevant tax period and in the subsequent 12 months as well. 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (b). It matters not whether that dependency claim was fraudulent, what the amount of support from the non-indigent taxpayer actually was,1
1
Even if the amount of support received from the taxpayer leaves the household with income below the income eligibility standards, the statute under consideration would terminate benefits. A 5-person household, for example, might receive $120 in public assistance each month, plus $121 from a divorced - non-indigent spouse. If that household had within it a child who was age 18 or older, and if the spouse claimed that child as a dependent, the household would be ineligible for food stamps. Yet in this hypothetical situation, the household's monthly income would be $241, whereas under the Department of Agriculture's own income standards a household of five can earn up to $440 per month without being disqualified for food stamps. 37 Fed. Reg. 7724. The opinion of the Court points out how totally arbitrary the challenged statute is in operation.
STEWART, J., concurring 413 U.S.
whether that support was still available at the time the welfare officials learned of it, or even whether the claimed dependent was still living in the household.
This Court recently declared unconstitutional, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Connecticut statute establishing a permanent, conclusive presumption of nonresidency for purposes of qualifying for reduced tuition rates at a state university. Vland'is v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441. As we said in that case:
"In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates." Id., at 452. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471; Stanley v. Illino'is, 405 U. S. 645; Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535.
Similarly, I think, the conclusive presumption that led to the termination of the appellees' benefits without p. 517508 MARSHALL, J., concurring
any opportunity for them to prove present need denied them due process of law.2 Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I wish to state briefly what I believe are the analytic underpinnings of that opm10n. One aspect of fundamental fairness, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is that individuals similarly situated must receive the same treatment by the Government. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it, the Government "must exercise [its] powers so as not to discriminate between [its] inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of the regulation." , Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (concurring opinion). It is a corollary of this requirement that, in order to determine whether persons are indeed similarly situated, "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands" must be provided. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 ( 1972). Specifically, we must decide whether, considering the private interest affected and the governmental interest sought to be advanced, a hearing must be provided to one who claims that the application of some general provision of the law aimed at certain abuses will not in fact lower the incidence of those abuses but will instead needlessly harm him. Cf. Reed v. Reed,
:! The Congres::; has alternative means available to it by which its purpose ran hr achieved. The Food Stamp Act, as amended, already providr::; that households must demonstrate present neediness to qualify, 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (b), and that its members must under certain circumstances accept available employment, id., § 2014 (c). There is no reason that enforcement of these provisions c4nnot be strengthened if the Congress believes that fraud is taking place. There arc already criminal penalties in effect for fraudulent acquisition, use, or transfer of food stamps. Id.,§§ 2023 (b), (c).
MARSHALL, J., concurring 413 U.S.
404 U. S. 71 (1971); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 ( 1973). In short, where the private interests affected are very important and the governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a well-designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to act on an individualized basis, with general propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting devices. That, I think, is the import of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 ( 1972).
Is this, then, such a case? Appellants argue that Congress could rationally have thought that persons claimed as tax dependents by a taxpayer himself not a member of an eligible household in one year could, during that year and the succeeding one, probably receive sufficient funds from the taxpayer to offset their need for food stamps. If those persons received food stamps, they would be denying to the truly needy some of the limited benefits Congress has chosen to make available. The statute, on this view, is aimed at preventing abuse of the program by persons who do not need the benefits Congress has provided. Even if, as appellants urge, the statute is interpreted to make ineligible for food stamps only those persons validly claimed as tax dependents, see Reply Brief for Appellants 2-3, I do not think that Congress adopted a ·method for preventing abuse that is reasonably calculated to eliminate only those who abuse the program. In particular, it could not be fairly concluded that, because one member of the household had received half his support from a parent, the entire household's need for assistance in purchasing food could be offset by outside contributions.
It is, of course, quite simple for ·Congress to provide an administrative mechanism to guarantee that abusers of the program were eliminated from it. All that is needed is some way for a person whose household would p. 519508 MARSHALL, J., concurring
otherwise be ineligible for food stamps because of this statute to show that the support presently available from the person claiming a member of the household as a tax dependent does not in fact offset the loss of benefits.* Reasonable rules stating what a claimant must show before receiving a ~earing on the question could easily be devised. We deal here with a general rule that may seriously affect the ability of persons genuinely in need to provide an adequate diet for their households. In the face of readily available alternatives that might prevent abuse of the program, Congress did not choose a method of reducing abuses that was "fairly related to the object of the regulation," by enacting the statute challenged in this case.
