Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938)
Case details
Citation
304 U.S. 1
Full caption
MORGAN et al . v. UNITED STATES et al .
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 25, 1938
Majority
Hughes (Chief Justice)
MORGAN et al . v. UNITED STATES et al . APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
No. 581. Argued March 10, 11, 1938.—Decided April 25, 1938.
Petition for rehearing denied May 31, 1938.
1
An order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum rates to be charged by market agencies (commission men) at stockyards held void for failure to allow the “full hearing” before the Secretary required by the Packers and Stockyards Act. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468. P. 13.
2
In administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character, the liberty and property of the citizen must be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. These demand a fair and open hearing. P. 14.
3
In requiring a “full hearing,” the Packers and Stockyards Act has regard to judicial standards,—not in any technical sense, but with respect to those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature. Those requirements relate not only to the taking and consideration of evidence but also to the concluding, as well as to the beginning and intermediate, steps in the procedure. P. 19.
4
The proceeding was begun by a general notice of inquiry into the reasonableness of the rates of market agencies at the Kansas City Stockyards. Thousands of pages of testimony were taken by an examiner and numerous complicated exhibits were introduced, bearing upon all phases of the broad subject of the businesses in question. Appellants’ request that the examiner prepare a tentative report, to be submitted as a basis for exceptions and 81638°—38---- 1 1
Syllabus. 304 U. S.
argument, was refused. Oral argument, before an Assistant Secretary, was general and sketchy and did not reveal in any appropriate maimer the Government’s claims. The Government submitted no brief and furnished no statement of its contentions. Numerous and elaborate findings were prepared by subordinates who had conducted the proceedings for the Government, and were submitted to the Secretary, who accepted them, with certain rate alterations. No opportunity was afforded the appellants to examine the findings until they were served with the order fixing rates which they claim to be confiscatory. A rehearing was refused by the Secretary. The Secretary did not read the testimony, but examined it somewhat to get its drift; he did not hear the oral argument but read a transcript of it and the appellants’ briefs, and conferred ex parte concerning the findings with the subordinates who prepared them. Held:
(1) The right to a “full hearing” embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command. P. 18.
(2) No such reasonable opportunity was accorded in this case. P. 19.
(3) In all substantial aspects, the proceeding was an adversary one—a prosecution by the Government of the owners of the market agencies threatening the existence of the agencies and the owners’ means of livelihood. P. 20.
(4) An earlier order containing findings of facts and fixing a schedule of rates, which was set aside because of changes in economic conditions, could not avail to remedy the defects in the conduct of the latter proceeding here in question. P. 21.
(5) The action of the Secretary in accepting and making as his own the findings which had been prepared by the active prosecutors for the Government, after an ex parte discussion with them and without according any reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the proceeding to know the claims thus presented and to contest them, was more than an irregularity in procedure; it was a vital defect. P. 21.
5. A petition for rehearing based upon the grounds of inconsistency of the decision on this appeal with rulings on the earlier appeal, 298 U. S. 468, and upon the ground of surprise—is denied. P. 23. 6. Questions as to the disposition of moneys impounded in the District Court representing charges for market-agency services paid in excess of the rates fixed by the void order, are for that court to decide. P. 26. 23 F. Supp. 380, reversed.
Appe al from a decree of the District Court, constituted of three judges, which dismissed the bills in fifty suits, consolidated for hearing, challenging the validity of maximum rates fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture for market agencies at the Kansas City Stock Yards. A former appeal is reported in 298 U. S. 468. The present report includes an opinion delivered May 31, 1938, denying a rehearing. Summaries of the arguments on the procedural questions are extracted from the main briefs used on the hearing.
Messrs. Frederick H. Wood and John B. Gage, with whom Mr. Thomas T. Cooke was on the brief, for appellants.
It is not necessary, in order to meet the requirements of a “full hearing,” that the Secretary, in person, should hear all of the evidence or that he should read it all. On the other hand, the requirements of a “full hearing” are not met if, as testified to by the Secretary in this case, the order merely represents his “independent conclusion as based upon the findings” of his subordinates, or his “own independent reactions to the findings of” such subordinates. It is not enough that he has exercised an independent judgment of his own predicated upon findings of fact made by others. Nor that he has satisfied himself, as an executive might, after making some inquiries of his subordinates, that he is willing to
Argument for Appellants. 304 U. S.
adopt their findings. He is, as stated by this Courts “the trier of the facts” and as such required to weigh the evidence upon which the findings depend, and upon which, in turn, his conclusions and ultimate determinations are based. This duty may not be delegated to or performed by others.
It is true that the “evidence . . . taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates,” 298 U. S. 481, but this clearly means that the sifting and analysis must be of the evidence as a whole upon any controverted issue of fact or in respect of which any ultimate findings of fact must be based. It may not be a one-sided analysis. If variant or contrary inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the subordinates may not choose between them but must fairly present both sides of the evidence, so that the authorized tribunal may make his choice. If an ultimate or evidentiary finding of fact, controversial in character, requires for its determination consideration of evidence relating to different but related subjects, without the weighing of all of which no ultimate or evidentiary finding may be made, then such analysis must fairly set forth these several descriptions of evidence and their relation to the possible ultimate or evidentiary inferences presented. To what extent the Secretary may rely upon such analyses without examination of the record himself in respect of controverted questions, it is unnecessary to discuss. This is so because it plainly appears from the record as a whole that no such analysis of the evidence was made and submitted to him by any subordinate.
The law is not concerned with the mechanics employed. What it does require is that the findings of fact shall be those of the Secretary himself, made only after a weighing and appraisal of the evidence, however that evidence may be submitted to him for consideration.
In leaving the findings of fact to his subordinates, the Secretary proceeded upon the erroneous assumption that the delegation of the legislative power to fix rates was to the Department of Agriculture rather than to the Secretary in person.
The evidence as to the manner in which the findings, submitted to the Secretary and accepted by him, were prepared, discloses the absence of any quasi-judicial weighing or appraisal of the evidence by those who prepared them. The record discloses that neither the evidence nor the argument was thereafter weighed or appraised by the Secretary.
The findings prepared by the Secretary’s subordinates do not constitute such a “sifting and analyzing” of the evidence as to absolve the Secretary from weighing and appraising the evidence itself.
The Secretary did not weigh and appraise the evidence concerning salesmanship performance, the findings concerning which are based on the flimsiest kind of evidence and are the most important of all.
The Secretary accepted without change findings made by his subordinates in respect of sales performance, apparently under the misapprehension that they were supported by actual performance, without any examination of the evidence in respect thereof, which, if made, would have disclosed the contrary.
The Secretary did not weigh and appraise the evidence upon which the order’s so-called reasonable cost assigned to business-getting and maintaining was predicated.
The Secretary did not weigh and appraise the evidence bearing upon the reasonable cost of yarding or office salaries, but accepted the findings submitted upon a misunderstanding of their import.
Neither the fragmentary oral statements of his subordinates as to what some of the evidence was nor the
Argument for Appellants. 304U.S.
Secretary’s hit or miss “investigation into” the record is an acceptable substitute for his weighing and appraising the evidence as a whole.
The altering by the Secretary of a few rates in the tentative order in no way tends to prove he weighed and appraised the evidence. Had he filled in a wholly blank schedule he would be no better off.
The inexorable requirement of a fair trial before an impartial tribunal, which shall render judgment upon the evidence, is not met where, without any allegation that any rates are unreasonable, and without any disclosure of their contentions as to the ultimate facts proved or the principles intended to be applied to them, the findings and order to be made are prepared by opposing counsel and, without the knowledge of the appellants or their counsel, submitted to the trier of the facts who, after private unrecorded conferences with opposing counsel, issues an order in accordance therewith, without himself weighing or appraising the evidence upon controverted issues.
There was no allegation or suggestion in the original order of inquiry that any of appellants’ rates were unjust, or unreasonable or discriminatory. The “Order Granting Rehearing” was not more explicit in these respects.
Counsel for the Government, in his argument, presented no issues of fact. Where he did refer to individual agencies he paid them the highest possible compliment as to efficiency of operation. He stated that in his opinion the rates under investigation were not discriminatory and that none of the appellants were making too much money under the existing rates.
Nothing occurred in the course of the oral argument to forecast the fact that the Assistant Secretary was not to pass upon the issues but was to retire from further p. 7consideration of the case. No statement indicated that a tentative report was to be prepared by the attorneys for the Government and a Government economist, an important witness for the Government. It was not suggested that the proposed findings and order, without having been first served upon counsel for appellants, would be presented to the Secretary personally and discussed with him by the attorneys for the Government in unrecorded conferences, out of the presence of appellants’ counsel. Appellants’ counsel, without the benefit of a complaint containing specific allegations as to the unreasonableness of any rates, having before him in the evidence a cost study prepared after extensive audits by Government accountants showing experienced costs to be in excess of receipts under existing rates, and without any knowledge of the contents of the tentative report, prepared a brief which was filed with the Assistant Secretary. No briefs were filed or served by the Government.
