Int'l Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506 (1922)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Int'l Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506 (1922)
Full caption
INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY v. DAVIDSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF BUFFALO, ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 30, 1922
INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY v. DAVIDSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF BUFFALO, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM AND CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 340. Argued January 3, 4, 1922.—Decided January 30, 1922.
1. The Act of February 13, 1911, c. 46, 36 Stat. 899, authorizing special permits for immediate lading and unlading of vessels and other conveyances, and empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to fix extra compensation to be paid customs officials at the expense of the licensees for Sunday and holiday service in such lading or unlading, was not applicable to an international toll bridge nor to the operation thereon of a line of passenger trolley cars; nor was it made so by the amendment of February 7, 1920, c. 61, 41
506. Statement of the Case.
Stat. 402, by which the extra compensation was extended to cover overtime “ in connection with the unlading, receiving, or examination of passengers’ baggage,” this provision being given full effect if confined to baggage of passengers on vessels for the immediate lading or unlading of whose cargoes special license may issue under the original act. P. 512.
2. A company owning and operating a toll bridge, with a line of trolley cars, across the Niagara River, over which was heavy passenger travel in the cars, in other vehicles and on foot, and as to which customs inspection service had been maintained by the United States, as well on Sundays and holidays, when the travel was heaviest, as on week days, was notified that unless it procured a special license under the above amended act, which would necessitate its agreeing to pay the amount of extra compensation for customs officials and giving a bond to indemnify the United States against all losses arising from the granting of the license, no vehicle, except the cars, would be permitted to enter the United States on Sundays and holidays, and no passengers, except after surrender of all personal baggage, including handbags, to a customs guard, and that all vehicles except the cars, and all baggage surrendered, would be held by the collector at the owner’s risk for examination on the following working day. Held: (a) That the instruction of the Secretary of the Treasury to this effect could not be sustained as a discretionary determination that the movement of merchandise at the place did not justify maintaining customs service on the days in question. P. 514. (6) That it was not a valid regulation under Rev. Stats., § 161, but was both unreasonable and inconsistent with law, virtually laying a tax and providing for extra compensation of officials from a private source contrary to statute. P. 514. (c) That the bridge owner, as well as passengers and vehicle owners, had a standing to question the regulation. P. 515.
273 Fed. 153, reversed.
Review of a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the action of the District Court in dismissing, for want of equity, a bill filed by the present petitioner to restrain the respondent collector of customs from putting into effect measures affecting the customs inspection at the terminus of petitioner’s toll bridge.
Mr. Basil Robillard for appellant and petitioner.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Harvey B. Cox were on the brief, for appellees and respondents.
Mr. John W. Beaumont, by leave of court, filed a brief as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court.
The International Railway Company owns and operates two public toll-bridges across the Niagara River between the United States and Canada. One is at Niagara Falls, the other at Lewiston, a short distance below. Over each bridge the company operates regularly its passenger cars; and over each there is heavy passenger travel also in other vehicles and on foot. For more than twenty years prior to June, 1920, the Government had, at its own expense, maintained at the American end of these bridges customs inspectors, continuously day and night, including Sundays and holidays. Then the Collector of Customs of the Port of Buffalo notified the company that on Sundays and holidays thereafter no vehicle (except trolley cars) would be permitted to enter the United States; that no passenger would be allowed to enter except after surrender to the customs guard of all personal baggage, even the smallest handbag; and that all vehicles (except trolley cars) and all baggage surrendered would be held by the Collector, at the owner’s risk, for examination on the next following working day. The company was further advised that continued service of customs inspectors on Sundays and holidays could be secured, if it would make application for a special license under the Act of February 13, 1911, c. 46, 36 Stat. 899, as amended by the Act of February 7, 1920, c. 61, 41 Stat. 402. Day and night customs service on ordinary week days was to be continued at the expense of the Government as p. 509theretofore. The Collector acted throughout under instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Act of 1911, entitled “An Act To provide for the lading or unlading of vessels at night ”, etc., declares that immediate lading or unlading of any vessel or other conveyance can be had upon the obtaining by “ master, owner, agent, or consignee ” of a special license therefor. To obtain the license it is necessary that the applicant shall agree to pay to the Collector of Customs an amount equal to the extra compensation of the customs officers employed therefor at night or on Sundays or holidays, and shall give a bond conditioned to indemnify the United States against all losses which arise from granting the license. The compensation payable for overtime, including services on Sundays and holidays, was fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury at double the day rate; and the amount of the bond for a six months’ license is fixed by the statute at fifty thousand dollars. The amendment of 1920 provides, among other things, that the work for which extra compensation is payable by the licensee shall include that of examining “ passengers’ baggage.” The company does not unlade any cargo at night or on Sundays or holidays, and does not contemplate doing so. It is interested only in preserving the passenger traffic passing over its bridges. This traffic on working days is not nearly as heavy as on Sundays and holidays. Discontinuance of the customs service on those days would, in large measure, destroy that traffic.
