Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943)

318 U.S. 724
63 S. Ct. 930
87 L. Ed. 1107
1942 SCDB 97
1943 U.S. LEXIS 1285
US-DOC-27828899
locator
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943)
Full caption
AGUILAR v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 19, 1943
AGUILAR v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY.*
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 454. Argued March 2, 3, 1943.—Decided April 19, 1943.
1. A shipowner’s liability for maintenance and cure extends to a seaman who, departing on or returning from shore leave (though without any duty to perform for the ship while on leave), is injured while proceeding, without misconduct, across a dock or other property which was the only available route between the vessel and the public streets. P. 736. 2. Liability in such case does not depend upon whether the shipowner was negligent. P. 736. No. 454, 130 F. 2d 154, reversed. No. 582,130 F. 2d 797, affirmed.
Certiorari, 317 U. S. 621, 622, to review, in No. 582, the reversal of a judgment dismissing the complaint, and, in No. 454, the affirmance of a judgment dismissing the complaint, in suits by seamen for maintenance and cure.
Mr. George J. Engelman for petitioner in No. 454; and Mr. Joseph W. Henderson, with whom Mr. George M. Brodhead, Jr. was on the brief, for petitioner in No. 582.
Mr. Walter X. Connor, with whom Mr. Vernon S. Jones was on the brief, for respondent in No. 454; and Mr. Abraham E. Freedman, with whom Messrs. Paul M. Goldstein and Charles Lakatos were on the brief, for respondent in No. 582.
*
Together with No. 582, Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Jones, on writ of certiorari, 317 U. S. 621, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by these cases is whether a shipowner is liable for wages and maintenance and cure to a seaman who, having left his vessel on authorized shore leave, is injured while traversing the only available route between the moored ship and a public street. The injury in No. 582 occurred while the seaman was departing for his leave. That in No. 454 occurred while he was returning.
The complaint in No. 582 discloses that the plaintiff, respondent here, was a messman on the Steamship Beauregard, owned by defendant. On January 16, 1941, the vessel, which apparently was engaged in the coastwise trade between New Orleans and East Coast and Gulf ports, was moored to Pier C, Port Richmond, Philadelphia. At about 6 p. m. plaintiff left the ship on shore leave. As he was proceeding through the pier toward the street, all the lights were extinguished. In the ensuing darkness, he fell into an open ditch at a railroad siding. This caused injuries which required treatment and prevented him from resuming his usual duties. This action followed, for maintenance and cure and wages. On defendant’s motion, the District Court dismissed the complaint. The ground assigned was that, at the time of his injury, plaintiff was not ashore on the ship’s business. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded (130 F. 2d 797), holding that, on the facts stated in the complaint, defendant was liable for maintenance and cure and wages.
The stipulation of facts in No. 454 discloses that on April 18,1938, the defendant’s vessel, the Steamship E. M. Clark, was lying docked at the premises of the Mexican Petroleum Company, in Carteret, New Jersey, which defendant neither owned, operated, nor controlled. Petitioner, a member of the crew, obtained permission from [p. 726] the master and went ashore on his own personal business. In order to reach the vessel on returning from shore leave, he had to pass through the premises of the Mexican Petroleum Company. After he had gone through the entrance gate and while he was walking on the roadway of those premises about a half mile from the ship, he was struck and injured by a motor vehicle which was neither owned, operated, nor controlled by the defendant. Petitioner brought this action to recover $10,000, the expense of his maintenance and cure for the injuries so incurred. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and on appeal the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 130 F. 2d 154. Both courts acted on the ground that in going ashore on personal business the plaintiff left the service of the ship and therefore no liability for maintenance and cure attached.
The cases were brought here to resolve the conflict thus presented on an important question of maritime law.
All admit the shipowner is liable if the injury occurs while the seaman is “in the service of the ship,” and the issue is cast in these ambiguous terms, the parties giving different meanings to the ancient phrase.
The claimants say it includes the whole period of service covered by the seaman’s articles; and, if he is injured during this time, the right is made out, unless it is shown by way of defense he has forfeited it by misconduct causing the injury. Since the injuries here took place during the period and there was admittedly no misconduct, it is said the claims are established. Corollaries of this view are that recovery is not conditioned on showing the injury was received while the seaman was at work or doing some errand for the employer, and that going ashore with leave, or returning from it, is part of being “in the service of the ship,” whether or not it was to perform such an errand.
The shipowners regard the phrase more narrowly. In their view, it requires the seaman to be injured, if ashore, [p. 727] while he is “on duty” or at work, doing some task connected with the vessel’s business. Going ashore simply for diversion and relief from its routine and discipline, or for any matter personal to the seaman, takes him out of the service of the ship; and the departure is made the moment he steps off deck and onto the dock or pier, perhaps as he descends the gangplank or ladder. Cf. The President Coolidge, 23 F. Supp. 575 (D. C.). Likewise, return is not made until he is on board again. Cf. Lilly n. United States Lines Co., 42 F. Supp. 214 (D. C.). In this view, it is of no moment whether the injury results from the seaman’s fault or misconduct or from causes entirely beyond his control.
It will aid in determining the scope of the liability to consider its origin and nature.
From the earliest times, maritime nations have recognized that unique hazards, emphasized by unusual tenure and control, attend the work of seamen. The physical risks created by natural elements, and the limitations of human adaptability to work at sea, enlarge the narrower and more strictly occupational hazards of sailing and operating vessels. And the restrictions which accompany living aboard ship for long periods at a time combine with the constant shuttling between unfamiliar ports to deprive the seaman of the comforts and opportunities for leisure, essential for living and working,1 that accompany most land occupations. Furthermore, the seaman’s unusual subjection to authority adds the weight of what would be involuntary servitude for others to these extraordinary hazards and limitations of ship life.