This analysis, of course, combines elements traditionally invoked in what are usually treated as distinct classes of cases, involving due process and equal protection. But the elements of fairness should not be so rigidly cabined. Sometimes fairness will require a hearing to determine whether a statutory classification will advance the legislature's purposes in a particular case so that the classification can properly be used only as a burden-shifting device, while at other times the fact that a litigant falls within the classification will be enough to justify its application. There is no reason, I believe, to categorize inflexibly the rudiments of fairness. Instead, I believe that we must as~ess the public and private interests affected by a statutory classification and then decide in each instance whether individualized determination is required or catego~ical treatment is permitted by the Constitution.
*
Such a mechanism must be made available, on the interpretation of the statute advanced by appellants, to persons who contend that they were not validly claimed as dependents.
BLACKMUN, J., dissenting 413 U.S.
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
Section 5 (b) of the Food Stamp Act, which the Court today holds unconstitutional, is not happily drafted and surely is not the kind of statute that attracts sympathetic review. Its purposes, however, are conceded to be laudatory. And, indeed, they are, for the statute seeks to prevent widespread abuse of the federal food stamp program by nonindigents and college students, with consequent denial of the full benefit of the program to those seriously in need of assistance.
The Court, however, invalidates § 5 (b) for, apparently, two reasons. The first is that tax dependency in one calendar year is tied to the subject's lack of need in the following year, and this, it is said, has no rational connection. The second, although it may not be clearly articulated, is that all that is needed to disqualify a household is the presence in it of a person over 18 who is claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes by someone outside the household. That this is a reason is quite apparent from the Court's special emphasis on the claims of dependency said to have been asserted by the father or parents of appellees Valdez, Broderson, and Schultz, even though the parent or parents, according to affidavits, gave "no support" or refused to give "any aid," to use the Court's words, ante, at 511.
For me, neither reason is persuasive. As I read § 5 (b) of the Act, see ante, at 509 n. 1, the years of ineligibility for food stamps are "the tax period such dependency is claimed" and the year that follows. They are not the latter year and the one subsequent thereto, as the Court seems to indicate. ·r confess that there must be some practical awkwardness in relating the food stamp year to the tax dependency year, for one often cannot know that he is being claimed as a tax dependent for a given year until the claimant files his income tax return p. 521508 BLACKMUN, J., dissenting
for that year some time after its close. Despite this fact, the statute, for me, is clear and, at least, acceptable, and I would not rewrite it on a pragmatic basis, as, I think, the Court has done. Furthermore, the "year after" provision is not without rational basis, for Congress, in allocating limited resources, has determined that by this means it recoups in the later year the loss sustained in the earlier year when food stamps were improperly claimed.
My second concern centers in the meaning of the words, "who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes," in § 5 (b) of ~he Act. I cannot believe that the mere fact of claiming is sufficient or that that is what Congress intended. It seems obvious to me that "claimed" in this context has only one meaning, that is, properly claimed for income tax purposes, and not the mere assertion of dependency in the return. This would be the sensible construction of the statute. It is obvious and clear, from the Court's description of the Valdez, Broderson, and Schultz situations, ante, at 510-511, that the parent or parents who claimed those appellees as income tax dependents were not at all entitled to make those claims. They clearly did not satisfy the requirements of § 151 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. § 151 (e) (1). Valdez' problem is with his father, not with the food stamp program, if the facts the Court states are accurate. The same is true of Broderson. The same is true of Schultz.
Each of these aspects, which the Court chooses not to analyze and prefers, instead, to resolve by convenient nullification of the statute, could be handled by an appropriate hearing directed to the ascertainment of the actual facts. In that hearing it may be shown whether Joe Valdez, in fact, "receives no support from Ben." If this be true, Joe should not automatically be ineligible p. 522for the program, and Ben's improper claim of Joe as an income tax dependent should have no food stamp consequence whatsoever. So it would be with appellees Broderson and Schultz. The same may be true as to the remaining appellees with respect to whom claims of dependency status, on the affidavits filed, are at least questionable.
I, therefore, would vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for a hearing directed to the development of the underlying facts in the light of § 5 (b) of the Food Stamp Act and of§ 151 (e) (1) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, and 'for the entry of a new judgment in the light of those facts as so ascertained.
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE PowELL concur, dissenting.
Appellees challenge on constitutional grounds a section of the most recent congressional revision of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq., whereby households containing persons 18 years or older who have been claimed as "dependents" for income tax purposes are made ineligible to receive food stamps. The Court's opinion sustains this challenge. Referring to what it conceives to be the legislative aim in enacting such a limitation, "a concern about abuses of the program by 'college students, ch.ildren of wealthy parents,' " the opinion states that "the Act goes far beyond .that goal and its operation is inflexible," ante, at 513.
