William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)
Full caption
WILLIAM R. WARNER & COMPANY v. ELI LILLY & COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
June 9, 1924
WILLIAM R. WARNER & COMPANY v. ELI LILLY
& COMPANY.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS'FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 32. Argued April 28, 29, 1924.—Decided June 9, 1924.
1. Names which are merely descriptive of the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of an article of trade,—such as the names “ Coco-Quinine ” and “ Quin-Coco,” applied to a liquid preparation of quinine in combination with chocolate and other things,—cannot be appropriated as trademarks. P. 528.
2. The use of a name similar to that already employed by another, truthfully to describe one’s own product, is not a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the public to mistake the origin or ownership of that product. Id.
3. A first made and marketed a liquid preparation containing quinine and other drugs compounded with chocolate to give it color and flavor and to aid in suspending the quinine. B then, using chocolate, produced an article of the same taste and appearance, but sold cheaper; and to reap A’s trade suggested to retail druggists the feasibility and economy of passing off the one for the other, when dispensed out of the bottle; which was done in many and divers instances.
Held: (a) That B was guilty of unfair competition. P. 528.
(b) He who induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes the means, is equally guilty. P. 530.
(c) When several acts of unfair competition are shown, there is warrant for concluding that they will continue, and equity will afford adequate relief by injunction. P. 531.
(d) The injunction in this case should forbid B and his agents from directly or indirectly representing or suggesting to his customers the feasibility or possibility of passing off B’s product for A’s, and may well require that his original packages sold to druggists shall bear labels not only distinguishing B’s bottled product from A’s, but also stating affirmatively that B’s preparation is not to be sold or dispensed as A’s, or be used in filling prescriptions or orders calling for the latter. P. 531.
(e) But the use by B of chocolate as an ingredient of his preparation should not be forbidden. Id: 275 Fed. 752, reversed.
Certiorari to a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed a decree of the District Court dismissing on the merits a suit brought by the above named respondent to enjoin the petitioner from continuing to manufacture a medicinal preparation called Quin-Coco, if flavored with chocolate, and from continuing the use of that name.
Mr. George W. Wickersham and Mr. Francis Rawle, with whom Mr. Roger S. Baldwin and Mr. Joseph W. Henderson were on the briefs, for petitioner.
Mr. E. W. Bradford for respondent.
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical and chemical products. In 1899 it began and has ever since continued to make and sell a liquid preparation of quinine, in combination with other substances, including yerba-santa and chocolate, under the name of Coco-Quinine.
Petitioner also is a pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturer. The Pfeiffer Chemical Company, Searle & Hereth Company and petitioner are under the same ownership and control. The first named company in 1906 began the manufacture of a liquid preparation which is substantially the same as respondent’s preparation and p. 528which was put upon the market under the name of Quin-Coco. Two years later the Searle & Hereth Company engaged in the manufacture of the preparation, which ever since has been sold and distributed by petitioner.
This suit was brought in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by respondent to enjoin petitioner from continuing to manufacture and sell the preparation if flavored or colored with chocolate; and also from using the name Quin-Coco, on the ground that it was an infringement of the name Coco-Quinine, to the use of which respondent had acquired an exclusive right. The District Court decided against respondent upon both grounds. 268 Fed. 156. On appeal the Court of Appeals ruled with the District Court upon the issue of infringement but reversed the decree upon that of unfair competition. 275 Fed. 752.
The entire record is here and both questions are open for consideration.
First. We agree with the courts below that the charge of infringement was not sustained. The name Coco-Quinine is descriptive of the ingredients which enter into the preparation. The same is equally true of the name Quin-Coco. A name which is merely descriptive of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of an article of trade cannot be appropriated as a trademark and the exclusive use of it afforded legal protection. The use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his own product does not constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the public to mistake the origin or ownership of the product. Candi Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 323, 327; Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., 220 U. S. 446, 453; Rowe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U. S. 118, 140.
Second. The issue of unfair competition, on which the courts below differed, presents a question of more difficulty. The testimony is voluminous, more than two p. 529hundred witnesses having been examined; but, since the question with which we are now dealing is primarily one of fact, we have found it necessary to examine and consider it. Nothing is to be gained by reviewing the evidence at length, and we shall do no more than summarize the facts upon which we have reached our conclusions.
The use of chocolate as an ingredient has a three-fold effect: It imparts to the preparation a distinctive color and a distinctive flavor, and, to some extent, operates as a medium to suspend the quinine and prevent its precipitation. It has no therapeutic value; but it supplies the mixture with a quality of palatability for which there is no equally satisfactory substitute. Respondent, by laboratory experiments, first developed the idea of the addition of chocolate to the preparation for the purpose of giving it a characteristic color and an agreeable flavor. There was at the time no liquid preparation of quinine on the market containing chocolate, though there is evidence that it was sometimes so made up by druggists when called for. There is some evidence that petitioner endeavored by experiments to produce a preparation of the exact color and taste of that produced by respondent; and there is evidence in contradiction. We do not, however, regard it as important to determine upon which side lies the greater weight. Petitioner, in fact, did produce a preparation by the use of chocolate so exactly like that of respondent that they were incapable of being distinguished by ordinary sight or taste. By various trade methods an extensive and valuable market for the sale of respondent’s preparation already had been established when the preparation of petitioner was put on the market. It is apparent, from a consideration of the testimony, that the efforts of petitioner to create a market for Quin-Coco were directed not so much to showing the merits of that preparation as they were to demonstrating its practical identity with Coco-Quinine, and, since it was sold at a
2080°—24----- 34
lower, price, inducing the purchasing druggist, in his own interest, to substitute, as far as he could, the former for the latter. In other words, petitioner sought to avail itself of the favorable repute which had been established for respondent’s preparation in order to sell its own. Petitioner’s salesmen appeared more anxious to convince the druggists with whom they were dealing that Quin-Coco was a good substitute for Coco-Quinine and was cheaper, than they were to independently demonstrate its merits. The evidence establishes by a fair preponderance that some of petitioner’s salesmen suggested that, without danger of detection, prescriptions and orders for Coco-Quinine could be filled by substituting Quin-Coco. More often, however, the feasibility of such a course was brought to the mind of the druggist by pointing out the identity of the two preparations and the enhanced profit to be made by selling Quin-Coco because of its lower price. There is much conflict in the testimony; but on the whole it fairly appears that petitioner’s agents induced the substitution, either in direct terms or by suggestion or insinuation. Sales to druggists are in original bottles bearing clearly distinguishing labels and there is no suggestion of deception in those transactions; but sales to the ultimate purchasers are of the product in its naked form out of the bottle; and the testimony discloses many instances of passing off by retail druggists of petitioner’s preparation when respondent’s preparation was called for. That no deception was practiced on the retail dealers, and that they knew exactly what they were getting is of no consequence. The wrong was in designedly enabling the dealers to palm off the preparation as that of the respondent. Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720; N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Manufg. Co., 77 Fed. 869, 875, 877-878; Lever n. Goodwin, L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 1, 3; Enoch Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Whittier-Coburn Co., 118 Fed. 657, 661. One who induces another to commit a p. 531fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is equally guilty and liable for the injury. Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co., 46 Fed. 188, 189.
The charge of unfair competition being established, it follows that equity will afford relief by injunction to prevent such unfair competition for the future. Several acts of unfair competition having been shown, we are warranted in concluding that petitioner is willing to continue that course of conduct, unless restrained. Hennessy v. Wine Growers’ Ass’n, 212 Fed. 308, 311. It remains to consider the character and extent of this relief.
Respondent has no exclusive right to the use of its formula. Chocolate is used as an ingredient not alone for the purpose of imparting a distinctive color, but for the purpose also of making the preparation peculiarly agreeable to the palate, to say nothing of its effect as a suspending medium. While it is not a medicinal element in the preparation, it serves a substantial and desirable use, which prevents it from being a mere matter of dress. It does not merely serve the incidental use of identifying the respondent’s preparation, Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., supra, p. 724, and it is doubtful whether it should be called a non-essential. The petitioner or anyone else is at liberty under the law to manufacture and market an exactly similar preparation containing chocolate and to notify the public that it is being done. Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U. S. 375, 380; Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190. But the imitator of another’s goods must sell them as his own production. He cannot lawfully palm them, off on the public as the goods of his competitor. The manufacturer or vendor is entitled to the reputation which his goods have acquired and the public to the means of distinguishing between them and other goods; and protection is accorded against unfair dealing whether there be a technical trademark or not. The wrong is in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those p. 532of another. Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665, 674. If petitioner had been content to manufacture the preparation and let it make its own way in the field of open and fair competition, there would be nothing more to be said. It was not thus content, however, but availed itself of unfair means, either expressly or tacitly, to impose its preparation on the ultimate purchaser as and for the product of respondent.
Nevertheless, the right to which respondent is entitled is that of being protected against unfair competition, not of having the aid of a decree to create or support, or assist in creating or supporting, a monopoly of the sale of a preparation which everyone, including petitioner, is free to make and vend. The legal wrong does not consist in the mere use of chocolate as an ingredient, but in the unfair and fraudulent advantage which is taken of such use to pass off the product as that of respondent. The use dissociated from the fraud is entirely lawful, and it is against the fraud that the injunction lies. But respondent being entitled to relief, is entitled to effective relief; and any doubt in respect of the extent thereof must be resolved in its favor as the innocent producer and against the petitioner, which has shown by its conduct that it is not to be trusted. Clearly, the relief should extend far enough to enjoin petitioner, and its various agents, from, directly or indirectly, representing or suggesting to its customers the feasibility or possibility of passing off Quin-Coco for Coco-Quinine. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner should be unconditionally enjoined from the use of^chocolate. We think this goes too far; but, having regard to the past conduct of petitioner, the practices of some druggists to which it has led, and the right of respondent to an effective remedy, we think the decree fairly may require that the original packages sold to druggists shall not only bear labels clearly distinguishing petitioner’s bottled product from the bottled product of
526 Statement of the Case.
respondent, but that these labels shall state affirmatively that the preparation is not to be sold or dispensed as Coco-Quinine or be used in filling prescriptions or orders calling for the latter. With these general suggestions, the details and form of the injunction can be more satisfactorily determined by the District Court. The decree of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
UNITED STATES AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. NEW RIVER COMPANY ET AL.
SLAB FORK COAL COMPANY ET AL. v. NEW RIVER COMPANY ET AL.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA.
Nos. 627 and 628. Argued April 24, 1924.—Decided June 9, 1924.
1. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in form dismissing a complaint of shippers but the effect of which was to require the observance of a rule of car distribution attacked in the proceedings as arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional, held not a " negative ” order, (Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, distinguished,) and reviewable in the District Court. P. 539.
