United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926)
Full caption
UNITED STATES v. RIVER ROUGE IMPROVEMENT COMPANY et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 4, 1926
UNITED STATES v. RIVER ROUGE IMPROVEMENT COMPANY et al.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
No. 3. Argued March 10, 11, 1924.—Decided January 4, 1926.
1. An adjudication of a Circuit Court of Appeals final in its nature as to the general subject of the litigation may be reviewed by this Court, without awaiting the determination of a separate matter affecting only the parties to such particular controversy. P. 413. 2. Under the provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act of July 18, 1918, directing that in proceedings to condemn lands in connection with any improvement of rivers, where a part only of any parcel is taken, the jury “ shall take into consideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation or damages any special and direct benefit to the remainder arising from the improvement,” an increase in value of such remainder, caused by its frontage on a river as widened and deepened by the improvement and the right of immediate access to and use of the improved stream, is such a “ special and direct benefit,” although the remaining portions of other riparian parcels would be similarly benefited. P. 414.
3. In the absence of a controlling local law, the right of the owner of riparian property on a navigable river to have access from the front of his land to the navigable part of the stream, and, when not forbidden by public law, to construct landings, wharves or piers for this purpose, is a property right incident to his ownership of the bank, which, though subject to the* absolute power of Congress over the improvement of navigable rivers, may not be arbitrarily destroyed or impaired by legislation having no real or
substantial relation to the control of navigation or appropriateness to that end. P. 418. 4. In view of the substantial character of this right, an instruction in a condemnation case giving the jury to understand that, in considering benefits to riparian land from a river improvement, the owner’s right amounted to no more than a mere uncertain and contingent privilege of such access, etc., as the Government might see fit to allow him, was error. P. 417. 5. An error which relates, not merely to formal or technical matters, but to the substantial rights of the parties—especially when embodied in the charge to a jury—is ground for reversal unless it appears from the whole record that it was harmless and did not prejudice the rights of the complaining party. P. 421. 6. The Act of February 26, 1910, amending § 269 Jud. Code, did not alter this rule. Id. 285 Fed. Ill, reversed.
Error to judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed judgments against the United States recovered in the District Court by owners of riparian land in a consolidated condemnation proceeding brought in aid of a river improvement.
Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Alfred Lucking, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Howell Van Auken, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was on the brief, for the United States.
Messrs. Selden Dickinson and Charles A. Wagner, with whom Messrs. Henry M. Campbell and Elliott G. Stevenson were on the brief, for defendants in error.
Mr. Paul B. Moody filed a supplemental brief for defendants in error, Forman Company and Ramsby.
Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to an appropriation for the improvement of the Rouge River, Michigan, made in the Rivers and [p. 413] Harbors Act of August 8, 1917/ the United States filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan five petitions for the condemnation of numerous parcels of riparian land needed for such improvement, and, also, of a gas main passing underneath the river.2
The petitions were consolidated, and a jury trial had resulting in seventy-three awards of compensation to the property owners. Judgments were entered confirming all these awards. Writs of error were sued out by the United States to review the judgments as to fifteen of the awards to riparian land owners and the award to the owner of the gas main. These were heard by the Circuit Court of Appeals as one case, and all the judgments were affirmed except that awarding compensation to the owner of the gas main, as to which a new trial was granted, 285 Fed. 111. This writ of error is brought to review the judgments as to the awards thus affirmed, involving fifteen parcels of land.
1. We are of opinion that, although a new trial was granted as to the award to the owner of the gas main, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals as to the awards to the riparian land owners, has such finality and completeness that it may be reviewed under this writ of error. The controversy as to the gas main is entirely distinct
140 Stat. 250, 258, c. 49, § 1.
2 The appropriation was made on condition that the “ local interests ” should donate the necessary land and settle all claims for damages. Act of 1917, supra; Ho. Doc. No. 2063, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 5, 15. The “ local interests ” which had undertaken to secure the necessary lands, were unable to obtain them by purchase; and, at the request of the Secretary of War, condemnation proceedings were instituted in the name of the United States. Act of May 16, 1906, c. 2465, 34 Stat. 196, as amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3628, 34 Stat. 632. In order that the United States might be given immediate possession and proceed with the work, the Ford Motor Co., the principal “local interest,” made a deposit to cover any awards of compensation and damages that might be made. Act of July 18, 1918, c. 155, 40 Stat, 904, 911, [p. 414] from those as to the riparian lands; and its result can have no bearing whatever upon the awards to the land owners. While the general rule requires that a judgment of a federal court shall be final and complete before it may be reviewed on a writ of error or appeal, it is well settled that an adjudication final in its nature as to a matter distinct from the general subject of the litigation and affecting only the parties to the particular controversy, may be reviewed without awaiting the determination of the general litigation. Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 699; Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 371; Arnold n. Guimarin, 263 U. S 427, 434. And so, conversely, an adjudication final in its nature as to the general subject of the litigation may be reviewed without awaiting the determination of a separate matter affecting only the parties to such particular controversy.
2. The principal matter here involved relates to the benefits to the land owners which were to be considered in reduction of their compensation and damages. The Rivers and Harbors Act of July 18, 1918, 3 contains a provision—whose validity is not questioned—that in all condemnation proceedings by the United States to acquire lands for the public use in connection with any improvement of rivers, where a part only of any parcel of land is taken, the jury “ shall take into consideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation or damages any special and direct benefit to the remainder arising from the improvement.” In each of the fifteen instances here involved the United States condemned only a portion of the parcel of land belonging to the riparian owner. It insists that there was error in the instructions to the jury in reference to the extent and measure of the benefits to the remainder.
