Voehl v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 288 U.S. 162 (1933)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Voehl v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 288 U.S. 162 (1933)
Full caption
VOEHL v. INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 6, 1933
VOEHL v. INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 315. Argued January 13, 1933.—Decided February 6, 1933.
1. In a case under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as applied to employment in the District of Columbia, the issue before the deputy commissioner -was whether the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. This turned on the general nature and scope of the employee’s duties, the particular instructions he had received, the practice that obtained as to work in extra hours or on Sundays, and the purpose of a journey in which he was injured, Held:
(1) That Congress had power to invest the deputy commissioner with authority to determine these questions after proper hearing and upon proper evidence; and
(2) That the findings of fact made by the deputy commissioner
in the course prescribed by the statute and upon sufficient evidence, are conclusive. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22. P. 166. 2. When by agreement, either express or implied in the course of business, the service of an employee in extra hours or on special errands begins when he leaves his home on the duty assigned and continues until his return, the hazards of the journey may properly be regarded as hazards of the service and hence within the Compensation Act. P. 169. 61 App. D. C. 173; 58 F. (2d) 1074, reversed. Supreme Court, D. C., affirmed.
Certiorari, 287 U. S. 592, to review the reversal of a decree dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin a deputy commissioner of compensation from enforcing a compensation order. The suit was brought by the Insurance Company, and the employee, petitioner here, was permitted to intervene.
Mr. Israel J. Mendelson for petitioner.
Mr. G. Bowdoin Craighill, with whom Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney and John 8. Flannery were on the brief, for respondent.
The evidence relating to the jurisdictional fact of employment, upon which was based the conclusion of law that the injury arose out of the employment, was reviewable. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22.
If the allegation that the injury did not arise out of the employment was an allegation of fact, it was admitted by the motion to dismiss. If a conclusion of law, it was reviewable in court. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Louisville de N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91.
The injury did not arise out of the employment and the deputy commissioner had no jurisdiction. An employee going to and from work is not covered by the
Argument for Respondent. 288 ILS.
An employee may be protected by compensation insurance while he is seeking ingress to or egress from his employer’s premises, and while he is immediately adjacent thereto, even though he is injured a few minutes before his work is to begin. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418; Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U. S. 154. But here the accident occurred several miles from the place of employment. See Gilmour v. Dorman, 105 L. T. (N. S.) 54.
The exception where the employer furnishes transportation to and from work does not apply where the employee is using his own automobile, even though he may be paid by his employer for its use. Artmeyer v. Mason, 220 App. Div. (N. Y.) 787; Grathwohl v. Nassau Point Club Properties, 216 App. Div. (N. Y.) 107, aff’d 243 N. Y. 567. Voehl was not a traveling employee or on a special errand. Cf. 36 A. L. R. 474.
The method by which the wages are paid does not determine whether the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. Stimal v. Jewett <& Co., 198 App. Div. (N. Y.) 427; Artmeyer v. Mason, 220 App. Div. (N. Y.) 787.
The injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment. McNicol’s Case, 215 Mass. 497.
Voehl’s injury was caused by an ordinary traffic hazard. De Voe v. N. Y. State Rys., 218 N. Y. 318; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 60 App. D. C. 40. The main object of the trip was his private affair. Cf. Marks v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90.
The presumption “ that the claim comes within the Act,” § 20, is not “ a substitute for proof.” The burden is always upon the claimant to produce substantial evidence that the injury arose out of and in the course of [p. 165] his employment. Collins v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 171 App. Div. (N. Y.) 381; Eldridge n. Endicott, 228 N. Y. 21.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the Act of Congress of May 17, 1928 (45 Stat. 600, D. C. Code, Tit. 19, §§11, 12), the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U. S. C., §§ 901-950) are made applicable to employees, as stated, in the District of Columbia. Petitioner, Karl F. Voehl, an employee of the National Electrical Supply Company, which was engaged in business in the District, filed a claim for compensation for an injury sustained through an automobile accident while he was on his way to his employer’s place of business on Sunday, April 6, 1930, for the purpose, according to his contention, of performing the duties assigned to him. The employer was notified and hearing was had before the deputy commissioner. Respondent, the insurance carrier of the employer, contested the claim. Admitting that the relationship of employer and employee existed on the date of the injury and that the employer was subject to the Compensation Act, respondent defended upon the ground that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. The deputy commissioner received the evidence offered, which included the testimony of the employer’s manager with respect to the petitioner’s duties, and made a compensation order setting forth detailed findings of fact supporting the claim and awarding compensation.