Accordingly, with the combined object of encouraging marine commerce and assuring the well-being of seamen, maritime nations uniformly have imposed broad responsibilities for their health and safety upon the owners of [p. 728] ships.2* In this country these notions were reflected early, and have since been expanded, in legislation designed to secure the comfort and health of seamen aboard ship,8 [p. 729] hospitalization at home*4 and care abroad.56 The statutes are uniform in evincing solicitude that the seaman shall have at hand the barest essentials for existence. They do this in two ways. One is by recognizing the shipowner’s duty to supply them, the other by providing for care at public expense. The former do not create the duty. That existed long before the statutes were adopted. They merely recognize the preexisting obligation and put specific legal sanctions, generally criminal, behind it. Compare Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason 541, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6047 (C. C.); The George, 1 Sumn. 151, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5329 (C. C.); The Forest, 1 Ware 429, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4936 (D. C.). The provisions for public assistance were not intended to relieve the shipowner of his duty. On the contrary, their purpose was to make sure the seaman would have care, if the employer should fail to give it and in the rarer cases to which his obligation does not extend. The legislation therefore gives no ground for making inferences adverse to the seaman or restrictive of his rights. Cf. Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumn. 195, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,641 (C. C.). Rather it furnishes the strongest basis for regarding them broadly, when an issue concerning their scope arises, and particularly when it relates to the general character of relief the legislation was intended to secure.
1
Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 447. 513236—43—vol. 318------50
2
As Mr. Justice Story, then on circuit, observed in Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason 541, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6047 (C. C.), at 483, “Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour. They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. If some provision be not made for them in sickness at the expense of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from the want of suitable nourishment. ... If these expenses are a charge upon the ship, the interest of the owner will be immediately connected with that of the seamen. The master will watch over their health with vigilance and fidelity. He will take the best methods, as well to prevent diseases, as to ensure a speedy recovery from them. He will never be tempted to abandon the sick to their forlorn fate; but his duty, combining with the interest of his owner, will lead him to succor their distress, and shed a cheering kindness over the anxious hours of suffering and despondency. Beyond this, is the great public policy of preserving this important class of citizens for the commercial service and maritime defence of the nation. Every act of legislation which secures their healths, increases their comforts, and administers to their infirmities, binds them more strongly to their country; and the parental law, which relieves them in sickness by fastening their interests to the ship, is as wise in policy, as it is just in obligation. Even the merchant himself derives an ultimate benefit from what may seem at first an onerous charge. It encourages seamen to engage in perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at lower wages. It diminishes the temptation to plunderage upon the approach of sickness; and urges the seamen to encounter hazards in the ship’s service, from which they might otherwise be disposed to withdraw.” 8 E. g., Act of July 20, 1790, c. 29, § 8, 1 Stat. 134; Act of June 7, 1872, c. 322, § 41,17 Stat. 270; 46 U. S. C. §§ 666, 667, requiring that ships carry a minimum supply of medicines and antiscorbutics. Act of July 20, 1790, c. 29, §9, 1 Stat. 135; Act of June 7, 1872, c. 322, § 36,17 Stat. 269; Act of Dec. 21,1898, c. 28, § 12, 30 Stat. 758; R. S. 4565; 46 U. S. C. §§ 661, 662, requiring that ships carry sufficient and adequate stores and water for the crew. See also 17 Stat. 277, 46 U. S. C. § 713. Act of June 7, 1872, c. 322, § 42, 17 Stat. 270, Dec. 21, 1898, c. 28, § 15, 30 Stat. 759; 46 U. S. C. §§ 669, 670, providing that certain basic clothes and heating facilities be furnished by the shipowner; 46 U. S. C. §§672-672 (c), 673, prescribing qualifications and quotas for crews, and watch divisions. 4 Act of July 16, 1798, c. 77, 1 Stat. 605; Act of March 2, 1799, c. 36, 1 Stat. 729; 2 Stat. 192; R. S. 4808-13; 24 U. S. C. §§ 1, 6, 8, 11,193. 6 Act of Feb. 28,1803, c. 9, § 4, 2 Stat. 204; 2 Stat. 651; R. S. 4577; 46 U. S. C. § 678, requiring consuls in the case of sick and destitute seamen abroad to provide for their subsistence and return passage to the United States.
Among the most pervasive incidents of the responsibility anciently imposed upon a shipowner for the health and security of sailors was liability for the maintenance and cure of seamen becoming ill or injured during the period of their service.678 In the United States this obligation has been recognized consistently as an implied provision in contract’s of marine employment.7 Created thus with the contract of employment, the liability, unlike that for indemnity or that later created by the Jones Act,8 in no sense is predicated on the fault or negligence of the shipowner. Whether by traditional standards he is or is not responsible for the injury or sickness, he is liable for the expense of curing it as an incident of the marine employer-em-ployee relationship.9 So broad is the shipowner’s obliga-
6 See, e. g., Laws of Oleron, Articles VI, VII; Laws of Wisbuy, Articles XVIII, XIX; Laws of the Hanse Towns, Articles XXXIX, XLV; Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, of Marine Contracts, Title Fourth, Articles XI, XII, compiled in 30 Fed. Cas. 1171-1216; cf. Harden v. Gordon, supra.
The Laws of Oleron are typical of the provision for injuries: “If any of the mariners hired by the master of any vessel, go out of the ship without his leave, and get themselves drunk, and thereby there happens contempt to their master, debates, or fighting and quarrelling among themselves, whereby some happen to be wounded: in this case the master shall not be obliged to get them cured, or in any thing to provide for them, but may turn them and their accomplices out of the ship; . . . but if by the master’s orders and commands any of the ship’s company be in the service of the ship, and thereby happen to be wounded or otherwise hurt, in that case they shall be cured and provided for at the costs and charges of the said ship.” Article VI.
7 Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason 541, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6047 (C. C.); The Atlantic, Abb. Adm. 451, 2 Fed. Cas. 620 (D. C.); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U. S. 367, 371.
