Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928)
Case details
Citation
278 U.S. 96
Full caption
HUNT, GOVERNOR OF ARIZONA, et al . v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 19, 1928
HUNT, GOVERNOR OF ARIZONA, et al . v. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA.
No. 44. Argued October 23, 1928.—Decided November 19, 1928.
1. When the numbers of wild deer on a national forest and game preserve have increased to such excess that by over-browsing upon and killing young trees, bushes and forage plants they cause great injury to the land, it is within the power of the United States to cause their numbers to be reduced by killing and their carcasses to be shipped outside the limits of such reserves. P. 100.
2. This power springs from the federal ownership of the lands affected, and is independent of the game laws of the State in which they are situate. Id.
3. A direction for such killing and shipment, given by the Secretary of Agriculture, was within the authority conferred upon him by Act of Congress. Id.
4. Carcasses and parts of the deer so killed, should be marked before being taken from the reserves, to show that the deer were killed there under authority of the Secretary of Agriculture. P. 101.
19 F. (2d) 634, modified and affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of permanent injunction granted by the District Court after a final hearing by three judges in a suit brought by the United States. The decree en-
joined the Governor, the Game Warden, a county attorney and a sheriff, of the State of Arizona, from arresting or prosecuting officers and agents of the United States under the state game laws, for or on account of the killing, possession and transportation of deer under an order made by the Secretary of Agriculture to protect a National Forest and Game Preserve from the destructive effects of over-browsing.
Mr. Earl Anderson, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, with whom Mr. John W. Murphy, Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellants.
The bill is defective under the rule announced in New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328. See Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Marge v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325; Muskrat n . United States, 219 U. S. 346; Texas n . Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 258 U. S. 158; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447.
A court of equity will not grant an injunction to restrain state officers from prosecuting under a state statute, because there is an adequate remedy at law by presenting a defense in such prosecutions.
This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action because it is, in fact, a suit against the State. Fitts v. McGee, 172 U. S. 516; Arbuckle v. Blackbum, 113 Fed. 616; Bisbee v. Insurance Agency, 14 Ariz. 313; Davis v. American Society, 75 N. Y. 363.
The title to all wild deer on the Grand Canyon National Game Preserve is vested in the State of Arizona. Ex parte Crosby, 38 Nev. 389; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504; New York v. Becker, 241 U. S. 562; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519; La Coste v. Department, 263 U. S. 535; Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476; Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; United States v. McCullough, 221 Fed. 288; United States v. Samples, 259 Fed. 479; United States v. Shauver, 214
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Argument for the United States. 278 U. S.
Fed. 154; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; 31 Stat, c. 553, p. 187; Rupart v. United States, 181 Fed. 87.
If the Government may kill deer on the game preserve, contrary to state game laws, the State would have a right to prosecute persons for possessing the deer and removing them from Arizona contrary to those laws. A State may prosecute a person for the possession of the carcasses of wild game contrary to the provisions of its laws, although such game was lawfully taken under the laws of another State. Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476; New York v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31; State v. Shattuck, 96 Minn. 45.
Even though the United States owns the lands upon which the deer range, it may not take or kill the deer in violation of the Arizona game laws. State v. Gallop, 126 N. C. 979; Percy v. Astle, 145 Fed. 53; Smith v. Odell, 185 N. Y. S. 647.
The Federal Government has no better rights in the game preserve than an ordinary citizen has on his private lands. Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523; United States v. Tulley, 140 Fed. 899; United States v. Pennsylvania, 48 Fed. 669; State x. Tulley, 31 Mont. 365; Gill v. State, 141 Tenn. 379.
We concede that under certain conditions or circumstances a property owner may kill game at a time different from that prescribed by the state game laws. But he must show that, at the time of killing, the particular animals killed were injuring or about to injure his property.
Congress has set aside this preserve as a feeding ground and park for the particular deer which the Government now seeks to slaughter. Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 607.
Solicitor General Mitchell, with whom Messrs. R. W. Williams, Solicitor, Department of Agriculture, and Robert P. Reeder were on the brief, for the United States.
That Congress may legislate for the protection of the public domain, even though that legislation may involve an exercise of what is known as the police power, is established. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518; Utah Light & Power Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353; United States v. Alford, 274 U. S. 264.
