Law v. United States, 266 U.S. 494 (1925)
Case details
Citation
266 U.S. 494
Full caption
LAW v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 5, 1925
LAW v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 550. Argued December 8, 1924.—Decided January 5, 1925.
1. A judgment of the District Court based on a general finding for the plaintiff in a law case tried without a jury is not reviewable in the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the ground that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to sustain the cause of actioh pleaded by the complaint. P. 496.
2. In an action on a contract for insurance issued under the War Risk Insurance Act, as amended October 6, 1917, jurisdiction of the District Court is to be exercised in accordance with the laws governing the usual procedure of that court in actions at law for money compensation. Id.
3. Error in granting the Government’s motion to sit without a jury in such a case cannot be complained of by the Government. Id. 4. Denial of a motion for special findings cannot be complained of if not excepted to. Id.
299 Fed. 61, reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, in an action on a war risk insurance contract, and directing entry of judgment for the United States. For the opinion of the District Court, see 290 Fed. 972.
Mr. DeWitt T. Law pro se.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely were on the brief, for the United States.
Mr . Justi ce Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action at law brought in the federal court for Montana on a contract for insurance issued under the War Risk Insurance Act as amended October 6, 1917, c. 105, 40 Stat. 398, 409. The United States filed an answer denying liability and moved for trial without a jury. The motion was granted. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence the defendant moved for judgment. The motion was denied. No special findings of fact were made. Judgment for $3,335 was entered for the plaintiff upon a general finding. 290 Fed. 972. Upon writ of error sued out by the Government the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and directed the District Court to enter judgment for the defendant. 299 Fed. 61. The case is here on the plaintiff’s writ of error under § 241 of the Judicial Code.
The action was brought by the insured. The contract provided for payment in installments in case of total and permanent disability. Whether the plaintiff was so disabled was the main issue. The evidence introduced by him occupies forty pages of the printed record. It disclosed, among other things, that, at the time of enlistment, plaintiff was a common laborer with but several months of recent high school education; that he was seriously wounded overseas; that, after discharge, he resumed his studies; that later, in the rehabilitation process, he entered upon the study of law; and that he acted as his own counsel in the trial of the case. The Government’s motion for judgment was made on the ground, among p. 496others, that plaintiff had failed to prove that he ever had been, or then was, totally disabled, within the meaning of the contract of insurance.
The Court of Appeals held that the motion should have been granted. Its judgment must be reversed apd that of the District Court must stand, because the case was tried without a jury and there was only the general finding for the plaintiff. Neither the evidence, nor the questions of law presented by it, were reviewable by the Court of Appeals. To enquire into the facts and the conclusions of law on which the judgment of the lower court rests was not permissible. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125; Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237; Boardman v. Toffey, 117 U. S. 271. The bill of exceptions and the assignment of errors do not attempt to present any other question which is substantial. The petition confessedly set forth a good cause of action. The District Court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. Its decision is final.
The jurisdiction possessed was that to be exercised in accordance with the laws governing the usual procedure of the court in actions at law for money compensation. Crouch v. United States, ante, 180; United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 552. The District Court, having erroneously decided that it was the exceptional jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims, granted the Government’s motion to sit without a jury. Of this error thè Government cannot complain. Nor can it complain of the denial by the trial court of the motion for special findings. It did not except thereto. Whether special findings can ever avail where there was no stipulation in writing waiving the jury, we need not consider. Compare Kearney v. Case, 12 Wall. 275; Campbell n . United States, 224 U. S. 99; Cleveland v. Walsh Construction Co., 279 Fed. 57, 60-63.
Reversed.
Statement of the Case.
HYGRADE PROVISION COMPANY, INC., ET AL. v. SHERMAN, AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
LEWIS & FOX COMPANY v. SHERMAN, AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
SATZ v. SHERMAN, AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Nos. 104-106. Argued November 20, 21, 1924.—Decided January 5, 1925.
Appeals from decrees of the District Court dismissing the bills in three suits brought by dealers to enjoin the Attorney General of the State of New York and the District Attorney of the County of New York from p. 498proceeding against the plaintiffs under chapters 580 and 581, Laws of New York, 1922, respecting the sale of “ Kosher ” meat and meat preparations.
1
Equity will interfere to prevent criminal proceedings under an unconstitutional statute when that is necessary to effectually protect property rights. P. 500.
2
A criminal statute is not lacking in due process of law merely because the application of its prohibition may be uncertain in exceptional cases; and the more clearly so where the act defined is made criminal only when performed with a specific intent to defraud. P. 501.