9 The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390 (D. C.); The A. Heaton, 43 F. 592 (C. C.); The Wensleydale, 41 F. 829 (D. C.); Sorenson v. Alaska [p. 731] tion, that negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct on the seaman’s part will not relieve him of the responsibility. Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 F. 645 (D. C.); see also The J. F. Card, 43 F. 92 (D. C.); The Ben Flint, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 126, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1299 (D. C.). Conceptions of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption of risk have no place in the liability or defense against it. Only some wilful misbehavior or deliberate act of indiscretion suffices to deprive the seaman of his protection. The Ben Flint, supra. The traditional instances are venereal disease*1011and injuries received as a result of intoxication,11 though on occasion the latter has been qualified in recognition of a classic predisposition of sailors ashore.12 Other recent cases, however, disclose a tendency to expand these traditional exceptions.13
Consistently with the basic premises of the liability, it was early suggested that the risks which it covered were not only those arising in the actual performance of the seaman’s duties. Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumn. 195, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,641 (C. C.); Ringgold v. Crocker, Abb. Adm. 344, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,843 (D. C.). Unlike men employed in service on land, the seaman, when he finishes his day’s work, is neither relieved of obligations to his em-
5. S. Co., 247 F. 294 (C. C. A.); Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 F. 645 (D. C.); cf. Seely v. City of New York, 24 F. 2d 412 (C. C. A.); cf. Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumn. 195, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,641 (C. C.).
10 Pierce v. Paiton, Gilp. 435,19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,145 (D. C.); The Alector, 263 F. 1007 (D. C.); Chandler v. The Annie Buckman, 21 Betts 112, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2591a (D. C.); Zambrano v. Moore-Mc-Cormack Lines, 131 F. 2d 537 (C. C. A.); Wytheville, 1936 A. M. C. 1281 (D. C.)
12 The Quaker City, 1 F. Supp. 840 (D. C.). 18 Cf. text and note 15 infra.
ployer nor wholly free to dispose of his leisure as he sees fit. Of necessity, during the voyage he must eat, drink, lodge and divert himself within the confines of the ship. In short, during the period of his tenure the vessel is not merely his place of employment; it is the framework of his existence. For that reason, among others, his employer’s responsibility for maintenance and cure extends beyond injuries sustained because of, or while engaged in, activities required by his employment. In this respect it is a broader liability than that imposed by modern workmen’s compensation statutes.1415Appropriately it covers all injuries and ailments incurred without misconduct on the seaman’s part amounting to ground for forfeiture, at least while he is on the ship, “subject to the call of duty as a seaman, and earning wages as such.” The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831, 833 (C. C. A.), certiorari denied, 245 U. S. 647; Calmar S. S. Co. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525,527-8; Holm n. Cities Service Transportation Co., 60 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A.); Highland v. The Harriet C. Kerlin, 41 F. 222 (C. C.); The Quaker City, 1 F. Supp. 840 (D. C.); compare Neilson v. The Laura, 2 Sawy. 242, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 10,092 (D. C.); Callon v. Williams, 2 Lowell 1, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2324 (D. C.).18
When the seaman’s duties carry him ashore, the shipowner’s obligation is neither terminated nor narrowed.16*
15 The recent tendency to confine the scope of the obligation to those shipboard injuries which are caused by the requirements of the seaman’s duties (Meyer v. Dollar S. S. Lines, 49 F. 2d 1002 (C. C. A.); cf. Brock v. Standard Oil Co., 33 F. Supp. 353 (D. C.)) is consonant neither with the liberality which courts of admiralty traditionally have displayed toward seamen, who are their wards, nor with the dictates of sound maritime policy. Calmar S. S. Co. v. Taylor, supra, at 529.
16 See, e. g., Laws of Oleron, Art. VI, VII; Laws of Wisbuy, Art. XVIII, XIX; Laws of Hanse Towns, Art. XXXIX, XLV; see also The
When he leaves the ship contrary to orders, however, the owner’s duty is ended.*17 Between these extremes are the instant cases, raising for the first time here the question of the existence and scope of the shipowner’s duty when the seaman is injured while on shore leave but without specific chore for the ship. Liability in that circumstance was obscured in the first maritime codes,18 and although early suggested has been recognized only implicitly in lower federal courts.19 Very recently it has been explicitly denied in several district courts.20
We think that the principles governing shipboard injuries apply to the facts presented by these cases. To relieve the shipowner of his obligation in the case of injuries incurred on shore leave would cast upon the seaman hazards encountered only by reason of the voyage. The assumption is hardly sound that the normal uses and purposes of shore leave are “exclusively personal” and have no relation to the vessel’s business. Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship, without substantial impairment of their efficiency, if not also serious danger to discipline. Relaxation beyond the confines of the ship is
17 Sound reasons of discipline long have impelled this rule. Cf., e. g., Laws of Oleron, Art. VII; Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, supra; Laws of Wisbuy, supra; and compare Pierce v. Patton, supra, note 10.
18 Thus, while the Laws of Oleron and the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, supra, relieve from liability for injuries incurred while on shore without leave, they say nothing on the question here involved. Similarly, the Laws of Wisbuy, supra, are ambiguous on this point. The Laws of the Hanse Towns suggest that any injuries received otherwise than in the ship’s service are not within the right to maintenance and cure.
necessary if the work is to go on, more so that it may move smoothly. No master would take a crew to sea if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would be taken if it could never obtain it. Even more for the seaman than for the landsman, therefore, “the superfluous is the necessary ... to make life livable”21 and to get work done. In short, shore leave is an elemental necessity in the sailing of ships, a part of the business as old as the art, not merely a personal diversion.
The voyage creates not only the need for relaxation ashore, but the necessity that it be satisfied in distant and unfamiliar ports. If, in those surroundings, the seaman, without, disqualifying misconduct, contracts disease or incurs injury, it is because of the voyage, the shipowner’s business. That business has separated him from his usual places of association. By adding this separation to the restrictions of living as well as working aboard, it forges dual and unique compulsions for seeking relief wherever it may be found. In sum, it is the ship’s business which subjects the seaman to the risks attending hours of relaxation in strange surroundings. Accordingly, it is but reasonable that the business extend the same protections against injury from them as it gives for other risks of the employment.
