Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O’Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O’Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924)
Full caption
SOVEREIGN CAMP WOODMEN OF THE WORLD v. O’NEILL ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 17, 1924
SOVEREIGN CAMP WOODMEN OF THE WORLD v. O’NEILL ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.
No. 58. Submitted October 9, 1924.—Decided November 17, 1924.
1. A decree of the District Court dismissing a bill upon the specific ground of want of jurisdiction is appealable directly to this Court under Jud. Code, § 238. P. 295.
2. It is a settled general rule that, in a suit based on diversity of citizenship brought against several defendants to enjoin the collection of claims against the plaintiff which are separate and distinct although depending for their validity upon a common origin, the test of jurisdiction is the amount of each separate claim, and not their aggregate amount. P. 295.
3. But there is an exception to this rule, where the bill alleges, not only that the defendants’ claims are baseless, but that they originated and are being prosecuted in pursuance of a conspiracy to embarrass and attempt to ruin the plaintiff, the amounts of the particular claims not being disputed and the validity of all depending on the same issue. P. 295.
4. In such case, the conspiracy partakes of the nature of a fraudulent conspiracy, and ties together the several claims as one claim for jurisdictional purposes, making their aggregate amount the value of the matter in controversy. P. 297. McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 415; 212 U. S. 428.
5. The objection that relief by injunction sought against proceedings in a state court is prohibited by Jud. Code, § 265, goes to the equity of the particular bill and not to the federal court’s jurisdiction of the suit. P. 298. Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274.
286 Fed. 734, reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court which dismissed, for want of jurisdiction, a bill to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting separate actions for damages in a state court and from endeavoring to collect money from the plaintiff in any other manner by reason of the . matters alleged.
Mr. T. D. Gresham for appellant. Mr. D. E. Bradshaw and Mr. J. Hart Willis were also on the brief.
No appearance for appellees.
Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity brought in the District Court by the Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, a fraternal society organized under the laws of Nebraska, against twenty-five of its members, all citizens of Texas. Federal jurisdiction was based upon the diversity of citizenship, and the matter in controversy, which, it was averred, exceeded, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars. Jud. Code, § 24, subd. 1.
The bill alleged, in substance, that the defendants had entered into an agreement and conspiracy to embarrass and attempt to ruin the Society; that pursuant to this agreement and conspiracy they endeavored at a meeting of the* Head Camp of Texas to secure their election as delegates to a session of the Sovereign Camp at New York; that they were defeated and other persons were duly elected and certified to the Sovereign Camp; that [p. 294] they contested the election and appealed to the Sovereign Camp, which decided that they had not been elected and were not entitled to be recognized as delegates or to any privileges or perquisites as such, and seated the delegates certified by the Head Camp; that under the constitution and by-laws of the Society this decision was final; that nevertheless, acting in concert and pursuant to their joint agreement and conspiracy, they had brought twenty-five separate actions at law against the Society in a local court of Texas to recover amounts ranging from $987.00 to $1,170.00, which they severally claimed as per diem and mileage allowances and traveling expenses by -reason of at-, tending the Sovereign Camp as delegates;1 that in each of these suits the same cause of action was alleged, in identical language, and only one issue was involved in all of them;2 that there was no merit in the cause of action set up by the defendants and the suits were wholly without any foundation; that if the Society were compelled to defend each of these separate suits, it would be subjected to an enormous expense; and that its remedy at law was inadequate: wherefore it prayed that the defendants be enjoined from prosecuting their separate suits in the state court or endeavoring to collect in any other manner [p. 295] any sums of money from the Society by reason of the matters alleged.
1
The bill also alleged that one of the defendants in pursuance of the conspiracy originally brought suit in the state court against the Society for $28,882, alleging that the other defendants had transferred their claims to him, but that, upon notice of a petition for removal of the suit to the federal court, he had amended his original petition by striking out the averment of such assignments and limiting his claim to the amount claimed to be due him individually; and that thereafter the other defendants had brought their separate suits in the state court.
2
It appears from the averments of the bill that the contention of the defendants was that by a secret exchange of ballot boxes forged and fraudulent votes were substituted for the true votes, and that they were elected at the original meeting after a minority of the delegates to the Head Camp had withdrawn to hold a pretended separate meeting.