Respondent then filed a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court of the District to obtain an injunction restraining the enforcement of the compensation order and annexed to the bill, as a part thereof, the full record of
Opinion of the Court. 288 UK
the proceedings and evidence before the deputy commissioner. Respondent charged that the compensation order, findings and award, were not in accordance with law and were not supported by the evidence. Petitioner was permitted to intervene. Motion by the deputy commissioner to dismiss the bill of complaint was granted and decree was entered accordingly. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the District, taking a different view of the evidence, reversed the decree, 58 F. (2d) 1074, and the case comes here on certiorari.
The relation of master and servant admittedly existed. The business of the employer, carried on within the District, and the nature of the petitioner’s employment, were such that both were subject to the Compensation Act. D. C. Code, Tit. 19, §§ 11, 12. By the express provisions of the Act, the deputy commissioner was authorized to entertain the claim of the employee and “to hear and determine all questions in respect of such claim.” 33 U. S. C., § 919 (a). The proceedings of the deputy commissioner conformed to the statute. The precise issue, whether the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, turned on the general nature and scope of the employee’s duties, the particular instructions he had received and the practice which obtained as to work in extra hours or on Sundays, and the purpose of the journey in which he was injured. We think that there can be no doubt of the power of the Congress to invest the deputy commissioner, as it has invested him, with authority to determine these questions after proper hearing and upon sufficient evidence. And when the deputy commissioner, following the course prescribed by the statute, makes such a determination, his findings of fact supported by evidence must be deemed to be conclusive. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 46, 47; L’Hote v. Crowell, 286 U. S. 528.
The deputy commissioner found that petitioner was injured while on his way to the employer’s warehouse for [p. 167] the purpose of clearing it of debris in accordance with his duties, and that when so engaged on Sunday the terms of his employment covered the period of service from the time he left his home until his return, his compensation for this service being at an agreed rate per hour for the entire time with an allowance for his transportation. We think that these findings were supported by the proof. From the testimony of the employer’s manager, who had supervision of petitioner’s work, it appeared that petitioner, being employed in the ‘ refrigeration division ’ of the Supply Company, had charge of the maintenance and operation of the company’s warehouse and of the maintenance of service on refrigerators in customers’ homes. He was the “head of the products division.” With other matters, it was his duty to see that the buildings and stock were kept in proper order and that there was compliance with the fire rules. He had strict instructions with respect to the disposition of debris and their prompt removal. Voehl was a trusted employee who had been with the company for sixteen years and the company relied upon him to attend to whatever was necessary in the line of his work without specific or detailed instructions. His regular hours at the company’s building were from 7:30 A. M. to 5:30 P. M. The manager testified that, in addition to these hours, Voehl was “ on duty all of the time, on our call. That is to say, he was a very willing employee and we kept him purposely for taking care of emergencies and seeing that all details were cleaned up properly.” By reason of the 24-hour service which the company maintained, Voehl was always subject to the calls of customers, responding either personally or through one of the service men under his direction. He had access to the warehouse at all times. Voehl used his own automobile, and when he was at work for the company outside of “ office hours ” and on Sundays he was paid a mileage rate of five cents a mile for the use of his car and at the rate of 75 cents per
16$ OCTOBER TERM, 1932.
hour from the time he left his home until his return. As the one in charge of the warehouse and service, Voehl submitted weekly a memorandum of the overtime of the employees under him and his own. The company had found him to be honest in his statements and his overtime account was never questioned.
Respondent’s contention was that Voehl was going to the warehouse for a purpose of his own,—to obtain ashes to place in front of his house, being accompanied by his brother-in-law to assist him in their removal. The evidence showed that the company did not object to the employees taking ashes but their removal was not part of Voehl’s work. Voehl’s statement was that the purpose of his Sunday trip was to remove an unusual accumulation of trash, which it was his duty to remove, and that under his orders it was necessary for him to do this on Sunday in order that the building might be in proper condition on the following morning. He said that he often had “to come down on Sundays to finish cleaning up that the manager inspected the warehouse “every Monday morning to see that it was free of all trash ” and that he (Voehl) did his utmost “ to have the building clean for inspection.” While his brother-in-law testified as to the intention to take the ashes, he also said that Voehl “went there specifically to straighten up the warehouse and bring the ashes back home when he came back.” Voehl’s statement as to the necessity of his trip on the particular Sunday, in the course of his duties, finds corroboration in the testimony of the manager. The latter said that Voehl had authority to go to the plant on the Sunday in question and that he could have made a charge for his service on that day and for his mileage. While the manager did not himself know the condition of the plant on the day of the accident, or the day before, he did know that there had been an unusual amount of unpacking of refrigerators during the [p. 169] three days before the accident and that such work was “ always attended by a large accumulation of trash and litter which must be cleared up.” He said that “ two or three days prior to the accident ” he had called Voehl’s attention “ to the necessity of keeping it better cleared up ”; he knew that the warehouse at that time “ was in a badly littered condition.” The manager also had information as to Voehl’s work on previous Sundays and, on respondent’s request, furnished a statement of what the manager described as an “ exactly parallel instance ” for which Voehl had been paid, and he believed that if the records of the busy season from April to August were available, they would show other similar instances.
