Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works etal, 292 U.S. 190 (1934)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works etal, 292 U.S. 190 (1934)
Full caption
SANDERS v. ARMOUR FERTILIZER WORKS etal.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 30, 1934
SANDERS v. ARMOUR FERTILIZER WORKS etal.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
No. 106. Submitted February 5, 1934.—Decided April 30, 1934.
1. Two claimants of a fund due by a fire insurance company, one claiming it as insurance money due under a policy and the other claiming it as a creditor of the first who had attached the fund by garnishing the insurance company, are adverse claimants within the intendment of the Interpleader Act of May 8, 1926; 28 U.S.C., § 41 (26). P. 199.
2. The purpose of the Interpleader Act of May 8, 1926; 28 U.S.C., § 41 (26) is to protect the stakeholder, and to determine the claims according to equity, weighing the right or title of each claimant under the law of the State in which his claim arose. Full faith and credit must be given by the forum to judicial proceedings in other States upon which claims are founded. Pp. 199, 204.
3. Under this Act, the fund paid into court by the applicant for interpleader does not come under the domination of the law of the particular State in which the suit is brought, and the rights of [p. 191] 190 Argument for Petitioner.
claimants can not be varied by the applicant’s choice of forum. Pp. 200, 205.
4. Under the law of Illinois a garnishment, with judgment by default against the debtor after service on him by publication, gives the plaintiff in the garnishment proceeding at least an inchoate lien upon the fund or debt attached, which may be perfected by a final judgment against the garnishee. P. 203.
5. An exemption from execution extended by statutes of Texas to proceeds of fire insurance on property appertaining to a homestead in that State is not recognized by the laws of Illinois when the insured is sued there on a debt and the insurance money is attached by garnishment served on the insurance company. P. 203.
6. A fire insurance company owing money to a resident of Texas on account of the burning of his homestead property in that State, was garnished in Illinois in an action on a debt against the insured in which he suffered judgment by default. The company then interpleaded the garnishor-plaintiff and the insured by a suit in the federal court in Texas, under 28 U.S.C., § 41 (26); paid the insurance money into the registry; and prosecution of the Illinois action was enjoined. Held that the Illinois claimant was entitled to the fund as against the insured, who claimed that it Was exempt under the Texas homestead exemption statutes. P. 204. 63 F. (2d) 902, affirmed.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 623, to review the reversal of a judgment recovered by Sanders in a case of interpleader in the federal court. See also 33 F. (2d) 157; 38 id. 212, on the question of the District Court’s jurisdiction.
Mr. Thomas D. Gresham submitted for petitioner.
The judicial proceeding instituted by Armour in Illinois, which under the laws and practice of that State merely gave rise to an inchoate and defeasible claim upon the debt sought to be garnished, in an indeterminate amount so far as a garnishing plaintiff was concerned, need not be honored in Texas as a definite and final judgment awarding the entire debt sought to be garnished to the satisfaction of Armour’s claim.
The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, after prescribing in general terms that full faith
Argument for Petitioner. 292 U.S.
and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State, leaves the specific enforcement of the clause to statutory enactment by Congress. This power has been exercised by Congress, and the statute on this point (28 U.S.C., § 687) is clear. The judicial proceeding relied upon by Armour is to be given only such faith and credit as it would be entitled to by law or usage in the courts of Illinois. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Ill. 592; Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 250 Ill. 40; 28 C.J. 252; Bigelow v. Andress, 31 Ill. 322; McElwee v. Wilce, 80 Ill. App. 338; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608; Union & Planters Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71; Covington v. First Nat. Bank, 198 U.S. 100; Free v. Western Union, 158 Wis. 36; Bruce v. Ackroyd, 95 Conn. 167; Aldrich n. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 170; Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107; National Bank v. Indiana Banking Co., 114 Ill. 483; Reeve v. Smith, 113 Ill. 477; Martin v. Dryden, 6 Ill. 187; Corbin n. Graves, 27 Fed. 644; Walker v. Garland, 235 S.W. 1078; Lears n. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 3 Ga. App. 614; Rood on Garnishment, § 11; Black on Judgments, p. 1039; 34 C.J. 1105; 15 R.C.L. 900; 1 Lewis’s Sutherland on Statutory Construction, p. 283; State Bank of Chicago v. Thweatt, 111 Ill. App. 599; U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, § 1; Illinois Attachment Act, § 37.
All matters of procedure, including the remedies of garnishment and exemption, in all kinds of actions, are to be governed wholly by the law of the forum. The idea that in interpleader suits the courts of the forum are free to disregard its procedural law and to follow such procedural law, domestic or foreign, as may appeal to them as reaching the most equitable result under the circumstances, is fallacious. Story, Conflict of Laws, Sth ed., §§ 556, 558; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, Vol. 2, p. [p. 193] 190 Argument for Petitioner.