The company brought this suit in the Federal District Court for Western New York against the Collector to enjoin the threatened action, insisting that the provisions of these statutes are not applicable to a toll-bridge and that the Collector is without power to exact, as a condition of continuing the service, that the company take a license with the attendant burdens. The District Court p. 510dismissed the bill for want of equity, 271 Fed. 313; and its decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 273 Fed. 153. The case was brought here by appeal; and a petition for a writ of certiorari was also filed, consideration of which was postponed until the hearing on the merits. Whether the action taken and threatened exceeds the powers conferred by law is the main question presented.
The Act of 1911 contained no reference whatsoever to passengers or to their baggage or personal effects. It dealt exclusively with the grant of special permits for the immediate lading or unlading of vessels and other conveyances. It consists of five sections and a repealing clause. The first four prescribe the conditions under which such license shall issue and the proceedings to be taken thereunder. The fifth section gives the Secretary of the Treasury power to fix extra compensation to be paid customs officials serving at night, on Sundays or on holidays in connection with lading or unlading under such special permit; and it provides that an amount equal to the extra compensation shall be paid to the Collector by the licensee. The amendatory Act of February 7, 1920, made no change whatsoever in the first four sections of the Act of 1911. It dealt solely with the extra compensation, merely substituting the new § 5, shown in the margin.1 This p. 511substituted section defines what shall be deemed overtime, how the rate of extra pay shall be fixed, and what the work is, for which extra compensation shall be paid. In
1
In the following reprint of the new § 5 the phrases omitted from old § 5 are bracketed and are in small capitals. The new phrases are in italics. That part of the section which remained unchanged is in ordinary type. “ The Secretary of the Treasury shall fix a reasonable rate of extra compensation for [night ] overtime services of inspectors, storekeepers, weighers, and other customs officers and employees who may be required to remain on duty between the hours of five o’clock postmeridian and eight o’clock antemeridian, or on Sundays or holidays, to perform services in connection with the lading or unlading of cargo [at night ], or the lading [at night ] of cargo or merchandise vessels at night or on Sundays or holidays at the rates prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury as herein provided, the said extra compensation to be paid by the master, owner, agent, or consignee as such vessel [s] : Provided further, That in those ports where customary working hours are other than those hereinabove mentioned, the Collector of Customs is vested with authority to regulate the hours of customs employees so as to agree with prevailing working hours in said ports, but nothing contained in this proviso shall be construed in any manner to affect or alter the length of a working day for customs employees or the overtime pay herein fixed.”
