United States v. Chi. Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1940)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. Chi. Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1940)
Full caption
UNITED STATES et al. v. CHICAGO HEIGHTS TRUCKING CO. et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 20, 1940
UNITED STATES et al. v. CHICAGO HEIGHTS TRUCKING CO. et al.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
No. 724. Argued April 26, 29, 1940.—Decided May 20, 1940.
Common carriers by motor, in interstate commerce, filed tariffs providing rates on goods reshipped in the original packages as less than truck-load consignments immediately after their transportation as parts of a truck-load or carload consignment, and on less-than-truck-load goods which, on arrival at their immediate destination, are to be immediately reshipped, in the original packages, as parts of a truck-load or carload consignment. The Interstate Commerce Commission found the rates lower than other rates on like goods between the same points; that practically they could be used only by forwarders and a few large shippers; that they would operate for the special benefit of forwarders and would not benefit owners of the goods shipped; and that forwarders would thereby be afforded transportation at rates lower than those charged certain other shippers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, in violation of § 216 (d) of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Hdd:
1. That the Commission was justified in canceling the proposed tariffs. P. 347.
2. Section 216 (d) of the Motor Carrier Act, like provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, insures equality of rates for substantially similar services. P. 351.
3. Although the evidence was undisputed, it was for the Commission to determine the question of undue preference and discrimination. P. 352.
4. The Commission was authorized to act in the matter on its own motion, without complaint by shippers. P. 353.
5. The Commission performs its duties in the interests of shippers generally, of the national transportation system, and of the public. P. 354.
Reversed.
guarantees of § 7 of the Act required disestablishment of the Federation {Falk case, 308 U. S. 461, and cases cited), and that posting of appropriate notices was necessary. Id., p. 462.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges, which set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission canceling tariffs of motor carriers.
Mr. A. H. Feller, with whom Solicitor General Biddle, Assistant Attorney General Arnold, and Messrs. Frank Coleman, William J. Campbell, Daniel W. Knowlton, and E. M. Reidy were on the brief, for appellants.
Messrs. JohnR. Turney and R. E. Quirk for appellees.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents are forty-one interstate common carriers operating motor vehicles subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935? Our decision turns upon the validity of an order of the Commission cancelling certain proposed tariffs of these carriers upon the ground that they were unlawfully discriminatory in affording lower rates to “forwarders” of freight than to other shippers.
Forwarders utilize common carriers by rail and motor truck to transport goods owned by others. They solicit and obtain many small shipments, from various points within an area, and cause them to be carried in less than truck-load or carload lots to a concentration center within the area. There they are assembled by the forwarder for further transportation in truck-load or carload lots. Although the forwarder gives owners of individual small shipments his own contract corresponding in form to through bills of lading and assumes responsibility for safe through carriage, the forwarder customarily arranges for the pickup, assembly and transportation of the shipments by carriers for hire. And the forwarders, not the owners of the goods, select the carriers and
x49 Stat. 543.
route the shipments. Upon arrival of a truck-load or carload of the assembled small shipments at a distribution center, the bulk shipment is broken up, the forwarder separates and takes possession of the original small shipments and arranges, where necessary, their further carriage to their various final destinations in the area served by the particular distribution point. In this final carriage of the small shipment to its ultimate destination, the forwarder again utilizes carriers for hire to move these less than truck-load or carload lots. Thus, forwarders may use the service of carriers to assemble shipments of less than truck-load or carload lots at their concentration center, to transport the assembled truck-load or carloads to a distribution center and to carry the broken up small shipments beyond their break-bulk distribution center.
