Case details
Bluebook Citation
Browne v. Thorn, 260 U.S. 137 (1922)
Full caption
BROWNE v. THORN ET AL., PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS AS THORN & MAGINNIS.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 13, 1922
BROWNE v. THORN ET AL., PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS AS THORN & MAGINNIS.
ERROR AND CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
No. 88. Argued October 20, 1922.—Decided November 13, 1922.
1. In an action by brokers to recover from their customer the balance of their account for purchases and sales of cotton made on their exchange pursuant to his orders, it is not a defence that the transactions were gambling because he had no intention to receive or deliver the actual cotton, if his intention in that regard was not disclosed to the brokers. P. 139. 2. Hedging—a means whereby manufacturers and others who have to make contracts of purchase and sale in advance, secure themselves against fluctuations of the market by counter contracts—is prima facie lawful. P. 139. 3. Section 4 of the “ United States Cotton Futures Act ”, must be read in the light of construction of similar language of the Statute [p. 138] of Frauds, and does not require that bought and sold notes should name the principals and be signed by both brokers.1 P. 140.
4. Evidence of an understanding between the parties held to justify interpreting a telegraphic “ stop ” order from a customer to his brokers as directing sale of his cotton at the prices specified in the order, or, if those could not be got, at the next best price possible. P. 140.
272 Fed. 950, affirmed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming adjudgment for the plaintiffs in an action by brokers, to recover from their customer, Browne, the balance of their account for purchase and sale of cotton, on a cotton exchange of which they were members. The case went twice to the court below. See 257 Fed. 519; 272 Fed. 950.
Mr. James B. McDonough for petitioner.
Mr. Ira D. Oglesby and Mr. L. C. Going, with whom Mr. Jos. E. Johnson and Mr. Ben Cravens were on the brief, for respondents.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.
Act of August 11, 1916, c. 313, Part A, 39 Stat. 446, 476.
“ Sec. 3. That upon each contract of sale of any cotton for future delivery made at, on, or in any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business, there is hereby levied a tax in the nature of an excise of 2 cents for each pound of the cotton involved in any such contract.”
“ Sec. 4. That each contract of sale of cotton for future delivery mentioned in section three of this Act shall be in writing plainly stating, or evidenced by written memorandum showing, the terms of such contract, including the quantity of the cotton involved and the names and addresses of the seller and buyer in such contract, and shall be signed by the party to be charged, or by his agent in his behalf. If the contract or memorandum specify in bales the quantity of the cotton involved, without giving the weight, each bale shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to weigh five hundred pounds.”
This is a suit brought by the respondents, cotton brokers, to recover the balance of an account for the purchase and sale of 2,000 bales of cotton on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. At a first trial a verdict was directed for the defendant on the ground that broker’s seller’s slips coupled with oral evidence that corresponding buyer’s slips were executed, or vice versa, were not competent evidence of the transactions, under the United States Cotton Futures Act. Act of August 11, 1916, c. 313, Part A, § 4, 39 Stat. 446,476. The judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals after a very satisfactory discussion. 257 Fed. 519. There followed a second trial in which the verdict was for the plaintiffs and a judgment, sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 272 Fed. 950, that is brought here by writ of error, supplemented by a petition for a writ of certiorari. There is no ground for the writ of error on the record, although the plaintiff in error now, in view of Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, argues that the Cotton Futures Act is void except in the taxing provision enacted as an alternative to compliance with its regulations. A petition for certiorari was granted at the October Term, 1920, 256 U. S. 689.
The first ground relied upon for the petition is that the transactions were gambling transactions. That was the petitioner’s contention at the trial, but to put it at the lowest, there was evidence to the contrary, the question was left to the jury with instructions that if the plaintiffs knew that the defendant had no intention to deliver or receive the actual cotton they could not recover, and the jury found for the plaintiffs. The defendant contended that his undisclosed intention was enough to defeat the plaintiff’s claims; but that is not the law. It is objected that the judge instructed the jury that hedging was lawful, hedging being explained as a means by which manufacturers and others who have to make contracts of purchase or sale in advance secure themselves against the fluctuations [p. 140] of the market by counter contracts. Prima facie such transactions are lawful. Chicago Board of Trade n. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 249.