It was from considerations of exactly this character that the liability for maintenance and cure arose. From them, likewise, its legal incidents were derived. The shipowner owes the protection regardless of whether he is at fault; the seaman’s fault, unless gross, cannot defeat it; unlike the statutory liability of employers on land, it is not limited to strictly occupational hazards or to injuries which have an immediate causal connection with an act of labor. An obligation which thus originated and was shaped in response to the needs of seamen for protection from the
21 Holmes, J., dissenting in Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 447.
hazards and peculiarities of marine employment should not be narrowed to exclude from its scope characteristic and essential elements of that work. And, indeed, no decision has been found which so narrows the shipowner’s parallel obligation in the case of sickness or disease. Rather, the implications of existing authority point the other way. Cf. The Bouker No. 2, supra.22 The considerations, including those of public interest adverted to by Mr. Justice Story, which support the liability for illness,23 or for injuries received aboard ship, likewise sustain it for injuries incurred on shore leave, as were those now in issue. To exclude such injuries from the scope of the liability would ignore its origins and purposes.
There is strong ground, therefore, for regarding the right to maintenance and cure as covering injuries received without misconduct while on shore leave. Certainly the nature and foundations of the liability require that it be not narrowly confined or whittled down by restrictive and artificial distinctions defeating its broad and beneficial purposes. If leeway is to be given in either direction, all the considerations which brought the liability into being dictate it should be in the sailor’s behalf. In this view,
22 See also Holmes v. Hutchinson, Gilp. 447, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6639 (D. C.); The Forest, 1 Ware 429, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4936 (D. C.); The Nimrod, 1 Ware 1, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,267 (D. C.); and see cases cited supra, note 10.
23 At the argument, it was suggested that a reason which might sustain the imposition of liability for sickness innocently contracted on shore leave, but not for injuries so incurred, would be the difficulty of proving origin ashore. The difficulty undoubtedly would exist in some cases, but hardly in all. No authority has been found which suggests this explanation. Rather, cases of illness, which are within the reason and policy of the liability, are indistinguishable from cases of injury received without misconduct. The risk of incidence is not less in the one case than in the other. The afflicted seaman is made as helpless and dependent by injury as by illness. His resources for meeting the catastrophe and his employer’s burden are not greater because he is hurt rather than ill.
the nature and purposes of the liability do not permit dib tinctions which allow recovery when the seaman becomes ill or is injured while idle aboard, cf. Calmar S. S. Co. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525; The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831 (C. C. A.); Holm v. Cities Service Transportation Co., 60 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A.); The Quaker City, 1 F. Supp. 840 (D. C.), or when doing some minor errand for the ship ashore, Gomes v. Pereira, 42 F. Supp. 328 (D. C.), but deny it when he falls from the ladder or gangplank as he leaves the vessel on shore leave, cf. The President Coolidge, 23 F. Supp. 575 (D. C.), or is returning from it, Lilly v. United States Lines Co., 42 F. Supp. 214 (D. C.). Such refinements cut the heart from a protection to which they are wholly foreign in aim and effect. The sailor departing for or returning from shore leave is, sensibly, no more beyond the broad protection of his right to maintenance and cure than is the seaman quitting the ship on being discharged or boarding it on first reporting for duty. Cf. The Michael Tracy, 295 F. 680 (C. C. A.); The Scotland, 42 F. 925 (D. C.).
Plaintiffs here were injured while traversing an area between their moored ships and the public streets by an appropriate route. It is true that in No. 454 the area consisted of the extensive premises of the Mexican Petroleum Company, at whose dock the ship was moored. And it is said the shipowner should not be liable because he had no control over the premises. But it was the shipowner’s business which required the use of those facilities. And his obligation to care for the seaman’s injuries is, as has been shown, in no sense a function of his negligence or fault. While his ability to control conditions aboard ship may be to some extent an element in creating his responsibility, it is only one of many, is not definitive, and by no means determines the occasions on which his obligation arises. Consequently, the fact that the shipowner might not be liable to the seaman in damages for the [p. 737] dock-owner’s negligence, cf. Todahl v. Sudden & Christenson, 5 F. 2d 462 (C. C. A.), does not relieve him of his duty of maintenance and cure. We can see no significant difference, therefore, between imposing the liability for injuries received in boarding or quitting the ship and enforcing it for injuries incurred on the dock or other premises which must be traversed in going from the vessel to the public streets or returning to it from them. That much, at least, is within the liability. How far it extends beyond that point we need not now determine. And, in view of the ground on which we rest the decision, it is not necessary to consider the effects of the Shipowners’ Liability Convention of 1936,24 other than to state that it in no way alters the conclusion here reached.
24 By presidential proclamation the Convention became effective for the United States and its citizens on October 29, 1939 (54 Stat. 1693). Article 2 provides:
“1. The shipowner shall be liable in respect of—
(a) sickness and injury occurring between the date specified in the articles of agreement for reporting for duty and the termination of the engagement;
(b) death resulting from such sickness or injury.
“2. Provided that national laws or regulations may make exceptions in respect of:
(a) injury incurred otherwise than in the service of the ship; (b) injury or sickness due to the wilful act, default or misbehaviour of the sick, injured or deceased person;
(c) sickness or infirmity intentionally concealed when the engagement is entered into.
“3. National laws or regulations may provide that the shipowner shall not be liable in respect of sickness, or death directly attributable to sickness, if at the time of the engagement the person employed refused to be medically examined.”
Relevant material on the scope and effect of the Convention may be found in H. R. Rep. No. 1328, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., containing the interpretation by the Secretary of State; Record of Proceedings, International Labor Conference, 21st and 22d Sessions, Geneva, 1936, 249-51; International Labor Conference, Geneva, 1929, The Protec-
Opinion of Stone, C. J. 318 U. S.
The judgment in No. 582 is affirmed; that in No. 454 is reversed and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
No. 582 affirmed. No. 4&4- reversed.
Mr. Justice Roberts did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Chief Justice thinks that the judgment in No. 454, Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals below, 130 F. 2d 154. In No. 582, Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Jones, he concurs in the result on the ground that the recovery was authorized by the Shipowners’ Liability Convention, 54 Stat. 1695, which became effective before the date of respondent’s injury. He is of opinion that Article 2, Clause 1 of the treaty authorizing the recovery is self-executing, and that the exceptions permitted by Clause 2 are not operative in the absence of Congressional legislation giving them effect. (See letter of Secretary of State to the President, dated June 12, 1939, quoted in H. R. Rep. No. 1328, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-7.)
tion of Seamen in Case of Sickness, 1st Discussion, 28-46; International Labor Conference, Geneva, 1931, The Protection of Seamen in Case of Sickness, 2d Discussion, 29-43, 161-2. See also H. R. 6881, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.; 84 Cong. Rec. 10540; Hearings before Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, on H. R. 6881, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., passim; Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on H. R. 6881,76th Cong., 3d Sess., passim. [p. 739] DECISIONS PER CURIAM, ETC., FROM JANUARY 19, 1943, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1943.*
No. 631. United States v. Nickerson. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey. February 1, 1943. Per Curiam: The judgment is affirmed on the authority of Jerome v. United States, ante, p. 101. Solicitor General Fahy for the United States.