The forwarding business has been built upon the expectation that a material part of the transportation which it causes to be provided for small shippers can by consolidation of small shipments be obtained at truck-load or carload rates. For the forwarders’ business was originally made profitable because it could operate upon the margin of profit represented by the difference between railroad carload rates paid by the forwarder and the higher rates, approximating less than carload rates, which the forwarder charged the owner of a shipment.2 But forwarders in using railroads enjoy no special tariff rates and pay the same published carload and less than carload rates that other shippers pay. And the question here it not whether the Commission should have approved as lawful lower rates for truck-loads than for smaller shipments, but whether the court properly set aside the Commission’s order which had directed cancellation of [p. 347] respondents’ tariffs providing lower rates for certain less than truck-load shipments solely because they had previously been, or were intended subsequently to be, consolidated in truckloads with other individual shipments.
Upon the Commission’s own motion, a hearing was held and the Commission ordered the cancellation of these tariffs.3 Respondents brought suit in the District Court to set aside and restrain enforcement of the Commission’s order. A three judge court held the order void and perpetually enjoined its enforcement. The case is here on direct appeal by the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission.4
Respondents’ tariffs would be available to forwarders who arrange assembling, transportation and distribution services in the trade areas surrounding concentration and break-bulk centers in Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana. And the Commission found that “In practical effect these rates can be used by few, if any, shippers, except the forwarders.” Since in its opinion these tariffs were “materially lower than respondents’ local rates on like traffic between the same points,” 5 the Commission found that “the forwarders . . . and possibly a few large shippers . . . will be afforded transportation at rates lower than the rates . . . charged certain other shippers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, in violation of Section 216 (d).”6*8 In the view we take, it be-
3 Division 5 first reported, 10 M. C. C. 556. On reconsideration, the report was by the Commission, 17 M. C. C. 573.
428 U. S. Code, 45, 45 (a), 47 (a), 345.
5 Two Commissioners in dissent thought this was “true only in part. They are lower than some, but by no means all, of the corresponding local rates.”
8 § 216 (d): “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, gateway, locality, or description of [p. 348] comes unnecessary to consider additional grounds upon which the Commission found the tariffs violated another Section of the Act.*7
So far as pertinent here, the tariffs before us propose rates for transportation of commodities in less than truck-load lots. All commodities (with exceptions not here material) are as a group given the same special rate. In general, respondents’ other tariffs provide rates which vary for different types of commodities. Accordingly, if the suspended rates were in effect, transportation of the same commodity over the same haul might cost a forwarder less than other shippers.
The findings of the Commission and the supporting evidence8 reveal that local less-than-truck-load rates charged shippers are in many if not most instances greater than rates on like commodities between the same points to be afforded forwarders under the proposed tariffs which the Commission ordered cancelled. However, upon reviewing the identical evidence which the Commission had considered, the court below drew inferences opposite to those of the Commission and disagreed with its conclusion that in operation the disputed tariffs would violate § 216 (d) which forbids undue preferences and advantages that lead to unjust discrimination. The exercise of judgment by the Commission and by the court
traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, port, gateway, locality, or description of traffic to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be construed to apply to discriminations, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever description.”
7See § 217 (a), (b).
in appraising the same evidence has led to these opposing conclusions.
The tariffs apply on “ ‘All freight’ (except as otherwise provided . . .), which has been transported to . . . [an] origin station . . . , as a part of a truck-load consignment or carload consignment moving under tariffs or schedules lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and immediately reshipped in the original packages as an L. T. L. [less than truck-load] shipment: or
“(b) ‘All freight’, . . . which is to be transported to ... [a named] destination station ... as an L. T. L. shipment, and immediately reshipped in the original package as part of a truck-load consignment or carload assignment moving under tariffs or schedules lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.”
It is evident that these special tariffs are available only to shippers who intend and are able (a) to arrange immediate further transportation in carloads or truck-loads for commodities that have been carried in less than truck-load lots, or (b) to move commodities in less than truck-load lots immediately after they have been carried as part of a carload or truck-load. While, as has been noted, some few large shippers may possibly avail of the tariffs, there is no question about the finding of the court below that the “principal traffic which will be carried under the suspended rates is what is called by the Commission ‘freight forwarder traffic.’ ”
Almost since its inception the Commission has been called upon to exercise its judgment relative to the Interstate Commerce Act as applied to forwarders.9 Initial hostility of the railroads caused them to deny forwarders the advantage of their published rates. However, when
Opinion of the Court. 310U.S.