The bought and sold notes executed on the Exchange mentioned only the names of the brokers and neither was signed by both the brokers. It is said that the act of Congress, § 4, was not satisfied. We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the language of § 4 of the Cotton Futures Act must be read in the light of the decisions upon the similar language of the Statute of Frauds and that the notes were sufficient; assuming without discussion that in this case it was necessary to prove that § 4 was followed. See Bibb n. Allen, 149 U. S. 481.
Perhaps the most serious of the petitioner’s defences was that the 2,000 bales of cotton were sold without authority. As stated by his counsel, on Germany’s announcing unrestricted submarine warfare, cotton fell and the petitioner telegraphed to the defendants to sell 2,000 bales. The telegram read as follows: “Stop ten seventeen twenty and ten seventeen fifteen ”—which is understood to carry a direction to sell one thousand bales at 17.20 cents per pound and one thousand at 17.15. But there was clear and sufficient evidence that such stop orders as they were called were understood to direct not only sale at the price mentioned but, if that could not be got, a sale at the next best possible price. The respondents sold at fourteen cents which was the best that could be done. We think it unnecessary to go into further detail to show that the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. [p. 141] NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY v. FRUCHTER, AN INFANT, &c.
NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY v. FRUCHTER.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 35, 36. Argued October 6, 9, 1922.—Decided November 13, 1922.
A boy of eight years, by climbing to the topmost girder of a municipal bridge used for conveying a street across a railroad, and thence up a latticed tower, touched a live electric wire twenty-nine feet above the street, and was injured. Held, upon the circumstances stated in the opinion, that the railroad company, (which maintained the wires and the bridge framework,) could not be deemed liable upon the theory of license or invitation. P. 143. United Zinc Co. n. Britt, 258 U. S. 268. 271 Fed. 419, reversed.
Certiorari to judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming judgments in the District Court against the petitioner, in two actions for personal injuries.
Mr. James W. Carpenter for petitioner.
The attractive-nuisance doctrine was not applicable, for defendant owed the plaintiff no active or affirmative duty. Defendant’s duty to the public in relation to the bridge was confined by statute to maintenance of the bridge superstructure as such, and no negligence in whole or in part could be predicated on its attractiveness to children. There was no excuse nor justification for plaintiff’s trespass on defendant’s property, since (a) it was not attractive or alluring to him,—the bird attracted him, the property was a mere incident; (b) the relative inaccessibility of the property and the obvious danger [p. 142] involved in scaling the intervening bridge superstructure was notice to all, having the physical capacity to reach it, of defendant’s intent to use and occupy it exclusively; (c) the attitude of both the city and the defendant was forcibly resistant to the public use of the respective properties as a play or hunting ground; and (d) defendant had no notice of any use of its property by boys. Furthermore, there was no proof that either insulation or the evidential protective devices would not seriously interfere with the wires’ functions in interstate commerce.
The New York rule of non-liability to infant trespassers or licensees for injuries received from inherent dangers in private premises is so thoroughly established that it has become a fixed rule of property and action by which the courts below were bound in comity. National interests require the affirmation of the principle declared by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 169 Fed. 1.
If the defendant owed the infant any duty, there was no evidence of negligence.
Mr. Harold R. Medina, with whom Mr. Leon Sanders, Mr. George M. Curtis, Jr., Mr. Young B. Smith and Mr. Jacob Zelenko were on the brief, for respondents.
The defendant’s liability is governed by those rules of law applicable to persons maintaining a dangerous thing in or adjacent to a public highway.