2. The courts cannot substitute their judgment for the findings and conclusions of the Commission made within the scope of its power to regulate the distribution of coal cars. P. 541.
3. A rule fixing the number of cars distributable to coal mines in proportion to the daily capacity of each to produce, held not arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of due process, as applied to mines served by more than one carrier. P. 542.
293 Fed. 460, reversed.
Appeals from a final decree of the District Court enjoining the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission respecting distribution of coal p. 534cars. The suit was brought by the New River Company and other coal mine operators, (appellees), against two railroad companies, the United States and the Commission. Other coal operators intervened to defend the order. The United States and the Commission took one appeal, and the interveners another. The carrier defendants abstained.
Mr. Blackbum Esterline, Assistant to the Solicitor General, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. George T. Bell for appellants in No. 628.
Mr. James W. Carmalt, with whom Mr. Addison C. Burnham and Mr. August G. Gutheim were on the brief, for appellees.
Mr. J. Carter Fort, with whom Mr. P. J. Farrell was on the brief, for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the appellees against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and the Virginian Railway Company, competing interstate carriers by railroad, the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission to enjoin the carriers from applying a certain rule (Rule 4 of Circular CS-31, Revised) for the distribution of coal cars and to set aside the decision and order of the Commission of December 11, 1922, in certain proceedings instituted by the appellees against the defendant carriers.
For convenience, a mine served by one carrier is called a * local mine ”, and a mine served by two or more carriers a 11 joint mine ”. Each appellee is the operator of a joint mine served by the defendant carriers, and each appellant mining company is the operator of a local mine p. 535served by one or the other of the carriers. The car service rules were promulgated to govern uniformly the “ ratings” of coal mines, other than anthracite, and car distribution to such mines during periods of car shortage. The daily rating of a local mine for any month is based on its tonnage shipped during the preceding month, and is identical with its daily capacity to produce coal. The rating of a joint mine is calculated in the same way that the daily rating of a local mine is determined, except that its shipments over all carriers serving it are considered in determining its total capacity to produce coal. The figure so ascertained is called the “ gross daily rating,” in • recognition of the fact that the rating of a joint mine does not represent its capacity to ship over each carrier on days when it uses more than one, but on the contrary represents its total daily capacity to ship over all lines which serve it. Rule 4 provides: “ Copies of orders for cars for a mine that is joint with any other carrier (steam, electric, or water) shall be filed with a designated representative of each such carrier. Such combinations must not exceed the gross daily rating of the mine ”. Under the rules, when a mine orders less than its rating, distribution to it is on the basis of its orders.
These rules were established during the period of federal control of the railroads. After the expiration of .that period, the Commission issued a notice, dated March 2, 1920, recommending to carriers and shippers that the rules be continued in effect until experience and further study demonstrated that others would be more effective and beneficial. They were continued by carriers generally. July 8, 1920, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and the Virginian Railway Company asked for permission to discontinue rule 4 and to substitute for it the “ 150 per cent, rule ”, which the Commission in 1912 had found to be a reasonable rule for the Illinois Central Railroad Company (In re Irregularities in Mine Ratings, 25 p. 536I. C. C. 286, 295), but which had never been followed by the railroads generally or by the defendant carriers. Under this rule, a joint mine may order 100 per cent, of its gross daily rating from either carrier serving it and is entitled to receive its pro rata share of that carrier’s available cars. If it so orders, it is not entitled to any cars from the other carrier. In this respect, it does not differ from rule 4. However, if a joint mine served by two carriers orders cars from both on the same day, it is entitled to order from each carrier 75 per cent, of its gross daily rating, making its combined orders 150 per cent., but subject to the limitation that it is not entitled to receive in the aggregate more than its gross daily rating. The Commission declined to give permission to substitute the 150 per cent, rule for rule 4.
January 11, 1921, appellees filed separate complaints with the Commission against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company and against the Virginian Railway Company, attacking rule 4 as unjust and unreasonable and unduly prejudicial to joint mines and unduly preferential of local mines. Certain operators of joint mines intervened in support of the complaints. Certain operators of local mines intervened in support of rule 4. The complaints were consolidated with each other and with similar complaints. June 21, 1921, Division 5 of the Commission reported as follows: . We find that rule 4 of Circular CS-31, Revised, is unreasonable and unduly prejudicial to joint mines and unduly preferential of local mines, to the extent that it limits the aggregate orders of the joint mine to 100 per cent, of its rating from both roads; and that for the future during periods of car shortage defendants should distribute cars to the joint mines on their lines here considered on the basis outlined in the Illinois Case [In re Irregularities in Mine Ratings, suprd\ . . Fairmont & Cleveland Coal Co. v. Balti~ more & Ohio R. R. Co., 62 I. C. C. 269, 276. The p. 537Commission referred to its authority under § 1 (13) of the Interstate Commerce Act by general or special orders to require carriers by railroad to file their rules and regulations with respect to car service, and to direct that such rules and regulations be incorporated in the schedules showing rates, fares and charges for transportation, and be subject to the provisions of the act relating thereto; and added, “ We have not required that car service rules be filed as tariff schedules. We will not in this proceeding direct that the rules which we herein find to be reasonable be so filed. We shall expect, however, that defendants will promptly amend their car service rules so as to conform with our findings and evidence same by filing copies thereof with us.” No formal order was entered, but the defendant carriers amended their rules to conform to the findings in the report, and put in force and applied the 150 per cent. rule.
Subsequently, on petition of the intervening operators of the local mines, the case was reopened and considered by the full Commission. December 11, 1922, it reversed the findings of Division 5 and found that rule 4 was not unreasonable or unduly prejudicial. Bell & Zoller Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R. R. Co., 74 I. C. C. 433. It said: “Our former conclusions in the Fairmont Case, based upon a mistaken adherence to and extension of the decision in the Illinois Case, are reversed.” The Commission made a formal order, reciting that it had “ made and filed a report containing its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which said report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof: It is ordered, That the complaints in these proceedings be, and they are hereby, dismissed.” Following the report and order, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and the Virginian Railway Company gave notice to the appellees that they would put rule 4 in effect again.
Thereupon this suit was brought. The complaint alleged that the carriers put the rule in effect because of the order of the Commission, and in fear of the penalties imposed by law for violation of its orders. It attacked the order and rule on the ground that they are beyond the power which the Commission can constitutionally exercise; and are in excess of the power conferred upon it by statute; and that they are arbitrary and unreasonable. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company answered that the effect of the order upon it was necessarily the same as though the order had been in affirmative form, requiring it to cease and desist publishing and observing the Illinois rule (150 per cent, rule) and in lieu thereof to publish and observe rule 4; and that, facing the danger of suits for heavy damages, supported by a decision and reparation orders which it believed would follow its failure to observe the rule prescribed by the Commission, it undertook to cancel the existing rule and to restore rule 4. The Virginian Railway Company answered that in the matter of distribution of cars, it was subject to the orders of the Commission, and that the Commission having decided that rule 4 is not unreasonable or unduly prejudicial, and in the, same decision having expressly reversed its conclusion in the Fairmont Case, that company considered itself legally bound to put rule 4 in effect on its railroad. The United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission moved to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction and want of equity. The interveners moved to dismiss and later answered.
The case was presented to and heard by a court of three judges. Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 220. The operation of the order of the Commission was stayed and suspended. After trial, final decree was entered setting aside the Commission’s order and rule 4 and enjoining the United States, the Commission and the defendant carriers from restricting the rights of appellees in p. 539accordance with the order and rule or through any other order or rule to the same effect. 293 Fed. 460. The United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission appealed. No. 627. The interveners appealed. No. 628. The carriers did not appeal.
The questions for decision are: Whether the order was subject to review by the District Court; and, if so, whether it should be set aside.
1. The District Courts have jurisdiction over “ cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539; Judicial Code, § 207, Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1148; Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219. The appellants contend the order is negative and therefore not subject to review by the court. They cite Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282; Hooker v. Knapp, 225 U. S. 302, and Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412. In the first of these cases, application was made by the Procter & Gamble Company, a shipper and owner of tank cars, to be relieved from paying demurrage charges, in accordance with demurrage rules applied by the carrier. The Commission dismissed the complaint. As shown by the report (19 I. C. C. 556, 560), the reason for dismissal was that the tank cars were made subject to the demurrage rules, by an arrangement between the shipper owning the cars and the carrier hauling them. The question before this Court (p. 292) was whether the Commerce Court had power to exert its own judgment by originally interpreting the administrative features of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and upon that assumption to treat the refusal of the Commission to grant the relief prayed for as an affirmative order, and accordingly to pass on its correctness. Hooker v. Knapp and Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. United States were decided on the authority of the Procter & Gamble Case. p. 540The opinion in that case, when viewed in the light of the report of the Commission, furnishes no support for appellants’ contentions here. In all of these cases, affirmative relief sought was denied by the Commission. Judicial review was refused on that ground. The taking of jurisdiction in such cases would involve determination by the courts whether relief denied by the Commission, in the exercise of its powers, should be granted. See The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258. The authority conferred upon the Commerce Court by § 207 of the Judicial Code was vested in the District Courts by the Act of October 22,1913, and, like the authority previously exercised by the Federal Circuit Courts, is confined to determining whether the Commission’s order violates the Constitution, or exceeds the power delegated by statute, or is an exercise of power so arbitrary as virtually to transcend the authority conferred. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423, 439; Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 483, 489. See also Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 470; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 547; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 490; Skinner & Eddy Corporation v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 562.
The mere fact that the order of the Commission dismisses the complaint of shippers against rule 4 does not make it a negative order. That rule, promulgated during federal control, was continued in effect upon the recommendation of the Commission until it decided, June 21, 1921, that the rule was unduly prejudicial to joint mines and unduly preferential of local mines, and that the carriers should distribute cars to joint mines on the basis of the 150 per cent. rule. The Commission refrained from making an order that the rule be filed as a tariff schedule, but announced that it expected the carriers p. 541promptly to amend their car service rules to conform with its findings. Accordingly, the carrier ceased to apply rule 4 and applied the 150 per cent, rule in its place. When the case was reopened before the Commission, the contest was between the operators of local mines attacking the 150 per cent, rule and the operators of joint mines supporting that rule and objecting to rule 4. The Commission reversed its former findings and decided in favor of rule 4 and dismissed the complaints assailing that rule. The order expressly includes the findings and conclusions stated in the report. It is not merely negative. Clearly, the order permits and authorizes the carriers to apply rule 4. If that rule is illegal, as alleged, such permission and authority will not sustain it, and suit will lie to set it aside. The Chicago Junction Case, supra. Plainly it was the intention and purpose of the Commission that rule 4 should be applied in place of the 150 per cent. rule. The effect of the order is to grant the relief sought by the operators of local mines. We hold that the District Court had jurisdiction.