The proposed findings and order so prepared by the attorneys for the Government, together with certain memoranda prepared in part by the economist who was a Government witness in the case, was presented to the Secretary. The Secretary, according to his testimony, after examining the record casually, took the order, the briefs, and transcript of oral argument home with him. He states that he read the tentative order and part, at least, of the briefs. After discussing the matter with counsel for the Government in private unrecorded conferences, he changed, to an unimportant extent, a few figures expressing individual rates, and signed the order as proposed, otherwise unchanged, on June 14, 1933.
This he did without weighing or appraising the evidence on controverted issues of fact and without familiarizing himself with any part thereof except as com-
Argument for Appellants. 304U.S.
municated to him in ex parte oral conversations with his subordinates including the attorney prosecuting the case. No record was kept of these conversations, but it appears they were fragmentary and unaccompanied by any weighing and appraising of .the evidence by the Secretary. And this although the findings accepted are directly contrary to statements in appellants’ administrative briefs. Such a course of administrative procedure constitutes neither a full hearing nor due process of law.
The more extensive the employment of the implement of the administrative tribunal becomes—and its use is daily becoming more widespread—and the more credit which is given to its decisions, the more important is it that strict regularity be observed in the conduct of its hearings and that all the elements of a full and fair bearing and of due process of law be accorded. See Lord Chief Justice Hewart, “The New Despotism,” pp. 50-51.
It is not contended by appellants that in cases where a fair and proper method has been adopted for limiting the issues, whether it be a tentative report of the Examiner or otherwise, the tribunal passing judgment must review or appraise all of the evidence relating to non-controversial as well as controversial issues. Nor is it contended that in order that there be a full hearing, oral argument or oral presentation is essential in every instance—for by other methods the trier of the facts may become so adequately informed as to enable himself to properly appraise the evidence. Nor is it contended that the order is void solely by reason of the fact that the attorneys for the prosecution, assisted by a witness for the prosecution, prepared it,—for had such an order, so prepared, been followed by presentation of it to counsel for appellants with full opportunity to refute the conclusions expressed therein before him whose duty it was to resolve the evidence into findings, the requirement of a fair trial p. 9could be met if the Secretary weighed and appraised all of the evidence upon the findings questioned by appellants’ counsel. A court or administrative tribunal may for its convenience require submission of issues upon written statement—if such written statements are, under conditions fairly permitting reply, made known to opposing parties. Evidence may for the assistance of the one charged with the responsibility of decision be fairly analyzed by impartial and competent assistants, unbiased by previous partisan connection with the proceeding. Where, however, issues are not defined and limited by means and methods fair to all persons affected or to be affected, fair analyses or synopses of the evidence are not prepared by impartial or competent assistants, and the one deciding the issues does not personally review and weigh and appraise the evidence, a full hearing is not had in accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements.
Assuming that, as claimed, the Secretary read oral and written argument, nevertheless it is clear that he did not judicially weigh and appraise the same, since he admittedly adopted the vitally important inferences drawn by his subordinates from the evidence, and rejected the widely differing inferences asserted by appellants in their briefs, without weighing or appraising the evidence upon which either set of inferences was based.
The order should be set aside because unsupported by essential findings of basic facts, because the fundamental findings of fact therein are not supported by substantial evidence, because based upon an erroneous conception of the law and of the powers of the Secretary, because based upon a departure from recognized and accepted standards, both of reasonableness and of administrative procedure, and because arbitrarily made.
Argument for Appellees. 304 U.S.
Solicitor General Jackson and Mr. Wendell Berge, with whom Ass’t Solicitor General Bell, and Messrs. Hugh B. Cox, James C. Wilson, Edward J. Ennis, and G. N. Dagger were on the brief, for the appellees.
The contention that the decision of a quasi-judicial officer, made upon a proper record after full hearing of argument, may be declared to be void on the ground that it was insufficiently considered is without precedent. In its prior decision, this Court held that where it was alleged that the Secretary heard neither evidence nor argument a case was made for judicial investigation. It did not hold that where he had heard argument, judicial investigation may test the adequacy of his further consideration of the case. The detailed facts of the Secretary’s physical examination of arguments and evidence and the detailed mental processes which he employed in reaching his determination are not a proper subject for judicial inquiry. Appellants’ contention is, in essence, an endeavor to avoid, by a novel doctrine of judicial review, the established rule that the findings of a quasi-judicial officer, made after hearing or reading full argument on a proper record submitted to him, can be attacked only by showing that the findings are in fact unsupported by the evidence.
The question of the scope of the issue is not of controlling importance in the present case. Should this Court decide that it is free to look behind the fact that the Secretary read and considered appellants’ arguments, it will find that the evidence shows that the Secretary fully complied with any procedural standard that may reasonably be imposed.
The Secretary made his decision on the basis of his own personal consideration and appraisal of the evidence and argument. The transcript of record was in his possession and, while he did not read it consecutively or in full, he p. 11consulted it wherever in his judgment such consultation was necessary. As a guide to his examination of the record he studied the arguments of appellants directed to the evidence and compared them with the voluminous findings of fact, which constituted a summary and analysis of the evidence. Having read and considered the tentative findings of fact and the arguments of appellants, he made an investigation into the record—assisted by consultation with members of the Department—for the purpose of considering and appraising the evidence upon which the findings were made. Uncontradicted testimony establishes that the Secretary, in the exercise of his independent judgment, altered three of the most important items in the tentative schedule of rates. With respect to all the numerous questions raised by appellants, persuasive evidence exists to show independent inquiry and the exercise of independent judgment by the Secretary. By asserting that the Secretary did not give them a fair hearing, appellants have assumed the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the Secretary did not consider their arguments or the evidence to which those arguments related.
Appellants renew their objection that they were not given an opportunity to file exceptions to an examiner’s report or to tentative findings of fact, and to present argument in support of those exceptions. This Court has already passed on this argument. [Citing Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 478.] The practice which the Court described as desirable has now been established in proceedings under § 307 of the Act. See Order of September 16, 1936, 1 Federal Register 1362. It remains true, however, that the failure to follow it is not fatal to the validity of the hearing.
Appellants also complain that in his oral argument counsel for the Department did not apprise them of the
Argument for Appellees. 304U.S.
issues which they might be expected to meet, and they refer to statements he made which were in agreement with their contentions. It is not to be supposed that the appellants were prejudiced by such friendly statements in oral argument or that appellants’ counsel needed the assistance of Government counsel, or of an examiner’s report, or of tentative findings of fact, to determine what the important issues in the proceeding were. It is common knowledge that often in ordinary litigation the argument addressed by counsel to the court is made before the submission of proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law, and that the argument of opposing counsel does not in every case disclose with clarity the issues on which the case is to be decided. Such circumstances when they exist can hardly be said to amount to a denial of a full hearing.
Furthermore, it should be noted that, at the time of the oral argument and when petitioners filed their supplemental brief with the Secretary, they had before them an order, which had been signed on May 18, 1932, by the Secretary of Agriculture, containing findings of fact and fixing a schedule of rates. At the time the rehearing was granted, the Secretary had set this order aside. The record upon which that order had been made was a part of the record before the Secretary at the time of the rehearing, and the order served to inform the appellants of the nature of the issues involved. That it did so inform them is shown by the fact that much of appellants’ supplemental brief was devoted to a discussion of this order, and that in the course of that discussion they advanced most of the contentions which they make with respect to the order now under attack.
Appellants attempt to distinguish this present situation from one in which a court adopts findings prepared by counsel on the ground that a court affords opposing p. 13counsel an opportunity to submit findings of his own or to except to the findings which are adopted. There is no force in this distinction. Although the appellants were not given an opportunity to except to the tentative findings of fact, they had an unrestricted opportunity to submit findings of their own to the Secretary of Agriculture which he could have considered. They did not take advantage of that opportunity; but that is not a circumstance which can be held against the Secretary of Agriculture. There is no logic in appellants’ suggestion that the adoption of findings is done independently if opposing counsel has a chance to criticize those findings, but must be presumed not to have been done independently if the opportunity to criticize is not afforded.
The order of the Secretary is based upon correct principles of law and is supported by substantial evidence.
Mr . Chief Justic e Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question of the validity of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates to be charged by market agencies at the Kansas City Stock Yards. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159; 7 U. S. C. 181-229. The District Court of three judges dismissed the bills of complaint in fifty suits (consolidated for hearing) challenging the validity of the rates, and the plaintiffs bring this direct appeal. 7 U. S. C. 217; 28 U. S. C. 47.
The case comes here for the second time. On the former appeal we met, at the threshold of the controversy, the contention that the plaintiffs had not been accorded the hearing which the statute made a prerequisite to a valid order. The District Court had struck from plaintiffs’ bills the allegations that the Secretary had made the order p. 14without having heard or read the evidence and without having heard or considered the arguments submitted, and that his sole information with respect to the proceeding was derived from consultation with employees in the Department of Agriculture. We held that it was error to strike these allegations, that the defendant should be required to answer them, and that the question whether plaintiffs had a proper hearing should be determined. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468.
