Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)

303 U.S. 391
58 S. Ct. 630
82 L. Ed. 917
1938 U.S. LEXIS 398
1937 SCDB 140
US-DOC-27828010
locator
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)
Full caption
HELVERING, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. MITCHELL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 7, 1938
HELVERING, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. MITCHELL.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 324. Argued January 14, 1938.—Decided March 7, 1938.
Section 293 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1928, Title I, provides that, if any part of a deficiency is due to fraud with intent to évadé tax, 50% of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed, collected and paid. Section 146 (b) of the same Title déclarés that any person who wilfully attempts in any manner to évadé or defeat any tax imposed by the Title, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and upon conviction be subject to fine and imprisonment.
Held: That an acquittai of a charge of wilful attempt to évadé, under § 146 (b), does not bar assessment and collection of the 50% addition prescribed by § 293 (b). P. 397 et seq.
The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable because of the difference in quantum of proof in civil and criminal cases; the acquittai was merely an adjudication that the proof was not sufîicient to overcome ail reasonable doubt of guilt. P. 397.
The doctrine of double jeopardy is inapplicable because the 50% addition to tax provided by § 293 (b) is not primarily punitive but is a remédiai sanction imposed as a safeguard for protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for expense and loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud. As such it may be enforced by a civil procedure to which the accepted rules and
constitutional guaranties goveming the trial of criminal prosecutions do not apply. P. 398.
Franca, 282 U. S. 568, distinguished. 89 F. 2d 873, reversed.
Certiorari, 302 U. S. 670, to review a judgment reversing in part a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 32 B. T. A. 1093, which sustained a deficiency income tax assessment, with a 50% addition for fraud.
Mr. Edward S. Greenbaum, with whom Soliciter General Reed, Assistant Attorney General Morris, and Messrs. Sewall Key and Lucius A. Buck were on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. William Wallace for respondent.
The fifty per centum addition to the tax deficiency is a penalty intended for punishment.
As fraud présupposés a plan conceived before its execution, it must of necessity be wilful. There can be no act of fraudulent évasion under § 293 (b) that would not also be a wilful évasion under § 146 (b). The penalty prescribed by § 293 (b) is imposed only because of acts which, when committed, constitute a crime.
The fact that the words “tax” or “addition to the deficiency” are used to describe the imposition, or that collection is made through the Bureau of Internai Revenue of the Treasury Department, is of no significance if the real purpose of the imposition is to define and suppress a crime. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20; Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605; Dorsheimer N. United States, 7 Wall. 166.
Even though termed a tax, the assessment is under suspicion of not being a true tax, when levied because of illégal acts. United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568. If “evidence of a crime is essential to the imposition of [p. 393] a tax, the courts do not hesitate to pronounce it a penalty, even if it may incidentally bring in revenue.” Regai Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386; Lipke v. Lederer, 269 U. S. 557. Nor does the fact that the penalty may be superimposed on what is clearly a tax lessen the penal character of the former. Helwig N. United States, supra, 614-616; 17 Ops. Atty. Gen. 433; 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 398.
A review of the decisions of this Court compels us to the conclusion that (1) if a so-called tax is meant primarily to suppress a certain kind of conduct, rather than to supply regular revenue for the support of the Government, or (2) if the addition is greatly out of proportion to the ordinary tax, or (3) if it is levied upon a particular act because of its fraud, then it is regarded as a penalty and punishment rather than a mere tax. Cases supra, and Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214; Wright v. Blakeslee, 101 U. S. 174; Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263; Moore Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, 50 F. 2d 288. Tayloe v. Sandjord, 7 Wheat. 13, 17; and Stearns v. United States, 22 Fed. Cas. 1188, 1192, distinguished.
Ail of the cases above cited which held the addition to be a penalty or punishment were civil in their nature. In ail of them the rules of evidence and of procedure applicable to civil actions were applied, except that the défendant could not be compelled to bear witness against himself. Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476, 480; Boyd N. United States, 116 U. S. 616. This application of rules of civil procedure included admissibility of evidence, United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475, also quantum of proof, United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, and direction of verdicts, Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103. The penalties were either assessed by administrative officiais or sued for in a civil action.
