Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478 (1922)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478 (1922)
Full caption
DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ET AL. v. WALLACE ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 9, 1922
DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ET AL. v. WALLACE ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA.
No. 329. Argued December 16, 1921.—Decided January 9, 1922.
1. Where the case as made by the bill involves a real and substantial question under the Constitution and the requisite jurisdictional amount, the jurisdiction of the District Court, and of this court upon a direct review of its action, extends to all other questions involved, whether of federal or state law, and enables the court to rest its judgment on the decision of such of the questions as in its opinion effectually dispose of the case. P. 482.
2. Equity will enjoin collection of an illegal tax in the absence of an adequate and certain remedy at law. P. 482.
3. The Act of North Dakota, Laws 1919, c. 222, which lays an excise on foreign corporations of a percentage of their capital actually invested in the transaction of business in the State, provides that, for one engaged in business within and without the State, investment within the State shall mean that proportion of its entire stock and bond issues which its intrastate business bears to its total business; that where the business within the State is not otherwise p. 479easily and certainly separable, it shall be held to mean such proportion of the entire business as the property of the corporation within the State bears to its entire property, and that, in the case of a railroad or other specified public service corporation, whose line extends into the State from without, property within the State shall mean the proportion of the entire property of the corporation which its mileage within the State bears to its entire mileage. Held, that the mileage basis (declared unconstitutional in Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66), was intended to be the exclusive basis for computing the assessments of such a railroad company, and that assessments based on the ratio of the value of its railroad within the State to that of its entire railroad were not authorized by the statute. P. 482. \4. The unconstitutionality of an excepting provision in a statute does not enlarge the scope of its other provisions. P. 484. Reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court, after a final hearing on bill and answer, dismissing a bill filed by the Director General of Railroads and five railroad companies to enjoin the collection of a special excise tax sought to be imposed under North Dakota Laws, 1919, c. 222.
Mr. Charles W. Bunn, with whom Mr. E. C. Lindley, Mr. M. L. Countryman and Mr. D. F. Lyons were on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. George E. Wallace for appellees.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court. .
This is a suit by the Director General of Railroads and five railroad companies to enjoin the collection of a special excise tax assessed against each of the companies for the years 1918 and 1919 under a statute of North Dakota, c. 222, Laws 1919, which declares: • “Every corporation, joint-stock company or association, now or hereafter organized under the law of any other State, the United States or a foreign country, and p. 480engaged in business in the State during the previous calendar year, shall pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business in the State by such corporation, joint-stock company or association, equivalent to 50 cents for each $1,000.00 of the capital actually invested in the transaction of business in the State; provided, that in the case of a corporation engaged in business partly within and partly without the State, investment within the State shall be held to mean that proportion of its entire stock and bond issues which its business within the State bears to its total business within and without the State and where such business within the State is not otherwise more easily and certainly separable from such entire business within and without the State, business within the State shall be held to mean such proportion of the entire business within and without the State, as the property of such corporation within the State bears to its entire property employed in such business both within and without the State; provided, that in the case of a railroad, telephone, telegraph, car or freight-line, express company or other common carrier, or a gas, light, power or heating company, having lines that enter into, extend out of or across the State, property within the State shall be held to mean that proportion of the entire property of such corporation engaged in such business which its mileage within the State bears to its entire mileage within and without the State. The amount of such annual tax shall in all cases be computed on the basis of the average amount of capital so invested during the preceding calendar year; provided, that for the purpose of this tax an exemption of $10,000.00 from the amount of capital invested in the State shall be allowed; provided, further, that this exemption shall be allowed only if such corporation, joint-stock company or association furnish to the Tax Commissioner all the information necessary to its computation.”
Each of the five railroad companies was subjected in the usual way to a full property tax on all of its property within the State, and that tax is not here in question. The suit relates only to the special excise tax.
The companies were all organized under the laws of States other than North Dakota and all own lines of railroad extending from other States into or through that State. These lines were under federal control and operated by the Director General during the years for which the excise tax was assessed.
