Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929)
Full caption
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY v. HINKLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 18, 1929
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY v. HINKLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, et al.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.
No. 278. Argued January 7, 1929.—Decided February 18, 1929.
1. State taxation of a foreign corporation admitted to do business in a State, in the form of a filing fee and a license tax, both reckoned upon its authorized capital stock, held a burden on interstate commerce, and an attempt to reach property beyond the jurisdiction of the State contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a case where the property of the corporation within the State and the part of its business there transacted (less than half of it intrastate) were but small fractions, respectively, of its entire property and of its business transacted in other parts of the Union and abroad, and where the amount of capital stock authorized was much more than the amount of the stock issued and the value of the total assets. The laws imposing the taxes fixed maximum limits of $3,000.00 each; and the taxes actually demanded were $545.00 and $580.00, respectively. P. 465. 2. A state tax that really burdens the interstate commerce of a foreign corporation and reaches property beyond the State, cannot be sustained upon the ground that it is relatively small. P. 466.
24 F. (2d) 124, reversed.
Appeal from a decree of a District Court of three judges refusing an interlocutory injunction and dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin state officials from proceeding to enforce penalties against the plaintiff foreign corporation for its failure to pay filing fees and license taxes prescribed by the state law.
Messrs. J. Harry Covington and S. W. Brethorst, with whom Messrs. E. B. Palmer, Thomas M. Askren, and Thomas Creigh were on the.brief, for appellant.
Mr. Levi B. Donley, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, with whom Mr. John H. Dunbar, Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellees.
An excise tax may be graduated according to the amount of the authorized stock of a corporation and, if a reasonable maximum be fixed, the law will be upheld as a reasonable exercise of the state taxing power and not a burden upon interstate commerce. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachussetts, 231 U. S. 68.
The only distinction betwen the Kansas statute, disapproved in Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, and the Massachusetts statute, approved in Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, is that a reasonable maximum was not provided in the former. The Baltic case is followed and approved in St. Louis, etc. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350; Kansas City, etc. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227; Kansas City, etc. Ry. v. Styles, 242 U. S. Ill; Virginia Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500.
As for the contention that the doctrine announced in the Baltic case, and followed by other cases, has been abandoned and overruled by later cases, see the opinion of the District Court in the case at bar, 24 F. (2d) 124.
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, relied upon by appellant, is authority only for the proposition that where a foreign corporation is engaged [p. 462] solely in interstate commerce, the several States may not impose an excise tax upon it as a prerequisite to its engaging in such commerce, and that the Baltic case, in so far as it might affect such a situation, is expressly overruled. This Court has never held invalid an excise graduated in accordance with the authorized capital stock of the corporation, where the corporation was engaged in intrastate business and where a reasonable maximum fee was provided for in the statute. Cf. Airway Corp’n v. Day, 266 U. S. 71; Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178.
Cases involving excise taxes sought to be collected by a State from a corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce are not in point, as is true where no maximum tax is fixed. Referring to: International Paper Co. n. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135; Locomobile Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. .146; Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massorchusetts, 246 U. S. 147; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203.
The Washington excise tax is reasonable in amount and has a reasonable maximum.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant is incorporated under the laws of Maine. Its authorized capital stock is $45,000,000. Less than $30,000,000 has been issued and the total value of the corporate property does not exceed that sum. It does an extensive business in meats and foodstuffs throughout the Union and abroad. During 1916 when the capital stock was $20,000,000 the articles of incorporation were duly filed with the proper state officer and the corporation began to carry on closely associated interstate and intrastate business in Washington. Its property therein is now worth $40,000. Gross sales by the corporation for the [p. 463] year ended October 31, 1926, were $231,750,000. Of these $1,313,275 were made in Washington, less than half being intrastate.
The statutory provisions here important appear in the sections of Remington’s Compiled Statutes of Washington mentioned below.
Sec. 3852 authorizes foreign corporations to do business within the State as those organized under her laws upon compliance with conditions prescribed by Secs. 3853-3854.
Sec. 3853 requires every foréign corporation to file with the Secretary of State a certified copy of its charter, etc., and Sec. 3854 requires appointment of a local agent.
Sec. 3836 (as amended by Chap. 149, Extraordinary Session, 1925) directs that every local and foreign corporation required by law to file its articles with the Secretary of State shall pay graduated filing fees, not above $3,000, reckoned upon its authorized capital stock.1
Sec. 3837 requires every corporation, foreign or domestic, desiring to file with the Secretary of State articles [p. 464] amendatory or supplemental articles increasing its capital stock to pay the fees prescribed in the preceding section less any sum theretofore paid.2
1
Section 3836. Every corporation incorporated under the laws of this state, or of any state or territory of the United States or of any foreign state or country, required by law to file articles of incorporation in the office of the secretary of state, shall pay to the secretary of state a filing fee in proportion to its authorized capital stock as follows: Capital not exceeding $50,000, fee $25; Capital of more than $50,000, and less than $100,000, fee $40; Capital of $100,000,or more, and less than $150,000, fee $75; Capital of $150,000,or more, and less than $200,000, fee $100; Capital of $200,000,or more, and less than $300,000, fee $150; Capital of $300,000,or more, and less than $400,000, fee $200; Capital of $400,000,or more, and less than $500,000, fee $250; Capital of $500,000, or more, and less than $1,000,000, fee $500; Capital of $1,000,000, or more, and less than $2,000,000, fee $750; and $10 additional for each $1,000,000, or major fraction thereof, of capital stock in excess of $2,000,000; Provided, however, That the total filing fee for filing such articles of incorporation shall in no case exceed the sum of $3,000.