Upon the decisions of the federal courts, the defendant was under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to guard against injuries to children of tender years which were likely to occur because of the close proximity of the live wire to a place and structure alluring to children and about which, well known to the defendant, young children were in the habit of playing.
It was not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that the structure and wire maintained by the defendant, as distinguishable from the city’s bridge and defendant’s strut, [p. 143] were alluring to children. It is sufficient that the defendant maintained a dangerous wire in close proximity to something which was alluring to children or in close proximity to a place where defendant knew, or should have known, children were likely to be attracted.
The remaining contentions of the defendant with reference to the essentials of the attractive-nuisance doctrine are unsound.
The defendant’s duty in the premises was in no sense diminished by § 93 of the Railroad Law of New York.
It is well settled that the question of liability for negligence when not modified or regulated by statute, is one of general common law and the federal court is not bound to follow the decisions of the state court. Furthermore, the New York decisions sustain the judgments in these cases.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since 1908, One Hundred and Forty-Ninth Street, New York City, has been carried over and across the tracks of the New York, New Haven ’& Hartford Railroad by a public municipal steel truss bridge of standard construction. The bridge is fifty-four feet wide, two hundred and seventy feet long and is formed of posts, beams, girders, etc., connected and strengthened by trellis or lattice work. The top girders, or beams, are twenty-three feet above the street. The local law imposes upon the railroad the duty of maintaining the framework; the municipality is required to keep the roadway in repair.
Fastened to the top girder at the end of the bridge are two upright steel lattice towers, posts or struts. Cross arms attached to these six feet above their bases, support bare wires carrying electric current used for operating trains. The nearest wire is nineteen inches from the strut.
With considerable difficulty and some danger active boys can climb to the highest parts of the bridge. They did often climb upon it; some reached the struts. They were frequently chased away by a policeman and the railroad guard, and seem generally to have understood that to play there was forbidden; when an officer came in sight they kept off. At each corner of the bridge there was a notice board displaying the words: “Live wires, Danger, Keep Off.”
In June, 1916, the plaintiff David Fruchter, eight years old, by using the trellis work climbed from the street to the top of the bridge in quest of a bird’s nest. He then saw a bird on the wire above and to catch it climbed up the strut and reached out; the bird flew away; his hand touched the wire and severe injuries resulted. He sued for damages; and the father also seeks to recover for loss of services and expenses incurred. The causes were tried together. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgments for the plaintiffs February, 1921. 271 Fed. 419.
At the time of the accident the boy was attending school. Whether he could then read the warning words upon the notice boards is left in doubt; upon the witness stand he both affirmed and denied that he could. He further stated that before climbing upon the bridge he looked to see whether a policeman was present, and admitted that if one had been there he would not have gone up.
The court below accepted the theory that the jury could have found the structure was well known to be both dangerous and attractive to children and that failure to supply proper guards, human or mechanical, constituted negligence within the doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, and Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262.
In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 275, we pointed out the theory upon which liability may [p. 145] exist for injuries suffered by an infant although the circumstances would give no cause of action to an adult. “ Infants have no greater right to go upon other peoples’ land than adults, and the mere fact that they are infants imposes no duty upon landowners to expect them and to prepare for their safety. On the other hand the duty of one who invites another upon his land not to lead him into a trap is well settled, and while it is very plain that temptation is not invitation," it may be held that knowingly to establish and expose, unfenced, to children of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically as a fish, something that is certain ,to attract them, has the legal effect of an invitation to them although not to an adult. . . . There can be no general duty on the part of a landowner to keep his land safe for children, or even free from hidden dangers, if he has not directly or by implication invited or licensed them to come there.”
Considering the peculiar circumstances of the present cause, it is clear that if the plaintiff had been an adult he could not recover; and we are unable to find any sufficient evidence from which the jury could have properly concluded that the railroad company either directly or by implication invited or licensed him to climb upon the strut to a point from which he could touch the bare wire thirty feet above the street. The motion for an instructed verdict should have been granted.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
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