Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953)
Full caption
POPE & TALBOT, INC. v. HAWN ET AL. CERTIORAIU TO THE Ur-;ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH& THIRD CIRCUIT.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 7, 1953
Syllabu•. 346 U.S.
POPE & TALBOT, INC. v. HAWN ET AL.
CERTIORAIU TO THE Ur-;ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR TH& THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 13. Argued October 12, 1953.-Decided December 7, 1953.
Plaintiff, a carpenter employed by an independent contractor, was injured while working on a ship hnthM on navigable waters in Pennsylvania. Basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, he brought a civil action for damages against the shipowner in a federal district court m Pennsylvania, alleging negligence and the ship's unseaworthiness. The shipowner pleaded contributory nrgli-gence as a defense and brought in the contractor a. a third-party defendant, alleging tbat the injury resulted from the eontractor's ncgligt'nC<' and claiming n--covery against the contractor by way of contribution or indemnity. A jury found that the ship was unsea-worthy, that both the shipowner and ,he con<ractor were negligent and that the plaintiff'i; own negligence had contributed to his damages. Held: PlaintitI1s judgment against the shipov.'ller is affinncd, and the shipowner is not entitled to a judgment against the contractor for contribution. Pp. 407-414.
1. Plaintiff's contributory negligence was not a. complete bar to his recovery. Pp. 408-41 I.
(a) In admiralty, contributory negligence may mitigate, but does not bar, recovery for personal injuries. Pp. 408--409.
(h) Since plaintiff was injured on navigable waters while working on a ship, the basis of his action is a maritime tort; and his rights are not determined by Pennsylvania l:iw. Pp. 409-411.
(c) Em R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, does not require a different result. Pp. 410-411.
2. Plaintiff's judgment against the shipowner should not be reduced by the amount of comJl('ns,ition payments plaintiff bas received from his empJoyer under the Longshoremen's nnd Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Pp. 411-412.
3. This Court declines to overrule or distinguish Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85. Pp. 412--413.
4. The plaintiff, not being a seaman, is not barred by The O,ceola, J89 t'. S. 158, from nw..intaining a negligence action agaifu-t the shipowner. Pp. 413-414.
40i
POPI•: & TALBOT, 1:-,c.t·, II \\Y~.
Opiwuo of 1h,, Coun
4flfj
1nbutton5 \j11 lw.;int·11l" barn,dfor bythf'*1/alcyonlupov.ntrl,nn apinst, . /la,""tht- ron•r:it1or .,h,p Crllinq for ron.t Rclitt1,ig l'urp ~'.!* t•:.?~ P 4(, 1g, F 2di;oo, affirm..,!
.\lark /J. Al•parh nrgurd the cnuse lor pPlitioner With " o he brief "as 1'Jwmaa f:. By,ne, Jr.
respond-
C'hnrlea Lakatos argued the c11usc fur Hawn, ent. With him on the hrirl was Samuel H. La11dy.
Thomaa F ..If0,111/ ari:ucd the caut>e fur Jlaenn :-lup ('ci\in11: & Rcfittin11 Corp., re•po111lcnt. With lun• on the brief was Jouph II'. Hrridu•on .
.l\111. Ju11ncEBr.ACK drlivcred the opinion of the Court.
Chorlrs Hawn su,tained severe physi-The re!<porulent
callllltch injuric, hole onwhen the petitioner Pope he ilippc<land fl.-11 & throui:hTnlhot's anve>sel. uncovered The ship ":1, tl,,·n berthed at a pier located in Pennsyl\'ania water~ of the Dclnwarc River. Lonwng of the \'es,el with l(l'ain for a voyage harl i-n temporarily interrupted to make minor repairs on the grain loa,linR this equipment equipment. to makellawn itwasl!J)readdoin11: the,:nuncarpentry work on evenly and thereby balance the ~hip's load to make the roming voyage !'&for. He was
not an employee of Pope & Talbot'sbut of the rP~pondcntwhich had Haenn ~hip Ceiling awl HefitlmR Company been hin•,l to mak!' tht•MC repairs, Hawn hroul!ht this dvil
orti,ages forin ahisl' nitedinjuries. ~tales His Distrirt romplaint Court charged to rero\'rr that dam- andhis injuriesrtorulted from the \'~l's unseaworthitll''5 Pope & from Po1,e & Talbot's negligen('(), In answering.
negli-
Talbot d<·nie<I both chnrge~ and 11et up contributory
·n a,, d•·fen.'IC ID e-a~h. In addition, Pope & Tai-
hotcausc.-<lpart) hroup:ht de Ilnwn'amd innt, alleging injury and !lawn's 1·mployerclaimingthat Haenn reco\'cry Ha1•nn 's neglrgenl'e o\'eras angain~t third hnd p. 408Haenn by way of contribution or indemnity. A jury found that the ship was unseaworthy, that Pope & Talbot had been negligent, that Haenn had been negligent and that Hawn's own negligence had contributed 17½% of his damages. On this basis, the court entered judgment for Hawn against Pope &Talbot for$29,700, 17½% less than the $36,000 at which the jury had fixed his damages. A judgment for contribution by Haenn t-0 Pope & Talbot was also entered. 99 F. Supp. 226, 100 F. Supp. 338. The Court of Appeals affirmed Hawn's judgment against Pope & Talbot. It reversed the judgment of contribution against Haenn. 198 F. 2d 800. This Court granted certiorari. 345 U. S. 990.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for contribution by Hacnn on the basis of our holding in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceili~ & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282. In that case we held that contribution could not be exacted under circumstances like those here involved. For that reason we affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the District Court's judgment against Haenn and proceed to a consideration of the several questions presented by Pope &Talbot as grounds for attack on Hawn's judgment.
First. Petitioner urges that the jury finding of contributory negligence should have been accepted as a complete bar to Hawn's recovery. The contention appears to rest on two separate bases: (a) Admiralty has not developed any definite rule as to the effect of contributory negligence, and therefore the common-law rule under which contributory negligence bars recovery should govern in admiralty, (b) Pennsylvania law controls this case and under that state's Jaw any contributory negligence of an injured person is an insuperable bar to his recovery.
(a) The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly barred an injured person p. 409from recovery is completely incompatible with modern admiralty policy and practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and now follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires.' Petitioner presents no persuasive arguments that admiralty should now adopt a discredited doctrine which automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to their injuries in any degree, however slight.
(b) Nor can we agree that Hawn's rights must be determined by the law of Pennsylvania, under which, it is said, any contributory negligence would bar all recovery in this personal injury action. True, Hawn was hurt inside Pennsylvania and ordinarily his rights would be determined by Pennsylvania law. But he was injured on navigable waters while working on a ship to enable it to complete its loading for safer transportation of it-s cargo by water. Consequently, the basis of Hawn's action is a maritime tort,' a type of action which the Constitut.ion has placed under national power to control in "its substantive as well as its procedural features ...." Pana.ma R. Co. v. JohnJJon, 264 U.S. 375, 386. And Hawn's complaint asserted no claim created by or arising out of Pennsylvania law. His right of recovery for unseaworthiness and negligence is rooted in federal maritime law. Even if Hawn were seeking to enforce a state created remedy for this right, federal maritime law would be controlling. While states may sometimes supplement
'E.g., The Ma:e Morrn, 137 u. s. I; The Ariz-011<1 v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 122, and case.s cited; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 428-429; Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752,755; and compare Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 244-245, with Belden v. Chase, 150 U. $. 674.
'Atlantic Transport Co. v. lmbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 61~.
HO ()('TOBER TEH\I, t!l!i:1.
<)p1 ion ol 1bt- C'ourt
federal maritrnie policies• a • t n not <lcprh'e a Jl{'r-son of a11y substuntinl a<lmimlty
nghtH us define,! in rontrollini.:
net, of Conl(Te • interpretath·e de-
11•• of thi, Court. Thr.oe principll'll
have b1•t•n frequcnt.ly 1l1·clarc<lnnd\IC aclherl' to them. :,;.,e e.g., <lnr-
Moort-.lfc('
( '), :u; r :-. 239 2~24fi.
11nd ca•es thnc rited C'11/d1m1/a
v. El'kal, 3:12 U. S. 15,;, doe~ not R11pport the rontl'ntion
that n Etntr. wl11ch undt'l'tAkl!!
to enforce federally created rnan lime rights rim <liluti• claims fashion,,!
hy fe,lnalpO\\Pr, whi,·1, is dominant
in this field.
Another argument
ts thot Pe11nsyl\'aula
law must govt•rn herr. becnusr. thr. District Court'• jurisdiction was rt,tl"I on di\'tr,ity
of otize11,hip
under 2'!U.1-i.C. § 1332.'
For this rontrntion the principle rstablishetl
in Erie R. Co. \', Tompkin.•,
304 ti. S. IW, is mvoketl.