Sec. 3841, (as amended by Chap. 149, Extraordinary Session, 1925) requires corporations, foreign and domestic, to pay annual license fees, not above $3,000, reckoned upon authorized capital stock.3
Secs. 3842, 3843, 3844, 3846, 3855, and 3861 provide heavy penalties for failure to pay prescribed filing fees and license taxes.
Filing fees because of the increased capital, and license taxes for 1927, both reckoned upon the authorized capital stock, were demanded of appellant. Penalties for failure to comply were threatened. By an original bill in the United States District Court, Western District of Washington, it set up the above-stated facts and asked an [p. 465] appropriate injunction to prevent enforcement of the demands. A court of three judges heard the cause, denied a preliminary injunction, and dismissed the bill for want of equity.
2
Section 3837. Every corporation, foreign or domestic, desiring to file in the office of the secretary of state articles amendatory or supplemental articles increasing its capital stock, or certificates of increase of capital stock, shall pay to the secretary of state the fees prescribed in the preceding section for the total amount to which the capital stock of the corporation is so increased, less the amount already paid for filing the original articles of incorporation, or original articles and amendatory or supplemental articles, or certificates of increase, and every such corporation desiring to file amendatory or supplemental articles decreasing, or certificates of decrease of capital stock, shall pay to the secretary of state a filing fee of $25. For filing of other amendatory or supplemental articles, it shall pay a fee of $10; Provided, however, That the total amount paid by any corporation for filing its original articles of incorporation and all of its articles amendatory or supplemental articles increasing its capital stock or certificates of increase of capital stock, shall in the aggregate in no case exceed the sum of $3,000, plus $10 for each separate instrument filed in addition to its original articles of incorporation.
3
Section 3841. Every corporation incorporated under the laws of this state, and every foreign corporation, having its articles of incorporation on file in the office of the secretary of state, shall, on or before the first day of July of each and every year, pay to the secreday of July of any year, and desiring to pay the same thereafter, and before the first day of January next following, shall pay to the secretary of state, for the use of the state, in addition to the said license fee the following further fee, as a penalty for such failure, the sum of two dollars and fifty cents: Provided, however, That building and loan and savings and loan associations paying special fees provided for in the act under which same are incorporated shall not be required to pay the regular fee provided herein: Provided, further, That the annual fee required to be paid to the Department of Public Works by any public service company shall be deducted from the annual fee provided herein, and the excess only shall be collected under this act. 27228°—29------ 30
Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 187, examined Texas statutes which required foreign corporations to pay permit and franchise taxes graduated according to authorized capital stock and declared them in conflict with the Federal Constitution because they imposed “direct burdens upon interstate commerce, and, moreover, exerted the taxing authority of the State over property and rights which were wholly beyond the confines of the State, and not subject to its jurisdiction, and therefore constituted a taking without due process.” These statutes prescribed
tary of state, for the use of the state, the following license fees in proportion to its authorized capital stock, as follows:
Capital of $50,000, or less, fee $15;
Capital in excess of $50,000, and up to and including $100,000, fee $25;
Capital in excess of $100,000, and up to and including $500,000, fee $50;
Capital in excess of $500,000, and up to and including $1,000,000, fee $100;
Capital in excess of $1,000,000, and up to and including $2,000,000, fee $150; and $10 for each $1,000,000, or fraction thereof of capital in excess of $2,000,000: Provided, however, That the total amount of such annual license fee shall in no case exceed $3,000. Every corporation failing to pay the said annual license fee, on or before the first [p. 466] no maximum tax. In other respects they were not unlike the acts here under consideration.
Unless saved by the $3,000 limitation, the Washington enactments are subject to the constitutional objections pointed out in Looney v. Crane Co., and must be denied effect.
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, upheld a tax based upon authorized capital stock, but limited to $2,000, imposed by Massachusetts upon foreign corporations for the privilege of doing local and domestic business therein. Consideration was given to the fact that the corporate assets were four times the authorized capital and to the limitation. Weighing all the circumstances, the Court concluded that no direct substantial burden was imposed upon interstate commerce and that property beyond the State was not taxed.
“ It must now be regarded as settled that a State may not burden interstate commerce or tax property beyond her borders under the guise of regulating or taxing intrastate business. So to burden interstate commerce is prohibited by the commerce clause; and the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit taxation of property beyond the State’s jurisdiction. The amount demanded is unimportant when there is no legitimate basis for the tax. So far as the language of Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 87, tends to support a different view it conflicts with conclusions reached in later opinions and is now definitely disapproved.”
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts had sometimes been regarded as lending support to the theory that a tax which really burdens interstate commerce and reaches property beyond the State may be sustained if relatively small. This view did not harmonize with the principles approved by Looney v. Crane Co., and was expressly disapproved by Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass.
460 Brandeis, J., dissenting.
It follows that the decree of the court below is erroneous and must be reversed.
Whether, because reckoned upon authorized and not upon actual capital stock, the challenged legislation fails to require like fees for equal privileges within the doctrine of Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, we need not now consider.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting.
The corporation maintains in Washington a branch office and a warehouse. There, it does a large intrastate business. Nearly one-half of the aggregate sales of $1,313,- 275.74 made within the State were local and were from broken packages. It is subjected to two taxes which are separate and distinct. The filing fee is payable only once and as laid was $545. The annual license fee is $580. The latter results in a charge of about one-tenth of one per cent on the intrastate business. The corporation’s pay roll there is more than a hundred times as large. These small taxes are obviously not more than a fair contribution to the necessary expenses of the State government. They are the same for foreign corporations as for domestic. In my opinion both taxes are valid.
