W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 347 U.S. 67 (1954)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 347 U.S. 67 (1954)
Full caption
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 1, 1954
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD ET AL.
NO. 22 5. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.*
Argued December 9-10, 1953.—Decided February 1, 1954.
Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, as amended, requires the Civil Aeronautics Board, in fixing mail-pay subsidy for air carriers, to “take into consideration . . . the need of each such air carrier for compensation . . . sufficient . . . together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier ... to maintain and continue the development” of a national air-transportation system. Held: In fixing mail-pay subsidy for the air carrier in this case, the Board was required to take into consideration the carrier’s profits derived from (1) the operation of restaurants and other concessions at airports, (2) the sale of tangible assets to another air carrier, and (3) the sale of a route to another air carrier. Pp. 68-73.
(a) The “need” of the carrier which the Board is required to consider in fixing a subsidy rate is “the need” of the carrier as a whole. P. 71.
(b) The “all other revenue” which the Board is required to consider includes nonflight income from incidental carrier activities, not transportation revenue alone. P. 71.
(c) The profit derived by a carrier from the sale of a route to another carrier is also “other revenue” within the meaning of §406 (b). Pp. 71-72.
(d) The standard prescribed by Congress to guide the Board in fixing mail-pay subsidy is “the need” of the carrier; and the Board was not justified, on the record in this case, in disregarding profits derived from the sale of a route to another carrier, in order “to safeguard the incentive for voluntary route transfers.” Pp. 72-73.
92 U. S. App. D. C. 248,207 F. 2d 200, affirmed.
*Together with No. 224, Civil Aeronautics Board v. Summerfield, Postmaster General, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
The Civil Aeronautics Board issued an order fixing mail-pay subsidy for an air carrier. 14 C. A. B. 201. Both the Postmaster General and the carrier sought review of the Board’s order in the Court of Appeals, which sustained the order in part and reversed it in part. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 207 F. 2d 200. This Court granted certiorari. 346 U. S. 811. Affirmed, p. 73.
Emory T. Nunneley, Jr. argued the cause for the Civil Aeronautics Board. With him on the brief was 0. D. Ozment.
Hugh W. Darling argued the cause for Western Air Lines, Inc., petitioner in No. 225 and respondent in No. 224. With him on the brief were Edward S. Shattuck and D. P. Renda.
Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States and the Postmaster General, respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Murray L. Schwartz and Eugene J. Brahm.
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, here on writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, present an important question in the construction of § 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. Section 406 (a) authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board to fix “fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft.”1 Section 406 (b) requires the Board to take into p. 69consideration, inter alia, “the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense.”2 The p. 70controversy in the present cases turns on the meaning of the words “the need of each such air carrier” and “all other revenue of the air carrier.”
1
“The [Board] is empowered and directed, upon its own initiative or upon petition of the Postmaster General or an air carrier, (1) to fix and determine from time to time, after notice and hearing, the fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft, the facilities used and useful therefor, and the services connected therewith (including the transportation of mail by an air carrier by other means than aircraft whenever such transportation is incidental to the transportation of mail by aircraft or is made necessary by conditions of emergency arising from aircraft operation), by each holder of a certificate authorizing the transportation of mail by aircraft, and to make such rates effective from such date as it shall determine to be proper; (2) to prescribe the method or methods, by aircraft-mile, pound-mile, weight, space, or any combination thereof, or otherwise, for ascertaining such rates of compensation for each air carrier or class of air carriers; and (3) to publish the same; and the rates so fixed and determined shall be paid by the Postmaster General from appropriations for the transportation of mail by aircraft.”
2
“In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation under this section, the [Board], considering the conditions peculiar to transportation by aircraft and to the particular air carrier or class of air carriers, may fix different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers, and different classes of service. In determining the rate in each case, the [Board] shall take into consideration, among other factors, the condition that such air carriers may hold and operate under certificates authorizing the carriage of mail only by providing necessary and adequate facilities and service for the transportation of mail; such standards respecting the character and quality of service to be rendered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to law; and the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense.”
Western Air Lines filed a petition for a rate order April 26, 1944. In 1951 the Board finally determined the rate applicable between May 1, 1944, and December 31, 1948. During this open-rate period Western realized some $88,000 in profits from the operation of restaurants and other concessions at airport terminals. The Board determined that this income was “other revenue” available to reduce mail pay. During the open-rate period Western with approval of the Board3 sold to United Air Lines its certificate and properties for air operations (Route 68) between Los Angeles and Denver, at a profit in excess of $1,000,000. The Board treated the profit derived from the sale of the tangible assets (approximately $650,000) as “other revenue” and reduced the mail compensation by that amount. But it declined to reduce the mail-pay allowance by the profit realized from the sale of the “intangible value” of the route. The Board concluded that that amount should not be used in offset because it wanted “to encourage improvement of the air route pattern through voluntary route transfers by other air carriers.” 14 C. A. B., at 246.