That case
decided
that fcd<·ral district ilivrrsity courts must try
Btali, crente<I causes of ac•tion in ncconlance
"ith state lllWS. This Pndr<I a long••taurling fl'cl!'ral <'OIITt prlll'-
tire under "h1rh tlie 011tco111e
of )a\\sUlt8
to t•nforce state rreatt.-d cauS<'l! of action often <lepended
on ,.hether they
"ere trie<I in a stnte rourthou~c
or a frdcral courthouse.
Hri, R. <'o. v. TompkwR
\\Rs thus clt•,il(ne<I
to ensure thllt litigants
,.;th the same kind ofC:l<C "·ould have their right, 1111•11.'!ut·l'<.I
lty the Hatn<J ICl(HI stnndnr,J,
of li11bil-
•Stt , g. Ju,t, C/umcb,r,
Wcuh,ngto11,302 31~ I' 3S:I :~,7 -3'12, Ktllu v
thct111n•·1neor rompl:unt the I >i,trirtti.boon Court,dhtr!ltyTiu•httbcompl.\mtIII a:.t!.id<'llt to ,upport JUrU--
,wm re<t5 ~n a mant m,, lort •lurh undrr the l:on,t1tution is"1bjttt
1.0 1l11111i1111nt ro11rrol uf 1tu~ F~·dni.11 (~onmnu ut In lhts t-1tu:1t11 n
,re o..-d not dttidc •hethtt the llnlnc-t C'oun'1 )UTl'<IICIIOn
un he
re:..11.J on:!~ 1' R (' § 1:cu a~ nr1-1111r: "unclrr th•JConi.titut111n, 1,-,...,
or lttallM of the l"n,1£d :-:,.te." :;..., Dov,,u, ,. l'llltrnl 1'4 F 2d l.tj4 an<IJa,umm
v 81tt,,/u.h llmrnrm1 /,,,u, IS.S
Jord,n, \ lrol/cng, I~ F :?d 6(;:!
0111111011 ur th, Court.
ity. It appears to be contender! here, howevrr, that one i,,red on 11a,;gablc wattrs who sues in federal court under diver•ity jurisdiction somehow jeopardi1.es his right t, &H,, 1 a recovery as he otherwise \\ould. It is cer-
1irle" of
tainly ronknde<l that one who ,ues on the "law the do,·kct has much less chance to rrrovrr than one who sut'S on the "admiralty side " Thus we are uked to ca•r to bring about the same kind
use tlrn Kri1•-Tom11ki11a of unfairness 11rte,, ,e<l to end. Once again, the substantial right• of partie would depend on which courthouse, or eve:: o wl•1ch 1ne"of the same courthou~. a lawyer npgbt l(lless to be in the b(>;;t intere!!ls of his client. We dcclme to depart from the prinriple of e<1ual justice doctrine. orCOU™! the
emb,,Ji ir I< 1-. r"e-1'ompkin, substantial r111;ht, of nn injured person are not to be deternun, <l di, ~nt) whether hi• cas,, is labelled "law side" or "admiralty si,le" on a di•trict rourt's docket. Sea, Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 3:?h U S. 115, 88 so.• The Distri,·• Court d C 1rl of .\ J ·a <01Trttly refused to deny Hawn'• fl'tlcr11J riJ(ht of recovery hy applying the
l'"'lnsyh·ani co, trib 1tory negligence rule.
Srcond. Haenn ha• b,•en making comp<'n'!Alion payments to Hawn hccanse of obligations impo~ed by lhc l remcn's a1 1 H,1 ,r Workers' C"omJlf'nsalion.\cl. 44 Stat. 1424, 3:J l. S. C'. 901 rt ~rq. Hawn ha.~ a~rced re •nd lhP.Se pa,.. t o h1• em11loyer 0111 of hi, Pope
& Talbot recov~ry. Pope & TallJot contPnds that the Judgment Rj!ain~t it should he rc<luce,I by this amount.
•0( 1 Mimr"h:tt 1m1l.1r ronlrntmn ~l~btrh1-• Court100;,41\l"ntd tha, U edid §fl."-'• not
nitar,Jttruin•-orJ.;inthtiJont.S.-\tt
rulesa.t mt":lnm(ir he ,,11"8rh.11on thertw-b•·1[1("3ffi,tnIJdt- 0£nu, thr cour1,h,1\f' ch"hut nott~rn•hr1r be, ofruerhf"on "''"tbe&ilrmr.;1h) 1,!.-...:,, 1rh a 111,tm, taou\H)11lcl llf!;;o unrr. 1-.on!lblc th;st ,;e Drt' 110-. dlin:: to n.ttr l,utf" to C'oni:f'e# n p.arpo:ir to m.,kr it'' J>anama R. Co., Johruort, 264 t' J;,i, :Nt.
____ ,______
Opinion or thl' Court. ~46 l'. s.
It points out that Hawn's verdict includes sums for past loss of wages and medical expenses which it is argued were the very items on account of which Hawn's employer paid him. Consequently Pope & Talbot says that if Hawn keeps the money he will have a double recovery and that to allow him to repay Haenn would give an unconscionable reward to an employer whose negligence contributed t-0 the injury. A weakness in this ingenious argument is that § 33 of the Act has specific provisions to permit an employer to recoup his compensation payments out of any recovery from a third person negligently causing such injuries. Pope & Talbot's contention if accepted would frustrate this purpose to protect employers who are subjected to absolute liability by the Act. Moreover, reduction of Pope & Talbot's liability at the expense of Haenn would be the substantial equivalent of contribution which we declined to require in the Halcyon case.
Third. We are asked to reverse this judgment by overruling our holding in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85. Sieracki, an employee of an independent stevedoring company, was injured on a ship while working as a stevedore loading the cargo. We held that he could recover from the shipowner because of unseaworthiness of the ship or its appliances. We decided this over strong protest that such a holding would be an un warranted extension of the doctrine of seaworthiness to workers other t,han seamen. That identical argument is repeated here. ,Ye reject it again and adhere to Sieracki. We are asked, however, to distinguish this case from our holding !,here. It is pointed out that Sieracki was a "stevedore." Hawn was not. And Hawn was not loading the vessel. On these grounds we are asked to deny Hawn the protection we held the law gave Sieracki. These slight differences in fact cannot fairly justify the distinction urged as between the two cases. Sierack.i's p. 413legal protection was not based on the name "stevedore" but on the type of work he did and its relationship to the ship and to the historic doctrine of seaworthiness. The ship on which Hawn was hurt was being loaded when the grain loading equipment developed a slight defect. Hawn was put to work on it so that the loading could go on at once. There he was hurt. His need for protection from unseaworthiness was neither more nor less than that of the stevedores then working with him on the ship or of seamen who had been or were about to go on a voyage. All were subjected to the same danger. All were entitled to like treatment under law.
Fourth. A concurring opinion here raises a question concerning the right of Hawn to recover for negligence-a question neither presented nor urged by Pope & Talbot. It argues that the Sieracki case, by sustaining the right of persons like Hawn to sue for unseaworthiness, placed them in the category of "seamen" who cannot, under The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, maintain a negligence action against the shipowner. The Osceola held that a crew member employed by the ship could not recover from his employer for negligence of the master or the crew member's "fellow servants." Recoveries of crew members were limited to actions for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. But Hawn was not a crew member. He was not employed by t,he ship. The ship's crew were not his fellow servants. Having no contract of employment with the shipowner, he was not entitled to maintenance and cure. The fact that Sieracki upheld the right of workers like Hawn to recover for unseaworthiness does not justify an argument that the Court thereby blotted out their long-recognized right to recover in admiralty for negligence.'
• Illustrative of the unbroken line of federal cases holding that per$Ons working on ships for independent contractors or persons rightfully transacting business on ships can rr.~wcr for <Lsmages due
Xr11her the hold1nir; nor what "as said m :-iieraclri could •upport ~ud1 a rontrntion.
In fact, the dissent in
Sura<~·, appears to ha,t' he<'n prt'dicated
on an obiecuon to adding unsea,.orthin«·-•
to the existin11 ri11ht to re<'Ovcr for negh!{encc.
It would be strange mderd to hold now that a deci 10n "h1ch o,cr the th -rot rC'COgnizcd
un caworthinrss
111 an adtht,onal right of J><'rsons injured on
•h1pboard had un"1tt1 1dy deprl\ed them of all right to maintain actions for
nrp;ligrncc.
\IR. Ju~Tlo: FRANKFt:RTER, concurring.
We are told that Hawn'• "ri11ht of recovery for unsraworthint•,, and nPp;hir;Pncc
is rooted in fcd"al maritime law \c rase or •tudrnt of11dmiraltyi• cited in •uppo.-t oi tl11s •t tcment.
