Chi. Great W. R.R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287 (1925)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Chi. Great W. R.R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287 (1925)
Full caption
CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. SCHENDEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RING, DECEASED.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 2, 1925
Argument for Petitioner.
CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. SCHENDEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RING, DECEASED.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
No. 422. Argued January 6, 1925.—Decided March 2, 1925.
1. Where a freight car with defective automatic coupler was moved with the train from the main line to a siding to be cut out and left there, held that the use, movement or hauling of the car, within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, had not ended when a brakeman went between it and the next car to detach the chain and was injured by the movement of the car by gravity as the engine was cut off; that he was within the protection of that statute; and, under the Employer’s Liability Act, his assumption of the risk, or contributory negligence in going between the cars with knowledge of the danger and without notice to the engineer did not bar his right of action. P. 291. 59 Minn. 166, affirmed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota which affirmed a judgment for damages recovered against the railroad company for personal injuries of a brakeman resulting in death.
Mr. Asa G. Briggs, with whom Mr. Charles H. Weyl, Mr. Allan Briggs and Mr. Allen V. Junkin were on the briefs, for petitioner.
The facts do not bring the case within the Safety Appliance Act. The car had come to rest on the sidetrack and had ceased to be “ used ” as contemplated by the act.
The association of the word “ used ” with the words “ hauled or permitted to be hauled on its line ” clearly indicates that the use must be associated with or related to the transportation or hauling of a crippled car, either in transportation from place to place' or of the car from the place where found to be defective or insecure to the
Argument for Petitioner. 267U.S.
place of repair. It does not mean such use of the car elsewhere or in other relation than such hauling or movement. McCalmont v. Penn. R. Co., 273 Fed. 231; s. c. 283 Fed. 736.
Let us examine the immediate facts of the case. The draw-bar had pulled out on the main line. The car was then chained up and hauled onto the sidetrack, to be cut out of the train. During this movement nothing occurred. The car was safely hauled to a place on the siding where it was to remain. Having so been placed on this sidetrack, it ceased to be “ used ” by the carrier. From this time on, then, the Safety Appliance Act did not govern the case.
If intending to permit a car to stand still constituted a violation of the act, the company could have no alternative but to violate. If they hauled the car they violated the act, and if they did not haul the car they violated the act. See Boldt n. Penn. R. Co., 245 U. S. 441.
The defective draw-bar did not proximately contribute to the injury in this case. Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry., 107 Atl. 122; McCalmont v. Penn. R. Co., supra; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444; Rittenhouse v. St. L. etc. Ry. Co., 252 S. W. 945; Davis v. Hand, 290 Fed. 73; Phillips v. Penn. R. Co., 283 Fed. 381.
The deceased would not have been in the position he was except for the defect in the coupler. Beyond this there is no connection between the defective coupler and his injuries. Douglas v. Washington Terminal Co., 298 Fed. 199.
The probability that an injury would be caused by the alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act was so unlikely, under all the circumstances, that it could not reasonably be foreseen. Lang v. New York Cent., 255 U. S. 455. Otos Case, 239 U. S. 42, distinguished.
Mr. Tom Davis, with whom Mr. Ernest A. Michel was on the brief, for respondent.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed a judgment in favor of respondent for damages resulting from the death of his intestate, Ring, fatally injured while in petitioner’s service and while both were engaging in interstate commerce. The original action was based upon the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 66, and the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531, as amended in 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, 299.
While the freight train upon which Ring served as brakeman was upon the main line at Budd, Iowa, a draw-bar pulled out of a car. Thereupon the crew chained this car to the one immediately ahead. The engine pulled the whole train onto the adjacent siding, which lies on a gentle grade, and stopped. The intention was to detach the damaged car and leave it there. The plan was to cut off the engine, bring it around back of the train, remove the rear portion, couple this to the forward portion and move on. Acting under the conductor’s direction, Ring asked the head brakeman to tell the engineer to proceed; and then, without the knowledge of either of the others, he and the conductor went between the crippled car and the next one, in order to disengage the connecting Qhain. While they were working there the engineer cut off the engine, the car ran slowly down the grade, and Ring, caught by the chain, suffered fatal injuries.