The Rouge River, which empties into the Detroit River, had long been used for purposes of navigation, and various
3 40 Stat, 901, 911, c. 155, § 6, [p. 415] industrial plants were located along its banks. Although it had been somewhat improved by the United States prior to 1917, the channel was narrow, winding, comparatively shallow, and incapable of accommodating large freighters. Under the terms of the Act of 1917 the new improvement was to be made in accordance with a plan recommended by the engineers of the War Department.4 This contemplated straightening the channel of the river and widening and deepening it for about four miles above its mouth, so that it would accommodate the largest type of freighters on the Great Lakes and become, as was said, “practically a long slip serving for numerous docks and industries.” The bottom width of the new channel was to be 200 feet, the banks, sloping to a top width of 290 feet between the harbor lines. After its completion riparian owners desiring to construct docks were to be “required to locate the dock line or retaining wall ” upon the harbor line, and excavate the bank “ in front of the retaining wall or dock front ” to the depth necessary to permit vessels to lie alongside.
The portions of the lands which were condemned were those lying within the limits of the widened channel or harbor lines. The United States contended that the remaining portions of these parcels would receive special and direct benefits from the improvement by reason of fronting on the widened river and having direct access thereto for the building of docks and other purposes of navigation for which they had not been previously available.
We are of opinion that an increase in the value of the remaining portion of any parcel of land caused by its frontage on the widened river, carrying a right of immediate access to and use of the improved stream, would constitute a special and direct benefit within the meaning of the statute, as distinguished from a benefit common to [p. 416] all the lands in the vicinity, although the remaining portions of other riparian parcels would be similarly benefited. This is in accordance with the rule recognized by this court and established by the weight of authority in the state courts in reference to special benefits to lands abutting upon a new or widened street. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 575; Allen v. Charlestown, 109 Mass. 243, 246; Hilbourne v. Suffolk, 120 Mass. 393, 394; Cross v. Plymouth, 125 Mass. 557, 558; Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 526; Lewis v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 741, 758; Lowe v. Omaha, 33 Neb. 587, 593; St. Louis Railway v. Powler, 142 Mo. 670, 683; 2 Lewis’ Eminent Domain, 3d ed., § 702, p. 1216. And see Roberts v. Commissioners, 21 Kans. 247, 252; Trosper v. Commissioners, 27 Kans. 391, 393. In Allen v. Charlestown, supra, 246, the rule is thus stated: “The benefit is not the less direct and special to the land of the petitioner, because other estates upon the same street are benefited in a similar manner. The kind of benefit, which is not allowed to be estimated for the purpose of such deduction, is that which comes from sharing in the common advantage and convenience of increased public facilities, and the general advance in value of real estate in the vicinity by reason thereof. . . . The advantages of more convenient access to the particular lot of land in question, and of having a front upon a more desirable avenue, are direct benefits to that lot, giving it increased value in itself. It may be the same, in greater or less degree, with each and every lot of land upon the same street. But such advantages are direct and special to each lot. They are in no proper sense common because there are several estates, or many even, that are similarly benefited.”
But while the trial judge recognized the right of the United States to the deduction of such special benefits, if any, it insists that in charging the jury in reference to them he erroneously minimized their nature and extent.
In this portion of the charge the court stated, inter alia, that the Government had “ the absolute power of control ” over navigable streams, and the right to deprive any riparian owner of all access to the navigable portion of the stream and order the removal of any docks or other structures placed in the stream; that the deepening and widening of the channel would not confer on any riparian owner any property right to use the river for loading or unloading of vessels, this being “ subject to the absolute power of control by the Government”; that the jury could not make any deduction of benefits on the theory that the improvement would increase any property right in connection with the access to or use of the river or bring the owner any new or different property right of access and use for purposes of navigation; that no benefit could be deducted unless the remainder of the land was rendered suitable for new or greater uses in navigation because of its new location “ and because of a greater opportunity directly and specially to enjoy such use of the improved river as the Government may permit such owner to have; ” and that the jury should keep “always' in mind the uncertainty of securing from the Government the privilege to enjoy these advantages, and the limited character of whatever advantages may be so secured.”
The United States not only excepted to these portions of the charge, but also requested that the jury be instructed, as bearing upon the existence and amount of the special benefits, that a riparian owner bordering on the new stream would have in respect thereto the usual rights of navigation pertinent to riparian property, that is, the right of access to the navigable part of the river in front of his property and the right to make a landing, dock or pier upon his harbor line, subject only to such general rules and regulations as the Government, in its power over navigation, might properly impose for the protection of the public right of navigation; that this
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power of the Government “ over navigation for the protection of public rights can not be arbitrarily and capriciously exercised so as to destroy these riparian rights, but must be exercised with reasonable relations to the requirements of navigation”;! and that, by the terms of the plan of improvement, riparian owners whose lands would border the new stream, were given the right or privilege of constructing docks or retaining walls for their use upon the harbor line, and to excavate the bank in front thereof to the depth necessary to permit vessels to lie alongside. These requests were denied; and the United States excepted.
We are of opinion that the giving of these instructions and the refusal of these requests involved prejudicial error. It is well settled that in the absence of a controlling local law otherwise limiting the rights of a riparian owner upon a navigable river, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 40, he has, in addition to the rights common to the public, a property right, incident to his ownership of the bank, of access from the front of his land to the navigable part of the stream, and when not forbidden by public law may construct landings, wharves or piers for this purpose. Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 23, 31; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 1 Wall. 272, 289; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 699; St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 226, 246; Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 445; Weems Steamboat Co. v. People’s Co., 214 U. S. 345, 355; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53, 70. There is no limitation upon this right of a riparian owner in the laws of Michigan. On the contrary it was recognized in Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18, 25, that the rights of riparian owners must be determined by the common law so far as applicable to the local situation; and in Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 196, 210, it was said that: “ If wharves and similar conveniences were not allowed upon our large [p. 419] streams, the shipping business would become practically worthless. It can never be unlawful for a land owner to make such wharves and landings as will accommodate all vessels ordinarily using the stream, unless there are some exceptional circumstances, as narrows, bends, or the like, which may in particular cases render his structure improper.”