Notions that in dispensing public funds to the needy Congress may not impose limitations which "go beyond the goal" of Congress, or may not be "inflexible," have not heretofore been thought to be embodied in the Constitution. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970), the Court rejected this approach in an area of welfare legislation that is indistinguishable from the food p. 523stamp program here involved. There the District Court, in the words of this Court,
"while apparently recognizing the validity of at least some of these state concerns, nonetheless held that the regulation 'is invalid on its face for overreaching,' 297 F. Supp., at 468-that it violates the Equal Protection Clause '[b] ecause it cuts too broad a swath on an indiscriminate basis as applied to the entire group of AFDC eligibles to which it purports to apply ....' " / d., at 484.
Applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to state action, the Court reversed the District Court and held:
"[T]he concept of 'overreaching' has no place in this case. For here we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment only because the regulation results in some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families. For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or social regulation as 'overreaching' would be far too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws 'because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school ·of thought'....
"In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
REHNQUIST, J. , dissenting 413 U.S.
In placing the limitations on the availability of food stamps which are involved in this case, Congress has not in any reasoned sense of that word employed a conclusive presumption as stated by the majority, ante, at 511, 512, and MR. JusTICE STEWART in his concurring opinion, ante, at 516; it has simply made a legislative decision that certain abuses which it conceived to exist in the program as previously administered were of sufficient seriousness to warrant the substantive limitation which it enacted. There is a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, holding unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds presumptions ;which conclude factual inquiries without a hearing on such questions as fault , Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) , the fitness of an unwed father to be a parent, Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U. S. 645 ( 1972) , or, accepting the majority's characterization in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 ( 1973) , residency, and, on the other hand, holding unconstitutional a duly enacted prophylactic limitation on the dispensation of funds which is designed to cure systemic abuses. Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 643 (1968).
Thus, we deal not with the law of evidence, but with the extent to which the Fifth Amendment permits this Court to invalidate such a determination by Congress. In Willwmson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 ( 1955), the Court said:
"But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." p. 525Accord, Dandridge v. Williams, supra; Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 u. s. 603, 611-612 (1960).
The majority concludes that a "deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives." Ante, at 514. But judged by the standards of the foregoing cases, the challenged provision of the Food Stamp Act has a legitimate purpose and cannot be said to lack any rational basis. Section 5 (b) declares ineligible for food stamps "[a]ny household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household." Thus, in order to disqualify a ,household for food stamps, the taxpayer claiming one of its memb~rs as a dependent must both provide over half of the dependent's support and must himself be a member of a household with an income large enough to disqualify that household for food stamps. These characteristics indicate that the taxpayer is both willing and able to provide his dependent with a significant amount of support. To be sure, there may be no perfect correlation between the fact that the taxpayer is part of a household which has income exceeding food stamp eligibility standards and his provision of enough support to raise his dependent's household above such standards. But there is some correlation, and the prov1s10n is, the~efore, not irrational. Dandridge v. Williams, supra.*
*
The Court's opinion makes much of the facts that there may be no relationship between the tax . dependent's parent and the remaining members of the household, that they mny be completely destitute, and that they may be one or 10 or 20. Ante, at 514. Secmembers and that the basic needs of all members are provided for without regard to their ability or willingness to contribute." (Reply Brief for Appellants in No. 72-534, 0. T. 1972, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 9 n. 19, post, p. 528.) The majority does not question that Congres5 could rationally so choose to dispense welfare benefits to "economic units" rather than to individuals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since the resources of the household member claimed as a tax dependent are by definition available to the entire household, it is rational to disqualify such units containing ineligible tax dependents.
Nor is § 5 (b) deprived of a rational basis because disqualification of the household extends one year beyond the year in which the dependency deduction is claimed. Since income tax returns are not filed until after the termination of the tax year, the carryover provision is the only practical means of enforcing the congressional purpose unless Congress were to establish an administrative adjudication procedure wholly independent of the existing tax collection structure. Such an alternative system would doubtless have its own delays, inefficiencies, and inequities.' Under these circumstances we cannot say that Congress acted irrationally in judging a person's need in one year by whether he was claimed as a tax dependent in the previous year. ,
Finally, the fact that the statute as presently administered may operate to deny food stamps on the basis of fraudulent as well as lawful dependency deduction claims does not, as suggested by the three-judge District Court, 348 F. Supp. 242, 243 (DC 1972), render it unconstitu-
tion 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S. C. §2012(e), provides in relevant part:
"The term 'household' shall mean a group of ... individuals ... who ... are living as one economic unit ...." In its instructions to the state agencies administering the food stamp program, the Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service defines "economic unit" as meaning that "the common living expenses are shared from the income and resources of all p. 527tional. A false dependency claim subjects the taxpayer to both civil and criminal penalties, and Congress may reasonably proceed on the assumption that taxpayers will obey the law.