If the statute sought to impose a tax on corporations engaged wholly in interstate commerce, or if the taxes laid a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or if they were laid upon property without the State, or if they were unjustly discriminatory, the fact that they are small in amount would, of course, be immaterial. Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 171. But these taxes are not subject to any of those infirmities. The taxes are not laid upon interstate commerce. They are not measured by the amount of interstate commerce. They do not grow, or shrink, according to the volume of interstate commerce or of the capital used in it. They are not
Brandeis, J., dissenting. 278U.S.
furtively directed against such commerce. The taxes would be precisely the same in amount if the corporation did in Washington no interstate business whatsoever. Nor are they taxes laid upon property without the State. Indeed, they are neither property taxes nor substitutes for property taxes. They are an excise, laid solely for the privilege of doing business as a corporation. An individual doing the same business would not be required to pay either these taxes or any substitute therefor.
General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500, requires, in my opinion, that the filing fee be held valid. There, a filing fee of $1,000 on an authorized capitalization of $5,000,000 was sustained as against a foreign corporation; under a statute limiting the maximum tax to $5,000. Here, the filing fee demanded was $545 on an authorized capital nearly ten times as great; and the maximum fee demandable in any case was limited to $3,000. The General Ry. Signal Co. case was decided by a unanimous Court and the correctness of the decision has never been questioned.
Cheney Bros. Co. n. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 154-158, requires, in my opinion, that the license fee be held valid. That case held a statute imposing an annual license tax valid as applied to all the foreign corporations which, like the Cudahy Company here, did both intrastate and interstate business. That decision was made by a unanimous Court after much deliberation. It has never been disapproved. The statute there in question is identical, so far as here material, with the Washington statute, except that the Massachusetts law fixes a maximum tax of $2,000, while here it is $3,000. But the Massachusetts statute was enacted in 1909; and the tax there challenged was laid in 1913. The Washington statute was enacted in 1925; and the tax here challenged was laid in 1926. The rise in the general price level since 1913 makes the Wash- [p. 469] 460 Brandeis, J., dissenting.
ington maximum relatively lower than that prescribed by Massachusetts.
The Cheney Bros. Co. case is entirely consistent with Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203. In the latter case, the tax held void was on a foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce; and it was laid under a different statute. The situation here is also wholly unlike that considered in Air-Way Corp’n v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 79 and in Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, and cases there cited. In those cases, not only did the statutes fail to fix a maximum, but the taxes actually laid were so large as compared with the local business done as to constitute a substantial obstruction of interstate commerce. The case at bar is also unlike International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135. There, the statute failed to fix any maximum.
A tax proportionate to the capital of a corporation is sometimes laid in lieu of the ordinary property taxes, and in such cases is treated as a property tax. But the taxes here in question are not of that nature. I am aware that it has been said by this Court that a license fee of a given per cent of the entire authorized capital of a foreign corporation doing both a local and interstate business is essentially a tax on the entire business, interstate as well as intrastate; and a tax upon property outside the State. But that was said in cases where the statute did not fix any maximum. The statement seems to me legally unsound. If it were true that every tax imposed generally upon a foreign corporation doing both interstate and intrastate business taxed its interstate business and its property outside the State, then most of such corporations would largely escape taxation. By the same process of reasoning all taxes laid by a State upon property within its borders, which is used in both intrastateand interstate commerce, would be a tax on interstate commerce. But
Syllabus. 278 U. S.
such taxes have been universally upheld. They are valid, because, when the burden is indirect, even a large burden upon interstate commerce does not render a tax void. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 530; Hump Hairpin Co. n. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290.
It would be unfortunate to hold that merely because a foreign corporation, doing a local business does also interstate business, the State may not lay upon it a reasonable, non-discriminatory excise, necessarily limited to a reasonable amount, to which all domestic corporations similarly situated are subject and which can affect interstate commerce only indirectly, if at all. To hold such a tax void seems to me to ignore the wise rule of decision declared in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 698: “ The substance and not the shadow determines the validity of the exercise of the [taxing] power.”
Mr. Justice Holmes joins in this opinion.
TAFT v. BOWERS, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
GREENWAY v. SAME.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 16 and 17. Argued April 26, 1928. Reargued October 9, 1928.—Decided February 18, 1929.
1. Under par. (2), § 202 of the Revenue Act of 1921, where one who purchased shares of stock after February 28, 1913, gave them to another after December 31, 1920, when their market value Lad increased over the investment, and the donee afterwards sold them at a price still higher, the gain taxable to the donee is the difference between the price realized by him and the price paid by the donor. P. 481.
2. In such case, Congress has power under the Sixteenth Amendment to treat the entire increase in value, when separated from the investment by the sale, as income of the donee. P. 482. 20 F. (2d) 561, affirmed.
Certiorari, 275 U. S. 520, to judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing judgments in favor of the present petitioners, 15 F. (2d) 890, in actions against the Collector to recover money paid as income taxes.
Mr. Henry W. Taft, with whom Mr. Clarence Castimore was on the brief, for petitioner in No. 16.
“ Income ” has been defined to mean “ the gain derived from capital, labor, or from both combined, provided it is understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets.” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189. In order to apply this definition, we must determine first what is profit or gain to the taxpayer. The value of the gift itself is not profit or gain, but capital in the hands of the donee. Edwards v. Cuba R. R. Co., 268 U. S. 628; United States v. Oregon-Washington R. R. Co., 251 Fed. 211. Indeed the statute itself specifically provides that a gift is not to be included in the gross income of the donee.