This right of a riparian owner, it is true, is subordinate to the public right of navigation, and subject to the general rules and regulations imposed for the protection of such public right. And it is of no* avail against the exercise of the absolute power of Congress over the improvement of navigable rivers, but must suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation, if Congress determines that its continuance is detrimental to the public interest in the navigation of the river. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra, 62, 70.
The right of the United States in the navigable waters within the several States is, however, “limited to the control thereof for the purposes of navigation.” Port of Seattle v: Oregon Railroad, 255 U. S. 56, 63. And while Congress, in the exercise of this power, may adopt, in its judgment, any means having some positive relation to the control of navigation and not otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution, United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra, 62, it may not arbitrarily destroy or impair the rights of riparian owners by legislation which has no real or substantial relation to the control of navigation of appropriateness to that end. In Yates v. Milwaukee, supra, 504, it was said in reference to the right of a riparian owner on a navigable stream: “This riparian right is property and is valuable, and though it must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired.” This language was cited with approval in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, supra, 445.
Considering the charge of the court in the light of these general principles, we find that it was permeated by the fundamental error, emphasized by the refusal of the requests, that the jury were left to determine the amount of the benefits to be deducted on the theory that a riparian owner on the improved river would have merely such uncertain and contingent “privileges” of access to the navigable stream and of constructing docks fronting on the harbor line, as the Government, in the exercise of an absolute control over the navigation of the river, might see fit to allow him, instead of being instructed that he would have a right to such access and the construction and maintenance of such docks until taken away by the Government in the due exercise of its power of control over navigation. And this error was the more serious since the plan of the improvement contemplated that the improved river should become a slip for docks and industries and recognized the right of a riparian owner to construct docks upon the harbor line; and there was nothing in the evidence indicating any probability that the Government would at any time abrogate or curtail this right in any respect.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, while stating that the trial court had over-emphasized the elements of uncertainty in the rights of riparian owners and the contingent character of these rights, was of opinion that, under all the circumstances, such over-emphasis was not sufficiently prejudicial to call for a reversal of the judgment. With this we cannot agree. The charge was not merely an over-emphasis of the contingent character of the rights of the riparian owners, but in substance an instruction that they had no rights in this respect, and could only obtain uncertain privileges, as a matter of grace. There is an essential difference between a substantial property right which may be enjoyed until taken away in the appropriate exercise of a paramount authority, and an uncertain and [p. 421] contingent privilege which may not be allowed at all. The failure to observe this distinction went to the root of the charge in reference to the deduction of benefits. And its natural, if not inevitable, effect, was to lead the jury to a lower estimate of the benefits than would have been, made under a proper charge.
The present case is not controlled by the provision of § 269 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 26, 1919,5 that in an appellate proceeding judgment shall be given after an examination of the entire record, “without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” We need not enter upon a discussion of the divergent views which have been expressed in various Circuit Courts of Appeals as to the effect of the Act of 1919. It suffices to say that since the passage of this Act, as well as before, an error which relates, not to merely formal or technical matters, but to the substantial rights of the parties—especially when embodied in the charge to a jury—is to be held a ground for reversal, unless it appears from the whole record that it was harmless and did not prejudice the rights of the complaining party. See Yazoo Railroad v. Mullins, 249 U. S. 531, 533; Fillippon v. Albion Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 82. In the present case the error in the charge could not but mislead the jury in reference to a material element necessary for its consideration in determining the amounts of the awards; and it cannot be said from the whole record that the substantial rights of the United States were not prejudiced thereby. The judgments of the District Court should therefore have been reversed, and new trials granted.
3. It is unnecessary to set forth various errors assigned as to other rulings of the trial court. These matters were fully and carefully considered by the Circuit Court of
5 40 Stat. 1181, c. 48.
Appeals, and we are entirely satisfied with the conclusions which it reached in reference to them.
The judgments of the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgments reversed.
UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON et al.
UNITED STATES v. YALE & TOWNE MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Nos. 337,420. Argued November 20,1925.—Decided January 4,1926.
1. The Revenue Act of 1916 imposed a tax on net income and profits ascertained by deducting from gross income, expenses paid, losses sustained, interest and taxes paid during the calendar year, but provided, § 13(d), that “a corporation . . . keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly reflect its income, may, subject to regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, make its return upon the basis upon which its accounts are kept, in which case the tax shall be computed upon its income as returned.” Held, that where the taxpayer’s books, reflecting its income, were kept upon an “accrual” basis, i. e., by charging against income earned during the taxable period (1916) the expenses incurred in and attributable to the process of earning income during that period, and made its return upon that basis and not the basis of actual receipts and disbursements, it was permitted under the statute, as correctly construed by a Treasury regulation, to include in its deductions the amount of a “ reserve ” entered on its books for taxes imposed by the United States on the profits of munitions made and sold by the taxpayer during that year, although the tax had not “accrued” in the sense of having been assessed and become due; and that it was not permissible, as the taxpayer attempted, to defer deduction of the tax until the income return for the following year, during which the tax became due and was paid. Pp. 438, 441.
2. Findings considered and held to show, that the books of a tax payer were kept on the basis of accruals and reserves to meet liabilities incurred. P. 442. 3. In a suit to recover a tax erroneously exacted, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the facts establishing invalidity of the tax. P. 443. 60 Ct. Cis. 100; Id. 440, reversed.
Appeals from judgments of the Court of Claims in two suits brought by the Trustees in dissolution of the Burton-Richards Company, a corporation and by the Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, to recover income taxes alleged to have been erroneously exacted under the Revenue Act of 1916.
Solicitor General Mitchell, with whom Mr. John B. Milliken, Special Attorney in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was on the brief, for the United States.