The prior holdings of the Court convince me that this limitation which Congress has placed on the availability of food stamps does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and I therefore dissent from the Court's affirmance of the judgment of the District Court.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL-
TURE ET AL. V. MORENO ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
o. 72-534. Argued April 23, 1973-Decided June 25, 1973
Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended in 1971, generally excludes from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other household member. The Secretary of Agriculture issued regulations thereunder rendering ineligible for participation in the program any " household" whose members are not " all related to each other." Congress stated that the purposes of the Act ,vere "to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise leYels of nutrition among low-income households ... [and] that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution . . . of our agricultural abundance and will strengthen cur agricultural economy .... " The District Court held that the "unrelated person" provision of § 3 (e) creates an irrational. classification in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Held: The legislative classification here involved cannot be sustained, the classification being clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act and not rationally furthering any other legitimate governmental interest. In practical operation . the Act excludes, not those who are "likely to abuse the program," but, rather, only those who so desperately need aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility. Pp. 533-538. 345 F. Supp. 310, affirmed.
BRENNAN, J. , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DouGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and PowELL, .JJ., joined. DouGLAS, J., filed a concurring opinio'n , post, p. 538. REHNQUIST, J ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., joined, post, p. 545.
A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General p. 529Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Walter H. Fleischer, and William Kanter.
Ronald F. Pollack argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Roger A. Schwartz.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of§ 3 (e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S. C. § 2012 (e), as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, which, with certain exceptions, excludes from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household. In practical effect, § 3 ( e) creates two classes of persons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of those individuals who live in households all of whose members are related to one another, and the other class consists of those individuals who live in households containing one or more members who are unrelated to the rest. The latter class of persons is denied federal food assistance. A three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia held this classification invalid as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 345 F. Supp. 310 ( 1972). We noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U. S.
1036 (1972). We affirm.
I
The federal food stamp program was established in 1964 in an effort to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more needy segments of our society. 7 U. S. C. § 2011. Eligibility for participation in the program is determined on a household rather than an individual basis. 7 CFR § 271.3 (a). An eligible household purchases sufficient food stamps to provide that household with a nutritionally adequate diet. The household pays for the stamps at a reduced rate based p. 530upon its size and cumulative income. The food stamps are then used to purchase food at retail stores, and the Government redeems the stamps at face value, thereby paying the difference between the actual cost of the food and the amount paid by the household for the stamps. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 (a), 2016, 2025 (a).
As initially enacted, § 3 ( e) defined a "household" as "a group of relate,d or non-relate.d individuals, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common."1 In January 1971, however, Congress redefined the term "household" so as to include only groups of related individuals.2 Pursuant to this amendment, the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated regulations rendering ineligible for participation in the program any "household" whose members are not "all related to each other."3
1
78 Stat. 703 (emphasis added). The act provided further that "[t]he term 'household' shall also mean a single individual living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption." Ibid.
2
84 Stat. 2048. The 1971 amendment did not affect certain groups of nonrelated individuals over 60 years of age. As amended, § 3 (e) now provides: "The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals (including legally adopt_ed children and legally assigned foster children) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common. The term 'household' shall also mean (1) a single individual living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (2) an elderly person who meets the requirements of section 2019 (h) of this title." 7 U. S. C. § 2012 (e).
3
Title 7 CFR § 270.2 (jj) provides: "(jj) 'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, " ( 1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age, they are all related to each other; and "(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60 years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60 years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age is related to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60 years of age or older. "It shall also mean (i) a single individual living alone who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (ii) an elderly person as defined in this section, and his spouse."