Prior to the year 1921, there was no specific provision in the various Revenue Acts which fixed the basis for determining gain or loss on the sale of property acquired by gift, devise or bequest. The statute provided that the basis to determine gain on the sale of assets was cost or March 1, 1913 value. The uniform rule of the Treasury Department under those prior statutes was that the basis to be used for determining gain upon the sale of an asset acquired by gift, devise or bequest, was the value of such property when acquired. In other words, until - the Revenue Act of 1921 became effective, the Department laid down the rule [p. 472] that gain on the sale of property acquired by gift could be computed only by taking into consideration the value of the gift when it was acquired. This was an express recognition by the Treasury Department that a gift is.a capital transaction, as pointed out in Edwards v. Cuba R. R. Co., and United States v. Oregon-Washington R. R. Co., supra, and that the donee can haye “gain” only to the extent that the < proceeds in his hands exceed the value of his capital at the time of acquisition. These rulings are entitled to great weight. United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169.
In Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527, this Court held that the Income Tax Act of 1916 taxed “gains” only, and that a taxpayer could have no gain until the proceeds of the sale exceeded his cost, even though the proceeds may have exceeded the March 1, 1913, value. In Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221, this Court passed upon the question as to whether an increase in the value of capital assets which has accrued prior to March 1, 1913, was income to a taxpayer when realized after that date at a very great increase over the cost price. In passing upon the question this Court said that there was “ no increase subject to tax,” allowing the taxpayer to recover his capital investment on March 1, 1913. See also Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U. S. 179.
We see no reason for distinguishing between a case where the increase occurred prior to the passage of the taxing statute and a case where the increase occurred prior to ownership by the present taxpayer. If a taxpayer in the former case is entitled to recover his capital investment before he can have any gain, a fortiori, a taxpayer in the latter case should be entitled to recover his capital investment which he acquired at the date of the gift. We submit that the above decisions lay down definitely the principle that' a taxpayer is entitled to recover his cost or capital investment before he can have [p. 473] gain or income. If then a taxpayer’s capital investment at the time of acquisition is not “ income,” as it is usually understood, a statute which seeks to make it such is invalid. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189.
The provisions in question are capricious and arbitrary and contrary to the Fifth Amendment. That the results of the application of the statute here under consideration are arbitrary and capricious is plain. Let us illustrate: A bought stock for $10. He makes a bona fide gift of it to B after December 31, 1920, when it is worth $100, and B sells the stock for $200. The statute provides that B has a gain of $190. Thus B is given no benefit whatsoever of the capital which he received at the commencement of his period of ownership, and the indirect effect of the statute is that he is taxed on a part of the value of the gift, which the statute provides in another section, § 213 (b) (3), shall not be taxed as income. So far as B is concerned, he has an actual economic gain of $200, but it has long ago been settled that an economic gain is not necessarily a taxable gain in the constitutional sense. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330; United States v. Oregon-Washington R. R. Co., 251 Fed. 211.
Let us reverse the above example: A bought stock for $200. He gives it to B after December 31, 1920, when it is worth $100, and B, after a year, sells for $10. The statute provides that B has a loss of $190. This is absurd and unreal, because B never had anything worth $190.00 to lose. It was just this sort of unreality and disregard of actual facts that this Court refused to sanction in Goodrich v. Edwards, supra, and in the later case of United States v. Flannery, 268 U. S. 98.
Congress must not use its taxing power in such an arbitrary and capricious manner as to invade the rights of citizens under the Fifth Amendment. Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 625; Coolidge v. Nichols, 274 U. S. 531; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142.
The provision is not a legitimate and necessary exercise of the power ancillary to the power to levy taxes. To attempt to remedy a supposed weakness in the statute by adopting a basis for determining gain which is inherently fallacious does not answer the argument that the amount so included is not income. Eisner v. Macomber, supra. Nor is it sufficient to justify the means that the omission might have been closed by other methods of taxation, as, for example, an excise tax on the gift, as suggested by the learned Judges below.
Nor is the means justified by saying that the donee took the property impressed with a tax liability. First of all, no income tax liability with respect to the property attached to the donor at any time prior to or at the time of the gift, People ex rel. Wilson v. Wendell, 196 N. Y. (App. Div.) 596; so there was no liability to pass on. Secondly, the argument has been effectively answered in Miles v. Graham, 268 U. S. 501. There it was held that a federal judge could not be taxed on his salary contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, even though he took the judgeship after the passage of the Revenue Acts and with the knowledge that the Act attempted to tax his salary.
Furthermore, from the inception of our federal income tax laws, a clear and distinct cleavage has been made between different taxpayers. Such has become settled practice, both in the wording of the laws and in the decisions that have been made under them. The person acquiring property can never tell what liability he assumes in the way of income tax if any basis entirely foreign to him can be arbitrarily adopted for determining his gain. It is this fact that no doubt underlies the attempt in the statute and the trend in the decisions, always to draw a distinct line between separate taxpayers. If a decedent and his executor, or a decedent and his legatees, must be dealt with separately, surely there is no justification for [p. 475] confusing the identity of a donor and a donee and treating them as one.
Neither in “ common speech ” nor in the “ ordinary sense ” (Eisner v. Macomber, supra; Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509; United States v. Oregon- Washington R. R., 251 Fed. 211) is a gift income. Income, as defined by lexicographers, comes to a person “ within a specified time ” or “ regularly,” or is the “ periodical produce ” or the “ annual, or periodical receipts.” This language would exclude a gift or a legacy or an inheritance, all of which are casual and come without regularity. It must be “ as payment for services, interest from investment; revenue,” or “ produce of one’s work, business, lands, or investments.”