The court below erred in holding it the policy of the United States to aid a creditor to collect his claim against a debtor in violation of the exemption laws of the State of the debtor’s domicile, and especially so in a United States District Court sitting within the confines of the State whose exemption laws the creditor is seeking to evade. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 214; Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218; Ketcham v. Ketcham, 269 Ill. 584; Reames v. Morrow, 193 Ill. App. 155; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 679; Strawn Mercantile Co. n. First Nat. Bank, 279 S.W. 473; Jackson v. Republic, 141 Ill. App. 453; Baltimore de Ohio R. Co. v. McDonald, 112 Ill. App. 391; Steele v. Buel, 104 Fed. 972.
We believe that the majority decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is plainly in violation of the provisions of 28 U.S.C., § 687, in that the decision expressly gave to the incomplete garnishment proceeding in Illinois a greater effect than was given to it by the established law and usage of that State, on the plea that the Supreme Court of Illinois had incorrectly interpreted the law of that State, and that the court below had the right to place its own interpretation upon the law of Illinois in preference to accepting the interpretation of the Illinois Supreme Court. In its holding that the
61745°—34------ 13
institution of a garnishment suit is the equivalent of a final judgment awarding to the garnishing plaintiff all the relief sought by him in such suit, and that it must be recognized and enforced as such in the courts of a sister State, even though it be in violation of the public policy and laws of such sister State, the decision is squarely in conflict with the prior decision of this Court in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107.
In the right asserted by the majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals to disregard the sovereign laws of the State in which the district court is sitting, whenever the individual judge sitting as such court may consider such sovereign laws to be inequitable, the decision is revolutionary, wholly without precedent, and dangerous in the extreme.
Messrs. Charles J. Faulkner, Jr., and Mark McMahon submitted for Armour Fertilizer Works, respondent.
Mr. George S. Wright submitted for National Fire Insurance Co., respondent.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy (1916), 241 U.S. 518, exhibited the serious problems encountered by insurance companies when conflicting demands are made by residents of different States. There two individuals, residents of California and Pennsylvania, claimed the surrender value of a life policy. The insurer unsuccessfully sought through interpleader proceedings in Pennsylvania to secure release from all liability.
In order to mitigate the difficulties, Congress, by the Act of February 27, 1917, 39 Stat. 929, authorized insurance companies to file bills of interpleader in District Courts of the United States. An amendment followed
February 25, 1925, 43 Stat. 976, U.S.C.A. 28, § 41 (26). And the Act of May 8, 1926, 44 Stat. 416, U.S.C.A. 28, Supp., § 41 (26) (in the margin 0, rewrote and amplified the provisions of the earlier enactments.
J Act approved May 8, 1926, 44 Stat. 416. Chap. 273—“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction to entertain and determine suits in equity begun by bills of interpleader duly verified, filed by any casualty company, surety company, insurance company or association or fraternal or beneficial society, and averring that one or more persons who are bona fide claimants against such company, association, or society resides or reside within the territorial jurisdiction of said court; that such company, association, or society has in its custody or possession money or property of the value of $500 or more, or has issued a bond or a policy of insurance or certificate of membership providing for the payment of $500 or more to the obligee or obligees in such bond or as insurance, indemnity, or benefits to a beneficiary, beneficiaries, or the heirs, next of kin, legal representatives, or assignee of the person insured or member; that two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different States, are claiming to be entitled to such money or property or the penalty of such bond, or to such insurance, indemnity, or benefits; that such company, association, or society has deposited such money or property or has paid the amount of such bond or policy into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court.
“ Sec. 2. In all such cases if the policy or certificate is drawn payable to the estate of the insured and has not been assigned in accordance with the terms of the policy or certificate the district court of the district of the residence of the personal representative of the insured shall have jurisdiction of such suit. In case the policy or certificate has been assigned during the life of the insured in accordance with the terms of the policy or certificate, the district court of the district of the residence of the assignee or of his personal representative shall have jurisdiction. In case the policy or certificate is drawn payable to a beneficiary or beneficiaries and there has been no such assignment as aforesaid the jurisdiction shall be in the district court of the district in which the beneficiary or beneficiaries or their personal representatives reside. In case there are claimants of such money or property, or in case there are beneficiaries under any such bond or policy resident in more districts than one, then jurisdiction shall be in the district court in any district in which a
National Fire Insurance Company and Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Connecticut corporations, under policies issued to him, became indebted to W. D. Sanders, resident of the Eastern District of Texas, for loss by fire (July 3, 1927) of property located therein and part of his homestead. Texas statutes exempt from execution the proceeds of such insurance. The indebtedness of the two insurers respectively was adjusted at $3400.00 and $4250.00; these sums they agreed to pay. Both Companies were garnished in a foreign attachment proceeding against Sanders instituted July 18, 1927, in an Illinois court by Armour Fertilizer Works, a corporation of that State. This proceeding was based upon his notes which undertook to waive homestead and exemption rights. The garnishees admitted liability to Sanders but gave notice of his claim that the proceeds of the policies were exempt from garnishment under Texas laws. He did not appear. After proper pubheation, judgment was entered against him September 19, 1927. This sustained the attachment and awarded recovery against him in favor of
beneficiary or the personal representative of a claimant [sic] or a deceased claimant or beneficiary resides. Notwithstanding any provision of Part I of this title to the contrary, said court shall have power to issue its process for all such claimants and to issue an order of injunction against each of them, enjoining them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or proceeding in any State court or in any other Federal court on account of such money or property or on such bond or on such policy or certificate of membership until the further order of the court; which process and order of injunction shall be returnable at such time as the said court or a judge thereof shall determine and shall be addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the respective districts wherein said claimants reside or may be found.