A rule of the company provided that employees should advise the engineer when they were going between or under cars and must know that he understood their purpose before they put themselves in any dangerous position. Ring gave no such warning, although familiar with the rule and with the grade upon which the train stood.
42684°—25------19
Petitioner insists: (1) The facts do not bring the case
within the Safety Appliance Act since the car had come
to rest on the side-track and had ceased to be “ used,”
within the meaning of the statute. (2) The defective
draw-bar did not proximately contribute to the injury.
(3) The violation of the rule by Ring constituted negli-
gence subsequent to and independent of the question of
a defective safety appliance and was a proximate cause
of the injury.
It is provided by the original Safety Appliance Act—
“Sec. 2. That on and after the first day of January,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, it shall be unlawful
for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be
hauled or used on its line any car used in moving inter-
state traffic not equipped with couplers coupling auto-
matically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without
the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.”
The amendment of 1910 directs—
“ Sec. 4. That any common carrier subject to this Act
using, hauling, or permitting to be used or hauled on its
line, any car subject to the requirements of this Act not
equipped as provided in this Act, shall be liable to a pen-
alty of one hundred dollars for each and every such viola-
tion . . . Provided, That where any car shall have
been properly equipped, as provided in this Act and the
other Acts mentioned herein, and such equipment shall
have become defective or insecure while such car was being used by such carrier upon its line of railroad, such car may be hauled from the place where such equipment was first discovered to be defective or insecure to the nearest available point where such car can be repaired, without liability for the penalties imposed by Section four of this Act, or Section six of the Act of March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, as amended by the Act of April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, if such movement is necessary to make such repairs and p. 291such repairs cannot be made except at such repair point; and such movement or hauling of such car shall be at the sole risk of the carrier, and nothing in this Section shall be construed to relieve such carrier from liability in any remedial action for the death or injury of any railroad employee caused to such employee by reason of or in connection with the movement or hauling of such car with Equipment which is defective or insecure or which is not maintained in accordance with the requirements of this Act and the other Acts herein referred to. . .
The Employers’ Liability Act provides that in an action under it for injury or death of an employee, “ such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment [or to have been guilty of contributory negligence] in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.”
Former opinions have adequately explained the purpose of these enactments. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 295; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559; St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. n. Conarty, 238 U. S. 243; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66; Lang n. New York Central R. R. Co., 255 U. S. 455; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, must be understood as in entire harmony with the doctrine announced in St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Conarty, and not as intended to modify or overrule anything which we there said.
Under the circumstances disclosed, we think it clear that the use, movement or hauling of the defective car, within the meaning of the statute, had not ended at the time of the accident. To cut this car out of the train so p. 292that the latter might proceed to destination was the thing in view, an essential part of the undertaking in connection with which the injuries arose.
The things shown to have been done by the deceased certainly amount to no more than contributory negligence or assumption of the risk, and both of these are removed from consideration by the Liability Act. When injured he was “ within the class of persons for whose benefit the Safety Appliance Acts required that the car be equipped with automatic couplers and draw-bars of standard height. . . . His injury was within the evil against which the provisions for such appliances are directed.” St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Conarty, supra. He went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car which it was necessary to detach did not meet the statutory requirements especially intended to protect men in his position.
We find no material error in the judgment below, and it is
Affirmed.
DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ETC., OPERATING PHILADELPHIA & READING RAILWAY, v. NEWTON COAL COMPANY.
DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ETC., OPERATING PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, v. NEWTON-COAL COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Nos. 709 and 710. Argued January 12, 1925.—Decided March 2,
1. While coal which plaintiff had purchased through contracts with producers was in course of transportation over railroads then under Federal Control, it was commandeered by the Director General of
Railroads, acting under orders of the Fuel Administrator, for use in operating the railroads, and he paid the producers the prices fixed by the Fuel Administrator, which were the same as the prices named in plaintiffs’ contracts. Held (a) That the plaintiff was entitled to be paid the difference between prices thus paid to its vendors and the market value, which was higher. P. 301.
(6) That by § 206 (a) of Transportation Act, 1920, actions therefor could be maintained in the state court against the agent designated by the President under that Act. P. 301. 281 Pa. St. 74, affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirming recoveries from the Director General of Railroads, as agent under the Transportation Act, 1920, on account of coal seized and appropriated for operating railroads while under Federal Control.
