Nicholls v. Hodges, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 562 (1828)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Nicholls v. Hodges, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 562 (1828)
Full caption
William S. Nicholls and others, Appellants, v. Thomas Hodges, Executors of Thomas L. Hodgson, deceased.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1828
* William S. Nicholls and others, Appellants, v. Thomas Hodges, Executors of Thomas L. Hodgson, deceased.
Decedents' estates.—Executory commissions.—Clai/ms agai/nst the estate.
Issue.—Jurisdiction.
The orphans’ court, by the testamenary laws of Maryland, has a general power to administer justice in all matters relative to the affairs of deceased persons, according to law. The commission to be allowed to an executor or administrator, is submitted to the discretion of the court, and is not to be under five per cent., nor exceeding ten per cent., on the amount of the inventory, p. 565.
If the executor has a claim on the estate of the deceased, it stands on an equal footing with other claims of the same nature, p. 565.
On a plenary proceeding, if either party require it, the court will direct an issue or issues to be made up and sent to a court of law to be tried, and any person conceiving himself aggrieved by any judgment, decree, decision or order, may appeal to the court of chancery, or to a court of law, and in Maryland, the decision of the court, to which the appeal is made, is final, p. 565. The supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction of appeals from the orphans’ court, through the circuit court for the county of Washington, by virtue of the act of congress, of February 13th, 1801, and by the act of congress subsequently passed, the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, must exceed the value of $1000, in order to entitle the party to an appeal, p. 565. The commission to be allowed to an executor or administrator is submitted by law to the discretion of the court, upon a consideration of all the circumstances; it was obviously the intention of the legislature, that the decision of the orphans’ court should be final and conclusive, p. 565. The court being satisfied, by an examination of the evidence contained in the record of the proceedings of the orphans’ court of the county of Washington, relative to a claim made upon the estate of the testator, by the executor, that such evidence was too loose and indefinite to sanction the claim, disallowed the same, and reversed the decree of the orphans’ court which allowed the claim.1 p. 566.
Nicholls v. Hodges, 2 Cr. C. C. 582, reversed, in part.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the county of Washington.
The defendant obtained letters testamentary on the estate of Thomas C. Hodges, deceased, and passed his accounts in the orphans’ court of Washington county, in which he was allowed ten per cent, commission on the inventory of the deceased’s estate, amounting to $2358.70, and $1200 for services rendered by him to the deceased.
The testamentary law of Maryland, under which this commission was allowed, is in these words :—“ His commission, which shall be at the discretion of the court, not under five per cent, nor exceeding ten per cent, on the amount of the inventory.” Act of Maryland, ch. 101, sub. ch. 10, § 2.
*The appellants, creditors of the deceased’s estate, filed their peti- r*Kf»o tion in the orphans’ court, objecting to the allowance of these claims ; and upon the answer of the appellee, and the testimony taken in the cause, the judge of the orphans’ court decided in favor of the appellee, and allowed these claims. From this decision, an appeal was prayed to the circuit court for Washington county, where the' judgment of the orphans’ court was affirmed. From this decision, this appeal was made.
1
Where a family relationship exists, the law ' M To establish such claim, an express condoes not imply a promise to pay for services ren-tract must be shown. Zerbe v. Miller, 16 Penn, dered in such relation. Neel v. Neel, 59 Penn. St. . .Ht. 488 ; Hertzog tuHertzog, 29 Id. 465; Mos-347 ; Neel v. Gilmore, 79 Id. 421 ; Van Kuren teller’s Appeal, 30 Id. 473 ; Kelly’s Estate, 1 v. Saxton, 3 How. 547 ;.Cooper v. Turner, 2 Id. Tucker 28.
The depositions of William W. Corcoran, Philip T. Berry, John S. Hare, James A. Magruder and Isaac S. Nicholls were taken, and were sent up with this record. These depositions were intended to prove, that the board and expenses of Thomas C. Hodges were paid by the deceased, by whom he was employed in his store as an assistant. That when the executor was spoken to about the account he had raised against the estate of the testator, he stated, he was sorry he had brought forward the account, and that he should not have done so, but by the advice of another. That he had said, that his uncle, the testator, did not agree to give him wages ; a share of the property was promised, but no agreement was made. The depositions also stated, that some six months before the death of the testator, the defendant applied for wages, which were refused, and he was told to take money from the drawer, and goods from the store, and if not satisfied, he might return to his father. That it was understood, the appellee was in the store of the testator as a clerk. The testator observed, at the time of making hi., will, that he had given the defendant, his nephew, a legacy, as a consideration for his services ; he had always intended to give him something ; he gave him the legacy for his services, because he had not been paid for them. It was also testified, that the executor had a good deal of trouble in settling the estate.