After the remand, the bills were amended and interrogatories were directed to the Secretary which he answered. The court received the evidence which had been introduced at its previous hearing, together with additional testimony bearing upon the nature of the hearing accorded by the Secretary. This evidence embraced the testimony of the Secretary and of several of his assistants. The District Court rendered an opinion, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that the hearing before the Secretary was adequate and, on the merits, that his order was lawful. On this appeal, plaintiffs again contend (1) that the Secretary’s order was made without the hearing required by the statute and (2) that the order was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.
The first question goes to the very foundation of the action of administrative agencies entrusted by the Congress with broad control over activities which in their detail cannot be dealt with directly by the legislature. The vast expansion of this field of administrative regulation in response to the pressure of social needs is made possible under our system by adherence to the basic principles that the legislature shall appropriately determine the standards of administrative action and that in administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the p. 15rudimentary requirements of fair play. These demand “a fair and open hearing,”—essential alike to the legal validity of the administrative regulation and to the maintenance of public confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental process. Such a hearing has been described as an “inexorable safeguard.” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 73; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 304, 305; Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 393; Morgan n . United States, supra. And in equipping the Secretary of Agriculture with extraordinary powers under the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Congress explicitly recognized and emphasized this requirement by making his action depend upon a “full hearing.” § 310?
In the record now before us the controlling facts stand out clearly. The original administrative proceeding was begun on April 7, 1930, when the Secretary of Agriculture issued an order of inquiry and notice of hearing with p. 16respect to the reasonableness of the charges of appellants for stockyards services at Kansas City. The taking of evidence before an examiner of the Department was begun on December 3, 1930, and continued until February 10, 1931. The Government and appellants were represented by counsel and voluminous testimony and exhibits were introduced. In March, 1931, oral argument was had before the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and appellants submitted a brief. On May 18, 1932, the Secretary issued his findings and an order prescribing maximum rates. In view of changed economic conditions, the Secretary vacated that order and granted a rehearing. That was begun on October 6, 1932, and the taking of evidence was concluded on November 16, 1932. The evidence received at the first hearing was re-submitted and this was supplemented by additional testimony and exhibits. On March 24, 1933, oral argument was had before Rexford G. Tugwell as Acting Secretary.
1
Section 310 of the Packers and Stockyards Act (42 Stat. 159, 166; 7 U. S. C. 211) provides: “Sec. 310. Whenever after full hearing upon a complaint made as provided in section 309, or after full hearing under an order for investigation and hearing made by the Secretary on his own initiative, either in extension of any pending complaint or without any complaint whatever, the Secretary is of the opinion that any rate, charge, regulation, or practice of a stockyard owner or market agency, for or in connection with the furnishing of stockyard services, is or will be unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory, the Secretary—“(a) May determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable rate or charge, or rates or charges, to be thereafter observed in such case, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, to be charged, and what regulation or practice is or will be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory to be thereafter followed; . . .”
It appears that there were about 10,000 pages of transcript of oral evidence and over 1,000 pages of statistical exhibits. The oral argument was general and sketchy. Appellants submitted the brief which they had presented after the first administrative hearing and a supplemental brief dealing with the evidence introduced upon the rehearing. No brief was at any time supplied by the Government. Apart from what was said on its behalf in the oral argument, the Government formulated no issues and furnished appellants no statement or summary of its contentions and no proposed findings. Appellants’ request that the examiner prepare a tentative report, to be submitted as a basis for exceptions and argument, was refused.
Findings were prepared in the Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of Agriculture, whose representatives had conducted the proceedings for the Government, and were submitted to the Secretary, who signed them, with a few p. 17changes in the rates, when his order was made on June 14, 1933. These findings, 180 in number, were elaborate. They dealt with the practices and facilities at the Kansas City livestock market, the character of appellants’ business and services, their rates and the volume of their transactions, their gross revenues, their methods in getting and maintaining business, their joint activities, the economic changes since the year 1929, the principles which governed the determination of reasonable commission rates, the classification of cost items, the reasonable unit costs plus a reasonable amount of profits to be covered into reasonable commission rates, the reasonable amounts to be included for salesmanship, yarding salaries and expenses, office salaries and expenses, business getting and maintaining expenses, administrative and general expenses, insurance, interest on capital, and profits, together with summary and the establishment of the rate structure. Upon the basis of the reasonable costs as thus determined, the Secretary found that appellants’ schedules of rates were unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory and fixed the maximum schedules of the just and reasonable rates thereafter to be charged.
No opportunity was afforded to appellants for the examination of the findings thus prepared in the Bureau of Animal Industry until they were served with the order. Appellants sought a rehearing by the Secretary but their application was denied on July 6, 1933, and these suits followed.
The part taken by the Secretary himself in the departmental proceedings is shown by his full and candid testimony. The evidence had been received before he took office. He did not hear the oral argument. The bulky record was placed upon his desk and he dipped into it from time to time to get its drift. He decided that probably the essence of the evidence was contained in appellants’ briefs. These, together with the transcript of the
81638°—38------2
oral argument, he took home with him and read. He had several conferences with the Solicitor of the Department and with the officials in the Bureau of Animal Industry and discussed the proposed findings. He testified that he considered the evidence before signing the order. The substance of his action is stated in his answer to the question whether the order represented his independent conclusion, as follows:
“My answer to the question would be that that very definitely was my independent conclusion as based on the findings of the men in the Bureau of Animal Industry. I would say, I will try to put it as accurately as possible, that it represented my own independent reactions to the findings of the men in the Bureau of Animal Industry.”
Save for certain rate alterations, he “accepted the findings.”
In the light of this testimony there is no occasion to discuss the extent to which the Secretary examined the evidence, and we agree with the Government’s contention that it was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary in reaching his conclusions if he gave the hearing which the law required. The Secretary read the summary presented by appellants’ briefs and he conferred with his subordinates who had sifted and analyzed the evidence. We assume that the Secretary sufficiently understood its purport. But a “full hearing”—a fair and open hearing—requires more than that. The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government p. 19proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.
No such reasonable opportunity was accorded appellants. The administrative proceeding was initiated by a notice of inquiry into the reasonableness of appellants’ rates. No specific complaint was formulated and, in a proceeding thus begun by the Secretary on his own initiative, none was required. Thus, in the absence of any definite complaint, and in a sweeping investigation, thousands of pages of testimony were taken by the examiner and numerous complicated exhibits were introduced bearing upon all phases of the broad subject of the conduct of the market agencies. In the absence of any report by the examiner or any findings proposed by the Government, and thus without any concrete statement of the Government’s claims, the parties approached the oral argument.
Nor did the oral argument reveal these claims in any appropriate manner. The discussion by counsel for the Government was “very general,” as he said, in order not to take up “too much time.” It dealt with generalities both as to principles and procedure. Counsel for appellants then discussed the evidence from his standpoint. The Government’s counsel closed briefly, with a few additional and general observations. The oral argument was of the sort which might serve as a preface to a discussion of definite points in a brief, but the Government did not submit a brief. And the appellants had no further information of the Government’s concrete claims until they were served with the Secretary’s order.
Congress, in requiring a “full hearing,” had regard to judicial standards,—not in any technical sense but with respect to those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature. If in an equity cause, a special master p. 20or the trial judge permitted the plaintiff’s attorney to formulate the findings upon the evidence, conferred ex parte with the plaintiff’s attorney regarding them, and then adopted his proposals without affording an opportunity to his opponent to know their contents and present objections, there would be no hesitation in setting aside the report or decree as having been made without a fair hearing. The requirements of fairness are not exhausted in the taking or consideration of evidence but extend to the concluding parts of the procedure as well as to the beginning and intermediate steps.
The answer that the proceeding before the Secretary was not of an adversary character, as it was not upon complaint but was initiated as a general inquiry, is futile. It has regard to the mere form of the proceeding and ignores realities. In all substantial respects, the Government acting through the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department was prosecuting the proceeding against the owners of the market agencies. The proceeding had all the essential elements of contested litigation, with the Government and its counsel on the one side and the appellants and their counsel on the other. It is idle to say that this was not a proceeding in reality against the appellants when the very existence of their agencies was put in jeopardy. Upon the rates for their services the owners depended for their livelihood, and the proceeding attacked them at a vital spot. This is well shown by the fact that, on the merits, appellants are here contending that under the Secretary’s order many of these agencies, although not found to be inefficient or wasteful, will be left with deficits instead of reasonable compensation for their services and will be compelled to go out of business. And to this the Government responds that if as a result of the prescribed rates some agencies may be unable to p. 21continue, because through existing competition there are too many, that fact will not invalidate the order. While we are not now dealing with the merits, the breadth of the Secretary’s discretion under our rulings applicable to such a proceeding (Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420; Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426) places in a strong light the necessity of maintaining the essentials of a full and fair hearing, with the right of the appellants to have a reasonable opportunity to know the claims advanced against them as shown by the findings proposed by the Bureau of Animal Industry.