Mr. Wm. Clarke Mason, with whom Mr. John Hampton Barnes and Mr. Charles Myers were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.
At the time of the transactions, January and February, 1920, the war with Germany had not terminated and therefore any powers which the Government had incident to the war still remained. Hamilton n. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146.
It must be assumed that all of the orders made by the President or his agents under § 25 of the Lever Act were made “ for the efficient prosecution of the war ” unless the contrary appears on the face of such orders. The orders here definitely show that they were made on account of the war emergency. All of the orders, both executive and those made by the Fuel Administration, refer to the Act of Congress of August 10th, 1917. The executive order of October 30th, 1919, states in its preamble “. . . whereas it is necessary to restore and maintain during the war certain of said rules, regulations, orders and proclamations . . .”
The Fuel Administration order of October 31st, 1919, states that it is made on account of the “ present emergency ” and it must be assumed that this means the war emergency.
It would be a most unwise policy to allow courts to enquire into the motives of the executive branch of the Government in making orders during the war emergency in order to determine their validity.
The state court in its opinion, however, said that the testimony showed that the Fuel Administrator in issuing the orders under consideration did not act on account of the war emergency but on account of the threatened coal strike and, therefore, the orders were invalid. Section 2 of the Lever Act provides “ that in carrying out the purposes of this Act the x President is authorized to create or use any agency or agencies.” Congress delegated certain of its powers by this act to the President and the Fuel Administrator was the President’s duly authorized agent in issuing orders, so that these orders were substantially the acts of Congress and, therefore, the first answer to the reasoning of the court below is that the court has enquired into the motive of Congress in determining the validity of the orders. The second answer is that there is no evidence to justify the finding that the orders were issued solely because of the coal strike, but on the contrary the evidence shows that the conditions existing because of the war emergency were made more alarming by the additional shortage due to the strike.
The conclusion* of the State Supreme Court is in direct conflict with decisions of this Court. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51.
The fact and date of the termination of the war had not been ascertained and proclaimed by the President in the manner fixed by Congress at the time the events under consideration took place, and this fact of termination was not ascertained and proclaimed until after the orders which are attacked in these cases were suspended.
The orders under consideration did not violate the Fifth Amendment by the method provided to fix compensation.
The question must be approached in. the light of the facts, and the answer must take into consideration the identity of the divertee. The diversion was by the agency of the Fuel Administrator and the use of the diverted coal was by the Director General of Railroads, which were the first preferred consumers on the fuel administration list. If the railroads had been privately operated at the time of diversion this case would present substantially the facts found in Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 188, and the conclusions should be the same as there. If the fact of Government operation requires the diversion to be treated as a requisitioning under § 10 of the Lever Act for use by the United States of America, then a totally different case is developed. In the latter event the sole cause of action would seem to be under that section of the Lever Act, and the rule of United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, would probably apply.
In several decisions of the lower federal courts the constitutionality of the Lever Act has been assumed, and there seems to have been but one federal decision which has discussed and adjudicated the constitutionality of the applicable sections of the Lever Act, Ford v. U. S. 281 Fed. 298. This Court reversed that decision (264 U. S. 239), but did so solely on the ground that the Lever Act did not apply to the coal involved. See Lajoie v. Milliken, et al., 242 Mass. 508.
Congress is given certain powers in war time which even the Fifth Amendment does not limit or restrict. The power to restrict the liquor traffic is one, as stated in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra, at page 156, for the reason that this is an appropriate means of increasing war efficiency. Is not this war efficiency just as much affected by the use, distribution and price of coal?
Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 267 U.S.
The contracts between the Coal Company and the shippers, show that the Coal Company agreed that the coal to be shipped under the contracts would be subject to the regulations of the Fuel Administration, including of course the orders, such as those under consideration, to be thereafter issued. In the case of Vogelstein v. United States, 262 U. S. 337, this Court held that one who cooperated with others in putting into effect and maintaining a price established by the Government could not later recover a greater price, and the same reasoning would seem to apply to the claim of the defendant-in-error. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 188.