called upon to decide, the Commission held that the railroads’ action discriminated against forwarders and declared forwarders to be entitled as shippers to published carload rates. This Court sustained the action of the Commission.1011
About 1920, prior to the Motor Carriers Act, forwarders began to utilize motor carriers. Forwarders and truckers operated under individual contracts providing divisions of the complete line haul charge. After the tariff provisions of the Motor Carriers Act went into effect, forwarders filed tariff schedules with the Interstate Commerce Commission on the assumption that they were subject to the Act as common carriers. Tariffs so filed were, however, ordered cancelled by the Commission upon the ground that forwarders were not motor carriers subject to the Act. A three judge District Court upheld the Commission11 and this Court affirmed.12
Here, the complaint itself has alleged that the so-called “proportional” tariffs under consideration “name rates which are identical with” the divisions of through L. C. L. rates which respondents would have received had the forwarders’ tariffs been upheld. And, as stated by the Commission, “Stripped of protective coloring, these rates are published as proportional rates primarily as a matter of expediency to serve the purpose of certain freight forwarders and to perpetuate in another form so-called divisions of purported joint rates of the freight forwarders.”
Respondents contend that the Commission improperly concluded that the canceled tariffs create undue preferences or advantages resulting in unjust discriminations in
12 Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 309 U. S. 638. [p. 351] violation of 216 (d) because there was no evidence that the suspended rates would subject any particular person or type of traffic to disadvantage or injury; while the suspended rates, applicable on all classes of traffic, might be lower as to some commodities, the aggregate compensation from them would not be less than that from like local traffic if all such local traffic is considered; services rendered by respondents to the forwarders are unlike and less burdensome than local services rendered individual shippers; services rendered the forwarders are on longer hauls than on other local less than truck-load commodity traffic; terminal services rendered forwarders by respondents are less expensive than in the case of other shippers; forwarders bear the expense of soliciting business thereby relieving respondents of that burden; the only evidence before the Commission was introduced by respondents; and no shippers complained of injury.13
Weighty as these arguments were, they did not persuade the Commission that forwarders could without discrimination be given lower L. T. L. rates than other shippers. The Commission was impressed by the facts that the proposed rates were not in reality available to all of the shipping public and in practical effect would operate for the special benefit of the forwarders and would not benefit the owner of goods shipped; that § 216 (d) of the Act represented a manifestation of the congressional purpose in Part I, § 2, and Part II, § 202 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, to prevent favoritism by insuring equality of treatment on rates for substantially similar services; and that the proposed tariff would afford “forwarders . . . , and possibly a very few large shippers . . . , transportation at rates lower
Opinion of the Court. 310U.S.
than the rates which . . . [would] be charged certain other shippers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, in violation of Section 216 (d).” Moved by these considerations, the Commission concluded that the mere fact that forwarders might ordinarily furnish a volume of traffic greater than but identical in kind with that furnished by individual shippers did not justify lower rates for forwarders.
“It is not disputable that from the beginning the very purpose for which the Commission was created was to bring into existence a body which from its peculiar character would be most fitted to primarily decide whether from facts, disputed or undisputed, in a given case preference or discrimination existed.”14 And where a court substituted “its judgment as to the existence of preference for that of the Commission on the ground that where there was no dispute as to the facts it had a right to do so, [the court] obviously exerted an authority not conferred upon it by the statute.”1516So here, it has been pointed out that there was no dispute in the evidence before the Commission, all of which was introduced by respondents. But the differing inferences as to discrimination finding possible support in that evidence are made to stand out by the persuasive reasoning advanced in both the majority and minority opinions of the Commission. The Interstate Commerce Act does not attempt to define an unlawful discrimination with mathematical precision. Instead, different treatment for similar transportation services is made an unlawful discrimination when “undue,” “unjust,” “unfair,” and “unreasonable.” And the courts have always recognized that Congress intended to commit to the Commission the determination, by application of an informed judgment
