Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941)
Full caption
CASKEY BAKING CO., INC. v. VIRGINIA.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 28, 1941
CASKEY BAKING CO., INC. v. VIRGINIA.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.
No. 676. Argued April 2, 1941.—Decided April 28, 1941.
A statute of Virginia imposes an annual fee of $100 for each vehicle used in the business of peddling goods, wares, or merchandise “by selling and delivering the same at the same time to licensed dealers or retailers at other than a definite place of business operated by the seller.” The statute exempts manufacturers taxable by the State on capital; distributors of manufactured goods paying a state license tax on their purchases; and wholesale dealers regularly licensed by the State. Held—as applied to a foreign corporation which had its principal office and place of business outside of the State and whose drivers brought into the State bread which they there sold and delivered to regular customers—not in contravention of the commerce clause or the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. P. 119.
176 Va. 170; 10 S. E. 2d 535, affirmed.
Appeal from the affirmance of a conviction for violation of a state license tax statute.
Messrs. R. Gray Williams and Clarence E. Martin, with whom Messrs. J. Sloan Kuykendall and Clarence E. Martin, Jr. were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Abram P. Staples, Attorney General of Virginia, with whom Mr. W. W. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant, a corporation of West Virginia, has its principal office and place of business in Martinsburg, in that State. As a foreign corporation registered in Virginia, it has paid the latter State an annual registration fee and an income tax on its net profits allocable to its p. 118Virginia business. It makes bread which it sells to grocers and other retailers in territory adjacent to Martinsburg, including Winchester and other places in Virginia. Appellant’s trucks carry the bread into Virginia where they serve regular routes at regular intervals. The drivers call only on regular customers, inquire of each how much bread he needs and, in response to his order, take it from the truck and deliver it to the customer. Thus each such transaction in Virginia is a sale and delivery in that State to a regular customer.
The company has no property permanently located in Virginia and no place of business in the State, except that, as required by the statute respecting registered foreign corporations, it maintains an office in the State where claims against it may be audited, settled, and paid.
The appellant was convicted for making a sale in Virginia without having procured a license pursuant to § 192b1 of the Tax Code of Virginia and a fine was imposed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.2
So far as material the statute provides: “There is hereby imposed an annual State license tax on every person, firm and corporation (other than ... a manufacturer taxable on capital by this State, or a distributor of manufactured goods paying a State license tax on his purchases) who or which shall peddle goods, wares or merchandise by selling and delivering the same at the same time to licensed dealers or retailers at other than a definite place of business operated by the seller. Provided, however, this act shall not be construed to apply to wholesale dealers regularly licensed by this State, and who shall at the same time sell and deliver merchandise p. 119to retail merchants.” The annual fee is $100 for each vehicle used in the business.
1
Acts of Virginia, 1932, p. 376, 1938, p. 440; Va. Tax Code, 1936, 192b, Michie, p. 2458,1940 Supp. 472. * 176 Va. 170, 10 S. E. 2d 535.
It is admitted that appellant was not a manufacturer taxable on its capital stock, nor a distributor of manufactured products paying a state license tax on its purchases, nor a licensed wholesale dealer, and did not, therefore, come within any of the classes exempted by the Act.
In the state courts, and here, the appellant challenged the statute as contravening the commerce clause and the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. Its position is that it is doing either an interstate business which the State may not burden by imposing a license tax, or an intrastate business as to which the exaction works a forbidden discrimination. We hold both contentions untenable.
1. While the transportation of bread across the state line is interstate commerce, that is not the activity which is licensed or taxed. The purely local business of peddling is what the Act hits, and this irrespective of the source of the goods sold. It is settled that such a statute imposes no burden upon interstate commerce which the Constitution interdicts. 3 The appellant, however, urges that the Act discriminates against interstate commerce by exempting from its operation the privilege of sales by manufacturers paying tax on their capital employed in manufacture in Virginia. It is said that if its bakery were situate in Virginia the appellant would have the benefit of this exemption and, since it is not, the marketing of appellant’s goods shipped into the State is the target of a hostile discrimination. But the argument overlooks the fact that peddlers resident in Virginia who buy their goods within the State, or buy or procure them8
from extra-state sources, are alike subject to the Act. The contention that the Act discriminates against interstate commerce by virtue of the exemption in question is negatived by our decisions.4
2. Examination of the Tax Code of Virginia discloses that the Act in question is but one portion of a comprehensive scheme of taxation. Manufacturers who sell their own products pay a tax on capital, which the State deems sufficient to cover all their activities, including the vending of the goods. 5 Wholesale merchants who have a fixed place of business pay a license tax measured by a percentage of all their purchases; and if they are also licensed by the town or city in which they have their place of business or, in lieu thereof, are taxed by such town or city on the capital employed in the business, they may sell and deliver at the same time and place anywhere in the State without payment of any additional license tax.*6 Every distributing house, whether operated by a manufacturer or wholesaler, for distributing goods amongst the owner’s retail stores, must be licensed and pay the same tax as if it were a wholesaler.7 8 Retail merchants8 and peddlers at retail 9 must be licensed and pay license taxes,—the former a percentage of the value of his purchases and the latter a fixed annual fee. Those who have no fixed place of business, who peddle their wares only to licensed dealers or retailers at the places of business of the latter, fall into none of the described classes. As the court below points out, were it not for
‘Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1, and cases therein cited. ’Tax Code of Virginia, 1936, §§ 73, 188, Va. Code, 1936, Michie, pp. 2416, 2451.