In lW:3 thi• Court in Th, O&ccola, 1'<9 {T, S. 1~. reoogni,e,t for the first time the rip.ht of crew mcmbprs to recover for the uosea"orthy condition of their ship and dcnit~I a ril(ht of rcrovery agamst the shipowner for negli,:rnce. :\"ot until l!l'.!O, and lhen by ,\ct of C.onl?reSS, 46 l'. :-. ('. § nss, w1•re "t•amrn givt•n tlw altrrnat1ves of
suing for neghgentt
or unsca,.orthmt~,
:-et' Pac,. -.;
C'o.,. Pft,rio11, 278 P.:-. 130. 138. As for 101111:shoremcn, they could sue their o"n rmployer for n ii._ 'I' not provulinit safr rondition~ of work. ,\11(1 m Hl26 tl11, Court extmdcd to them the add1t1onal benc·1t, ' Jones Art by ronstr uing "seaman" to iJl!'lud!' u lon11•hor('-
lo Fh11lOunrN-' n{1:l t:ttncr :trt Uatlia, , Blt,iing, H)!; l R 0'..?f\ (Ii>,_), T~.I/cu,\forru, 137 l " I (1890) Gtmlf • TA, B t Kalt /'ano 2 F 241 ( lkSO); 7h, /Idiot, 12 F 732 (lhS2), clec1>111n by Judtt Addison Dnnrn; GnfJI 1/orbar Sl~d rt ('o v Folllllal 5 F. 2d 3&'> ( lfl2b); Tufe Wottr Auocinttd O,I Co. \' R,r1,ardAo1', 169 •• '.!<l W- (111,1, , Brodi • H-•'tll $. S Co 317 I' :- ~71, 5i7 ( 1943) al.., rives ,ollec1c,I in 11 A 1,. R. llT2~ lffi~.
FRANK.Fl HTEK, J,. r:oocurnng
Slet•rrlori11u Co. v. Ha1•ert11, 272
man folrr1111/io1111I t'. ::-. 50. Congn•,,, preferring R different mode of rrlH' for longshoremen thnn for seamen, di,placcd th<•ar
right,m to,:-auonSlit' thrir act employer for apphcablr solt'ly nrgligt·ncc to longshoremrn, by a workmen's 33 l'. S1 C'. 001 ,t ,rq. Likl\ othl'r business invitees such a11d freight consignres, long•honmen could a,al50pn~engcrs sue the ,hiprn1 n.-r for uegligence. Then on .\pril 2'2, 1046. this Court in Sc11~ .Shipping Co. \", Siuack;,
32S t'. ::,. ._;. ior the first t,111,· extended to longshoremen
the right to rerover for un~aworthi11e-• from the owner
of the ship. Thedceasion was based on the fact that long-
1 -.-.,men'• \\Ork and that thrrefore
•hor ·1 f>I .,,,. they Rhoulrl be ent,tlr<I to a ,rnmt'n's remedy. l'ntil today C'our h.c, ne,-er held that longi.horemen have the alternative rittht• of action for ne1?li~en~ or unseagave to crew memhers.
Th'wortl11neossummary"hich hi,torythe Jones Act hardly sho"s such deep roots of the alternative rights of recovery that this Court should
,, ) d ·1de that "Uch right! exist.
I woulcl affirm the Judgml'nt of the Court of.\ppenls, hecausc the ~pnrnte finding that the ~hip wn• un~cawv•th}' support• rero\'ery.' Thi,, of roul'!'e, a«umes Hawn wos tht• kind of workt>r who we hclcl in Sieracki c,u rl rero,·cr for unscaworthtnfS<.
The right of sl'nmcn to rrco\'cr for unreaworthine<s i~ peculiarly a rnu•e of "ndrnirnlty nncl maritime iuri~dictior• " 1 ~tat. 73, 77. The ril.:ht i• in the nature of liahility without fault for which contributory negli1tl'nre i~ not it may be refo,·ant in a -e~,ang ab tor rovcry. 11lthn11gh
Sen~ Shipping Co. v. Siernrki, aupr11, r:rie the clama{l!e•.
1
No oh tttion " . >Pd t an,· Jl()1nt m this n....q,, to th(' tri:tl by JUI),t·ntith.•1lBOtod~:i. jurrqw•:rtion in a tuiti~ notLa.se,l lw-forr on bo1b us •hethtrruaritune thflanJ plaintiffrom1nonrlaw \145' c:,_,. ol action,
FR.~~KtTHTEK, J., concurnng. 346 U.S.
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, is irrelevant in that unseaworthiness is a federally created right, so state law on a state cause of action is not an issue. We should not commingle federal admiralty and state common-law and should not engraft onto the federally created right to recover for unseaworthiness a common-law defense foreign to that right.
If negligence were the only count in the complaint and the jury found it, or if the jury had found the ship seaworthy but sustained the negligence claim, different considerations would come in to play not now before us. The opinion below indicates that the application of Pennsylvania law would have completely barred recovery, since the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Therefore, to recover solely on the basis of Pope and Talbot's negligence, Hawn would have to rely on a federal maritime cause of action for negligence to which contributory negligence is not a bar. Whether such a cause of action would be available in this case is a difficult question which should not be decided here, since its disposition is unnecessary in view of the separate finding of unseaworthiness.
Both before and after this Court's decision in The Osceola, recognizing the right of crew members to recover for unseaworthiness, longshoremen recovered for negligence-often described as "negligence of the ship"-as did other business invitees. Compare Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626, with The Max Morris, 137 U. S. l. Although these were cases where the elements of unseaworthiness were probably present, courts rarely used that term. The plaintiff's default in such cases did not bar recovery altogether, however, but rather served to reduce the damages to be awarded.
In Sieracki, this Court assimilated longshoremen to seamen and held that they could recover for unseaworthiness. That decision inevitably raises doubts whether longshoremen are still entitled to recover against a shipowner for p. 417l:\C'. v. H.\WN.<Iii
POl'E & T.\LBO'I,
FRASKfl KTDI• .r.. ronr-urnn,:.
ncgligentt, exttpt insofar as a ilate right of action for nei(lige1H'e. to whirh thr •tale rule on rontnhutory neglig, ,r ,wuld be applicable, is enforceahle.Cf. T/11 Ha111-ilto11:.!il7 l' !'-. :ms. For The Oact·olo, in reroi(niiine:
uns<•11worthi111·,~. also
en mt>mbcrs' ri11:ht of action for held that th1·y had no uch right again•t the shipowner
1 Did /:,11racki, in holding that long~horefor 11cgligcnt'1•. mrn lahoring like -ear n of olrl in the "sen-ice of the ship'' wt're entitled to r1•rovrr for unsrnworthincss, le1we tli, a1 " I lhr e,:li,.ence cause of action which The Oscrola dm1r!I to seam1•n?'
01 t 01 I, nd, it may Le urg,~ lhal Sieracki broadenrcl tlw 1·ightsof ~hort" workt'rs; it p:ave them a •t'aman's ,ta ,, ,out depmin11: them of the r1ght of action they had before thry nttainl"tl that stntus. On the other, it may be 11ri:~I ,,ith e<inal rt'ason thnt n long~horemnn should not be ablr to "play it both way~": be entitlPd, that i,, to a ~eaman's rt•mNly for un~nworthincs. and abo enjoy reco,·c11· from the shipowner for neclii:ence which. prior to thr Joni's.\ct, was denied to a •l'aman. He would thus have &\'ailable two 11011-Matutory rPmrdieto rrcov('r damnp;I'• for his injuri!'s, whill' till' crew mem-
• Ahho11gh tin. holdrn~ \\UN ha~•«IIIIp.1rt on lhf;' "•llo\\...,rY:tnt n1le,
11betbtrth,,
it ...,.DI fortb,r ' ,ttd that while11 """doubtful rruL.'1t'r or thr• hipv..1;l frllow l'lrn·ant, the- rrew n11•mb:•r eoo.JJ not no-n1,t•r Kain t the o•·nu for the m.utu•, Df!l:lirr-nte Tlt.t OlttOla",
holdm;:thl",,; ., h1pcmn4'rCo,&.h.n 3:?In~Iigrnc:r CILu1 Sh~•1•n 96, ttandn•:,,ffirnuiw:In<,r CAdC1tluava1l:1.blt>by th~vnisLurl:C1tbach nCourtnu~inorUahnithnrllonS . .$. Co, a,t:11n~t ,. 247So u. s.37'2.
11Jicll ,..... ..-hol )11ll<'Onttrntd
!ornxhr• The.'i:na,:l,umQa-orth to rt'<'ovrr-. for nl'glui;t•nN•Tlwn- IS nolor thf'th, •hipcmnrrnmo1...1 mtim.U,on,m,l al"o holtlIn n• him her
th~to lhemaJonl) q•J<>tionor 1'ru-thrr1ht" mmorityth, at•udon' opmion .,,..that lonny""'° thought 1btoe,,...,w:ti ruthU,Jt1Hn nhf1tm;:h 1 111tmht-r of the uew wn.; tit nirtl lllf'm prior tu tht> Jtmes Art anJ lh• Jon<'>I \rt 1lo<s not •r11ly to lont homnm
FRANKPl'RTER, J., concurring. 3461:. s.
bcr, the true "ward of admiralty," has only one. And the fact that Congress in the Jones Act has given crew members a statutory cause of action for negligence hardly justifies this Court's according longshoremen alternative remedies, any more than we should now define the crew members' rights as including compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' C'ompeusation Act.