While the definition of income has been extended by the Income Tax Law and the decision of this Court in Merchants Loan & Trust Co. n. Smietanka, supra, so as to include accretion to capital, that decision was rendered with reference to an accretion which was a realized “gain or profit,” “produced by” or “derived from” an investment; but the words used in Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, and applied in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, which were approved as to the Income Tax Law in Eisner n. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, and Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, do not affect the essential features of an income that it (1) must be the product of invested capital or labor or services, and (2) must be reckoned for regular periods (annually, if not specified otherwise), or within some definite or specified period, as, for instance, the period during which a realized gain upon an investment is to be measured.
It was not the intention of Congress to give to the amended § 202 (b) (3) of the Revenue Act a retroactive effect so as to take account of increase in the value of the gift accruing prior to the passage of the law.
Mr. Hiram C. Todd, with whom Mr. Roger S. Baldwin was on the brief, for petitioner in No. 17.
The gist of the Government’s contention is that a gift constitutes income to the donee; and that the Government could, if it saw fit, tax the entire proceeds of a sale of the gift as income of the donee; from which it follows that it can tax as income of the donee, the difference between the cost of the gift to the donor and the proceeds of the sale of the gift by the donee.
We believe this argument ignores the fundamental fact that income is derivative and complementary. It has no existence independent of the source from which it is derived and is dependent upon capital in some form or upon labor for its very existence. Citing Eisner n. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, and definitions of “income” from various dictionaries.
If the entire proceeds of the sale of a gift constitute income to the donee, where is the capital from which the income is derived? The answer must be that the corpus of the gift is capital in the hands of the donee at the time of its receipt. But the mere conversion of such capital into money does not constitute income. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221.
An amount sufficient to restore the capital value that existed at the commencement of the taxing period must be withdrawn from the gross proceeds in order to determine whether there has been a gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179.
The popular conception of the meaning of “ income ” excludes property or money received by way of gift. The ordinary layman would not think of including, as a part of his income, money Or property which he had received as a gift.
470 Argument for the Collector.
Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt and Mr. Edwin G. Davis, with whom Solicitor General Mitchell, and Messrs. Sewall Key and J. Louis Monarch were on the brief, for respondent.
The word “ income ” is to be construed in its ordinary-sense. Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509.
Congress, in the various Revenue Acts, has consistently treated gifts as income; one time, as in § 4 of the Revenue Act of 1916, specifically referring to gifts as “ income,” but generally by exempting them from inclusion in gross income. The legislatures of certain States have regarded gifts as income.
The sale of purchased property separates income from capital. The income is measured by the difference between the investment and the selling price. If this rule be applied to the sale of property acquired by gift, the value of the gift, i. e., its selling price, will appear as income, since the donee’s investment therein is zero. This conception of income is not inconsistent with the definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189; but in any event, that definition, as the Court there intimated, does not represent the uttermost limits of what can be regarded as income.
Congress assumed the gift of a corpus which is exempted from taxation, but it taxed the income from the gift. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161. In the cases at bar, the corpus was the shares of stock conveyed by gift. The increment in the value of these shares when realized by sale was income. Eisner v. Macomber, supra. That part of the increase which accrued while the stock was still held by the donor was inherently income. It was intrinsically a gift of income to the donee, and, when separated from capital and realized in the hands of the [p. 478] donee by the sale of the gift, may constitutionally be taxed as income to him for the year in which realized.
Since the authority to tax given by the Sixteenth Amendment is an authority to tax “income,” not “persons,” a change in ownership of what is inherently income after its accrual and before realization by sale, can not affect the right of Congress to impose a tax thereon. Atlantic Coast Line v. Daught on, 262 U. S. 413; United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156; McKinney v. United States, 62 Ct. Cis. 180; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161; Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509.
If the corpus of the gift in these cases be construed as including the increment in the value of the shares of stock while held by the donor, still the sale of the gift resulted in a realized gain which may be constitutionally measured by taking the cost of the latest actual capital investment in the gift as a basis.
Section 202 (a) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1921 does not prescribe a capricious or arbitrary scheme of taxation, nor is it in violation of the Fifth Amendment. It is a necessary part of a complete scheme of taxation whose purpose was to prevent tax evasion or avoidance in respect to a particular type of gain.
It is not capricious to put property acquired by gift in a special class and to tax it differently from property acquired by purchase. Bowman n. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642; Brushdber n. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1; Thomas v. United States, 192 U. S. 363.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, who are donees of stocks, seek to recover income taxes exacted because of advancement in the market value of those stocks while owned by the donors. The facts are not in dispute. Both causes must turn upon the effect of paragraph (2), § 202, Revenue Act, 1921, (c. 136,
42 Stat. 227) which prescribes the basis for estimating taxable gain when one disposes of property which came to him by gift. The records do not differ essentially and a statement of the material circumstances disclosed by No. 16 will suffice.
During the calendar years 1921 and 1922, the father of petitioner Elizabeth C. Taft, gave her certain shares of Nash Motors Company stock then more valuable than when acquired by him. She sold them during 1923 for more than their market value when the gift was made.
The United States demanded an income tax reckoned upon the difference between cost to the donor and price received by the donee. She paid accordingly and sued to recover the portion imposed because of tlje advance in value while the donor owned the stock. The right to tax the increase in value after the gift is not denied.
Abstractly stated, this is the problem—
In 1916 A purchased 100 shares of stock for $1,000 which he held until 1923 when their fair market value had become $2,000. He then gave them to B who sold them during the year 1923 for $5,000. The United States claim that, under the Revenue Act of 1921, B must pay income tax upon $4,000, as realized profits. B maintains that only $3,000—the appreciation during her ownership—can be regarded as income; that the increase during the donor’s ownership is not income assessable against her within intendment of the Sixteenth Amendment.