Under the Revenue Act of 1916 a taxpayer was permitted to make his income-tax return on an accrual basis if his books were kept on that basis. Corporation Excise Tax Law of 1909 plainly required the computation of net income on the basis of actual receipts and disbursements. There was no provision for accrual systems of accounting or for including items of expense incurred but not due and paid. The first corporation income tax Act of October 3,1913, like the 1909 Act, provided for the calculation of net taxable income on the receipts and disbursements basis. Under these two Acts some departures from the strict receipts and disbursements basis were permitted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, such as the use of inventories. This legislation shows that the subject was undeveloped and the resulting system was a mongrel one, but, in the main, the returns were required to be made on a receipts and disbursements basis. Lumber Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Malley, 256 Fed. 380; Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 52 Ct. Cis. 201; same case, 251 U. S. 342. The first decided shift occurred in the [p. 424] Revenue Act of 1916, evidenced by the insertion of a new provision, § 13 (d). This allowed the taxpayer the option to make his return on a cash basis without regard to how he kept his books, or if he kept his books on some other basis to make his return upon the basis upon which his accounts were kept. Montgomery’s Income Tax Procedure, 1918, pp. 67-68. In connection with the accrual basis offered as an alternative by the 1916 Act, the Treasury Department, in T. D. 2433, issued January 8, 1917, approved of the practice of setting up and maintaining reserves to meet liabilities accrued but not yet due and including those the amount of which may not have been definitely determined. The next shift was made in the Act of February 24, 1919,. c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, which limited the taxpayer to making his return on the basis on which his books were kept provided the basis tended to correctly show net income. Under § 12 (a) of the Act of 1916, it is clear that if the taxpayer used the accrual basis in keeping his accounts and made his return on that basis he could not be permitted to depart from the accrual basis in dealing with any item of expense.
Under the accrual system an expense accrues when all the events have occurred from which liability is determined and the liability has become fixed, even though payment is not yet due. The munitions tax for 1916 accrued in 1916, and the taxpayer made no mistake in entering the item on its books for that year as an accrued expense. Under the accrual system of accounting, income is said to be accrued when it is definitely receivable, although its payment may not be due, and liabilities or expenses are said to be accrued when the events have occurred from which liability is determined and the liability has become fixed, even though payment is not yet due. The basic idea under the accrual system of accounting is that the books shall immediately reflect obligations and expense definitely incurred and income definitely [p. 425] earned without regard to whether payment has been made or whether payment is due. Under this system, the use of the word “ accrued ” does not signify that the item is due. On the contrary, the accrual system wholly disregards due dates. Neither is it necessary that the amount of an incurred liability be accurately ascertainable in order to “accrue” it. Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice, 3rd Ed. Vol. 1, pp. 239, 240; Esquerre, Applied Theory of Accounts, pp. 299-301; Holmes, Federal Income Tax, 1917, pp. 299-301.
The munitions tax for 1916 is based on the amount of munitions profits for that year; it was an actual expense or element of cost in the production of the income for that year; the law imposing the tax was in force during that year; definite liability to pay the tax had arisen by the end of the year; every fact or circumstance affecting the amount of the tax had occurred by the end of the year, and no fact or event occurring after the end of the year was a factor in the computation or determination of the tax. By the close of the year, liability for the tax had become definitely fixed, the tax being based on the result of operations for 1916, which were closed December 31, 1916. Neither liability for the tax nor the amount properly payable could be affected under the law by anything occurring after December 31,1916. It is true the monthly estimates of the amount of the tax appearing in the monthly trial balances during the year 1916 were tentative and might vary up or down from month to month, and required final correction in closing the books for the year, but if the accounts of the corporation were correctly kept and its profits computed in the manner required by law, the amount of the munitions tax was definitely ascertainable at the end of the year. In this case the taxpayer knew the amount of the munitions tax at the close of the year when it entered the reserve on its books as well as it did when the return was made and the [p. 426] tax paid. The fact that a difference of opinion might arise after December 31, 1916, between the taxpayer and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as to what was a reasonable depreciation on plant and equipment, or as to other items of that nature, did not provide new factors occurring after December 31, 1916, varying the tax. The accrual by the taxpayer of this tax on its books for 1916 was not only proper and in accordance with good accounting practice but was expressly approved by T. D. 2433. Cases of United States v. Woodward, 256 U. S. 632, and Ed. Schuster & Co., Inc., v. Williams, 283 Fed. 115, distinguished.
The only respect in which case No. 337 differs from No. 420, is because of a dispute as to whether the taxpayer’s books were kept and its income-tax return made on a cash basis or an accrual basis. The Findings show that the books were kept and the return made on the accrual basis. In this, a suit to recover taxes paid, the burden is on the taxpayer to show that the tax was illegally assessed and to overcome the prima facie validity of the assessment, and unless the Findings of the Court of Claims affirmatively show that the books were kept and the income-tax return made on a cash basis they do not sustain the judgment.
Mr. John W. Davis, with whom Messrs. Frank S. Bright and Montgomery B. Angell were on the brief, for appellees, in No. 337.
Under the Revenue Act of 1916, taxes may properly be taken as a deduction from income only in the year when paid, regardless of the character of the return made. In keeping its books for the year 1916, the Burton-Richards Company took up on its books all items of gross income and general business expenses as and when such items became fixed and ascertainable in the form of accounts receivable and accounts payable regardless of whether the [p. 427] amounts shown were actually received or paid in cash. Interest was entered on its books during 1916 only as and. when actually received or paid within the year. The Company’s interest on its indebtedness was all paid in 1916, and so appeared on its books. No losses nor bad debts appeared in 1916, nor were any set up on its books during that year. The Company set up on its books month by month an arbitrary 11 reserve for taxes” of $35,000, as set forth in the Findings of Fact. It did not pretend in so doing to be 11 accruing ” the amount for income tax or other purposes. The service of such an entry was solely to reflect in conjunction with other entries the general financial condition of the Company as a going concern and to guide it in the declaration of dividends or the making of other disbursements. In the original and amended income tax returns of the Burton-Richards Company for 1916 and 1917 there was included as gross income all items arising from sales made within the year whether paid or payable in cash, while the company took as deductions: (a) General expense, whether paid in 1916 or not; (b) Depreciation charged off; (c) Interest paid; and (d) Taxes, domestic, paid.