3
Laws of New York punishing those who sell or expose for sale meat or meat preparations falsely misrepresenting them as “Kosher,” or “ as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements,” or who sell or expose for sale in the same place both Kosher and non-Kosher meat etc., without signs indicating that both kinds are sold and labeling the articles accordirigly, do’ not violate the rights of dealers under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or infringe the Commerce Clause. Pp. 501, 503. Affirmed.
Mr. David L. Podell, with whom Mr. Benjamin S. Kirsh was on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Samuel H. Hofstadter, with whom Mr. H. H. Nord-Unger was on the brief, for Sherman, Attorney General, appellee.
Mr. Felix C. Benvenga, with whom Mr. Charles Henry was on the brief, for Banton, District Attorney, appellee.
Mr . Justice Sutherl and delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals challenge the constitutionality of cc. 580 and 581, 2 Laws of New York, 1922, pp. 1314^—1315, as being in contravention of the due process and equal protection of the law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. So far as these cases are concerned, the statutes are substantially alike, and it is enough to refer to c. 581 which provides that any person who with intent to defraud: . . . “4. Sells or exposes for sale any meat or meat preparation and falsely represents the same to be kosher, or as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements; or falsely represents any food product or the contents of any package or container to be so constituted and prepared, by having or permitting to be inscribed thereon the word ‘ kosher ’ in any language; or sells or exposes for sale in the same place of business both kosher and nonkosher meat or meat preparations who fails to indicate on his window signs and all display advertising, in block letters at least four inches in height, ‘ kosher and nonkosher meat sold here;’ or who exposes for sale in any show window or place of business p. 499497 • Opinion of the Court.
both kosher and nonkosher meat or meat products who fails to display over such meat or meat preparation so exposed a sign in block letters at least four inches in height reading ‘ kosher meat,’ or ‘ nonkosher meat,’ as the case may be,” is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Separate suits .were brought against appellees to enjoin them from proceeding against appellants for any alleged failure to comply with the foregoing statutory requirements or from making any threats of prosecuting or from conducting any prosecutions by reason of any failure to label any of the meats sold as “ not kosher ” or otherwise interfering with or seeking to prevent the full, free and unhampered sale of their products without labeling, etc., and from injuring their business “ by compelling it to be discredited in standing and reputation, and by having its merchandise wrongfully branded as ‘ nonkosher,’ in accordance with the requirements of said enactments.”
The several bills allege that appellees “ have threatened to prosecute all complaints against persons or concerns engaged as manufacturers, dealers, retailers, or otherwise in the sale of raw or prepared meat commodities, who are charged with violating the statutes; ” that by reason of these threats and of the fear inspired by the requirements of the statutes, when called upon at their peril to determine whether their products are kosher and label the same, appellants have decided and will continue to decide that all products sold by them are not kosher; that such determination has been and will be induced by the fear that some judge or jury might determine that the Rabbinical law or the customs, traditions and precedents of the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements necessitate that even such meats as appellants sell as kosher are not kosher. The bills contain allegations tending to show the impossibility or, at least, the great difficulty of determining with certainty what is kosher according to the Rabbinical law and the customs, traditions and precedents
Opinion of the Court. . 266 If. S.
of the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements; but appellants allege that whenever they could possibly determine in advance whether any meat commodity in their honest belief might be called kosher, they have sold the same as kosher, but not otherwise. The bills aver that irreparable injury to appellants’ business, property, good will and reputation will result. It does not appear that any of the appellants has ever been prosecuted for a violation of the statutes or has ever been specifically threatened with prosecution, the threats alleged being, in substance, simply that all violators of the statutes will be prosecuted. The District Court, in each case, after a hearing upon an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, upheld.the statutes, denied the injunction and dismissed the bill.
The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional. Packard n . Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 209-211; Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 217. But appellants seek to bring themselves within an exception to this general rule, namely, that a court of equity will interfere to prevent criminal prosecutions under an unconstitutional statute when that is necessary to effectually protect property rights. Packard v. Banton, supra; Terrace N. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214. That these bills disclose such a case of threatened actual and imminent injury as to come within the exception is not beyond doubt. But upon a liberal view of the decisions above cited and other decisions of this Court (see Kennington n . Palmer, 255 U. S. 100, and cases referred to in footnote), we accept the conclusion of the lower court, based on the decisions of this Court, that if the statutes under review are unconstitutional appellants are entitled to equitable relief; and pass to a consideration of the constitutional questions.