16 Id.
to existing facts, of the existence of forbidden preferences, advantages and discrimination.16
A special allowance to a forwarder as an inducement to ship goods by a particular carrier would be an illegal rebate.17 Similarly, and as previously pointed out, forwarders are shippers protected by the Interstate Commerce Act from discrimination by carriers.18 As shippers, forwarders do business subject to the paramount principle that Congress intended our national transportation system to operate without favoritism. Pursuant to its duty to apply that principle upon a national scale, the Commission can prevent unjust rate discrimination by carriers against other shippers and in favor of forwarders. The particular problem here involved is but a segment of the larger complicated national problem of rates with which the Commission must deal. As exemplified by this record, the Commission is “informed by experience”19 of years in its consideration of the relationship of forwarders to our national transportation system.
The fact that the Commission acted on its motion without complaints by individual shippers did not detract
ie Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 304; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., supra, at 255; Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 481. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 162 U. S. 197, represents an apparent exception, at an early date before the function of the Commission had become fully outlined against the background of time and the empiric pattern of litigation. (Commission’s bill to enforce its holding that the difference between domestic and imported merchandise could not justify different rates between the port of reception and point of delivery, ordered dismissed).
18 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., supra, at 255.
269631°—40----- 23
Syllabus. 310 U. S.
from the Commission’s power to protect and maintain a transportation system free from partiality to particular shippers. The Commission acted in its capacity as a public agency and carried out duties imposed upon it by Congress in the interest of shippers generally, the national transportation system and the public interest.20 Its order was the embodiment of the Commission’s judgment that the proposed tariff was a discrimination prohibited by the Act. “The judgment so exercised, being supported by ample evidence, is conclusive.”21
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the bill is ordered dismissed.
Reversed.
EX PARTE BRANSFORD, COUNTY TREASURER OF PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA, ETC.
No. —, Original. Argued April 23,1940.—Decided May 20, 1940.
1. Mandamus is proper to review error of a district court in refusing to call in additional judges, under Jud. Code § 266, in a suit praying an interlocutory injunction against state officers. P. 355. 2. The application for mandamus may be made by one of several defendants. P. 356.
3. A suit by a national bank to enjoin the collection of a state tax is not a suit to restrain the enforcement of a statute of the State "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute,” within the meaning of Jud. Code § 266, where the bill makes no attack upon the state legislation involved but alleges that state officials have misconstrued it and have made an assessment which is unconstitutional because excessive and discriminatory and which is also invalid because it discriminates against national bank shares in violation of R. S. § 5219, and includes preferred shares of the bank owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which are exempt under the Act of Congress of March 20,1936. P. 357.
A petition for an injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which requires a three-judge court,
is to be distinguished from one based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter does not require a three-judge court, its attack being aimed at allegedly erroneous administrative action. Motion denied.
On a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus and on the respondent’s return to a rule to show cause.
Mr. Gerald Jones, with whom Mr. John Mercer Johnson was on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. J. L. Gust for David W. Ling, U. S. District Judge, respondent.
Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court.
The county treasurer and ex-officio tax collector of Pima County, Arizona, moves to file a tendered petition for a writ of mandamus to be directed to District Judge Ling of the federal district court for that state. A rule to show cause has issued and the return has been made. Petitioner, a county treasurer, and other officials are defendants together with their counties, in a suit brought in the district court by the Valley National Bank in which the Bank is seeking an interlocutory and permanent injunction against the collection of certain taxes by the counties. The district judge has ruled that he will hear the case while sitting alone and petitioner contends that under § 266 of the Judicial Code he is entitled to have the case heard before three judges. Mandamus is the proper remedy.1
Arizona taxes shares of bank stock in the name of the shareholders and requires the bank to pay for them.12 [p. 356] Assessments are made in the first instance by county assessors, with an appeal allowed first to a county and then to a state board of equalization. The state board returns the final assessment with a levy of the rate for state purposes to the county supervisors. This body adds the several local rates and places the assessment upon the tax roll. Collection is performed by the county treasurer,3 and the taxes collected are apportioned between state and county.4 Where a bank is doing business in several counties the value of its stock is apportioned among the counties in accordance with the assets located in each.5 Because other property in the state has been under-assessed the state board in 1935 ordered that bank shares be valued at 75% of capital stock, surplus and undivided profit. Assets, borrowings, deposits and other liabilities are disregarded.