The contention of the appellants that, because of the game laws of the State of Arizona restricting the killing of deer, the United States must remain inactive and allow the forests on its public domain to be seriously damaged, if not destroyed, is without any support in the decisions of this Court.
State courts have held that a private proprietor may kill wild game when necessary to protect his property, and that state game laws, if construed to prevent it, would be invalid.’ Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N. H. 398; State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185; State v. Burk, 114 Wash. 370. Cf. Barrett v. State, 220 N. Y. 423.
Mr . Justice Sutherl and delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Kaibab National Forest and the Grand Canyon National Game Preserve, covering practically the same area, are situated north of the Colorado River in Arizona. They were created by proclamations of the President under authority of Congress. During the last few years deer on these reserves have increased in such large numbers that the forage is insufficient for their subsistence. The result has been that these deer have greatly injured the lands in the reserves by over-browsing upon and killing valuable young trees, shrubs, bushes and forage plants. Thousands of deer have died because of insufficient forage. Attempts were made under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture to remove some of the deer from p. 100the reserves to other lands, but these entirely failed, as did other means. The district forester, acting under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, proceeded to kill large numbers of the deer and ship the carcasses outside the limits of the reserves. That this was necessary to protect the lands of the United States within the reserves from serious injury is made clear by the evidence. The direction given by the Secretary of Agriculture was within the authority conferred upon him by act of Congress. And the power of the United States to thus protect its lands and property does not admit of doubt, Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 525-526; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 404; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353, 359; United States v. Alford, 274 U. S. 264, the game laws or any other statute of the state to the contrary notwithstanding.
Appellants interfered with these acts of the United States officials and threatened to arrest and prosecute any person or persons attempting to kill or possess or transport such deer, under the claim that such officials were proceeding in violation of the game laws of the State of Arizona, the observance of which would have so restricted the number of deer to be killed as to render futile the attempt to protect the reserves. Three persons who had killed deer under authority of United States officials were actually arrested. Thereupon suit was brought to enjoin appellants from continuing or threatening such interference, arrest or prosecution. The court below, after a trial, found for the United States and entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, with the limitation, however, that the decree should not be construed to permit the licensing of hunters to kill deer within said reserves in violation of the state game laws. 19 F. (2d) 634.
While the Solicitor General does not concede the authority of the court to make this limitation, he is content p. 10196 Statement of the Case.
to let the decree stand. We, therefore, pass the matter without consideration and accept the opinion and decree below, with the modification that all carcasses of deer and parts thereof shipped outside the boundaries of the reserves shall be plainly marked by tags or otherwise, in such manner as the Secretary of Agricuture may by regulations prescribe, to show that the deer were killed under his authority within the limits of the reserves.
Thus modified the decree is affirmed.
EX PARTE THE PUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
No. 16 Original. Argued October 29, 1928.—Decided November 19, 1928.
Upon Retur n to a rule issued by this Court to three judges who had convened as a district court under Jud. Code, § 266, in an injunction suit, but had dissolved of their own motion in the belief that the suit was not within that section. The rule called upon them to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue requiring them to reconvene and proceed with the suit.
1
Section 266 of the Judicial Code, which provides that no injunction restraining the enforcement of any statute of a State by restraining the action “ of any officer of such State ” in the enforcement of such statute shall be granted upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute, except upon a hearing and determination by a court composed of three judges, does not apply where the action sought to be enjoined is that of a municipal officer in performance of local, as distinguished from state, functions. P. 103.
2
A case has not the force of a precedent on a question which, though existent in the record, was not raised or considered by the court. P. 105. Rule discharged.
Opinion of the Court. 278 U. S.
Mr. Martin Saxe, with whom Messrs. Henry L. Moses, Robert C. Beatty, Herman G. Kopald, and Edward F. Colladay were on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. Wm. H. King, with whom Messrs. George P. Nicholson and Eugene Fay were on the brief, for Mr. Andrew B. Keating, as Receiver of Taxes of the City of New York, and Mr. William Reid, Jr., as City Collector.
Mr. Henry S. Manley, with whom Mr. Albert Ottinger, Attorney General, was on the brief, for the State of New York.
Honorable Learned Hand and Honorable Augustus N. Hand, Circuit Judges, and Honorable William Bondy, District Judge, submitted on printed return for themselves.