The taxing officers at first assessed the tax for the year 1918 against these companies by using in its computation the mileage ratio prescribed in the second proviso of the statute; but this court held that the tax so assessed was an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce and a taking of property without due process of law. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66. Thereupon the taxing officers assessed the tax for that year, and also for 1919, by using in its computation the ratio specified in the last preceding clause of the statute—that is to say, a ratio fixed by contrasting the value of the company’s railroad within the State with the value of its entire railroad within and without the State.
In the District Court the validity of the tax assessed on the new or substituted basis was challenged on the grounds (a) that as to railroad companies whose lines lie partly within and partly without the State the statute does not authorize or sanction a tax assessed on that basis; (b) that the statute imposes the tax only as a special excise on doing business in the State, and these companies were not thus engaged during the years for which the tax was assessed,—their railroads being then under federal control and operated exclusively by the Director General; and (c) that an excise tax assessed against these companies on the new or substituted basis operates necessarily to burden interstate commerce and to take property p. 482without due process of law, and so is in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At an early stage in the suit three judges granted an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of the tax; but on the final hearing, which was on bill and answer, a decree was entered dismissing the bill on the merits. The plaintiffs then sought and were allowed a direct appeal to this court under § 238 of the Judicial Code.
The case made by the bill involved a real and substantial question under the Constitution of the United States and the amount in controversy exceeded three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, so the case plainly was cognizable in the District Court. In such a case the jurisdiction of that court, and ours in reviewing its action, extends to every question involved, whether of federal or state law, and enables the court to rest its judgment or decree on the decision of such of the questions as in its opinion effectively dispose of the case. Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U. S. 618, 620; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R. Co., 244 U. 8. 499, 508.
As respects the right to sue in equity, it is enough to say that in this case we find the same absence of an adequate and certain remedy at law that was found in Wallace v. Hines, supra, where the right to invoke the aid of a court of equity was sustained.
The first of the objections made to the tax is that it was assessed on a basis which the statute does not authorize or sanction. Of course, if this be so the tax must fall, and the other objections need not be considered. The statute does not prescribe a single or unvarying basis whereon the tax shall be assessed, but designates several bases and p. 483defines the particular situation in which each shall be applied. Where the business of the • corporation is wholly within the State the tax is to be computed according to the “capital actually invested” in the business. Where the business is partly within and partly without the State the computation is to be based on a proportion of the company’s “entire stock and bond issue”, which is to be taken as representing the “investment within the State.” But the proportion is to be determined by standards which vary materially. In one situation it is to conform to the ratio of the company’s business within the State to its total business, and in another to the ratio of the company’s property employed in its business within the State to its entire property employed in its business wherever conducted. In the instance of railroad companies and other public utility corporations having lines partly within and partly without the State the statute specially provides that it shall conform to the ratio of the company’s mileage within the State to its entire mileage. This special provision is eimbodied in a proviso or excepting clause which comes immediately after the clause relating to other corporations and reads as follows:
“ . . . provided, that in the case of a railroad, telephone, telegraph, car or freight-line, express company or other common carrier, or a gas, light, power or heating company, having lines that enter into, extend out of or Across the State, property within the State shall be held to mean that proportion of the entire property of such corporation engaged in such business which its mileage within the State bears to its entire mileage within and without the State.”
This provision shows that the legislature intended by it to put the corporations which it describes in a separate class for the purposes of the tax, to require as to them that the tax be computed and assessed on the special basis there prescribed, and to exempt them from the bases
6267°—22------ 36
applicable to other corporations. That intention hardly could have been more clearly expressed.
True, this provision was held in Wallace v. Hines, supra, to be in conflict with constitutional limitations and indefensible as respects the railroad companies now before us; but that does not make the provision any the less a key to the intention of the legislature, or enable the taxing officers to subject these corporations to other provisions from which the act as a whole shows the legislature intended to except them.