No. 238. Martin v. City of Struthers. February 1,1943. Upon reconsideration the judgment entered herein October 12,1942, 317 U. S. 589, is vacated, the mandate is recalled, and probable jurisdiction is noted.
No. 358. Hoopeston Canning Co. et al. v. Pink, Superintendent of Insurance, et al. This case reported under the title Hoopeston Canning Co. et al. v. Cullen, Superintendent of Insurance, et al., ante, p. 313.
No. 77. Dunn et al. v. Ohio. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Ohio. Argued January 7, 1943. Decided February 8, 1943. Per Curiam: The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236; Federal Power Comm’n v. Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575,582-83; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374. Mr. James H. Nacey, with whom Mr. Meyer A. Cook was on the [p. 740] brief, for appellants. Mr. Kenneth L. Sater, with whom Messrs. Thomas J. Herbert, Attorney General of Ohio, and Frank T. Cullitan were on the brief, for appellee. Reported below: 139 Ohio St. 621, 41 N. E. 2d 577.
*
Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of orders announced on April 12,1943. For decisions on applications for certiorari, see post, pp. 747,755; for rehearing, post, pp. 796, 797. For cases disposed of without consideration by the Court, post, p. 795.
No. 396. Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Constructi on Co. On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New York. February 8, 1943. Per Curiam: Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment reversed on the authority of Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation, ante, p. 125. Mr. Justice »Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Daniel H. Prior for petitioner. Messrs. Henry E. Foley and Charles E. Nichols for respondent. Reported below: 288 N. Y. 687,43 N. E. 2d 83.
No. —, original. Ex parte William W. Boehman. February 8, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
No. 554. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. v. United States et al. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. February 12, 1943. Appeal dismissed as to appellant, Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, on motion of counsel for said appellant. Mr. David M. Wood for the Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, appellant. Reported below: 47 F. Supp. 940.
No. 669. Allied Mills, Inc. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana et al. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Indiana. February 15, 1943. Per Curiam: The judgment is affirmed. McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Co.,
309 U. S. 70; Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62. Mr. Frank T. Miller for appellant. Mr. Joseph W. Hutchinson for appellees. Reported below: 220 Ind. 340, 42 N. E. 2d 34.
No. 670. United States v. American Federation of Musicians et al. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. February 15, 1943. Per Curiam: The judgment is affirmed. Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552; Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union n. Lake Valley Co., 311 U. S. 91. Assistant Attorney General Arnold for the United States. Mr. Joseph A. Padway for appellees. Reported below: 47 F. Supp. 304.
No. —. Ex parte James B. Goodrich. February 15, 1943. Application denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Frank Smith;
No. —, original. Ex parte Dewey Wallace McMur - trey; and
No. —, original. Ex parte Hugh A. Bowen. February 15, 1943. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Robert L. Peyton. March 1,1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte E. C. Lilly;
No. —, original. Ex parte John Russell Miller; and
No. —, original. Ex parte James Raymond Bu - chanan. March 1, 1943. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Robert Spies. March 8, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Margaret E. Waley. March 8, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to an application to the District Court.
No. —. Ex parte Ross Cummings Patton. March 8,1943. Application for stay denied.
No. 396. Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Construction Co. March 8, 1943. The judgment entered in this case on February 8, 1943, ante, p. 740, is amended by adding the following: “and without prejudice to a determination of the nature of the employment of any members of the class on whose behalf this suit has been brought.” The petition for rehearing is denied. Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
No. 704. Redus v. Alabama. March 11, 1943. The application for a stay of execution, referred to the Court by Mr. Justice Black, is granted and an order is entered staying execution to and including April 5, next.
No. 554. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. et al. v. United States et al. ; and
No. 555. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States et al. March 12, 1943. The motion for a temporary restraining order in each case is granted, and the stay entered by the District Court is continued until 10 days after the filing in the District Court of this Court’s mandates upon decision of the appeals. See 319 U. S. 190.
No. —. United States ex rel. Purcell v. State of New York et al. March 15,1943. Application denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Daisy D. Wilson. March 15, 1943. Applications denied. .
No. —, original. Ex parte Charles H. Cochran. March 15, 1943. Application denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Martin M. Goldman et al. March 15,1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Sam Miner;
No. —, original. Ex parte Joe Sowder; and
No. —, original. Ex parte Joseph Greco. March 15, 1943. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.
No. 12, original. United States v. Louisiana et al. March 15, 1943. Streeter B. Flynn, Esq., of Oklahoma
513236—43—vol. 318------ 51
City, Oklahoma, appointed, a Commissioner in this cause, for the purpose of perpetuating testimony.
No. 490. Clearfield Trust Co. et al. v. United States. March 15, 1943. Ordered that the opinion in this case dated March 1,1943, be amended by striking the sentence beginning on the 5th line from the bottom of page 3, which reads: “Its facts are practically on all fours with those of the present case.”
Opinion reported as amended, ante, p. 363.
No. 630. Goldsmith v. Sanford, Warden. March 15, 1943. Application denied. Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. H. Ely Goldsmith, pro se. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Messrs. Oscar A. Provost and W. Marvin Smith and Miss Melva M. Graney for respondent.
No. 288. Agricultural Prorate Commission of Cali - fornia et al. v. Mutual Orange Distributors et al. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California. April 5, 1943. Per Curiam: The motion to vacate the judgment is granted. The judgment of the District Court is vacated, without costs to either party in this Court, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint as moot. United States n. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U. S. 466,477-8; Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216; Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 306 U. S. 619; Retail Food Clerks & Managers Union v. Union [p. 745] Premier Food Stores, 308 U. S. 526. Messrs. Earl Warren, Attorney General of California, and Walter L. Bowers, Deputy Attorney General, for appellants. Mr. Guy Richards Crump for appellees. Reported below: 35 F. Supp. 108.
