Francis Henderson & wife v. Ira Griffin, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 151 (1831)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Francis Henderson & wife v. Ira Griffin, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 151 (1831)
Full caption
Francis Henderson and wife, Plaintiffs in error, v. Ira Griffin, Defendant in error.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1831
Francis Henderson and wife, Plaintiffs in error, v. Ira Griffin, [*151
Defendant in error.
State decisions.—Statute of uses.—Ejectment.—Costs of former suit.
The supreme court of the state of South Carolina having decided, that the act of the legislature of that state, of 1744, relative to the commencement, within two years, of actions of ejectment, after nonsuit, discontinuance, &c., is a part of the limitation act of 1812, and that a suit, commenced within the time prescribed, arrests the limitation; and this being the decision of the highest judicial tribunal on the construction of a state law relating to titles and real property must be regarded by this court as the rule to bind its judgment. That court having decided on the construction of a will, according to their view of the rules of the common law in that state, as a rule of property, this decision comes within the principle adopted by this court in Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 167, that such decisions are entitled to the same respect as those which are given on the construction of local statutes. ^here an estate was devised to A. and B., in trust for C. and her heirs, the estate, by the settled rules of the courts of law and equity in South Carolina, as applied to the statute of uses of 27 Hen. VIII., c. 10, in force in that state, passed at once to the object of the trust, as soon as the will took effect, by the death of the testator; the interposition of the names of A. and B. had no other legal operation than to make them the conduits through whom the estate was to Pass, and they could not sustain an ejectment for the land. C., the grandchild of the testator, 18 a purchaser under the will, deriving all her rights from the will of the testator, and obtaining title from A. and B.; and A. and B. were as much strangers to the estate, as if their names were not to be found in the will.
Th
e case contemplated in the law of 1744, by which a plaintiff or any other person claiming under one who had brought an ejectment for land, which suit had failed by verdict and judgment
against him, or by nonsuit or discontinuance, &c., is empowered to commence his action for the recovery of the said lands de novo, is clearly a case where the right of the plaintiff in the first suit passes to the plaintiff in the second; where it must depend upon some interest or right of action which has become vested in him by purchase or descent, from the person Claiming the land in the former suit.
It would be quite a new principle in the law of ejectment and limitations, that the intention to assert the right was equivalent to its being actually done; it is settled law, that an entry on land, by one having the right, has the same effect in arresting the progress of the limitation as a suit; but it cannot be sustained as a legal proposition, that an entry by one having no right is of any avail.
Where the court ordered the costs to be paid; of a former ejectment brought by the plaintiffs, in the names of other persons, but for their use, before the plaintiff could prosecute a second suit, in his own name, for the same land, this was not a judicial decision that the right of the plaintiffs in the first suit was the same with that of the plaintiffs in the second suit; it was perfectly consistent with the justice of the case, that when the plaintiffs sued the same defendant, in their own name, for the same land, they should reimburse him for the past costs to which they had subjected him, before they should be permitted to proceed further. Rules of this kind are granted by the court to meet the justice and exigencies of cases as they occur; *15*21 uot depending solely on the interest *which those who are subjected to such rules may
J have in the subject-matter of suits which they bring and prosecute in the names of
others; but on a variety of circumstances, which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may furnish a proper ground for their interference.
Error to the Circuit Court of South Carolina. This was an action of trespass, instituted in the circuit court, to try titles, according to the forms prescribed by the local law of South Carolina ; by which this action is substituted for an ejectment.
The plaintiffs proved a good title to a tract of land, in Abbeville district, South Carolina, under the will of Henry Laurens, who devised the land in •question to Dr. and Mrs. Ramsay, and their heirs, in trust for the use and hehoof of Frances Eleanor Laurens (now the wife of Francis Henderson), during her life, &c. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for a part of the said land, with damages. But the defendant having set up a claim under the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs, in reply, showed, from the records of the state court, that this action was commenced the 29th of May 1823, and on the 21st of November 1823, a rule was made and entered by the said court, against the plaintiffs, in these words : “ Francis Henderson and wife v. John Carey, and the Same v. Other Defendants, to the number of forty, including Ira Griffin. On reading the affidavit of Henry Gray, it is ordered, that the plaintiffs show cause, on Monday morning, why all proceedings in these cases should not be stayed, until the costs of the actions prosecuted in the names of the heirs of David Ramsay, by the same plaintiffs, in the state court, against the same defendants, be paid.” On the return of this rule, counsel were heard for and against it; and on the 20th of April 1824, the court ordered, that upon a taxed bill of costs in the state court being made out, the same be forthwith paid by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in the circuit court, by their counsel, showed on the trial, that the suit in the state court, prosecuted in the name of the heirs of David Ramsay, against the defendant, was regularly discontinued in that court, on the 23d of October 1822, and they were compelled to pay the costs of that suit, before they could proceed with the present. And the plaintiffs [p. 99] counthe present suit ought to be joined and connected with the said former suit in the state court. But the court, admitting that the plaintiffs’ title was not barred at the commencement of the first suit, instructed the jury, that the present suit could not be connected with the former, and the jury found a verdict accordingly. To which instruction and finding, the plaintiffs’ counsel excepted, and prosecuted this writ of error.
