Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (1965)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (1965)
Full caption
SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 22, 1965
SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD CO. et al. v.
UNITED STATES et al.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.
No. 425. Decided November 22, 1965*
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), after administrative proceedings, approved a merger between the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company. Though recognizing that the merger would eliminate compétition in parts of Florida, the ICC found that the benefits of the merger outweighed its potential disadvantages. On the ground that the ICC failed to détermine whether the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton Act by reference to the relevant product and géographie markets, a three-judge District Court set aside the ICC’s order. Held: The ICC is authorized to approve a merger notwithstanding what would otherwise be violative of the antitrust laws if it makes adéquate findings after weighing the effects of the curtailment of compétition against the advantages of improved service that the merger would be “consistent with the public interest” under § 5 (2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act and further the overall transportation policy. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173, followed.
242 F. Supp. 14, vacated and remanded.
Paul A. Porter, Dennis G. Lyons, Harold J. Gallagher, Walter H. Brown, Jr., Richard A. Hollander, Edwin H. Burgess, Prime F. Osbom, Albert B. Russ, Jr., and Phil C. Beverly for appellants in No. 425. Robert W. Ginnane and Fritz R. Kahn for appellant in No. 555.
Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Lionel Kestenbaum for the United States. A. Alvis Layne and Fred H. Kent for Florida East Coast
*
Together with No. 555, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court.
Railway Co., W. Graham Claytor, Jr., for Southern Railway Co., and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and William G. Mahoney for Railway Labor Executives’ Association, appellees.
Per Curiam.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission an application for authority to merge. In the administrative proceedings, the applicants contended that the merger would enable them to lower operating costs, improve service, and eliminate duplicate facilities; other carriers opposed the merger on the ground that it would hâve adverse compétitive effects; and the Department of Justice contended that the merger would create a rail monopoly in central and western Florida.
The Commission approved the merger, subject to routing and gateway conditions to protect competing railroads. It recognized that the merger would eliminate compétition and create a rail monopoly in parts of Florida. But it found that the merged lines carried only a small part of the total traffic in the area involved; that ample rail compétition would remain therein; and that the réduction in compétition would “hâve no appreciably injurious effect upon shippers and communities.” Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 320 I. C. C. 122, 167. In addition, the Commission noted that the need to preserve intramodal rail compétition had diminished, due to the fact that railroads were increasingly losing traffic to truck, water, and other modes of compétition.
A three-judge District Court set aside the order and remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. It concluded that the Commission’s analysis of the compétitive effects of the merger was fatally defective because the Commission had not determined whether
Per Curiam. 382 U.S.
the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1964 ed.), by reference to the relevant product and géographie markets. By thus disposing of the case, the District Court did not reach the ultimate question whether the merger would be consistent with the public interest despite the foreseeable injury to compétition.1
We believe that the District Court erred in its interprétation of the directions this Court set forth in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944), and Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173 (1959). As we said in Minneapolis, at 186:
“Although § 5 (11) does not authorize the Commission to ‘ignore’ the antitrust laws, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 80, there can be ‘little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposais for [acquisitions] by the standards of the antitrust laws.’ 321 U. S., at 85-86. The problem is one of accommodation of § 5 (2) and the antitrust législation. The Commission remains obligated to ‘estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtaihnent of compétition which will resuit from the proposed [acquisition] and consider them along with the advantages of improved service [and other matters in the public interest] to détermine whether the [acquisition] will assist in effectuating the overall transportation policy.’ 321 U. S., at 87.”
The same criteria should be applied here to the proposed merger. It matters not that the merger might p. 157otherwise violate the antitrust laws; the Commission has been authorized by the Congress to approve the merger of railroads if it makes adéquate findings in accordance with the criteria quoted above that such a merger would be “consistent with the public interest.” 54 Stat. 906, 49 U. S. C. §5 (2)(b) (1964 ed.).
1
It expressly declined to consider two further issues, i. e., whether the Commission’s labor-protection conditions were adéquate and whether control of the merged company by the Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Company would be consistent with the public interest.
Whether the Commission has confined itself within the statutory limits upon its discrétion and has based its findings on substantial evidence are questions for the trial court in the first instance, United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U. S. 562, 578 (1952), and we indicate no opinion on the same. We therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to it for a full review of the administrative order and findings pursuant to the standards enunciated by this Court.
Vacated and remanded.
Mr. Justice Portas took no part in the considération or decision of these cases.
UNITED STATES v. MARYLAND FOR THE USE OF MEYER et al.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
No. 543, October Term, 1963. Certiorari denied December 16, 1963.—Rehearing denied December 7, 1964.—Rehearing and certiorari granted and case decided November 22, 1965.
116 U. S. App. D. C. 259, 322 F. 2d 1009, reversed and remanded for further proceedings on unresolved issues in complaint.
Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Morton Hollander and David L. Rose for the United States.
Louis G. Davidson, Richard W. Galiher, William E. Stewart, Jr., and Peter J. McBreen for respondents.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to file a conditional pétition for rehearing is granted and the pétition for rehearing is also granted. The order of December 16, 1963, 375 U. S. 954, denying the pétition for writ of certiorari is vacated, and the pétition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed in conformity with our decision in Maryland for the use of Levin et al. v. United States, 381 U. S. 41, and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for further proceedings with respect to the unresolved issues tendered in respondents’ bill of complaint. • , ,
It zs so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan, believing that a remand is legally unjustified, dissent from that part of the Court’s order.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the considération or decision of this case.