The District Court ruled against the United States; the Circuit Court of Appeals held with them.
Act of Congress approved November 23, 1921, Chap. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 229, 237—
“ Sec. 202. (a) That the basis for ascertaining the gain derived or loss sustained from a sale or other disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired after February 28, 1913, shall be the cost of such property; except that—"(1) • • •
“(2) In the case of such property, acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis shall be the same as that which it would have in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift. If the facts necessary to determine such basis are unknown to the donee, the Commissioner shall, if possible, obtain such facts from such donor or last preceding owner, or any other person cognizant thereof. If the Commissioner finds it impossible to obtain such facts, the basis shall be the value of such property as found by the Commissioner as of the date or approximate date at which, according to the best information the Commissioner is able to obtain, such property was acquired by such donor or last preceding owner. In the case of such property acquired by gift on or before December 31, 1920, the basis for ascertaining gain or loss from a sale or other disposition thereof shall be the fair market price or value of such property at the time of such acquisition; ”
“ Sec. 213. That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise provided in section 233) the term ‘ gross income ’—
“(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service . . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. The amount of all such items (except as provided in subdivision (e) of section 201) shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted under subdivision (b) of section 212, any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period; but
“(b) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation under this title;
“(1) . . . (2) . . .
“(3) The value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent (but the income from such property shall be included in gross income); . . .”
We think the manifest purpose of Congress expressed in paragraph (2), Sec. 202, supra, was to require the petitioner to pay the exacted tax.
The only question subject to serious controversy is whether Congress had power to authorize the exaction.
It is said that the gift became a capital asset of the donee to the extent of its value when received and, therefore, when disposed of by her no part of that value could be treated as taxable income in her hands.
The Sixteenth Amendment provides—
“ The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”
Income is the thing which may be taxed—income from any source. The Amendment does not attempt to define income or to designate how taxes may be laid thereon, or how they may be enforced.
Under former decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income.
Also, this Court has declared—“ Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets.” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207. The “ gain derived from capital,” within the definition, is “ not a gain accruing to capital, nor a growth or increment of value in the investment, but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however invested, and coming in, that is, received or drawn by the claimant for his separate use, benefit and disposal.” United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 169.
27228°—29------ 31
If, instead of giving the stock to petitioner, the donor had sold it at market value, the excess over the capital he invested (cost) would have been income therefrom and subject to taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment. He would have been obliged to share the realized gain with the United States. He held the stock—the investment—subject to the right of the sovereign to take part of any increase in its value when separated through sale or conversion and reduced to his possession. Could he, contrary to the express will of Congress, by mere gift enable another to hold this stock free from such right, deprive the sovereign of the possibility of taxing the appreciation when actually severed, and convert the entire property into a capital asset of the donee, who invested nothing, as though the latter had purchased at the market price? And after a still further enhancement of the property, could the donee make a second gift with like effect, etc.? We think not.
In truth the stock represented only a single investment of capital—that made by the donor. And when through sale or conversion the increase was separated therefrom, it became income from that investment in the hands of the recipient subject to taxation according to the very words of the Sixteenth Amendment. By requiring the recipient of the entire increase to pay a part into the public treasury, Congress deprived her of no right and subjected her to no hardship. She accepted the gift with knowledge of the statute and, as to the property received, voluntarily assumed the position of her donor. When she sold the stock she actually got the original sum invested, plus the entire appreciation; and out of the latter only was she called on to pay the tax demanded.
The provision of the statute under consideration seems entirely appropriate for enforcing a general scheme of lawful taxation. To accept the view urged in behalf of petitioner undoubtedly would defeat, to some extent, the [p. 483] purpose of Congress to take part of all gain derived from capital investments. To prevent that result and insure enforcement of its proper policy, Congress had power to require that for purposes of taxation the donee-should accept the position of the donor in respect of the thing received. And in so doing, it acted neither unreasonably nor arbitrarily.
The power of Congress to require a succeeding owner, in respect of taxation, to assume the place of his predecessor is pointed out by United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 171—
“ Where, as in this case, the dividend constitutes a distribution of profits accumulated during an extended period and bears a large proportion to the par value of the stock, if an investor happened to buy stock shortly before the dividend, paying a price enhanced by an estimate of the capital plus the surplus of the company, and after distribution of the surplus, with corresponding reduction in the intrinsic and market value of the shares, he were called upon to pay a tax upon the dividend received, it might look in his case like a tax upon his capital. But it is only apparently so. In buying at a price that reflected the accumulated profits, he of course acquired as a part of the valuable rights purchased the prospect of a dividend from the accumulations—bought ‘ dividend on ’ as the phrase goes—and necessarily took subject to the burden of the income tax proper to be assessed against him by reason of the dividend if and when made. He simply stepped into the shoes, in this as in other respects, of the stockholder whose shares he acquired, and presumably the prospect of a dividend influenced the price paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an income tax to be paid thereon. In short, the question whether a dividend made out of company profits constitutes income of the stockholder is not affected by antecedent transfers of the stock from hand to hand.”
Syllabus. 278 U.S.
There is nothing in the Constitution which lends support to the theory that gain actually resulting from the increased value of capital can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the recipient only so far as the increase occurred while he owned the property. And Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 167, is to the contrary.
The judgments below are
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these causes.
SALOMON et al. v. STATE TAX COMMISSION OF NEW YORK.
SIMONSON et al. v. SAME.
ERROR TO THE SURROGATES' COURT OF NEW YORK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK.