“ Sec. 3. Said court shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the complainant from further liability; and shall make the injunction permanent and enter all such other orders and decrees as may be suitable and proper, and issue all such customary writs as may be necessary or convenient to carry out and enforce the same.”
the Fertilizer Works for the amount due upon the notes—$7,589.81; also directed execution. It is in the margin.2 Before final trial in the Illinois court under their answers, as permitted by the Act of May 8, 1926, the Insurance Companies, claiming to be mere stakeholders, filed separate interpleader proceedings in the District Court, Eastern District of Texas—June 12, 1928. Sanders and Armour Fertilizer Works, alleged adverse claimants, were made defendants. The sums admitted to be [p. 198] due under the fire policies were paid into court. An injunction restrained the Armour Fertilizer Works from proceeding further in the Illinois court. Answers by both, defendants followed. The causes were consolidated. The District Court awarded the fund to Sanders; the Circuit Court of Appeals held that it should go to Armour Fertilizer Works and reversed the trial court. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 33 F. (2d) 157; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 213. Certiorari, granted upon Sanders’s petition, brings the matter here.
2
“ On motion of the plaintiff herein, the defendant, W. D. Sanders, is ruled to appear herein instanter, and thereupon said defendant being called in open court comes not, nor does anyone for said defendant, but herein said defendant makes default, and it appearing to the court that said defendant was duly notified by publication of notice according to law duly notifying said defendant of the pendency of this suit and of the time required of said defendant to appear herein, all of which was a sufficient number of days prior to the time required of said defendant to appear as aforesaid to now require of, said defendant that said defendant either appear in this cause at this time or that said defendant suffer judgment by default for want of such appearance, and it further appearing to the court that said defendant is still in default of an appearance herein, it is, on motion of the plaintiff, ordered by the court that default be entered herein against said defendant for want of an appearance. “And as to the damages sustained by the plaintiff herein, the court hears the evidence contained in the affidavit of plaintiff’s claim filed herein and finds therefrom that there is due to the plaintiff the sum of money shown in said affidavit of claim to be due, and assessed the plaintiff’s damages at the sum of seven thousand, five hundred eighty-nine and 81/100 dollars ($7,589.81). “ This cause coming on for further proceedings herein, it is considered by the court that the attachment herein be and it hereby is sustained, that the plaintiff have judgment on the default and assessment of damages herein, and that the plaintiff have and recover of and from the defendant, W. D. Sanders, the damages of the plaintiff amounting to the sum of seven thousand, five hundred eighty-nine and 81/100 ($7,589.81) in form as aforesaid assessed, together with the costs by the plaintiff herein expended and that execution issue therefor.”
The facts are not in dispute. The parties agree that the proceedings in Illinois were according to her statutes; and that under the settled law there Sanders’s claim of exemption would have been denied and judgment given against the garnishees if the cause had followed the ordinary course.
The Circuit Court of Appeals overruled objections to the jurisdiction of the District Court and affirmed the latter’s authority to consider and determine the rights of the claimants.
It concluded that the Texas statutes did not control; that the Act of May 8, 1926, was intended to afford protection to stakeholders, not to alter the rights of adverse claimants; that the rights of each claimant under the law of the State where they arose should be considered; and that equitable principles commonly accepted in federal courts should be applied.
It held that by the Illinois garnishment the money payable by the Companies to Sanders was sequestrated and that this was good against his claim of exemption; that the lien so obtained followed the fund paid into court. And it directed that the Illinois judgment against him should be satisfied. Upon the first hearing the District Court dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction; the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Judgment went for [p. 199] Sanders on the second trial; the Circuit Court of Appeals again reversed.
Objection to jurisdiction of the District Court is now made upon the theory that the defendants are not adverse claimants within the intendment of the interpleader Act since one admits the attached debt is payable primarily to the other and seeks to recover because of his indebtedness to it. The court below adequately answered this contention—
“We think that the facts in this case show that the District Court is mistaken in concluding that the claims of Armour and Sanders are not adverse. Each is claiming the proceeds of the policies to the exclusion of the other. Armour claims by virtue of its Illinois judgment against Sanders and the attachment, and Sanders, while not disputing his obligation to Armour, claims the proceeds, notwithstanding, by virtue of the exemption under the laws of Texas. The statute is remedial and to be liberally construed. It is broad enough to cover any adverse claims against the proceeds of the policies, no matter on what grounds urged. Its terms are not to be interpreted as meaning only adverse claims of those pretending to be beneficiaries of the insured?’ [38 F. (2d) 214.]