for transportation in bond or for exportation in bond or for [the ] exportation with benefit of drawback, or in connection with the receiving or delivery of cargo on or from the wharf, or in connection with the unlading, receiving, or examination of passengers’ baggage [but such rate of compensation shall not exceed an amount EQUAL TO DOUBLE THE RATE OF COMPENSATION ALLOWED TO EACH SUCH OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE FOR LIKE SERVICES RENDERED BY DAY], SUCh rates to be fixed on the basis of one-half day’s additional pay for each two hours or fraction thereof of at least one hour that the overtime extends beyond five o’clock postmeridian (but not to exceed two and one-half days’ pay for the full period from five o’clock postmeridian to eight o’clock antemeridian), and two additional days’ pay for Sunday or holiday duty. [,] The said extra compensation shall [to ] be paid by the master, owner, agent, or consignee of such vessel or other conveyance whenever such special license or permit for immediate lading or unlading or for lading or unlading at night or on Sundays or holidays shall be granted to the collector of customs, who shall pay the same to the several customs officers and employees entitled thereto according to the rates fixed therefor by the Secretary of the Treasury: Provided, That such extra compensation shall be paid if such officers or employees have been ordered to report for duty and have so reported, whether the actual lading, unlading, receiving, delivery, or examination takes place or not. Customs officers acting as boarding officers and any customs officer who may be designated for that purpose by the collector of customs are hereby authorized to administer the oath or affirmation herein provided for, and such boarding officers shall be allowed extra compensation for services in boarding p. 512this work it includes that u in connection with the unlading, receiving, or examination of passengers’ baggage.” The contention of the Government is that the mere insertion of these words in § 5 has the effect of establishing a system of special licenses applicable to toll-bridges which are not vessels or other conveyances, and on which there is neither cargo, lading or unlading, but passengers who pass on foot or in trolleys or automobiles.
The contention is at variance with the language of the act and with its history. Obviously the words “ vessel or other conveyance ” are not appropriate to describe the plant of a toll-bridge. Other provisions, also, of the Act of 1911, like the requirement of “entry of vessels, and due report of other conveyances” before issue of the special license, show that it was not the purpose of Congress to make it applicable to the conduct of a toll-bridge or the operation thereon of a line of passenger trolley cars. The clause in the amendment of 1920 by which the extra compensation payable under § 5 is extended to cover overtime “ in connection with the unlading, receiving, or examination of passengers’ baggage ” is given full effect, if applied to the baggage of passengers on those vessels for the immediate lading and unlading of whose cargoes special license may issue under the first four sections of the Act of 1911. That these were the only overtime services in connection with passengers for which the amendment made provision is confirmed by its history. The injustice of denying to customs officials compensation for such overtime services was obvious. But the Secretary of the Treasury had been advised, after the passage of the Act of 1911, as well as before, that he was without power to make—or to require the vessel owner to make—any payment therefor, since passengers’ baggage is not “ cargo ”, 30 Ops. Atty. Gen. 123. To remedy this and other defects in the provision for extra pay, the amendment was introduced at the instance of the Treasury p. 513Department, with the approval of the United States Shipping Board and of the American Steamship Association.1 Congress created two distinct systems for the examination of articles coming from foreign countries. One dealt with articles imported as merchandise; the other with passengers’ baggage and personal effects. That distinction, established by the Act of March 2,1799, c. 22,1 Stat. 627, has been preserved in all later legislation. One Pearl Chain v. United States, 123 Fed. 371, 374. For merchandise there are elaborate provisions concerning entry, manifests, unloading, invoices, consular certificates and bills of lading. Revised Statutes, §§ 2581, 2867, 2962 and 2872, as amended by Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 25, 23 Stat. 53, 59. There are special provisions affecting importations from Canada and Mexico. Revised Statutes, §§ 3097, 3098, 3099. Compliance with these requirements necessarily involves delays. Concerning passengers’ baggage and effects the provisions are much simpler. They are designed to secure expeditious entry. Revised Statutes, §§ 2799, 2800, 2801 and 2802, deal with articles from foreign ports. There are additional provisions concerning p. 514articles coming from contiguous countries. Revised Statutes, §§ 3100, 3101, 3102. That Congress intended by the Act of 1920 to abandon this distinction between merchandise and passengers’ baggage which had been carefully preserved in the Act of 1911, is not to be assumed.