Mr . Just ice Suther land delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, a national banking association organized under the National Bank Act, with its principal office in the City of New York, brought suit in the federal district court for the southern district of New York against Andrew B. Keating, receiver, and William Reid, Jr., collector of taxes of the City of New York, to enjoin them from collecting taxes assessed against shares in the association in pursuance of a state law but by, and for the sole use of, the city. The prayer for relief rested upon the contention that the provisions of the state law, which fixed the rate of tax, discriminated in favor of other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the state, in contravention of § 5219 Rev. Stats., and of provisions of the Constitution of the United States. A statutory court of three judges was constituted under § 266 of the Judicial Code (U. S. Code, Title 28, § 380), and a master appointed, by whom evidence was taken and p. 103reported. When the case came on for final hearing, the court, of its own motion, dissolved after directing that the cause proceed before a single district judge upon the ground that the suit was not one coming within the terms of § 266. Petitioner applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus requiring the judges composing the statutory court to reconvene and proceed to a determination of the case. Upon filing the petition, a rule to show cause was issued, upon a return to which the application has been heard.
The statutory court held that § 266 did not apply because neither of the defendants was an officer of the state and the suit involved only the action of city officials in the collection of taxes for the use of the city. In support of this ruling, Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565, was relied upon. In that case suit was brought to enjoin proceedings under a resolution of the City of Phoenix, Arizona, directing the paving of a street upon which petitioner was an abutting owner. The improvement was to be made pursuant to general statutes of the state, which were assailed as contravening the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district judge denied a request to call two judges to sit with him, upon the ground that the case did not come within § 266. This Court sustained the action of the district judge and held that the section did not apply, although the constitutionality of a statute was challenged, because the defendants were local' officers and the suit concerned matters of interest only to the particular municipality involved. We need add little to what we there said.
Section 266 provides that no injunction “ restraining the enforcement ... of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement ... of such statute . . . shall be issued or granted . . . upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute ” except upon a hearing and p. 104determination of a court composed of three judges. The suit here involved the constitutionality of a state statute, but it was not brought to restrain “the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement ” thereof. The persons sued are municipal officers, having no state functions to perform, but charged only with the duty of collecting and receiving taxes assessed by other city officials in no respect for the use of the state but for and in behalf of the city alone. In effect, the contention for petitioner practically comes to this—that the general purpose of § 266 being to safeguard state legislation assailed as unconstitutional from the improvident action of federal courts, the words “ by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement . . of such statute” are without significance. In other words, we are asked to ignore the quoted words and read the section as though they were not there.
But we are not at liberty thus to deny effect to a part of a statute. No rule of statutory construction has been more definitely stated or more often repeated than the cardinal rule that “ significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon’s Abridgment, sect. 2, it was said that ‘ a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115. We are unable to perceive any ground for departing from the rule in the case before us. It follows that, giving effect to the phrase in question, § 266 requires the concurrence of two things in order to give the three-judge court jurisdiction: (1) the suit must seek to have a state statute declared unconstitutional, or that in effect, and (2) it must seek to restrain the action of an officer of the state in the enforcement of such statute. See Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 26 F. (2d) 799, 800; Connor v. Board of Comm’rs of Logan County, p. 105101 Syllabus.
Ohio, 12 F. (2d) 789, 790; Connecting Gas Co. v. Imes, 11 F. (2d) 191, 194-195. The second requisite here is lacking.
Our attention is directed to several cases disposed of under § 266, where this Court passed on the merits although the suits were against local officers. We do not stop to inquire whether, at least in some of these cases, the so-called local officers in fact represented the state or exercised state functions in the matters involved and properly might be held to come within the provision of § 266 now under review. Compare, for example, People ex rel. Plancon v. Prendergast, 219 N. Y. 252, 258; State ex rel. Lopas v. Shagren, 91 Wash. 48, 52; Griffin v. Rhoton, 85 Ark. 89, 93-94; Fellows v. Mayor, 8 Hun. 484, 485-488; Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb Ac Tyner, 28 Okla. 275, 286. It is enough to say, as was said in the Collins case, that the propriety of the hearing before three judges was not considered in the cases to which we are referred; and they cannot be regarded as having decided the question. Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511; United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 14.
Rule discharged.
1
The business of a foreign corporation is property, and the corporation a “person,” within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 111.
2
A foreign corporation may not be subjected to statutes that are in conflict with the Federal Constitution by a State in which it has been permitted to do business. Id.