Upon this evidence and the findings of the deputy commissioner, the compensation order did not violate any principle of law. The general rule is that injuries sustained by employees when going to or returning from their regular place of work are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of their employment.1 Ordinarily the hazards they encounter in such journeys are not incident to the employer’s business. But this general rule is subject to exceptions which depend upon the nature and circumstances of the particular employment. “ No exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every case.” Cudahy Packing Co. n. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 424. See, also, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U. S. 154, 158. While service on regular hours at a stated place generally begins at that place, there is always room for agreement by which the service may be taken to begin earlier or elsewhere. Service in extra hours or on special
17Ó OCTOBER TERM, 1032.
Syllabus. 288 U.S.
errands has an element of distinction which the employer may recognize by agreeing that such service shall commence when the employee leaves his home on the duty assigned to him and shall continue until his return. An<l agreement to that effect may be either express or be shown by the course of business. In such case the hazards of the journey may properly be regarded as hazards of the service and hence within the purview of the Compensation Act.2
The decree of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Supreme Court of the District is affirmed.
Reversed.
GEORGE A. OHL & CO. v. A. L. SMITH IRON WORKS.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.
Nos. 228 and 229. Argued December 16, 1932.—Decided February 6, 1933.
1. Under R. S., § 953, which provides that a bill of exceptions shall be deemed sufficiently authenticated if “signed” by the judge,
signature by his initials only is not a nullity, and the irregularity may be disregarded or cured by amendment, under R. S., § 954, 28 U. S. C. 777 and 391, after expiration of the term. P. 174. 2. Held that there was no occasion in this case to send the bill back for amendment, there being no doubt that it was the judge who signed his initials, for the purpose of authentication, and no one having been misled or injured. P. 177. 57 F. (2d) 44, reversed.
Certiorari, 287 U. S. 586, to review judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgments of the District Court solely upon the ground that the bills of exceptions had not been properly authenticated and that it was too late to send them back for amendment.
Mr. Lee M. Friedman, with whom Mr. Louis B. King was on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. Martin Witte, with whom Messrs. Lowell A. Mayberry and Robert Gallagher were on the brief, for respondent.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.
In these actions at law, tried together before District Judge James A. Lowell and a jury, respondent obtained judgments and petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The records on the appeals contained what purported to be bills of exceptions signed by the attorneys for the respective parties and initialed by the District Judge as follows: “Allowed August 20, 1930, J. A. L., D. J.” The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments upon the sole ground that the bills of exceptions were not sufficiently authenticated and that it was too late to send the cases back for amendment as the term for which the judgments were entered had expired and the District Court had lost jurisdiction. 57 F. (2d) 44. This Court granted certiorari.
There is no question that District Judge Lowell affixed his initials to the bills of exceptions and intended in this manner to authenticate them as allowed. Apparently in connection with petitioner’s application for a rehearing in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Lowell addressed a communication to the judges of that court stating that the bills had been seasonably presented to him and that he had signed them with his initials intending that they should have full legal effect; he requested that the bills should be returned to him for correction.1 There was also submitted to the Circuit Court of Appeals a certificate by the clerk of the District Court in which it was stated: " It has been the practice in this district for a long time for judges, the clerk and deputy clerks and the bar to treat as sufficiently allowed for appellate purposes bills of exceptions signed by the trial judge with either his full name or his initials.” The petition for rehearing was denied.
Under the statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 31, it was essential that exceptions should be authenticated by the seal of the trial justice. Enfield v. Hills, 2 Lev. 236; 2 Inst. 427, 428; 2 Bac. Abr., 326, 327; 2 Tidd’s Pr., 789; Nolle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165, 176; Krauss Bros. Co. v.