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.. sei contended, that the title was not barred by the *act of limitations, $ J when the suit in the name of the heirs of Ramsay was commenced, and the act did not run against the plaintiffs since that time, inasmuch as
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error claimed to reverse the judgment in the circuit court, because the suit in the state court, in the name of the heirs of Ramsay, trustees for the plaintiffs, ought to have been connected with the present action ; being for the same land, under the same title, and by the showing of the same defendant, upon the records of the court, prosecuted by the same plaintiffs, in the name of their trustees.
The case was argued by Wirt and McDuffie, for the plaintiffs in error ; and by Warren D. Davis, for the defendant.
For the plaintiffs, it was contended, that the suit in the state court, and that which was subsequently instituted in the circuit court, being substantially between the same parties, and for the same tract of land, was fully within the provision of the act of assembly of South Carolina, which saved the parties to such a suit from the effect of the limitation. The 10th section of the act of 1744 declares, that if, in an action of ejectment, there shall be a nonsuit or discontinuance, or letting fall of the action, it shall not be conclusive; and the party may institute another suit, within two years, and thus have the benefit of the time in which the first suit was instituted. The object of the first suit was, to maintain the title of the cestuis que trust, and the names of the heirs of Mr. Ramsay were used for no purposes of their own, but only with the same object as that in the present suit. They were parties to that suit in form only ; essentially, Mr. and Mrs. Henderson were the plaintiffs. The defendant, by the first suit, had notice of the plaintiffs’ title ; thus they were within the words, as *w’ell as the spirit, of the exception in the law of South Carolina. 2 McCord 252 ; L 2 Brev. Stat, of S. C. 21, 24.
The order on the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the suit in the state court, showed, that there was, in the opinion of the court, a connection between the suits. One was deemed a continuation of the other. Tidd’s Pract. 479, 480 ; 3 Bos. & Pul. 22 ; 2 Esp. 75, 493 ; 1 Str. 1192 ; 8 Cranch 462.
Davis, ior the defendant, insisted, that the parties to the two suits were different. The legal title, asserted in the suit in the state court, was claimed to be in the plaintiffs in that suit ; and in the suit now before the court, other parties sought to maintain their legal title. The provisions of the law of South Carolina applied only to cases between the same parties, and who claimed, in the second suit, the title set up by them in the first suit.
Baldwin, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.—The action in the court below was brought to try title to a tract of land, in Abbeville district, claimed by the plaintiffs, under the will of Henry Laurens ; and by the defendant, in virtue of a possession of five years, which, by the limitation law of South Carolina, gives a good title.
On the trial of the cause, it appeared, that Henry Laurens, being seised [p. 100] in fee of the premises in controversy, devised the same to his daughter, Mrs. Ramsay, and to Dr. Ramsay, “to hold the same, to them and their heirs, in trust for the use and behoof of his grand-daughter, Frances Eleanor Laurens, wife of the plaintiff, during her life, &c.” On the 23d of October 1822, the heirs of David Ramsay, claiming by the will aforesaid, brought their action against the defendant, in the state court of South Carolina, to recover the land claimed by him, which was part of a larger tract of land, devised to Mrs. Henderson by the will of Mr. Laurens. The supreme court, on argument, decided that the legal estate was in those •for whose use it was devised, and that the action could not be sustained in the name of the heirs of Ramsay. Ilamsay and others Trustees v. Marsh, [p. 101] courts, both of law and equity, as applied to the statute of uses of 27 Hen. VIII., c. 10, in force in South Carolina, there was, according to the principle of the decision of the state court, nothing executory in the trust. Mr. or Mrs. Ramsay were to do no act, before both the legal and beneficial interest vested in the devisee in trust. The estate never vested in them for a moment, but passed directly to the objects of the trust, as soon as the will took effect by the death of the testator. The interposition of the names of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, had no other legal operation than to make them the conduits through whom the estate was to pass. The application of the statute of Henry VIII. to a will, gives it the effect of a deed of bargain and sale to uses ; they are only modes of passing title. Haying no legal operation to vest the legal estate in the names used as the conduits or instruments of conveyance, the effect of either would be the same, if the grant or devise were made directly to the purposes and uses declared, transferring both the title and possession. “ The statute conveys the possession to the use, and transfers the use into possession, thereby making the cestui que use complete owner of the lands and tenements, as well at law as in equity. The possession thus transferred is not a mere seisin or possession in law, but an actual seisin and possession in fact; not a mere title to enter upon the land, but an actual estate.” 2 McCord 254.