2. Appellees contend that each operator of a joint mine has a legal right to its fair share of the car supply of each carrier serving the mine; that the operator on any day may offer the prospective output of the mine to any carrier serving it and is entitled on that basis to its share of the carrier’s available cars, and that, if any portion of the output remains, the operator may offer it to the second carrier and is entitled to a fair share of that carrier’s available cars. This practice is forbidden by rule 4, approved by the order of the Commission. The court below held the order invalid as discriminatory in that it deprived the operator of a joint mine of an advantage to which it has a legal right.
The Interstate Commerce Act confers power on the Commission to regulate the distribution of cars. See § 1, (3), (4), (6), (10), (11), (12), (14); § 3 (1); § 15 (1). p. 542And its jurisdiction over the subject is exclusive. Interstate Commerce Commission n. Illinois Central R. R. Co., supra, 472; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481, 493; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 230 U. S. 304, 313; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121, 131, 133; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Clark Coal Co., 238 U. S. 456, 468; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Stineman Coal Co., 242 U. S. 298, 300. The courts will not review determinations of the Commission made within the scope of its powers or substitute their judgment for its findings and conclusions. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., supra, 470; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., supra, 547; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, 456; United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 235 U. S. 314, 320; Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, 488.
Under rule 4, an operator of a local mine is entitled on the basis of its daily rating to its pro rata share of the available cars of the carrier serving it. An operator of a joint mine is not confined to any one carrier serving it. It may order from each carrier, but the total number of cars ordered may1 not exceed the gross daily rating of the mine. It may select the carrier which at the time has the better car supply and receive its pro rata share of that supply according to its gross daily rating, based on its capacity to ship by all carriers. It may choose between the carriers to secure the service, connections and markets it desires to have. The determination of the Commission in favor of rule 4 cannot be said to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to transcend the power conferred upon it in respect to car distribution. The contention that the order of the Commission deprives operators of joint mines of their property without due process of law is without merit.
Decree reversed. p. 543533 McKenna, J., dissenting.
Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting.
Let me state the proposition of the opinion denuded of the confusion of its words. It is that the owner of property—a “ joint mine,” to use the designation of the case—having available to him the car facilities of two carriers, must yield his advantage or some of it to the owner of a “ local mine ” (to use the designation of the case) who is not so situated.
I am unable to assent and yet I hesitate to dissent,—certainly hesitate to do so by unsupported declaration. I am, however, puzzled to go beyond declaration. Exposition seems to be that of demonstrating the certainty and self-evidence of an axiom. The doctrine of the opinion *is that the Interstate Commerce Commission, and this Court in sustaining it, can take from property an attribute, almost as tangible an attribute as its physical substance—that is, its position, that which avails and makes wealth of its products. This, in my opinion, is a deprivation of property. I repeat, to have it intimately in our attention and estimation, that the doctrine of the opinion is that the owner of a “ joint mine ” may not avail of the cars accessible to his situation—cars of two carriers—only in a degree—he must yield in other degree the full advantage of his position to the owner of a “ local mine ” that the latter may have accommodation. And why? Is it the dictate of public interest? And if public interest may so dictate, may it not dictate other constituents and conditions of property,—whatever contributes to its value and is formidable to a competitor?
Position of property is as much a constituent of its value as' its composition. A market for its products is as necessary as its products. * There must be demand for the products and means of their supply, and both, I repeat, are attributes of property. Indeed, they constitute its value aside from its utility. Take them away or limit p. 544them and you take away or limit its value—its right and exercise—its existence.
Property has adversaries in this world and different forms excite different degrees of antagonism, but we have not yet attained to that subserviency of regulation that one owner of property must surrender the advantage of his position to every other owner, giving up what is of value to him, and what was of cost to him.
And what is the justification—the interest of the public? Is it an exercise of eminent domain? Under the fundamental law it is a condition of the exercise of eminent domain that it recompense the detriment it causes or the property it takes. This would seem so elementary as to require no exposition. If one property oxyner may be required to share his means of reaching markets with another property owner, why not the markets; and having customers of a definite portion of the alphabet, be required to remand the rest of it to other property owners?
One residing in this town should need no illustration of the advantage of position. One can not step out on the streets without having thrust upon him the evidence of the eager push of business to advantageous positions, recognizing their value and paying with eager competition the increase of price.
According to the doctrine of the opinion, the inducement does not exist in a coal mine, but whatever advantage of instrumentalities it has it must share in the public interest with a competitor. If so, why not all instrumentalities—those it owns as well as those that by its position it is able to obtain.
Nor is the proposition of the opinion justified because it Is the disposition of an instrumentality of a public service corporation. I repeat, that an owner of property is entitled in the exercise of his rights and satisfaction of his needs to demand service of the carriers to which he p. 545533 Syllabus.
has relation according to his rights and needs, and in the order of their requisition, and the ability of the carrier.
I concur in the reasoning of Commissioner Potter. 11 We may not restrict the use of transportation facilities in order to equalize mine operation. To do so would be to require discrimination in the use of equipment—not remove it. If a local mine is at a disadvantage it is not because of a transportation problem with which we may deal. . . .”
The question in the case is made obscure by an attempt at its simplification. It seems the prompt assurance of self evidence that a mine owner with the facilities of two railroads may order such number of cars from both railroads as he may need, this being a right relative to his property, indisputably an element of its value, represented in its price and the cost to him.
I think, therefore, the decree should be affirmed.
JAMES EVERARD’S BREWERIES v. DAY, PROHIBITION DIRECTOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
EDWARD AND JOHN BURKE, LIMITED, v. BLAIR, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ET AL.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Nos. 200 and 245. Argued March 4, 5, 1924.—Decided June 9, 1924.
1. Section 2 of the Supplemental Prohibition Act of November 23, 1921, in so far as it prevents physicians from prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes, is constitutional. P. 557. 2. This provision does not violate the Tenth Amendment, since it is not an invasion of power reserved to the States. P. 558. 3. It is supported both by the implied power of Congress to make laws necessary and proper for executing powers expressly granted
2080°—24----- 35
Argument for Appellant in No. 245. 265 U.S.
(Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18,) and by the clause of the Eighteenth Amendment specifically conferring power to enforce by “ appropriate legislation ” the prohibition of traffic in intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. P. 558.
4. The Court cannot say, in face of the contrary affirmation by Congress, that prohibiting traffic in intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes has no real or substantial relation to the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. P. 560.
5. Nor can it be held that the act is an arbitrary and unreasonable prohibition of the use of valuable medicinal agents, in view of the determination of Congress, and the evidence supporting it, that intoxicating malt liquors possess no substantial and essential medicinal properties, which, as respects the public health, cannot be supplied by permitting physicians to prescribe spirituous and vinous intoxicating liquors in addition to non-intoxicating malt liquors. P. 561.
6. Dealers in beer, ale and stout, who were prevented by the act from disposing of stocks acquired before it was passed, were not thereby deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. P. 563.
Affirmed.
Appeals from decrees of the District Court which dismissed the bills, for want of equity, in two suits brought by manufacturers and dealers in intoxicating malt liquors, to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and other officials, from enforcing a Supplemental Prohibition Act.
Mr. Samuel W. Moore, with whom Mr. Marcus L. Bell was on the briefs, for appellant in No. 245.
I. The allegation that Guinness’s Stout is a valuable medicinal agent, is to be taken as true, for the purposes of this appeal, notwithstanding the provisions of the Willis-Campbell Act, being admitted by the motion to dismiss.
How can Congress, acting under a constitutional grant of authority to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, prohibit the sale of a recognized medicinal agent for medicinal pur- p. 547545 Argument for Appellant in No. 245.
poses? The National Prohibition Act itself recognizes the value of malt as well as other liquor for medicinal purposes, and contains carefully drawn provisions which permit the use of intoxicants for medicinal purposes.
The sale and use of sacramental wines, the use of liquor in hospitals and sanitariums, and the use of industrial alcohol are also permitted. A great number of regulations have been made by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Treasury Department, throwing safeguards and restrictions around the sale and prescription of intoxicating liquor for medicinal purposes.
The Eighteenth Amendment did not clothe Congress with the general power to invade the domain of medical authority, or to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the attending physician. Much less may it select a recognized therapeutic agent, such as Guinness’s Stout, and declare that it may not be prescribed for a patient, even though the attending physician regards it as essential or indispensable in bringing about a restoration to health. If Congress can select one recognized medical agent, and lawfully prohibit its use, there is no limit to which it may not go. United States v. Freund, 290 Fed. 411; Lambert v. Yellowley, 291 Fed. 640.
The determination of questions of fact is a judicial and not a legislative question. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282; Producers Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312.
II. The grant of power contained in the Eighteenth Amendment is limited by the reservations of the Tenth Amendment. The two amendments effect a division of legislative power over intoxicating liquor, the Congress and state legislatures being vested with concurrent legislative power over intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, and the legislatures of the several States retaining p. 548exclusive legislative power over intoxicating liquor for non-beverage purposes. United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377.
It is true that Congress in the exercise of a delegated power, such as the power to prohibit the use of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, possesses the incidental power to enact such laws and make such regulations as will effectively prevent the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquor for the prohibited purposes; but the exercise of this incidental power must stop short of the actual prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for non-beverage purposes. Otherwise the legislative. control of the several States over intoxicating liquor for non-beverage purposes, reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be nullified.
The incidental power of Congress to give full effect to a delegated power cannot, consistently with the Tenth Amendment, wholly deprive the States of the power which that amendment reserves to them. In other words, judicial construction cannot write into the Eighteenth Amendment authority to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for non-beverage purposes, as well as for beverage purposes. To do so would be to strike the words “ for beverage purposes ” from the amendment. Had the amendment when submitted to the legislatures of the several States contained a delegation of authority to Congress to prohibit the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquor for non-beverage, as well as beverage, purposes, there is no reason to suppose that it would have received the ratification it did.
It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind that the power over the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, similar to the power to regulate intrastate and interstate commerce, is a divided power, a part of this power being vested in the general government and a part p. 549545 Argument for Appellant in No. 245.
being reserved to state governments. The state powers may not encroach upon the power of Congress, nor may the power of Congress encroach upon the state power to the extent of occupying the entire legislative field. The Constitution itself creates a dividing line which neither may cross.