1
District Judge Lowell’s communication contained the following: " It has been called to my attention that I signed the bills of exceptions in the above two cases with my initials only instead of with my full signature. They were seasonably presented to me for allowance and I told counsel for the Appellant presenting them, after examination of them, that I allowed them, did nothing more with respect to them in counsel’s presence and counsel departed. I later signed them intending so to sign them that they should have their full intended legal effect but not knowing any better I signed them only with my initials; that was my personal mistake to which neither the Appellant nor its counsel in any way contributed. I desire if I have the power and your permission now to correct my personal inadvertence by completing my signature so that my allowance of each bill may have my full signature and as of August 20, 1930. I therefore request, so far as I properly may, that the record be returned to the District Court for such correction by me as now within my power to make.”
Mellon, 276 IT. S. 386, 389, 390. In the practice of the federal courts, however, it was held that a seal was unnecessary, the signature of the trial judge being sufficient. Generes v. Campbell, 11 Wall. 193, 198; Herbert v. Butler, 97 U. S. 319, 320. Compare Mussina v. Cavazos, 6 Wall. 355, 363; Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354, 357. The Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 4 (17 Stat. 197, R. S., § 953) expressly dispensed with the necessity of a seal but retained the requirement of the signature of the judge of the court in which the cause was tried. Herbert v. Butler, supra; Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.'S. 281, 286, 287; Krauss Bros. Co. v. Mellon, supra. As amended by the Act of June 5, 1900, c. 717 (31 Stat. 270, 28 U. S. C. 776), the statute provides for the signature of another judge of the court in certain contingencies.2
’Section 953 of the Revised, Statutes, as amended by the Act of June 5, 1900, c. 717, 31 Stat. 270, 28 U. S. C. 776, provides:
“A bill of exceptions allowed in any cause shall be deemed sufficiently authenticated if signed by the judge of the court in which the cause was tried, or by the presiding judge thereof if more than one judge sat at the trial of the cause, without any seal of the court or judge annexed thereto. And in case the judge before whom the cause has heretofore been or may hereafter be tried is, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, unable to hear and pass upon the motion for a new trial and allow and sign said bill of exceptions, then the judge who succeds such trial judge, or any other judge of the court in which the cause was tried, holding such court thereafter, if the evidence in such cause has been or is taken in stenographic notes, or if the said judge is satisfied by any other means that he can pass upon such motion and allow a ‘true bill of exceptions, shall pass upon said motion and allow and sign such bill of exceptions; and his ruling upon such motion and allowance and signing of such bill of exceptions shall be as valid as if such ruling and allowance and signing of such bill of exceptions had been made by the judge before whom such cause was tried; but in case said judge is satisfied that owing to the fact that he did not preside at the trial, or for any other cause, that, he can not fairly pass upon said motion, and allow and sign said bill of exceptions, then he may in his discretion grant a new trial to the party moving therefor.”
The statute does not prescribe the form of signature. The manifest purpose is authentication by the proper judge. In the absence of such authentication there is no bill of exceptions which the appellate court may consider. Malony v. Adsit, supra; Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322, 330; McCuing v. Bovay, 60 F. (2d) 375, 376; compare Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196, 201, 202. Appropriate disapproval of the practice of signing by initials such important documents as bills of exceptions, and insistence upon a method of signature more in keeping with the formal character of the proceeding, do not reach the question now presented. That question is not whether the signature is informal but whether there is a signature. If the attempted authentication by Judge Lowell be deemed to be merely informal or irregular, but not a nullity, the defect could be disregarded or cured by amendment. R. S. § 954,28 U. S. C. 777. See, also, 28 U. S. C. 391. Thus, in Idaho & Oregon Land Co. v. Bradbury, 132 U. S. 509, the clerk of the court below in attempting to authenticate the record had appended the seal of the court but had failed to comply with the rule of this Court in affixing his signature. The Court said (p. 513): “ The question presented is not one of no authentication, but of irregular or imperfect authentication; not of jurisdiction, but of practice. It is therefore within the discretion of this court to allow the defect to be supplied.” And as it appeared to be then “ too late to take a new appeal or writ of error,” the Court permitted the record to be withdrawn “ for the purpose of having the certificate of authentication perfected by adding the signature of the clerk.” A defect or inaccuracy in mere matters of form can be corrected notwithstanding the end of the term. United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 67.