Since unseaworthiness affords longshoremen recovery without fault and has be<'n broadly construed by the courts, e. g., Mahnich v. So. S. S. Co., note 2, supra, it wilJ be rare that the circumstances of an injury will constitute negligence but not unseaworthiness. F.ven if such a case should arise, the longshoreman, were he barred from suing the shipowner for negligence, has available the statutory remedy against his employer which Congress has given him in the Longshoremen's and Harbor '\Yorkers' Compensation Act.
But the practical importance of the question is no measure of its difficulty. Tt raises subtle issues of such judicial lawmaking as is the main source of maritime law. We ought not to embarrass future answers to such a question by premature pronouncements, especially without the benefit of mature submissions by counsel.
Since the Erie problem is not here, it is also irrelevant to decide what remedy a state court could give or decline to give. We should not even imply that if suit had been brought in a state court and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held that its law prevented a contributorily negligent plaintiff from recovering in Pennsylvania courts, we would overrule that judgment and require the state courts to provide a remedy.
Of course, when state courts purport to enforce federally created rights, they must apply the contents of those rights as determined by this Court. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 2:w. But whether it is federal Jaw that a state court is enforcing or the state fails
IX(' t•. HA\\X.
POPE & TALBOT
40h
to affor<l n rl'mt•1ly in its court• is too complir11ted n qucs-
n ,e passed upon "hen not before u,. The ans"er dt•pend, mnrh too much 011 wl111t the st11te court decides. L g., Caldarola,·. Eckert, 332 C :5. 155.
with who111'.\IR. Jn,nn: Ru:o
'.\IR. Ji;~ IICE .JACK~o.-;, arnl '.\IR. J1•;;-r1ct B ros join, disse111,11g.
to a dispog.sionnte considt>ratlon
It may h1• ro11ducive of 1hc la" of ,i, ·a.selO remind our5elw, thlll the plnintilI helow u11qur,tionably was ro\'rred by tht• Long~l,oremen"s and Harhor Workers' C'ompen~ation.-\ct. ~obody quc,tion., his right to all that other injurt'd h11rbur workers usually rl'reive for hke injury or to what t~ l'l, I ~oul,l receive for the ,ame injune, if suffered under shl(htly diffen•nt circumstances. Whnt is in is.,ue h, .. u, reco,·cl")" o,·er and abo,·e thP sta111tory for hu cstnbli,hed
!'('Ole of compcn~ation that Congress 11.Jllr -d harhor worktrs in general, which this plaintiff claims only herl\use of •perial circumstance, •aid to create II liability byII thin! party, o barcboat rhartcrer we "ill refef' to a., the ~hipowner.
This decision seem~ to me to so confuse maritime la"· v. t :ommon and statutol")' tort la"· as lo destroy the integrity of the forml'r u• a •rparutc •y•tcm ba•tsl 011 the 1 J ,antic• and ri•ks of sea11:oin11: labor.
<J ( z ,s111P "'D PE:-.,.,slL\A'.\IA
1. Dt\EIISITl
8-rATE LAw.
Tiu, c11,c wus instituted on the low ,i<le of fe,lcral 1lis-alleging that "jurislr1ct court, tit, o •laint ~()C(:1fically diction is based on di\'er~1ty of citizenship" and pleiuling the other re<i atl' ,f that juris<l1ction. ,\fter amendment. the t'omplaint alleged hoth ordi11ary rommon-low negligenco and lark of l!l'a" orthmes,; against the ~hipowncr..\8 I •hall presently point out, the allt"gations of ncghgc111-e ('\)111<1 not ha.n• been an invO(·ation of the
JACKSON, J., dissenting. 346 U.S.
Federal Jones Act, which affords to seamen a federal remedy for negligence. It appears to have b<!en an invocation of the negligence Jaw of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in the territorial waters of which the injury was sustained. This may have been permissible because § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77, gave the District Courts of the United States "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... ; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it ...." Under this reservation it would appear that there is considerable room for application of state law, although I do not undertake to guess how much. Cf. Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155.
This being the form of action, the plaintiff had a jury trial. The court's instructions scrambled common-law negligence doctrines wit,h admiralty principles of indemnity for unseaworthiness.
But, as a diversity action based on the tort Jaw of Pennsylvania, plaintiff's case must fail because the jury, in answer to special interrogatories, reported that the plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence which contributed 17%% to his injuries. Under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 'C'. S. 64, the Jaw of the state of injury would apply to the case and, under Pennsylvania law, contributory negligence defeats recovery. Therefore, some other basis must be found to sustain the verdict.
2. ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE.
The failure of maritime law to afford a remedy for negligence, The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, was overcome by the Federal Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688 et seq., which provides an action for negligence with jury trial. But this plaintiff's difficulties, under this Act. were so formidable that his counsel makes no claim that the recovery can rest upon it. ~otwithstanding this, case after case p. 421406 JACKSON, J., dis-::.cnting.
which was decided under the Jones Act is cited by the Court today, which implies that the Court relies on the Jones Act to help out in some way toward supporting the recovery here. But that Act gives a right of action only against the employer, and this plaintiff was not employed by the shipowner. Moreover, the Jones Act gives its right of aetion only to seamen, and this claimant is not a seaman.
It is clear that Congress provided the compensation remedy, not the Jones Act remedy, for such a case as this. In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, this Court attempted to allow recovery by a longshoreman against his employer under the Jones Act. Immediately Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which made exclusive, as against the employer, the compensation remedy it conferred on longshoremen and harbor workers. So the Jones Act is not available to support a recovery against this plaintiff's employer because of provisions of the compensation Act, nor against the shipowner because the Jones Act makes no one liable who is not an employer. Therefore, as a tort action this case cannot be sustained under the Federal Act.
If plaintiff was invoking Pennsylvania negligence law-the ordinary law of the busine..ss invitee-he cannot recover because he was contributorily negligent. The only possible basis for recovery is a maritime tort. The question is a tricky and difficult one. resurrecting old cases which involved many aspects of maritime law no longer in force. In any event, the charge below so scrambled two theories of recovery that the jury could not possibly have had a fair understanding of the Jaw of the case. The jury was instructed on the one hand that negligence was not necessary to recovery because of the unseaworthiness theory and on the other that negligence itself was a basis for recovery. The least petitioner was ent.itled
JAC'Kr-;or-., J., dissenting. 346 U.S.
to was a submission which would eliminate the confusing doctrine of liability without fault not applicable to the case.
3. INl>BMNITY FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS.
Along with the claim of common-law negligence there was submitted to the jury in this case, as an alternative basis of liability, the claim that the ship was unseaworthy. It is true that a seaman has a right to indemnity or compensatory damages where he can show injury from unseaworthiness of the ship.
As was explained in The Osceola, supra, at 171, this was adopted into our maritime law from British legislation, wherein "in every contract of service, express or implied, bctwt.-en an owner of a ship and the master or any seaman thereof, there is an obligation implied that all reasonable means shall be used to insure the seaworthiness of the ship before and during the voyage." This obligation was adopted into American admiralty law as a warranty of seaworthiness, of which the owner is not relieved by exercise of due diligence and which rests on wholly different principles from those of negligence. Mahnich v. SouthPrn S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 100. But this case was begun. tried, submitted and decided as a negligence action, while it is sustained here on an admiralty doctrine of liability for breach of warranty which does not at all depend upon negligence.
The principal reliance of the Court is on Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, :128 U. S. 85. That decision advanced a novel holding that the traditional warranty of seaworthiness extended not only to seamen but also to longshoremen. This was a virtual repetition of the Court's earlier effort in the Inter-national Stevedoring Co. case, supra, to give seamen's remedies to longshoremen, an effort which was promptly rebuffed by Congress when it enacted the Longshorcmcn's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act p. 423to preserve the tradit.ional distinction. But a much greater departure than that which Congress rejected must be taken here if the warranty of seaworthiness is to be further expanded to sustain this recovery. There may be some logic in saying that when a longshoremen or steve-· dore is brought aboard to load a ship, the ship should be fit for sailing. But it seems to me that the extension of this implied warranty to a repair crew which works for an independent contractor is unjustified. The Court can cite no authority for such a holding, and I think there is no logic in it.
This claimant was a carpenter in the employ of a ship repairing company. That company had a contract to make certain repairs aboard this ship and the claimant was sent aboard by his employer, under whose direction he worked. It does not seem to me that one who hires a contracting firm to put his ship in seaworthy condition guarantees that it is in seaworthy condition before the work starts. If everything were shipshape, he would not need the services of the repairmen.
I think that the expansion of the warranty of seaworthiness from a seaman to a repairman is illogical, contrary to any decisional law and not consistent with the scheme of Congress to maintain a sharp distinction between the seafaring man and the harbor worker.