Where an excepting provision in a statute is found unconstitutional, courts very generally hold that this does not work an enlargement of the scope or operation of other provisions with which that provision was enacted and which it was intended to qualify or restrain. The reasoning on which the decisions proceed is illustrated in State ex rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167, 174. In dealing with a contention that a statute containing an unconstitutional proviso should be construed as if the remainder stood alone, the court there said: “This would be to mutilate the section, and garble its meaning. The legislative intention must not be confounded with their power to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and vitality to a provision of law is one thing, and to refuse to read it is a very different thing. It is by a mere figure of speech that we say an unconstitutional provision of a statute is 'stricken out.’ For all the purposes of construction it is to be regarded as part of the act. The meaning of the legislature must be gathered from all they have said, as well from that which is ineffectual for want of power, as from that which is authorized by law.”
Here the excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legislature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should be taken as restricted accordingly. Only with that
478. Syllabus.
restricted meaning did they receive the legislative sanction which was essential to make them part of the statute law of the State; and no other authority is competent to give them a larger application. Had they been enacted without the excepting provision and had it been embodied in a subsequent amendatory act a different situation would be presented—one in which that provision would have no bearing on the meaning or scope of the others—because an existing statute cannot be recalled or restricted by anything short of a constitutional enactment. This was recognized in Truax v. Corrigan, ante, 312, where, when an amendatory exception proved unconstitutional, we held that the original statute stood wholly unaffected by it.
From what has been said it follows that to sustain the tax in question we should have to hold that the taxing officers, on finding that it could not constitutionally be assessed on the basis specially prescribed in the statute, were at liberty to assess it on another and different basis which the statute shows was not to be applied to corporations of the class to which these railroad companies belong. Of course we cannot so hold.
We are accordingly of opinion that the first objection to the tax is well taken, and therefore that the tax is invalid and its collection should be enjoined.
Decree reversed.
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. LEMKE, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.
IN EQUITY.
No. 25, Original. Argued on motion to dismiss January 5, 1922. Decided January 23, 1922.
1. Section 211 of the Judicial Code, requiring that the United States be made a party to any suit to set aside or suspend an order of the
Argument for Complainant. 257 U. S.
Interstate Commerce Commission, and § 208, requiring that such suits be brought in a District Court, were not repealed by the Act abolishing the Commerce Court, October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219. P. 489.
2. The provision that the United States shall be a party (Jud. Code, § 211) was made not as a mere matter of procedure but in protection of the public interests. P. 490.
3. A State can sue in the District Court when the United States is a party and has consented to be sued there and has not expressed its consent to be sued elsewhere. P. 491.
4. A bill brought by a State in this court against railroad companies to prevent their applying an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission increasing rates within the State, dismissed for want of equity, and the plaintiff remitted to its remedy in the District Court, upon the grounds that complete justice to the companies, and to the public policy indicated by Jud. Code, § 211, so required. P. 490.
Bill dismissed.
Original suit in this court against the above named and four other railroad companies, to restrain them from applying an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission increasing intrastate rates in North Dakota until this court can review the decision of the Commission and pass upon constitutional questions concerning it.
Mr. Charles W. Bunn, with whom Mr. Erasmus C. Lindley, Mr. Dennis F. Lyons and Mr. Benjamin W. Scandrett were on the brief, for defendants, in support of the motion to dismiss.
Mr. Karl Knox Gartner, with whom Mr. William Lemke, Attorney General of the State of North Dakota, was on the brief, for complainant, in opposition to the motion. Mr. Sveinbjorn Johnson, successor of Mr. Lemke as Attorney General, was on a supplemental brief filed after argument.
Neither the United States nor the Interstate Commerce Commission is a necessary party to this suit, as no remedy is sought against either.