1. The specific complaint is that the word “kosher” and the phrase “ orthodox Hebrew religious requirements ” are so indefinite and uncertain as to cause the statutes to be unconstitutional for want of any ascertainable standard of guilt. It is in support of this assumption that appellants allege they are unable to determine with any degree of certainty whether a particular meat product is kosher, and, when called upon, at their peril, to make a determination and label the product accordingly, they have decided and will continue to decide that all of the products sold by them are nonkosher. But obviously the statutes put no such burden upon them, since they expressly require that any representation that a product is kosher must not only be false but made with intent to defraud. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, upholding the validity of a statute substantially the same as those now under review, in People n . Atlas, 183 App. Div. 595, 596-597, thus characterized it:
“ The purpose of the statute, manifestly, is to prevent and punish fraud in the sale of meats or meat preparation, and it only operates on those who knowingly violate its provisions, for it is expressly provided that there must be both an intent to defraud and a false representation.”
It thus appears that, whatever difficulty there may be in reaching a correct determination as to whether a given product is kosher, appellants are unduly apprehensive of the effect upon them and their business, of a wrong conclusion in that respect, since they are not required to act at their peril but only to exercise their judgment in good faith, in order to avoid coming into conflict with the statutes. Indeed, putting the statutes aside, such judgment they would be bound to exercise upon ordinary principles of fair dealing. By engaging in the business of selling kosher products they in effect assert an honest purpose to distinguish to the best of their judgment between p. 502what is and what is not kosher. The statutes require no more. Furthermore, the evidence, while conflicting, warrants the conclusion that the term 11 kosher ” has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply it, at least as a general thing. If exceptional cases may sometimes arise where opinions might differ, that is no more than is likely to occur, and does occur, in respect of many criminal statutes either upheld against attack or never assailed as indefinite. In Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376-7, this Court had before it a similar contention in respect of the Anti-Trust Act and disposed of it as follows:
“And thereupon it is said that the crime thus defined by the statute contains in its definition an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with the result that a man might find himself in prison because his honest judgment did not anticipate that of a jury of less competent men. . . .
“ But apart from the common law as to restraint of trade thus taken up by the statute the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death.”
See also, Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U. S. 86, 109; Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 434; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52; Coomer n . United States, 213 Fed. 1, 5. Many illustrations will readily occur to the mind, as for example statutes prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors and statutes prohibiting the transmission through the mail of obscene literature, neither of which have been found to be fatally indefinite because in some instances opinions differ in respect of what falls within their terms. Moreover, as already suggested, since the statutes require a specific intent to de- p. 503497 Syllabus.
fraud in order to encounter their prohibitions, the hazard of prosecution which appellants fear loses whatever substantial foundation it might have in the absence of such a requirement. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348.
2. Lewis & Fox Co. is a Massachusetts corporation conducting a general provision supply business including the shipment and sale of original packages into and within the State of New York. It is this situation which forms the basis of the contention that the commerce clause is violated. It is enough to say that the statutes now assailed are not aimed at interstate commerce, do not impose a direct burden upon such commerce, make no discrimination against it, are fairly within the range of the police power of the State, bear a reasonable relation to the legitimate purpose of the enactments, and do not conflict with any congressional legislation. Under these circumstances they are not invalid because they may incidentally affect interstate commerce. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 60-61; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 524-526.
Affirmed.
Mr . Just ice Brandeis took no part in the consideration of this case.
FARMERS & MECHANICS NATIONAL BANK OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS, v. WILKINSON, TRUSTEE, AND THE UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.
No. 487. Motion to dismiss submitted October 6, 1924.—Decided January 5, 1925.
1
When a decree of the District Court has been affirmed by a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which this Court has 19458°—25----- 36
declined to review by certiorari, questions concerning its validity and merits cannot be reopened either by the District Court or through an attempted review in this Court, by direct appeal or writ of error, of the order enforcing the mandate. P. 506.
2. An order of the District Court inflicting punishment for contempt is not ordinarily reviewable in this Cou^t by direct appeal or writ of error. Id.
3. Of writ of error and appeal, the former is the appropriate mode of review in criminal contempts; but c. 448, § 4, 39 Stat. 727, renders the distinction unimportant. P. 507.
4. An order of the District Court punishing a party for contempt in disobeying an order made to enforce a mandate from the Circuit Court of Appeals, cannot be reviewed here by direct writ of error upon the grounds that it exceeded the District Court’s jurisdiction and infringed constitutional rights, where these questions were foreclosed by the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals upon which the mandate issued. Id.
Appeal dismissed.
Appeal from an order of the District Court commanding the appellant to make a payment, as ordered by a referee in bankruptcy, and fining the appellant for contumacy in having refused to do so. The referee’s order was made in pursuance of a mandate from the Circuit Court of Appeals. See 295 Fed. 120.
