Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272 (1938)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272 (1938)
Full caption
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. PACIFIC GREYHOUND LINES, INC.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 28, 1938
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. PACIFIC GREYHOUND LINES, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 504. Argued February 4, 1938.—Decided February 28, 1938.
1. National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, ante, p. 261, followed.
2. The evidence and subsidiary findings in this case support the conclusion of the National Labor Relations Board that continued récognition of a company union by an employer would be a continuing obstacle to the exercise of the employées’ right of self-organization and of collectively bargaining through représentatives of their own choosing, and justified its order requiring the employer to withdraw ail récognition of such union and give appropriate notice of the withdrawal to employées. P. 275.
91 F. 2d 458, reversed.
Certiorari, 302 U. S. 679, to review a judgment setting aside, in part, an order of the National Labor Relations Board, upon a pétition for its enforcement.
Mr. Charles Fahy, with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Solicitor General Bell, and Messrs. Robert L. Stem, Robert B. Watts, and Laurence A. Knapp were on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. Ivan Bowen, with whom Mr. M. H. Boutelle was on the brief, for respondent.
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, which cornes here on certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, présents the same issues discussed in No. 413, National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, ante, p. 261, but on a somewhat different state of facts. The only question requiring separate considération is whether, in the case in which the National Labor Relations Board has ordered respondent to cease certain unfair labor practices, including the domination and financial support of a company union, the facts justify its further order that respondent withdraw ail récognition of the union and give appropriate notice of the withdrawal to employées.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the Board’s findings and ail of its order except the affirmative parts relating to withdrawal of récognition of the company union, which it set aside. 91 F. (2d) 458. The authority conferred on the Board by § 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act to direct withdrawal of employer récognition when such an order will carry out the policies of the National Labor Relations Act was considered and sustained in the Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines case, supra. The question calling for attention here is whether the facts found by the Board afford a basis for its conclusion that the policies of the Act will be effectuated by the présent order.
The findings show that respondent, an interstate carrier by motor bus, took an active and leading part in the organization in 1933 of the Drivers’ Association, a labor organization of its employées; that respondent had since continuously interfered with and dominated the internai administration of the Association, and contributed to its support; that through such domination it had obtained a
53383°—38-------18
“working agreement” with the Association in which it was stipulated that grievances of any employée should be presented first to his superior officer and then to respondent’s president, whose decision should be final.
Before the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, respondent twice made successful use of the Association as a means to forestall attempts to organize its employées, one in 1933 by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, and another in 1934 by the employées themselves who sought to establish a Brotherhood of Motor Coach Operators. Respondent’s officers were active in persuading, threatening and coercing employées to join or remain members of the Drivers’ Association, and not to join the rival unions. In 1935, foliowing the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, there was a renewed but unsuccessful attempt by respondent’s employées to establish an organization affiliated with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen. The attempt was met by persuasions and wamings of respondent’s employées, by its officers, not to join the new union, and by threats of discharge if they should join. The Board found that the respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of § 8 (1), (2), and ordered the cessation of these practices and withdrawal of respondent’s récognition of the Drivers’ Association.
While the formai provisions, in constitution and by-laws, for insuring employer control of the company union in the Pennsylvania case are wanting here, the record shows, as the Board found, that employer control of the Drivers’ Association was none the less effective. During a period of three years it had been successfully used by respondent as an instrument for preventing three successive attempts for the organization by respondent’s employées of a union free from company domination. In [p. 275] ordering withdrawal of récognition of the Drivers’ Association by respondent, the Board pointed out that a mere order to cease the unfair labor practices “would not set free the employee’s impulse to seek the organization which would most effectively represent him”; that continued récognition of the Drivers’ Association would provide respondent “with a device by which its power may now be made effective unobtrusively, ahnost without further action on its part. Even though he would not hâve freely chosen” the Association “as an initial proposition, the employée, once having chosen, may by force of a timorous habit, be held firmly to his choice. The employée must be released from these compulsions.”
Whether the continued récognition of the Drivers’ Association by respondent would be a continuing obstacle to the exercise of the employées’ right of self-organization and to bargain collectively through représentatives of their own choosing, was an inference of fact which the Board could draw if there was evidence to support it. Section 10 (e) ; see Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U. S. 297. We cannot say that the Board’s conclusion was without support in the evidence and in the subsidiary findings which respondent does not challenge.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the considération or decision of this case.
UNITED STATES v. KLEIN, ESCHEATOR OF PENNSYLVANIA.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. No. 439. Argued February 11, 1938.—Decided February 28, 1938.
1. Moneys due by a défendant in a suit in the fédéral district court, to certain bondholders whose whereabouts were unknown, were by direction of the court paid into its registry. Unclaimed for more than five years, the fund was deposited in the U. S. Treasury, as required by R. S. § 996. Under that section the money remains subject to the order of the district court to be paid to the persons entitled to it upon full proof of their right. In the exercise of a jurisdiction conferred by state statute, a state court subsequently decreed escheat of the fund and directed the state escheator to apply to the district court for an order that the money be paid to him. There was no contention on behalf of the United States of actual or possible escheat to the United States, or that it had any interest in the money adverse to the unknown bondholders. Held, that the decree of the state court was not an unconstitutional interférence with the fédéral court nor an invasion of the sovereignty of the United States. Pp. 280, 282.
