First Nat'l Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362 (1922)
Case details
Citation
258 U.S. 362
Full caption
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI, v. ADAMS, REVENUE AGENT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 10, 1922
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI, v. ADAMS, REVENUE AGENT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
No. 136. Argued March 2, 1922.—Decided April 10, 1922.
1
A state tax upon a national bank, based on its capital stock, surplus, undivided profits and other property, is not equivalent to a tax upon the shareholders in respect of their shares and is invalid under Rev. Stats., § 5219. P. 364.
2
When the validity of an assessment by state officers is challenged here, the court must determine the effect of the thing actually done; what might have been done under the local statute is not controlling. P. 365. 123 Miss. 279; 84 So. 707, reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment sustaining a tax on the petitioner.
Mr. Wm. H. Watkins for petitioner.
Mr. J. B. Harris, for respondent, submitted.
Mr . Justice Mc Reynol ds delivered the opinion of the court.
Petitioner is a national bank located at Gulfport, Harrison County, Mississippi. The State Revenue Agent instructed the Tax Collector for that County as follows:
“ The following described property, in said County, to-wit: Capital Stock, surplus, undivided profits, and any and all other property properly assessable to banks, amounting to $75,150, belonging to and owned by First National Bank of Gulfport has escaped taxation during each of the years 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906 and 1907, by reason of not being assessed.
“ You are by virtue of the Annotated Code of Mississippi of 1906, Chapter 131, Sec. 4740, now notified and required to, within ten days hereafter, make the proper assessment of said property by way of an additional assessment, on the roll or tax list in your hands, and to give ten days’ notice in writing to said First National Bank whose property is so assessed, and also notify in writing the Board of Supervisors of said County, of said assessment.”
In obedience to this instruction, the Collector entered upon the rolls of his office an assessment to the Bank in these words—“Amount of all other personal property not otherwise mentioned, $174,000.00.”
Objection was duly offered upon the ground that the corporation was assessed and not the stockholders as required by § 5219, Revised Statutes of the United States. The Harrison County Circuit Court overruled this and directed the Board of Supervisors:
“ To assess the First National Bank of Gulfport, Mississippi, with capital stock, surplus, undivided profits, and any and all property assessable to said bank, in the sum of $75,150.00, for the years 1903, 1906 and 1907, which said property was at said time owned by said First National Bank and which had escaped taxation for each of the years as hereinbefore set out; and said Board of Supervisors is hereby directed to make such assessment by way of additional assessment on the roll and tax list of Harrison County, Mississippi.”
The Supreme Court of the State approved this judgment. See State Revenue Agent v. Bank, 108 Miss. 346; Adams v. First National Bank of Gulfport, 116 Miss. 450; First National Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 123 Miss. 279.
Section 52191 Revised Statutes, (copied below) prescribes the full measure of the power of the several States to impose taxes upon national banking associations or their stockholders. Any assessment not in conformity therewith is unauthorized and invalid. Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476, 483. “ The tax assessed to shareholders may be required by law to be paid in the first instance by the corporations themselves as the
1
Nothing herein shall prevent all the shares in any association from being included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of the State within which the association is located; but the legislature of each State may determine and direct the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking assocations located within the State, subject only to the two restrictions, that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State, and that the shares of any national banking association owned by non-residents of any State shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located, and not elsewhere. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from either State, county, or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according to its value, as other real property is taxed, CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 390. Argued March 14, 1922.—Decided April 10, 1922. After expiration of the term of the District Court at which final judgment was entered and after expiration of an extension of the term provided by general rule, but before a day to which the parties, CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA. No. 146. Argued March 3, 1922.—Decided April 10, 1922. 1. When goods moving in interstate commerce upon a through bill of lading are delivered in bad condition and the evidence shows that they were sound when received by the initial carrier but does not affirmatively establish where the lossi occurred, there is a common-law presumption, applicable under the Carmack Amend95440—23------ 27
362. Syllabus.
debt and in behalf of the shareholder, leaving to the corporations the right to reimbursement for the tax paid from their shareholders, either under some express statutory-authority for their recovery or under the general principle of law that one who pays the debt of another at his request can recover the amount from him.” Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 518. But as pointed out in Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 676, 677, a tax levied upon a corporation measured by the value of its shares is not equivalent to one upon the shareholders in respect of their shares.
Where the validity of an assessment by officers of the State is properly challenged, and the matter comes here, this court must determine the effect of the thing actually done. What might have been done under the local statute is not controlling. We think it clear that the assessment in the present case was against the corporation and beyond the power of the State definitely delimited by § 5219.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Mr . Justice Clarke took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause.
EXPORTERS OF MANUFACTURERS’ PRODUCTS, INC. v. BUTTERWORTH-JUDSON COMPANY.
Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 258 U. S.
after such expirations, stipulated the term should be extended for the purpose, a bill of exceptions was proposed to and settled and signed by the judge. Held that the consent gave no jurisdiction and the bill was unlawful. P. 368.
Questi ons certified by the court below under Jud. Code § 239.
Mr. Henry M. Ward for Exporters of Manufacturers’ Products, Inc.