Equally unavailing is the contention that the former Secretary of Agriculture had made an order in May, 1932, containing findings of fact and fixing a schedule of rates, of which appellants were apprised. Because of changes in economic conditions, the Secretary himself had set aside that order and directed a rehearing. This necessarily involved, as the Secretary found, a consideration “of changes both general and particular” which had “occurred since the year 1929” and brought up all the questions pertinent to the new situation to which the additional evidence upon the rehearing was directed. The former findings and order were no longer in effect and it is with the conduct of the later proceeding that we are concerned.
The Government adverts to an observation in our former opinion that, while it was good practice—which we approved—to have the examiner, receiving the evidence in such a case, prepare a report as a basis for exceptions and argument, we could not say that that particular type of procedure was essential to the validity of the proceeding. That is true, for, as we said, what the statute requires “relates to substance and not form.” Conceivably, the Secretary, in a case the narrow limits of which made such a procedure practicable, might himself hear p. 22the evidence and the contentions of both parties and make his findings upon the spot. Again, the evidence being in, the Secretary might receive the proposed findings of both parties, each being notified of the proposals of the other, hear argument thereon and make his own findings. But what would not be essential to the adequacy of the hearing if the Secretary himself makes the findings is not a criterion for a case in which the Secretary accepts and makes as his own the findings which have been prepared by the active prosecutors for the Government, after an ex parte discussion with them and without according any reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the proceeding to know the claims thus presented and to contest them. That is more than an irregularity in practice; it is a vital defect.
The maintenance of proper standards on the part of administrative agencies in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions is of the highest importance and in no way cripples or embarrasses the exercise of their appropriate authority. On the contrary, it is in their manifest interest. For, as we said at the outset, if these multiplying agencies deemed to be necessary in our complex society are to serve the purposes for which they are created and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play.
As the hearing was fatally defective, the order of the Secretary was invalid. In this view, we express no opinion upon the merits. The decree of the District Court is
Reversed.
Mr . Justice Black dissents.
Mr . Justi ce Cardozo and Mr . Justice Reed took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.
1 On Petition for Rehearing.
A Peti ti on for Rehearing , Filed on May 20, 1938, Was Denie d on May 31, 1938.
Per Curiam .
The Solicitor General moves for a rehearing of this case upon two grounds:
First. The first ground is that the Court has reversed itself; that the present decision is “directly contrary to the law of the case” as established by the Court’s decision on the former appeal, Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468; and that “a procedural omission” previously held “to be of no significance” is now regarded as “fatally defective.”
These assertions are unwarranted. Not only are the two decisions consistent, but the rule announced in our former opinion was applied and was decisive of the present appeal. And the Government is in no position to claim surprise. The question whether there had been a fair hearing in the present case, in the light of the situation disclosed by the Secretary’s testimony and the other evidence, was fully argued at the bar. Appellants presented, both orally and in an elaborate brief, with copious references to the record, the contention which we sustained.
The first appeal was brought to this Court because the plaintiffs had been denied an opportunity to prove that the Secretary of Agriculture had failed to give them the full hearing which the statute required. Their allegations to that effect had been struck out by the District Court. 8 F. Supp. 766. We held its ruling to be erroneous and that the question whether the plaintiffs had a proper hearing should be determined, saying:
“But there must be a hearing in a substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
On Petition for Rehearing. 304U.S.
The case was then tried by the District Court upon that issue. From the Secretary’s frank disclosure it appeared that findings of fact necessary to sustain the order had not been made by him upon his own consideration of the evidence but as stated below. Because such action fails to satisfy the requirement of a full hearing stated in our first opinion and quoted above, we reversed the judgment of the District Court which sustained the order.
Testimony of the Secretary and his associates, disclosed what had actually occurred. It appeared that the oral argument before the Assistant Secretary had been general and sketchy; that, aside from the oral argument, which did not reveal the claims of the Government in any appropriate manner, the Government had submitted no brief and no statement of its contentions had been furnished; that in this situation findings had been prepared in the Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of Agriculture, whose representatives had conducted the proceedings for the Government; that these findings, 180 in number, were elaborate, dealing with all phases of the practices and facilities at the Kansas City live-stock market, the services and methods of the plaintiffs, and the costs and profits which should be allowed them as reasonable. These findings, prepared not by the Secretary but by those who had prosecuted the case for the Government, were adopted by the Secretary with certain rate alterations. No opportunity was afforded to the plaintiffs for the examination of the findings thus prepared until they were served with the Secretary’s order and their request for a rehearing was denied.
The statement made in the petition for rehearing that the present decision is contrary to the law of the case as declared in our first opinion is wholly unfounded. Our decision was not rested upon the absence of an examiner’s report. So far from departing from our former opinion, p. 251 On Petition for Rehearing.
or from the statement that the mere matter of the presence or absence of an examiner’s report was not itself determinative, we reiterated both that statement and the principle underlying it in our opinion on the present appeal. We said:
“Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.
“No such reasonable opportunity was accorded appellants. . . .
“The Government adverts to an observation in our former opinion that, while it was good practice—which we approved—to have the examiner, receiving the evidence in such a case, prepare a report as a basis for exceptions and argument, we could not say that that particular type of procedure was essential to the validity of the proceeding. That is true, for, as we said, what the statute requires ‘relates to substance and not form.’ Conceivably the Secretary, in a case the narrow limits of which made such a procedure practicable, might himself hear the evidence and the contentions of both parties and make his findings upon the spot. Again, the evidence being in, the Secretary might receive the proposed findings of both parties, each being notified of the proposals of the other, hear argument thereon and make his own findings.”
And, then, pointing out the distinction and the serious defect in the procedure in the instant case, we added:
“But what would not be essential to the adequacy of the hearing if the Secretary himself makes the findings is not a criterion for a case in which the Secretary accepts and makes as his own the findings which have been prepared by the active prosecutors for the Government, after
On Petition for Rehearing. 304U.S.
an ex parte discussion with them and without according any reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the proceeding to know the claims thus presented and to contest them. That is more than an irregularity in practice; it is a vital defect.”
The distinction was again brought out in our recent decision in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., post, p. 333, where the mere absence of an examiner’s report was found not to be controlling, as the record showed that in that case the contentions of the parties had been clearly defined and that there had been in the substantial sense a full and adequate hearing.
The effort to establish a case for rehearing, either because of an asserted inconsistency in our rulings or because of lack of opportunity for full argument, is futile.
Second. The second ground upon which a rehearing is sought is that there is impounded in the District Court a large sum representing charges paid in excess of the rates fixed by the Secretary. The Solicitor General raises questions both of substance and procedure as to the disposition of these moneys. These questions are appropriately for the District Court and they are not properly before us upon the present record. We have ruled that the order of the Secretary is invalid because the required hearing was not given. We remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with our opinion. What further proceedings the Secretary may see fit to take in the light of our decision, or what determinations may be made by the District Court in relation to any such proceedings, are not matters which we should attempt to forecast or hypothetically to decide.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Mr . Justice Black dissents.
Mr . Justic e Cardozo and Mr . Justic e Reed took no part in the consideration of this petition.
Syllabus.
UNITED STATES v. BEKINS et al ., TRUSTEES,
ET AL.
LINDSAY-STRATHMORE IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. BEKINS ET AL., TRUSTEES, et al .
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
Nos. 757 and 772. Argued April 7, 1938.—Decided April 25, 1938.
1
Proceedings for voluntary composition of debts without adjudication of bankruptcy are within the scope of the bankruptcy power. P. 47.
2
California Law, 1934, Extra Sess., gave the State’s consent to the application to state “taxing districts,” of the Bankruptcy Act and amendments, including Chapter X, added to that Act Aug. 16, 1937. P. 47.
3
The omission from c. X of the Bankruptcy Act of a provision specifically requiring that the petition of a state taxing district under that chapter be approved by a governmental agency of the State, held unimportant in determining the validity of the legislation where the State has actually consented. P. 49.
4
In conditioning the confirmation of a plan of composition upon proof that the petitioning taxing district is “authorized by law” to take all action necessary to carry out the plan, c. X of the Bankruptcy Act refers to the law of the State. P. 49.
5
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, adopted Aug. 16, 1937, empowers the courts of bankruptcy to entertain and pass upon petitions-by state taxing agencies or instrumentalities, including irrigation districts, for the composition of their indebtedness payable out of assessments or taxes levied against and constituting liens upon property in their districts or out of income derived therefrom or from sale of water, etc. The plan of composition must be approved by creditors owning not less than 51% of the securities affected by the plan and can not be confirmed unless accepted by creditors holding 66%% of the aggregate indebtedness of the district. There must be consent by the State; and the judge must be satisfied that the district is authorized by local law to carry out the plan. The statute aims to relieve serious distress existing in many such improvement districts where, because of economic conditions, property owners can not pay assessments, and taxation is useless, so that the districts can not meet 81638°—38----- 3
Argument of Mr. Sumners. 304U.S.
their obligations and creditors are helpless. A remedy through composition of the debts of the district could not be afforded by state law unaided, because of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Held that the statute is a valid exercise of the bankruptcy power. Ashton n . Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, distinguished. P. 49.