From ancient times admiralty has given to seamen rights which the common Jaw did not give to landsmen, because the conditions of sea service were different from conditions of any other service, even harbor service. The seaman on board a merchant ship ties his fate to that of the ship and joins its separate community for the voyage. 'C'nder earlier conditions seagoing labor was extremely hard. Voyages were long, tedious and treacherous. Shipwreck, stranding, capture by pirates, fire, and other eventualities threatened. Scurvy was common, and the ships were little prepared to combat disease. Discipline p. 424424 OCTOBER TEH:'-1, 1953.
JACKsos, .J., dissenting. 3~6 l'.S.
was harsh and cruel, and savage punishments were inflicted. Poor food, cramped quarters, long hours and complete subjection t-0 the will of the master was the rule. While his lot has been ameliorated, even under modern conditions the seagoing laborer suffers an entirely different discipline and risk than docs t,hc harbor worker. His fate is still tied to that of the ship. His freedom is restricted. He is under an unusual discipline and is dependent for his food, medicine, care and welfare upon the supplies of the ship. Contrast the lot of this plaintiff who lived at home, was free to leave his employment, took no risks of the sea and had no different condition or hazard attached to his employment than would have attached t-0 a carpentry job in a building ashore.
That the sharp differentiation Congress made in the rights of seamen as contrasted with harbor workers has a basis in differences in risk and working conditions will be apparent from a study of 46 U. S. C., c. 18, which governs merchant seamen. I point out some of the most obvious respects in which this claimant's position as a land-based laborer, free to bargain, strike or quit, and subject to no extraordinary ha1.ards, differed from that of most seamen (there are certain exceptions) who arc employed as a part of the ship's crew.
The Government superintends the engagement and discharge of seamen and apprentices and the terms and execution of their contract, and provides for their presence on board at the proper time. §§ 545,561,565. A master and the vessel are subject to penalties for taking on a seaman as one of the crew except by virtue of an agreement under such supervision. §§ 567-568, 575. But the penalties are not all on the master and the vessel. Every contract must provide the day and hour when the seaman shall render himself on board the ship. If the seaman shall neglect to be on board at the time mentioned without giving twenty-four hours' notice of his inability, he may p. 4254()6 JACKSON, J., dl&~nting
forfeit for every hour which he shall so neglect to render himself one-half of one day's pay. If he wholly neglects to appear or deserts, he shall forfeit all of his wages and emoluments. § 576. Unlike the land laborer, the seaman may forfeit his wages if he has not "exerted himself to the utmost to save the vessel, cargo, and stores ...." § 592. The seaman may not be paid any wages in advance of the time he has earned the same, and his assignment or allotment to dependents of his wages is restricted. § 599. The seaman is deprived of credit, for no sum exceeding one dollar shall be recoverable from him by any one person for any debt contracted during his service. § 602.
It is so important to the seaman that the ship be seaworthy that a majority of the crew may complain that the vessel is unseaworthy or unfit in crew, body, tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions or stores to proceed on an intended voyage and thereupon require an inquiry and a determination, and, if the charge is not sustained and the seamen refuse to proceed, they shall forfeit any wages due them. §§ 653, 655. So dependent are they that the Government provides inspection of the crew quarters, which must comply with standards, §§ 660-1, 660a, and the seamen may complain as to the provisions or water and obtain an examination. § 662.
!\fore importantly, the seaman is not a free man. He may not, as the longshoreman or harbor worker may, protect himself by striking or quitting the job. Desertion, refusing without reasonable cause to join his vessel, absence without leave at any time within twenty-four hours of the vessel's sailing from any port, or absence from his vessel and from his duty at any time without leave and without sufficient reason, or quitting the vessel without leave after arrival at port and before she is in security, are all punishable by certain forfeitures of his wages. Moreover, at the option of the master, willful
126 OC'TOBEH
TEIC\l. l!J,j3,
d1sobed1ence
to any la"ful command
at va is pun·•hnble by bring plarNl m irons until surh disobedience shall cc~e. aml for continued "illful d:sobcdicnce
10 such commaud or ne1tlcct of duty the ~N1mnn may be plnrecl in irons anti four days out of lh·e on bre.ad an
ul
such disobedience
shall ccu,e. To the!-C pennltles nre adclr.d cerlam other forfeitures.
§illl Tl,1 re,
hut this i~ enough to demonstrate
that Congress knew and
respected the diliercnc-e bet.. een the l!CSman to whom it preserved admiralty remNlies plus thr rrmerlies of the Jone, \et and harbor workers, Auch as thi, cla1man1, "ho are t:i\'Cll the remeclirs of the romprn~n11on.\ct, like 1110-1 other !bore "orker-;.
I cnnuol brin1t myself lo hclil'\'C that 1t is either the con1.cre!Sional
"ill or the tra,lition of maritime l:iw or rommon sen•<' to miuirlr the two wholly scpnratc types of labor in their rcmcd1e- as i, Leinii: doll" , tla case. There are other questions in th<• cas~ as to di\'i"1on of the da111Ag,,s which I need not di-cuss. i ie o my ronrh1,ion that there i~ no hn.~i~ for n•1-overy. I would re\'ersc the JU!~men I iK'lo".
\\'ILl~O1•.:,,\\ \i\.
\\ ILKO t·. ~\\',.\). >:T Al,., DOING 111·s1m.,s All HAYDEX,
STO:'.\F & C'O.. 1:T AL.
Cl RTlllRARI TOFOIiTIIETIii:l'SITE:I>,..r,cusoI\TATl:S CIRCl'.ICOi.RT r. OF APP£ALII
In an a,1.,n brou&ht L) a -'omrr a:a n•t a ~nt..,, broku.age finn to r,'COn:r cl.tr11nge,i1 under th.- twtl l1.1b1litu-a pro\·U110M or § 12 (2l of tht' ~11nt1N A<t of 1933, for allncP<I llli•n,p,-,ita• uon jn 1he&le of K'f1mtres, latld that an :.gm ment for arb1trat1on of .wy t·11ntro\·1•f'!<,• on•m«1n rh<• futur,IJf:•IWN>n ll.e portiiegWM the proH!IODS of th• l:mted u v r II, nota,tlistond1lll! Stat<'~ Arlutr;,tmn Ac·t P,, .J'Js l;J.1;,
"ttllH"flt lo arbilrJ.te faiu~ con1rv,t1111e-'": was , 01d
to ..,.~,-f' romp1.untt•• 1r1th a "pro\'LCJOn"" of the Act
Pp l,>--1,l,;.
(b) Tht' ricbt of an &an<'\'"' 1•r,,o11 un.Jtr iz.? (a) to orlttl tltf" Jud1t"1.il £onim1 a pnwn,,on" of 1h~ ~unhee Act dmt Mn-not b,, ".11.-,J 11nurr § It th•·l't'OI Pp. Hl-1:1..~
(c) At theprottttl\l'! pn>H90n~ or 1hn ~lntlt-3 Arirt'C'JUlrt
thr C'~Prrl""'-' or jmJici.d dirN"tion to £aarly a.&iure tb••1r tff«ti,·rnffiS, C ,.,. 1 "" b...-~ 1n1~ § If to •pply io*1'31\'tr of 1ud1<1>l trl'tl ,ind tl'VH'W. P. *4:Ji.
311 t 2d rn-.nod.
Petitioner ,uoore, r,onde, ts to r"t'Ovl'r damagl'!! undl'r motion to stay tht• :--erurittcs Act of 103:3. Rl'~pondents' the "tion JIUl"luant t § 3 of tht l"n tro State-,. Arbitration Art, wn.s <lrn,r<I by thl' Distrirt Court. 107 F. 81111p. '"· Tht ('. ,,,rt o.\p1 a r-·l"'t 201 F 2<1 439 This Court grantrd certiorari. 3·15 tr S. 969. Rcueraed, p. 43-..
Rirh •d H II r arg ed h cauSI' for petitioner. With him on the brief was llrnry E. Milla.
By ~I ·cu1l le&\'C of Court, Trilliom H. Timber, argued the cau~ for the Securities and Exchange Commi••ion, p. 428as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stem, Roger S. Foster and Alexander Cohen.
Horace G. Hitchcock argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Ralph D. Ray and Francis E. Koch.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action by petitioner,* a customer, against respondents, partners in a securities brokerage firm, was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, to recover damages under § 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933.' The complaint alleged that on or about January 17, 1951, through the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, petitioner was induced by Hayden, Stone and Company to purchase
*The Securities and Exchange Commi~ion participated as amicus curiae throughout this ea.S<J and has shared pNitioncr's burden in presenting the c:IBe to the Court.
• 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. § 12 (2), 48 Stat. 84, 15 li. S. C. § 771 (2), pro,•ide,;; "Any person wh<>- , , ..