The validity of a stipulation for the settlement of a bill of exceptions made after the expiration of the term of the trial court, as extended by standing rule, has been repeatedly recognized by this court. Ex parte Bradstreet, 4 Pet. 102; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333; Jennings v. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 255; Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293.
The District Court had the power on the stipulation to enter the orders by which the term was extended, and hence the trial judge had power to settle the bill of exceptions. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333; Life Insurance Co. v. Francisco, 17 Wall. 672, 679; United States v. Breitling, 20 How. 252.
Defendant having entered into the stipulation is estopped from questioning its validity.
The plaintiff followed the well settled practice in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Blisse v. United States, 263 Fed. 961; Exporters of Manufacturers Products v. Butt erworth-Judson Co., 265 Fed. 907, 908.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in granting the motion to strike out, now before it on rehearing, misapprehended the decision of this court in O’Connell v. United States, 253 U. S. 142. In all the cases cited by this court in the O’Connell Case it is either assumed or expressly stated that a stipulation is valid even though made after the expiration of the term. Davis v. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138; Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U. S. 361.
Mr. William Wallace, Jr., for Butterworth-Judson Company.
Mr . Just ice Mc Reynol ds delivered the opinion of the court.
Asking instruction as provided by § 239, Judicial Code, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has sent up the statement and question which follow.
“ This cause came here on a writ of error to a judgment in favor of the Butterworth-Judson Company in an action at law in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Judgment resulted from the verdict of a jury and thereupon plaintiff-in-error took a writ.
“ The stated terms of the trial court as prescribed by Act of Congress begin each month on the first Tuesday thereof; but a general rule of that court provides as follows: 1 For the purpose of taking any action which must be taken within the term of the court at which final judgment or decree is entered, each term of court is extended for ninety days from the date of entry of the final judgment or decree.’
“ In respect to this case the ninety day period above provided for, and therefore the Term at which the final judgment in question was entered expired on the 24th of February, 1920.
“ On March 1, 1920, a written stipulation was executed between the attorneys for the parties hereto in the words following: 1 It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the November Term of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York be extended to April 6, 1920, for the purpose of settling and filing the bill of exceptions herein.’
“ On or before the 6th of April, 1920, but long after the 24th of February, 1920, the plaintiff-in-error proposed a bill of exceptions. Thereupon the trial Judge over the objection of defendant-in-error and on the faith of the p. 368stipulation above quoted, settled and signed the bill of exceptions annexed to the writ of error herein , and now in this court.
“ Defendant-in-error then moved in this court for an order striking from the record the bill of exceptions so settled as above set forth, on the ground that the same had been settled, signed and made a part of the record herein in contravention of law, in that the term had expired.
“ Upon consideration of this motion a question of law arises concerning which this court desires the instruction of the Supreme Court in order properly to decide the cause.
“ Question Certified. Is the bill of exceptions so as above set forth settled, signed and certified to this court in contravention of law, in that the term had expired before the same was offered for settlement? ”
In the recent case of O’Connell v. United States, 253 U. S. 142, 146, we reaffirmed the doctrine announced in Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293, 298—
“ By the uniform course of decision, no exceptions to rulings at a trial can be considered by this court, unless they were taken at the trial, and were also embodied in a formal bill of exceptions presented to the judge at the same term, or within a further time allowed by order entered at that term, or by standing rule of court, or by consent of parties; and, save under very extraordinary circumstances, they must be allowed by the judge and filed with the clerk during the same term. After the term has expired, without the court’s control over the case being reserved by standing rule or special order, and especially after a writ of error has been entered in this court, all authority of the court below to allow a bill of exceptions then first presented, or to alter or amend a bill of exceptions already allowed and filed, is at an end.”
365. Syllabus.
And applying this rule we held the bill of exceptions, signed by the trial judge after expiration of the time allowed by the rule of court, was no part of the record.
In the present cause the term as extended had expired before any action concerning the bill of exceptions was taken by either court or counsel. In such circumstances the court had no power to approve it unless this could be conferred by mere consent of counsel. This they could not do.
Consent of parties can not give jurisdiction to courts of the United States. Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 22 Wall. 322, 327. The policy of the law requires that litigation be terminated within a reasonable time and not protracted at the mere option of the parties. See United States n . Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 70. We think the better rule and the one supported by former opinions of this court requires that bills of exceptions shall be signed before the trial court loses jurisdiction of the cause by expiration of the term or such time thereafter as may have been duly prescribed. The certified question is accordingly answered in the affirmative.
CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. C. C. WHITNACK PRODUCE COMPANY.
Argument for Petitioner. 258 U.S.
ment, against the delivering carrier, that the injury occurred on the delivering carrier’s line. P. 371. 2. There is no inconsistency between this rule and the provision of the amendment making the initial carrier also liable. P. 373. 104 Neb. 587, affirmed.
Certi orar i to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a judgment against the present petitioner in an action by the respondent for damages to goods in transitu.
Mr. Wymer Dressier for petitioner.