2
McCord 252. *Whereupon, the suit was discontinued, on the 23d ° J of October 1822. At the commencement of that suit, five years had not expired from the time of the defendant’s entry on the land ; but they had expired when the present action was brought, on the 29th of May 1823 : so that the only question arising in this action is, whether the two suits can be so connected, that the present can relate back to the former one, and thus bring it, by legal intendment, within the five years. The circuit court being of opinion, that the two suits could not be connected, a verdict and judgment passed for the defendant; and this is the only error assigned. The plaintiffs in error rest their case on the following clause of an act of assembly of South Carolina, passed in 1744. (2 Brevard’s Digest 24.} “And in case verdict and judgment shall pass against the plaintiff in such action, or that he suffers a nonsuit or discontinuance, or any otherwise lets fall the same, such verdict or judgment, nonsuit or discontinuance, or other letting fall the action or suit aforesaid, shall not be conclusive and definitive on the part of such plaintiff; but at any time within two years, the said plaintiff, or any other person or persons claiming by, from and under him, shall have right, and is hereby empowered to commence his action for the recovery of the said lands and tenements de novo, and prosecute the same, in the manner, and with the expedition, herein-before directed.” The supreme court of that state have decided that this law is considered as a part of the limitation act of 1712, and that a suit commenced within the time prescribed arrests the limitation ^Kdson v. Davis, 5 McCord 555-6) : and this being a decision of their highest judicial tribunal on the construction of a state law relating to titles and real property, it must be adopted by us, as the rule to guide our judgment; and this brings the merits of this case to this single question, whether the plaintiffs claim by, from or under David Ramsay’s heirs? The opinion of the court in the case of Kennedy v. Marsh, was an able and deliberate one; it was. a judicial construction of the will of Mr. Laurens, according to their view of the rules of the common law in that state, as a rule of property, and comes within the principle adopted by this court in Jackson n. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 167, that such decisions
*
. are ^entitled to the same respect as those which are given on the 6 J construction of local statutes. By so considering it, and adopting it as a rule by which to decide this case, it follows, conclusively, that if there was no such estate in the heirs of Dr. Ramsay as would authorize them to sustain an ejectment under this will, in their own names, the trust in the will was one clearly executed in Mrs. Henderson. By the settled rules of
This decided opinion of the highest court of South Carolina renders it unnecessary for this court to express their own opinion on this will. Thus construed, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Ramsay ever had, and their heirs never could have, any right or estate in the premises so devised by Mr. Laurens, in law or equity—no right of entry, possession or ultimate enjoyment. They could not take the rents and profits, as the entire estate of the devisor vested in the devisee ; they could, therefore, sustain no ejectment, which must be founded on a right of *possession. Mrs. Henderson is a purchaser, directly under the will of her grandfather, deriving all her rights L from him. There being not a spark of right in the Ramsays, she could by no possibility claim by, from or under them. There was no privity of estate between them ; the Ramsays formed no link in the chain of title from the person last seised to the plaintiff. They were as much strangers to the estate in law, as if their names were not to be found in the will; and there could be, in no principle of law, any connection between the present and the former suit. The case contemplated in the law of 1744 is clearly one where the right of the plaintiff in the first suit passes to the plaintiff in the second, where it must depend upon some interest or right of action, which has become vested in him by purchase or descent from the person claiming the land in the former suit.
These are the views which inevitably result from the local laws, expounded by the highest court in the state ; in accordance with which, the right of Mrs. Henderson was as perfect on the death of Mr. Laurens, as it could be afterwards. She might have supported her ejectment against Griffin, at the time when the heirs of Ramsay brought theirs ; and this is not the case provided for by the law; which, in our opinion, applies only to the case of a suit brought to enforce a right derived from the first plaintiff. To give the law any other interpretation would be to establish in South Carolina the principle, that an action brought by a person having no right, title or interest in land, in the actual possession of a person claiming it for [p. 102] himself, would arrest the act of limitation, and prevent its running on the right of a stranger to the suit. It would be doing violence to the law, to give it this meaning.
The plaintiffs’ counsel seem to consider this as a case where the first ejectment was brought by a trustee, and the second by a cestui que trust; but this is not such an one. If the construction given to the will is to be considered as the law of the case, the will of Mr. Laurens did not sever his interest in the estate devised to his grand-daughter; the legal was not separated from the equitable estate ; but the whole passed unbroken by the will. So that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust never subsisted. The utmost extent of the argument drawn from this alleged analogy in favor of the *plaintiff would be, that the heirs of Ramsay brought -1 the first suit in assertion of the title of Mr. Laurens, but for the want
of privity, they could not bring it to bear on the defendant, in their names. It would be quite a new principle in the law of ejectment and limitation, that the intention to assert the right was equivalent to its being actually done.