The District Court, on motion of the defendants, dismissed the bill on the ground that the court was “ without jurisdiction ” thereof; being of opinion that as jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the requisite jurisdictional amount was not present, since each of the defendants claimed in his suit in the state court an amount less than $3,000, and that § 265 of the Judicial Code also deprived the court of jurisdiction. 286 Fed. 734.
As the bill was dismissed upon the specific ground of want of jurisdiction, the direct appeal to this Court was properly allowed. Jud. Code, § 238; Smith n. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 277.
1. It is the settled general rule, frequently applied by this Court in tax cases, that in a suit based on diversity of citizenship brought against several defendants to enjoin the collection of claims against the plaintiff which are separate and distinct—although depending for their validity upon a common origin—the test of jurisdiction is the amount of each separate claim, and not their aggregate amount. Walter v. Northeastern Railroad, .147 U. S. 370, 372; Northern Pacific Railroad v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391,392; Fishback v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 161U. S. 96, 100; Citizens’ Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319, 322. An exception to this general rule was, however, recognized in McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 415, 427. There the heirs of one Hiram Evans, an intestate, brought suit in the circuit court against several defendants to enjoin the enforcement of claims that had been allowed as liens upon his real estate by orders of a probate court. Each claim was less than the requisite jurisdictional amount, but their aggregate exceeded that sum. The bill alleged that these claims were not debts of the intestate, but that the defendants had conspired and confederated with the [p. 296] administrator to secure their payment out of the estate, and that the orders allowing them had been procured as the result of the conspiracy and the fraud practiced in pursuance thereof. This Court reversed a decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill, on demurrer, for want of jurisdiction, and held that, on the face of the bill, the value of the matter in dispute was “ the aggregate amount of the claims fraudulently procured by the defendants acting in combination to be allowed in the Probate Court as claims against the estate.” In the opinion, after referring to the class of cases to which Walter v. Northeastern Railroad belonged, the Court said: 11 The case before us, however, is presented by the bill in an entirely different aspect. The case may be regarded as exceptional in its facts, and may be disposed of without affecting former decisions. There is no dispute as to the amount of any particular claim. So far as the bill is concerned, if any one of the specified claims is good against the estate of Hiram Evans, then all are good . . . The matter in dispute is whether the lands . . . can be sold to pay all the claims, in the aggregate, which the defendants, by combination and conspiracy, procured the Probate Court to allow against the estate of Hiram Evans. The essence of the suit is the alleged fraudulent combination and conspiracy to fasten upon that estate a liability for debts of John Evans, which were held by the defendants and which they, acting in combination, procured, in cooperation with James Evans, to be allowed as claims against the estate of Hiram Evans. By reason of that combination, resulting in the allowance of all those claims in the Probate Court, as expenses of administering the estate of Hiram Evans, the defendants have so tied their respective claims together as to make them, so far as the plaintiffs and the relief sought by them are concerned, one claim. The validity of all the claims depends upon the same facts. The lien on the lands which is asserted by each defendant [p. 297] has its origin as well in the combination to which all were parties as in the orders of the Probate Court which, in furtherance of that combination, were procured by their joint action.”
And in McDaniel v. Traylor, 212 U. S. 428, 433—on a second appeal—in affirming a decree of the circuit court, made on return of the case, again dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction, upon a finding that the allegation that the defendants had conspired in procuring the allowance of the claims, had not been established,3 it was said: “As we have already seen, it was the fraudulent combination and conspiracy which united the claims and made the aggregate of the claims the matter in dispute. By reason of that combination we decided the claims were 1 so tied ’ together as to make them, ‘ so far as the plaintiffs and the relief sought by them are concerned, one claim.’ ”
We find that under the allegations of the present bill the case comes fairly within the reason of the exception recognized in the McDaniel Cases. It is not only alleged that the defendants’ claims are without foundation, but that they originated and are being prosecuted in the state court in pursuance of an agreement and conspiracy to embarass and attempt to ruin the Society. There is no dispute as to the amount of any particular claim; and the validity of all of them depends upon the same issue. A conspiracy to prosecute, by concert of action, numerous baseless claims against the same person for the wrongful purpose of harassing and ruining him, partakes of the nature of a fraudulent conspiracy; and in a suit to enjoin
3
On the first appeal this Court had said (p. 428): “ If the plaintiffs do not prove such a combination and conspiracy, in respect, at least, of so many of the specified claims as in the aggregate will be of the required amount, then their suit must fail for want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court; for, in the absence of the alleged combination, the claim of each defendant must, according to our decisions, be regarded, for purposes of jurisdiction, as separate from all the others.” 194'58°—25------23 /
Syllabus. 266 U. S.
them from being separately prosecuted, it must likewise be deemed to tie together such several claims as one claim for jurisdictional purposes, making their aggregate amount the value of the matter in controversy. We conclude, therefore, that, on the face of the bill, the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit by reason of the diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy.