On review, Western challenged the inclusion in “other revenue” of the amounts received from the concessions and the profit from the sale of the tangible assets. The Postmaster General4 challenged the exclusion from the p. 71offsets of the profit Western made on the sale of the intangibles. The Court of Appeals sustained the Board in Western’s petition and reversed it in the other petition and remanded the case to the Board for the fixing of a new rate after deducting the entire profit from the sale of Western’s Route 68. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 207 F. 2d 200.
3
United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C. A. B. 298 (1947).
4
The Postmaster General has not only the duty to pay the mail rates from appropriations for the transportation of mail by aircraft but also is given standing by § 406 (a) to petition the Board to fix and determine the rates. A change in the function of the Postmaster General was made by Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1953, effective October 1, 1953, 67 Stat. 644.
Some air-mail rates are service rates, based on mail-miles flown;5 others are subsidy rates based on “need.” We are here concerned with a subsidy rate which in Western’s case was fixed so as to produce a 7-percent return on investment after taxes for the period in question. In other words, the end problem concerns not the amount of money provided for operation and development but the amount of profit over and above all such sums.
We read the Act as meaning that “the need” of the carrier which Congress has directed the Board to consider in fixing a subsidy rate is “the need” of the carrier as a whole. The need specified in § 406 (b) is measured by “compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable” it to develop air transportation, etc. The “compensation for the transportation of mail” is flight income. It seems too clear for argument that “all other revenue” would include nonflight income from incidental air-carrier activities. We have found nothing persuasive as indicating that “all other revenue” means transportation revenue. The inclusive nature of the category precludes a narrow reading. If the carrier’s treasury is lush, “the need” for subsidy decreases whether the opulence is due to transportation activities or to activities incidental thereto.
By the same reasoning the profit made by Western on the sale of Route 68 is also “other revenue” within the p. 72meaning of § 406 (b). The Board agrees; but it goes on to say that that is not the end of the matter, since the reduction of the subsidy by the entire amount of the profit is not mandatory. The Act, it is true, merely says that the Board in determining the rate “shall take into consideration” various factors, including “the need” of the carrier (§ 406 (b)); and the “need,” as we have noted, is not merely for compensation to insure the transportation of mail but compensation for “the development of air transportation” under the prescribed standards. By that standard the “need” in a given case may be so great that profits from other transactions should be allowed in addition to the normal rate. Or, on the other hand, the total revenues of the carrier as against its operating costs and developmental program may be so great that “the need” for subsidy disappears and the carrier is transferred to the service rate for mail pay. The difficulty here is that the Board, in concluding that a part of the profits from the sale to United should not be used as an offset, forsook the standard of “need” and adopted a different one. The Board wanted “to safeguard the incentive for voluntary route transfers.” It thought it could not keep this incentive alive in the industry unless the profit were allowed in addition to the subsidy. The Board thought it important to keep that incentive alive in order to promote route transfers and mergers which the Board could not compel. The Board therefore argues that allowance of the profit over and above a subsidy enables Western “to maintain and continue the development of air transportation” within the meaning of § 406 (b), since the sale of Route 68 was consistent with the development program which the Board deemed desirable.
5
See, for example, Eastern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 733 (1942). 288037 0—54---- 10
The Act, however, speaks of “the need” of the carrier for the subsidy, not the effect of a policy on carriers in general. This is not a case of recapture of earnings. Western keeps the entire amount of the profit. The issue p. 73is how much additional money Western is to receive in the form of a subsidy. Western’s “need” is the measure of the amount authorized by Congress. No finding was made that there was “need” for the additional subsidy, in the sense that otherwise Western would not have been willing or able to make the transfer of Route 68 in accordance with the development program which the Board deems advisable. Whether such a finding would have satisfied the statutory requirement is a question we do not reach, since the opinion of the Board makes plain that other considerations were controlling:
“. . . our decision not to include the net profit from the sale of intangibles was reached solely because we are thus seeking to encourage improvement of the air route pattern through voluntary route transfers by other air carriers.” 14 C. A. B., at 246.
The standard prescribed by Congress, however, is “the need” of the air carrier whose subsidy rates are being fixed.