It should also be borne in mind that this is not a case where Congress acts in the exercise of a power covering the entire legislative field, as it did in Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264.
Nor is it like the case of Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, where an act of the Legislature of Mississippi prohibiting the sale of malt liquors was upheld. There the state authority was exclusive, covering the entire legislative field, and it could regulate or prohibit as its public policy might require. In neither case was there any constitutional division of power between national and state governments.
III. The incidental power possessed by Congress to make effective its power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, cannot be constitutionally exercised so as wholly to prohibit its sale for non-beverage purposes.
There are well-recognized limitations upon the incidental power of Congress to make effective the exercise of its authority under an express or delegated power. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44. The right to control this subject matter has been exclusively reserved to the several States. While it may be incidentally affected by proper congressional action, it cannot be wholly destroyed. Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463. “
The Tenth Amendment is a limitation imposed by the Constitution upon the action of Congress, and this p. 550limitation should receive a liberal, and not a narrow construction. Fairbank n. United States, 181 U. S. 283; Monongahela Nav. Co. n. United States, 148 U. S. 312; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161; United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113; Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46.
Congress may go no further than is reasonably necessary to put an end to traffic in intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563.
The effect of the Eighteenth and Tenth Amendments, considered together, is to vest in the several States the power to regulate or prohibit the use of malt liquors for non-beverage purposes. The effect of this act, if valid, is to divest the States of every shred of authority over the subject.
IV. The enforcement of the act will deprive the appellant of its property without due process of law, and take its property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385; Caldwell v. Texas 137 U. S. 692; Leeper n . Texas, 139 U. S. 462; Giozza n. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657; McGhee, Due Process of Law, p. 60; Willoughby, Const., pp. 873, 874.
The act made no provision for compensating the appellant for the loss which it would sustain from its enforcement, nor did it postpone the effective date of the act for a period during which the appellant might dispose of its stock. Immediately upon its passage it was approved, and at once became effective. Ruppert n. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, and Mugler n. Kansas, 123 U. 8. 623, distinguished.
545 Argument for Appellant in No. 200.
Mr. Nathan Ballin, with whom Mr. William M. K. Olcott and Mr. Walter E. Ernst were on the brief, for appellant in No. 200.
I. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the use of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes only. Op. Atty. Gen., March 3, 1921; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146; Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264; National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350.
In Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, it was decided only that the State might in the exercise of its police power prohibit the use of non-intoxicating malt liquors in order effectually to carry out its state prohibition. There cannot, in the course of that opinion, be found any specific authority to hold that what was permitted to the States, was likewise delegated to Congress, for the prohibition of liquors for medicinal purposes was not included in the delegation of power covered by the Eighteenth Amendment. It is apparent that the power of the States to enforce prohibition, resting on the general rights of the State to regulate the health of its citizens, was a broader function, and not subject to the limitation which has been fastened upon Congress by the express language of the Eighteenth Amendment.
The distinction between national and state functions still remains, and the powers which are undelegated still rest in the States.
Among these functions, the power to regulate health was never delegated by the States to Congress, and is, therefore, a power expressly reserved to the States. It is apparent that the right to practice medicine, the right to manufacture drugs, and the right to manufacture liquors for medicinal purposes, still exist undisturbed, and that Congress has no express power to interfere with these rights. If, in the regulation of national prohibition for beverage purposes, it becomes necessary to establish certain restrictions upon the manufacture of p. 552intoxieating liquors for non-prohibited purposes, these restrictions must always be taken in connection with the constitutional right of the individual to enjoy those privileges of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, which are guaranteed to him under the Constitutions not only of the United States, but also of the States.
In the decisions of this Court, this distinction is manifested in the cases in which acts of Congress have been held to be unconstitutional because they violate state functions, or because Congress has transcended its power. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521.
That the exercise of the regulation of health is purely a matter of state control is exemplified in Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138; and Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308.
More recently this Court has held that the power of Congress, even though intended to be beneficial, may not be asserted in respect to a purely state function. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20.
The power of the State in respect of health has also been recognized by such cases as Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; and Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, in all of which the power of the State to regulate vaccination and the practice of medicine is distinctly asserted and established as a state and not a national function. See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251. United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, distinguished.
A striking illustration of the constitutional right of a person to be treated medicinally as he chooses, or in fact, not to be treated at all, appears in People n. Cole, 219 N. Y. 98.
II. The prohibition of intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes is neither an appropriate nor areasonable exercise of the prohibitory power of Congress.
The power to prohibit the use of liquors as a beverage does not extend to the power to prohibit them as a medi- p. 553545 Argument for Appellant in No. 200.
cine. Sarris v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 427; Freund, Police Power, p. 210; Lambert v. Yellowley, 291 Fed. 640; United States n. Freund, 290 Fed. 411.
May a legislature declare a scientific fact because it has instituted some investigation? Because of such investigation, may Congress arbitrarily assume that malt liquors have no medicinal properties? In its last analysis, the scientific or medicinal value of the product should rest with the physician. Congress has transgressed not only the constitutional right of the physician to determine what is beneficial for his patients, but also the constitutional right of the patient to receive from the physician the prescription of malt liquors, if the physician deems it best for the health of his patient. In this enactment Congress assumed a function which it did not constitutionally possess. The power to define what is intoxicating, namely, the limitation to an alcoholic content of % of one per cent., may not be extended so as to give Congress power, also, to declare non-medicinal a form of liquor which has been recognized by leading physicians as having marked medicinal and therapeutic properties.
Mr. Joseph S. Auerbach, with whom Mr. Martin A. Schenck was on the brief, on behalf of Samuel W. Lambert, by special leave of Court, as amicus curiae.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck, with whom Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt and Mr. Mahlon D. Kiejer were on the brief, for appellees.
Mr. H. H. Griswold, on behalf of the Attorneys General of the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming, by special leave of Court, as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two cases were heard together. They involve the single question whether § 2 of the Supplemental Prohibition Act of November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, is constitutional, in so far as it prevents physicians from prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes. This section of the act provides: “That only spirituous and vinous liquor may be prescribed for medicinal purposes, and all permits to prescribe and prescriptions for any other liquor shall be void.”
The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “ the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States . . . for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited” (§ 1); and that “ Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” (§2.)
The National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305), enacted in pursuance of this Amendment, provides that no person shall “ manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor ” except as authorized in the act, and that all its provisions shall be liberally construed to the end that “ the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage ” may be prevented, Tit. II, § 3; that intoxicating liquor “ for nonbeverage purposes” may be manufactured, sold, etc., “but only” as provided in the act, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may issue permits therefor, lb., § 3; that no one shall manufacture, sell or prescribe intoxicating liquor without first obtaining a permit from the Commissioner, § 6; that no permit shall be issued for the sale of intoxicating liquor at retail except through a pharmacist licensed to dispense medicine prescribed by physicians,
§ 6; that no one shall be given a permit to prescribe intoxicating liquor except a licensed practicing physician, § 6; that no one but a physician holding such permit shall issue any prescription for intoxicating liquor, § 7; and that not more than a pint of “ spirituous liquor ” shall be prescribed for the same person within any period of ten days, § 7.
Under the Regulations adopted by the Treasury Department after the passage of the act, physicians obtaining permits were authorized to prescribe only distilled spirits, wines, and certain alcoholic medicinal preparations. T. D. 2985. In October, 1921, pursuant to an opinion of the Attorney General that the Commissioner might issue permits for the manufacture of beer and other intoxicating malt liquors, as well as whisky and vinous liquors, for medicinal purposes (32 Ops. Atty. Gen. 467), the Regulations were amended so as to authorize the Commissioner to issue permits for the manufacture of intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes, and to permit physicians to prescribe them. T. D. 3239.
In November Congress passed the Supplemental Act now in question, containing in § 2, as has been stated, the provision that “only spirituous and vinous liquor may be prescribed for medicinal purposes,” and that all prescriptions for any other liquor1 and permits therefor shall be void. The direct effect of this provision is to prohibit physicians from prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes, and the Commissioner from issuing permits authorizing such prescriptions. This section also limits prescriptions for vinous liquor to one- p. 556fourth of a gallon, containing not more than 24 per centum of alcohol, and provides that the vinous and spirituous liquor prescribed for any person within any period of ten days shall not contain more than one-half pint of alcohol.
1
The word “liquor” is used as meaning “intoxicating liquor” as defined in the Prohibition Act (Tit. II, § 1), including beer, ale, porter, and any malt liquor containing one-half of one per centum of alcohol by volume and fit for use for beverage purposes. Supp. Act, § 1.
James Everard’s Breweries, the plaintiff in the first case, is a New York corporation. Prior to the passage of the Prohibition Act it had been engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer and other intoxicating malt liquors. After the Treasury Regulations had been amended, it obtained a permit for the manufacture of intoxicating malt liquor for medicinal purposes, and brewed a large quantity of beer, ale and stout for sale to pharmacists for resale on physician’s prescriptions. When the Supplemental Act was passed it had on hand a large quantity of these intoxicating malt liquors which it could not thereafter sell in the conduct of its business, and of which it could only dispose, after de-alcoholization, at a heavy loss.
Edward and John Burke, Limited, the plaintiff in the second case, is a British corporation, engaged in bottling and distributing an intoxicating malt liquor known as Guinness’s Stout. Prior to the passage of the National Prohibition Act it had maintained a branch of its business in New York. Early in November, 1921, the Commissioner refused it a permit to sell such stout for medicinal purposes because of the pendency in Congress of the Supplemental Prohibition Bill. At the time of the passage of the act it had on hand a large quantity of stout.
Each of these corporations brought a suit in equity in the District Court to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and other federal officers from enforcing the provision of the Supplemental Act prohibiting the prescribing of intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes, alleging that it was not authorized by the Eighteenth Amendment and was in conflict with other provisions p. 557of the Constitution.2 Each of these bills was dismissed by the District Court, for want of equity.3 The plaintiffs then appealed directly to this Court. Jud. Code, § 238.
The contention that this provision of the Supplemental Act is unconstitutional, is based primarily upon the grounds: That the Eighteenth Amendment merely delegates to Congress the authority to prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and the control of the traffic in such liquors for non-beverage purposes is reserved to the several States; that while Congress possesses the incidental power to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors for non-beverage purposes so far as is reasonably necessary to make effective the prohibition of the traffic in such liquors for beverage purposes, this incidental power is limited to reasonable regulation and does not extend to complete prohibition; and that the prohibition of prescriptions for the use of intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes is neither an appropriate nor reasonable exercise of the power conferred upon Congress by the Amendment and infringes upon the p. 558legislative power of the States in matters affecting the public health.