2. The jurisdiction thus acquired was not taken away by § 265 of the Judicial Code, providing that, except in bankruptcy cases, “ the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State.” This section does not deprive a district court of the jurisdiction otherwise conferred by the federal statutes, but merely goes to the question of equity in the particular bill; making it the duty of the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to determine whether the specific case presented is one in which relief by injunction is prohibited by this section or may nevertheless be granted. Smith v. Apple, supra, p. 278.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. STATE OF TEXAS.
UNITED STATES, intervener.
IN EQUITY.
No. 13, Original. Argued November 17, 1924.—Decided November
1, A receiver appointed by this Court to conserve and operate private oil wells as an incident to an interstate boundary suit, is not subject to a state occupation tax, laid on those who engage in producing oil, based on the market value of the oil produced. P. 301. 2. But where the net proceeds of such operations by the receiver are in his hands ready to be paid over to the persons for whose [p. 299] ultimate benefit the wells were operated, and many of these have left the State or become insolvent during the receivership, so that collection by other means would be attended by embarrassment and loss, a timely petition of the State for payment of such taxes as taxes upon the several beneficiaries, from the respective funds so derived and held by the receiver, may equitably be granted. P. 302, 3. Texas held entitled to payment of unpaid taxes laid under Art. 7383, Rev. Civ. Stats, of Texas, as amended, out of net funds derived by the receiver herein from his operation of private oil wells in Texas, each well to be treated as a separate unit in computing the taxes and making the payments, the tax as to each well to be computed on its full production during the receivership, payment in each case to be limited to the net balance on hand. Id. 4. As between owners of wells and lessees, the amounts so paid for taxes shall be charged against lessees. Id.
5. The petition of Texas for payment of additional taxes, under Laws of 1917, c. 30, § 11, comes so late that it cannot equitably be allowed, since to grant it would require readjustment of many of the receiver’s accounts, delay distribution of large funds in his hands and be distinctly prejudicial to many claimants. Id.
Petition of the State of Texas that the receiver herein be directed to pay the gross production tax due under Art. 7383, Rev. Civ. Stats, of Texas, as amended, upon the oil produced in Texas during the receivership from wells in the hands of the receiver; and also a like tax under Laws of Texas, 1917, c. 30. See also, 265 U. S. 513, par. 4.
Mr. Thomas Watt Gregory and Mr. W. A. Keeling, Attorney General of the State of Texas, with whom Mr. G. Carroll Todd was on the brief, for Texas.
Mr. John Spalding Flannery for Frederic A. Delano, receiver.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the last term the State of Texas presented a petition for an order requiring the receiver to pay, out of the pro1-
Opinion of the Court. 266 U, S.
ceeds from receivership wells found to be south of the interstate boundary, the gross-production tax which the state law exacts of those who engage in producing crude oil from wells within the State. On consideration of the petition the Court issued to the receiver the instructions which are set forth in paragraph 4 of the order of June 9, last, 265 U. S. 513. The receiver collected the requisite data and otherwise prepared to make payments of the tax computed on so much of the oil produced from each well as was represented by the proceeds actually impounded in his hands. But the State questioned that mode of computation and insisted that the total production be taken as the basis of the computation; so the receiver withheld payment until the question could be brought to the attention of the Court.
In other paragraphs of the order of June 9 the receiver was instructed to make necessary preparations for closing up the receivership, to have his books and accounts examined and audited by designated public acountants, to surrender the oil wells to the rightful claimants, and to pay the net proceeds remaining in his hands to the owners, lessees, etc., entitled to them. There were pressing reasons why this work should go ahead and not be deferred until the tax question was settled. The receiver accordingly set aside from the impounded proceeds from each well, in so far as they were sufficient, the amount which would be required to pay the tax in respect of that well in the event the computation should be based on the full production; and he then proceeded with the work. That work is now far advanced, some of it being completed. The receiver’s books and accounts have been audited; statements of the receipts and expenses pertaining to each well, certified by the public acountants, have been transmitted to the several owners, lessees, etc.; the time allotted for presenting objections has expired, and the checks for the balances shown to be awaiting [p. 301] disbursement, after deducting the amount set aside for the gross-production tax and a further sum to cover remaining receivership expenses, have been drawn and are ready for transmission, save in exceptional instances where conflicting claims need to be adjusted or determined.