In the earlier Income Tax Acts Congress did not make what is commonly known as 11 commercial net income ” the basis for the tax levy. That which is subject to tax under these several Acts is 11 net income,” and in every case “net income” is ascertained by deducting from gross income certain arbitrary deductions. Obviously, a literal interpretation of the 1909 Excise Tax Act demanded a strict and thorough-going cash basis for making return and paying tax. Yet, from the first, the Treasury Department not only permitted but required a departure from a strict cash basis. See Regulations 31, under the 1909 Act, Arts. 4, 5; Id. fl 77, T. D. 1742. With these formal regulations issued by the Treasury Department before it, Congress, in passing the 1913 Revenue Act, [p. 428] employed substantially the same phraseology as to gross . income, business expenses, losses, interest, and taxes as it had employed in the 1909 Act. Under this, also, the Treasury necessarily permitted departures from the strict cash basis, Regulation 33, Jan. 5,1914, Arts. 104,158. But when it came to taxes, the Treasury invariably permitted them to be taken as deductions only in the year when “ actually paid.” Id. Art. 156.
The 1916 Act employed the same phraseology as the earlier Acts had used in defining net income subject to tax. The Treasury Department in its regulations under the 1916 Act, namely Regulations 33 (Revised), as in the prior regulations under the 1909 and 1913 Acts, defined gross income as “ the total sales . . . during the year ” (Article 91), required that inventories “must be taken where the business consists of buying and selling commercial commodities ” (Article 120), and in Article 126, in defining the word “ paid ” it was flatly stated: “ If the amount involved represents an actual expense or element of cost in the production of the income of the year, it will be properly deductible even though not actually disbursed in cash, provided it is so entered on the books of the company as to constitute a liability against its assets.” But again, so far as taxes were concerned, Regulations 33 (Revised), in Article 191 thereof, permitted as a deduction for taxes only such taxes as were “ paid within the year.”
It is evident from the foregoing that the so-called cash or receipts and disbursements basis used under the 1909 and 1913 Acts and recognized at least for a time under the 1916 Act, was not and never had been a literal cash basis. It was in reality a mongrel basis which had taken shape on account of the very necessities of the case and which after adoption had received Congressional sanction by the subsequent re-enactment of similar provisions of law. This statutory cash basis was consistently recognized and employed by the Treasury Department in [p. 429] administering the several income tax acts until the issuance in January, 1921, of the opinion of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue known as L. 0. 1059 (see Cumulative Bulletin 4, p. 147), the‘opinion upon which the Commissioner acted in disallowing the deduction for taxes and which gave rise to the instant case, an opinion which constituted an entire reversal of the Treasury’s prior practice in treating the deduction for taxes.
Under the 1916 Act only taxes actually paid within the year were deductible in determining taxable net income, whether the tax returns were made on the so-called cash basis under §§ 10 and 12(a), or under the alternative basis contemplated in § 13(d). By the express provisions of the 1916 Act, that which is subject to tax is “net income,” and “net income” must be determined by deducting from “the gross amount of its income received within the year” certain arbitrary deductions. One of these deductions, among others, is “ taxes paid within the year imposed by the authority of the United States or its territories.” All indications are that Congress intended to limit the deduction for taxes in any particular year to an amount not exceeding that actually paid within the year. Congress again employed the word “paid,” and “paid” alone, in describing the allowable deductions for taxes. The re-enactment by Congress of provisions similar to those employed in an earlier Act which had received a certain construction by the Executive Department charged with the administration of the Act “ amounts to an implied recognition and approval of the executive construction of a statute.” National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140.
Whatever may be the effect of the appearance of § 13(d) in the 1916 Act, there is no warrant in law for imputing to Congress an intent to permit or require the deduction of taxes in. any taxable period other than that in which such taxes were actually paid. That Congress [p. 430] was familiar with the word “accrued” is evidenced by the phraseology used in the Munitions Tax law, which was Title III of the Revenue Act of 1916, § 302. Had Congress intended the word “ paid ” in § 12(a) of the 1916 Act to mean “ paid or accrued,” it would have said so. In the relative provision of the 1918 Act, namely, § 234(a) (3), Congress did say so, for that Act permitted the deduction of taxes “ paid or accrued within the taxable year.” To permit or require under the 1916 Act the deduction of taxes when accrued rather than when paid would be to impute to Congress an intent in enacting the 1916 Act to which it first gave expression in the 1918 Act. This is not to be done. Shwab V. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529; Brilliant Coal Co. v. United States, 59 Ct. Cis. 481. The proposition that § 13(d) sets up a separate and distinct method of reaching taxable income is a strain upon its language, quite aside from the fact that its very position in the Act as a minor section can hardly justify giving it such dignity. Obviously Congress did not contemplate that a taxpayer, regardless of the limitations imposed in § 12(a) upon the extent of the deductions for interest and taxes authorized, might, nevertheless, take as a deduction an amount of interest or taxes merely by the simple device of setting up on its books a reserve for interest or taxes. Such a construction would put it in the power of the taxpayer to take as a deduction from net income an amount of taxes or interest which Congress said specifically in § 12(a) could not be so taken. It is arguable that § 13(d) to a limited extent contemplated the so-called “accrual” system of accounting and that Congress by inserting that section in the 1916 Act intended to give express recognition and legislative sanction to the practice which had grown up under the earlier Acts by administrative regulation of permitting and even requiring the use of accounts receivable in determining gross income, and accounts payable in reaching [p. 431] deductible business expenses. In fact, it may be that the insertion of § 13(d) in the 1916 Act foreshadowed the decision of this Court in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, in the sense that it was an express recognition by Congress of the necessity of subtracting from gross income the cost of earning gross income in reaching that “ income ” which alone is taxable under the Constitution. But it is hardly conceivable that § 13(d) authorized deductions for such items as taxes and interest without regard to the specific limitations placed on such deductions in § 12(a). It is true that the right to employ § 13(d) is made subject to regulations issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, but an interpretation of § 13(d) which would permit, under appropriate regulation, deductions for interest and taxes other than those specified in § 12(a) would vest in the Executive branch of the Government a discretion clearly not intended, and one which would perhaps amount to an unconstitutional delegation of authority. The fact is that § 13(d) was not a recognition of the so-called accrual system of accounting as the Treasury would have us believe, but contemplated a great variety of methods of accounting. The words “ accrue ” or “ accrual ” are nowhere used in the law. It is respectfully submitted that § 13(d) represented the first step by Congress, though a cautious one, toward a recognition of the principle that there are a number of corporations, which, on account of the nature of the business in which they are engaged, employ a variety of accounting methods not adapted to making returns upon the so-called statutory cash basis, and that in such cases a return on the basis upon which the accounts are kept will more clearly reflect income than a return on the statutory cash basis.