Despite the fact that the statutory provisions so enforced were civil in their nature, or at most quasi criminal—this term was applied to them in Boyd v. United States, supra, (p. 634)—they were uniformly held to be penalties, i. e., punishment for wrongful conduct. In none of the cases did the fact of adhérence to the civil forms of action militate against a détermination that the imposition was penal in character. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, distinguished.
Neither the method of collection nor the taxpayer’s inability to invoke the aid of equity to enjoin collection are determinative of the punitive character of such additions. Helwig v. United States, supra; United States v. Chouteau, 102 U. S. 603, 611; Dorsheimer v. United States, supra.
In Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, no question of double jeopardy was presented nor did the Court by using the word “compensatory” mean to detract from the essentially punitive character of the penalty.
Ail the facts and intents requisite to the imposition of the 50% addition to the deficiency were put in issue and determined against the Government in the criminal trial, and the judgment of acquittai bars petitioner from obtaining a second judgment based upon the same facts and intents.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court.
Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, § 293, 45 Stat. 791, provides, in dealing with assessment of deficiencies in income tax returns:
“(b) Fraud.—If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to évadé tax, then 50 per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be so assessed, collected and paid. . .
The question for decision is whether assessment of the addition is barred by the acquittai of the défendant on an indictment under § 146 (b) of the same Act for a wilfull attempt to évadé and defeat the tax.
The Commissioner of Internai Revenue found that Charles E. Mitchell of New York had, in his income tax return for the year 1929, fraudulently deducted from admitted gross income an alleged loss of $2,872,305.50 from a purported sale of 18,300 shares of National City Bank stock to his wife; that he had fraudulently failed to return the sum of $666,666.67 received by him as a distribution from the management fund of the National City Company, of which he was chairman; and that these fraudulent acts were done with intent to évadé the tax. On December 8, 1933, the Commissioner notified Mitchell that there was a deficiency in his tax return of $728,709.84 and, on account of the fraud, a 50 per cent, addition thereto in the sum of $364,354.92.
Mitchell appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, which sustained the Commissioner’s détermination. 32 B. T. A. 1093. Upon a pétition for review, the Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that there was ample evidence to support the Board’s findings that Mitchell had fraudulently made déduction of the loss and that he had fraudulently failed to return the amount received from the management fund; and that, despite the facts hereafter stated, [p. 396] the Board was free to find the facts according to the evidence. It accordingly affirmed the assessment of the deficiency of $728,709.84. But it reversed the Board’s approval of the additional assessment of $364,354.92, because of the following facts:
Before the deficiency assessment was made Mitchell had been indicted in the fédéral court for Southern New York under § 146 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1928, which provides:
“Any person . .. who willfully attempts in any manner to évadé or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payaient thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”
The first count charged that Mitchell “unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly, feloniously, and fraudulently did attempt to defeat and évadé an income tax of, to wit, $728,709.84, upon his net income for 1929.” He was tried on the indictment and acquitted on ail the counts. The item of $728,709.84 set out in the first count is the same item as that involved in the deficiency assessed; and both arose from the same transactions of Mitchell. But the addition of $364,354.92 by reason of fraud was not involved in the indictment.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prior judgment of acquittai was not a bar under the doctrine of res judicata; and hence it affirmed the assessment of the $728,709.84. But it held that our decisions in Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, and United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, required it “to treat the imposition of the penalty of 50 per cent, as barred by the prior acquittai of Mitchell in the criminal action.” 89 F. (2d)
873. Mitchell’s pétition for certiorari to review so much of the judgment as upheld the assessment of the [p. 397] deficiency of $728,709.84 was denied. 302 U. S. 723. The Commissioner’s pétition to review so much of the judgment as denied the 50 per centum in addition was granted, because of the importance in the administration of the revenue laws of the questions presented and alleged conflict in decisions. 302 U. S. 670.