The general purpose and effect of the Act of March 8, 1926, were also well stated below—
“ Suits for interpleader in which actions in other courts are enjoined were familiar to equity when the Constitution was adopted [see Spring v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 8 Wheat. 268] and are one of the forms of controversy to which, when arising between citizens of different States, the federal judicial power was extended. The Act enlarges the processes of the District Court to cover a broad territory, but otherwise authorizes only an ordinary form of equitable relief. . . . The District Court, of course, is bound on an interpleader to give full faith and credit to [p. 200] the garnishment proceedings in Illinois. Cooper n. Newell, 173 U.S. 567. ... [63 F. (2d) 903.]
“ We do not think the filing of the federal interpleader and the payment thereunder of the money into the District Court in Texas operated to bring it under the dominion of Texas law. The applicant for interpleader often has a choice of forum, and he cannot at his will subject the rights of the contesting claimants to one set of laws rather than another. The purpose of the interpleader statute was to give the stakeholder protection, but in nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its operation. The interpleader is a suit in equity, and equitable principles and procedure are the same throughout the federal jurisdiction. The court is to weigh the right or title of each claimant under the law of the State in which it arose, and determine which according to equity is the better. The decision should be the same whether the interpleader is filed in Illinois or in Texas. No one’s rights are intended to be altered by paying the fund into the court, which as an impartial neutral is to determine them.” [63 F. (2d) 906.]
Assertion by the complainant of entire disinterestedness is essential to a bill of interpleader. Groves v. Sentell, 153 U.S. 465, 485. “ In such a bill it is necessary to aver that the complainant has no interest in the subject-matter of the suit; he must admit title in the claimants and aver that he is indifferent between them, and he cannot seek relief in the premises against either of them.” Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 571.
The situation here is .unlike that presented where one voluntarily subjects himself to its jurisdiction and seeks the aid of a court to enforce his claim. See Story on Conflict of Laws (8th ed.) § 598. The Armour Fertilizer Works asks nothing under any Texas law. Brought into the District Court against its will it was held there against its protest and enjoined from proceeding further in Illinois.
It now claims priority of right and only asks what it would have secured but for the injunction. Under such circumstances, to hold that the statutes of Texas control would destroy rights duly obtained in Illinois; would permit the Insurance Companies by interpleader proceedings to change the positions of defendants; and, in effect, seriously interfere with the impartial adjustment of existing equities. We think Congress had no intention to permit such destruction of acquired rights, if indeed it had power so to do.
By his answer Sanders thus stated his claim to the fund in court—
“That by reason of the fact that the property which was the subject of insurance covered by said insurance policy was the homestead of the defendant, W. D. Sanders, the proceeds of the same which have been tendered into court by the plaintiff herein are exempt to the defendant, W. D. Sanders, under the laws and Constitution of the State of Texas, and his rights therein are superior and prior to the rights of the defendant, Armour Fertilizer Works.”
Armour Fertilizer Works asserted—
“On or about the 18th day of July, 1927, it filed a suit in the Municipal Court of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, styled Armour Fertilizer Works, a corporation, trading as the Planters Fertilizer and Chemical Company, versus W. D. Sanders, being numbered 1,413,423. Said suit was based upon eight promissory notes upon which there was due at that time, including principal, interest and attorney’s fees, the sum of $7,589.81. That in connection with said proceedings a writ of attachment and garnishment was issued out of said court, and was, on the 19th day of July, 1927, served upon the plaintiff herein. That the defendant W. D. Sanders was duly cited by publication, in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois, to appear and answer said suit. Judgment was taken [p. 202] against the said W. D. Sanders in said suit on September 19, 1927, for the sum of $7,589.81. That said case has not been dismissed as between this defendant and the plaintiff herein, garnishee in that suit. The judgment rendered in said suit is a valid and binding judgment and was procured in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois, and is a valid judgment against the defendant W. D. Sanders to the extent of the funds impounded by said garnishment. That under the terms of said judgment the said attachment and garnishment against the plaintiff herein and against the defendant W. D. Sanders was sustained and all matters in dispute and with reference to the funds involved herein, were and have been judicially determined by said judgment.”
We are not now primarily concerned with rights of a garnishee. The Insurance Companies have paid their debts and obtained complete discharge. Only Sanders and the Armour Fertilizer Works are interested.
He presented claims against Connecticut corporations arising under insurance contracts which he had not undertaken to enforce. These were free from execution in Texas. He might have sued upon them in Illinois; there they were subject to valid attachment.