The origin of the Fuel Administrator and the Federal Agent is in the federal statutes, and both are agencies of the President. One derived his powers, however, from the Lever Act and the other from the Transportation Act. There is no authority given to the Federal Agent under § 206 of the latter act to answer for the acts of the agencies of the Fuel Administration under § 10 of the Lever Act, or under the general power of condemnation of the Federal Government, but merely for those causes of action for which the carriers would have been otherwise liable.
The Director General as Federal Agent, plaintiff-in-error in these cases, admits his liability under the orders of the Fuel Administrator to pay the proper price for coal lawfully diverted to the Director General and lawfully used by the Director General in the operation of the railroads. He has assumed that the payment of the price fixed by the Fuel Administration discharged this liability; but if authority was lacking to fix such price, then for the coal lawfully diverted he is liable for such price as may be judicially determined.
The clear distinction which this Court has drawn between the several capacities in which the Director General functioned is found in Dahn v. Davis, 258 U. S. 421;
Dupont v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456; North Carolina Ry. Co. v. Lee, 260 U. S. 16; Missouri R. R. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554; Davis v. Donovan, 265 U. S. 257; Davis n. O’Hara, 266 U. S. 314.
Mr. Allen S. Olmsted, 2d, with whom Mr. Wm. A. Glasgow, Jr., was on *the brief, for defendant in error.
The post-war fuel regulations of 1919-20 were not within the President’s statutory power to regulate the distribution of coal “ whenever in his judgment necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war.”
The Government, having taken and used the coal, must pay its fair value, judicially determined.
Section 25 of the Lever Act, which gives the President power to fix prices, also provides that in fixing the prices, he shall cause a careful inquiry to be made into costs and other factors affecting the price. There is no pretense that such an inquiry was made here. The price paid by the divertee of this coal was fixed in a series of orders, of which the latest is dated May 24, 1918. The Government control of prices had been lifted on January 31, 1919, and there followed nine months of free trading. Suddenly on October 30, 1919, the President revived the 1918 prices. Current prices, as this record shows, and the trial court found, were far higher than the 1918 prices. Under such circumstances we submit that, even though the diversions were lawful, the 1918 prices were not binding, and therefore, even though the Director General were a private citizen, the payment of the 1918 price would not protect him in a suit by the owner of the coal.
But the Director General was not a private citizen. A suit against him “ is an action against the United States.” Davis v. O’Hara, 266 U. S. 314, and cases cited. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 527. Plaintiff-in-error stresses the dual capacity of the Director General. As Fuel Administrator he diverted the coal; as Railroad p. 298Operator he received it. This is but another way of saying that the Government both took and used the coal. How much must it pay for it?
Even the plaintiff-in-error, in answering that question, concedes that the rule of United States v. New River Collieries Co. 262 U. S. 341, would probably apply. National City Bank v. United States, 275 Fbd. 855, s. c. 281 Fed. 754, 263 U. S. 726; Vogelstein v. United States, 262 U. S. 337.
This suit was properly brought against the Director General under § 206a of the Transportation Act, 1920.
If the orders were invalid, the taking was wrongful and all who participated in the transactions were trespassers in their own wrong. That the Director General is liable for torts committed by railroad employees is well settled. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault 256 U. S. 554; Director General v. Kasteribaum, 263 U. S. 25.
If the taking be assumed to be lawful, the Director General is none the less liable. In the pleadings he admits he is the proper defendant and counsel reiterates that admission.
These suits come exactly within the language of the statute. The cause of action arises out of Federal Control. It is of such character as prior to Federal Control could have been brought against a corporate carrier; for surely an action lies against a corporation to recover the value of property to which it has rightfully obtained title, e. g., by eminent domain, or under contract.