The counsel for the appellants endeavored to maintain, 1. That the claims of the executor had been improperly allowed by the court below.
2. That the evidence shows the commission allowed is unjust and unreasonable. 3. The appellee had no legal claim for services rendered to the deceased.
Key, for the appellant.—The evidence does not establish any claim to the compensation claimed by the appellee. On the contrary, he himself acknowledged he had no claim. But if any debt was due to him, the amount thereof could not be ascertained by the course adopted in this case. It must become the subject of proof, like all other demands on the estate. * -J *It is contended, that no appeal is allowed in this case, because J the provisions of the law of Maryland leave to “ the discretion ” of the
court, the determination of the amount of commissions. What is the meaning of the assertion, that no appeal can be maintained in such a case ? It is only when the exercise of discretion by the court is matter of favor or indulgence, that the rule applies ; but when there are legal rights, the discretion of the court applies to thosie rights, and its exercise is a matter of law, and like all others, when exercised, is examinable.
Coxe, for the appellee.—This is an application to have an examination of an account which has been passed upon by the orphans’ court. It is denied, that a matter to be determined by the discretion of the court, can be the subject of appeal. The party must point out an error in law, and if the allowance by the court is not beyond the per-centage authorized by the statute, there cannot be such error. These accounts having been passed by the orphans’ court, before whom were all the facts, the only remedy which remains is upon the bond given by the executor ; and in such an action, all the matters are open for examination.
Duvall, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.—The appellee in this case obtained letters testamentary on the estate of Thomas C. Hodges, deceased, and passed accounts in the orphans’ court for Washington county, in which he was allowed ten per cent, commission on the inventory of the deceased’s estate, amounting to $2358.70, and $1200 for services rendered to the deceased in his lifetime. The appellants, creditors of the deceased, finding that the estate would probably be insufficient to pay the full amount of their claims, filed their petition in the orphans’ court, objecting to the allowance of the claims of the executor, alleging that the property of the deceased consisted only of a store of goods in Georgetown, and a few debts due to him ; and that the settlement of the estate was made without much labor or expense. Upon the answer of the executor, and the testimony taken in the cause, the judge of the orphans’ court decided in favor of the executor, and decreed, that both claims be allowed. From this decree, an appeal was prayed and granted to the circuit court for Washington county, in which the judgment of the orphans’ court was affirmed. From this decision, the cause is brought up, by appeal, to this court, for final hearing and decree.
Several questions have been raised in arguing this cause. On the part of the appellants, it is contended, 1st, that the *allowance of ten per cent, on the inventory, circumstanced as this case appears to be, is >- unjust and unreasonable : 2d, that there is no foundation for the claim of $1200, made by the executor, for services rendered the testator in his lifetime.
The counsel for the appellee contends, 1st, that the whole allowance made by the orphans’ court was no more than a moderate compensation for the attention and prompt settlement of the accounts of the deceased, by the executor, and for his services for several years as a clerk in the store of the deceased ; and 2d, that the decision of the orphans’ court was final and conclusive, and from which there ought to have been no appeal.
The power and authority of the orphans’ court is derived from the testamentary laws of Maryland. The last general act upon the subject, is that passed in the year 1798, ch. 101. The orphans’ court has a general power to administer justice in all matters relative to the affairs of deceased persons, according to law. The commission to be allowed to an executor or administrator, is submitted to the discretion of the court, “not under five per cent, nor exceeding ten per cent, on the amount of the inventory.” If the executor has a claim against the deceased, it shall stand on an equal footing with other claims of the same nature. On a plenary proceeding, if either party shall require, the court will direct an issue or issues to be made up and sent to a court of law to be tried, and any person conceiving himself aggrieved by any judgment, decree, decision or order, may appeal to the court of chancery, or to a court of law. And in Maryland, the decision of the court to which the appeal is made, is final and conclusive. But in the case under consideration, this court has jurisdiction, by virtue of the act of congress of February 1801, by which the circuit court for the district of Columbia was created, which provides that “ any final judgment, order or decree in the said circuit court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of $100, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States, by writ of error or appeal.” By an act of congress, subsequently passed, the matter in dispute, p. 430exclusive of costs, must exceed the value of $1000, in order to entitle the party to an appeal.