The regulations .issued under § 13(d) preclude the deduction of the 1916 munitions tax in 1916. T. D. 2433. In the last paragraph of this regulation its application is [p. 432] limited by the following provision: “The reserves contemplated by the foregoing rule are those reserves only which are set up to meet some actual liability incurred, the amount necessary to discharge which cannot at the time be definitely determined.” This language leaves the reserve for taxes established by this taxpayer outside the bounds of the Treasury Decision, since the munitions tax here involved was not an actual liability at December 31st, 1916. Taxes constitute a liability only when they become due or at the earliest when they are assessed. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Meriwether n. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. That T. D. 2433 was not intended to permit taxpayers to deduct reserves for taxes is indicated not only by the contemporaneous action of the Commissioner, but also by the specific provisions of T. D. 2490, issued January 2, 1918, nearly a year after T. D. 2433, under which Treasury Decision taxes deductible were without qualification described as “ taxes paid within the year.”
The appellees’ munitions tax for 1916 did not accrue until 1917, in which year it was first assessed, became due and payable, and was in fact paid, and consequently it was properly deducted from income for that year. United States n. Woodward, 256 U. S. 632. Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589; Mason v. Sargent, 104 U. S. 689; Sturges n . ¡United States, 117 U. S. 363. The fact is that the uncertainties attending the computation of the munitions tax in 1916 which could only be resolved by future events, were at least as many and as great as in the case of the ordinary estate tax. Moreover, there was always the possibility that the law would be changed before the tax became due. There is no analogy between taxes and expenses. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Schuster v. Williams, 283 Fed. 115.
The Burton-Richards Company made its returns for 1916 and 1917, not under the alternative provisions of §
13(d), but under the provisions of §§ 10 and 12(a). That being the case, there can be no dispute that its 1916 munitions tax was deductible in 1917, the year when it was paid.
Mr. Louis H. Porter, with whom Mr. F. Carroll Taylor was on the brief, for appellee in No. 420.
I. Under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917 only taxes actually paid within the taxable period could be deducted in determining taxable net income.
The specific language of § 12a permits only the deduction of taxes “ paid within the year.”
Under the 1909, 1913, and 1916 laws the clause allowing the deduction of taxes was substantially the same and, since under the earlier acts the Treasury adopted a construction permitting only the deduction of taxes actually paid, although permitting the deduction of business expenses accrued but not paid, Congress, in using the same clause in the 1916 Act, intended to adopt the former departmental construction. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U. S. 337; United States v. G. Falk & Bro., 204 U. S. 143.
The subsequent change of this clause in the 1918 Revenue Act to’permit the deduction of taxes “ paid or accrued during the taxable year ” amounts to a Congressional construction that the prior act did not intend the deduction of taxes “accrued.” Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286; Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570.
Sec. 13d of Part II, Title I of the 1916 Revenue Act which permitted returns to be made on the basis of the corporate books, under the direction of the Treasury, where the books were kept on other than a receipt and disbursement basis, was merely a recognition of a privilege which had in fact been extended by the Treasury under the 1909 and 1913 acts and serves only to confirm the prior departmental construction permitting deduction of
80Q48°—26------- 28
accriied business expenses but only deduction of taxes actually paid.
II. The munition manufacturers tax did not accrue until the year in which it was due and payable.
III. The contention that appellee’s accounting practice of setting up a tax reserve at the end of 1916 required its tax for the years 1916 and 1917 to be computed on the basis of such tax reserves, instead of on the basis of taxes actually paid, involves impossible inconsistencies.
Consistency and certainty in fiscal acts are of universal importance. Comm’rs. of Inland Revenue v. Harrison, L. R. 7 H. L. 1.
The Government’s contention is unsound and inconsistent in that it substitutes a rule of accounting to determine when a tax 11 accrues ” in place of a legal definition. . United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179.
Where there is ambiguity in the language of a taxing statute the taxpayer is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. United States v. Wigglesworth, Fed. Cas. No. 16690; Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151; Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529.
The right to deduct taxes “paid within the year” is specifically given by § 12a, while § 13d does not definitely or clearly vary the specific language of § 12a. The Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227.
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellees in both cases brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover payments of corporate income taxes alleged to have been erroneously exacted. From judgments in their favor the Government brings the cases to this court on appeal. Jud. Code, § 242, before amendment of 1925.
For the purpose of discussing the main question raised by both appeals, No, 420 will first be considered, and such [p. 435] additional questions as are involved in No. 337 will then be taken up.