The Armour Fertilizer Works, an Illinois corporation, presented the judgment against Sanders duly rendered by a court of that State in a proceeding properly begun and prosecuted. It had secured a lien upon the claims against the Insurance Companies. There is no ground for any claim of fraud. True, no final judgment had gone against the garnishees; but as between Sanders and the Fertilizer Works judgment stood against him; also, sequestration of the debts. The precise effect which would be given this preliminary judgment, as against the garnishees, in proceedings involving their rights may be doubtful, but opinions by the Supreme Court of Illinois clearly indicate that Armour Ferlitizer Works secured a lien [p. 203] upon the Sanders claims; and that, but for the injunction, final valid judgment would have gone against the Insurance Companies, accompanied by a lien good against all the world.
The effect of the proceedings in Illinois as against one occupying the position of Sanders is plain enough under her statutes and decisions. The Illinois courts would have rejected his claim of exemption under the laws of Texas. This view is affirmed here by agreement.
The Illinois rule is that garnishment imposes an inchoate lien subject to defeat by certain subsequent events, none of which are present here. Also, that final judgment in Illinois against the garnishee prior to one in another jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Ill. 592; 46 N.E. 631; Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 250 Ill. 40; 95 N.E. 42. Also, “that property, real and personal, attached, and funds in the hands of the garnishee, are placed on the same footing,—that is, when attached, such property or funds are appropriated from that time to the payment of a certain class of judgment creditors specifically enumerated.” Accordingly, the principal debtor may not assign his claim against the garnished one after the writ has been served upon the latter. National Bank of America V. Indiana Banking Co., 114 Ill. 483, 489; 2 N.E. 401. Martin v. Dryden, 6 Ill. 187, declares—
“ Without a levy of the attachment, or the service of a garnishee, the court has no jurisdiction to proceed, by publication of notice, to render any judgment. But, by the seizure of any estate or property of the defendant, or the service by garnishment upon any having estate, property, or effects of his in their hands, the law has laid hold of a fund, which it may condemn, and appropriate to the satisfaction of whatever judgment it may render against the defendant, and thereupon the court proceeds to hear as to the indebtedness, [p. 212] . . .
Opinion of the Court. 292U.S.
“ These remarks and views apply also to the question of lien. This specific appropriation of property must amount to something as to those who may deal in relation to it; else the defendant could, at any time before judgment, defeat the object of the party by a sale, and possibly, even the jurisdiction of the court. We are of opinion, that the attachment is a lien from the date of the levy, when followed by a judgment, and which will have relation back to it. This doctrine is sanctioned by numerous authorities, which I will not review.” [p. 213]
In the circumstances presented the proceedings in Illinois gave to Armour Fertilizer Works a paramount right or superior equity to the proceeds of the policies. To hold that the District Court in Texas could enjoin the Fertilizer Works from proceeding further and then declare that because the last step in the Illinois suit had not been taken Sanders, in some way, became entitled to priority, plainly would be inequitable. Moreover, it would deny to the garnishment proceedings the credit and effect accorded them in the State where taken.
It is unnecessary to enter upon discussion of vexed questions arising out of garnishment proceedings in different jurisdictions. The different views are well stated in Minor on Conflict of Laws, §§ 125, 126, 209. This Court has had occasion to consider the general subject in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107; Chicago, R. I. P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710; King v. Cross, 175 U.S. 396; Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223. The latter says—
“Notice to the debtor (garnishee) of the commencement of the suit, and notice not to pay to his creditor, is all that can be given, whether the garnishee be a mere casual and temporary comer, or a resident of the State where the attachment is laid. His obligation to pay to his creditor is thereby arrested and a lien created upon the debt itself. Cahoon v. Morgan, 38 Vermont 234, 236; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N.J.Eq. 468, 483.
We can see no reason why the attachment could not be thus laid, provided the creditor of the garnishee could himself sue in that State and its laws permitted the attachment.”
Petitioner’s argument proceeds upon the erroneous assumption that the money paid into court came under the dominion of Texas law—especially her exemption statutes. This view is not in harmony with the settled law of Illinois that an attachment when levied on the debtor fixes a lien upon the claim and prevents subsequent transfer by the creditor; also, with the reasoning and conclusion in Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, supra.
The latter case—approved in King v. Cross, supra, and Harris v. Balk, supra—held that garnishment proceedings pending in Iowa against a claim for wages due by the Railway to a resident of Kansas, and there exempt from execution, constituted good defense when the wage-earner subsequently sued the Railway in Kansas. It approved the doctrine that debts accompany the debtor and may be attached wherever he can be sued by his creditor. Among others, it cited with approval, National Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N.J.Eq. 468; 32 Atl. 663. It declared that the exemption law was no part of the contract of employment and disapproved the notion that when debts are exempt from execution in the State where created this privilege follows as an incident into other jurisdictions.