No. —, original. Ex parte Forest G. Wood. April 5, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice for the reasons stated in Ex parte Elmer Davis, ante, p. 412.
No. —, original. Ex parte Edward J. Borah;
No. —, original. Ex parte Clarence M. Holmes; and
No. —, original. Ex parte Charles Jennings. April 5, 1943. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.
No. —. Ex parte Frank Kuczynski. April 5,1943. Application denied.
No. 844. Pearson v. California et al. Appeal from the Supreme Court of California. April 12, 1943. Per Curiam: The appeal is dismissed for the want of a properly presented substantial federal question. Clarence Pearson, pro se.
No. —, original. Ex parte Raymond Barton;
No. —, original. Ex parte Chesteen McConnell; and
No. —, original. Ex parte Frank Contardi. April 12,1943. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Henry Hawk. April 12, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to an application to the District Court.
No. —, original. Ex parte Dewey Wallace McMur - trey. April 12, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
No. 792. Stephan v. United States. April 14,1943. The motion for a stay of execution is granted and it is ordered that execution of the sentence of death in this case be stayed until further order of this Court.
No. 720. Bayuk Cigars, Inc. v. Pennsylvania. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. April 19, 1943. Per Curiam: The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. (1) Butler Bros. v.McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, and cases cited; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 441; Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U. S. 62, 66-67; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193; (2) Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 87-90. Mr. Jerome J. Rothschild for appellant. Mr. Frank A. Sinon for appellee. Reported below: 345 Pa. 348, 28 A. 2d 134.
No. 876. Jewel Incandescen t Lamp Co., Inc. v. General Electric Co. et al. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey. April 19, 1943. Per Curiam: The appeal is dismissed on the authority of Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14; Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 311, and United States n. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 [p. 747] 318 U. S. Decisions Granting Certiorari.
U. S. 553, 556. Mr. Samuel E. Darby, Jr. for appellant. Mr. Alexander C. Neave for appellees. Reported below: 47 F. Supp. 818.
No. —, original. Ex parte Emmet H. Bozel;
No. —, original. Ex parte Elmer Davis;
No. —, original. Ex parte Charles Erickson; and No. —, original. Ex parte Frank Roberson. April 19,1943. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.
No. —, original. Ex parte Thomas B. Mulrennan. April 19, 1943. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to an application to the District Court.
No. —. Daniels v. Alabama; and
No. —. Robinson v. Alabama. April 19, 1943. The applications for stay of execution are granted and it is ordered that execution of the sentence of death in each of these cases be stayed until further order of this Court.
DECISIONS GRANTING CERTIORARI, FROM JANUARY 19, 1943, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1943.
No. 396. Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Construction Co. See ante, p. 740.
No. 584. Roche, U. S. District Judge, et al. v. Evaporated Milk Association et al. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. Solicitor General Fahy for petitioners. Messrs. Marshall P. Madison, [p. 748] Francis R. Kirkham, Herbert W. Clark, Arthur B. Dunne, U. S. Webb, Maurice E. Harrison, Willis I. Morrison, Joseph A. Murphy, and Nat Brown for respondents. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 843.
Nos. 623, 624, and 625. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States. February 15, 1943. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted. Messrs. W. A. Barnett, C. W. King, and A. L. Herr for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Littell, and Mr. Norman Mac-Donald for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 635.
No. 636. United States v. Delia. February 15,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted. Solicitor General Fahy for the United States. Messrs. Morton A. Eden and Jack N. Tucker for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 614.
No. 480. Murdock v. Pennsylvani a (City of Jean - nette );
No. 481. Perisich v. Pennsylvania (City of Jean - nette );
No. 482. Mowder v. Pennsylvania (City of Jean - nette );
No. 483. Seders v. Pennsylvania (City of Jean - nette );
No. 484. Lamborn v. Pennsylvani a (City of Jean - nette );
No. 485. Maltezos v. Pennsylvani a (City of Jean - nette ) ;
No. 486. Anastasia Tzanes v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette ); and
No. 487. Ellaine Tzanes v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette ). February 15, 1943. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania granted. Mr. Hayden C. Covington for petitioners. Mr. Fred B. Trescher for respondent. Reported below: 149 Pa. Super. 175, 27 A. 2d 666.
No. 450. Douglas et al. v. City of Jeannette (Pennsylvania ) et al. February 15,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted. Mr. Hayden C. Covington for petitioners. Mr. Fred B. Trescher for respondents. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 652.
No. 589. Bowles v. United States. March 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted. Mr. Osmond K. Fraenkel for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Messrs. Oscar A. Provost, Andrew F. Oehmann, and W. Marvin Smith for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 818.
No. 593. Direct Sales Co. v. United States. March 1,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. Messrs. Edwin J. Culligan and William B. Mahoney for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Messrs. Robert S. Erdahl and W. Marvin Smith for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 835.
No. 675. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner of In - ternal Revenue. March 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth [p. 750] Circuit granted. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Messrs. Edward H. Green, Norris Darrell, and Oscar C. Hull for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 619.
No. 721. North American Company v. Securities & Exchange Commission. March 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. Charles E. Hughes, Jr. for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy and Mr. John F. Davis for respondent. Reported below: 133 F. 2d 148.
No. 725. Richardson v. James Gibbons Co. March 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. Mr. George A. Mahone for petitioner. Messrs. 0. Bowie Duckett and Edward E. Hargest, Jr. for respondent. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 627.
No. 696. Altvater et al. v. Freeman et al. March 8,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted. Messrs. Lawrence C. Kingsland and Edmund C. Rogers for petitioners. Mr. Marston Allen for respondents. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 763.
No. 698. Boone v. Lightner et al. March 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted. Messrs. Milton I. Bdldinger, Stuart H. Robeson, Roy L. Deal, J. G. Moser, and I. Irving
Bolotin for petitioner. Mr. M. R. McCown for respondents. Reported below: 222 N. C. 205, 22 S. E. 2d 426.