Appellees in this case consist of several groups of individuals who allege that, although they satisfy the income eligibility requirements for federal food assistance, they have nevertheless been excluded from the program solely because the persons in each group are not "all related to each other." Appellee Jacinta Moreno, for example, is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. They share common living expenses, and Mrs. Sanchez helps to care for appellee. Appellee's monthly income, derived from public assistance, is $75; Mrs. Sanchez receives $133 per month from public assistance. The household pays $135 per month for rent, gas, and electricity, of which appellee pays $50. Appellee spends $10 'per month for transportation to a hospital for regular visits, and $5 per month for laundry. That leaves her $10 per month for food and other necessities. Despite her poverty, appellee has been denied federal food assistance solely because she is unrelated to the other members of her household. Moreover, although Mrs. Sanchez and her three children were permitted to purchase $108 worth of food stamps per month for $18, their participation in the program will be
housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, and who are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common: Provided, That:
terminated if appellee Moreno continues to live with them.
Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children. Although the Hejnys are indigent, they took in a 20-year-old girl, who is unrelated to them, because "we felt she had emotional problems." The Hejnys receive $144 worth of food stamps each month for $14. If they allow the 20-year-old girl to continue to live with them, they will be denied food stamps by reason of § 3 ( e).
Appellee Victoria Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing deficiency. The daughter requires special instruction in a school for the deaf. The school is located in an area in which appellee could not ordinarily afford to live. Thus, in order to make the most of her limited resources, appellee agreed to , share an apartment near the school with a woman who, like appellee, is on public assistance. Since appellee is not related to the woman, appellee's food stamps have been, and will continue to be, cut off if they continue to live together.
These and two other groups of appellees instituted a class action against the Department of Agriculture, its Secretary, and two other departmental officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 1971 amendment of § 3 ( e) and its implementing regulations. In essence, appellees contend,4 and the District Court held, that the "unrelated person" provision of § 3 ( e) creates an irrational classification in violation p. 533of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.5 We agree.
4
Appellees also argued that the regulations themselves were invalid because beyond the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary by the statute. The District Court rejected that contention, and appellees have not pressed that argument on appeal. Moreover, appellees did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute's reliance on "households" rather than "individuals" as the basic unit of the food stamp program. We therefore intimate no view on that question.
II
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546 (1972); Richar,dson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The purposes of the Food Stamp Act were expressly set forth in the congressional "declaration of policy" :
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income households.
The Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households. The Congress further finds that ,increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abun- · dances and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein ·authorized which will permit low-income households to p. 534purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade." 7 U. S. C. § 2011.
5
"[WJ hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' -" Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 680 n. 5 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 641-642 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954).
The challenged statutory classification (households of related persons versus households containing one or more unrelated persons) is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act. As the District Court recognized, "[t]he relationships among persons constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their personal nutritional requirements." 345 F. Supp., at
313.
Thus, if it is to be sustained, the challenged classification must rationally further some legitimate governmental interest other than those specifically stated in the congressional "declaration of policy." Regrettably, there is little legislative history to illuminate the purposes of the 1971 amendment of § 3 (e).6 The legisla- . tive history that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment was intended to prevent so-called "hippies" and "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp program. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970) (Sen. ·Holland). The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, "[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the p. 535public interest, justify the 19-71 amendment." 345 F. Supp., at 314 n. 11.
6
Indeed, the amendment first materialized, bare of committee consideration, during a conference committee's consideration of differing House and Senate bills.
Although apparently conceding this point, the Government maintains that the challenged classification should nevertheless be upheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental interest in minimizing fraud in the administration of the food stamp program.7 In essence, the Government contends that, in adopting the 1971 amendment, Congress might rationally have thought (I) that households with one or more unrelated members are more likely than "fully related" households to contain individuals who abuse the program by fraudulently failing to report sources of income or by voluntarily remaining poor; and ( 2) that such hous~holds are "relatively unstable," thereby increasing the difficulty of detecting such abuses. But even if we were to accept as rational the Government's wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between "related" and "unrelated" households, we still could not agree with the Government's conclusion that the denial of essential p. 536federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible households containing unrelated members constitutes a rational effort to deal with these concerns.