6. The ability to contract and to give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental power is of the essence of sovereignty. P. 51.
7. The reservation to the States by the Tenth Amendment, did not destroy, but protected, their right to make contracts and give consents where that action would not contravene the provisions of the Federal Constitution. P. 52.
8. Cooperation between Nation and State through the exercise of the powers of each, to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both, is consistent with an indestructible Union of indestructible States. P. 53.
9. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, held not violative of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to creditors of a state irrigation district, which sought a composition of its debts under that chapter. P. 54. 21 F. Supp. 129, reversed.
Appeals from a decree of the District Court dismissing a petition for confirmation of a plan of composition presented by the above-named Irrigation District under c. X of the Bankruptcy Act. The District and the United States, which had been notified and had intervened, took separate appeals. The following arguments are extracted from a stenographic report of the hearing.
Mr. Hatton W. Sumners for the Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives of the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
As we understand the issues here presented, there is no question involving the rights of individuals, and there is no question with regard to the mechanics of the law. The sole question is whether or not legislation embodied in §§ 81, 82 and 83 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, which sections we know as the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, impinges upon the sovereignty of the State.
27 Argument of Mr. Sumners.
In this particular litigation the question arises with reference to an irrigation district.
Briefly visualizing the transactions with reference to that district and the character of the district, we observe that a group of farmers owning contiguous lands, desiring to cultivate those lands under irrigation, availed themselves of the facilities provided by the State of California for putting a blanket mortgage on those lands for the purpose of bringing water to those lands to aid them in the business of farming.
That district exercised, under delegation from the State, power of eminent domain and power of taxation. It did not relieve the State of California of any governmental responsibility theretofore exercised by it.
It seems to us that in so far as drainage and irrigation districts are concerned, they have more the characteristics of a railroad corporation than they do of an ordinary municipality. A railroad corporation, by delegation, exercises the right of eminent domain—probably as high a right and power as Government has—yet it does not thereby become a part of the State.
But I do not desire to take the time of the Court in discussing the differences, whatever they may be, between an irrigation district and an ordinary municipality, because the provisions of this Act cover them all.
When we come to examine what happened as the result of this legislation with reference to the sovereignty and dignity of the municipality, or of the State, however it may be considered, we discover that every debt which could be composed under this Act is a debt which, under the then existing law, would constitute a basis of litigation in an ordinary suit against the municipality.
The municipality, therefore, before this law was enacted, could be brought into court for these same debts by the process of the court, against the will of the municipality, the issues tried as though the municipality were
Argument of Mr. Sumners. 304 U. S.
an ordinary defaulter, judgment had in the ordinary way; and if the judgment of the court were not complied with, the municipality could be brought into court again and subjected to the coercion of the court, even to the extent of the incarceration of its officers. . . .
In a similar situation this same municipality, which theretofore could be brought into court by the might of the court and without regard to its consent, under this Act comes into that court as a sovereign would come, a complete sovereign. It comes in under its own will. Nobody is compelling it to come. Nobody can compel it to come under this Act. In the exercise of its sovereign right to arrange its indebtedness—it had been sitting around a table with its creditors, and they had agreed. In the instant case 87 per cent, agreed that 59 cents on the dollar was the best thing for everybody concerned.
So this municipality, by authority of this Act, goes into that same courthouse, before the same judge, leading a procession of its consenting creditors, and says to the judge, “We have entered into this agreement, 87 per cent. There are 13 per cent, who do not consent. Will you be good enough to examine to determine whether or not this agreement is fair to the 13 per cent, and that it does not do some other things provided against in the law.” It tells the court also, “I am here because, first, I was created by a sovereign State in the exercise of its sovereign powers. That sovereign gave me authority to come here. There is nowhere else myself and my creditors can go, and won’t you please write our agreement into the book of judgments.”
Even if it were an ordinary lawsuit, as we understand it, there is no higher act of sovereignty than for the sovereign voluntarily to submit itself to the judgment of a p. 3127 Argument of Mr. Sumners.
court. The Federal Government does it all the time, the States do it; and we have never understood that, when a sovereign voluntarily submits itself to trial and judgment, by that submission it impairs its sovereignty or thereby makes it possible to be sued without its will.
May I respectfully submit to the Court that, instead of impinging upon the sovereignty of the State, this Act clearly is in line with the nature and philosophy of sovereignty of the State, and that to declare this Act unconstitutional would impinge upon the sovereignty of the State. Such a determination would deny to the State of California, in this matter, the right to have a sovereign will with reference to what it will permit its creatures to do.
All the way down the line there has been consent. First, the consent of the creator, California; consent of the Congress, the policy-fixing agency of the Federal Government; consent of the municipality itself, and consent of the creditors. Now, if we are to deny these agencies, which speak the voice of sovereignty and the judgment and will of the private citizen, the right thus to speak, what becomes of their sovereignty?
If the creditors consent, and the municipality consents, and the State consents, and the policy-fixing agency of the Federal Government consents, with all respect, whose else business is it, if they are sovereign?
We respectfully submit that to deny to a sovereign the right to have a sovereign will and to make that will effective, denies to it the very essence of sovereignty.
I am privileged to take a longer time of the Court, but I could not add to the substance of what I have said. We appreciate very much the Court permitting me to appear.
Argument for the United States. 304 U. S.
Solicitor General Jackson, with whom Assistant Attorney General Whitaker, and Messrs. Vincent N. Miles, Warner W. Gardner, and Henry A. Jülicher were on the brief, for the United States in No. 757.
The District is utterly unable to meet its obligations in due course, and it is authorized by law to carry out a plan of composition.
It asks the bankruptcy court to serve the notice required by statute to bring in the dissenting creditors, to grant hearings, to hold inquiry as to the reasonableness and fairness of the plan, to stay all suits that might be brought to interfere with the District or its property meanwhile, and that the court, if it finally approves the plan, enter an order as provided for in the Act, discharging the District from all further obligations under these outstanding bonds which would be composed by a payment of 59 cents on the dollar.
The measure received careful consideration before the committees of the House and Senate, amendments were made with a view to insuring constitutionality, and the Congress concluded after full discussion that the bill as enacted was free from the objectionable features which had been held fatal to the original Act. [c. IX. See Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U. S. 513.]
The only jurisdiction that is conferred, is the jurisdiction to compose
“. . . indebtedness of or authorized by any taxing agencies or instrumentalities hereinafter named, which are payable out of assessments or taxes or both, or out of property acquired by foreclosure by the District, or out of income by such taxing districts.”
These districts are then enumerated in separate subdivisions.
The purpose of the subdivisions and of the separability clause was clearly stated on the House floor by Judge Sumners.
Mr. Sumners frankly stated that the sixth classification, the political subdivisions, implied proceedings that would be unconstitutional under the Ashton case. He felt, however, it was not only the right, but the duty of Congress to present the question once more to this Court, since the decision, if allowed to stand, threatened grave impairment to the powers of the States, in that it forbade them to authorize their political subdivisions to enter into bankruptcy proceedings.
The case before this Court does not involve the sixth subdivision, but involves subdivision 1, so that if it be held that the law is constitutional in its application to this particular district, even though it could be held unconstitutional as applied to districts covered by subdivision 6, we are entitled to prevail.
The power to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies frequently has been passed upon by this Court. And the constitutional development of this clause at the hands of this Court in over a century has followed out the general conception of the breadth and sweep of that power as it seems to have been entertained at the time the power was given.
The whole method and purpose of bankruptcy has changed with that century of interpretation. Bankruptcy as it existed at the time, and as it existed in the first Bankruptcy Act passed by the Federal Government in 1800, was a remedy of the creditor, a further remedy, against the debtor.
It is now a new opportunity in life, and a clear field for further efforts to the bankrupt, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debts. Certainly if that is the purpose of this Act, no reason appears why it should be extended to private debtors and not to public debtors. Many subdivisions of the bodies which composed the United States at the time of the Constitu-
Argument for the United States. 304U.S.
tional Convention were themselves at that time in default, and in need, but there was no suggestion that public debtors should be excluded from the benefits of the bankruptcy power, although, we must grant, at that time the bankruptcy power was conceived to be a narrower power than it has since become.
There is equal urgency for applying this Act to public debtors—an urgency equal to any that has ever existed for extending it to private debtors.
The statistics are in the brief, and I will not dwell upon them at length, but over 2,000 improvement districts were in default in 1934. Cities as large as Detroit and Miami and Asheville were in default. 41 of the 48 States had defaults within their borders. The defaulted bonds were between one billion and two billion eight hundred million, and in 1938, when the Congress was reconsidering this matter, over 3,000 units of government were found to be in default.
