The Panoil, 266 U.S. 433 (1925)

266 U.S. 433
45 S. Ct. 164
69 L. Ed. 366
1924 SCDB 59
1925 U.S. LEXIS 295
US-DOC-27825562
locator
Case details
Bluebook Citation
The Panoil, 266 U.S. 433 (1925)
Full caption
THE PANOIL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 5, 1925
THE PANOIL.1
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
No. 139. Argued December 10, 1924.—Decided January 5, 1925.
The District Court has not admiralty jurisdiction of a libel in rem against a vessel for damages caused by its colliding with a spur dike, a structure mainly of wood, driven into the bed and extending out from the bank of a navigable river, the purpose of which is to improve the channel, in aid of navigation, by producing shore deposits through a slackening of water flow. P. 434. Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court in admiralty which dismissed a libel for want of jurisdiction.
Mr. J. Frank Staley, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for the United States.
We read the opinions in The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 166, and The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, as determining that, as the dike was a government public work, built and maintained as an aid to navigation, the court had jurisdiction.
Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316, and The Troy, 208 U. S. 321, involved the questions whether admiralty had jurisdiction over claims for damages caused by vessels to docks and piers, or the abutments of bridges. This Court denied jurisdiction, because “ none of these structures were aids to navigation in the maritime sense but extensions of the shore and aids to commerce on land as such.”
The Poughkeepsie, 212 U. S. 558, upon authority of the bridge and dock cases, denied jurisdiction for damages [p. 434] by vessel to pipes in the bed of the river. These pipes were being used for the purpose of locating a tunnel aqueduct under its bed. There the structures had prospectively an immediate relation to land and an exclusive anticipated connection with commerce on land.
1
The docket title of this case is United States v. Steamship “ PantnE’
In Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191, this Court discussed the question whether damage to a bridge injured by collision with a vessel was the subject of a maritime tort.
In Southern Lighterage Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 699, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided court, without opinion, a decree of the District Court, which held that the admiralty did not have jurisdiction over a claim for injuries to a cluster of mooring pilings damaged by a vessel. The District Court (284 Fed. 978) determined that the piling, if it served any purpose, was for mooring vessels or keeping them in deep water when unloading, without regard to aiding navigation.
Mr. Walter Carroll, with whom Mr. George H. Terriberry, Mr. Joseph M. Rault and Mr. W. W. Young were on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States libeled the Steamship “ Panoil ” and asked a decree for two thousand dollars because of damage inflicted upon spur dike No. 5, a structure extending into the Mississippi River. Upon exception duly taken the District Court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction of the matter and dismissed the libel.
In order to deflect the current and cause it to deepen the channel at the mouth of the river the United States built submerged dikes and sills, composed of willow mattresses weighted down with stone; also several spurs. Spur dike No. 5, located near the “ Head of the Passes,” consists of a cribwork of round piles, hewn walings and [p. 435] 433 Syllabus.
sawn cross braces, all securely bolted together, with a curtain of round piles bolted against the upstream face. It is driven into' the bed of the river and extends out about seven hundred feet from the east bank, approximately at right angles to the channel. Its special purpose is to slacken the current, induce deposits of sediment and eventually build out the shore; and in this way to improve the channel and aid navigation. Proceeding in a thick fog the “ Panoil ” struck this dike, shoved thirty feet of the channel end upstream, and so damaged it as to require rebuilding at an expense of two thousand dollars.
Appellants maintain that as the dike is an aid to navigation the court below had jurisdiction of the alleged tort, within the doctrine of The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, and The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 166. We think the principle of those cases does not go so far. The dike constitutes an extension of the shore, and must be regarded as land. The mere fact that its presence may affect the flow of the water and thereby ultimately facilitate navigation is not enough to bring the injury within the admiralty jurisdiction. Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316; The Troy, id. 321.
Affirmed.
FULLERTON-KRUEGER LUMBER COMPANY v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.
ERROR AND CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
Nos. 152 and 179. Argued December 12, 1924.—Decided January
1. A statute should not be construed retrospectively, unless express language or necessary implication requires. P. 437.
2. Transportation Act, 1920, § 206, par. (f), providing: “The period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to Federal control”, does not apply to causes barred by limitation before its passage. P. 437. 156 Minn. 20 affirmed.
Error and certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota which reversed a judgment recovered by the Lumber Company in an action to recover excessive charges alleged to have been exacted by the Railway Company on shipments between points within the State. The writ of error is dismissed.
Mr. P. L. Solether, with whom Mr. John Junell was on the brief, for plaintiff in error and petitioner.
Mr. Charles W. Bunn appeared for defendants in error and respondents.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
After suing out the writ of error, No. 152, the Lumber Company obtained a certiorari, No. 179, to review the same judgment. The record plainly discloses that a right under an act of Congress was claimed below and denied. The cause is properly here by certiorari and upon it the issue can be decided. That adequate ground for the writ of error was specially set up below is not clear. It will be dismissed.
On January 24, 1921, the original action was brought in the District Court, Hennepin County, to recover excess freight charges demanded by respondents between November 25, 1912, and September 16, 1913, in violation of § 4347, Minnesota General Statutes, 1913. Admitting original liability, the Railway Company relied upon the local statute of limitation, fixing six years as the time within which such actions must be begun. To this the [p. 437] reply was that the prescribed period of limitation had been extended by paragraph (f), § 206, Federal Transportation Act 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 462, which provides, “ The period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to Federal control.” And upon the sole point of law thus raised the cause is before us.
The petitioner maintains that Congress intended to revive actions against carriers when the period designated by the state statute for bringing them had expired during federal control and asserts that the mischief to be remedied indicates such purpose and the ordinary meaning of the words employed discloses it. The respondent insists that a statute should never be given retroactive effect where another construction is fairly permissible, as here; that if in the circumstances the act of Congress be so construed it would create new causes of action and thus permit the taking of property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, rightly, we think, that the Transportation Act was not intended to revive or restore rights of action barred before it became effective.
“ It is a rule of construction, that all statutes are to be considered prospective, unless the language is express to the contrary, or there is a necessary implication to that effect.” Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 347; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 599; Twenty Per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187; Chew Heong n. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 559; Shwdb v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 534. And see Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N. Y. 213.
Applying this rule, we find no circumstances existing when the statute in question was enacted, nor any language therein, which shows that it should be applied to causes barred by limitation before its passage.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.
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