7
The Government initially argued to the District Court that the challenged classification might be justified as a means to foster "morality." In rejecting that contention, the District Court noted that "interpreting the amendment as an attempt to regulate morality would raise serious constitutional questions." 345 F. Supp. 310, 314. Indeed, citing this Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), the District Court observed that it was doubtful, at best, whether Congress, "in the name of morality," could "infringe the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home." 345 F. Supp., at 314. (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, the court also pointed out that the classification established in § 3 (e) was not rationally related "to prevailing notions of morality, since it in terms disquaiifies all households of unrelated individuals, without reference to whether a particular group contains both sexes." Id., at 315. The Government itself has now abandoned the "morality" argument. See Brief for Appellants 9.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Food Stamp Act itself contains provisions, wholly independent of § 3 ( e), aimed specifically at the problems of fraud and of the voluntarily poor. For example, with certain exceptions, § 5 (c) of the Act, 7 U.S. C. § 2014 (c), renders ineligible for assistance any household containing "an able-bodied adult person between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five" who fails to register for, and accept, offered employment. Similarly, §§ 14 (b) and (c), 7 U. S. C. § § 2023 (b) and ( c), specifically impose strict criminal penalties upon any individual who obtains or uses food stamps fraudulently.8 The existence of these p. 537prov1s10ns necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses. See Eisenstadt v. Bair.d, 405 U. S. 438, 452 ( 1972); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 353-354 ( 1972).
8
Title 7 U. S. C. §§ 2023 (b) and (c) provide: "(b) Whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization to purchase cards in any manner not authorized by this [Act] or the regulations issued pursuant to this [Act] shall, if such coupons or authorization to purchase cards are of the value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both, or, if such coupons or authorization to purchase cards are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. "(c) Whoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for payment or redemption of the value of $100 or more, knowing the same to have been :received, transferred, or used in any manner in violation of the provisions of this [Act] or the regulations issued pursuant to this [Act] shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, or, if such coupons are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."
Moreover, in practical effect, the challenged classification simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud. As previously noted, § 3 ( e) defines an eligible "household" as "a group of related individuals ... [1] living as one economic unit [2] sharing common cooking facilities [and 3] for whom food is customarily purchased in common." Thus, two unrelated persons living together and meeting all three of these conditions would constitute a single household ineligible for assistance. If financially feasible, however, these same two individuals can legally avoid the "unrelated person" exclusion simply by altering their living arrangements so as to eliminate any one of the three conditions. By so doing, they effectively create two separate "households," both of which are eligible for assistance. See Knowles v. Butz, 358 F. Sup_p. 228 (ND Cal. 1973). Indeed, as the California Director of Social Welfare has explained:9
"The 'related household' limitations will eliminate many households from eligibility in the Food Stamp Program. It is my understanding that the Congressional intent of the new regulations are specifically aimed at the 'hippies' and 'hippie communes.' Most people in this category can and will alter their living arrangements in order to remain eligible for food stamps. However, the AFDC mothers who try to raise their standard of living by sharing housing will be affected. They will not be able to
9
App. 43.
DouaLAs, J., concurring 413 U.S.
utilize the altered living patterns in order to continue to be eligible without giving up their advantage of shared housing costs."
Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are "likely to abuse the program" but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility. Traditional equal protection analysis does not require that every classification be drawn with precise " 'mathematical nicety.' " Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. But the classification here ,in issue is not only "imprecise," it is wholly without any rational basis. The judgment of the District Court holding the "unrelated person" provision invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is therefore
Affirmed
MR. JUSTICE DouGLAS, concurring.
Appellee Jacinta Moreno is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. The two share common living expenses, Mrs. Sanchez helping to care for this appellee. Appellee's monthly income is $75, derived from public assistance, and Mrs. Sanchez' is $133, also derived from public assistance. This household pays $95 a month for rent, of which appellee pays $40, and $40 a month for gas and electricity, of which appellee pays $10. Appellee spends $10 a month for transportation to a hospital for regular visits and $5 a month for laundry. That leaves her $10 a month for food and other necessities. Mrs. Sanchez and the three children received $108 worth of food stamps per month for $18. But under the "unrelated" person p. 539528 DOUGLAS, J., concurring
prov1s10n of the Act,1 she will be cut off if appellee Moreno continues to live with her.
Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children, ages two to five. She and her husband took in a 20-year-old girl who is unrelated to them. She shares in the housekeeping. The Hejnys pay $14 a month and receive $144 worth of food stamps. The Hejnys comprise an indigent household. But if they allow the 20-year-old girl to live with them, they too will be cut off from food stamps by reason of the "unrelated" person provision.
1
Section 3 (e) of the Food Stamp Act provides in relevant part: "The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals (including legally adopted children and legally assigned foster chilren) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common." 7 U. S. C. § 2012 (e). The Regulations provide: "'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, and who are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common: Provided, That: " ( 1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age, they are all related to each other ; and "(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60 years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60 years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age is related to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60 years of age or older." 7 CFR § 270.2 (jj). "Eligibility for and participation in the program shall be on a household basis. All persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or child care reasons, residing in common living quarters shall be consolidated into a group prior to determining if such a group is a household as determined in § 270.2 (jj) of this subchapter." 7 CFR § 271.3 (a).