In National Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, supra, (an interpleader proceeding—1895) Vice Chancellor Pitney elaborately discussed a situation substantially similar to the one before us. After full review of the authorities, he held that a pending garnishment proceeding properly instituted under the laws of Pennsylvania against indebtedness due to a resident of New Jersey created a lien thereon and gave the attaching creditor superior equity
Cardozo, J., dissenting. 292U.S.
to one who claimed by transfer from the New Jersey creditor. He applied the familiar principle that he who is first in time is best in right. See also American Bank v. Rollins, 99 Mass. 313, and Garity v. Gigie, 130 Mass. 184.
The record does not indicate that any other creditor was interested in the fund impounded in Illinois. The court below rightly gave precedence to the claim of the Fertilizer Works; also properly ruled that the controversy should be terminated by a decree devoting the fund in court to the Illinois judgment against Sanders.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting.
The federal court in Texas is under a duty, prescribed by statute (R.S. § 905; 28 U.S.C. § 687; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166), to give full faith and credit to judicial proceedings in Illinois, including proceedings under writs of garnishment or attachment. Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139. This does not mean that the proceedings are to have any greater effect than they have by law or usage in the courts of Illinois. Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 610, 611; Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler Co., 289 U.S. 439, 443. The duty is fulfilled if the force and efficacy are the same.
Garnishment in Illinois does not create a lien upon the debt or chose in action subjected to the writ. Bigelow v. Andress, 31 Ill. 322, 330, 332 (distinguishing Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608, which was based upon a different statute) ; Gregg n. Savage, 51 Ill. App. 281, 284, aff’d, 150 Ill. 161; 37 N.E. 312; McElwee v. Wilce, 80 Ill. App. 338, 342. In substance it is a monition whereby the defendant is apprised that he will be acting at his peril if he makes a voluntary payment to the original creditor, the peril consisting in this, that he may have to pay again. Bigelow v. Andress, supra; Gregg n. Savage, supra; McElwee v. WUce, [p. 207] 190 Cardozo, J., dissenting.
supra.1 The writ has no effect upon involuntary payments before the stage of judgment. Some other attaching creditor, suing the same defendant, may garnish the same debt in another jurisdiction. The Illinois plaintiff, though the first to have recourse to garnishment, will be postponed to the other plaintiff who is first with execution. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Ill. 592; 46 N.E. 631. Indeed, the primary creditor, i.e., the debtor of the attaching plaintiff, may bring suit against the garnishee in another jurisdiction, and collect the indebtedness if he wins the race to judgment. Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 250 Ill. 40; 95 N.E. 42.2 The garnishment suit is in personam against the debtor of a debtor {Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215), and the res is not impounded till the compulsion of judgment and execution has caused it to be paid. Then, but not before, the garnishee will have protection against the hazard of conflicting claims. Cf. Harris v. Balk, supra; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176; B. & O. R. Co. v. Hostetter, 240 U.S. 620.
What has been written does not go beyond the law as declared in Illinois. The fact is not ignored that there are other jurisdictions in which the process of gamish-
X“A garnishment is an attachment of the effects of the debtor in the hands of the garnishee; creating no lien upon anything, but holding the garnishee to a personal liability.” Gregg v. Savage, supra.
sThe Illinois Supreme Court in that case did, it is true, refer to a garnishment in Missouri as creating an “ inchoate ” lien, but coupled the description with a ruling that the inchoate lien was not a charge upon a cause of action elsewhere against the same defendant.
“ By the service of the garnishee summons in Missouri, Miller [the plaintiff in that action] acquired a contingent or inchoate lien upon the debt, and appellant could not thereafter make a voluntary payment to the appellee; but the right which Miller acquired was dependent upon subsequently acquiring judgment, and that was not accomplished until a judgment had been recovered in this state, where the debt was free from any right or claim that he had.” Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra,
Cardozo, J., dissenting. 292 U.S.
ment receives a different meaning. Sometimes the service of the writ is held to impose upon the debt a fixed and present lien which will have recognition and enforcement everywhere. See, e.g., Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 100; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136; In re Rans]ord, 194 Fed. 658, 661; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. n. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710. Sometimes the lien is spoken of as a quasi lien or an inchoate one. See e.g., Focke v. Blum, 82 Tex. 436, 441; 17 S.W. 770; North Star Boot Co. v. Ladd, 32 Minn. 381, 383; 20 N.W. 334; In re Ransford, supra. Cf. Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra. In the conflict of laws the difference may be important between realities and metaphors, between the organism and the germ. Sometimes the Illinois rule is accepted, and there is said to be no lien, or one that does no more than restrain the garnishee from making voluntary payments. See e.g., Commercial State Bank v. Pierce,3 176 la. 722; 158 N.W. 481; McGarry n. Lewis Coal Co., 93 Mo. 237; 6 S.W. 81; Parker N. Farr, 2 Browne (Pa.) 331. Little is to be gained by dilating upon these and like decisions, for they are rooted in local laws or customs. Garnishment and attachment today are statutory remedies. They are what the state creating them declares that they shall be. It is of no moment that Illinois might have made their efficacy greater as long as her legislature and courts have preferred to make them less.