The petitioner is the only defendant to apply for mandamus. As the issuance of such an order depends on the jurisdiction of the single district judge, sitting alone, over the suit pending in the district court, this is sufficient. As the issues with this petitioner in that suit include those with all other defendants, we do not need to state the issues arising with the officials of counties other than Pima. The Bank states its controversy with the petitioner arose in the following manner. The Bank had branches in several counties. It had common capital stock, a surplus and undivided profits. Also the Bank had an issue of preferred which it had sold to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation prior to the time of the 1935 assessment at the par value of $1,240,000 and which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation still owns. Taking the position that the preferred owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation could not be taxed, [p. 357] 354 Opinion of the Court.
3
Id., § 3110.
4
Id., § 3111.
5
Id., § 3071.
the Bank reported a total value of $524,629.50, 75% of $699,026 (the amount of its common, surplus, undivided profits and reserves), as the total taxable value of its shares, and apportioned this among the counties according to the assets there located. On this basis $139,088.80, 26.53% of its total taxable value, was apportioned to Pima County. The assessor of Pima County made an assessment of $327,590, the “actual cash value of the real and personal property” situated in Pima County. By agreement of the parties, the Bank paid the amount which under its computation was due Pima County, the right to litigate the validity of the county’s assessment being reserved. Subsequently, the petitioner having threatened to institute proceedings to enforce the county’s assessment, the Bank brought its suit in the district court to enjoin collection.
The Bank by its bill in the district court seeks an injunction upon several grounds. We are of the opinion that none of these compels the trial judge to call a three-judge court under § 266.
The assessment in Pima County was made in the amount of the value of the Bank’s real estate and personal property. It is therefore, says the Bank, impossible to tell whether the assessment is the valuation of the property, the proportion of the value of the common stock alone or that of the aggregate of the common and preferred. An assessment upon the property, it is alleged, is “void as unauthorized by the statutes of Arizona.” If the valuation includes the preferred stock, the complaint alleges it is invalid because of the Act of March 20, 1936, exempting the preferred stock while owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.6 If the valuation is upon the common stock alone, it is said to be invalid (1) because the valuation is far beyond the actual value and therefore confiscatory and (2) because the valuation is discrimina-
*49 Stat. 1185.
Opinion of the Court. 310U.S.
tory since the common stock in other banks is assessed at 75% of the value of common stock, surplus and undivided profits and other classes of property at sixty per cent of its actual value, while this valuation is on the basis of approximately twice the common stock, surplus and undivided profits of the bank and twice its actual value. It is further alleged that this excessive and discriminatory valuation violates R. S. § 5219 which limits the rate of taxation of national bank shares to that assessed “upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens . . . coming into competition with the business of national banks.” It is prayed that action under these assessments for the reasons stated be enjoined as violative of the Constitution and laws of the United States and Arizona.
Section 266 lays down as one of the requirements for a three-judge court that the injunction against the officer of the state to restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of the state statute must be sought “upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute.”
In so far as it is alleged that the assessments are void because unauthorized by the Arizona statute, the injunction sought is obviously not upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the state statute as tested by the Federal Constitution.
