Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384 (1960)

This is a suit by appellee for a declaratory judgment that he is a citizen of the United States. The District Court sustained the contention of the United States that appellee had lost his citizenship by reason of § 401 (j) 1 [p. 385] of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended, 58 Stat. 746, 8 U. S. C. § 1481 (a) (10), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 238 F. 2d 239. Meanwhile we had decided Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86; and when certiorari was sought here we granted the petition and remanded the cause to the District Court for reconsideration in light of that decision. 356 U. S. 258. On remand the District Court held that § 401 (j) was unconstitutional. The case is here on direct appeal (28 U. S. C. § 1252) from the judg ment of the District Court holding that appellee is there fore a citizen of the United States. We noted probable jurisdiction. 359 U. S. 933.

“(1) Was the judgment of conviction of appellee for draft evasion premised in any respect upon his [p. 386] citizenship status after the date of enactment of Section 401 (j)?

Appellee contends that while that Act requires service of aliens residing here, it is inapplicable to nonresident aliens; and that therefore the charge in the indictment that appellee remained away could be applicable only if appellee were a citizen. Indeed the facts stipulated in the present case state that he was a citizen by birth. It follows, appellee argues, that the judgment of convic tion for draft violation necessarily included an adjudica tion of citizenship, and that that judgment brings into play the doctrine of collateral estoppel (Washington Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580; Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U. S. 558) since the conviction of draft evasion was subsequent to September 27, 1944, the date of the enactment of § 401 (j). The Solicitor General argues, inter alia, that the issue of citizenship was not necessarily involved in the conviction for draft evasion since a charge of evasion by an alien would be made out even though he had left the country provided the duty to serve had attached when he resided here. The Solicitor [p. 387] 384 Memorandum of Frankfurter, J.

The Solicitor General’s acquiescence in having this case disposed of by avoiding decision of the important consti tutional question concerning the validity of § 401 (j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which is the only one pre sented by the record, probably reflects an understandable desire on the part of the Government to have this Court adjudicate that issue unembarrassed by an extraneous problem that did not come to the surface until this appeal had been submitted. I do not think that this new mat ter—a claim of collateral estoppel—should be considered here as though this were a court of first instance. No matter how sympathetic one may be towards liberaliza tion of pleading and informality in judicial proceedings, [p. 388] the intrinsic demands of orderliness in the judicial process require that the issues on which this Court is to render judgment should be appropriately defined through plead ings and proceedings in the lower courts and not be ini tially shaped for adjudication in this Court. Apart from all else, since taking testimony before this Court has long since ceased to be feasible, we would necessarily have to act on the merits of a claim, based on the rather opaque law of collateral estoppel, resting on documentary submis sions not subject to the test of testimonial examination.