Nos. 79 and 80. Argued November 28, 1928.—Decided February
18, 1929.
1. A state law imposing a graduated tax on the transfer of contingent remainders measured by the value at the testator’s death of the estate transferred, undiminished by the value of the intervening life estate, and requiring the executor to deposit security for the payment of the tax, but postponing the definitive assessment and the payment of the tax until after the death of the life tenant—held consistent with due process of law. P. 489.
2. The due process clause places no restriction on a State as to the time at which an inheritance tax shall be levied or the property valtied for purposes of such tax. P. 490.
3. The graduation of the tax and the impossibility of forecasting exactly the duration of life estates may cause a lack of equivalency of tax burden as between a contingent remainder, when taxed as above stated, and a like vested remainder when the tax on the latter is based on its value separate from the intervening life estate and is paid at the testator’s death; but such differences do not amount to an unjustifiable discrimination against the contingent remainderman violative of the equal protection clause. Id.
4. There are differences between vested and contingent remainders which justify classification in imposing inheritance taxes. P. 491. 5. The fact that a state tax law is not the best that might be conceived and produces minor inequalities and hardships does not render it invalid under the Constitution. Id. Affirmed.
Error to judgments fixing transfer taxes, entered in the Surrogates’ Court of the County of New York, on remittitur from the Court of Appeals, the latter court having affirmed judgments of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, which had affirmed the assessments as originally made in the Surrogates’ Court. See 127 Mise. 211; 219 App. Div. 656; 246 N. Y. 601, 602.
Mr. Charles Angulo, with whom Mr. Edmund 0. Austin was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error in No. 79.
Mr. Abraham L. Gutman, with whom Mr. Wm. V. Goldberg was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error in No. 80.
Mr. Seth T. Cole for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, which were argued together, present the question whether the provision in the New York Transfer Law for taxing the transfer of contingent remainders violates the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That statute imposes a graduated succcession tax. On the transfer of life estates and vested remainders the tax is measured by their respective values as of the testator’s death and is payable then. The tax on the transfer of contingent remainders is not payable until the death of the life tenant; and it is measured by the value at the testator’s death of the estate transferred, undiminished by the value of the intervening life estate. For the due payment of the deferred tax the [p. 486] executor must furnish adequate security. The amount of the security is fixed by a temporary taxing order. Laws of 1925, c. 144, §§ 230 and 241.
It will be sufficient to state the facts and proceedings in the Salomon case. Meyer Hecht died in 1925 a resident of New York. He bequeathed his residuary estate in trust to his widow for life; and upon her death one equal share thereof to each child then living and to the then living issue per stirpes of each deceased child. The value of the residue as of the testator’s death was appraised at $322,094.37. The then value of the widow’s life estate therein, computed according to the standard mortality tables using five per cent interest, was appraised at $124,- 957; the tax then payable was assessed thereon; and no objection is made thereto. If the future interests had been vested remainders, the tax thereon would have been payable then on an appraisal of $197,137.37; that is, on the difference between the then value of the residue and the then value of the life estate. The future interests were all contingent. The tax was not payable until the death of the life tenant. The temporary taxing order appraised their aggregate value at the widow’s death as $322,094.37; that is, at the value of the residue undiminished by the value of the life estate. Security for the future payment of the tax was required to be given as the statute requires. An appeal from the appraisal was denied by the Surrogate of New York County. Matter of Hecht, 127 Mise. 211. His judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, 219 App. Div.
656. Its judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, without opinion, 246 N. Y. 601, 602; and by the remittitur it became the judgment of the Surrogates’ Court That judgment is final within the meaning of § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936. Compare Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434; Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122. [p. 487] The constitutional claims were duly made below; and the case is properly here.
The need of a peculiar provision for taxing the transfer of contingent remainders arises from the fact that the New York law imposes a graduated tax. The rates differ according to the amount or value of the gift to the particular beneficiary and also according to his relationship to the decedent. The lowest rate payable by a lineal descendant is one per cent, the highest four per cent. The lowest rate payable by a stranger is five per cent, the highest eight per cent. As the remainders are contingent, it is impossible to know before the contingency happens in whom the remainders will vest; and it may be impossible to determine until then the relationship of the beneficiaries to the testator and the portions of the estate which they will respectively receive. Thus the rate of taxation will remain uncertain. For this reason, the statute postpones until the contingency happens both the definitive assessment of the tax on the transfer of the contingent remainders and the payment thereof. In respect to vested remainders, there is no obstacle to requiring both assessment and payment of this graduated tax as of the testator’s death. The amount of the tax can be determined then; because it is known who the vested remaindermen are, what the share of each is and what his relationship to the testator was. And the value of the remainders as of the testator’s death is likewise known, being the difference between the then value of the property transferred and the computed value of the life estate.
The need of a special provision for the taxation in respect to contingent remainders and the reasonableness of the particular measure adopted in 1925 appear from the history of the legislation. Since the enactment of the Transfer Tax Law in 1885 (Ch. 483), the aim of the Legislature has been at all times to adopt a method of laying the tax which would be fair to both the life tenant [p. 488] and the future interest and would protect the revenues of the State. From time to time, various methods for doing this were tried. Experience revealed their defects. Under the original law and the early amendments, the transfers to contingent remaindermen were not taxable upon the testator’s death, Matter of Coger, 111 N. Y. 343. They were taxable at the time when they vested in possession, Matter of Stewart, 131 N. Y. 274. And the tax then payable was computed upon the value, as of the testator’s death, of the property transferred, less the value of the intervening life estate, Matter of Sloane, 154 N. Y.