2
In the Everard case the bill prayed that the Supplemental Act be declared unconstitutional; and that the defendants be enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff in manufacturing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes and selling the same to pharmacists; from interfering with pharmacists in purchasing and physicians in prescribing such liquors for such purposes; and from refusing to issue permits to pharmacists and physicians for such purposes. In the Burke case the bill prayed that the defendants be enjoined from enforcing the act and Treasury Regulations in so far as they prohibited the plaintiff from selling stout to pharmacists for medicinal purposes; from interfering with the plaintiff in making such sales; and from refusing to issue to the plaintiff and to pharmacists and physicians permits for the sale, purchase and prescribing of such stout.
3
In the Everard case there was no opinion. In the Burke case the opinion was mainly based on the earlier opinion of the same court in Piel Bros. v. Day, 278 Fed. 223, which had been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, per curiam. 281 Fed. 1022.
It is clear that if the act is within the authority delegated to Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment, its validity is not impaired by reason of any power reserved to the States. The words “ concurrent power ” as used in the second section of the Amendment “ do not mean joint power, or require that legislation thereunder by Congress, to be effective, shall be approved or sanctioned by the several States or any of them”; and the power confided to Congress, while not exclusive, “ is in no wise dependent on or affected by action or inaction on the part of the several States or any of them.” National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 387. And if the act is within the power confided to Congress, the Tenth Amendment, by its very terms, has no application, since it only reserves to the States “ powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.” See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 357.
We come then to the question whether this act is within the power conferred upon Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment. By its terms the Amendment prohibits the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and grants to Congress the power to enforce this prohibition “by appropriate legislation.” Its purpose is to suppress the entire traffic in intoxicating liquor as a beverage. See Grogan v. Walker, 259 U. S. 80, 89. And it must be respected and given effect in the same manner as other provisions of the Constitution. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 386.
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers that are vested in it. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In the exercise of such non-enumerated or “ implied ” powers it has long been settled that Congress is p. 559not limited to such measures as are indispensably necessary to give effect to its express powers, but in the exercise of its discretion as to the means of carrying them into execution may adopt any means, appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to be accomplished and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 395; Martin n. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326; McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, pp. 421, 422; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 372; Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 421, 440; In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110,134; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 283; Fong Yue Ting n. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 712; Lottery Case, supra, p. 355; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323. Furthermore, aside from this fundamental rule, the Eighteenth Amendment specifically confers upon Congress the power to enforce “by appropriate legislation ” the constitutional prohibition of the traffic in intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. This enables Congress to enforce the prohibition “by appropriate means.” National Prohibition Cases, supra, p. 387.
It is likewise well settled that where the means adopted by Congress are not prohibited and are calculated to effect the object intrusted to it, this Court may not inquire into the degree of their necessity; as this would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread upon legislative ground. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, p. 423; Legal Tender Case, supra, p. 450; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, p. 713. Nor may it enquire as to the wisdom of the legislation. Legal Tender Case, supra, p. 450; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 54; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146,141. What it may consider is whether that which has been done by Congress has gone beyond the constitutional limits upon its legislative discretion. Ex parte Curtis, supra, p. 373.
It is clear that Congress, under its express power to enforce by appropriate legislation the prohibition of traffic in intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, may adopt any eligible and appropriate means to make that prohibition effective. The possible abuse of a power is not an argument against its existence. Lottery Case, supra, p. 363; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra, p. 161. And it has been held that the power to prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquors includes, as an appropriate means of making that prohibition effective, power to prohibit traffic in similar liquors, although non-intoxicating. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192; Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264.
The ultimate and controlling question then is, whether in prohibiting physicians from prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes as a means of enforcing the prohibition of traffic in such liquors for beverage purposes, Congress has exceeded the constitutional limits upon its legislative discretion.
In enacting this legislation Congress has affirmed its validity. That determination must be given great weight; this Court by an unbroken line of decisions having “ steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 544.
We cannot say that prohibiting traffic in intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes has no real or substantial relation to the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, and is not adapted to accomplish that end and make the constitutional prohibition effective. The difficulties always attendant upon the suppression of traffic in intoxicating liquors are notorious. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304, 307. The Federal Government in enforcing prohibition is confronted With difficulties similar to those encountered by the States. Ruppert n .
Caffey, supra, p. 297. The opportunity to manufacture, sell and prescribe intoxicating malt liquors for “ medicinal purposes,” opens many doors to clandestine traffic in them as beverages under the guise of medicines; facilitates many frauds, subterfuges and artifices; aids evasion: and, thereby and to that extent, hampers and obstructs the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. A provision in a revenue act which tends to diminish the opportunity for clandestine traffic in avoidance of the tax, has a reasonable relation to its enforcement. United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 94.
Nor can it be held that the act is an arbitrary and unreasonable prohibition of the use of valuable medicinal agents.
When the bill was pending in Congress the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives held an extended public hearing, in which it received testimony, among other things, on the question whether beer and other intoxicating malt liquors possessed any substantial medicinal properties. Hearings before House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 5033, Serial 2, May 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 1921. On the information thus received the Committee recommended the passage of the bill. H. R., 67th Cong., 1st sess., Rep. No. 224.4 And in the light of all the p. 562testimony Congress determined, in effect, that intoxicating malt liquors possessed no substantial and essential medicinal properties which made it necessary that their use for medicinal purposes should be permitted, and that, as a matter affecting the public health, it was sufficient to permit physicians to prescribe spirituous and vinous intoxicating liquors in addition to the non-intoxicating malt liquors whose manufacture and sale is permitted under the National Prohibition Act.
4
In its report the Committee said: 11 The evidence presented to the committee to the effect that beer has never been recognized as a medicine was overwhelming. The United States Pharmacopoeia has never listed it as a medicine. One hundred and four of the leading physicians and scientists in the Nation signed the following statement: ‘The undersigned physicians of the United States desire to place on record their conviction that the manufacture and sale of beer and other malt liquors* for medicinal purposes should not be permitted. Malt liquors never have been listed in the United States Pharmacopoeia as official medicinal remedies. They serve no medical purpose which can not be satisfactorily met in other ways, and that without the danger of cultivating the beverage use of an alcoholic liquor.’ Several thousand other physicians signed the 2080°—24------ 36
Neither beer nor any other intoxicating malt liquor is listed as a medicinal remedy in the United States Pharmacopoeia. They are not generally recognized as medicinal agents. There is no consensus of opinion among physicians and medical authorities that they have any substantial value as medicinal agents; and while there is some difference of opinion on this subject the question is, at the most, debatable. And their medicinal properties, if any, may, it appears, be supplied by the use of other available remedies. That the opinion is extensively held that the prohibition of prescription of malt liquors is a necessary and proper means to the suppression of the traffic in intoxicating beverages likewise appears from the legislation in many States, under which such prescriptions are not permitted.
The distinction made by Congress between permitting the prescription of spirituous and vinous liquors while prohibiting the prescription of malt liquors is not plainly
above, or a similar statement, and presented it to the committee. The attorney for the Anheuser-Busch Co. (Inc.) appeared before the committee and called' attention to the fact that if beer was permitted as a medicine it would be impossible to enforce the prohibition law. There was only one doctor who appeared before the committee in favor of beer as a medicine, and the New York County Medical Association, the official medical association of New York, denied that he spoke for them in favoring beer for medicinal purposes.”
unreasonable or without a substantial justification, based upon their essential differences.
We find, on the whole, no ground for disturbing the determination of Congress on the question of fact as to the reasonable necessity, in the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, of prohibiting prescriptions of intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes. See Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292.
It cannot be said that its action in this respect violated any personal rights of the appellants protected by the Constitution. That it did not take their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, is clear. Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 301, and cases there cited.
We are unable to say that the provision of the Supplemental Act is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power vested in Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment or that it is not “ appropriate legislation ” for its enforcement.
The decrees of the District Court are
Affirmed.
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AMENDMENT OF RULE 26.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Qctober Term, 1923.
Order: It is ordered that sections 1 and 9 of Rule 26 of this Court be amended so that said sections shall, respectively, read as follows:
“1. The court, on the first day of each term, will commence calling the cases for argument in the order in which they stand on the docket, and proceed from day to day during the term in the same order (except as hereinafter provided); and, if the parties, or either of them, shall be ready when the case is called, the same will be heard; and if neither party shall be ready to proceed in the argument, the case shall be continued to the next term of the court unless the court shall otherwise order.”
“ 9. If, after a case has been continued under section 1, both parties shall desire to have it heard at the same term, they may, not later than three days before a regular motion day, file with the Clerk their joint request to that effect accompanied by their affidavits or those of their counsel giving the reasons why the case was continued and why it should be reinstated. Reinstatement shall be made by the court only when it appears to the court that there was good reason for the previous continuance, and that the reinstatement can be made without prejudice to parties in other cases coming on regularly for hearing.”
Promulgated June 9, 1924.
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DECISIONS PER CURIAM, FROM APRIL 28, 1924, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 9, 1924, NOT INCLUDING ACTION ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI.
No. 235. Henry D. Owens v. United States. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Submitted April 22, 1924. Decided April 28, 1924. Per Curiam. Suit for damages against the United States under a contract for the removal of garbage from Camp Meade. Judgment for claimant for part of claim. Appeal to secure larger recovery. Question turns on the constructions of contract. This Court concurs in the view of the Court of Claims and the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Horace S. Whitman and Mr. William L. Marbury for appellant. Mr. Solicitor General Beck, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger and Mr. Wm. M. Offley for the United States.
No. 236. Bromwell Brush and Wire Goods Com - pany v. State Board of Charities and Correction of Kentucky. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Submitted April 22, 1924. Decided April 28, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: (1) Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 568, 569; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720; St. Anthony Church v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 237 U. S. 575, 577, 578; Norton v. Whiteside, 239 U. S. 144, 147; (2) Miller v. Cornwall R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 131, 134; New York Central R. R. Co. v. New York, 186 U. S. 269, 273; Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 326, 331. Mr. Harvey Myers for plaintiff in error. Mr. Thomas B. McGregor and Mr. Swager Sherley for defendant in error.
No. 239. E. L. Pierce et al. v. Drainage District No. 17, Mississippi County, Arkansas. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Argued April 25, 1924. Decided April 28, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Farrell n. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100; Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 583; Piedmont Power & Light Co. n. Graham, 253 U. S. 193, 195. Mr. Arthur T. Brewster, with whom Mr. Jesse C. Sheppard was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. G. B. Rose, with whom Mr. D. H. Cantrell, Mr. J. F. Loughborough and Mr. A. W. Dobyns were on the brief, for defendant in error.