First. Mitchell contends that the claim for the 50 per cent, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. He asserts that ail the facts and intents requisite to the imposition of the 50 per centum addition to the deficiency were put in issue and determined against the Government in the criminal trial, and that hence, under the doctrine of res judicata the judgment of acquittai bars it from obtaining a second judgment based upon the same facts and intents. Since this proceeding to détermine whether the amount claimed is payable as a tax is a proceeding different in its nature from the indictment for the crime of wilfully attempting to évadé the tax, the contention that the doctrine of estoppel by judgment applies rests wholly on the assertion that the issues here presented were litigated and determined in the criminal proceeding. Compare Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 289 U. S. 620, 623. But this is not true.
The différence in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata. The acquittai was “merely ... an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome ail reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.” Lewis n. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 302. It did not détermine that Mitchell had not wilfully attempted to évadé the tax. That acquittai on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remédiai in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been settled. Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, 188; Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630, 631, 632. Compare Chantangco N. Abaroa, 218 U. S. [p. 398] 476, 481, 482.1 Where the objective of the subséquent action likewise is punishment, the acquittai is a bar, because to entertain the second proceeding for punishment would subject the défendant to double jeopardy; and double jeopardy is precluded by the Fifth Amendment whether the verdict was an acquittai or a conviction. Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630, 632.
The Government urges that application of the doctrine of res judicata is precluded also by the différence in the issues presented in the two cases; that although the indictment and this proceeding arise out of the same transactions and facts, the issues in them are not the same; that on the indictment the issue was whether Mitchell had “willfully” attempted to “évadé or defeat” the tax; that whether he had done so “fraudulently” was not there an issue, United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518; compare United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 397; and that in this proceeding the issue is specifically whether the deficiency was “due to fraud.” Compare Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 380. Since there was not even an adjudication that Mitchell did not wilfully attempt to évadé or defeat the tax, it is not necessary to décidé whether such an adjudication would be décisive also of this issue of fraud. Compare Hanby N. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 125, 129.
Second. Mitchell contends that this proceeding is barred under the doctrine of double jeopardy because the 50 per centum addition of $364,354.92 is not a tax, but a criminal penalty intended as punishment for allegedly fraudulent acts. Unless this sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal, [p. 399] the double jeopardy clause provided for the défendant in criminal prosecutions is not applicable.
1. In assessing income taxes the Government relies primarily upon the disclosure by the taxpayer of the relevant facts. This disclosure it requires him to make in his annual return. To ensure full and honest disclosure, to discourage fraudulent attempts to évadé the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such sanctions may confessedly be either criminal or civil. As stated in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339:
“In accord with this settled judicial construction, the législation of Congress from the beginning, not only as to tariff but as to internai revenue, taxation and other subjects, has proceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.”
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense. The question for decision is thus whether § 293 (b) imposes a criminal sanction. That question is one of statutory construction. Compare Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630, 632.
Remédiai sanctions may be of varying types. One which is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element is révocation of a privilège voluntarily granted.2
Forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which hâve been recognized as enforcible by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789. Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47. In spite of their comparative severity, such sanctions hâve been upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and subject to the procédural rules governing criminal prosecutions. Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214; United States N. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475; Hepner n. United States, 213 U. S. 103; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559, 578; United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37; Grant Bros. Construction Co. N. United States, 232 U. S. 647, 660; Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630; Various Items v. United States, 282 U. S. 577; Lloyd Sdbaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 334.3
265. Compare also Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 196, 199-200; Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F. (2d) 402, 407 (C. C. A. 7) ; Farmers’ Livestock Commission Co. v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 375, 378 (E. D. 111.).
3 See also notes 7 to 13, infra. The distinction here taken between sanctions that are remédiai and those that are punitive has not generally been specifically enunciated. In determining whether particular rules of criminal procedure are applicable to civil actions to enforce sanctions, the cases hâve usually attempted to distinguish between the type of procédural rule involved rather than the kind of sanction being enforced. Thus Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 111-112, holding that a verdict may be directed for the Government, and United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, 50, holding that the Government need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, distinguished Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, and Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476, holding that the défendant could not be required to be a witness against himself on the ground that “the guaranty in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution against compulsory self-incrimination . . . is of broader scope than are the guaranties in Article III and the Sixth Amendment governing trials in criminal prosecutions.” 232 U. S. at 50. Compare also Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398, 401.