1
Report of Committee on Commerce, Senate No. 306, 66th Cong., 1st sess. In presenting the report in the Senate on behalf of the Committee, Mr. Calder said: “We have had a law on the statute books for a number of years permitting the lading and unlading of vessels at night, for which the Government employees were paid in some such manner as is prescribed in this measure. But a year or two ago the Attorney General held that men could not be paid for passing upon the baggage taken off ships at night, but could be paid for supervising the discharging of the cargoes. That caused some difficulty, because we found a customs official examining baggage at night and being unpaid for it, and right alongside of him a customs official examining cargo and being paid for that.” 59 Cong. Rec., Part 1, p. 640. See also 59 Cong. Rec., Part 2, pp. 2176-2178; Hearing of October 11, 1919, on Hours of Labor and Pay of Customs Inspectors on H. R. 6577, Committee on Ways and Means; Senate Report No. 660, 61st Cong., 2d sess.; House Report No. 1657, 61st Cong., 2d sess.
It is also insisted that the Secretary of the Treasury has authority, independently of the power specially conferred by the Act of 1911 as amended, to issue the instruction complained of. The contention is that his instruction to the Collector was not to compel the bridge company to pay the cost of the inspection service but merely to withdraw the service unless the company would agree to pay the cost; that since customs officials cannot be maintained at every point where merchandise may conceivably enter from contiguous countries, discretion must rest in the Secretary to determine whether the character and extent of the movement at a particular place justifies maintaining them there; and that the instruction given was a regulation under § 161 of the Revised Statutes which had the force of law. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 480. To this contention it is perhaps a sufficient answer to say that the instruction given was obviously not a determination by the Secretary that the travel over these bridges on Sundays and holidays was not such as to justify the Government in maintaining the inspection service. The travel was heavier on those days than on any other; and the service had been maintained continuously for more than twenty years. But there are other conclusive answers. Section 161 does not confer upon the Secretary any legislative power. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466; United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14. A regulation to be valid must be reasonable and must be consistent with law. The instruction given lacks both of these essentials. To collect the cost of customs service from vessel owners or others is virtually laying a tax upon them. This cannot be done except by specific authorization of Congress.
Moreover, unless so authorized, no official or employee may receive from the Government pay for extra services. Revised Statutes, § 1764; United States v. Garlinger, 169 U. S. 316. Nor may he receive in connection with his services pay from any private source, Act of March 3, 1917, c. 163, § 1, 39 Stat. 1106. Customs officials especially are forbidden to receive such payment. Revised Statutes, § 1790. Furthermore, to impose upon the company the obligation of furnishing an indemnity bond covering losses which may accrue to the Government from the action, not of the bridge company or of its employees, but of any passenger who crosses the bridge was clearly unreasonable. It was this lack of power in the Secretary to impose upon others any part of the cost of the customs service unless specially authorized by Congress which led to the enactment also of the earlier legislation concerning special licenses for lading and unlading of cargoes.1 The instructions here attacked profess to rest, not upon Revised Statutes, § 161, but upon the Act of 1911 as amended by that of 1920, T. D. 38290; T. D. 38429. The claim of such authority by virtue of the power to establish regulations for the Department was apparently first made in this suit.