No. 687. St. Pierre v. United States. March 8,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Messrs. Edward V. Broderick, S. Bertram Friedman, and Joseph H. Broderick for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy for the United States. Mr. Osmond K. Fraenkel filed a brief on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 837.
No. 552. Interstat e Transit Lines v. Commis - sioner of Internal Revenue. March 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted. Messrs. Joseph F. Mann and Nelson Trottman for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Clark, and Messrs. Sewall Key and Joseph M. Jones for respondent. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 136.
No. 660. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. March 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Messrs. Bart A. Riley and Thomas H. Anderson for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Clark, and Messrs. Sewall Key and J. Louis Monarch for respondent. Reported below: 131F. 2d 388.
No. 640. Bailey, Administratrix, v. Central Ver - mont Railway, Inc. March 8, 1943. Petition for writ
. Decisions Granting Certiorari. 318U.S.
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Vermont granted. Mr. Joseph A. McNamara for petitioner. Mr. Horace H. Powers for respondent. Reported below: 113 Vt. 8, 28 A. 2d 639.
No. 684. County of Mahnomen v. United States. March 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted. Messrs. J. A. A. Burnquist, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Geo. B. Sjoselius, Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Littell, and Mr. Vernon L. Wilkinson for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 936.
No. 707. Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., Inc. March 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted. Messrs. Marston Allen and Nathan Heard for petitioner. Messrs. George P. Dike and Cedric W. Porter for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 190.
No. 709. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Na - tional Labor Relations Board. March 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. Messrs. T. Justin Moore and George D. Gibson for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy and Mr. Robert B. Watts for respondent. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 390.
No. 606. Buchalter v. New York;
No. 610. Weiss v. New York; and No. 619. Capone v. New York. See post, p. 797.
No. 717. United States v. Dotterweich. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Solicitor General Fahy for the United States. Mr. Francis E. Bagot for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 500.
No. 756. Roberts v. United States. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Messrs. Benton Littleton Britnell and Newton Benjamin Powell for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Messrs. Oscar A. Provost and W. Marvin Smith and Miss Melva M. Graney for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 392.
No. 794. Green, doing business as Green Vacuum Cleaner Co., v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted. Messrs. Merritt A. Vickery and Earl William Aurelius for petitioner. Messrs. John F. Oberlin and L. C. Spieth for respondent. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 312.
No. 750. Carter v. Kubler. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted limited to the first question presented by the petition. Mr. Elmer McClain for petitioner. George A. Kubler, pro se. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 222.
No. 708. Hill, Administrator, v. Hawes, Trustee, et al. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of [p. 754] Columbia granted. Messrs. Henry Lincoln Johnson and Thurman L. Dodson for petitioner. Mr. John B. Gunion for respondents. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 569.
No. 766. Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, Com - missioner of Internal Revenue. April 5, 1943. Petion for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. Messrs. S. V. Kemp and F. G. Davidson, Jr. for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Samuel 0. Clark, Jr., and Messrs. Sewall Key, J. Louis Monarch, and L. W. Post for respondent. Mr. W. A. Sutherland filed a brief, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 909.
No. 849. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. et al. v. Huffman, Administrator. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Messrs. R. Emmett Kerrigan and James J. Morrison for petitioners. Mr. Eugene Stanley for respondent. Reported below: 134 F. 2d 213.
No. 787. McLeod v. Threlkeld et al., doing busi - ness as Threlkeld Commissary Co. April 5, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Mr. Harry Dow for petitioner. Mr. John P. Bullington for respondents. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 880.
No. 762. Bartchy v. United States. April 12,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Mr. Bernard A. [p. 755] 318 U. 8. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
Golding for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Mr. Robert S. Erdahl for the United States. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 348.
No. 848. Brotherhoo d of Railroad Trainmen et al. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad. April 19, 1943, Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted. Mr. John E. Cassidy for petitioners. Messrs. John M. Elliott and Clarence W. Heyl for respondent. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 265.
No. 815. Securities & Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp, et al. April 19, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Solicitor General Fahy and Mr. John F. Davis for petitioner. Mr. David A. Frank for respondents. Reported below: 133 F. 2d 241.
No. 749. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Society et al. April 19, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Mr. Warren E. Miller for petitioner. Mr. Richard T. Rives for respondents. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 516.
DECISIONS DENYING CERTIORARI, FROM JANUARY 19,1943, THROUGH APRIL 19,1943.
No. 577. Thomson, Trustee, v. Industrial Com - mission of Illinois (Herman E. Stoll ). February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois denied. Messrs. William T. Faricy and Weldon A. Dayton for petitioner. Messrs. Marshall Solberg [p. 756] and Gerald T. Wiley for respondent. Reported below: 380 Ill. 386, 44 N. E. 2d 19.
No. 578. Helms Bakeries v. State Board of Equal - ization et al. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, 1st Appellate District, of California, denied. Mr. David R. Faries for petitioner. Messrs. H. H. Linney, Assistant Attorney General of California, and Adrian A. Kragen, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents. Reported below: 53 Cal. App. 2d 417,128 P. 2d 167.
No. 586. Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Mr. Thomas S. Allen for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Clark, and Messrs. Sewall Key, Samuel H. Levy, and Joseph M. Jones for respondent. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 977.
No. 596. Galban Lobo Co. v. Henderson. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Emergency Court of Appeals denied. Mr. Donald Marks for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy for respondent. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 150.
No. 599. Fairclaw v. Forrest. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied. Mr. Geo. E. C. Hayes for petitioner. Mr. Richard E. Shands for respondent. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 829.
No. 604. Squire, Superintendent of Banks, v. Mer - riam. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California denied. Messrs. Thomas J. Herbert, Attorney General of Ohio, and William C. Mathes for petitioner. Mr. Louis E. Hart for respondent. Reported below: 21 Cal. 2d 889,129 P. 2d 698.