2. The remédiai character of sanctions imposing additions to a tax has been made clear by this Court in passing upon similar législation. They are provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud.4 In Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 547, 551, the Court said of a provision which added double the value of the goods:
“It must therefore be considered as remédiai, as providing indemnity for loss. And it is not the less so because the liability of the wrongdoer is measured by double the value of the goods received, concealed, or purchased, instead of their single value. The act of abstracting goods illegally imported, receiving, concealing or buying them, interposes difficulties in the way of a government seizure, and impairs, therefore, the value of the government right. It is, then, hardly accurate to say that the only loss the government can sustain from concealing the goods liable to seizure is their single value, or to assert that the liability imposed by the statute of double the value is arbitrary and without reference to indemnification. Double the value may not be more than complété indemnity. . . .
“The act of 1823 was, as we hâve seen, remédiai in its nature. Its purpose was to secure full compensation for interférence with the rights of the United States. ...”5
3. In §§ 276 and 293 it is provided that collection of the 50 per centum addition, like that of the primary tax it-
4 Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 210; Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263, 274; Cliquot’s Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 145; Dorsheimer v. United States, 7 Wall. 166, 173; Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214, 221. Compare McDowell v. Heiner, 9 F. (2d) 120 (W. D. Pa.), affirmed on opinion below, 15 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 3); Doit v. Evans, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,969 (C. C. E. D. Pa.) ; Stearns v. United States, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,341 (C. C.).
53383°—38------26
self, may be made “by distraint” as well as “by a proceeding in court.” If the section provided a criminal sanction, the provision for collection by distraint would make it unconstitutional? Compare Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557; Regai Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U. S.
386. See also United States v. Chouteau, 102 U. S. 603, 611; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476; United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568. That Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for the collection of the additional 50 per centum indicates clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction. Civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial of criminal prosecutions, and where civil procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of remédiai sanctions, those rules and guaranties do not apply. Thus the détermination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury,7 or if the prescribed proceeding is in the form of a civil suit,
6Even though Congress may not provide civil procedure for the enforcement of punitive sanctions, nothing in the Constitution prevents the enforcement of distinctly remédiai sanctions by a criminal instead of a civil form of proceeding. Compare United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190, with United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, both enforcing the sanction prescribed in 34 Stat. 898. The fact that a criminal procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of a sanction may be an indication that it is intended to be punitive, but cannot be deemed conclusive if alternative enforcement by a civil proceeding is sustained.
7 Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320; Elting v. North Germon Lloyd, 287 U. S. 324, 327-28; Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 334; cf. Hamburg-American Line v. United States, 291 U. S. 420; Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 U. S. 98. Compare also San Souci v. Compagnie Française de Navigation A Vapeur, 71 F. (2d) 651, 653 (C. C. A. 1); Lloyd Royal Belge, S. A. v. Elting, 61 F. (2d) 745, 747 (C. C. A. 2); Navigazione Libéra Triestina v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 631, 633 [p. 403] a verdict may be directed against the défendant;8 there is no burden upon the Government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,9 and it may appeal from an adverse decision;10 furthermore, the défendant has no constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses
(C. C. A. 9); Clay v. Swope, 38 Fed. 396 (C. C. D. Ky.). And see cases cited in note 2, supra.
Administrative détermination of sanctions imposed by the income tax laws has likewise been upheld. Berlin v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 996, 997 (C. C. A. 2); McDowell v. Heiner, 9 F. (2d) 120 (W. D. Pa.), aff’d on opinion below, 15 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 3); Board v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 73, 76 (C. C. A. 6) ; Wickham v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 527, 531-32 (C. C. A. 8); Little v. Helvering, 75 F. (2d) 436, 439 (C. C. A. 8); Bothwéll v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 35, 38 (C. C. A. 10); DoU v. Evans, Fed. Cas. No. 3,969 (C. C. E. D. Pa.).