11(2) sells n security (whether or not excmptOO by the provisions of section 77e of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section 77c), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by me:ins of a prospc.-etus or oral communication, whieh includes an untrue statement of a. material fact or omits to state a material fact nece..ary in order to make the statements, in the light of the cireumstanees under which they were m:ide, not m.L$leading (the purchaser not knowing of sueh untruth or omission), and who shall not sust,iin the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, or $UCb untruth or omission, shnll be liable to the per.son purchasing such security from him1 who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of comprtcnt jurisdiction, to reeover the consi<leration paid foi- such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
1,600 shares of the common stock of Air Associates, Incorporated, by false representations that pursuant to a merger contract with the Borg Warner Corporation, Air Associates' stock would be valued at $6.00 per share over the then current market price, and that financial interests were buying up the stock for the speculative profit. It was alleged that he was not told that Haven B. Page (also named as a defendant but not involved in this review'), a director of, and counsel for, Air Associates was then selling his own Air Associates' stock, including some or all that petitioner purchased. Two weeks after the purchase, petitioner disposed of the stock at a loss. Claiming that the loss was due to the firm's misrepresentations and omission of information concerning Mr. Page, he sought damages.
Without answering the complaint, the respondent moved to stay the trial of the action pursuant to § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act• until an arbitration in accordance with t.he terms of identical margin agreements was had. An affidavit accompanied the motion stating that the parties' relationship was controlled by the terms of the agreements and that while the firm was willing to arbitrate petitioner had failed to seek or proceed with any arbitration of the controversy.
Finding that the margin agrecmcn ts provide that arbitration should be the met.hod of settling all future
2
See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F. 2d 439, 445. '9 U.S. C. (Supp. V, I9o2) § I t! s,q. § 3 provides: "H any ~uit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue rcfC>rablc to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in :ruch s:.uit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of t.he agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proce(.)(hng with b1.1ch arbitration."
OC TOBEH TER:11, Hl53
<>t ruon of tht- Court
contro\'ersies
th•• District Court h,·hl that th~ agreernPnt to arbitrate deprin~I pl·titio11cr
of the ntlvantag,·ous court remedy afforded
by the :-ccurille,;
\ct, and dellil,I the stt1y.• .\ d1\'id,,I Court of,\ppeuls roncluded that thr. .\rt d1,I not proh1b1t
the agr~rnent
to refer future controver
ies to arbitration,
and re\'er<:('11 •
The que,tion is whl'lhrr au a11:n·cnwut
future rontro,·el"II)' lo arhitratl' a
1s a "condition, ,t1pula11on
or provi•ion b111di11g auy 1J<'No1111cq11iri11g
any security to waivr romplioure
with any pron,ion''
of the ::,,,cunttes .\ct which § 14• d~lare• "'"oid." We granted c,•rtiorari
:145 l'. :-l. 9119. to rl'\'ie" thi, important
11nd 110,·cl federal question affcctmg both the :,ccuriue-
.\ct an I tlw l"111tNI
:-tale• .\rlntrntion.-\ct. Cf. Fro,t & Co.,. ('o..ur D'.\/r11e.l/i11ea Corp., :H:2 l'. :--. :lh, 40.
.\s the mari:in ai:reement
in the light of the complaint evide11red
II trnni<!lctiou
in interstate commcrcr.
no issue arise,11 tu the npplicab1hty
of the pro\'Nons
of the l'nite<I :-tatf'• .\rbitration
Art to this •uit, ha,rd upon the ~ceuritie~
Co.,. .\fcGough
Hro, If"., :?d 2i6,
F.278, 2d"ith"-;>-1,Agoatini:--ee :=-tur~c- /Jros. Hldg. an,1.:ll11q1hy. Corp.,·. l'11iled Statc·s, 142
:-,.,rr ( mfu•ing
:\!alters Helatin1t to \rbitratiu11, 17 Law & C'ontrmp. l'rob.580.
In re-ponse to a Presidenti.,I
m<>"ll~ urgin~ 11 c
be arl<led to thf' all(•ient rull' ofrnt"flll n11plor the furthl•r doctrme of "IN the !<('!ltr al!!O lwwarP,"' Coni;r•"'· pa,.
• lt',lko \."'i1m11, l07 r ;"\IJ)JI. i5.
• ll'i/ko, S1CO•'.!Ill F ~.J'39
• ts ~,at M, ll> r.:,; C I 77n § 14 prond..
·An) rondition, supul.:,11011,
or pro,IB>Ol'I bind ng any p,non a<•
quinna sny Ft'Cun1y lo w.11\P romph:snc-r.
\\Ith:my proH•J()n of th1:-'i
11>1b<h11f)ltr or ol rht rules and ~L.1100.,
oft~ Comm1911()o wuU
be \'Old."
r H R ll•p. Xo. ,,;, 73'1 Cone, M ~- 2
\\ I LKO t•. ,\\'.\~
Opt n of •hP Coun
the '-l'Cuntie;; .\~t or 193:1. I>c!!igned to protect im·e•- ton1,' the \rt requin·s issuers, u11dcrwriten1, and deniers to make full and fair disc-lo,ure of the character ofM'- cunt1es ~"1,I in m ter•tnte nnd foreign conunerrr. and to preH•nt frnud 111 thmr 53lc.• To efftttu111e this pohcy,
12 (2) creawd a special rill:ht to rt•cov1•r fo1· mim•presc11tation which differs substantially from the oom-mon-lo.w action in that the s1•1lcr 1, m1ule to nssume the burden of pro\lnl? lnck of SQl'nter•• The Act's in 1111y <·ourt or compet1•nt
special ri1d1t i~ cnforccnblt• jurisdiction-fedrral or state-and remo,·a! from a state rourt is prohib11l·d. If suit be brought inn reder11l court, the purchASE"r has a "Ide choice of ,·enue. the prnilege of nation-wicll' srrv1ce of proces~ and the jurisdirtionnl
3 ()(I() req"'t t din r;,jty CL-.:Sis inapplicable."
Act cstnbli,hes by stnt-
The l"111ted :--tntes.\rbitrntion ute the <le I, ty ..,-b11 ationa;an altcmati,e to the complicat1ons or liti11:11t1on. Tlw reports of both IIouRes on that ..\c<I th need for a,·01dmg the delay and ex-
nncl practice untl,•r its terms raises p~nst• of li1ip;ation,"
• :-i. Uf1,. 'io. 4i, 7;Jd ( 'un$C • l"'t rit , J~•f• OUahoma*4 TtLtJ.t*
Tnut, S E. (' IOU f.:?<I ,, , I
"-4:'\ M t i.J, Prr:unlJlr, "":-,,•at.;-;, 15 t. S C' § iitl.~'C fro.t
,<: <'o \" ('ntttr D'.11,nr \fin,, l'orp 312 l' !" .:i, ro
..., ,upro l Die! rt'!po It)1 to 1mohf' mt'f'f'IJ
pnp<'r hub1ht,· 1t '" n<'<'e ,ry to rhrow •~ h11rd1·11 of d1 pmv111.:rt••
~,.. bl• att I om"""m r comm,- on 1hooc
Vwho r 1rr-,,Jrt toilfflut atntrnwntN for thr publtr'a n-lmn<'c. . . To 11upoo, a 1....., ,....pon,,,b,hl) •wld nu! Ii t!M- purix- ol th 1tg,,._
Lu11 §:.?'.?n f.t),II R..ts H,1,~ht ;,.,., ~.ftll73dom1r11l•Co11,:,I t t ~t-t IHO.J0'.21,lS P S C §;;,.(a) = Dulm.- In ,pnulrnu,/,arc, Corp, 311 l' :- 2,,_, 2hU. Ex, tin~ n•m<'clira at lnw nnd N111ityurt f<'t unrd. §lf11 4~ :,;, ,t
I~ t: s C 1,,p.
12 H H Rrp :-;o. ~)fi, fiMh Con,t, J...r St M, 1-.?, Rt'p !\o. 5.'36,
~,,h Co~, l I Sc a :-l<T 1/onnt 1',.,..,1 <'orp, [),eyf.,, u " :!63 p. 432hope for its usefulness both in controversies based on statutes" or on standards otherwise created." This hospitable attitude of legislatures and courts toward arbitration, however, does not solve our question as to the validity of petitioner's stipulation by the margin agreements, set out below, to submit to arbitration controversies that might arise from the transactions.''
Petitioner argues that § 14, note 6, supra, shows that the purpose of Congress was to assure that sellers could not maneuver buyers into a position that might weaken their ability to recover under the Securities Act. He contends that arbitration lacks the certainty of a suit at Jaw under the Act to enforce his rights. He reasons that the arbitration paragraph of the margin agreement is a stipulation that waives "compliance with" the pro-
'' Ago,tini Bro,. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 f'. 2d 854; Watkins v. Hudson Cool Co., 151 F. 2d 311; Donahue,,. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3; Donahue v. Suaquehanrta Collieries Co., 160 F. 2d 661; Evans,•. Hud,on Cool Co., 165 F. 2d 970.