With respect to the commission to be allowed to the executor or administrator, it is submitted by law to the discretion of the court, not less than five, nor more than ten per cent. They may allow the lowest, or highest rate, or any intermediate proportion between the minimum and maximum, to which, in their discretion, they may adjudge the party to be entitled, * , *upon a consideration of all circumstances, according to the services
J rendered, and the trouble and expense in completing the administration. Upon a just construction of this act, it was obviously the intention of the legislature, that such the decision of the orphans’ court should be final and conclusive, and is the opinion of this court.
The claim of $1200 for services rendered in the lifetime of the testator, rests upon different ground. The law places it “ on an equal footing with other claims of the same nature.” The legality and equity of the claim, must be examined in the same manner as the claim of any other creditor. Of course, it is a claim, on the trial of which either party might have required a trial by jury, in the manner prescribed by law. But this was not asked, and the claim was submitted in gross to the decision of the orphans’ court, and was decided on, in like manner, by the circuit court ; and it is now brought in the same shape before this court.
To support a claim of this nature, it is incumbent on the party making it to prove some contract, promise or agreement, expressed or implied, in relation to it. The testimony contained in the record may be summed up in a few words. It is admitted by the appellee, that there was no agreement to pay him wages. It is in proof, that he lived with his uncle three or four years in the capacity of a clerk, and that for more than half the time, he was the only clerk in the store, his uncle having great confidence in him. That it was distinctly understood between them, that the testator had agreed to pay his board, to find him in clothing, and to pay his expenses generally ; that it was customary among merchants to take young men, of a certain age, for their board and clothes ; that the uncle had said, that at a future day, he intended to take him into partnership with him ; and it was proved, that the testator, at the time of making his will, observed, that he had. given his nephew a legacy as a consideration for his services, and that he had always intended to give him something. It is not denied, that the testator had fully complied with his engagement to pay his board, supply him with clothes, and pay his expenses. On this testimony, the claim rests. The evidence is too defective to require comment. It is the opinion of this court, that it is too loose and indeterminate, to sanction the claim, and it cannot be allowed.
The decree of the circuit court, affirming the decree of the orphans’ court, as to this claim, is reversed ; in all other respects, it is affirmed.
*Bank of Columbia v. George Sweeny.
Mandamus.
The court refused to issue a mandamus to the circuit court for the county of Washington, commanding the court to strike off a plea which the court had permitted the defendant to put in, and to compel the defendant to enter another plea, which the plaintiff’s counsel deemed the proper plea, under the provisions of an act of the legislature of Maryland, upon which the proceedings were founded, incorporating the Bank of Columbia.1
Motion for Mandamus.
Jones and Key moved the court for a mandamus, to be directed to the Circuit Court of the United States, foi the county of Washington in the District of Columbia ; commanding them to have a certain issue joined, which issue had been tendered in a proceeding in that court against George Sweeny, and in which the Bank of Columbia were plaintiffs.
George Sweeny being indebted to the Bank of Columbia, upon a promissory note, the president of the bank, in conformity with the provisions of the statute of Maryland, incorporating the bank, passed in 1793 (Acts of 1793, vol. 20), instituted proceedings in the circuit court, under which, by virtue of a capias ad satisfaciendum, he was arrested by the marshal; and he applied to the court to be allowed, under the authority of the 14th section of the act incorporating the bank, to “ dispute ” the debt claimed by the bank. The court, thereupon, ordered an issue to be joined, and the attorney of the bank being directed to draw a declaration, offered one tendering an issue upon the allegation that the debt mentioned in the execution was due. To this issue, the attorney for the defendant objected, and he claimed the right to put in issue the plea of the statute of limitations. The circuit court held, that the defendant was entitled to avail himself of the statute, and that the attorney of the bank should file a declaration, in the common form, on the promissory note mentioned in the execution, to which the defendant might plead the statute of limitations, as running from the time of payment mentioned in the note ; and that the bank should reply, so as to make up the issue under the statute of limitations. The court refused to make up the issue offered by the bank, or to make up the issue in any other way than as stated.