It is settled law, that an entry on the land, by one having the right, has the same effect in arresting the progress of the limitation as a suit ; but it cannot be sustained as a legal proposition, that an entry by one having no right, is of any avail. If the use or trust was executory ; if the legal title had remained in the Ramsays, as trustees, until they had done some act to vest it in the devisee, as the cestui que trust, there would be great force in the reasoning of the plaintiffs’ counsel. But here there is no estate devised to Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay in trust. The statute, according to the local law of South Carolina, operates to make the devise directly to Mrs. Henderson.
The only remaining point made by the plaintiffs, is that which arises from the following rule made by the circuit court in this cause, on the 21st of November 1823. “On reading the affidavit of Henry Gray, it is ordered that the plaintiffs show cause, on Monday morning, why all proceedings in these cases should not be stayed, until the costs of the action prosecuted in the names of the heirs of David Ramsay, by the same plaintiffs, in the state court, against the same defendants, be paid.” In pursuance of which rule, the plaintiffs paid the costs in the action referred to. Assuming the fact stated in the rule to be true, that the plaintiffs brought these suits in the name of David Ramsay’s heirs, it shows no more than that it was a case which, by the rules and practice of all courts, authorized the order made by the circuit court. Costs had accrued to the defendant, by a suit brought and prosecuted by the plaintiffs in this suit, in the name of those who had no right to the land. It was perfectly consistent with the justice of the case, that when these plaintiffs sued the same defendant, in their own name, for the same land, they should reimburse him for the past costs to which they had subjected him, before they should be permitted to proceed further. Rules of this kind are granted by courts to meet the justice and exigencies [p. 103] interest in the subject, or that it was identical with one afterwards brought by A., in his own name, for the same property. It was the exercise of a summary power to compel what, under the circumstances of the particular case, the court consider to be justice to a party, in defending himself against an unfounded claim. The case before the circuit court was a proper one for the exercise of their discretionary powers, but their rule can have no possible bearing on the question in issue between the parties in the action.
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of cases as they occur, not depending *solely on the interest which J those who are subjected to such rules may have in the subject-matter of suits which they bring and prosecute in the names of others ; but on a variety of circumstances which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may furnish a proper ground for their interference. A rule on A., to pay the costs of a suit in the name of B., is no judicial decision that he had any
It is, therefore, the opinion of the court, that there is no error in the record ; the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.
This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, and was argued by counsel: On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that there is no error in the judgment of the said circuit court; whereupon, it is considered, ordered and adjudged, that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
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John Backhouse, surviving Administrator de bonis non of * John Backhouse, deceased, James Hunter and Martha L Hunter, and James Hunter and John M. Garnett, Executors of Mubcoe G. Hunter, Archibald Hunter and Adam Hunter, George W. Spotswood and William L. Spotswood, Executors of Alexander Spotswood, and Margaret Jones, Executrix of Gabriel Jones, who was Executor of Thomas, Lord Fairfax, v. Robert Patton, Administrator de bonis non, cum testamento annexo of James Hunter, deceased, Joseph Ennever, Administrator of Adam Hunter, deceased, James Hunter, son of John Hunter, deceased, who was heir of Adam Hunter, Robert Dunbar, the said Robert Dunbar, Administrator of Alexander Vass, John Strode, Robert Randolph, Executor of William Fitzhugh, deceased, Hugh Mercer and Robert Hening. Legal and equitable assets.—Application ofpayments In Virginia, the moneys arising from the sale of personal property are called legal assets, in the hands of an executor or administrator; and those which arise from the sale of real property are denominated equitable assets. By the law, the executor or administrator is required, out of the legal assets, to pay the creditors of the estate, according to the dignity of their demands but the equitable assets are applied equally to all the creditors, in proportion to their claims. Legal and equitable assets were in the hands of an administrator, he being also commissioner to sell the real estate of a deceased person; and by decree of the court of chancery he was directed to make payment of debts due by the intestate, out of the funds in his hands, without directing in what manner the two funds should be applied ; payments were made under this decree, to the creditors, by the administrator and commissioner, without his stating, or in any way making known, whether the same were made from the equitable or legal assets—a balance remaining in his hands, unpaid to those entitled to the same, the sureties of the administrator, after his decease, claimed to have the whole of the payments made under the decree credited to the legal assets, in order to obtain a discharge from their liability for the due administration of the legal assets : Held, that their principal having omitted to designate the fund out of which the payments were made, they could not do so. Where debts of different dignities are due to a creditor of the estate of an intestate, and on specific application of the payment made by an administrator is directed by him, if the creditor
applies the payment to either of his debts, by some unequivocal act, his right to do so cannot be questioned. Qwcere ? Whether the application must be made by the creditor, at the time, or within a reasonable time afterwards ? , * There may be cases where no indication having been given as to the application of the
> payment, by the debtor or creditor, the law will make it; but it cannot be admitted,
that in such cases, the payment will be uniformly applied to the extinguishment of a debt of the highest dignity ; that there have been authorities which favor such an application, is true; but they have been controverted by other adjudications. Where an administrator has had a reasonable time to make his election, as to the appropriation of payments made by him, it is too late to do so, after a controversy has arisen; and it is not competent for the sureties of the administrator to exonerate themselves from responsibility, by attempting to give a construction to his acts, which seems not to have been given by himself.