The appellee, Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., a Connecticut corporation, was, in 1916, engaged in the manufacture of munitions. The tax imposed by the United States on the profits on munitions manufactured by it and sold during that year, became due and was paid in 1917. In making its return for income tax for the year 1917, the appellee deducted from its gross income the amount of the munitions tax thus paid. Later the Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that the munitions tax paid in 1917 should have been deducted from the appellee’s gross income in its return for 1916. There was in consequence an adjustment of the income taxes payable in those years, resulting in a net increase of the tax payable for the year 1917 of $116,044.40, which was assessed and paid under protest and is the amount for which suit was brought.
The correctness of the determination of the Commissioner depends upon the construction of the Revenue Act of 1916 and its application to the particular method employed by the taxpayer in keeping its books of account and in making return for income tax for 1916. The pertinent provisions of the statute are sections 10, 12(a), 13(a) and (d) and 300 of the Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 765, 767-8, 770-1, 780-1). The Act imposes a tax on net income and profits ascertained as provided by § 12(a), by deducting from gross income, expenses paid, losses sustained, interest and taxes paid during the calendar year. Section 13(d) however, provides that: “A corporation . . . keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly reflect its income, may, subject to regulations by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, make its return upon the basis upon which its [p. 436] accounts are kept, in which case the tax shall be computed upon its income as returned . . .”
In the year 1916 the appellee set up on its books of account all the obligations or expenses incurred during the year whether they fell due and whether they were paid during that year. It entered in an account, “reserves for taxes,” items of various kinds of taxes, liability for which was incurred by reason of its operations for that year, whether paid or payable during the year. Included in the reserves for taxes for 1916 were items aggregating $247,763.19 for taxes on profits from the sale of munitions during the year. The return for the munitions tax was made by the appellee in 1917, and the tax, after revision and an additional assessment, was paid in 1917, the year when it was due.
In making up its income tax return for 1916, appellee deducted from gross income all the items appearing on its books as losses sustained and obligations and expenses incurred during the year, except that it omitted from the return the items of munitions tax, likewise carried on its books, as an obligation or expense incurred or accrued in the year.
It is urged by the Government that the appellee, not having kept its books or made its tax return on the basis of receipts and disbursements, has elected to avail itself of the privilege afforded by § 13(d) of making its return on what was referred to in the briefs and arguments as 11 the accrual basis ”; that having so elected, it is required consistently to deduct from gross income all items appearing on its books as expenses accruing or incurred during the taxable year, including its reserve for munitions taxes, whether payable or not.
It is not denied by the appellee that its method of keeping its accounts and setting up a reserve for munitions taxes reflected its true income for 1916 or that its amended return on that basis accurately reflects its income and [p. 437] profits for the year. But it contends that the munitions tax was deductible only in 1917 because under the Revenue Act of 1916 only taxes actually paid during the year were deductible in determining net income for the year; and that in any case the provisions of that Act and the regulations made by the Commissioner, authorizing the taxpayer to make his returns on an “ accrual ” basis if his books are so kept, could have no application to tax deductions, since a tax does not accrue until it is due and payable.
While § 12(a) taken by itself would appear to require the income tax return to be made on the basis of actual receipts and disbursements, it is to be read with § 13(d) which we have quoted and which obviously limits in some respects the operation of § 12(a) by providing in substance that a corporation keeping its books on a basis other than receipts and disbursements, may make its return on that basis provided it is one which reflects income.
Standing by themselves and taken at their face value, these sections would seem to require the taxpayer to make its return on the basis of receipts and disbursements or, in the alternative, on the basis of its own books of account if they reflect true income, under such regulations as the Commissioner may make, and indeed to require the latter alternative if the taxpayer is unable to make a return except on that basis.
So interpreting the statute, the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, on January 8, 1917, before appellee made its income tax return for 1916, promulgated Treasury Decision 2433 which provides in part that under § 13(d) it “will be permissible for corporations which accrue on their books monthly or at other stated periods amounts sufficient to meet fixed annual'or other charges to deduct from their gross income the amounts so accrued, provided such accruals approximate [p. 438] as nearly as possible the actual liabilities for which the accruals are made, and provided that in cases wherein deductions are made on the accrual basis as hereinbefore indicated, income from fixed and determinable sources accruing to the corporations must be returned, for the purpose of the tax, on the same basis.” It also provided in substance that when the taxpayer, following a consistent accounting practice, sets up reserves to meet liabilities, the “ amount of which or date of maturity” is not definitely determinable, such reserve may be deducted from gross income. The decision also laid down a procedure for readjusting such reserves when the amount actually required for that purpose was definitely ascertained, and provided that if returns upon this basis of “ accrual or reserves ” did not reflect true net income, the taxpayer would not be permitted to make its return on any other basis than that of “ actual receipts and disbursements.”
We think that the statute was correctly interpreted by the Commissioner and that his decision referred to was consistent with its purpose and intent. >
The Revenue Acts of 1909 and 1913 authorized a method of computing the income of corporations, which did not differ materially from that provided by § 12(a) of the Act of 1916. They required in terms that net income should be ascertained by deducting from gross income received, interest, expenses and taxes actually paid and losses actually sustained, but contained no provision corresponding to § 13(d) of the Act of 1916 by which a return might be made on the basis of the taxpayer’s books of account. Corporation Excise Tax, Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112; Corporation Income Tax, Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, Section II, subdiv. G, 38 Stat. 114, 172.
It was pressed upon us in argument by appellees that it was found impracticable to comply strictly with the [p. 439] requirements of the 1909 and 1913 Acts for computing income on the basis of receipts and disbursements and that under both acts the administrative practice was established, by appropriate Treasury regulations, permitting the use of inventories and authorizing deduction of expenses constituting a liability of the taxpayer, whether paid or not, in ascertaining net income, but that those regulations did not permit the deduction of taxes except in the year when paid. From this it is argued that Congress, by reenacting in § 12(a) of the Act of 1916 the corresponding provisions of the earlier acts, adopted the settled administrative practice, and that accordingly under that act, as well as under the earlier acts and Treasury regulations, taxes could be deducted only in the year when paid.