DOUGLAS, J., concurring 413 U.S.
Appellee Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing deficiency who requires instruction in a school for the deaf. The school is in an area where the mother cannot afford to live. So she and her two minor children moved into a nearby apartment with a woman who, like appellee· Keppler, is on public assistance but who is not related to her. As a result appellee Keppler's food stamps have been cut off because of the "unrelated" person provision.
These appellees instituted a class action to enjoin the enforcement of the "unrelated" person provision of the Act.
The "unrelated" person provision of the Act creates two classes of persons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of people who are all related to each other and all in dire need; and the other ' class is composed of households that have one or more persons unrelated to the others but have the same degree of need as those in the first class. The first type of household qualifies for relief, the second cannot qualify, no matter the need. It is that application of the Act which is said to violate the conception of equal protection that is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499.
The test of equal protection is whether the legislative line that is drawn be_ars "some rational relationship to a legitimate" governmental purpose.2 Weber v. Aetna p. 541528 DouGLAS, J., concurring
2
The purpose of the present Act was stated by Congress : " [T]o safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income households. The Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households. The Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized which will permit low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade." 7 U. S. C. § 2011. . (Italics added.)
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 172. The requirement of equal protection denies government "the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective" of the enactment. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75-76.
This case involves desperately poor people with acute problems who, though unrelated, come together for mutual help and assistance. The choice of one's associates for social, political, race, or religious purposes is basic in our constitutional scheme. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 363; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429-431; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U. S. 539; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288. It extends to "the associational rights of the members" of a trade union. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U. S. 1, 8.
I suppose no one would doubt that an association of people working in the poverty field would be entitled to the same constitutional protection as those working in the racial, banking, or agricultural field. I suppose poor people holding a meeting or convention would be under the same constitutional umbrella as others. The dimensions of the "unrelated" person problem under the Food Stamp Act are in that category. As the facts of this case show, the poor are congregating in households where they can better meet the adversities of poverty. This banding together is an expression of the right of freedom of association that is very deep in our traditions.
DouoLAs, J., concurring 413 U.S.
Other like rights have been recognized that are only peripheral First Amendment rights-the right to send one's child to a religious school, the right to study the German language in a private school, the protection of the entire spectrum of learning, teaching, and communicating ideas, the marital right of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482-483.
As the examples indicate, these peripheral constitutional rights are exercised not necessarily in assemblies that congregate in halls or auditoriums but in discrete individual actions such as parents placing a child in the school of their choice. Taking a person into one's home because he is poor or needs help or brings happiness to the household is of the S?,me dignity.
Congress might choose to deal only with members of a family of one or two or three generations, treating it all as a unit. Congress, however, has not done that here. Concededly an individual living alone is not disqualified from the receipt of food stamp aid, even though there are other members of the family with whom he might theoretically live. Nor are common-law couples disqualified: they, like individuals living alone, may qualify under the Act if they are poor-whether they have abandoned their wives and children and however antifamily their attitudes may be. In other words, the "unrelated" person provision was not aimed at the maintenance of normal family ties. It penalizes persons or families who have brought under their roof an "unrelated" needy person. It penalizes the poorest of the poor for doubling up against the adversities of poverty.
But for the constitutional aspects of the problem, the "unrelated" person provision of the Act might well be sustained as a means to prevent fraud. Fraud is a concern of the Act. 7 U. S. C. §§ 2023 (b) and (c). Able-bodied persons must register and accept work or lose their food stamp rights. 7 U. S. C. § 201~ (c). I p. 543528 DouGLAs, J., concurring
could not say that this "unrelated" person provision has no "rational" relation to control of fraud. We deal here, however, with the right of association, protected by the First Amendment. People who are desperately poor but unrelated come together and join hands with the aim better to combat the crises of poverty. The need of those living together better to meet those crises is denied, while the need of households made up of relatives that is no more acute is serviced. Problems of the fisc, as we stated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 633, are legitimate concerns of government. But government "may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens." Ibid.
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the "unrelated" person provision of the Act was to prevent "essentially unrelated individuals who voluntarily chose to cohabit and live off food stamps"3-so-called "hippies" or "hippy communes"-from participating in the food stamp program. As stated in the Conference Report,4 the definition of household was "designed to prohibit food stamp assistance to communal 'families' of unrelated individuals."