The allegations that the assessments should be enjoined because violative of the statute exempting preferred stock owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and R. S. § 5219 depend upon no constitutional provision within the meaning of Judicial Code § 266. If such assessments are invalid, it is because they levy taxes upon property withdrawn from taxation by federal law 7 or in a manner forbidden by the National Banking Act.8 The
8R. S. § 5219; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S-664, 668.
declaration of the supremacy clause91011gives superiority to valid federal acts over conflicting state statutes but this superiority for present purposes involves merely the construction of an act of Congress, not the constitutionality of the state enactment. This was decided as to § 266 in Ex parte Buder,w and before that a similar result had been reached in *Lemke v. Farmers Grain Company*11 in regard to a provision of the Judicial Code granting direct appeal to this Court in cases where the sole issue12 was the unconstitutionality of a state statute.13
It is said, however, that the allegations of confiscation and discrimination in valuation of the common shares in comparison with the stock of other banks and other property show the injunction is sought upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute. This point depends upon excessive valuation of the shares. The validity of the statute itself is not involved. Variations by assessors in valuations of like property, taxable under the same statute, sufficiently marked to be discriminatory under the Constitution or valuations so large as to be confiscatory cannot properly be said to be the basis for attack on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Such assessments, if made and if invalid, are so because of a wrong done by officers under the statute rather than because of the requirement of the statute itself.14
But it is said by the petitioner here that the last sentence of § 3071 requires this excessive and discrimina-
9 Art. VI, cl. 2: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .”
Opinion of the Court. 310U.S.
tory assessment. That sentence reads: “When a bank maintains branches or conducts business in more than one county, city or town, the assessed value of the capital stock shall be apportioned among the several counties, cities and towns in which the main office or such branches are maintained or business conducted, and the amount apportioned to each county, city or town shall not be less than the actual cash value of the real and personal property of such bank situated in such county, city or town.” If this is interpreted as requiring that the apportionment of the value of the capital stock to each county must not be less than the tangible property in that county, the aggregate apportionment may be much larger than the assessed value of the stock. A greater assessment per share will occur if the total valuation is allocated to common shares only. If the valuation, reached under the formula by treating the preferred as capital stock, is allocated among the common shares, only, it would mean that the preferred was treated as stock for purposes of the valuation and disregarded for the assessment of individual shares. The argument of petitioner is that if the result, as he contends the Bank alleges, violates the Federal Constitution by discrimination of common shares as compared to shares of other banks without preferred stock or owners of other property, the statute violates it. Therefore, in effect, the attack on the constitutionality of the assessment is an attack on the constitutionality of the statute.
The contention of the Bank, however, is that the assessor misinterpreted the statute; that the objectionable aspect of the assessment is the attribution to the common of the whole amount instead of an apportionment to both preferred and common or the use of the preferred as capital stock in the state valuation formula. We are not now called upon to reach any conclusion upon the meaning of the Arizona tax statutes. If the trial court [p. 361] determines that the assessment complained of is made properly under the statute and that by the statute the assessment is to be prorated among the common shares, it would determine only a question of statutory construction. It is necessary to distinguish between a petition for injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which requires a three-judge court,15 and a petition which seeks an injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter petition does not require a three-judge court.16 In such a case the attack is aimed at an allegedly erroneous administrative action.17 Until the complainant in the district court attacks the constitutionality of the statute, the case does not require the convening of a three-judge court, any more than if the complaint did not seek an interlocutory injunction.18 Where by an omission to attack the constitutionality of a state statute, its validity is admitted for the purposes of the bill, a determination by the trial court that the assessment accords with the statute would result in the refusal of the injunction and the dismissal of the bill. Jurisdiction, properly assumed, may be lost by the special court, when it appears that a prerequisite such as need for relief against state officers is lacking.19 Even where the statute is attacked as unconstitutional, § 266 is inapplicable unless the action complained of is directly attributable to the statute.20 There is no indication that Congress sought by § 266 to have every attack on the constitutionality of a state statute determined by a three-judge court.
Syllabus. 310 U. S.
It sought such a bench only to avoid precipitate determinations on constitutionality on motions for interlocutory injunctions.
As the foregoing ground adequately disposes of the petition for mandamus, we do not discuss the other reasons for refusal urged by the Bank.
The motion to file the petition for mandamus is
Denied.
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