It is further contended that the petitioner has no standing to question the regulation which applies not to it, but to the owners of private conveyances and of personal baggage brought over the bridge. While these also might be entitled to seek redress, it is clear that the instructions given threaten vital interests of the bridge company to which a court of equity should afford protection. The
1
See Act of March 3, 1873, c. 240, 17 Stat. 579; Revised Statutes, §§2871, 2872; Acts of June 26, 1884, c. 121, §25, 23 Stat. 53, 59; June 5, 1894, c. 92, 28 Stat. 85; May 31, 1900, c. 600, 31 Stat. 249; December 16, 1902, c. 2, 32 Stat. 753; June 30, 1906, c. 3909, 34 Stat. 633. See also T. D. 28214, in re Act of 1906; T. D. 31562, in re Act of 1911. 6267°—22----- 38 between the island bank and the South Carolina shore, with the water at ordinary stage. P. 522. (c) Islands in the Chattooga River, the “ most northerly branch or stream ” of the Tugaloo, apparently not known as the Chattooga at the time of the Convention, are reserved to Georgia as completely as those in the Savannah and Tugaloo proper. P. 522.
Syllabus. 257 U. S.
jurisdiction of this court on appeal was also questioned. In support of the jurisdiction it is urged that the bill invoked rights under the Constitution as well as under the revenue laws; and treaty rights are also pressed upon us; Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 407; Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 237 U. S. 618, 621. Whether the appeal lies we need not decide. A writ of certiorari was also applied for and the question presented is of sufficient importance to require determination by this court. Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co., 204 U. S. 204, 213.
Decree reversed.
STATE OF GEORGIA v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
IN EQUITY.
No. 16, Original. Argued January 4, 5, 1922.—Decided January
30, 1922.
1. Under the Beaufort Convention of April 28, 1787, defining the boundary between South Carolina and Georgia on the Savannah River and tributaries, reserving islands to Georgia,—Held: (a) Where there are no islands in the boundary rivers, the line is on the water midway between the main banks when the water is at ordinary stage. P. 521. (b) Where there are islands, it is midway
2
The general rule is that where a river, navigable or nonnavigable, is the boundary between two States, and the navigable channel is not involved, in the absence of convention or controlling circumstances to the contrary, each takes to the middle of the stream. P. 521.
3. The location of the boundary under the above convention, held unaffected by the Thalweg or Main Navigable Channel doctrine, in view of the provision that each State shall have equal rights of navigation on the streams. P. 521. Original suit to define a boundary between States.
Mr. Geo. M. Napier, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, and Mr. Thos. F. Green, with whom Mr. Seward M. Smith was on the brief, for complainant.
Mr. S. M. Wolfe, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, and Mr. A. M. Lumpkin for defendant.
Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court.
The parties to this case agree: That the boundary line between the States of Georgia and South Carolina is the river Savannah from the sea to the junction of the Seneca (formerly Keowee) and the Tugaloo (formerly spelled Tugalo) rivers; that it continues thence northwesterly by the Tugaloo river to the junction of the Tallulah and Chattooga rivers, and thence by the Chattooga river to the 35th parallel of north latitude, which is the south boundary of North Carolina. But they differ as to the location of the boundary line in these three rivers, and the State of Georgia, by original bill, prays that the controversy be settled by a decree of this court.
The State of Georgia contends: That, where there are no islands in the rivers, the line between the two States is midway between the river banks, when the water is at its ordinary stage; that, where there are islands, this line deflects and follows the middle line of the most northerly branch or stream, where it runs between any island and the South Carolina shore; and it claims jurisdiction over all islands in all three boundary rivers.
South Carolina, on the other hand, admits in its answer that where there are no islands the line between the States is the “ middle thread of the stream where the rivers flow p. 518in one stream or volume,” but at the bar and in its brief it is argued, strenuously, that the true line is the low water mark on the southerly or Georgia bank of each river. It also claims that where there are islands the line is at low water mark on the southerly bank of the most northerly stream or branch of the river, and, while conceding all the islands in the rivers Savannah and Tugaloo to Georgia, it denies the jurisdiction of that State over those in the Chattooga river.