The creditors in those cases stood without a practicable remedy. There is usually no property of a district subject to execution. Taxpayers are not personally liable. Mandamus to lay taxes is futile, because it results only in assessments that are defaulted. Tax sales drive down the value of property, and add further tax delinquencies. The experience of those creditors—who were themselves largely instrumental in the pressure which brought about the enactment of these Acts—the experience of those creditors was that they were without practicable remedies. This was because, though the only possible remedy was a remedy by agreement, it was almost always subject to defeat. Even though a great majority of the creditors agreed with the district on a practical course to restore some value to the defaulted bonds and to rehabilitate the district so that it could go on and exercise its public functions, any creditor who had a high estimate of the nuisance value of his particular security was in a p. 35position to block the settlement, which required unanimous action.
Therefore the only remedy available to districts, or available to creditors, is the practicable plan of composition, in which nuisance values shall be ruled out, and in which equality of treatment of these creditors will prevail.
And it is clear that that power, as attempted to be exercised by this statute, is within the general bankruptcy power of the Congress. It is equally clear it is not within the power of the State. The States granted their power over bankruptcies to the Federal Government. They were expressly forbidden to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts. It seems impossible to say that a statute of Congress which exercises a power twice denied to the States—denied once by delegation to the Federal Government, and denied once by express prohibition—can be an invasion of States’ rights.
There is one thing the States can do. The State can connive at repudiation. It can refuse to extend remedies. It can fall back on its power to nullify a contract and refuse to approve. That, neither in point of good finance, nor of good morals, is a desirable situation. In order that the situation may be frankly faced, and that sounder remedies may be practicably applied, there must be an escape from the limitation imposed upon the State, and that escape must be found in the power of the Federal Government.
This power not only was delegated to the United States, but it was denied to the States, and it is clear the Tenth Amendment under such circumstances has no function whatever to perform in this case. Once a delegated power is found there is then no room for the operation of the Tenth Amendment.
There is then no question of state sovereignty involved, since we have a granted power.
Argument for the United States. 304U.S.
Then there is the argument advanced here that from the necessities of our form of government, because of the dual nature of our system, there is a necessity to preserve the independence of the State and to protect its sovereignty, and that therefore this power, even though it be a delegated power, cannot be exercised if it impinges upon what would be called sovereign powers or independent powers of the State. I submit that the Tenth Amendment itself denies that argument.
If the Federal Government must point out the delegation of its powers, the Tenth Amendment equally holds the advocates of the rights of sovereignty of the States to the wording of the instrument. It clearly prohibits using the theory of necessity, the theory of the nature of government, or other philosophical reasons, for cutting down granted powers.
Now, there is an effort in the brief of our adversary to compare this power with the taxing power, and to hold that because there are certain immunities to the State and to state agencies under the taxing power, a similar immunity must be written into the bankruptcy power. That argument starts by asserting the theory that the bankruptcy power is found in the same subsection of the Constitution as the grant of the taxing power. So are the powers to regulate interstate commerce, and to punish counterfeiters. The taxing and bankruptcy powers are not parallel powers; and no argument based on the one can be applied to the other. The power of the Federal Government to tax is subject to qualification, and the bankruptcy power is not. The power to tax is to provide for the common defense and the general welfare, and hence it may very well be that where you have a plan of which the tax is a part, such as this Court held the Agricultural Adjustment Act to be, or the Child Labor Act, then you are led to an inquiry as to whether the taxing plan itself is local or is general, is national or p. 37is within powers reserved to localities. The very nature of the taxing power, as it exists in the Federal Government, may demand that inquiry; but there is no such qualification in the bankruptcy clause. That requires only uniformity.
When we consider immunity as it exists in the States from federal taxes, and as it exists in the Government from state taxation, we are dealing with a totally different thing. The power of taxation derives from the relationship of sovereign and subject. That relationship derived originally from the duty of a sovereign to protect, and from the duty of the subject to assist the sovereign in maintaining that protection. We find no State has assumed such a duty toward the Federal Government; we find no State has assumed a relationship toward the Federal Government which in the nature of the taxing power makes it applicable, one to the other.
The very nature of the taxing power implies that it is exerted by the sovereign against the citizen, and not against another governmental body, regardless of whether the relationship is that of an equal sovereign, or that of a subsidiary governmental group.
Tax burdens, of course, are involuntary burdens and, as this Court has said, may be destructive. The power to tax may be the power to destroy, and it may be laid upon a State as a State only when it has assumed that obligation, or if the liability to taxation is to be implied from the nature of the activities of the taxpayer.
Bankruptcy is an entirely different kind of power. It is merely the opening, in this case, of a forum to which this State may resort, as we may open a forum to which foreign creditors or foreign debtors may resort.
No compulsion upon any State or State agency is here involved. This is a voluntary Act, and it raises no questions under the Eleventh Amendment.
Argument for the District. 304 U. S.
This Court has held that, without any consent of a sovereign state, its taxing agencies may be sued. Mandamus may lie against a taxing district. And it has been held in one case that, where a state law provides a similar remedy, a receiver may be appointed to go into such a district and take over its affairs and operations.
Even the taxing immunity can be waived. This Court has held that a State may waive the tax immunity of its agencies, and that the Federal Government may waive the tax immunity of the agencies which it creates. In this case this Bankruptcy Act can never apply to any district unless there is a finding that the law of the State authorizes it to seek that remedy and authorizes it to carry that remedy to completion.
It is true we have a dual system of State and Federal Governments, but that does not mean that they can not cooperate for the common need. That question was settled by this Court in the Social Security cases. [301 U. S. 548, 619.]
Now, we find the State and the Nation confronted with this difficulty arising out of the limitation of the power of the State to deal with its own taxing agencies and their debts. We find these defaulted bonds in the channels of trade. We find taxing districts impaired in their capacity to carry on and perform the very functions for which they were created, and we say that there is no difficulty in the two units, the State and the Nation, without either one of them in the least receding from its sovereignty, setting up together a common remedy.
Acting Solicitor General Bell filed a memorandum for the United States in No. 757.
Messrs. Guy Knupp and James R. McBride for appellant in No. 772.
Mr. Knupp for the Irrigation District explained the character of the District, the history and extent of its p. 39indebtedness and the hopelessness of its financial situation. The court below had misconceived the Ashton case and the nature and purpose of the new legislation. The present Act aims to avoid interference with governmental functions, public agencies, and their fiscal affairs. It deals with voluntary composition. Chapter IX gave power to the court to change the proposed plan of composition. Not so Chapter X. Chapter IX gave power to interfere with fiscal powers and policies of the public debtor. Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440, is applicable.
Messrs. W. Coburn Cook and Charles L. Childers, with whom Mr. Maurice E. Harrison was on the briefs, for appellees.
Mr. Cook on behalf of appellees explained the peculiar importance of irrigation in California. The control of water is a public trust, embedded in the state constitution and executed through its laws. The work of the Irrigation District is work that the State might itself directly perform, without giving the land owners within the District any voice in the selection of managers and trustees. But California, in order that it might carry out what it conceived to be a state function, has permitted the organization of something like 100 irrigation districts in the State and has conferred upon those districts sovereign powers, the power of taxation, the power to borrow money.
The legislature itself could perform those functions directly by some department of the State. Instead of that, it chose to give the people greater control, because they were vitally interested. It could have raised revenues by direct taxation upon the entire State, because the purpose would have been public. But realizing that greater justice would be done, it allocated the indebtedness to the districts more directly affected, and thereby
Argument for Appellees. 304U.S.
permitted the people in those districts to have a voice in those affairs.
One of the greatest powers is that of borrowing money. There is a misunderstanding here as to what fiscal power is affected by this Act. It is true that in the Act everything has been -done which could possibly have been thought of in order to relieve the court from the necessity of making a direct order on the district, but the effect upon the fiscal powers goes back to the time of the borrowing of the money.
Each holder of a bond and coupon is entitled to payment out of the bond values of the district in the order in which his bond or coupon has been presented. That makes each bond and coupon a separate class, and the one presented today is entitled to payment before the one presented tomorrow.
This Act would have the same effect as respects the fiscal powers of the district and State as would an exercise of powers to tax income from the bonds—it would tend much more to destroy, because under this Act you take the principal, whereas under the income act, you can take only a portion of the interest.
If this power under this Act is sustained, our great cities,—all the taxing districts, sewer districts, road districts, reclamation districts of California—could be forced into bankruptcy.
I believe it is true that a sovereign State as well as a sovereign nation does not have the right to abdicate any sovereign function which is essential to its sovereignty. Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330.
The Eleventh Amendment gives us no help. The State may waive its right not to be sued. The fact that these districts can be brought into court under certain conditions in no manner detracts from any essential of sovereignty, because the plaintiff in such case brought against the State is merely permitted to obtain an p. 41adjudication of whatever rights he may have. He is not by waiver of the immunity against suit given the right to assert other or different rights.