"Marine Tran,it Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263; Kentucky River Mills v. Jock.wn, 206 F. 2d 111; Campbell v. American Fabrics Co., 168 F. 2d 959; Columl>ian Fuel Corp. v. United Fuel Gas Co, 72 F. Supp. 843, affinned, 165 F. 2d 746; Matter of Springs Cotton Mills (Buster Boy Suit Co.), 275 App. Div. 196, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 295, affirmed, 300 N. Y. 586, 89 N. E. 2d 877; White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 Ill. 578, 77 N. E. 327; Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co., 83 Ore. 528, 163 P. 600; Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards, pp. 502, 793-798.
1
$0 Any controversy arising between us under this eont.ract shall be determined by arbitration pur.11ant to the Arbitration Law of the State or New York, and under the rul.. of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, or of the American Arbitration Association, or of the Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Exchange or such other Exchange as may have jurisdiction over the matter in dispute, as I may elect. Any arbitration hereunder shall be before at least three arbitrators."
OJ1ruon of tht- Coun
vison of '1e "' -.nt1e,, .\ct, •et out n the margm ronfemn~ junsdictton of suito and spe<•tal powers."
R• "'' I, nt ,serts that arbarauon is merely a form of trinl to be u•1•<l in lieu or a tnal at law," 11nd thererore o fl e:, b-..e, th ~urities .\ct and the
Act t'1ther in their lan~uagfl or
l'mtrd !'it11tes \rbitrntion
, 001 e, a 1 ·r ~s the ena ment 1-.ACh may function within its 01< n scope. tht' former to prot<•ct .n ors d la t.:> npl ly n. ·e" loraetionaLle violut1onR of lnw by issuers or t!Palers in srcurities.
R1011 kut10et. it 1th the Court of .\pp(.'als that the mnrgin agreement 11rbitrntion para11rnph, note 15, •up do, n r,•lie, tl •eller from either liability or burd1•11 of proof, note t, supra, impo•cd by the !-rcurities \c• \\f agr, tht in l!O far asthe award in arbitra-
•• "'al 66 u amnidNI, '-tat 1921, IS l ' C I;;,, (a). § 22 (11) pnnule,,:
'The dist net rounaof tht- l"1111NI"' te, . •lull h,,eJ riswtuon . toutm~n1." th Sta•t•n.nd T ..rr110r1itrourt , or1111 u1h1in~u11y
an,l artion~ at l:rn broua:ht to tnforct h bilitv or duty cr<'8tNl b) t oubtbopt,r.-\n) a,,b nut or a,tionRU) bt broti;ht 111 tlw, 1lit"tr1rt "ht>n•in lhr dtfend.1nt ,s fouml or 1Jo1 irn inhabit:1nt or tran 1rt~ bu-.. or n the ·ri<t.-bt-tt tho lo tooL pix<, f tbr ct.fm<bnt Jiar11r1pnt<'\I1hrrtin1 andJtl"OC'eM m ,urh t'fi"<'" may t,... ttrvrd1n any othtr tlli!1nt"l or wh1th I~ ,.h•r{'~l,,nt1' au anh.tbtta11l or \\ht-J't\tr t~ driNKb.nt ma) be fount Ju~mmts and 1f('('n'f"S M> n-n,ltr,'11 h:,11 IM" 1.:uhJ1•,·t to rrvll'\\' a~ pru\·uli'tl m t:-ttk1n [121ri t'l31 anJ I12:>I of Titlo - ~oc:,.,earu1111 undor tlus ,ubrh,pt,rand brou~ht m ,In\'~, tlf' rourl of romfll'Crnl Jllfh•clwtinn ,-h:,11 he:ff'TTIO\eJ to an),curt of tho l"n tNI S1at"1 not• II, ,vp,o
.\lurMy Oil /'wrfoet, r·o \ .\l,t"m 1l f'o, 14h :.M 3'-il~3:"I.J;
Ami rieon /..«omoht•, ro , Clumical. Rtuarclr ro,p 1;1 F !?tl I IS, 120
111"l\1r,11trnph 3 oftlll' mur,c:in n(lr.-t·mt•nt pron,le, 111,t all u:m ..
a<IJoo,; II o tho pn>H!JOm of tho -..ntlN Extha= Art of HJ.JI ,mil prt>•tnt ,mil fuum· artH 11m4"11d:itor) thtrl'lo ll5 l " C \ § •, J ' It <0nta11,. no np,.,.. mfflllOn of the,
Opinion of the Court. 346 l'.S.
tion may be affected by legal rPquirements, statutes or common law, rather than by considerations of fairness, the provisions of thf' Securities Act control." This is true even though this proposed agreement has no requirement that the arbitrators follow the law. This agreement of the parties as to the effect of the Securities Act includes also acceptance of the invalidity of the paragraph of the margin agreement that relieves the respondent sellers of liability for all "representation or advice by you or your employees or agents regarding the purchase or sale by me of any property ...."
The words of§ 14, note 6, supra, void any "stipulation" waiving compliance with any "provision" of the Securities Act. This arrangement to arbitrate is a "stipulation,"
Securities Act of 1933. If reference to the 1934 Art were construed as excluding the 1933 Act, it mi~ht be argued that the ag~ment did not provide for arbitration of a controversy as to the liability of Haydeu, Stone & Co. under seetion 12 (2) of the 1933 Aet. llut we do not think the princip)e of exprtssio Ut1itt8 est e.xclusio alteriw is here applicable. It may well be that the phrn:ie 'prr~nt * * * acts • • • supplemental' to the 19~4 Art should be construed to include the 1933 Act. In any event the snle trnn:,nction would nf'Cf'S-sarily he subject to th,% Act. Therefore the amicus doe, not regard it as material whether or not the agreemt>nt purport:-l to make thnt .stat-ute applicable. We agree, and ,hall proceed lo a con<idcrntion of the qu~tion decided below, nameJy, whether the 1933 Act evidences a public policy which forbids refrrring the controversy to arbitration." 201 F. 2d, at 443.
The paragraph of the agreement referred to by the Court of Appeals as "3" reads as follows:
"All transactions made by you or your agrnts for me are to be subject to the eon.::;titutions, rules, cu~tOml:i and practices of the ex-changel:i or markets where executed and of their respective tlfl'~ring houses and sha11 be subjert to the provi.-.ion~ of the Securities Ex-chan~e Act of 1934 and pre,ent and future acts amendatory thereof or supplement:tl thereto, and to the rules and regulations of the Fcdccal Securities and Exchange Comrn,ssion and of the Federal lle,erve Uoard msofar as they may be applicable.
1
~ 5<'<' Sturg<'s, CommC'rei:ll Arbitr:1t1on)'( rrnd Award~, p. 500.
\\ ILKo t·. -.\L\~.
Opunoo t~ Court
llllc.l "e thmk the right to 6<'1ect the judirial forum L• the kind of '"pro,·ision·· thnt <·annot he waived ttnder § 1-1 of the '-<'Cur11les \ct. That oonclu,ion is reached for the rea~ons sN out aboH• 111 the stnten1cnt of J)f·titionrr's coot~ntion on th[s revie\\. Whtie a buyt'r and l!E'ller of ,ccuntie,, undn sonu· circumstnnces, may deal nt arm"s lcn,i:th on l'QU&l term, it is dt"ar that the !--eeuriti!'S .\ct was drnftt d "1th nn eyt• to the rlisad\'llntngcs under wh1rh buyers labor. I uers of am.I c.lt'nlers in ~ecurities hn\"e betu·r opportunities to investi,tnte and appraiq, tlie pro•pccti\"I• Parnine:s and business plans 11ffec11nl\ s1·cun11es th.m buyers. It 1s thPrPfore reasonable for ('onl!rl'l! to put buyers of !Ct'urities oo,ere<l hy that \ct on a rhffcrcnt b11,1s from othrr purchn,l'rs.
of the
\\'hrn tl,e <eeurity buyer, prior to any,;olation :-ecunues.\ct. \\t1ivcs his right to su<•111 courtb. he i:1vrs
up more than "oulrl a participant inother bu•incss trans-
actions. The security buyer hos n wider choice of courts
He thus surrenders one of th<' ac.l\·ant.ag!'
and,·cnue the .\ct givl's him anti surrl'nders it nt a time whrn hr is 11'" 11ble to jud~ the weiitht of the handicap the i-ecun-ties,\ct plnres upon his 1uhersnry.
F,,tn thoul!h the pro\·t-1on, of the ~uritic, Act, ad,·anta~eou, to the buyer, apply. their effectiveness in application is le sene<l in arbitration as oomparl'd to judidal proct-echn~•· Determination of the quality or n comrnodil\·" or the amount of money due under a oontract 1s not the ty1>e of is-ue here involved." This cnse requires •ubjet-ti,·P findings on the 11urpo--c and lrnoY.lec.lge
a, rnmi r·J,. l'G£1/cc l/JU,; Y S !M 16, rr-,ffl("tJ. 275
\pp D1, 4 - '> Y .., 2d3-1,
11 R11mu, v 1/udtton Coal Cu., Hl5 F 2J 070; V,mahu, ,. $u.,qut-,._ a C IGO F .d 661 IIau, 11.t1- Coal ro. l~l
l'ollinin f'o., 13'-+ F. '2d 3;
,tgo,t1mF. 2d 311, /lro, l>mmlmt Bldg r• ,.rp,S11.1q1uhm,mi I ltd,14ln II~ F id,,4, .4nw""'1 .4/moad Prod Co., . lonw/1 fottrl l'wm ;:, I o., IH F 2d Ho.