2. While a fédéral court which has taken possession of property in the exercise of the judicial power conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States is said to acquire exclusive jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is exclusive only in so far as restriction of the power of other courts is necessary for appropriate control and disposition of the property by the fédéral court. P. 281.
Appeal from a decree affirming a decree declaring an escheat of certain moneys, theretofore deposited in the fédéral Treasury pursuant to R. S. § 996, and authorizing the state escheator to prosecute the State’s claim to them. The United States appeared in opposition to the proceedings below, asserting jurisdictional objections.
Assistant Attorney General Whitaker, with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Solicitor General Bell, and Messrs. Paul A. Sweeney, and Henry A. Julicher were on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. A. Jere Creskoff, with whom Mr. Albert H. Ladner, Jr. was on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Purdon’s Penn. Statutes, Tit. 27, §§ 41, 45, 282, 334, are unconstitutional because they authorize interférence with a fédéral court and an invasion of the sovereignty of the United States, in so far as they purport to confer jurisdiction on a state tribunal to déclaré the escheat of moneys deposited in the registry of the fédéral court and later covered into the Treasury of the United States.
In a suit brought by secured bondholders in the district court for eastern Pennsylvania to compel payment of the bonds by a défendant on the ground that it had appropriated the security to itself, a decree was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and other bondholders similarly situated, with provision for notice to the latter that they file their daims in the suit. Brown v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 229 Fed. 444; Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Brown, 235 Fed. 669; Brown N. Pennsylvania R. Co., 250 Fed. 513. It appearing that certain of the bondholders had not filed their daims and could not be found, the défendant was directed by the court to pay into its registry the money due to such bondholders, which was then placed in a designated despositary of the United States, in the name and to the crédit of the court, pursuant to R. S. § 995, 28 U. S. C. § 851. On June 30, 1926, the fund was deposited in the Treasury of the United States as required by R. S. § 996, 28 U. S. C., § 852, in the case of funds paid into court and unclaimed for more than five years.
In 1934 the présent appellee, as Escheator of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, proceeding under the [p. 278] Pennsylvania statutes which authorize the escheat of moneys paid into court where the persons entitled to them hâve remained unknown for seven years, petitioned the district court to déclaré an escheat of the fund. The court dismissed the pétition, without préjudice, on the grounds that appellee had not yet procured a déclaration of escheat, which was deemed necessary in order to perfect the Commonwealth’s title, and that the court was without jurisdiction to make such a déclaration. Thereupon the Pennsylvania escheat statutes were amended, Act of June 28, 1935, P. L. 475, to confer upon the Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction to decree an escheat of moneys deposited in the custody or under the control of any court of the United States within the Commonwealth.1
1
As amended, the statutes provide: “Sec. 41. . . . Whenever an escheat has occurred, or shall occur, of any money or property deposited in the custody of, or under the control of, any court of the United States in and for any district within this Commonwealth, or in the custody of any depository, clerk or other officer of such court, the court of common pleas of the county in which such court of the United States sits, shall hâve jurisdiction to ascertain if an escheat has occurred, and to enter a judgment or decree of escheat in favor of the Commonwealth. “Sec. 282. . . . After the owner, bénéficiai owner, or person entitled to any of the following named moneys or property, shall be and remain unknown, or the whereabouts thereof shall hâve been unknown, for the period of seven successive years, such moneys or property shall be escheatable to the Commonwealth, and shall be escheated in the manner hereinafter provided, with interest actually accrued thereon to the date of the decree for the escheat of the same, namely: . . . “(b) Any moneys, estate, or effects paid into or deposited in any court of this Commonwealth, or in any Fédéral court in and for any district within the Commonwealth, or in the custody of any officer of any such court. “Sec. 334. That whensoever any money, estate or effects, shall hâve been, or shall hereafter be paid into, or deposited in the custody or be under the control of any court of this Commonwealth, or of any court of the United States in and for any district within this Commonwealth, or shall be in the custody of any depository, registry, or of any receiver, clerk, or other officer of any of said courts, and the rightful owner or owners thereof shall hâve been or shall be unknown for the space of seven years, the same shall escheat to the Commonwealth, subject to ail legal demands on the same.”
The présent suit was brought by appellee in the Court of Common Pleas, No. 5, of Philadelphia County, upon a pétition setting out the facts already detailed and praying a déclaration that the fund had escheated to the Commonwealth. The United States appeared in the suit and moved to dismiss the pétition on the ground that the state court was without jurisdiction to escheat moneys in the custody of the United States or of its courts. The order of the Court of Common Pleas granting the motion was reversed by the Suprême Court of Pennsylvania, which held that the statutes relating to escheat of funds in the custody of fédéral courts, conferred jurisdiction on the court to déclaré the escheat and was subject to no constitutional infirmity since exercise of that jurisdiction involved no interférence with the fédéral court and no attempted control over funds in its custody. 322 Pa. 481; 192 Atl. 256.
The United States then filed an answer and upon a trial of the issues the Court of Common Pleas gave its decree declaring that the fund had escheated to the Commonwealth and that appellee had authority to claim it, and directing him to apply to the district court for an order that the moneys be paid to him as Escheator. The State Suprême Court affirmed so much of the decree as declared the escheat and authorized appellee to prosecute the claim of the Commonwealth to the moneys. 326 Pa. 260; 192 Atl. 256. From its decree of affirmance the case cornes here on appeal under § 237 of the Judicial Code.
Section 996 of the Revised Statutes directs that when the right to moneys paid into fédéral courts has been [p. 280] adjudicated and they are unclaimed for more than five years, they shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States, in the name of the United States. It further provides: “Any person or persons or any corporation or company entitled to any such money may, on pétition to the court from which the money was received . . . and upon notice to the United States attorney and full proof of right thereto, obtain an order of court directing the payment of such money to the claimant, and the money deposited as aforesaid shall constitute and be a permanent appropriation for payments in obedience to such orders.”2
The Government does not, in pleading or argument, set up any right, title or interest in the présent fund adverse to the unknown bondholders. It does not contend that the fund has been or can be escheated to the United States. It agréés with the contention of appellee, which we accept as correctly interpreting the applicable fédéral statutes, that the fund remains subject to the order of the district court to be paid to the persons lawfully entitled to it upon proof of their ownership. But it insists here, as in the state courts, that the decree declaring the escheat is an unconstitutional interférence with a court of the United States, an invasion of its sovereignty, and is an attempt, void under the Fourteenth Amendment, to exercise jurisdiction over the absent bondholders and [p. 281] the moneys, neither of which are shown to be within the state.
2
The Permanent Appropriation Repeal Act, June 26, 1934, c. 756, 48 Stat. 1224, 1230, § 17, déclarés that appropriation accounts appearing on the books of the govemment, including “Unclaimed moneys of individuals whose whereabouts are unknown (Justice),” “are abolished, and any unobligated balances under such accounts as of June 30, 1935, shall be covered into a trust fund receipt account in the Treasury to be designated ‘Unclaimed Moneys of Individuals Whose Whereabouts Are Unknown.’ . . . There are authorized to be appropriated, annually, from such account such sums as may be necessary to meet any expenditures of the character now chargeable to the appropriation accounts abolished by this section. . .
While a fédéral court which has taken possession of property in the exercise of the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution and laws of the United States is said to acquire exclusive jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is exclusive only in so far as restriction of the power of other courts is necessary for the fédéral court’s appropriate control and disposition of the property. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189; see Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U. S. 475, 477. Other courts having jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in the property do not, because the property is possessed by a fédéral court, lose power to render any judgment not in conflict with that court’s authority to décidé questions within its jurisdiction and to make effective such decisions by its control of the property. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, supra; see Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil-Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 294, 304; cf. Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 342; Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218. Similarly a fédéral court may make a like adjudication with respect to property in the possession of a state court. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 620; Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U. S. 211, 227; Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & T. Co., 215 U. S. 33, 43-46; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradjord, 297 U. S. 613, 619; General Baking Co. v. Harr, 300 U. S. 433.
In this case jurisdiction was acquired by the district court, by reason of diversity of citizenship, to adjudicate ,the rights of the parties. That function performed, it now retains jurisdiction for the sole purpose of making disposition of the fund under its control, by ordering payment of it to the persons entitled as directed by the fédéral statute. Beyond whatever is needful and [p. 282] appropriate to the accomplishment of that end, the jurisdiction and possession of the fédéral district court does not operate to curtail the power which the state may constitutionally exercise over persons and property within its territory.
The présent decree for escheat of the fund is not founded on possession and does not disturb or purport to affect the Treasury’s possession of the fund or the district court’s authority over it. Nor could it do so. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra; United States v. Bank of New York & T. Co., 296 U. S. 463, 478. At most the decree of the state court purports to be an adjudication upon the title of the unknown claimants in the fund by a proceeding in the nature of an inquest of office as in the case of escheated lands, compare Security Savings Bank n. California, 263 U. S. 282, 287, with Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 263, and to confirm the authority of appellee to make claim to the moneys. It is subordinate to every right asserted and decreed in the fédéral suit and effective only so far as it establishes rights derived from them. Neither the nature of the suit in the district court nor the fédéral statutes preclude transfer of or change in the interest of the unknown claimants, either by judicial proceedings in the state court or otherwise, pending final disposition of the fund by the fédéral court. Section 996 of the Revised Statutes contemplâtes that changes in ownership of the fund may occur, since it provides that after the right to the fund has been finally adjudicated and it has been covered into the Treasury it shall be paid over to any person entitled, upon full proof of his right to receive it.
Since the Government has not set up and does not assert any claim or interest in the fund apart from the possession acquired under the decree of the district court and the statutes of the United States, it is unnecessary to consider now the effect on the decree of the state court of the fund’s absence from the state, and the absence or
276 Counsel for Parties.
nonresidence of the unknown claimants, if such is the case. Ail such questions will be open and may be raised and decided whenever application is made to the district court for payment over of the fund.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the considération or decision of this case.
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