The Interstate Commerce Clause does not seem to us to be analogous.
I know of no principle permitting state or federal governments to waive their power to tax,—a power essential to sovereignty.
The bankruptcy power is not a power essential to the National Government. It was given to the National Government for convenience, for uniformity. It is a sort of regulatory or police power granted to the National Government, and therefore if it comes in conflict with the power of the State, which is essential to the maintenance of the sovereignty of the State, it must give way completely.
This is a bankruptcy act, whether it be called readjustment, or whether it be called composition. The effect of it is to compel certain persons to accept something which they have not contracted to accept. The difference in nomenclature between calling this district a taxing agency or a political subdivision, it seems quite obvious could have no effect upon the inherent powers which Congress may have.
Mr. Cook compared chapter X with chapter IX. One essential difference is that c. X does not require the consent of the State.
The California Enabling Act authorized the filing of a petition under c. IX.
Mr. Childers, on behalf of appellees, maintained that chapters IX and X were alike objectionable. The same classes of agencies are dealt with—arms of the sovereign power of the State. The Ashton case decides that the power of Congress does not extend over the sovereign function of a State.
Argument for Appellees. 304 U. S.
If the power of bankruptcy extends over these state mandatories in a little way, that is, in a voluntary proceeding, it must follow that it may be exercised against these mandatories without their consent or without the consent of the State. The next logical step is to make that same power apply to the State itself. Congress must have all the power or none; and that is the principle that was announced in the Ashton case. We find nothing in this statute that would seem materially to differentiate it from the Ashton case.
To the great powers assigned to the United States by the Constitution, the States are powerless to add. Those powers are quite sufficient in themselves. The powers not delegated have been reserved to the States and to the people, and as this Court said in United States v. Butler, the Tenth Amendment was to make doubly sure.
It is the people who ultimately have the sovereign power; and the State is not in position to surrender those necessary elements of sovereignty by which it must exist.
A State, through its legislature, may consent to be sued, may surrender its sovereignty in a suit, because that is one of the powers not prohibited, and the legislature has the right to speak for the people to that extent. But it is prohibited from passing any law impairing the obligations of contract. Bankruptcy is necessarily an impairment of contract obligations. The taxing power is one of the highest attributes of sovereignty. If the United States can apply the bankruptcy power to a State, then it can control in the fiscal affairs of the State.
Though the Constitution does not expressly prohibit, State or Federal Governments may not tax each other’s instrumentalities, because that would be to affect their sovereign functions. It is not a question of the size of the tax.
This must be true of bankruptcy. As soon as it touches the State in the remotest degree, it would seem that the power could not exist.
There surely cannot be a little bankruptcy. Surely Congress must have the whole power or none.
The power in bankruptcy would seem to be much more sinister than the power to tax, because the power to tax operates ordinarily in an even, like manner.
The State, of course, is prohibited by the contract clause from impairing the obligations of a contract. Now, it would seem that regardless of what sort of statute a State might pass, it can not add to or take away from the power of Congress in that regard. If a consent is needed to make an Act of Congress effective, then it must be that the power does not exist. If Congress must look to another sovereign for its power, it can not have the power.
Irrigation districts in California exercise governmental functions. The legislature has plenary power over them. They are State agencies.
The legislature can destroy them by simply repealing the Act under which they exist, and the State can go out and do the work itself, by its own agents directly. The better considered cases hold that the beneficial interest in the property acquired by one of these districts is in the State itself. It does not make much difference in this connection whether it is in the State or the land owner. The district, as a legal entity, is not the beneficial owner. If the beneficial interest is in the land owner, he must be brought into court.
How could there well be a bankruptcy of one of these public agencies that can not respond to a judgment? It has no property that is subject to execution.
In answer to questions from the Chief Justice, Mr. Childers conceded that, under chapter X, no plan of com-
Amici Curiae. 304U.S.
position can go through unless approved by the district; and that the California Act of 1934 gave consent to the submission of such a plan under chapter IX, if not under chapter X; but he maintained that, even so, the federal bankruptcy power can not be applied.
All the power of government, whether possessed by the Nation or a State, can not be asserted to effect the composition of an indebtedness of such a district.
The Chief Justice . So that the State would be prohibited to effect a composition of 60 per cent., no matter how fair it is, and the Federal Government would be prohibited, although this district has an economic plight which needs relief for the benefit of the people of the district, and incidentally the people of the State. There is no power in the Government against a creditor to provide for that relief?
Mr . Childers . That is right. And the remedy would be much worse, I believe, than the disease.
The Chief Justic e . Remedies often are.
Mr . Justice Mc Reynolds . What power is there in a State Government or Federal Government or any other government to repudiate debts?
Mr . Chil ders . I think that is answered. I don’t think there is any power, and I don’t think the power ought to be there. As a matter of economics, I believe it would do much more harm to these districts than it could possibly do good. And if the power existed, the power might be exercised all the way.
By leave of Court, briefs of amici curiae were filed by Messrs. U. S. Webb, Attorney General of California, Greek L. Rice, Attorney General of Mississippi, Ray McKittrick, Attorney General of Missouri, Gray Mashburn, Attorney General of Nevada, Frank H. Patton, Attorney General of New Mexico, I. H. Van Winkle, Attorney General of Oregon, and Ray E. Lee, Attorney p. 45General of Wyoming, on behalf of those States; Messrs. G. W. Hamilton, Attorney General of Washington, and Fred J. Cunningham, on behalf of the State of Washington; and Messrs. Jack Holt, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Chas. D. Frierson, on behalf of the State of Arkansas and certain drainage districts thereof, all in support of appellant in No. 772; by Messrs. Cary D. Landis, Attorney General of Florida, and Giles J. Patterson, on behalf of the State of Florida, in support of appellant in No. 757; and by Messrs. Francis V. Keesling and Charles L. Childers, on behalf of the West Coast Life Ins. Co., in support of appellees.
Mr . Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are direct appeals from the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of California under the Act of August 24, 1937, c. 754, 50 Stat. 751. They present the question of the constitutional validity of the Act of August 16, 1937, 50 Stat. 653, amending the Bankruptcy Act by adding Chapter X providing for the composition of indebtedness of the taxing agencies or instrumentalities therein described. A certificate was issued to the Attorney General and the United States intervened. The District Court held the statute invalid as applied to the appellant and dismissed its petition for composition. The court considered itself bound by the decision in Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513.
Appellant, the Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District, was or<’ A nized in the year 1915 under the California Irrigation District Act of March 31, 1897 (Cal. Stat. 1897, p. 254). It comprises about 15,260 acres in Tulare County. It is an irrigation district and taxing agency created for the purpose of constructing and operating irrigation projects and works devoted to the improvement of lands for p. 46agricultural purposes. On September 21, 1937, it presented its petition for the confirmation of a plan of composition. The petition alleged insolvency; that its indebtedness consisted of outstanding bonds aggregating $1,- 427,000 in principal, with unpaid interest of $439,085.15; that no interest or principal falling due since July 1, 1933, had been paid; that the low price of agricultural products had prevented the owners of land within the irrigation district from meeting their assessments; that upon the assessment levied by the District in the year 1932 there was a delinquency of 47 per cent, and that since that year there had been levied only an assessment of sufficient amount to maintain and operate its works; that the District’s plan for the composition of its debts provided for the payment in cash of a sum equal to 59.978 cents for each dollar of the principal amount of its outstanding bonds in satisfaction of all amounts due; that creditors owning about 87 per cent, in the principal amount of the bonds had accepted the plan and consented to the filing of the petition; and that payment of the amount required was to be made from the proceeds of a loan which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had agreed to make upon new refunding serial bonds equal to the amount borrowed and bearing interest at four per cent.
The District Court approved the petition as filed in good faith and directed the creditors to show cause why an injunction should not issue staying the commencement of suits upon the securities affected by the plan. The appellees as bondholders appeared and moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act violated the Fifth and Tenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. It appeared from the return to the order to show cause that these creditors had obtained an alternative writ of mandate from the state court directing the county board of supervisors to levy an assessment upon the lands within the District sufficient to pay p. 47the amounts due the complaining creditors, and that the proceedings in that court had been suspended pending the proceeding in the bankruptcy court.
First. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act is limited to voluntary proceedings for the composition of debts. Aside from the question as to the power of the Congress to provide this method of relief for the described taxing agencies, it is well settled that a proceeding for composition is in its nature within the federal bankruptcy power. Compositions were authorized by the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, as amended by the Act of 1874, c. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 182. It is unnecessary to the validity of such a proceeding that it should result in an adjudication of bankruptcy. In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490, 496, 497; Continental National Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 672, 673. In the Continental Bank case, in the course of a full consideration of the scope of the federal bankruptcy power and of the evolution of its exercise, we said :
“The constitutionality of the old provision for a composition is not open to doubt. In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490, 496-497, cited with approval in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra. [186 U. S. at p. 187.] That provision was there sustained upon the broad ground that the /subject of bankruptcies’ was nothing less than ‘the subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and their relief.’ That it was not necessary for the proceedings to be carried through in bankruptcy was held not to warrant the objection that the provision did not constitute a law on the subject of bankruptcies.”