Opinion of the Coort. 346 i:. s.
of an alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material fact," see note I, supra, cannot be examined. Power to vacate an award is limit€d." While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would "constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,"" that failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error
"9 t:. S. C. (Snpp. V, 1952) § JO:
"In either of the following c:lses the l'nite<I States court in and for the district whcrf'in the award was made may make an order vacating the aware.I upon the application or any 1>:Hty to the arbitration-
" (a) Where the award was prorure<I by cornipl1on, fraud, or undue means.
"(b) Where there wa~ evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of thrm.
"(<') \\'here tht nrbitrator:- were- guilty of mi~nduct. in refu.sing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to h('sr f'vide-nee- penlne-nt :rnd mate-rial to the controvf'r~y; or or any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
"(dj \\"here the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, fiMl, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
"(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in HS <li,t,,('retion, dirN't ::i rC'hf'aring by the- arbitrators."
42i O1>inion of the Court.
in interpretation." The l'nited States Arbitration Act contains no provision for judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in the English law." As the protective provisions of t.hc Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended § 14, note 6, supra, to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review."
This accords with B011d v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 338 U. S. 263." We there held invalid a stipulation restricting an employee's choice of venue in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Section 6 of that Act permitted suit in any one of several localities and § 5 forbade a common carrier's exempting itself from any liability under the Act." Section 5 had been adopted to avoid contracts waiving employers' liability." It is
"BurcheU v. Mar,h, Ii How. 344, 349; United States v. Farragut, 22 Wall. 406, 413, 419-421 (note thr right of ~view); Kleine v. Catara. H Fed. Cas. i32, No. 7,869; 1'exGJt & P.R. Co. v. St.. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 158 F. 2d 251, 256; The Hartbridge, 62 F. 2d 72, 73. In Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Am,. v. United Cas. Co., 142 F. 2d 390, 393, the problem was dealt 1Vi1h on thr hasi• of the Mass.,chusetts law. See Sturges, note 19, $upra; Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the :\'lerits, 63 Harv. L. Re,•. 681,685, Award Based on Erroneous Rule; Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, XXXI V Chicago Bar Rec. 205.
"Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. \'I, c. 27, § 21, 29 Halsbury's Statutes of England (2d ed.) p. 106.
"'Cf. notes 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1326; 53 Col. L. Rev. 735; 41 Georgetown L.J. 565; 62YaleL.J.985.
"See al.o, Kre11ger v. Pennsylvania R . Co., 174 F. 2d 556; Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 168 F. 2d 812.
,. § 5 of the Federal Emplo~·ers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 66, 45 U.S. C. § 55, provides: "Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or mtent of which $hall bC" to rnahlc any common earner to exempt it~elf from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void "
"See H. n. Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 6. Compare 8. & 0. S. fl. Co. v. Voigt, li6 U.S. 498.
oc-rOHER
!'EH\(. J!l,33.
h( K os, .I I t"Onturnn::
14 l
to be not('<I that111\\on!, It forbade l'll<'mpt on only from "I J1bility.'' \\"c said the riitht to f!l'IPrl the "forum" <'V<'n after the cn•at1011 of n bal>1l1ty 1s11 '•ubstanllsl
nght • and that till' agrcem<'11I
rcstrid 1111: that <'hoice \\Ould thwart th<' PXprl'S~ purpo•<1 of ti" statute. \Ye 11ecd not and do not go so far in this prr.sent case By the tt•rm• of till' 11,m:<·ment
to nrhitrntP J>l'!ltiuner is rcstriet<'d 1n his choict" of forum prior
to the exi tence of a contro-
,·er-,y. \\'h1le th1• :--eruntiPs Art dor, not require (l<'llt oner to sue • a,. a1H'r in a,haneeofa rontrO\ ersy stand• upon a d11Termt footi11ir;."
T"o policies not easily rt'COnMbble
are 1mohed m this ra•<•, Co11gress hns afTonh·cl participnnts
in transactions s11b1ttt toits l<'gislatne po\\er an
Ly gcnerallv
to s<·curc prompt, eeo110111ical
anrl nrlcqunt.e
wlut on ofcontroven,ie,
through arbitration I es are "illing to ncc<•pt Je,s certni11ty of li•gally <'om•<·l urlju,tnient.'
On thr other hand 11 has enacted the :-ecur,tw, .\ct to protect the riRhts of ill\·estors und hu~ forhulden a \181\'er of811)' of thos<' r11(ht-. Recognmng the a,hnutagcs that prior ai:n·<•uwnts for arbitration may provide for the solution of comm, rc1al contro,·er·,.1!'•, \\C decide that th,· intrntion of C'onl{Te«• roncer11in11:
the ••le
of 8"r11nt1cs 1, bett1•r carried out by holtl,nl( 111,·alu.l such an agreement for arbitration of i55 1c, ari•mg unclPr UtP. .-\ct.
R, 1e11cd.
:\IH. Ji s1H·1 JAcKsos, conrurr111~.
I ai,-t w I• the Court's opin on11 '°for a,; 11 ron,tru.., tlw :-r•ruriti,·• Art to prohihit wnivcr of a iudic·ial remr,ly I faH of arbitration by &1IT<'<'ment
marfe before
any contro,·er•y
aro•e I think thereafter the par1i,•• coultl air;r,'C upon nrbitrauon,
Hu ..e,er, I fin,I 11 unnec-
• t f <al " , P,n Jin, R <o - l 6'!5 631 II Jlrooklvn,\1 ,ig, /lm,l \ O'.\,i}. ;~21 t· :,:. (197,707, ;14, • <f II ko, S,ran :!01 F iJ, al** m p. 439427 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting.
cssary in this case, where there has not been and could not be any arbitration, to decide that the Arbitration Act precludes any judicial remedy for the arbitrators' error of interpretation of a relevant statute.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom '.\>fR. JUSTICE MINTON joins, dissenting.
If arbitration inherently precluded full protection of the rights § 12 (2) of the Securities Act affords to a purchaser of securities, or if there were no effective means of ensuring judicial review of the legal basis of the arbitration, then, of course, an agreement to settle the controversy by arbitration wou Id be barred by § 14, the an ti-waiver provision, of that Act.
There is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitrnl system as practiced in the City of New York, and as enforceable under the supervisory authority of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.*
The impelling considerations that led to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act are the advantages of providing a speedier, more economical and more effec-
*Under the rul~ or the American Arbitration Association, avail .. able to the plaintiff under hi• contract, the procedure !or selection of arbitrators i,, as follows:
The Association submits a list of potential arbitrators qualified by experience to ad1udicace the particular controversy. In the City of New York, the list would be drawn from a panel of 4,400 persons, 1~75 of whom are la,vyers. Each party may strike off the names of any unacee1nable persons and number the remaining in order of preference. The A&!ociation then de,;ignates the arbitrators on the basis of the preferences expressed by both parties. See "Questions and Answers," Pamphlet of Amcrie..'ln Arbitration A...~iation. In short, those who are charged to enforce the rights are selected by the parties themselves from among those qualified to decide.
27Mal O- &4- -33
F'RAKKFt"RTER, .J., dis.:i.enting. 346 u. s.
tive enforcement of rights by way of arbitration than can be had by the tortuous course of litigation, especially in the City of New York. These advantages should not be assumed to be denied in controversies like that before us arising under the Securities Act, in the absence of any showing that settlement by arbitration would jeopardize the rights of the plaintiff.
Arbitrators may not disregard the law. Specifically they are, as Chief Judge Swan pointed out, "bound to decide in accordance with the provisions of section 12 (2)." On this we are all agreed. It is suggested, however, that there is no effective way of assuring obedience by the arbitrators to the governing law. But since their failure to observe this law "would ... constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," 201 F. 2d 439, 445, appropriate means for judicial scrutiny must be implied, in the form of some record or opinion, however informal, whereby such compliance will appear, or want of it will upset the award.
We have not before us a case in which the record shows that the plaintiff in opening an account had no choice but to accept the arbitration stipulation, thereby making the stipulation an unconscionable and unenforceable provision in a business transaction. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae, does not contend that the stipulation which the Court of Appeals respectL'<I, under the appropriate safeguards defined by it, was a coercive practice by financial houses against customers incapable of self-protection. It is one thing to make out a case of overreaching as between parties bargaining not at arm's length. It is quite a different thing to find in the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act a general limitation on the Federal Arbitration Act.
On the state of the record before us, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.