No. 230. William Bernard Duke et al. v. United States. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Argued April 22, 23, 1924. Decided April 28, 1924. Per Curiam.
On consideration of the record and arguments in this cause the judgment of the Court of Claims is set aside and the cause is remanded to that court with the following directions, one purpose of which is to elicit additional findings on questions of fact bearing on the right application to the cause of certain statutes of the United States, notably §§ 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Act of September 7, 1916, c. 451, 39 Stat. 728, as amended by the Act of July 15, 1918, c. 152, 40 Stat. 900:
1. To find (a) the nature, terms and conditions of the offer to sell on the part of the United States Shipping Board which is mentioned in the court’s second finding,
(b) whether that offer was based on any appraisement of the vessels to be sold and whether there was any public advertisement of the offer, (c) whether the offer contemplated a sale of the vessels free from the conditions and restrictions referred to in § 8 of the Act of 1916 and specified in § 9 thereof as amended, (d) whether the letter of December 15, 1919, by W. L. Mercer, Acting Manager p. 569of Ship Sales, which is set forth in the sixth finding, was written pursuant to a direction or authorization on the part of the Shipping Board, (e) whether the Shipping Board’s resolution of December 19, 1919, which is set forth in the eighth finding, was intended to rescind the resolution of December 12, 1919, on the ground that the latter was void or that it was not an effective acceptance of W. Bernard Duke’s proposal of December 5, 1019, but only a qualified acceptance which was as yet ineffective because Mr. Duke had not assented to the qualification, and (f) the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled if they have a right to recover damages.
2. To take further evidence, if need be, on which to base such additional findings.
3. To qualify or alter any of the existing findings, if need be, to bring them and the additional findings into accord.
4. To render upon all the findings when completed such judgment as shall appear to be right under the law, subject to the usual right of appeal. Remanded for additional findings, etc.
Mr. Conrad H. Syme for appellants. Mr. Henry M. Ward, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Chauncey G. Parker were on the brief, for the United States.
No. 607. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. Southern Pacific Company et al. Certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Motion submitted April 28, 1924. Order entered May 5, 1924. The motion for leave to take additional testimony is granted, such testimony to be taken, however, in accordance with Rule 12, paragraph 2, of the rules of this Court, to be limited to the subject matter specified in the motion, and to be upon interrogatories presented and p. 570served upon the opposite party by the petitioner on or before the 1st day of June next, and upon cross-interrogatories to be filed on or before the 20th day of June next. The commission with the interrogatories for the taking of said testimony shall issue to the clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the interrogatories and the evidence taken shall be forwarded to this Court on or before the 1st day of September next. The costs of the commission, when incurred, shall be paid by the petitioner. Mr. John M. Woolsey and Mr. W. H. McGrann, for petitioner, in support of the motion. Mr. Charles C. Burlingham, Mr. Ray Rood Allen and Mr. A. Howard Neely, for respondents, in opposition to the motion.
No. 194. C. E. Bulloch et al. v. Dermott -Collins Road Improvement District et al. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Submitted January 25, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Reversed upon the authority of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503; Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. Compania General, 249 U. S. 425, 426, 427; Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. 359, 362; Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U. S. 13, 15-16, on the ground that the question in the case has become moot, with direction to remand to the Chancery Court of Chicot County with direction to that court to dismiss the suit without prejudice. Mr. Joe S. Harris for plaintiffs in error. No appearance for defendants in error.
No. 227. United States v. James Reed. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Submitted April 16, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Affirmed upon the authority of United States v. Andrews, 240 U. S. 90, 94. Mr. p. 571265 U. S. Decisions Per Curiam, Etc.
Solicitor General Beck and Mr. George Ross Hull for the United States. Mr. George A. King, Mr. Wm. B. King and Mr. George R. Shields for appellee.
No. 241. James C. Davis, as Agent, etc. v. Charles Hareford. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Argued April 28, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 326, 334; St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 240 U. S. 240, 241; Godchaux n . Estopinal, 251 U. S. 179, 181; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114, 117. Mr. A. A. McLaughlin, with whom Mr. Thos. B. Pryor and Mr. Vincent M. Mills were on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. C. A. Starbird, with whom Mr. Robert A. Rowe was on the brief, for defendant in error.
No. 257. People of the State of New York ex rel. City of Buffalo v. Public Service Commission of the State of New York et al. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Argued April 30, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: (1) Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100; Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 583; Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham, 253 U. S. 193, 195; (2) Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 178; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U. S. 394; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182; Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 192, 196. Mr. George Clinton, with whom Mr. William S. Rann was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry W. Killeen, with whom Mr. James C. Sweeney was on the brief, for defendants in error.
No. 259. J. W. Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery Company. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Submitted April 28, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Mr. William R. Andrews and Mr. Joseph Chez for plaintiff in error. Mr. Jacob Evans and Mr. Mahlon B. Wilson for defendant in error.
No. 260. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. A. M. Burnett. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Submitted April 28, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Petition for certiorari dismissed for lack of submission under the rule. Mr. Thomas B. Pryor and Mr. Edward J. White for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joe T. Robinson for defendant in error.
No. 270. Charles Boettcher et al., Receivers, etc., v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado et al. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado. Argued May 1, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100; Toop n. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 583; Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham, 253 U. S. 193, 195. Mr. Elmer L. Brock, with whom Mr. Charles R. Brock and Mr. Milton Smith were on the brief, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Robert E. More and Mr. Kenaz Huffman, p. 573with whom Mr. Peter H. Holme and Mr. Tison S. Dines were on the brief, for defendants in error.
No. 734. Pluto Oil & Gas Company et al. v. H. C. Miller. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. Motion to dismiss submitted April 28, 1924. Decided May 5, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. I, 5-6. Petition for certiorari denied. Mr. L. 0. Lyle, Mr. W. V. Pryor, and Mr. D. A. McDougal, for defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mr. Henry B. Martin and Mr. B. B. Blakeney appeared for plaintiffs in error.
No. —, Original. Ex parte: In the Matter of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Petitioner. (Action No. 1.) Submitted May 5, 1924. Decided May 12, 1924. Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of mandamus herein denied. Mr. Charles A. Boston and Mr. Lindley M. Garrison for petitioner.
No. —, Original. Ex parte: In the Matter of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Petitioner. (Action No. 2.) Submitted May 5, 1924. Decided May 12, 1924. Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of mandamus herein denied. Mr. Charles A. Boston and Mr. Lindley M. Garrison for petitioner.
No. 15, Original. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas. In Equity. May 12, 1924. Order entered allowing compensation to receiver and counsel.
No. —, Original. Ex parte: In the Matter of the City of New York et al., Petitioners. Submitted May 12, 1924. Decided May 26, 1924. Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of mandamus herein denied. Mr. George P. Nicholson and Mr. William G. Fallen for petitioners.
No. 562. Lorenz Reich v. Alexander Smith Cochran et al., etc., as Executors, etc. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted May 26, 1924. Decided June 2, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726. And see Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444. Mr. Samuel Untermyer and Mr. Percy H. Stewart, for defendants in error, in support of the motion. Mr. Alton B. Parker, for plaintiff in error, in opposition to the motion.
No. 739. Wilson Clinton, an Incompetent, etc., et al. v. Gypsy Oil Company. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted May 26, 1924. Decided June 2, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Mr. J. B. Diggs, for defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mr. Horace H. Hagan, for plaintiffs in error, in opposition to the motion.
No. 892. City of New York et al. v. Lindley M. Garrison, as Receiver, etc., et al. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Motion to dismiss submitted May 26, 1924. Decided June 2, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 429; Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke Callender Co., 228 U. S. 339, 346; Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 365; Oneida Navigation Corporation v. Job & Co., 252 U. S. 521, 522. Mr. Charles P. Howland, for appellees, in support of the motion. Mr. George P. Nicholson and Mr. William G. Fullen, for appellants, in opposition to the motion.
No. —. Ex parte: In the Matter of Julius Shapiro et al., Individuall y and as Copartners, doing business as Shapiro & Company, Bankrupts, Petitioners. Submitted June 2, 1924. Decided June 9, 1924. Motion for a stay herein denied. Mr. Jerome C. Jackson and Mr. Melvin H. Dalberg for petitioners.
No. 1002. Twohy Brothers Company v. Clarence Kennedy. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Motion to dismiss submitted June 2, 1924. Decided June 9, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 568; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 444; Barnett N. Kunkel, 264 U. S. 16. Mr. W. T. Sprowls, for defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mr. E. C. Brandenburg, Mr. G. P. Bullard and Mr. Samuel White, for plaintiff in error, in opposition to the motion.
No. 738. Great International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. J. W. Green. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted June 2, 1924. Decided June 9, 1924. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100; Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 583; Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham, 253 U. S. 193, 195. Mr. J. T. Stokely, for defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mr. J. J. Mayfield, for plaintiff in error, in opposition to the motion.
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI GRANTED, FROM APRIL 28, 1924, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 9, 1924.
No. 861. Modern Woodmen of America v. Jennie Vida Mixer. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska granted. Mr. Nelson C. Pratt for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 971. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Anna F. C. Martin et al. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Mr. T. J. Wills and Mr. T. W. Davis for petitioners. Mr. Clayton D. Potter for respondents.
No. 991. American Railway Express Company v. George C. Daniel. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia granted. Mr. Robert C. Alston for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 750. Fulton National Bank of Atlanta v. I. S. Hoosier et al., Receivers, etc. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Mr. John D. Little, Mr. Arthur G. Powell, Mr. Marion Smith and Mr. Max F. Goldstein for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 785. James C. Davis, Agent, etc., v. L. D. Alex - ander et al. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted. Mr. C. 0. Blake and Mr. W. R. Bleakmore for petitioner. Mr. Fred E. Suits for respondents.
No. 986. Municipal Assembly of Arroyo, Porto Rico, v. Successors of C. and J. Fantauzzi. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted. Mr. E. B. Wilcox and Mr. C. Dominguez Rubio for petitioner. Mr. Francis E. Neagle and Mr. Eugene Congleton for respondents.
No. 987. Juan Perez Cami, Municipal Commissioner of Finance, v. Central Victoria, Limited. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted. Mr. E. B. Wilcox and Mr. Juan B. Soto for petitioner. Mr. Francis G. Caffey for respondent.
No. 891. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Rey - nolds -Davis Grocery Company. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas granted. Mr. Vincent M. Miles and Mr. Thomas B. Pryor for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
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No. 1017. R. H. Clemmer, Attorney in fact, etc., et al., v. Arthur L. Ross et al. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. Mr. H. H. Rumble for petitioners. Mr. R. Randolph Hicks and Mr. Arthur Leonard Ross for respondents.