This cause came before the Court on a certificate of a division of opinion in the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia. In that court, a bill was filed on the equity side of the court, for the recovery of debts, by John Backhouse’s administrator and others. The facts of the case, as agreed on the argument, were :
James Hunter died testate and insolvent, charging his estate, both real and personal, with the payment of debts. This suit was originally brought by Rebecca Backhouse, administratrix of John Backhouse, deceased, one of the creditors, in the circuit court of the United States for the middle circuit of Virginia, against said Hunter’s executor ; who dying during its pendency, Robert Patton, the defendant, was appointed administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, and gave bond and security accordingly. The suit having abated by the death of the executor, was revived against Patton. In 1803, it was decreed, that the real estate should be sold for the payment of debts, and Patton and others were appointed commissioners for that purpose, to hold the proceeds of such sale, subject to the order of court.
In the management of the estate, divers sums of money came into the hands of Patton, both as commissioner and administrator. After various alterations of the parties, by death and otherwise, and divers interlocutory decrees, ordering payments to be made ratably to creditors, as their claims were ascertained by the court, a decree was made, on the 12th of June 1820, against Patton, as commissioner and administrator ; whereby it was ordered and adjudged, that he should pay a certain sum, to be ratably apportioned among certain creditors therein mentioned. *It was also ordered by
■ said decree, that a commissioner of court should examine and report upon the administration accounts of said defendant. This examination was had, and a report made, on the 24th of November 1820. After the return of this report, to wit, on the 15th of June 1821, it was decreed, that the said defendant should pay a further sum, to be apportioned among the creditors as therein directed. Upon this decree, executions were issued and returned “ nulla bona.” Whereupon, a supplemental bill was filed, seeking to make the sureties for the faithful administration of Patton accountable for his waste.
One of the sureties failed to appear and answer, and the bill, as to him, was taken pro confesso; the other appeared and answered. When the cause came on for hearing against the sureties, the insolvency of Patton, and the amount of assets which came to his hands to be administered on, were not controverted. Patton having made satisfactory arrangements to [p. 105] secure the payment of the sum adjudged against him by the decree of the 12th day of June 1820, as to the present question, it was considered as paid. It was contended by the defendant, that the whole sum adjudged to be paid by Patton, under the decree of the 12th of June 1820, amounting to $23,322.56, should go to his credit as administrator.
At the hearing in the circuit court, the questions presented by the counsel of the parties, and argued before the court were the following, to wit:
1. Whether the whole of the said payments made by the said Robert Patton, under the said decree of the 12th of June 1820, was to be applied entirely to the debt due from him as commissioner of the court for the sale of the real estate, so as to leave his sureties for due administration liable for the whole balance in his hands as administrator de bonis non ? or—
2. Whether the payment ought to be applied to the debt due from R. Patton, as administrator, on his administration account ? or—
3. Whether the payment ought to be applied to the debts due by him in both characters, as commissioner of the court, and as administrator de bonis non, ratably, in proportion to the amounts of those responsibilities?
*The court holding the negative on the first question, and being divided on the second and third, they were adjourned to the supreme *■ court.
The complainants, by their counsel, contended, in the circuit court, that the whole sum of $23,322.56, adjudged, against Patton by the decree of the 12th of June 1820, ought not to go to the credit of his responsibility as administrator ; and that his sureties cannot claim more than its ratable apportionment, according to the amount of their respective responsibilities of commissioner and administrator.
Haynes, for the complainants, argued :—1. That the sureties of Patton as administrator could not avail themselves of any defence which could not avail their principal. 2. If the whole amount of the decree of 1820 should be placed to the credit of Patton’s responsibility as administrator, it would give his sureties an illegal and inequitable priority over the other creditors.
3. It would virtually repeal the law requiring bonds and security for administrators. 4. It would make the realty a guarantee for the faithful administration of the personalty, by releasing the sureties for such administrators.
Patton, on the part of the representatives and sureties, read the argument of Mr. Chapman Johnson.