In that state of the law the garnishee would have been remiss if it had failed to shape its course with prudent recognition of conflicting possibilities. Its indebtedness
8 “ The garnishment proceedings created no lien upon any property belonging to the original defendant, if any, in the hands of the garnishee. By the garnishment proceedings a personal claim was acquired against the garnishees to the extent of any money or property that might be in their hands at the time the garnishment was served, belonging to the judgment defendant.” Commercial State Bank V. Pierce, supra, at 732.
190 Cardozo, J., dissenting.
to Sanders had been subjected to garnishment by the Armour company in Illinois, but Sanders was threatening it with suit in Texas. If Sanders had a judgment there before Armour was in a position to issue execution in Illinois, the garnishment in all likelihood would count for nothing, yet there was a possibility even then of dispute and litigation. Plainly in the race for judgments and its aftermath, there was the risk of expense and embarrassment, if not of double payment.
The garnishee in this dilemma paid the amount of the indebtedness into the registry of the federal court in Texas and had the rival claimants interplead. 28 U.S.C., § 41 (26). The claimant Sanders was entitled to the money unless the Armour company had a lien, and the courts of Illinois had held there was no lien. True there had been a judgment against Sanders, though not against his codefendant, the insurer, but this judgment had been obtained by default after service by publication, not followed by an appearance. It was therefore ineffective as a judgment in personam, and in the absence of a lien did not operate in rem. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518. The joinder of Sanders had no effect except to give him notice of the garnishment and an opportunity to come in, if he was so minded, and contest the plaintiff’s claim. Harris v. Balk, supra, p. 27. He declined the invitation and preferred to litigate at home. Whatever lien has been adjudged as the result of his default was contingent upon the consummation of proceedings to charge the garnishee, and ended when they lapsed, just as if the suit were discontinued. It did not rise to the rank of a general interest in property, adhering to the debt everywhere and qualifying the title in another jurisdiction. Probably no one would contend that by force of the judgment against Sanders a suit could have been maintained by Armour as quasi owner of the policies outside of Illinois. If that was so before
61745°—34----- 14
, Syllabus. 292 U.S.
the interpleader, it was even more plainly so thereafter. By the express terms of the decree the stakeholder was discharged when the fund was paid into the registry, 38 F. (2d) 212, with the result that there was no longer the possibility of pursuing the garnishee anywhere and thus perfecting the attachment. If some inchoate incumbrance had existed until then, it was then obliterated forever. The fund was free and clear.
The federal court in Texas was thus driven to a choice between a claimant with a foreign attachment which by the law of its creation was of no extraterritorial validity till it had ripened into payment under the compulsion of a judgment, and a claimant whose title to the fund was undisputed unless the lien of the attachment was presently effective. It is not easy to see how there could be any choice but one.
The decree of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone join in this dissent.
AVERY v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
Nos. 791 and 792. Argued April 5, 1934.—Decided April 30, 1934.
Where dividends were declared payable on or before December 31st, but, pursuant to the invariable practice and the purpose of the corporation, were paid by checks so transmitted that they did not and could not reach the shareholders until the first business day in January of the following calendar year, held:
1. That, within the intendment of § 213 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1924, and like provisions of the Act of 1928, such dividends were “ received ” in the calendar years in which the checks were received. P. 214.
2. They were not on December 31st preceding “ cash or other property unqualifiedly made subject ” to the shareholder’s demands, within the meaning of Treasury Regulations 65, Art. 1541. Id. 67 F. (2d) 310, reversed.
Certiorari, 291 U.S. 657, to review the affirmance of an order of the Board of Tax Appeals, decision unreported, which sustained deficiency assessments of income taxes.
Mr. Leland K. Neeves for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General MacLean, with whom Solicitor General Biggs, Assistant Attorney General Wideman, and Messrs. Julius C. Martin, James W. Morris, and Morton K. Rothschild were on the brief, for respondent.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was a large stockholder, and president, of the United States Gypsum Company. In November, 1924, the Company declared a dividend payable on or before the 31st day of December following. Its check, dated December 31st, for the amount attributable to his stock, payable to him, was received by petitioner January 2, 1925. In November, 1929, another dividend was declared, payable on or before the following December 31st, and the Company’s check for petitioner’s portion was received by him January 2, 1930.
Annually, dividend checks, signed by the proper corporate officers and dated December 31st, were on that day mailed out to all stockholders except those who were officers and employees, including the petitioner. Checks for the latter were held in the treasurer’s office until the first business day of the next month and then distributed through the office mail.
The Company declared dividends quarterly; and in every instance they were made payable on or before the [p. 212] last day of some month. The dividend checks never left the treasurer’s office or went to the mailing department until the afternoon of the last day of the month. They were mailed on the last day of the month so as to be in the stockholders’ hands on the first business day of the following month. The practice was without exception that no stockholder, whether employee or officer, should receive his check before the first business day of the month following the month in which the dividend was made payable.