Affirmed.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC. v. SUMMERFIELD, POSTMASTER GENERAL, et al.
NO. 2 2 3. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.*
Argued December 9-10, 1953.—Decided February 1, 1954.
Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, as amended, requires the Civil Aeronautics Board, in fixing mail-pay subsidy for air carriers, to “take into consideration . . . the need of each such air carrier for compensation . . . sufficient . . . together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier ... to maintain and continue the development” of a national air-transportation system. Held: In fixing the mail-pay subsidy for the foreign operations of the carrier here involved during a past period, the Board erred in refusing to offset against the carrier’s need for foreign operations excess earnings during the same period on its domestic operations. Pp. 75-80.
(a) An air-mail subsidy may not exceed the carrier’s “need,” which is to be measured by the entirety of the carrier’s operations, not by the losses of one division or department, even when a rate is fixed for a class of service, as authorized by §406 (b). Pp. 78-79.
(b) Arguments of policy against this conclusion are for Congress, not the courts. Pp. 79-80.
92 U. S. App. D. C. 256,207 F. 2d 207, affirmed.
The Civil Aeronautics Board issued an order fixing mail-pay subsidy for an air carrier. 14 C. A. B. 681. On the Postmaster General’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals reversed. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 256, 207 F. 2d 207. This Court granted certiorari. 346 U. S. 811. Affirmed, p. 80.
Emory T. Nunneley, Jr. argued the cause for the Civil Aeronautics Board. With him on the brief was O. D. Ozment.
*Together with No. 222, Civil Aeronautics Board v. Summerfield, Postmaster General, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
L. Welch Pogue argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 223.
Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States and the Postmaster General, respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Murray L. Schwartz and Eugene J. Brahm.
Hubert A. Schneider, on behalf of Braniff Airways, Inc., C. Edward Leasure, on behalf of Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Gerald B. Brophy, on behalf of Trans World Airlines, Inc., filed a brief, as amici curiae, urging reversal.
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Delta Air Lines, petitioner in No. 223, is the successor by merger to Chicago and Southern Air Lines (C & S). C & S was an air carrier which conducted both domestic and foreign operations prior to the merger. The present case involves subsidy mail pay for its foreign operations from 1946 through 1950.
In 1948 the Board, on applications made by C & S in 1944 and 1945, fixed a prospective annual subsidy for its domestic operations beginning January 1, 1948, which the Board estimated would yield a net return after taxes of 7.4 percent on that part of its investment allocable to those operations. 9 C. A. B. 786. The following three years—1948, 1949, and 1950—the rates in operation produced a subsidy of more than $654,000 in excess of a 7.4-percent return.
In 1946 C & S applied for subsidy mail pay on its Latin-American routes. On October 18, 1951, the Board issued its opinion and order. Rates were fixed retroactively from November 1, 1946, to December 15, 1950, and prospectively from December 16, 1950. The subsidy awarded was designed to give the carrier a 7-percent p. 76return, on the property allocable to foreign operations, after taxes for the past period, and 10 percent for the future. 14 C. A. B. 681.
In fixing the subsidy for the past period, the Board refused to offset against the carrier’s need for foreign operations the excess earnings on its domestic flights. It gave two “considerations of economic policy” for that position.1 First, the Board said it would put p. 77an “unjustifiable strain” on domestic operations if the latter were required to carry the international operations. Second, it concluded that regulatory ends would be better served by maintaining “the comparative status between those domestic operators which have foreign routes as against those which do not have foreign routes.”
1
The Board said: “If an offset policy were adopted, the almost invariable result would be that, as in the instant case, the profits from a carrier’s domestic operation would be used to sustain any international operations it might have. Recognizing this likelihood, we hesitate to burden the more robust segment of the industry with the obligations of the economically weaker part. For if the domestic air transport system can be kept financially sound, the public must ultimately benefit, putting aside any consideration of the obvious advantage of reduced rates of mail compensation. Thus, we anticipate that if the carriers’ earning position continues strong, reductions in the domestic fare level will be possible, thereby giving impetus to the further development of the industry. In addition, with improved earnings, the domestic operators should be able to benefit the public and themselves with more modern aircraft, and with improved methods affording safer and more efficient operations. We cannot escape the thought that if we allow international operations to be carried on the back of domestic operations, we shall be subjecting the latter to an unjustifiable strain. Many of the domestic operators are well along the road to self-sufficiency. It is our duty to speed them on their way, not thwart them. “It also appears desirable to maintain the comparative status between those domestic operators which have foreign routes as against those which do not have foreign routes. Since carriers fall into fairly well-defined classes, the Board is enabled to fix uniform domestic mail rates for groups of carriers provided, of course, that their comparative status is preserved by excluding consideration of any international operations. A carrier operating under a class rate has every incentive to operate efficiently because it may retain any profits it earns in excess of the estimated return to be afforded by the uniform rate. It is also administratively desirable to preserve a comparative status between carriers because the Board has been light of the results achieved by others within the same class. The comparison technique of rate-making has proved to be the most satisfactory and practicable available to the Board. If we were required to fix rates for both domestic and international operations at the same time, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a suitable basis for a comparison technique of analysis. “In view of the foregoing, we find that the earnings from C&S’ domestic routes should not be used to offset the 'need’ resulting from the carrier’s international routes. This conclusion stems from considerations of economic policy; we are not deciding the question of our legal power to make such an offset.” 14 C. A. B., at 683.