Thus it will be seen that the controversy is limited to the determination: (1) Whether the boundary line shall be located midway between the banks of each river where there are no islands, or at low water mark on the Georgia shore; (2) Whether the location of the boundary line where there are islands in the rivers, is in the middle of the stream running between any island and the South Carolina shore, or at low water mark on the southern or island shore of such stream; and (3) Whether any islands there may be in the Chattooga river are within the territorial jurisdiction of Georgia.
The taxation of dams and hydro-electric plants, already constructed and hereafter to be constructed, in the boundary rivers, renders the decision of the questions involved of importance to the two States.
It is not necessary to recite or discuss the historic origin of the titles which the two contending States have to the territory comprised within their present boundaries, for it is stipulated that the rights of the parties are to be determined by the construction of the terms of a written convention or treaty, entered into on April 28, 1787, by commissioners appointed by the two States. This convention, entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Confederation of 1778, under which the States were then united for the purposes of government, having been executed at Beaufort, South Carolina, is designated in the record as the Beaufort Convention.
Only two articles of this Convention need be considered, and they are as follows:
“Art. I. The most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah, from the sea or mouth of such stream to the fork or confluence of the rivers now called Tugalo and Keowee; and from thence, the most northern branch or stream of the said river Tugalo, till it intersects the northern boundary line of South Carolina, if the said branch or stream of Tugalo extends so far north, reserving all the islands in the said rivers Savannah and Tugalo to Georgia; but if the head spring or source of any (branch or stream of the said river Tugalo does not extend to the north boundary line of South Carolina, then a west line to the Mississippi, to be drawn from the head spring or source of the said branch or stream of Tugalo river, which extends to the highest northern latitude, shall for ever hereafter form the separation limits and boundary between the states of South Carolina and Georgia.
“Art. II. The navigation of the river Savannah at and from the bar and mouth, along the northeast side of Cockspur island, and up the direct course of the main northern channel along the north side of Hutchinson’s Island, opposite the town of Savannah, to the upper end of said island, and from thence up the bed or principal stream of the said river to the confluence of the rivers Tugalo and Keowee, and from the confluence up the channel of the most northern stream of Tugalo river to its source, and back again by the same channel to the Atlantic Ocean—is hereby declared to be henceforth equally free to the citizens of both states, and exempt from all duties, tolls, hinderance, interruption, and molestation whatsoever, attempted to be enforced by one state on the citizens of another; and all the rest of the river Savannah to the southward of the foregoing description, is acknowledged to be the exclusive right of the state of Georgia.”
First. As to the location of the line where there are no islands. While the admission quoted from the answer of p. 520South Carolina would be sufficient to justify locating the line, where there are no islands, in the “middle thread of the stream where the rivers flow in one stream or volume,” nevertheless the earnestness with which the contention for the low water mark on the Georgia shore is argued constrains us to consider the question further.
That the admission in the answer was not made inadvertently is conclusively shown by the fact that the General Assembly of South Carolina, in 1852, by resolution, appearing in the record, declared: That the Beaufort Convention defines the boundary between the two States; that the terms of the first article of that convention “construed by the undisputed principles of international and common law, fix, as the limit of the respective jurisdictions of the two States, . . . the thread or middle of the most northern branch or stream of the rivers Savannah and Tugaloo, where these rivers have more than one branch or stream, and the thread or middle of these rivers where there is but one branch or stream,” and that the courts, the legislature and the departments of the government of the State have uniformly given to and acquiesced in this construction of the Convention.
A like declaration appears in the “Code of the Statute Law of South Carolina,” adopted in 1861, in which the line where there are no islands is described as located at the “ middle thread of the stream where the rivers flow in one stream or volume.”
With this construction of Article I of the Convention, by the courts, general assembly and heads of departments of South Carolina, we fully agree.