The argument urged, that the true question before the court is, whether the payment as made shall be applied first in satisfaction of the balance due from the administrator ; and next, in satisfaction of that due from the commissioner ; or shall be applied ratably to the satisfaction of both. ’ The rule for the decision of this question must be found either in the decrees of the circuit court, or in the general principles of law governing the application of payments. It was admitted, that the court had the whole fund under its control, as well the legal asserts, which, under the law of Virginia, are the personal estate of the intestate, as the equitable assets, the proceeds of the real estate ; and could have directed *the payment out of either fund. * But it was argued, that no directions had been given by the court on L 16 [p. 106] 164 SURPREME COURT [Jan’y
this point; and therefore, the inquiry was as to the manner the amount of the decree should be applied by the law.
The authorities from the common and civil law, and the general doctrine as to the appropriation of payments, established the following principles by an entire harmony between those codes. 1. The debtor making the payment has the primary right to direct its application. 2. If he does not exercise this right, it devolves on the creditor. 3. If neither exercises it, within the time allowed by law, the law itself makes the application. 1 Evans’s Pothier on Obligations (Lond. ed.), part 3, art. 7, rules 1-5, and notes, page 363-74 ; Cornyn on Contracts, part 2, ch. 2, § 8, page 216-28 ; 16 Vin. Abr. Payment, M, 277 ; 1 Meriv. 585 ; 2 Str. 1195. The debtor’s right to make the application, however limited in point of time, is not restrained as to the manner. It is not necessary, that he should declare the application in express terms ; it is sufficient, if, from circumstances, it may be fairly inferred, that the payment was made in satisfaction of one of the debts. Newmarch v. Clay, 14 East 239 ; Tayloe n. Sandiford, 1 Wheat. 14. Although, by the civil law, as stated by Pothier, the debtor is required to make the application, at the time of the payment, this is not the doctrine and rule of the common law. This has been so decided by this court in the Mayor of Alexandria v. Patton, 4 Cranch 317 ; see also, 1 Wash. 128 ; United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720 ; 2 Barn. & Cres. 65.
It cannot be contended, that Patten was indebted to the creditors of Hunter, as administrator and as commissioner of the court. The only debt due by him, before the decree, was as administrator. As commissioner of the court, he owed them nothing, and was not authorized to pay them anything, except as directed by the decree of the court. * When the decree of 1820 directed him, the administrator *ahd
J commissioner, to pay specific sums, this w’as a personal decree, and he became indebted to them as an individual; his fiduciary character was merged in the decree, and to each creditor, he became indebted separately. When the debts so made due were paid, the creditor had no election to make, no application to declare. The right of the creditors to appropriate the payments had then nothing to do with the case ; and the right of the debtor to appropriate continued, on the authorities referred to, up to the period of the decrees in the circuit court.
As to the rule, “ that if both the debtor and creditor omit to appropriate payments, the law will apply them according to its own notions of justice,’ the following cases were referred to : 1 Vern. 24 ; 2 Brownl. 207 ; 12 Mod. 559 ; 1 Ld. Raym. 287. The application contended for is warranted by the situation in which the administrator was placed. He was bound to appropriate the fund to the discharge of his obligations as administrator, in preference to any claims on him as commissioner : and the law will look at these considerations, and make the same application. As administrator, he had given bond, which subjected him to many actions. Duties as administrator, exposed him to heavier responsibilities than as commissioner ; his oath of office obliged him to pay the debts of the intestate out of the legal assets. It was also contended, that the fifth rule in Pothier (374), which declares, il that if different debts are of the same date, and in other respects equal, the application should be made proportionably to each,” was applicable to this case. For this rule was also cited, 1 Vern. 34 ; 2 Ch. Cas. 83.
1831J OF THE UNITED STATES. 165
McLean, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.—This cause is brought before the court on a certificate of a division of opinion, in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia. The question presented for decision relates to the application of certain payments made by Patton, one of the defendants. The facts in the case are, substantially, as follows:
James Hunter, by his last will, devised his estate, real and *personal, to certain relatives, subject to the payment of his debts. L Patrick Home, one of the devisees and executors, being the surviving executor named in the will, having taken upon himself the execution of it, sold a part of the real estate to one Dunbar. The complainants, creditors of Hunter, brought their suit in the circuit court against Home, as executor and devisee, and against others, to set aside the sale to Dunbar, and obtain satisfaction of their debts. After having answered, Home died, in the spring of 1803 ; and administration de bonis non, on Hunter’s estate, was granted to Patton. Being made defendant, he filed his answer in 1803, and a decree was made, appointing him, John Minor, and another, commissioners, to sell, on twelve months’ credit, the unsold lands of Hunter, and to hold the proceeds subject to the order of the court. As administrator, Patton received personal property to a considerable amount; and in June 1803, sold such part of it as was salable, on a credit of twelve months. The remaining lands of Hunter’s estate, he and Minor, acting as the commissioners of the court, sold on the same credit, in December 1803. In the progress of the cause, an amended bill was filed by the complainants, waiving all objections to Dunbar’s purchase.