No. 1029. Guardian Savings & Trust Company, Trustee, v. Road Improvement District No. 7 of Poin - sett County, Arkansas. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted. Mr. G. B. Rose, Mr. D. H. Cantrell, Mr. J. F. Loughborough and Mr. A. D. Dobyns for petitioner. Mr. Henry D. Ashley for respondent.
No. 1008. Great Northern Railway Company v. Charles W. Reed et al. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted. Mr. F. G. Dorety for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 1012. Charles Sherwin et al. v. United States. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Mr. W. B. Scott for petitioners. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 1033. United States v. New York & Cuba Mail Steamship Company. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Mr. Solicitor General Beck, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Davis, Mr. Alfred A. Wheat and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely for the United States. Mr. John Tilney Carpenter for respondent.
No. 1063. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company v. Ernest J. Goneau. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota granted. Mr. Marshall A. Spooner and Mr. John E. Palmer for petitioner. Mr. Samuel A. Anderson for respondent.
No. 1071. James C. Davis, Director General and Agent, etc. v. John L. Roper Lumber Company. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia granted. Mr. A. A. McLaughlin and Mr. R. M. Hughes, Jr., for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 1073. Thomas W. Miller, as Alien Property Custodian, et al. v. Benjamin Guinness et al. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Dean H. Stanley for petitioners. No appearance for respondents.
No. 1074. Benjamin Guinness et al. v. Thomas W. Miller, as Alien Property Custodian, et al. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Mr. Alexander B. Siegel for petitioners. No brief filed for respondents.
No. 1075. Chicago Great Western Railway Com - pany v. A. D. Sghendel, Special Administrator, etc. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota granted. Mr. Asa G. Briggs for petitioner. Mr. Tom Davis and Mr. Ernest A. Michel for respondent.
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI DENIED OR DISMISSED, FROM APRIL 28, 1924, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 9, 1924.
No. 984. Harry A. Horine et al. v. United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. April 28, 1924. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of certiorari herein, without a certified copy of the record, granted, the case docketed, and the petition denied. Mr. Harry A. Horine and Mr. Sam Goslinsky for petitioners. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 887. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Com - pany v. Alvin R. Durham Company et al. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan denied for lack of jurisdiction, there being no final decree. Mr. Robert H. Widdicombe and Mr. R. N. Van Doren for petitioner. Mr. Julius J. Patik for respondents.
No. 906. Daisy M. Scott et al. v. City of Columbus, Ohio. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio denied. Mr. Timothy S. Hogan for petitioners. Mr. Charles A. Leach for respondent.
No. 910. Prairie Oil & Gas Company v. Louis F. Shanblum et al. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. C. S. Arnold for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 918. Patrick McGovern et al., etc. v. City of Boston. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. John F. Cronan for petitioners. Mr. E. Mark Sullivan and Mr. Samuel Silverman for respondent.
No. 923. New Creek Company v. Ephraim Lederer, Collector of Internal Revenue, etc. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. James Wilson Bayard for petitioner. Mr. Solicitor General Beck, Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. Sewall Key for respondent.
No. 935. Kawasaki Zosensho, Owner, etc. v. Cosu - lich Societa Triestina di Navigazione of Trieste, Italy, Owner, etc. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. George Whitefield Betts, Jr., Mr. George C. Sprague and Mr. H. C. Hughes for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 936. Hettrick Manufacturing Company v. James A. Shepherd & Company, Ltd. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. George Roscoe Davis for petitioner. Mr. Charles H. Brady for respondent.
No. 937. Facer Forged Steel Car Wheel and Loco - motive Wheel Company v. Carnegie Steel Company. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Charles E. Townsend, Mr. Joseph R. Edson and Mr. Thomas G. Steward for petitioner. Mr. D. Anthony Usina for respondent.
No. 946. William A. Brown & Company et al. v. United States. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Customs Appeals denied. Mr. B. A. Levett and Mr. Allan R. Brown for petitioners. Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Hoppin for the United States.
No. 949. Nancy Roberts et al. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Company. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. Harvey Riddell for petitioners. No appearance for respondent.
No. 950. New York Central Railroad Company v. Joseph C. Dunbar. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Charles C. Paulding for petitioner. Mr. John B. Rogers for respondent.
No. 955. Alfred Emerson et al. v. Radio Corpora - tion of America et al. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Samuel H. Wandell for petitioners. Mr. L. F. H. Betts for respondents.
No. 957. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Robert E. Morrill, Sr. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama denied. Mr. C. P. McIntyre, Mr. E. Perry Thomas arid Mr. George W. Jones for petitioner. Mr. William M. Williams for respondent.
No. 961. United States ex rel. Dong Yick Yuen v. John F. Dunton, Chinese Inspector, etc. April 28, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Roger O'Donnell for petitioner. Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. George Ross Hull for respondent.
No. 260. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. A. M. Burnett. [See ante, 572.]
No. 734. Pluto Oil & Gas Company et al. v. H. C. Miller. [See ante, 573.]
No. 570. W. F. Gravins v. Walker D. Hines, Direc - tor General of Railroads, etc. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia denied. Mr. Robert H. Talley and Mr. Joseph W. Cox for petitioner. Mr. David H. Leake and Mr. Walter Leake for respondent.
No. 841. John G. Crosland v. United States. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Bart A. Riley for petitioner. Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Assistant Attorney General, for the United States.
No. 932. San Joaquin Lumber Company v. R. H. Dodd, Trustee, etc., et al. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. Percy S. Webster for petitioner. Mr. Arthur L. Shaw for respondents.
No. 941. Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Com - pany v. Albert E. Lee, Receiver. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Henry E. Warner for petitioner. Mr. Philip N. Jones for respondent.
No. 942. M. J. Bashara v. George C. Hopkins, Col - lector of Internal Revenue. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Harry C. Weeks for petitioner. Mr. Solicitor General Beck, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger and Mr. Harvey B. Cox for respondent.
No. 947. Manfred W. Ehrich, Trustee , etc., et al. v. Charles J. Eisenlohr. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Arthur Garfield Hays and Mr. Saul S. Myers for petitioners. Mr. Owen J. Roberts for respondent.
No. 953. Frank K. Bowers, Collector of Internal Revenue, etc. v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Com - pany. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Solicitor General Beck for petitioner. Mr. John W. Davis for respondent.
No. 954. Emily R. Cadwalader et al., Executors, etc. v. Edward L. Sturgess, etc., Collector of United States Internal Revenue, etc. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Herbert Noble for petitioners. Mr. Solicitor General Beck, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger and Mr. Harvey B. Cox for respondent.
No. 960. Arthur E. Donegan v. United States. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Alexander Akerman and Mr. W. M. Toomer for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 962. Empire Gas & Fuel Company v. Lone Star Gas Company. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. F. M. Etheridge for petitioner. Mr. Harry Preston Lawther for respondent.
No. 965. Belding Bros. & Company v. Benjamin L. Armstrong. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Robert B. Honeyman and Mr. Henry B. Twombly for petitioner. Mr. Livingston Gifford for respondent.
No. 970. Old Colony Trust Company v. Lawyers Title & Trust Company. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Eugene W. Leake and Mr. William C. Breed for petitioner. Mr. Frederick P. King for respondent.
No. 978. J. P. Evans v. Pat Marr, Individually and as Trustee, etc. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. J. D. Wilkinson and Mr. C. Huffman Lewis for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 982. Louis Milam et al. v. United States. May 5, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. Robert H. Talley for petitioners. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 707. Molsie Bailey v. Claude Jones et al. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. Mr. Guy H. Sigler for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 909. T. R. Bennett, Superintendent of Banks for the State of Georgia, v. John E. Schwarz et al. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia denied. Mr. Paul E. Seabrook for petitioner. Mr. H. Wiley Johnson for respondents.
No. 928. Nicholas A. Dawson v. Mrs. Charles D. Gondran et al. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Charles T. Wortham for petitioner. Mr. Percy S. Benedict for respondents.
No. 951. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Com - pany et al. v. H. L. Cockerham, Administrator, etc. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi denied. Mr. Charles N. Burch and Mr. H. D. Minor for petitioners. No appearance for respondent.
No. 952. Seaby Phillips v. United States. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Max Isaac for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 956. United States, Owner of Steamship Lake Fairlie, etc. v. Sugarland Industries et al. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Solicitor General Beck, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger and Mr. J. Frank Staley for the United States. No appearance for respondents.
No. 967. Oliver M. Tucker et al. v. Karl E. Peiler et al. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. George W. Ramsey for petitioners. Mr. Vernon M. Dorsey, Mr. Sidney F. Parham and Mr. John P. Bartlett for respondents.
No. 975. George H. Miles v. United States. May 12, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Ely Rosenberg for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 969. Alge Howell v. United States. May 26, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. George J. Gulotta for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 972. Randolph Whitman, as Chairman, etc., et al. v. Bondholders Committee of December 1, 1921, et al. May 26, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Robert Szold for petitioners. Mr. Mark Hyman for respondents.
No. 976. Dennison Brick & Tile Company v. Chi - . cago Trust Company et al. May 26, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio denied. Mr. Smith W. Bennett for petitioner. Mr. George W. Reed and Mr. Brooklyn Bridge for respondents.
No. 983. Mary Brafman v. Benjamin Brafman et al., Administrators, etc. May 26, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland denied. Elizabeth F. Vilkomerson for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 999. Cleveland & Western Coal Company v. Main Island Creek Coal Company. May 26, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. C. F. Taplin for petitioner. Mr. John H. Holt and Mr. Murray Seasongood for respondent.
No. 576. Denison -Pratt Paper Company v. News Publishing Company. June 2, 1924. Supplemental petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia denied. Mr. Clarence W. Dealtry, Mr. Charles D. Merrick and Mr. Buford C. Tynes for petitioner. Mr. C. M. Hanna for respondent. [See 263 U. S. 714.]
No. 806. E. R. Portucheck v. United States. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Will C. Austin and Mr. R. E. Taylor for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 890. Peter Sain et al. v. Cypress Creek Drain - age District. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. Mr. Lamar Williamson, for plaintiffs in error, in support of the petition. Mr. Charles T. Coleman appeared for defendant in error.
No. 943. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company et al. v. Josephine C. Kepler. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska denied. Mr. Wymer Dressier and Mr. R. L. Kennedy for petitioners. Mr. Edward P. Smith and Mr. Francis S. Howell for respondent.
No. 989. B. W. Neal, Inc., et al. v. Alvin N. Powell et al. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. James F. Terry for petitioners. Mr. Joseph B. Jacobs for respondents.