The right of association, the right to invite the stranger into one's home is too basic in our constitutional regime to deal with roughshod. If there are abuses inherent in that pattern of living against which the food stamp program should be protected, the Act must be "narrowly drawn," Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307, to meet the precise end. The method adopted and applied to these cases makes § 3 ( e) of the Act unconstitutional by reason of the invidious discrimination between the two classes of needy persons.
3
See 116 Cong. Rec. 42003.
4
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8.
DouaLAs, J., concurring 413 U.S.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, is not opposed. It sustained a Maryland grant of welfare, against the claim of violation of equal protection, which placed an upper limit on the monthly amount any single family could receive. The claimants had large families so that their standard of need exceeded the actual grants. Their claim was that the grants of aid considered in light of the size of their families created an invidious discrimination against them and in favor of small needy families. The claim was rejected on the basis that state economic or social legislation had long been judged by a less strict standard than comes into play when constitutionally protected rights are involved. Id., at 484-485. Laws touching social and economic matters can pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause though they are imperfect, the test being whether the classification has some "reasonable basis." Ibid. Dandridge held that "the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy." Id., at 486. But for the First Amendment aspect of the case, Dandridge would control here.
Dandridge, however, did not reach classifications touching on associational rights that lie in the penumbra of the First Amendment. Since the "unrelated" person provision is not directed to the maintenance of the family as a unit but treats impoverished households composed of relatives more favorably than impoverished households having a single unrelated person, it draws a line that can be sustained only on· a showing of a "compelling" governmental interest.
The "unrelated" person provision of the present Act has an impact on the rights of people to associate for lawful purposes with whom they- choose. When state action "may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to p. 545associate" it "is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 460-461. The "right of the people peaceably to assemble" guaranteed by the First Amendment covers a wide spectrum of human interests-including, as stated in id., at 460, "political, economic, religious, or cultural matters." Banding together to combat the common foe of hunger is in that category. The case therefore falls within the zone represented by Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, which held that a waiting period on welfare imposed by a State on the "in-migration of indigents" penalizing the constitutional right to travel could not be sustained absent a "compelling governmental interest." Id., at 631, 634.
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE concurs, dissenting.
For much the same reasons as those stated in my dissenting opinion in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, ante, p. 522, I am unable to agree with the Court's disposition of this case. Here appellees challenged a provision in the Federal Food Stamp Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq., which limited food stamps to related people living in one "household." The result of this provision is that unrelated persons who live under the same roof and pool their resources may not obtain food stamps even though otherwise eligible.
The Court's opinion would make a very persuasive congressional committee report arguing against the adoption of the limitation in question. Undoubtedly, Congress attacked the problem with a ·rather blunt instrument and, just as ·undoubtedly, persuasive arguments may be made that what we conceive to be its purpose will not be significantly advanced by the enactment of the limitation. But questions such as this are for Congress, rather than for this Court; our role is limited to the p. 546determination of whether there is any rational basis on which Congress could decide that public funds made available under the food stamp program should not go to a household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household.
I do not believe that asserted congressional concern with the fraudulent use of food stamps is, when interpreted in the light most favorable to sustaining the limitation, quite as irrational as the Court seems to believe. A basic unit which Congress has chosen for determination of availability for food stamps is the "household," a determination which is not criticized by the Court. By the limitation here challenged, it has singled out households which contain unrelated persons and made such households ineligible. I do not think it is unreasonable for Congress to conclude that the basic unit_which it was willing to support with federal funding through food stamps is some variation on the family as we know ita household consisting of related individuals. This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by households containing unrelated individuals that the household exists for some purpose other than to collect federal food stamps.
Admittedly, as the Court points out, the limitation will make ineligible many households which have not been formed for the purpose of collecting federal food stamps, and will at the same time not wholly deny food stamps to those households which may have been formed in large ·part to take advantage of the program. But, as the Court concedes, " [ t] raditional equal protection analysis does not require that every classification be drawn with precise 'mathematical nicety,' " ante, at 538. And earlier this Term, the constitutionality of a similarly "imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act was p. 547challenged on grounds such as those urged by appellees here. In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 ( 1973), the imposition of the rule on all members of a defined class was sustained because it served to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class of disclosure mechanisms chosen by Congress for consumer protection.
The limitation which Congress enacted could, in the judgment of reasonable men, conceivably deny food stamps to members of households which have been formed solely for the purpose of taking advantage of the food stamp program. Since the food stamp program is not intended to be a subsidy for every individual who desires low-cost food, this was a permissible congressional decision quite consistent with the underlying policy of the Act. The fact that the limitation will have unfortunate and perhaps unintended consequences beyond this does not make it unconstitutional.