109. Under this method the revenue derived from the tax on the contingent remainder was less than it would have been had the remainder been a vested one. For the State lost the benefit of the money during the period intervening between the death of the testator and that of the life tenant. To overcome this loss to the State and the discrimination thereby in favor of the contingent remaindermen, the Legislature provided by Chapter 284 of the Acts of 1897 that the tax payable on the vesting of the contingent remainder should be measured by the full value of the property as of the testator’s death, without deducting the value of the intervening life estate, Matter of Seligmann, 219 N. Y. 656. This statute, while on its face eliminating the discrimination in favor of contingent remaindermen, was found to result in serious loss of revenue to the State. Taxes escaped collection when they became due, because it proved to be impossible to ascertain currently when the contingencies happened and hence when a tax became payable. To remedy this defect, it was provided by Chapter 76 of the Laws of 1899, that the tax must be paid upon the testator’s death; and that it should then be paid out of the corpus of the estate at the highest applicable rate, with a provision for paying to the remainderman the surplus with interest if it should prove that a lower rate was applicable, *Matter of [p. 489] Vanderbilt, 172 N. Y. 69. This provision, while fully safeguarding the State’s revenues, favored the remainderman at the expense of the life tenant. Matter of Brez*, 172 N. Y. 609. For under this provision the life tenant lost the income on the full amount deducted to ensure payment of the tax on the contingent remainder; and the remainderman received from the State with interest such part thereof as proved not to be required for the ultimate payment of the tax. Thereupon some relief to the life tenant was afforded by Chapter 800 of the Laws of 1911. But it was not until the Act of 1925 here challenged provided for appraisal of the remainder as stated, that the Legislature succeeded in devising a means of laying the tax which operated justly as between life tenant and remaindermen and safeguarded the State’s revenues.
First. The contention that the method of taxation prescribed violates the due process clause rests upon the assertion that in measuring the transfer tax in respect to a contingent remainder by the corpus of the trust fund undiminished by the value of the intervening life estate, something is taxed which does not exist. The argument is that taxation even of an inheritance must be measured by property taxable within the jurisdiction, Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473; that New York levies the tax on the transfer of title from the testator, not on its value at the time of the transfer of possession, Matter of Davis, 149 N. Y. 539; that the tax must, therefore, be measured by what he transferred when he transferred it; that the aggregate value of the parts transferred by the testator cannot be greater than the value of the whole; but that here the State lays a tax upon both the value of the life interest and the undiminished value of the corpus.
The argument presented is unsound, because it ignores the fact that the tax in respect to the contingent remainders is not payable until after the death of the life tenant. The temporary taxing order, entered upon the [p. 490] testator’s death, is made solely to ensure that the tax so deferred will be paid when ultimately assessed. The requirement may be satisfied by depositing with the State either approved securities or cash. In either event the income collected from the security prior to the time when the tax becomes payable is accounted for to the executor; and after the tax has been paid, the securities or cash remaining on deposit will be accounted for to him. By applying the applicable rate to the full value of that which comes into enjoyment and not exacting payment of the tax until then, a just result is sought. For the definitive assessment of the contingent remainder and the payment of the tax thereon are postponed to the same date. The due process clause places no restriction on a State as to the time at which an inheritance tax shall be levied or the property valued for purposes of such tax. Compare Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543.
Second. It is claimed that the tax violates the equal protection clause. One contention is that it unjustifiably discriminates between contingent and vested remainders in that the value of the life estate is first deducted in assessing the latter. It is true that an exact equivalency is not always achieved, because the tax is graduated according to the value of the remainder. But since the payment of the tax is postponed until the termination of the life estate the present value of the tax will tend to approximate what it would have been, if vested remainders had been given to the same persons and in the same shares that eventually go to the contingent remaindermen—assuming, of course, that the same rate of interest is used in making the calculation of both the present value of the tax and the present value of the future estate. It is true, also, that there is not an exact equivalency, since life tenants do not die at the precise termination of their life expectancies. But this uncertainty underlies the taxation of all future interests, vested [p. 491] or contingent, wherever the tax is laid separately in respect to life estates and remainders. The uncertainty is unavoidable unless the State concludes to postpone laying the tax upon the remainders until they come into enjoyment, a course which it is not obliged to pursue. Moreover, there are differences between vested and contingent remainders which justify classification in imposing inheritance taxes. Compare Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 141-143; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97; Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553; Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477; Keeney n. New York, 222 U. S. 525.
Third. Several other reasons are urged why the statute should be held obnoxious to the equality clause. It is said that the tax being graduated according to amounts, there will result from the use of mortality tables discrimination between members of the same class. It is urged that since the tax is not collected until the termination of the life estate a more perfect equality would be achieved by assessing the tax on the value of the remainder, after deducting the value of the life estate, and allowing interest to the State for the actual known period during which the tax was withheld. The fact that a better taxing system might be conceived does not render the law invalid. As was said in Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70, 11 To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity . . . The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Further, it is said that postponing payment of the tax will prove burdensome, because it involves giving security to ensure the deferred payment; and that where the security is given by the deposit of cash, the income earned thereon will probably be less than would have been earned if the money had been otherwise employed. To all such objections it may be answered that minor inequalities and
Syllabus. 278 U.S.
hardships are incidents of every system of taxation and do not render the legislation obnoxious to the Federal Constitution.1 General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U. S. 367.
Whether the State’s power to tax the privilege of taking by will or descent property within its jurisdiction is in any way limited by the Fourteenth Amendment has not been argued. As we are of opinion that none of the objections urged can be sustained, we have no occasion to consider that question. Compare Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 140.
Affirmed.
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