No. 994. Commerce Trust Company v. F. Alexander Chandler et al., Co -Receivers. June 2,1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Robert G. Dodge and Mr. Harold S. Davis for petitioner. Mr. Judd Dewey for respondents.
No. 995. Ephraim Lederer, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. Real Estate Title Insurance & Trust Company of Philadelph ia. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Solicitor General Beck for petitioner. Mr. Maurice Bower Saul for respondent.
No. 996. Samuel T. Wiggins, Assignee, etc., et al. v. F. E. Hummel, Receiver. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. R. N. McConnell for petitioners. No appearance for respondent.
No. 998. W. A. Gentry v. James C. Davis, Agent, etc. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas denied. Mr. Charles Stephens and Mr. Frank Doster for petitioner. Mr. W. W. Brown and Mr. Alfred G. Armstrong for respondent.
No. 1006. John Beal Sneed et al. v. United States. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. James E. Gresham for petitioners. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 1007. Frederick Keighley, Trustee, etc. v. American Trust Company. June 2, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Samuel Silbiger for petitioner. Mr. Morgan J. O’Brien for respondent.
No. 454. United States ex rel. Soo Hoo Hong v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, etc.; and
No. 482. United States ex rel. Joseph Singleton, NEXT FRIEND OF Lui KAH, V. ROBERT E. TOD, COMMISSIONER of Immigration. Petitions for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. June 9, 1924. Suggestions to strike petitions for writs of certiorari in these causes from the docket granted. Mr. Walter Bates Farr for petitioners. Mr. Alfred A. Wheat for respondent.
No. 992. Edward H. Chilps, Trustee in Bankruptcy, v. United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. June 9, 1924. Suggestion to strike the petition for a writ of certiorari in this cause from the docket granted. Mr. Moses Cohen for petitioner. Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Alfred A. Wheat for the United States.
No. 1077. Catherine G. Branan, Junior, an infant, etc. v. William A. Wimsatt, Trading as Johnson and Wimsatt. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. June 9, 1924. The Court having considered the petition for a writ of certiorari filed in manuscript and the brief presented by the petitioner in support of the same, denies the petition for a writ of certiorari; and therefore denies the motion of the petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and to have the record printed at public expense. Mr. Sidney F. Taliaferro and Mr. Thomas P. Littlepage for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 751. J. E. Williams et al. v. United States. June 9,1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. George E. Wallace for petitioners. Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Seymour for the United States.
No. 973. North Pacific Steamship Company v. William T. Soley. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. Mr. Ernest Clewe, for plaintiff in error, in support of the petition. Mr. Henry Heidelberg, for defendant in error, in opposition to the petition.
No. 974. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Anna W. Gill, Administratrix, etc. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri denied. Mr. Ralph J. Kramer, Mr. Edward C. Kramer, Mr. Bruce A. Campbell, Mr. Walter R. Mayne, Mr. Morison R. Waite and Mr. William A. Eggers for petitioner. Mr. Sidney Thorne Able and Mr. Charles P. Noell for respondent.
No. 1009. S. H. Pomeroy Company et al. v. Frank F. Smith Hardware Company. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. William B. Greeley and Mr. William A. Redding for petitioners. Mr. Stephen J. Cox for respondent.
No. 1010. Emile Vital et al., Copartners, etc., v. Henry F. Kerr, trading as Kerr Steamship Line; and
No. 1011. Isaac J. Bigio v. Henry F. Kerr, trading as Kerr Steamship Line. June 9, 1924. Petitions for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied., Mr. T. Catesby Jones and Mr. James W. Ryan for petitioners. Mr. Elkan Turk for respondent.
No. 1021. Merriam & Millard Company v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Mr. Edward P. Smith and Mr. Francis S. Howell for petitioner. Mr. Bruce Scott, Mr. Byron Clark and Mr. Kenneth F. Burgess for respondent.
No. 1024. Elmyr A. Laughlin et al. v. Burry Rail - way Supply Company et al. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. Joshua R. H. Potts and Mr. Brayton G. Richards for petitioners. Mr. George L. Wilkinson for respondents.
No. 1025. George W. Reed et al., Trustees, v. Fed - eral Finance Corporation. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. George W. Reed for petitioners. Mr. Alexander Britton for respondent.
No. 1027. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company v. William H. Keller, Inc., etc. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. John W. Davis and Mr. Samuel E. Hibben for petitioner. Mr. Edward S. Rogers, Mr. George T. Buckingham and Mr. Marquis Eaton for respondent.
No. 1035. Rudolph De Marco v. United States. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. Moe Levy and Mr. Henry Bowden for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 1046. Herman Wolff et al., Executors, etc., v. John G. Williams. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Hugh W. Ogden and Mr. Hollis R. Bailey for petitioners. Mr. Mark W. Horblit for respondent.
2080°—24----- 38
No. 1000. Samuel S. Lewis et al. v. United States. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Harvey H. Pratt for petitioners. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 1001. Mrs. F. W. Leatherbury, Community Ad - ministratrix, v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas denied. Mr. Winboum Pearce and Mr. A. L. Curtis for petitioner. Mr. J. W. Terry for respondent.
No. 1015. Leda K. Mayfield v. Equitable Trust Company of New York. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. S. G. Mayfield for petitioner. Mr. Alfred Huger for respondent.
No. 1016. Leda K. Mayfield v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. S. G. Mayfield for petitioner. Mr. Hollins N. Randolph and Mr. A. B. Lovett for respondent.
No. 1030. Fred S. Hoback v. United States. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. A. B. Hunt and Mr. Walter R. Staples for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 1034. American Central Insurance Company v. Mrs. G. W. Sims. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. R. Lee Bartels for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
Nos. 1039 and 1040. Diamond Coal & Coke Company v. Hazelwood Dock Company et al. June 9, 1924. Petitions for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Edward B. Burling for petitioner. Mr. Lowrie C. Barton appeared for respondents.
No. 1041. American Creosote Works, Inc., et al. v. Edwin L. Powell. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. William B. Grant and Mr. Charlton R. Beattie for petitioners. Mr. Monte M. Lemann appeared for respondent.
No. 1049. Landers Company, Inc., et al. v. Lincoln - Alliance Bank. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. W. J. Howard and Mr. Sewall Myer for petitioners. Mr. Palmer Hutcheson appeared for respondent.
No. 1054. Commercial National Bank of Hutchin - son, Kansas, v. Heid Brothers, Inc. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Eighth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas denied. Mr. I. N. Watson and Mr. Charles R. Loomis for petitioner. Mr. Joseph U. Sweeney for respondent.
No. 1062. Irving National Bank, etc. v. Thomas M. Blake et al., Receivers, etc. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Irving L. Ernst for petitioner. Mr. Herman Aaron for respondents.
No. 1065. Forestglen Land Company v. George R. Scrugham et al. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Walter L. Clark and Mr. M. W. Acheson, Jr., for petitioner. Mr. A. Leo Weil for respondents.
No. 1066. Joe R. Irwin v. United States. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Huling P. Robertson, Jr., for petitioner. No brief filed for the United States.
No. 1069. J. G. White & Company, Inc. v. Ball En - gineering Company. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. J. Kemp Bartlett and Mr. Harry W. Reynolds for petitioner. Mr. Charles D. Lockwood and Mr. William M. Parke for respondent.
No. 1079. W. W. Wilkinson, Trustee , etc. v. J. L. Walker. June 9, 1924. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Mark McMahon for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT, FROM APRIL 28, 1924, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 9, 1924.
No. 985. United States to the use of Sue P. Gates v. Frank M. Harshberger et al. Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington. April 28, 1924. Docketed and dismissed, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General Beck for defendants in error. No appearance for plaintiff in error.
No. 838. William F. Quesse et al. v. People of the State of Illinois. On petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. April 28, 1924. Petition dismissed, on motion of Mr. Willard M. McEwen for petitioners. No appearance for respondent.
No. 278. Magnum Import Company, Inc. v. Francois Joseph de Spoturno Coty;
No. 279. Max L. Cohn, trading as Maclen Import Company, v. Francois Joseph de Spoturno Coty;
No. 280. Arthur Baum et al., trading as Beautex Company, v. Francois Joseph de Spoturno Coty; and
No. 281. Magnum Import Company v. Houbigant, Inc. On writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. May 1, 1924. Dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. Charles H. Tuttle and Mr. Wm. J. Hughes for petitioners. Mr. F. D. McKenney, Mr. Hugo Mock, Mr. Asher Blum, Mr. George S. Hornblower, Mr. Raoul E. Desvernine and Mr. Lindley M. Garrison for respondents.
No. 1018. Orinoco Company, Limited, et al. v.
Orinoco Iron Company. Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. May 12, 1924. Docketed and dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. William R. Harr and Mr. Edward S. Duvall for appellee. Mr. George N. Baxter for appellants.
No. 867. S. H. Kress & Company et al. v. Bessie Lee Crosby. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. May 12, 1924. Dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. Wade H. Ellis and Mr. Thomas J. Wills for plaintiffs in error. Mr. J. W. Cassedy and Mr. Clayton D. Potter for defendant in error.
No. 488. Margaret C. Lynch, Executrix, etc. v. Clara B. Congdon et al .. Executors, etc. Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. May 26, 1924. Dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General Beck in behalf of plaintiff in error. Mr. A. L. Agatin and Mr. Francis A. De Groat for defendants in error.
No. 993. United States v. Washington Market Company. On petition for ' a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. May 26, , 1924. Dismissed, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General Beck for the United States. Mr. Charles A. Douglas and Mr. Alexander Wolf for respondent.
No. 407. Arkansas Natural Gas Company v. W. N. McFarland, Supervisor of Public Accounts. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. May 26, 1924. Dismissed per stipulation. Mr. W. B. Smith and Mr. W. M. Phillips for plaintiff in error. Mr. A. V. Coco, Mr. Harry P. Sneed and Mr. S. L. Herold for defendant in error.
Summary Statement of Business of The Supreme Court of the United States for October Term, 1923.
Original Docket.
Cases pending at beginning of term.................................................. 24
New cases docketed during term........................................................ 6
Cases finally disposed of...................................................................... 6
Cases not finally disposed of.................................................... 24
' Appellate Docket.
Cases pending at beginning of term.................................................. 368
New cases docketed during term..........................................................725
Cases finally disposed of...................................................................... 655
Cases not finally disposed of................................................................ 438
The number of pending cases, original and appellate, was thus increased by 70.
Interlocutory decisions, and adverse decisions upon applications for leave to file, as in mandamus, prohibition, etc., are not here included.