This argument would have force had Congress stopped with the enactment of § 12(a). By thus adopting, without material change, the corresponding provisions of earlier acts, Congress might have been deemed to have recognized and adopted the established practice of the Department interpreting and applying them. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140. But, in the Act of 1916, Congress added § 13(d), which did not have its counterpart in earlier legislation. This section went further than any previous regulation by authorizing the tax return to be made on the basis on which the taxpayer’s books were kept, provided only that the basis was one reflecting income and the return complied with regulations made by the Commissioner.
Treasury Decision 2433, to which reference has been made, was in harmony with this view of § 13(d). It recognized the right of the corporation to deduct all accruals and reserves, without distinction, made on its books to meet liabilities, provided the return included income accrued and, as made, reflected true net income. If the return failed so to reflect income, the regulation reserved [p. 440] the right of the Commissioner to require the return to be made on the basis of receipts and disbursements.
A consideration of the difficulties involved in the preparation of an income account on a strict basis of receipts and disbursements for a business of any complexity, which had been experienced in the application of the Acts of 1909 and 1913 and which made it necessary to authorize, by departmental regulation, a method of preparing returns not in terms provided for by those statutes, indicates with no uncertainty the purpose of §§ 12(a) and 13(d) of the Act of 1916. It was to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns according to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income earned during the taxable period, the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process of earning income during that period; and indeed, to require the tax return to be made on that basis, if the taxpayer failed or was unable to make the return on a strict receipts and disbursements basis.
The appellee’s true income for the year 1916 could not have been determined without deducting from its gross income for the year the total cost and expenses attributable to the production of that income during the year. The reserve for munitions taxes set up on its books for 1916 must have been deducted from receivables for munitions sold in that year before the net results of the operations for the year could be ascertained. The taxpayer being unable to make its return on a strict receipts and disbursements basis, and not having attempted to do so, could not have complied with § 13(d) and Treasury Decision 2433 by deducting either accruals of interest or expenses alone without the other, or without deducting other reserves made on its books to meet liabilities such as the munitions tax, incurred in the process of creating income.
Only a word need be said with reference to the contention that the tax upon munitions manufactured and [p. 441] sold in 1916 did not accrue until 1917. In a technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does not accrue until it has been assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that in advance of the assessment of a tax, all the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it. In this respect, for purposes of accounting and of ascertaining true income for a given accounting period, the munitions tax here in question did not stand on any different footing than other accrued expenses appearing on appellee’s books. In the economic and bookkeeping sense with which the statute and Treasury decision were concerned, the taxes had accrued. It should be noted that § 13(d) makes no use of the words “ accrue ” or “ accrual ” but merely provides for a return upon the basis upon which the taxpayer’s accounts are kept, if it reflects income—which is precisely the return insisted upon by the Government. We do not think that the Treasury decision contemplated a return on any other basis when it used the terms “ accrued ” and “ accrual ” and provided for the deduction by the taxpayer of items “accrued on their books
United States v. Woodward, 256 U. S. 632, relied upon by appellees, arose under the Income Tax Law of 1918,
1067, 1071, 1151). Section 213(a) and (e) of that Act
provided that taxes “ paid or accrued ” within the taxable
year imposed by authority of the United States, except
income, war profits and excess profits taxes, might be de-
ducted in ascertaining income. The claim of the tax-
payer of the right to deduct estate taxes levied under that
Act for the year when due, although paid in a later year,
was upheld. It did not appear whether, as here, the taxpayer kept his books on the accrual basis or whether, as here, events had occurred before the tax became due which fixed the amount of it; for it did not appear [p. 442] whether the deductions to be made from the testator’s gross estate were ascertainable for the purpose of determining the estate tax. The question which we now have to determine was not raised, considered or decided in that case.
We conclude that the reserves for taxes which appeared on appellee’s books in 1916 were deductible under § 13(d) of the Act of 1916 and Treasury Decision 2433 in its income tax return on the accrual basis for that year.
It was argued in behalf of the appellees in No. 337 that the taxpayer did not keep its books on an accrual basis; that consequently its case was not controlled by § 13(d) and Treasury regulations made under it, and that by § 12(a) it was authorized to deduct the amount assessed for munitions taxes only in 1917, the year when paid. On this point we are concluded by the findings. They show that in the year 1916 the taxpayer accrued on its books expenses, whether paid or not, including “ insurance reserves,” “ freight reserves,” “ bonus reserves,” and depreciation charged off, aggregating more than two and a half million dollars, which it deducted from accrued gross income, whether actually received or not, in making its income tax return for the year. It charged on its books and deducted in its income tax return, interest accrued and paid during the year. So far as appears no other interest accrued during the year and there was no reserve for interest. No charge or deduction was made for bad debts. It also set up on its books for that year a monthly reserve of $35,000 for the payment of munitions taxes beginning with September, the month of the passage of the Revenue Act of 1916 taxing munitions. On December 31, 1916, this reserve account was closed out and a charge was made on its books against the corporate surplus for account of munitions taxes of $86,541.95. No deduction was made by the taxpayer for munitions taxes in its income tax return for the year 1916. In 1917 the [p. 443] munitions tax was returned and ultimately assessed and paid in the sum of $112,419.54.
Since the suit was one to recover a tax erroneously exacted, the burden was on the petitioners, appellees here, to prove the facts establishing the invalidity of the tax. But the findings fail to show affirmatively that the books were kept or the return made on the basis of receipts and disbursements. Indeed, the facts found, to which we have referred, show that the books were kept on the basis of accruals and reserves to meet liabilities incurred. It does not appear that there was any expense or liability of the taxpayer incurred by its operations during the year which was not accrued on its books. Its return was made on that basis, but omitted munitions taxes accrued on its books during the year for which the return was made. We think these facts bring the case clearly within the principle which we deem to be applicable to No. 420. The judgment of the Court of Claims in each case is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Sanford dissent.
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