Mr. Mark McMahon, for appellee, in support of the motion to dismiss or affirm. Mr. George M. Conner and Mr. Orestes Mitchell were also on the briefs.
Mr. Charles A. Boynton, for appellant, in opposition to the motion. Mr. W. E. Spell, Mr. Clay Cooke, Mr. J. A. Templeton and Mr. G. A. Stultz were also on the brief.
Mr . Justice Suthe rlan d delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Walker Grain Company, on July 27, 1918, borrowed from the American National Bank of Fort Worth, Texas, $10,000, for which it executed its demand note p. 505payable to the bank. August 16th following, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the Grain Company, upon which it was adjudicated a bankrupt. After the petition was filed the bankupt paid the amount of the note, and, thereafter, appellant succeeded to all the assets and rights and assumed all thé liabilities of the American National. Upon these facts the trustee in bankruptcy filed a motion with the referee to summarily require appellant to restore the amount of such payment. Appellant, by proper pleading, denied the jurisdiction of the referee, insisted that the trustee should proceed by a plenary suit, and alleged that the note was secured by property of the bankrupt and that the payee bank was entitled to priority of payment. The referee found that the note was not so secured, that appellant had no color of right to the payment made after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and ordered appellant to pay over to the trustee the amount received. The findings and conclusions of the referee were approved by an order of the district court, and its order was affirmed upon petition to revise by the court of appeals for the fifth circuit, 295 Fed. 120; and this court denied a petition for certiorari. 264 U. S. 588. After the mandate had gone down to the district court, the referee ordered appellant to comply therewith, but appellant refused to do so, which refusal was certified to' the district court for its action. At the same time the trustee moved the court for an order to compel compliance with the mandate. After a hearing the district court found appellant guilty of contempt, and, in addition to commanding payment of the amount ordered by the referee, imposed a fine of $2,500, as punishment for appellant’s contumacious behavior, one-half payable to the United States and one-half to the trustee in bankruptcy. From this order appellant has not only taken this appeal but also a petition to revise to the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit.
Appellee has submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal or affirm the decree of the district court upon the grounds, among others, that this court is without authority to entertain the appeal, and that there is no substance in the questions sought to be presented. The motion to dismiss must be granted.
Upon the appeal here appellant seeks a review of the order adjudging appellant in contempt and also of the jurisdictional issues disposed of by the original decree approving the action of the referee which the circuit court of appeals refused to disturb. All questions concerning the validity and merits of that decree were finally disposed of by the decree of the circuit court of appeals and the denial of the application for a certiorari by this court. The district court was bound to give effect to the decision of the circuit court of appeals; so that what, in effect, we are asked to do is to review and reverse the decree of the latter. The power here to review that decree has been exhausted; but, in any event, it could not be exercised upon direct appeal or error. Brown v. Al ton Water Co., 222 U. S. 325, 331-334; Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496, 500; Union Trust Co. n . Westhus, 228 U. S. 519, 522-524; Metropolitan Co. v. Kaw Valley District, 223 U. S 519, 522-524; Shapiro n . United States, 235 U. S. 412, 415-417.
It follows that the only questions open for consideration are those arising from the contempt order. But that order, being in part punitive, takes character from its criminal feature and, ordinarily, such an order is not open to review by this court upon direct appeal or error. O’Neal v. United States, 190 U. S. 36, 38; Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121, 122; In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 462. And see Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107,110-111; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 336-338; Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458, 461; In re Merchants’ Stock Co., 223 U. S. 639, p. 507503 Syllabus.
641-642. It may be said in passing that the case is here upon appeal not upon writ of error, the appropriate mode of review in criminal contempts; but that is unimportant under c. 448, § 4, 39 Stat. 726, 727, requiring disregard of such mistakes.
Appellant insists, however, that the jurisdiction of this court attaches upon the grounds that the district court was without jurisdiction to make the order and that there was a denial of constitutional rights. See Grant n . United States, 227 U. S. 74, 78-79. Jurisdiction of the district court here over the person and over the subject-matter of contempts is beyond question; and the challenge to the jurisdiction, as well as the assumed denial of constitutional rights, apparently, are made to rest only upon the assertion that it was not within the power of the referee or the district court, as a court of bankruptcy, to require the bank, by a summary order, to restore to the trustee the amount of the payment in question; the contention being that the only remedy was by plenary action with the right of trial by jury. Bui, since the decision of the circuit court of appeals, as already stated, is conclusively against appellant upon that issue, and prevented any further consideration of it by the district court, the asserted basis for a direct resort to this court is without any substance.
Appeal dismissed.
1
A suit lacking a necessary party defendant should be dismissed on that ground without deciding the merits. P. 510.