Second. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether Chapter X would be valid as applied to the irrigation district in the absence of the consent of the State which created it, for the State has given its consent. We think that this sufficiently appears from the statute of California enacted in 1934. Laws of 1934, Ex. Sess., p. 48ch. 4. This statute (§1) adopts the definition of “taxing districts” as described in an amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, to wit Chapter IX approved May 24, 1934, and further provides that the Bankruptcy Act and “acts amendatory and supplementary thereto, as the same may be amended from time to time, are herein referred to as the ‘Federal Bankruptcy Statute’.” Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act is an amendment and appears to be embraced within the state’s definition. We have not been referred to any decision to the contrary. Section 3 of the state act then provides that any taxing district in the State is authorized to file the petition mentioned in the “Federal Bankruptcy Statute.” Subsequent sections empower the taxing district upon the conditions stated to consummate a plan of readjustment in the event of its confirmation by the federal court. The statute concludes with a statement of the reasons for its passage, as follows:
“There exist throughout the State of California economic conditions which make it impossible for property owners to pay their taxes and special assessments levied upon real or taxable property. The burden of such taxes and special assessments is so onerous in amount that great delinquencies have occurred in the collection thereof and seriously affect the ability of taxing districts to obtain the revenue necessary to conduct governmental functions and to pay obligations represented by bonds. It is essential that financial relief, as set forth in this act, be immediately afforded to such taxing districts in order to avoid serious impairment of their taxing systems, with consequent crippling of the local governmental functions of the State. This act will aid in accomplishing this necessary result and should therefore go into effect immediately.”
While the facts thus stated related to conditions in California, similar conditions existed in other parts of the p. 49country and it was this serious situation which led the Congress to enact Chapter IX and later Chapter X.1
Our attention has been called to the difference between § 80 (k) of Chapter IX and § 83 (i) of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act in the omission from the latter of the provision requiring the approval of the petition by a governmental agency of the State whenever such approval is necessary by virtue of the local law. We attach no importance to this omission. It is immaterial, if the consent of the State is not required to make the federal plan effective, and it is equally immaterial if the consent of the State has been given, as we think it has in this case. It should also be observed that Chapter X, § 83 (e) provides as a condition of confirmation of a plan of composition that it must appear that the petitioner “is authorized by law to take all action necessary to be taken by it to carry out the plan,” and, if the judge is not satisfied on that point as well as on the others mentioned, he must enter an order dismissing the proceeding. The phrase “authorized by law” manifestly refers to the law of the State.
Third. We are thus brought to the inquiry whether the exercise of the federal bankruptcy power in dealing with a composition of the debts of the irrigation district, upon its voluntary application and with the State’s consent, must be deemed to be an unconstitutional interference with the essential independence of the State as preserved by the Constitution.
In Ashton v. Cameron County District, supra, the court considered that the provisions of Chapter IX authorizing p. 50the bankruptcy court to entertain proceedings for the “readjustment of the debts” of “political subdivisions” of a State “might materially restrict its control over its fiscal affairs,” and was therefore invalid; that if obligations of States or their political subdivisions might be subjected to the interference contemplated by Chapter IX, they would no longer be “free to manage their own affairs.”
1
See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1868 and H. R. 5950, 1934, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.; Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1670, etc., 1933, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.; Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, 533, 534. 81638°—38-----4
In enacting Chapter X the Congress was especially solicitous to afford no ground for this objection. In the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,2 which was adopted by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,3 in dealing with the bill proposing to enact Chapter X, the subject was carefully considered. The Committee said:
“Compositions are approvable only when the districts or agencies file voluntary proceedings in courts of bankruptcy, accompanied by plans approved by 51 per cent of all the creditors of the district or agency, and by evidence of good faith. Each proceeding is subject to ample notice to creditors, thorough hearings, complete investigations, and appeals from interlocutory and final decrees. The plan of composition cannot be confirmed unless accepted in writing by creditors holding at least 66% percent of the aggregate amount of the indebtedness of the petitioning district or taxing agency, and unless the judge is satisfied that the taxing district is authorized by law to carry out the plan, and until a specific finding by the court that the plan of composition is fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors. . . .
“The Committee on the Judiciary is not unmindful of the sweeping character of the holding of the Supreme Court above referred to [in the Ashton case], and believes p. 51that H. R. 5969 is not invalid or contrary to the reasoning of the majority opinion. . . .
2
H. Rep. No. 517, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 Sen. Rep. No. 911, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
“The bill here recommended for passage expressly avoids any restriction on the powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties. No interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a political subdivision is permitted. The taxing agency itself is the only instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the proposed legislation. No involuntary proceedings are allowable, and no control or jurisdiction over that property and those revenues of the petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental purposes is conferred by the bill. . . .
“There is no hope for relief through statutes enacted by the States, because the Constitution forbids the passing of State laws impairing the obligations of existing contracts. Therefore, relief must come from Congress, if at all. The committee are not prepared to admit that the situation presents a legislative no-man’s land. ... It is the opinion of the committee that the present bill removes the objections to the unconstitutional statute, and gives a forum to enable those distressed taxing agencies which desire to adjust their obligations and which are capable of reorganization, to meet their creditors under necessary judicial control and guidance and free from coercion, and to affect such adjustment on a plan determined to be mutually advantageous.”
We are of the opinion that the Committee’s points are well taken and that Chapter X is a valid enactment. The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter normally within its province and only in a case where the action of the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved by the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law. It is of the p. 52essence of sovereignty to be able to make contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental power. This is constantly illustrated in treaties and conventions in the international field by which governments yield their freedom of action in particular matters in order to gain the benefits which accrue from international accord. Oppenheim, International Law, 4th ed., vol. 1, § § 493, 494; Hyde, International Law, vol. 2, § 489; Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 353; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 597. The reservation to the States by the Tenth Amendment protected, and did not destroy, their right to make contracts and give consents where that action would not contravene the provisions of the Federal Constitution. The States with the consent of Congress may enter into compacts with each other and the provisions of such compacts may limit the agreeing States in the exercise of their respective powers. Const., Art. I, § 10, subd. 3. Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185, 209; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 725; Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., post, p. 92. The State is free to make contracts with individuals and give consents upon which the other contracting party may rely with respect to a particular use of governmental authority. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 137; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 643, 644; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 549; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436, 446. While the instrumentalities of the national government are immune from taxation by a State, the State may tax them if the national government consents (Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Comm’n, 297 U. S. 209, 211, 212) and by a parity of reasoning the consent of the State could remove the obstacle to the taxation by the federal government of state agencies to which the consent applied.
Nor did the formation of an indestructible Union of indestructible States make impossible cooperation between the Nation and the States through the exercise of the power of each to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both. We had recent occasion to consider that question in the case of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, in relation to the operation of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935. 49 Stat. 620. The question was raised with special emphasis in relation to § 904 of the statute and the parts of § 903, complementary thereto, by which the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to receive and hold in the Unemployment Trust Fund all moneys deposited therein by a state agency for a state unemployment fund and to invest in obligations of the United States such portion of the Fund as is not in his judgment required to meet current withdrawals. The contention was that Alabama in consenting to that deposit had “renounced the plenitude of power inherent in her statehood.” 301 U. S. at pp. 595, 596. We found the contention to be unsound. As the States were at liberty upon obtaining the consent of Congress to make agreements with one another, we saw no room for doubt that they may do the like with Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without impairment. And we added that “Nowhere in our scheme of government—in the limitations express or implied of our federal constitution—do we find that she [the State] is prohibited from assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits received.”
In the instant case we have cooperation to provide a remedy for a serious condition in which the States alone were unable to afford relief. Improvement districts, such as the petitioner, were in distress. Economic disaster had made it impossible for them to meet their obligations. As the owners of property within the boundaries of the district could not pay adequate assessments, the power of p. 54taxation was useless. The creditors of the district were helpless. The natural and reasonable remedy through composition of the debts of the district was not available under state law by reason of the restriction imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the impairment of contracts by state legislation. The bankruptcy power is competent to give relief to debtors in such a plight and, if there is any obstacle to its exercise in the case of the districts organized under state law it lies in the right of the State to oppose federal interference. The State steps in to remove that obstacle. The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue. Through its cooperation with the national government the needed relief is given. We see no ground for the conclusion that the Federal Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has reduced both sovereigns to helplessness in such a case.
Fourth. As the bankruptcy power may be exerted to give effect to a plan for the composition of the debts of an insolvent debtor, we find no merit in appellant’s objections under the Fifth Amendment. In re Reiman, supra; Continental National Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., supra.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
Mr . Justic e Mc Reynolds and Mr . Justic e Butler are of the opinion that the principle approved in Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, is controlling here and requires affirmation of the questioned decree.
Mr . Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.