The State now presents a supplemental petition asking that the instructions given on the original petition be so modified as to require that payments of the gross-production tax be computed on the full production, and also to require payment of another tax not mentioned before.
The gross-production tax is prescribed by Article 7383 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas and an amendment adopted in 1923, c. 45, 2d Called Sess. It is denominated an “ occupation tax ” and is laid on all who engage in producing crude oil from wells within the State. Up to April 1,1923, the tax was one and one-half per cent, of the market value of the oil and since that date it has been two per cent.. The other tax is prescribed by § 11 of an act passed in 1917 to regulate common-carrier pipe lines engaged in transporting crude oil, c. 30, Laws 1917. It is laid on the same persons and in the same manner as the gross-production tax and is to be used in paying salaries and expenses incident to the enforcement of the pipe-line regulations. The tax is one-twentieth of one per cent, of the market value of the oil produced.
This is an interstate-boundary suit and has been entertained in virtue of the original jurisdiction which the Constitution confers on this Court in respect of controversies between States. The appointment of the receiver and the conduct of the receivership, like the other proceedings, have been in virtue of that jurisdiction. In all that the receiver has done he has been the Court’s agent and repre- * sentative. In operating the oil wells in the area in dispute he was not engaged in a business or pursuing an occupation in the ordinary acceptation of those terms, but as an officer of the Court was conserving the property within [p. 302] that area for the benefit of those to whom it ultimately might prove to belong. The State recognizes that all this is true, and so does not seek to subject the receiver to the taxes described but only to have them paid out of the proceeds of the oil production which are in his hands and ready to be paid over to those for whose ultimate benefit the wells have been operated. In other words, the State seeks, through the equitable aid of the Court, to have the taxes paid out of these proceeds before they are turned over to the beneficiaries on whom the taxes otherwise would fall. This aid is invoked on the ground that during the receivership many of the beneficiaries have become insolvent or left the State, so that the collection of the taxes by other means would be attended with embarrassment, and in some instances be impossible.
As to the gross-production tax, we think the State is equitably entitled to the refief sought, and that the amounts to be paid should be computed on the full production. Sufficient money has been set aside, and the payments can be made without material inconvenience or appreciable interruption of other work. In a few instances the tax already has been paid by parties in interest; and of course it should not be paid again. There are also instances where a part only of the proceeds was impounded and the net balance in the receiver’s hands is not sufficient to pay the full tax. In such cases the payment necessarily will be limited to the net balance in hand. Because of the difference in ownership each well should be treated as a separate unit in computing the tax and making the payments. As between owners and lessees the amounts paid should be charged against the
« lessees, on whom as between the two the tax would fall.
As to the other tax, we think the State’s request should be denied. It comes so late that the weight of equitable considerations is against its allowance. To grant it would require a readjustment of many of the receiver’s accounts; [p. 303] 298 Order.
would delay the distribution of the proceeds, which in the aggregate reach large figures, and would be distinctly prejudicial to many claimants. Other objections to it have been suggested, but they need not be considered.
An order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. STATE OF TEXAS.
UNITED STATES, intervener.
IN EQUITY.
No. 13, Original. Order entered November 18, 1924.
Order amending an earlier order (265 U. S. 513, par. 4) for payment of a gross-production tax to Texas out of funds held by the receiver and denying the State’s supplemental petition for payment of another like tax.
On consideration of the supplemental petition of the State of Texas for a modification of paragraph 4 of the order of June 9, last, it is ordered that the petition be denied in so far as it relates to the tax prescribed in § 11 of the Texas statute of February 20, 1917, regulating pipe lines,—the denial to be without prejudice to such right as the State may have to collect this tax from persons other than the receiver,—and that paragraph 4 of the said order of June 9, last, relating to the payment of the gross-production tax prescribed by Article 7383 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, as amended by an Act of June 2, 1923, be so modified as to require (a) that the amounts to be paid by the receiver be computed on the full production of each well, (b) that the payment in respect of any well be not in excess of the net proceeds from that well remaining in the receiver’s hands, (c) that the payments be only of such part of the tax as has not been paid by parties in interest, and (d) that as between owners and
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