The plaintiffs claimed, and by this motion sought to maintain their claim, to have an issue joined, as offered by the bank, upon the debts being due, as provided in the statute. The following are the provisions erf the 14th section of the charter, upon which the proceedings were had, and by which *the plaintiffs insisted, they had a right to the proceedings they had r# adopted : “ And whereas, it is absolutely necessary, that debts due to •- the said bank should be punctually paid, to enable the directors to calculate with certainty and precision on meeting the demands that may be made upon them : Be it enacted, that whenever any person or persons are indebted to the said bank for moneys borrowed by them, or for bonds, bills or notes, given or indorsed by them, with an express consent in writing that they may be made negotiable at the said bank, and shall refuse or neglect to make
1
A mandamus cannot be made a substitute for a writ of error. Commonwealth v. Common Pleas of Philadelphia, 3 Binn. 273.
Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny.
payment at the time the same becomes due, the president shall cause a demand in writing on the person of the said delinquent or delinquents, having consented as aforesaid, or if not to be found, have the same left at his place of abode ; and if the money so due shall not be paid within ten days after such demand made, or notice left at his last place of abode as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful for the president, at his election, to write to the clerk of the general court, or of the county in which the said delinquent or delinquents may reside, or did, at the time he or they contracted the debt, reside, and send to the said clerk the bond, bill or note due, with proof of the demand made as aforesaid, and order the said clerk to issue a capias ad satisfaciendum, fieri facias, or attachment by way of execution, on which the debt and costs may be levied, by selling the property of the defendant for the sum or sums of money mentioned in the said bond, bill or note ; and the clerk of the general court, and the clerks of the several county courts, are hereby respectively required to issue such execution or executions, which shall be made returnable to the court whose clerk shall issue the same, which shall first sit after the issuing thereof, and shall be as valid, and as effectual in law, to all intents and purposes, as if the same had issued on judgment regularly obtained in the ordinary course of proceeding in the said court ; and such execution or executions shall not be liable to be stayed or delayed by any supersedeas, writ of error, appeal, or injunction from the chancellor: provided always, that before any execution shall issue as aforesaid, the president of the bank shall make an oath (or affirmation, if he shall be of such religious society as allowed by this state to make affirmation), ascertaining whether the whole or what part of the debt due to the bank on the said bond, bill or note, is due ; which oath or affirmation shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court from which the execution shall issue; and if the defendant shall dispute the whole or any part of the said debt, on the return of the execution, the court before whom it is returned shall and may order an issue to be joined, and trial to be had in the same court at which the return is made, and shall make such other proceedings that justice may be done in the speediest manner.”
* Q-. *The case was argued by Jones and Key, for the plaintiffs, at great
J length, upon the meaning and objects of the section, and that it authorized the demand make by the bank to exclude the plea of the statute of limitations ; and contra, by Swann and the Attorney- General, for the defendant. The court, in their decision, did not take notice of the arguments of counsel, as they considered the case not such as entitled it to the summary proceeding demanded.
Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court:—This case arose under the provision of the act of the legislature of Maryland incorporating the bank of Columbia, which authorizes summary process for the collection of debts due to the bank. That act allows an execution against the person of the debtor, to issue in the first instance, upon the application of the prefe’ ident of the bank ; but it also authorizes the court, if, upon the return of the execution, the defendant “ dispute the debt,” to order aq issue to be made up, &c., to try the action. In the present case, the circuit court did not refuse to direct such an issue to be made up ; which had they refused
Waring v. Eden.
to do, a mandamus would have been the proper process to compel that to he done, which the act requires. But the circuit court did direct an issue, and allowed a plea of the statute of limitations. The application now is, that the circuit court be ordered to withdraw that issue, and to direct a different issue to be made up, according to what the counsel for the bank supposes to be the proper construction of the act.
We think, this is not a proper case for a mandamus. It does not differ in principle from any other case in which the party should plead a defective plea, and the plaintiff should demur to it; in which case, there is no doubt, that the revising power of this court could be exercised only by a writ of error. If this motion could now prevail, it would be a plain evasion of the provision of the act of congress, that final judgments only should be brought before this court for re-examination. This case might still be brought before this court by a writ of error, notwithstanding any opinion expressed upon the mandamus, and the same question again be discussed upon the final judgment. The effect, therefore, of this mode of interposition, would be to retard decisions upon questions which were not final in the court below, so that the same cause might come before this court many times, before there would be a final judgment. The court is, therefore, of opinion, that this is not a case for a mandamus, and the motion is denied.
Motion denied.
1
Pet.—28 433