There is no common-law presumption, applied in federal courts, that damage to an interstate shipment occurred on the line of the last carrier; on the contrary, federal courts hold that, since the enactment of the Carmack Amendment making the initial carrier liable for the entire transportation, all such presumptions heretofore applied by state courts are superseded, and recovery against a connecting carrier can only be had by affirmatively showing that it caused the damage. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 420; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597; Henderson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 147 La. 647.
Liability of a carrier on account of interstate shipments is to be determined by the laws of the United States, the provisions of the bills of lading, and the common law as applied in federal courts. State laws and policies have no application. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U. S. 148; United Metals Selling Co. v. Pryor, 243 Fed. 91; Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. n . Harold, 241 U. S. 371.
The Carmack Amendment covered the whole field of interstate commerce, and the remedy afforded is as much in favor of the consignee as of the shipper or anyone else who may be the lawful holder of the bill of lading.
Mr. Henry H. Wilson, with whom Mr. Elmer J. Burkett, Mr. Elmer W. Brown and Mr. Ralph P. Wilson were on the briefs, for respondent.
Mr . Justice Mc Reynol ds delivered the opinion of the court.
The respondent Produce Company recovered a judgment against petitioner, the delivering carrier, for damages to two carloads of apples transported during November, 1914, upon through bills of lading over connecting lines from points in New York State to one in Nebraska. The evidence tended to show that the apples were in good condition when received by the initial carrier, but were frozen when delivered at destination. Where the damage occurred was not shown.
Petitioner moved for a directed verdict claiming no recovery could be had against it without affirmative evidence that it caused the damage. Having denied this motion, the court instructed the jury that there was a presumption of damage upon the line of the last carrier, and the Supreme Court of Nebraska approved the charge.
The single question now presentedd'or consideration is whether, since the Carmack Amendment, a presumption arises that the injury occurred on the delivering carrier’s line, when goods moving in interstate commerce upon a through bill of lading are delivered in bad condition and the evidence shows they were sound when received by the initial carrier but does not affirmatively establish where the loss occurred.
It is established doctrine that the rights and liabilities in respect of damage to goods moving in interstate p. 372commerce under through bills of lading depend upon acts of Congress, agreements between the parties and common-law principles accepted and enforced in the federal courts. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U. S. 148,151. While this court has not expressly approved it, we think the common-law rule, supported both by reason and authority, is correctly stated in § 1348, Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed.—
“ A connecting carrier, who has completed the transportation and delivered the goods to the consignee in a damaged condition or deficient in quantity, will be held liable in an action for the damage or deficiency, without proof that it was occasioned by his fault, unless he can show that he received them in the condition in which he has delivered them. The condition and quantity of the goods when they were delivered to the first of the connecting carriers, being shown, the presumption will arise that they continued in that condition down to the time of their delivery to the carrier completing the transportation and making the delivery to the consignee, and that the injury or loss occurred while they were in his possession.”
Some of the pertinent cases are collected in the note below.1
1 Smith v. New York Central R. R. Co., 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 225; Cote v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 182 Mass. 290; Laughlin v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 28 Wis. 204; Phila., Balt. & Wash. R. R. Co. v. Diffendal, 109 Md. 494; Blumenthal v. Central R. R. Co., 88 N. J. L. 254‘,"Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Naive, 112 Tenn, 239; Colbath v. Bangor & Aroostook R. R. Co., 105 Me. 379; Willett v. Southern Ry. Co., 66 S. Car. 477.
The following cases hold that the presumption is not in conflict with the Carmack Amendment: Erisman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 180 la. 759; Glassman v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 166 la. 255; Mewborn & Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 170 N. Car. 205; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. n . Harrington, 44 Okla. 41; Eastover Mule Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 99 S. Car. 470.
The petitioner insists that this common-law rule conflicts with the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 595,1 which requires issuance of a through bill of lading by initial carrier and declares it liable for damage occurring anywhere along the route, as interpreted and applied by this court. But we find no inconsistency between the amendment or any other federal legislation and the challenged rule. Properly understood, Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 IT. S. 597, especially relied upon, gives no support to the contrary view.
That cause involved the South Carolina statute which imposed a penalty of $50 upon the carrier for failure to pay within forty days for damages suffered by goods transported in interstate commerce. The opinion expressly states, “ The defendant contended that the law imposing the penalty was invalid under the Act to Regulate Commerce, especially § 20, as amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, known as the Carmack Amendment; ” refers to the penalty as “ The only matter that we are considering; ” and points out that “The state law was not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress, but to enforce a state policy differently conceived.” As the Supreme Court of South Carolina sustained the act and per-
1
Carmack Amendment. “ That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.”
Counsel for Parties. 258 U. S.
mitted recovery of the penalty, its judgment was necessarily reversed.
Here there is no question of conflict between a state statute and any federal policy; and nothing in the words of the amendment indicates a legislative purpose to abrogate the accepted common-law doctrine concerning presumption. The suggestion that by imposing additional liability upon the initial carrier the amendment provides an adequate remedy for shippers and thereby removes the necessity for any presumption against the terminal one and impliedly abrogates the rule, is unsound. There are adequate reasons why shippers should have the benefit of both; and we think Congress so intended.
The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
Mr . Justice Clarke took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause.