Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935)

Appellant’s application for an interlocutory injunction was heard in the District Court by three judges. Jud. Code, § 266, 28 U. S. C. 380. There was ¿so a motion by the defendant to dismiss the bill of complaint upon the grounds, among others, that it failed to allege facts constituting an equitable cause of action, and that the District Court was without jurisdiction. Pursuant to notice, the Attorney General of the State appeared in support of the state act. Affidavits were submitted on both sides and, on hearing, the District Court sustained the p. 92validity of the statute and, on that ground, denied the motion for injunction and granted the motion to dismiss the bill. An order to that effect was entered and the case comes here on appeal.

Despite this provision for local elections, the district attorney in each county has been regarded as a state officer performing a state function and taking the place, in p. 93respect to his duties within the district or county, of the attorney general, upon whom at the outset these duties had been laid. Lincoln’s Constitutional History of New York, vol. 2, pp. 529, 530; vol. 4, pp. 722, 723. Under the state statutes prior to 1892, it appears that district attorneys were classified as judicial officers. N. Y., Rev. Stat., Chap. V, Title I. In Fellows v. Mayor (1876), 8 Hun 484, 485, dealing with the status of an assistant district attorney, the court said: “ It is conceded that the district attorney is a state officer. It could not well be questioned.” And in People ex rel. Lyon v. Nicoll (1891), 32 N. Y. S. 279, 280, the court referred to the office of the district attorney as “ a state office, classified by the Revised Statutes as a judicial office.”

In this view we cannot regard the local description, or the method of selecting the officer, as decisive with respect to the application of § 266 of the Judicial Code. That section relates to suits in which an interlocutory injunction is sought to restrain, on constitutional grounds, the enforcement “of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute, or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes p. 94of such State.” To determine the application of this provision, we must have regard both to the nature of the legislative action which is assailed and to the function of the officer who is sought to be restrained. We have said that the reference is not to every legislative action, regardless of its nature and scope, but to a statute “of general application” or an order of a state board or commission. Thus, the section does not apply to suits to restrain the enforcement of municipal ordinances or the orders of a city board. Ex parte Collins, supra. And, although the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the provision is inapplicable where the defendants are local officers and the suit “ involves matters of interest only to the particular municipality or district.” Id. Accordingly, a suit against local officials to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed against shares in a national banking association, in pursuance of a state law but “ by, and for the sole use of, the city,” was found not to be within the section. Ex parte Public National Bank, supra. We pointed out that the suit must not only seek to have a state statute declared unconstitutional, or that in effect, but to restrain the action “ of an officer of the state.” But the Court was careful to reserve the question whether so-called local officers might not in fact represent the State or exercise “ state functions in the matters involved,” so as to bring the suit to restrain their action within the provision for three judges and direct appeal. Id., p. 105.

Where a statute embodies a policy of statewide concern, an officer, although chosen in a political subdivision and acting within that limited territory, may be charged with the duty of enforcing the statute in the interest of the State and not simply in the interest of the locality where he serves. This is especially true in the case of a prosecuting officer who acts for the entire State, as a part of. its machinery of enforcement, in proceedings against violators of the state statute. The function of p. 95such an officer, in enforcing a statute of general application, is of controlling importance in giving effect to the intent of the Congress.

The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 500. See, also, In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 209-211; Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 217. To justify such interference there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional rights. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214; Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143; Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 428; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445, 452; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 161-162. We have said that it must appear that “ the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate”; otherwise, the accused should first set up his defense in the state court, even though the validity of a statute is challenged. There is ample p. 96opportunity for ultimate review by this Court of federal questions. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 243, 244.

But, although the judgment provided for forfeiture to the Government, it contained an alternative provision, p. 99inserted pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, that if the owners paid to the Government the sum of $20,000 within thirty days, the property should be delivered to them free of all claims. The provision was explicit that, in that event, “the judgment of forfeiture above entered shall not be enforcible nor shall it be enforced, but the payment of Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars shall be in full satisfaction of the aforesaid judgment and shall operate as a release of the lien of said judgment and any cause of action in favor of the Government as to said property described in said libel.” The judgment also provided that, if the owners desired to perfect an appeal, they might give bond to the Government in the sum of $20,000, conditioned as specified in the stipulation, and, on approval of the bond, possession of the property should be immediately delivered to the owners “forever released of any lien or claim of any kind whatsoever in favor of the United States Government and the aforesaid bond shall stand in lieu of and in place of said property.” The bond was given, and the District Court, in September, 1928, ordered the release of the property accordingly.

This court is of opinion that, apart from the objectionable form of the certified questions, which are not aptly or definitely phrased, the question before the Court of Appeals upon the appeal from the interlocutory order is whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction; that the Court of Appeals is not bound to decide, upon the allegations of the bill, an important constitutional question, as to which the Court of Appeals is in doubt, in advance of an appropriate determination by the District Court of the facts p. 103of the case to which the challenged statute is sought to be applied.