It is, we submit, irrelevant that an action would also lie against the United States eo nomine, under § 10 of the Lever Act.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
These causes present the same points of law and were heard together both here and below. No disputed ques^- tion of fact remains. In 1919 defendant in error, a
Pennsylvania corporation, doing business at Philadelphia, contracted with producers for large quantities of bituminous coal, f. o. b. the mines, subject to the regulations of the United States Fuel Administration. During January and February, 1920, while thirty-three cars of coal consigned to the corporation under these contracts were moving over the Philadelphia & Reading Railway, the Director General of Railroads took possession of them and used the fuel for operating trains on that line. Eighty cars loaded with the same character of coal and moving on the Pennsylvania Railroad were similarly treated. The claim is that the Director General took this action under lawful rules and orders of the President, acting through the Fuel Administrator and pursuant to the Lever Act, approved August 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 279, 284. The producers of the coal were paid the prices specified in the contracts of purchase, as required by the Fuel Administrator; and it is now maintained that nothing more can be demanded by the owner. The owner’s claim is for the difference between the amount received by producers and the market value of the coal—approximately $1.44 per ton.
The Lever Act conferred upon the President certain powers to regulate the prices and distribution of fuel, to be exercised for the efficient prosecution of the war. August 23, 1917, he delegated these powers to a Fuel Administrator, who freely used them during the continuation of hostilities. Shortly after the armistice substantially all such regulations were suspended and the Administrator ceased to function; but his appointment was not canceled or revoked.
On October 30, 1919, the President undertook to restore former orders and to empower the Fuel Administrator, as occasion might arise, to change or make regulations relative to the sale, shipment and apportionment of bituminous coal as the latter might think necessary. The next p. 300day the Administrator delegated to the Director General of Railroads the power to divert coal upon the railroads as might seem “necessary in the present emergency to provide for the requirements of the country.” March 19, 1920, the President suspended all fuel regulations.
Seeking to recover the difference between the amounts paid to the shipper—the purchase price—and the market value of the coal, defendant in error commenced these proceedings (June, 1921), in a state court at Philadelphia, against the Agent appointed by the President under the Transportation Act, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461. Judgments went for it and were affirmed by the Supreme Court. 281 Pa. 74. The latter court held: That the war with Germany had ceased prior to October 30, 1919, and the purpose of the President’s order then issued was to meet an emergency incident to the miners’ strike—not to provide for the efficient prosecution of the war. Also that seizure and use of the coal by the Director General rendered the United States liable for just compensation, measured by market value. And, further, that the Director General was not an innocent third person to whom property has been delivered by the sovereign for the public welfare, but an agency of the United States for operating the railroads, and, under the Transportation Act, 1920, plaintiff in error might be sued upon claims arising therefrom.
The plaintiff in error now insists: That the order of October 30, 1919, and the regulations issued by the Fuel Administrator and the Director General of Railroads acting thereunder, were authorized by the Lever Act. That by diverting the coal to1 himself the Director General incurred no obligation except to pay the amounts due the shippers under the sale contracts—the compensation fixed by the orders. That the act of the Director General in diverting the coal to himself and its use on the railroads imposed no liability for which an action can be p. 301maintained against the Agent provided for by the Transportation Act.
From the facts stated it appears, plainly enough, that one hundred and thirteen cars of coal belonging to defendant in error were seized by the United States while upon the lines of carriers under their control and thereafter appropriated and used in the operation of such roads. The taking was for a public use. The incantation pronounced at the time is not of controlling importance; our primary concern is with the accomplishment. As announced in United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 343, 344, “ where private property is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that price is just compensation ” to which the owner is entitled. Also, “ the ascertainment of compensation is a judicial function, and no power exists in any other department of the Government to declare what the compensation shall be or to prescribe any binding rule in that regard.”
Transportation Act, 1920, § 206(a)—
“Actions at law, suits in equity and proceedings in admiralty, based on causes of action arising out of the possession, use, or operation by the President of the railroad or system of transportation of any carrier (under the provisions of the Federal Control Act, or of the Act of August 29, 1916) of such character as prior to Federal control could have been brought against such carrier, may, after the termination of Federal control, be brought against an agent designated by the President for such purpose, which agent shall be designated by the President within thirty days after the passage of this Act. Such actions, suits, or proceedings may, within the periods of limitation now prescribed by State or Federal statutes but not later than two years from the date of the passage of this Act, be brought in any court which but for Federal control would have had jurisdiction of the cause of action had it arisen against such carrier.”
If the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company or the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, while operating its own line, had seized and used the coal as the United States did while they operated those roads, the jurisdiction of the state court of actions to recover damages or compensation would be clear. And so, under the Transportation Act, that court properly entertained the proceedings now before us.
Affirmed.