Strother v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 314 (1932)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Strother v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 314 (1932)
Full caption
STROTHER v. BURNET, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 5, 1932
STROTHER v. BURNET, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.
No. 105. Argued November 18, 1932.—Decided December 5, 1932.
Decided in accordance with Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet,
Certiora ri * to review a judgment sustaining a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 18 B. T. A. 901, which upheld a ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Mr. Camden R. McAtee, with whom Mr. Wells Goodykoontz was on the brief, for petitioner.
Assistant Attorney General Youngquist, with whom Solicitor General Thacher, and Messrs. Whitney North Seymour, Sewall Key, and Andrew D. Sharpe were on the brief, for respondent.
Mr . Justi ce Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decision in this case, which is here on certiorari, turns on that in Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, just decided, ante, p. 308.
Petitioner, a stockholder in the Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co., received dividends upon his stock which were, to some extent, a distribution of the royalty payments received by the corporation and involved in its suit against the Commissioner. The ruling of the Commissioner in this case, that the amounts so distributed from royalties were taxable income, was upheld by the Board of Tax Appeals, 18 B. T. A. 901, and by the Court of
*See Table of Cases Reported in this volume.
314 Syllabus.
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 55 F. (2d) 626, which remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings, to enable the petitioner to offer additional testimony having a bearing on the correct computation of the deficiency, in accordance with the opinion of the court. The parties stipulate that the decision of this case shall be controlled by that of Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, and the judgment below is accordingly
Affirmed.
1
Under the Act of Congress authorizing the establishment of Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia, the lands taken for the park by purchase and condemnation were “ perpetually dedicated and set apart as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people of the United States.” By Act of a later Congress, the Commissioners of the District were directed to erect a fire engine house at a designated location in the park. Owners of neighboring land, claiming a right, in the nature of an easement, to have the land used for park purposes and no other, sought to enjoin the construction. Held: (1) The neighboring landowners derived no rights against the Government from the dedication of the park alone, since this constituted only a declaration of public policy by the particular Congress, which was not binding on its successors. P. 318. (2) Assuming that the building of the engine house was a diversion of the land from park uses, the change of use was within the legislative power. P. 320.
2
The existence of value alone does not generate interests protected by the Constitution against diminution by the Government, especially where the value was both created and diminished as an incident of the operation of government. P. 319.
3
The Rock Creek Park Act directed that surrounding lands be assessed to the extent that they were “ specially benefited by reason 1 “ Sec. 6. That the commission having ascertained the cost of the land, including expenses, shall assess such proportion of such cost and expenses upon the lands, lots, and blocks situated in the District of Columbia specially benefited by reason of the location and improvement of said park, as nearly as may be, in proportion to the benefits resulting to such real estate. “ If said commission shall find that the real estate in said District directly benefited by reason of the location of the park is not benefited to the full extent of the estimated cost and expenses, then they shall assess each tract or parcel of land specially benefited to the extent of such benefits as they shall deem the said real estate specially benefited. , .