The Circuit Court of Appeals felt constrained to reach its conclusion, that the attempted authentication was a nullity, by reason of the decisions of this Court in Origet
v. United States, 125 U. S. 240, 243, 244 and Kinney v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 222 U. S. 283, 284. Neither of these decisions is strictly in point. In the Origet case, at the foot of a paper entitled “ Bill of Exceptions,” appeared the following: “Allowed and ordered on file November 22, ’83. A. B.” Referring to the Act of 1872 (R. S., § 953) the Court said: “ This provision merely dispensed with the seal. The necessity for the signature still remains. We can not regard the initials ‘A. B.’ as the signature of the judge, or as a sufficient authentication of the bill of exceptions, or as sufficient evidence of its allowance by the judge or the court. Therefore the questions purporting to be raised by the paper cannot be considered.” In the Kinney case, the record did not contain any bill of exceptions. There was a paper styled “ Exceptions to the charge to jury,” which was initialed “ J. B. McP. trial judge ” and signed by the plaintiff. The Court said that this paper was “ not a bill of exceptions,” citing the Origet case, but the Court added that “ if it were to be treated as a bill of exceptions ” it could not avail, as all the matters in question “ depended upon examination of the evidence which is not in the record ” and hence the Court had “ no means of determining whether reversible error arose from the action of the court on any of the subjects to which the paper refers.” Thus, in the Kinney case the present question was not necessarily involved, and in the Origet case the Court was unable to regard the initials as the signature of the judge. In the instant case, it appears that the trial judge did affix his initials in order to authenticate the bills of exceptions and he added the initials “ D. J.” for the obvious purpose of referring to his office and characterizing his action as official. So far as the statements in the opinions of the Origet and Kinney cases may be taken to imply that such an authentication by the trial judge is void and that bills of exceptions so allowed cannot be [p. 176] considered, or the informality be corrected, the statements are not approved.
The statute contains no indication that the word “ sign ” is used in other than the ordinary sense. The statute gives neither definition nor qualification. Signature by initials has been held to be sufficient under the Statute of Frauds8 and the Statute of Wills and in other transactions.*i4 It has been held in some States56that a different rule obtains in the case of the official signature of certain judicial officers, but the Congress has not established such a rule for the judges of the federal courts. Nor, in the absence of special statutory requirement, is there a uniform custom in relation to official signatures. It may be assumed that a requirement of the officer’s signature, without more, means that he shall write his name or his distinctive appellation, but the question remains as to what writing of that character is to be deemed sufficient for the purpose of authenticating his official act. There is no rule that he shall adhere to the precise form of his name as it appears in his commission. The full name of
a Salmon Falls Mjg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446, 454; Phdlimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513; Chichester v. Cobb, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 433, 443; Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen 474, 478; Smith v. Howell, 11 N. J. Eq. 349, 357, 358; Bums v. Burrows, 196 Iowa 1048, 1056; 196 N. W. 62; Browne on the Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., § 362.
iRe Savory, 15 Jur. 1042; Knox’s Estate, 131 Pa. St. 220, 229-232; 18 Atl. 1021; Estate of Kimmel, 278 Pa. 435, 440, 441; 123 Atl. 405; 31 A. L. R. 688; Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356; 84 S. E. 667; Merchants Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443, 448; Brown v. Butchers & Drovers Bank, 6 Hill. 443, 444; Palmer v. Stephens, '1 Denio 471, 479; Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424, 432; Jarman on Wills, 6th ed., pp. 107, 108.
the officer may or may not be used. Not infrequently Christian names are omitted, in part or altogether, or are abbreviated or indicated by initials. In some of the most important communications on behalf of the Federal Government, only the surname of the officer is used. When an officer authenticates his official act by affixing his initials he does not entirely omit to use his name; he simply abbreviates it, he uses a combination of letters which are part of it. Undoubtedly that method is informal, but we think that it is clearly a method of “ signing.” It cannot be said in such a case that he has utterly failed to “ sign,” so that his authentication of his official act, in the absence of further statutory requirement, is to be regarded as absolutely void.
We do not approve the signing of bills of exceptions merely by the initials of the judge, but we regard the question as one of practice,—of regularity, not of validity. In the instant cases, the District Judge authenticated his allowance of the bills of exceptions by a form of signature easily and actually identified as his. No one was misled or injured. We perceive no reason why petitioner should lose its right to have the rulings upon the trial appropriately reviewed by the appellate court, merely because the District Judge failed to sign his full name. This is precisely the sort of defect which the Congress has provided shall not impair the substantial rights of the parties. 28 U. S. C. 391. At most, in the interest of a better practice, the bills of exceptions could have been returned for a more formal signature, but even that course was not necessary.
The judgments are reversed and the causes are remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for hearing upon the merits.
Reversed.
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