Patton, as commissioner, in 1813, reported a balance on the administration account of about 33124, including interest. On this report, in June 1815, the court directed payment by Patton and Minor, as commissioners, of one dollar in the pound to the creditors named ; and on the 3d of December following, ordered a provisional payment to the complainants to be made out of the moneys in the hands of Patton, as administrator, if any he hath, and that he and Minor, as commissioners, do pay, &c. This decree seems not to have been acted on. On the 12th of June 1820, the claims of the complainants having been established, the court, with a view, as expressed, to pnt them on an equality with the creditors named in the decree of 1815, ordered, “ that out of the funds of the estate of James Hunter, at the disposition of the court, *Robert Patton, one of the commissioners, and administrator de bonis non, do pay the sum of $23,322.56.” This sum was paid. The decree of 1820 having directed a further account, it was taken, and the sums in the hands of Patton, as commissioner and administrator, were stated. After the correction of various errors by the court, in the reports made, it was ascertained, in 1821, that after paying the sum of $23,322.56, there was still a balance in the hands of Patton of 60404 4s. 4c?.; and the court decreed, that he should pay that sum to the creditors of the estate, as administrator, and as one of the commissioners of the court.
Patton had given security as administrator, but none as commissioner. „° ^aake the securities liable, he being insolvent, a supplemental bill was eel against them, and by the answer of one of them, the question of lability is raised. The point presented for consideration is, whether the payment shall first be applied to the credit of the administration fund, or [p. 108] ratably to both funds? If the payment shall be decided to LaVC been made out of the administration fund, the sureties are discharged ; as the sum paid was greater than the amount Patton held in his hand as administrator. The payment also exceeded the sum he held as commissioner, though this fund was larger than the other. It is earnestly contended, in the learned and able argument in writing submitted to the court by the defendants’ counsel, that the administration fund must first be exhausted. To determine the question raised, it is not important to ascertain the precise sum which Patton held in his hands in each capacity; as the amount paid exceeded his liability in either.
In Virginia, the moneys arising from the sale of personal property are called legal assets, in the hands of an executor or administrator; and those which arise from the sale of real property are denominated equitable assets. By the law, the executor or administrator is required, out of the legal assets, * , *to pay the creditors of the estate, according to the dignity of their
• demands; but the equitable assets are applied equally to all the creditors, in proportion to their claims. The payment was made under the decree of 1820 ; and if the court did not direct specifically in what manner the two funds should be applied, it is contended, that Patton had a right himself to determine; and consequently, by applying first the legal assets, to discharge his sureties. If the correctness of this argument were admitted, it would still be important to show, that the payment was made by Patton, as administrator. This fact might be established by an unequivocal act, or by circumstances.
This is clearly not a case in which the creditor may apply the payment, no specific directions having been given by the debtor. To each of the creditors, there was but one debt due, on which the payment was made ; it could, therefore, be applied only to the payment of such debt. Had debts of different dignities been due to each creditor, and no specific application of the payment had been directed by Patton, and the creditor had applied it by some unequivocal act, his right to do so would not, perhaps, be questioned. Whether the application must be made by the creditor, at the time the money is received, or within a reasonable time afterwards, it can be of no importance in this case to inquire. There may be cases, where no indication having been given, as to the application of the payment by the debtor or creditor, the law will make it. But it cannot be admitted, that in such cases, the payment will be uniformly applied to the extinguishment of a debt of the highest dignity. That there are authorities which favor such an application is true, but they have been controverted by other adjudications.
From the terms of the decree of December 1815, the court undoubtedly intended, that the legal assets should first be applied in making the payments directed; and then the equitable assets. But no such direction is given in the decree of 1820. The payment is directed to be made out of both funds in the hands of Patton, without any indication that either should *irq! aPP^ed in preference to the other. *If, in making the payi ment, Patton could exercise his discretion, in first applying the lega assets, has he afforded any evidence of having done so ? Has he, by any entry in his accounts, or by a return to the court, or in any other manner, shown a special application of the money ? Within what time, was it necessary for him to make his election ? His intention is attempted to be adduce [p. 109] from his interest, aided by the principles of law referred to. As administrator, it is said, he was responsible for the funds in his hands, by various modes of proceeding, summary in their character; and from this, it is inferred, that he intended to relieve himself from such a responsibility. To relieve his securities, it is urged, must have formed an additional motive, to which might be superadded, the oath he had taken as administrator. But, on the other hand, it may be urged, that the motives were not less strong; as commissioner, if unfaithful to his trust, he was subject to the penalties which a court of chancery might impose. It would seem, therefore, that the circumstances of the case do not authorize an inference that any determination was made by Patton on the subject.