3
Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103; Four Packages v. United States, 97 U. S. 404, 412; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559, 578. Compare United States v. Thompson, 41 Fed. 28 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.); United States v. Atlantic Coast Line, 182 Fed. 284 (S. D. Ga.). ® Lilienthal’s Tobacco v. United States, 97 U. S. 237, 265-67, 271; United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37; Grant Bros. Construction Co. n. United States, 232 U. S. 647, 660. Compare New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 165 Fed. 833, 839 (C. C. A. 1); Grain Distillery No. 8 v. United States, 204 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 4) ; Pocahontas Distilling Co. v. United States, 218 Fed. 782, 786 (C. C. A. 4); United States v. Lôuisville & N. Ry. Co., 162 Fed. 185 (S. D. Ala.), aff’d, 174 Fed. 1021 (C. C. A. 5); St. Louis-S. W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 183 Fed. 770, 771 (C. C. A. 5); United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 170 Fed. 542, 545-546 (C. C. A. 6); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 178 Fed. 12, 14 (C. C. A. 8); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 178 Fed. 15, 17-18 (C. C. A. 8). Compare also Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, § 71, 1 Stat. 627, 678; Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348; Cliquons Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 143-44. 10 Compare United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546; United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475; United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37. See also United States v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., 159 Fed. 33, 38 (C. C. A. 6), modified, 220 U. S. 94; United States v. LouisviUe &
against him,11 or to refuse to testify;12 and finally, in the civil enforcement of a remédiai sanction there can be no double jeopardy.13
4. The fact that the Revenue Act of 1928 contains two separate and distinct provisions imposing sanctions, and that these appear in different parts of the statute, helps to make clear the character of that here invoked.14 The sanction of fine and imprisonment prescribed by § 146 (b) for wilfull attempts “in any manner to évadé or de-
12 Compare United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 155. We do not construe Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, or Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476, as holding to the contrary where the sanction involved is remédiai, not punitive. See note 3, supra.
13 Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630; Varions Items v. United States, 282 U. S. 577. Compare Egner v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 3); Wood v. United States, 204 Fed. 55, 57 (C. C. A. 4) ; United States v. St. Louis-S. W. Ry. Co., 184 Fed. 28, 32 (C. C. A. 5); Slick v. United States, 1 F. (2d) 897, 898 (C. C. A. 7). See also United States v. Three Copper Stills, 47 Fed. 495, 499 (D. Ky.); United States v. Olsen, 57 Fed. 579, 582-586 (N. D. Cal.); Castle v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 515, 518-520 (Ct. Cl.). Compare Hanby v. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 4).
feat any [income] tax/’ introduced into the Act under the heading “Penalties,” is obviously a criminal one. The sanction of 50 per centum addition “if any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to évadé tax,” prescribed by § 293 (b), introduced into the Act under the heading “Additions to the Tax,” was clearly intended as a civil one. This sanction, and other additions to the tax, are set forth in Supplément M, entitled “Interest and Additions to the Tax.” The supplément includes, besides § 293 (b), §§ 291, 292, 293 (a) and 294. Section 291 prescribes a 25 per centum addition for failure to make and file a return; § 292 prescribes interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum upon the deficiency from the date prescribed for payment of the tax; § 293 (a), an addition of 5 per centum if the deficiency “is due to négligence, or intentional disregard of rules and régulations but without intent to defraud”; and § 294 prescribes an addition to the tax of 1 per centum per month in case of non-payment. Obviously ail of these “Additions to the Tâx” were intended by Congress as civil incidents of the assessment and collection of the income tax.15
Third. Mitchell insists that Cofley n. United States, 116 U. S. 436, requires affirmance of the judgment; the Government argues that this case is distinguishable, and, if not, that it should be disapproved. The Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, 186-189, and later cases, recognized that the rule of the Coffey case “did not apply to a situation where there had been an acquittai on a criminal charge followed by a civil action requiring a different degree of proof”; but
Syllabus. 303 U. S.
construing § 293 (b) as imposing a penalty designed to punish fraudulent tax dodgers “and not as a mere préventive measure,” it thought that the Cofjey case and United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, required it “to treat the imposition of the penalty of 50 per cent, as barred by the prior acquittai of Mitchell in the criminal action.” Since we construe § 293 (b) as imposing a civil administrative sanction, neither case présents an obstacle to the recovery of the $364,354.92, the 50 per centum addition here in issue.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds is of opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the considération or decision of this case.
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