On the Postmaster General’s petition for review the Court of Appeals reversed the Board. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 256, 207 F. 2d 207. The cases are here on certiorari, 346 U. S. 811, and were argued with Nos. 224 and 225, decided this day, ante, p. 67.
As we have already noted in the companion cases, § 406 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 998, 49 U. S. C. § 486 (a), directs the Board to fix “fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft.” Section 406 (b) provides that the Board in determining those rates
“shall take into consideration, among other factors, . . . the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development
able to analyze the operations of each carrier within a class in the p. 78of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense.”
The mandate is that the Board “shall take into consideration” what “the need” of the carrier is. The Act thus poses as the initial question for the Board whether the financial condition of the carrier is such that it needs a subsidy or has no need for one. The Board did not find that Delta had a “need” for an additional 3654,000. It merely concluded that those excess domestic profits should not “as a matter of economic policy” be taken into account in computing a subsidy for international operations. In that posture the decision of the Board seems not in conformity with the law.
The Board answers to the effect that under § 406 (b) it “may fix different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers, and different classes of service.” It may, therefore, fix a rate for international service. Since it may do that, it may, consistently with rate-making decisions (see, e. g., American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commission, 307 U. S. 486, 494), fix the rate at a level which will sustain the particular unit. Therefore the Board need do no more under § 406 (b) when it fixes a rate for international service than offset revenue attributable to the class of service for which the rate is made. That is the argument.
There are aspects of traditional rate-making that are carried over into the Act. Thus we held in T. W. A. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U. S. 601, that rates under the Act are made retroactive only to the date of the application. We also noted in that case that the “need” clause in § 406 (b) is not wholly at war with traditional rate-making functions. Id., p. 604. But the application of the “need” clause which the Board has made in this case is at war with the language of § 406 (b). The p. 79standard is “the need of each such air carrier.” The “need” of the carrier is measured by the entirety of its operations, not by the losses of one division or department. The measure of “the need” is an amount of compensation necessary to carry the mail and “together with all other revenue of the air carrier” adequate for maintenance and development. And the Act defines “air carrier” as “any citizen of the United States who undertakes ... to engage in air transportation . . . .” § 1 (2). Thus the wording of the Act precludes measuring “the need” of the carrier by any other unit than the carrier as an entity.
As we read the Act, Congress has established a special formula for the fixing of a subsidy rate. While the rate may be for a class of service, the return in form of a subsidy must be computed with reference to the entire operations of the carrier. The requirement is that the Board offset all of a carrier’s revenues in determining the subsidy; there is no discretion in the Board to disregard any portion of the revenue because of economic or other policy considerations. In other words, an air carrier’s subsidy need is an amount which, “together with all other revenue” of the carrier, will enable it to meet and maintain the objectives of the Act. The carrier’s “need” is therefore a limiting factor in the sense that the subsidy may not exceed it. Since the Board did not construe and apply the Act in that manner, the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the rate order.
The Board makes an extended argument of policy against that position in elaboration of the reasons it advanced for not offsetting the excess earnings from domestic operations against the international subsidy rate.2 It maintains that maximum operating efficiency on the part of air carriers and the development of air p. 80transportation—prominent objectives of the Act3—will be better served by setting subsidy rates on a divisional rather than on a system basis. This may be so. But that is a matter of policy for Congress to decide. As we read § 406 (b), Congress adopted in the present Act a rate formula based on “the need” of the carrier as measured by its entire operations, even when a rate was being fixed for a class of service.
2
See note 1, supra.
Affirmed.
3
Section 2 of the Act provides: “In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the [Board] shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity—“(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; “(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; “(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; “(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; “(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its development and safety; and “(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.”