When, in 1821, the decree was rendered against him, as administrator and as commissioner, for the payment of the balance which appeared to be in his hands, no objection seems to have been made to the decree. It could not have been entered, without giving a construction to the decree of 1820 ; for if the $23,322.56 had been paid, by first applying the legal assets, the decree of 1821 must have directed the balance to be paid as commissioner. This decree, therefore, goes very strongly to show in what light the above payment was considered by the court and the administrator.. Can it be supposed, that when the decree of 1821 was about being entered against Patton, holding him responsible in both capacities, that he would have remained silent, if his liability as administrator had ceased ? The rendition of this decree must clearly refute any presumption, attempted to be raised either from the facts or circumstances of the case, that the legal assets were considered as having been first applied by the administrator in making the payment.
*Having had a reasonable time to make his election, is it not too late to do so, after the controversy has arisen ? And is it competent *■ for the sureties of the administrator, to exonerate themselves from responsibility, by attempting to give a construction to his acts, which seems not to have been given by himself ? They7 first raise the question as to the fund out of which the payment was made. If, then, Patton did no act which showed an intention to apply first the legal assets, in making the payment ; and if it was not the right of the creditor to make the application ; does the law make it, as contended for, under’ all the circumstances of the case ? Had Patton made the application, a question might have been raised, whether it was competent for him to do so.
Jurisdiction over the legal fund was assumed by a court of chancery, h was for that court, by its decree, to make the application of the fund as the law required ; and having done so, the administrator’ could exercise no discretion over it. The same may be said as to the priorities of the claims 8et up by the complainants, and established by a decree of the court. That the administrator was limited in making payment, by the terms of the ecree, will not be denied. It was not for him to pay more in the pound an was directed, nor to give a preference to one of the claims over another, n account of its higher dignity. The decree placed them on an equality, as t° the payment ; and this was clearly within the province of the court, the estate of Hunter being insolvent. The entire fund, in the hands of Patton, ^as subject to the distribution of the court. That part of the fund which, [p. 110] in the hands of the administrator, constituted legal assets, and under the law, was directed to be applied in a special manner to the extinguishment of debts, was taken from his control by the court of chancery. The fund was applied by the court, and not by the administrator. His official capacity was only noticed, to ascertain the extent of his responsibility, and the payment was directed accordingly. He had no discretion to exercise, no rule to observe, but that which the decree laid down. As administrator and commissioner, he was directed to make the payment, because in these capacities, he had received an amount greater than the sum directed to be paid. The payment was made in pursuance of the decree. *1711 *Suppose, Patton, as commissioner, had given sureties, who were
J now before the court, and objecting to the application of the money as contended for. This would present a question between sureties. The insolvency of their principal renders a loss inevitable, and the inquiry would be, how shall this loss be sustained? .Under such circumstances, could any substantial reason be given, why the sureties to the administration bond should be exonerated, in preference to the others ? No distinguishing quality exists, either in the fund as it now stands, or the debts to be paid, to determine this preference. It is not found in the act of Patton, if his discretion might have been exercised on the subject. The law has fixed no rule applicable to the case. By the decree, both funds are placed on an equality ; payment is directed to be made from both. Although Patton gave no security as commissioner, yet the question, in principle, is the same. A loss must be sustained, and by whom shall it be borne ? The sureties on the administration bond, as has been shown, cannot claim an exemption from responsibility, under the payment made in pursuance of the decree; nor can the creditors escape a portion of the loss.
If this were a question of responsibility between sureties, under the decree of the court, the payment would be considered as having been made from each fund, in the hands of Patton, in proportion to its amount. This rule will apply, with the same justice, to the parties interested, under the circumstances of this case. Indeed, it would seem, that no other construction could be given, with equal propriety, to the decree of the court. It is consonant to the principles of justice, and within the equitable powers of the court. On a view of the facts and circumstances of this case, the court think, that the payment of $23,322.56 should be deducted ratably from each of the funds in the hands of Patton, at the time it was made.
*1721 This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the *record from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, and on the questions and points on which the judges of the said circuit court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion, in pursuance of the act of congress for that purpose made and provided, and was argued by counsel: On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that the payment of $23,322.56 should be deducted ratably from each of the funds in the hands of Patton, at the time the decree of the 12th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1820, was made. Whereupon, it is ordered and decreed by this court to be certified to the judges of the said circuit court for the eastern district of Virginia, that the
Hunter v. United States,
payment of $23,322.56 should be deducted ratably from each of the funds in the hands of Patton, at the time the decree of the 12th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1820, was made.
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