The express reservation of the islands to Georgia and the placing of the boundary line in the most northerly branch of the Savannah and then of the Tugaloo river up to the “ northern boundary of South Carolina,” makes it clear that where there are islands in the river the line must be between them and the South Carolina shore, for p. 521otherwise the Georgia islands would be within the State of South Carolina. While it is true that the line, where there are no islands, is not specifically located by the Convention at the “ thread or middle of the stream,” neither is it, in terms, placed at the low water mark on the Georgia bank. However, the general rule is that where a river, navigable or non-navigable, is the boundary between two States, and the navigable channel is not involved, in the absence of convention or controlling circumstances to the contrary, each takes to the middle of the stream (Handly’s Lessee n. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374, 379; Hall, International Law, 6th ed., 123; Creasy First Platform of International Law, § 231), and therefore in this case the conclusion of the General Assembly of South Carolina in 1852 and in 1861, as we have quoted it, was clearly the correct one.
We conclude that where, in any of the boundary rivers here involved, there are no islands the location of the boundary line between the two States is the thread of the river—the middle line of the stream—regardless of the channel of navigation, the precise location to be determined when the water is at its ordinary stage, “ neither swollen by freshets nor shrunk by drought.” Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 9 Cush. 544, 552.
Second. As to the location of the boundary line “where the most northern branch or stream ” flows between an island or islands and the South Carolina shore.
Obviously such a stream may be wide and deep and may contain the navigable channel of the river, or it may be narrow and shallow and insignificant in comparison with the adjacent parts of the river. But such variety of conditions cannot affect the location of the boundary line in this case, because, by Article II of the Convention, equal and unrestricted right to navigate the boundary rivers is secured -to the citizens of each State, irrespective of the location of the navigable channel with respect to the boundary line.
Thus, Article II takes out of the case any influence which the Thalweg or Main Navigable Channel Doctrine {Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U. S. 1; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 169, 170, 171) might otherwise have had upon the interpretation to be placed on Article I, by which the location of the line must be determined, and leaves the uncomplicated case of a boundary stream between two States quite unaffected by other considerations.
Thus again we have the case of a stream for a boundary between two States and with the precise location of the boundary line unaffected by the Thalweg Doctrine, or by other circumstances, and again the rule must be applied that the division line is midway between the banks of e the stream,—here between the island bank on the one side and the South Carolina bank on the other,—its precise position to be determined when the water is at its ordinary stage.
Third. As to the islands in the Chattooga River.
Article I, as quoted, makes it plain that the commissioners executing the Convention of Beaufort intended to provide that the most northern branch of the river which they knew as the Tugaloo, as far northerly as its intersection with the northern boundary of South Carolina, if it extended so far north, should be the boundary line between the two States. It is now known that the most northern branch of that river extends as far north as the south boundary line of North Carolina (the 35th parallel of north latitude) and beyond that the controversy in this case does not extend. The fact that this “ most northerly branch or stream of the Tugalo ” has come to be known as the Chattooga in that part of it northerly of the junction of the rivers now known as the Tullulah and Chattooga, neither of which appears by this record to have been known or named at the time the Convention was executed, cannot change the rights of the parties to the Convention, in the islands in that part of
516. Syllabus.
the stream. The Chattooga is but the extension of the Tugaloo,—the northern branch or stream of that river—and the fact that it is called Chattooga cannot affect the jurisdiction of Georgia over “ all the islands in the said rivers Savannah and Tugalo ” to which State they are specifically reserved by the Convention. The islands in the Chattooga River, as well as those in the Savannah and Tugaloo, were reserved to Georgia by the Convention.
Thus we conclude: (1) Where there are no islands in the boundary rivers the location of the line between the two States is on the water midway between the main banks of the river when the water is at ordinary stage; (2) Where there are islands the line is midway between the island bank and the South Carolina shore when the water is at ordinary stage; and (3) That islands in the Chattooga River are reserved to Georgia as completely as are those in the Savannah or Tugaloo rivers.
Counsel may present a decree, within thirty days, to carry into effect these conclusions of the court, with or without a commission to locate and monument the boundary line as they may be advised. The costs of suit will be equally divided between the two States.