No. 418. Walling, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor, v. Gold - blatt Brothers, Inc. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Solicitor General Fahy and Mr. Irving J. Levy for petitioner. Messrs. Abram N. Pritzker and Stanford Clinton for respondent. Mr. Charles B. Rugg filed a brief on behalf of the American Retail Federation, as amicus curiae, urging denial of the petition. Reported below: 128 F. 2d 778.
No. 602. Caron Corporation v. R. K. 0. Radio Pic - tures, Inc. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New York denied. Messrs. Joseph H. Choate, Jr., William Byrd, and Maurice Leon for petitioner. Mr. Bruce Bromley for respondent. Reported below: 264 App. Div. 852,36 N. Y. S. 2d 188.
No. 603. Ohio ex rel. Squire, Superintendent of Banks, v. Porter. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California denied. Messrs. Thomas J. Herbert, Attorney General of Ohio, and William C. Mathes for petitioner. Mr. Edwin A. Meserve for respondent. Reported below: 21 Cal. 2d 45, 129 P. 2d 691.
No. 605. Guth v. Groves et al. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. Sidney A. Syme, Thomas H. Matters, Jr., and Donald Horne for petitioner. Mr. Albert R. Connelly for respondents. Reported below: 129 F. 2d 325.
No. 612 Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Messrs. William D. Mitchell, Worthington Campbell, and Brady Cole for petitioner. Messrs. Frederick S. Lyon, Leonard S. Lyon, and Ben F. Saye for respondent. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 589.
No. 618. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Magrath Oil Co. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. John A. Chambliss, Jr. for petitioner. Mr. Fred M. Williams for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 318.
No. 638. Nulsen, Executor, v. National Lead Co. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Mr. Richard S. Bull for petitioner. Mr. Thomas Bond for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 51.
No. 652. Halferty et al., doing business as Hal - ferty Brothers, et al. v. Hawkeye Casualty Co. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Mr.
Pross T. Cross for petitioners. Mr. K. B. Randolph for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 194.
No. 579. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California denied. Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Messrs. Thomas J. Straub and John Clarence Wood for petitioner. Mr. Stephen W. Downey for respondent. Reported below: 20 Cal. 2d 684,128 P. 2d 529.
No. 548. Reece et al. v. United States. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. James F. Kemp for petitioners. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Mr. Robert S. Erdahl for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 186.
No. 587. Viles v. Prudential Insurance Co. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied. Edmond L. Viles, pro se. Mr. Horace Phelps for respondent. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 944.
No. 611. Coates v. Lawrence, Superintendent and Warden. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Paul Crutchfield for petitioner. Mr. Ellis Arnall for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 110.
No. 594. Lundon v. Chapman, Keeper of the Flor - ida State Penitentiary. February 1, 1943. Petition
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for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida denied. Mr. S. D. McGill for petitioner. Messrs. J. Tom Watson, Attorney General of Florida, and Woodrow M. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. Reported below: 151 Fla. 336, 9 So. 2d 723.
No. 620. Stewart v. St. Sure, U. S. District Judge. February 1, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. J. L. Stewart, pro se. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Mr. Oscar A. Provost and Miss Melva M. Graney for respondent. Reported below: 131F. 2d 862.
No. 609. Boston Elevated Railway Co. v. Commis - sioner of Internal Revenue. February 8,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Messrs. Charles W. Mulcahy, Robert N. Miller, and John H. Moran for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Clark, and Messrs. Sewall Key, Joseph M. Jones, and Archibald Cox for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 161.
No. 613. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Underwood, Administratrix. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. White E. Gibson for petitioner. Mr. Louis E. Miller for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 306.
No. 616. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Messrs. Charles W. Milner, A. Louis Flynn, and Helmer Hansen for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Shea, and Messrs. Charles V. Shannon and Howard E. Wahrenbrock for respondent. Reported below: 129 F. 2d 126.
No. 617. Jayne et al. v. National Life Insurance Co. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. John H. Cantrell for petitioners. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 358.
No. 621. Bayside Bus Corp. v. United States. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. Emanuel Harris for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy and Assistant Attorney General Shea for the United States. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 825.
No. 627. Guttmann et al. v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp, et al. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. Harry Hoffman for petitioners. Mr. William H. Eckert for the Union Trust Co., and Mr. H. Eastman Hackney [p. 762] for the Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railway Co., respondents. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 872.
No. 635. Moore -McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Foster. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Messrs. Corydon B. Dunham and Irving L. Evans for petitioner. Mr. Sydney R. Snitken for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 907.
No. 639. Price Brothers Co. v. Smith. February 8,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. Andrew M. Henderson for petitioner. Mr. John Ruffalo for respondent. Reported below: 131 F. 2d 750.
No. 630. Goldsmith v. Sanford, Warden. February 8, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Jus - tice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. H. Ely Goldsmith, pro se. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Messrs. Oscar A. Provost and W. Marvin Smith and Miss Melva M. Graney for respondent. Reported below: 132 F. 2d 126.
No. 595. Kelley -Koett Manufacturing Co. v. Mc-Euen. February 15,1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. Dean S. Edmonds for petitioner. Mr. Ar-
Ion V. Cushman for respondent. Reported below: 130 F. 2d 488.
No. 607. Border Line Transportation Co. v. Haas, Collector of Customs. February 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. George R. Tuttle for petitioner. Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Shea, and Mr. Robert L. Stern for respondent. Reported below: 128 F. 2d 192.
No. 622. Gerity -Whitaker Co. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board. February 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Messrs. Milo J. Warner and Elmer A. Smith for petitioners. Solicitor General Fahy and Messrs. Robert B. Watts and Ernest A. Gross and Misses Ruth Weyand and Fannie M. Boyls for respondent.
No. 633. Pickering Lumber Co. v. Whiteside et al. February 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, 3d Appellate District, of California, denied. Messrs. Paul Barnett and Henry N. Ess for petitioner. Mr. Francis H. De Groat for respondents. Reported below: 54 Cal. App. 2d 200,128 P. 2d 899.
No. 641. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis v. Pashea. February 15, 1943. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri denied. Messrs. Louis A. McKeown and Arnot L. Sheppard for petitioner. Messrs. James T. Blair and Harvey B. Cox for respondent. Reported below: 350 Mo. 132,165 S. W. 2d 691.
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