6 Tax Code of Virginia, § 188, Va. Code, 1936, Michie, pp. 2451-2452.
§ 192b, such peddlers would be the only vendors in Virginia to escape some form of taxation.
Peddlers at wholesale are not entitled to be licensed and taxed on the same basis as other vendors, as respects either form or amount. As we have repeatedly held, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a State from classifying businesses for taxation or impose any iron rule of equality.10 Some occupations may be taxed though others are not. Some may be taxed at one rate, others at a different rate! Classification is not discrimination. It is enough that those in the same class are treated with equality. That is true here.
Affirmed.
CITY BANK FARMERS TRUST CO., TRUSTEE, v. HELVERING, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 408 and 409. Argued April 1, 1941.—Decided April 28, 1941.
The administration of a trust by a testamentary trustee whose duties and activities are confined to holding and safeguarding a fund of stocks and bonds, collecting income, making safe investments and reinvestments, distributing income to beneficiaries, keeping accounts, preparing and filing income tax returns, etc., is not a “carrying on business” within § 23 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1928. Hence the commissions allowed and paid the trustee are not deductible under that section as expenses of carrying on a business. In computing the taxable income the trust is subject to the same rules as an individual, Revenue Act, 1928, §§ 161-162. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212, followed. P. 124.
112 F. 2d 457, affirmed.
Argument for Petitioner. 313 U. S.
Certiorari, 312 U. S. 672, to review a judgment affirming a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 39 B. T. A. 29.
Mr. Rollin Browne, with whom Messrs. John G. Jackson, Jr. and George Craven were on the brief, for petitioner.
The Commissioner’s concession at the trial that certain items were deductible as business expenses in computing the net income of the trusts was an admission that the administration of the trusts was a business. That issue was thus removed from the case. The Commissioner should not have been permitted to repudiate his concession.
By settled and uniform administrative practice, “ordinary and necessary” trustees’ commissions have been allowed as “business” expenses. While this administrative practice has been in effect, the statutory provision allowing deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses has been reenacted twelve times. This indicates Congressional approval of the administrative practice and gives to it the force and effect of law.
The administrative practice is sound, and should be approved. Higgins n. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212, involving personal investment activities of an individual, is distinguishable. Here, the trusts were separate legal and taxable entities, and the trustee was administering the trust estates for the benefit of others. Therefore, the commissions of the trustee and the other expenses of administering the trusts can not possibly be regarded as “personal” expenses.
The trusts were established for the investment and reinvestment of a large sum and accumulating and reinvesting the income therefrom, thus building up an ever-increasing fund. Investment activities of that nature, when carried on by a corporation or a trust, have often been held to constitute the conduct of business.
The disallowance of trustees’ commissions as “business” expenses would produce difficult complications, and would result in only a slight increase in the public revenues.
The commissions here in issue should not be disallowed merely because they were computed on the basis of and paid out of principal of the trust funds. Such commissions were paid for the trustee’s care and management of the trusts, and not for the mere act of receiving the principal. They differ in no respect from the commissions paid on income, which the respondent conceded are allowable deductions. An item otherwise deductible in computing net income taxable to a trust as an entity may not be disallowed just because it is charged against principal instead of income of the trust.
Mr. Arnold Raum, with whom Assistant Attorney General Clark and Messrs. Newman A. Townsend, Sewall Key, and Lee A. Jackson were on the brief, for respondent.
