Chi. & E. Ill. R.R. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 284 U.S. 296 (1932)
Case details
Citation
284 U.S. 296
Full caption
CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 4, 1932
CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS.
No. 79. Argued December 1, 1931.—Decided January 4, 1932.
A railway employee, while occupied in oiling an electric motor which is used for hoisting coal into a chute, to be thence taken and used by locomotives principally employed in moving interstate freight, is not engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it; and therefore an injury suffered by him while so occupied is not within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, and Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bolle, ante, p. 74, followed. Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77, and Erie R. Co. V. Szary, id. 86, overruled. Affirmed.
Certiorari , post, p. 599, to review a judgment affirming an award of compensation for personal injuries under a state workmen’s compensation act. The Supreme Court of Illinois declined to review.
Mr. Edward W. Rawlins, with whom Mr. Thomas P. Littlepage was on the brief, for petitioner. They cited: Erie R. Co. n . Collins, 253 U. S. 77; Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 259 Fed. 172; Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U. S. 86; Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 251 U. S. 259; Rousch v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 243 Fed. 712; Horton n . Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 130 Pac. 897-901; Sells v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 206 Ill. App. 45, 51; Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170; New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147; Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U. S. 454.
Mr. Samuel E. Hirsch, with whom Messrs. Morris K. Levinson and K. L. Johnson were on the brief, for respondents. They cited:
Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U. S. 353; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. n . Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177; Kelly v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 238 Fed. 95; Payne v. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 223; Goldsmith v. Payne, 300 Ill. 119.
Mr . Justi ce Suther land delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thomas, an employee of the railroad company, in attempting to oil an electric motor while it was running, was injured by having his hand caught in the gears. The railroad was engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce. The motor furnished power for hoisting coal into a chute, to be taken therefrom by, and for the use of, locomotive engines principally employed in the movement of interstate freight. An action was brought before the Industrial Commission of Illinois to recover compensation for the injury under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois.
The railroad company contended, and an arbitrator, appointed by the commission, found, that the work in which Thomas was engaged was in interstate commerce, that the case, therefore, was not within the state act and the commission was without jurisdiction. The commission, on review, held otherwise and awarded compensation aggregating $2,184.64. The court below affirmed the award upon a writ of certiorari authorized by state statute. The state supreme court, in the exercise of its discretion, declined to review the judgment; and the case is p. 298properly here on certiorari to the state circuit court. American Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S. 19, 20; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, 366.
The contention that Thomas was employed in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, rests upon the decisions of this court in Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77, and Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U. S. 86. In the Collins case the employee, at the time of his injury, was operating a gasoline engine to pump water into a tank for the use of locomotives engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce. In the Szary case the duty of the employee was to dry sand by the application of heat for the use of locomotives operating in both kinds of commerce ; and he was so employed when injured. In each case this court held that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, within the terms of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
The only difference between those cases and this one is that here the work of the employee related to coal, while in the Collins case it related to water, and in the Szary case, to sand. Obviously, the difference is not one of substance and if the Collins and Szary cases are followed a reversal of the judgment below would result.
But in Chicago, B. de Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, the injured employee was engaged in taking coal from storage tracks to bins or chutes for the use of locomotives used in the movement of both interstate and intrastate traffic; and this court held that the service was not in interstate commerce. After quoting the test for determining whether an employee is engaged in interstate commerce, laid down in Shanks v. Delaware, L. de W. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 558, namely, “was the employé at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it,” this court said (p. 180), “ Manifestly, there p. 299296 Syllabus.
was no such close or direct relation to interstate transportation in the taking of the coal to the coal chutes. This was nothing more than the putting of the coal supply-in a convenient place from which it could be taken as required for use.”
We are unable to reconcile this decision with the rule deducible from the Collins and Szary cases, and it becomes our duty to determine which is authoritative. From a reading of the opinion in the Collins case, it is apparent that the test of the Shanks case was not followed (see p. 85), the words “interstate commerce” being inadvertently substituted for the words “ interstate transportation” The Szary case is subject to the same criticism, since it simply followed the Collins case. Both cases are out of harmony with the general current of the decisions of this court since the Shanks case, Chicago <& North Western Ry. Co. n . Bolle, ante, p. 74, and they are now definitely overruled. The Harrington case furnishes the correct rule, and, applying it, the judgment below must be
Affirmed.
1
Two sales of morphine not in or from the original stamped package, the second having been initiated after the first was complete, held separate and distinct offenses under § 1 of the Narcotics Act, although buyer and seller were the same in both cases and but little time elapsed between the end of the one transaction and the beginning of the other. P. 301.
2
Section 1 of the Narcotics Act, forbidding sale except in or from the original stamped package, and § 2, forbidding sale not in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom the drug is sold, create two distinct offenses, and both are committed by a single 1“It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs [opium and other narcotics] except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the person in whose possession same may be found; . . .” a “ It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the drugs specified in section 691 of this title, except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”