Petitioner kept his accounts on the cash receipts and disbursements and calendar year basis.
The Commissioner assessed the dividends above described as part of the petitioner’s income for the years 1924 and 1929. The Board of Tax Appeals approved; and the court below affirmed this action. The facts are not in dispute. The only question for our determination is when, within intendment of the statutes, the dividends were “ received ” by petitioner.
He maintains that under the plain language of the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1928 the dividends—like other assessable items—should be treated as income for the taxable years during which they were actually received—1925 and 1930. The Commissioner claims that under Treasury Regulations promulgated in 1921 and in effect ever since, the dividends constituted income for the years in which they were declared and made payable.1 The regulation specially important here (No. 65, Art. 1541) follows:—
“ Dividends. ... A taxable distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders shall be included in the gross income of the distributees when the cash or other property is unqualifiedly made subject to their demands.”
xSee Treasury Regulations, No. 62 (1921), Arts. 53 and 1541; No. 65 (1924), Arts. 52 and 1541; No. 69 (1926), Arts. 52 and 1541; Nos. 74 and 77 (1928-32), Arts. 333 and 621.
The Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234,43 Stat. 253, provides—“ Sec. 212. (b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer’s annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. If the taxpayer’s annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined in section 200 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar year.
“ Sec. 213. For the purposes of this title, . . .
“(a) The term ‘gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income. . . . The amount of all such items shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted under subdivision (b) of section 212, any such amounts are to be property accounted for as of a different period. . . .
“ Sec. 1001. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this Act.”
Sections 41, 42 and 62, Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, are substantially like corresponding ones quoted from the 1924 Act. Similar provisions appear in the Revenue Act of 1918 and all subsequent ones.
The Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 229, is peculiar in that it makes distinction between dividends and other income items by the following provision which does not appear in subsequent Acts.
“ Sec. 201. (e) For the purposes of this Act, a taxable distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders or [p. 214] members shall be included in the gross income of the distributees as of the date when the cash or other property is unqualifiedly made subject to their demands.”
If we give the words of the statutes their ordinary meaning, clearly the dividends under consideration were not actually received by the taxpayer during 1924 and 1929. Certainly, they were not received when declared. They did not come into the taxpayer’s hands on December 31st simply because payable on that day. And unless Congress has definitely indicated an intention that the words should be construed otherwise, we must apply them according to their usual acceptation.
The petitioner insists that the word “ receive ” is free from ambiguity and admits of no interpretation; the statute furnishes the sole measure as to when dividends are to be reported.
In behalf of the Commissioner it is said—
The Revenue Act directs that the amount of all such (specified) items shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer. The word “ received,” as applied to dividends, is not entirely clear since there are different times at which it reasonably may be claimed the taxpayer receives them. To meet this situation the Commissioner promulgated the regulation that dividends are taxable when unqualifiedly made subject to the stockholder’s demand. This provision has been included in all Treasury Regulations since 1918 and has been approved and accepted by Congress through subsequent re-enactments of the statute. When a dividend unqualifiedly becomes subject to a taxpayer’s demand is essentially a question of fact. Here, the Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Court of Appeals agree that the dividends were subject to the taxpayers demand on December 31st.
It is unnecessary for us to determine how far the quoted Treasury Regulation was incorporated into the Acts of
1924 and 1928. If we assume that the Regulation, in effect, became part of those enactments, nevertheless we think the Commissioner’s action was erroneous. In the disclosed circumstances the dividends cannot properly be considered as cash or other property unqualifiedly subject to the petitioner’s demand on December 31st. It was the practice of the Company to pay all dividends by checks not intended to reach stockholders until the first business day of January; there is nothing to show that petitioner could have obtained payment on December 31st, he did not expect this and the practice shows the company had no intention to make actual payrpent on that day. Nothing indicates that it recognized an unrestricted right of stockholders to demand payment except through checks sent out in the usual way. The checks did not constitute payments prior to their actual receipt. The mere promise or obligation of the corporation to pay on a given date was not enough to subject to petitioner’s unqualified demand 11 cash or other property ”; and none of the parties understood that it was.
This subject has been considered with varying results in Commissioner v. Bingham, 35 F. (2d) 503 (1929); Hadley v. Commissioner, 59 App.D.C. 139; 36 F. (2d) 543 (1929); Commissioner v. Adams, 54 F. (2d) 228, 230 (1931); Shearman v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 256 (1933). The facts here disclose a situation substantially like that in the Adams case; and we agree with the conclusion of the court therein, stated as follows: “ We are also of the opinion that, on the facts found, the dividends were 1 not unqualifiedly made subject to the demand of the stockholder,’ in the year 1924, if article 52 of the Departmental Regulations can be said to be valid and not in conflict with the express language of section 213 (a).”
Reversed.
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