Mr. Weston Vernon, Jr. filed a brief on behalf of the Committee of Banking Institutions on Taxation, as amicus curiae, in support of the petitioner.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
The ultimate question here involved is whether two testamentary trusts of which petitioner is trustee were in 1931 “carrying on . . . business” within the meaning of § 23 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1928.
Pursuant to the will of Angier B. Duke, two trusts, consisting of stocks and bonds worth approximately $7,- 600,000, were established in 1923 for the benefit of Duke’s two minor sons. Petitioner, as trustee, was charged with the duty of applying a sufficient amount of the income of each trust to the support and education of the beneficiary; p. 124the surplus income was to be accumulated until the beneficiary’s majority; and at that time all accumulated income was to be paid to the beneficiary, while the principal was to be continued in trust for the benefit of the son and his descendants. By 1931, the principal and accumulated income of the two trusts aggregated about $10,- 000,000. In that year the Surrogate Court of New York County allowed trustees’ commissions of about $77,000, ordering that payment be made out of principal. In reporting trust income for 1931, the trustee did not claim any deduction for these commissions. Later, in proceedings before the Board of Tax Appeals, the deduction was claimed but denied. The ground of denial was that during the taxable year the trusts had not been “carrying on any trade or business,” the carrying on of such an activity being a condition precedent to the allowance of the claimed deduction under the controlling Revenue Act.1 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 Differing interpretations as to the meaning and scope of “carrying on any trade or business” prompted us to grant certiorari in this case, in the case of Pyne v. United States, 92 Ct. Cis. 44; 35 F. Supp. 81; post, p. 127, and in the case of Higgins v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 795,312 U. S. 212.
In the Higgins case, 312 U. S. 212, we affirmed the judgment of the same Circuit Court of Appeals that rendered the decision below. Higgins, an individual taxpayer whose activities did not vary materially from the p. 125activities of the taxpaying trusts in the case at bar,3 was denied the deduction which petitioner here seeks. And §§ 161-162 of the Revenue Act of 1928 provide: “The taxes imposed by this title upon individuals shall apply to the income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust. . . . The net income of the estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner and on the same basis as in the case of an individual. . . s Since the trust is subject to the same rules as the individual, and since the findings of the Board of Tax Appeals in the Higgins case and in the case at bar are substantially the same,4 the Higgins case is controlling here, unless, as petitioner contends, dis-
1
Revenue Act of 1928, § §23 (a), 161, 162, 45 Stat. 799, 838. Cf. George Vanderbilt Trust, 36 B. T. A. 967. Though petitioner urges that the Commissioner, because of concessions made before the Board of Tax Appeals, should be barred from asserting that the trusts were not carrying on business, the judgment of the Board rested on its finding that the trusts were not so engaged, and the issue is properly before us. a 112 F. 2d 457.
3 The Board found in this case that the trustee’s activities were limited to reviewing the stocks and bonds in trust several times a year; selling securities and reinvesting the proceeds in other stocks and bonds; collecting interest and dividends on security; keeping account books for the trusts and rendering statements to the interested parties; preparing and filing income tax returns; and distributing income to the beneficiaries. Summarizing, the Board of Tax Appeals said, “The above facts demonstrate conclusively to us that this is a case of passive investment and not of carrying on a business, for not only is the trustee limited in its investments, but it is cautioned in effect to be a safe investor rather than a participant in trade or business, and, plainly carrying out the testator’s injunctions, it conducts no business, because it has, as above seen, no expenses of conducting business other than the collection of coupons and mailing bonds, amounting to a few dollars, and an even more negligible amount for transfer stamps or notary fees. . . . Extensive authority need not be compiled to demonstrate that a mere passive investor, collecting interest and clipping coupons, and making a very few reinvestments, is not engaged in trade or business.”
tinguishable by reason of administrative practice in relation to trusts.
But we regard the Higgins decision as controlling despite petitioner’s insistence that administrative practice has long permitted deduction of trustees’ commissions. In view of the express Congressional command that the same method and basis of computation must be applied to trust income as to individual income, it is doubtful whether any administrative practice, no matter how clear or long existing, would warrant our applying one concept of carrying on business in the case of an individual and another concept in the case of a trust. This is particularly true here, where the statutory interpretation petitioner urges has never received support in any regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.6 And not only is the result reached by the court below consistent with our decision in Higgins v. Commissioner, but, as we said in the Higgins case, the conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals “is adequately supported by this record, and rests upon a conception of carrying on business similar to that expressed by this Court for an antecedent section.” 6 The judgment below is accordingly
Affirmed.
8 Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 573, 582; Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455, 467-468.
8 The case referred to was Van Wart v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 112, 115.