485. Argument for Complainant.
A procedure prescribed for application in the District Courts can have no application to procedure to be observed in this court in the filing of an original bill authorized by the Constitution. There is nothing in Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493, or in any other decision of this court, or in § 208 or in any other provision of the Judicial Code, or any other law of Congress, that provides that the United States is a necessary party to a suit by a State against citizens of another State brought originally in this court, even though such suit might involve the nullification indirectly of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449; United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 32; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373; Skinner & Eddy Corporation v. United States, 249 U. S. 557.
Section 208, Jud. Code, has been repealed by the District Court Jurisdiction Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 219, passed as a part of the general deficiency bill of that date.
It is uncertain under the wording of Art. HI, § 2, of the Constitution whether the original jurisdiction of this court to try suits by a State against citizens of another State or States is exclusive. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 464. Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 32. At the most, the District Court Jurisdiction Act created a jurisdiction in the District Courts which, as respects suits by a State against citizens of other States, is simply concurrent with the original jurisdiction of this court under Art. Ill, § 2. Can that act—an act of Congress—providing that cases in the District Courts which but for its provisions would be brought against the Interstate Commerce Commission, shall thereafter be brought against the United States, be so interpreted by this court as constituting the United States a necessary party to this suit p. 488in the sense in which that term is defined in Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 236? Can an act of Congress intended to operate solely as a matter of procedure to be observed in District Courts be interpreted so as to operate to defeat a jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in the sovereign States of the nation to bring their controversies with citizens of other States originally in this court? Would not such an interpretation render the act itself unconstitutional?
For reasons of comity between the state and federal sovereignties, as a matter of judicial policy, any doubt as to the matter should be resolved in favor of the right of the State to proceed originally in this court. Ames v. Kansas, supra.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Blackburn Ester-line, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, by leave of court, filed a brief on behalf of the United States, as amici curiae.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill in equity brought in this Court by the State of North Dakota against certain named railroad companies to prevent their applying an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission until this Court can review the decision upon which that order was made. The order increased the intrastate rates in North Dakota upon a finding that the present rates were an unjust discrimination against interstate commerce within the meaning of paragraph 4 of § 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended by the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, c. 91, Title IV, § 416, 41 Stat. 456, 484. North Dakota Rates, Fares and Charges, 61 I. C. C. 504. Increased Rates, 1920, 58 I. C. C. 220. The ground of the bill is that the increase if applied will make the jobbing business within the State unable to compete with the p. 489jobbers of Minnesota, and that the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is invalid (1) because based upon an increase in interstate rates that the Commission ordered without complying with the conditions said to be imposed by §§ 15a and 19a of the Interstate Commerce Act (a physical valuation;) (2) and because based upon a misconstruction of the above mentioned § 13(4). It is not necessary to state the objections more at length.
The defendants move to dismiss the bill. The first reason offered is that a State cannot sue on account of the' private grievances of its citizens. By an amendment the State alleged a property interest in itself but that amendment did not cover the extent of the relief asked, and the case is argued on the broad ground originally taken. We shall leave this question on one side, without deciding whether this case can be distinguished from Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 277, 286, et seq. The argument that we shall consider is that the suit is one to set aside or suspend the order of the Commission, Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493; that therefore by §211 of the Judicial Code the United States must be. made a party, and that the United States has consented to be sued only in the District Court, where such suits are required to be brought. Judicial Code, § 208. Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219.
The State replies in the first place that the sections of the Judicial Code relied upon relate to the establishment of the Commerce Court and therefore are repealed in terms by the Act of October 22, 1913, just referred to. But that argument cannot be maintained. A provision that all suits of a certain sort shall be brought in the Commerce Court is only modified, not repealed, by the abolition of the Court and the transfer of its jurisdiction to the District Courts. Such a statute does not relate merely to the establishment of the Commerce Court. The
Opinion of the Court. 257 U. S_
sections cited always have been assumed, we believe, to remain in force and they were made a basis of decision in Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493, 504.
The main contention of the State is that if in the opinion of the Court it has a substantial right that is infringed by what the defendants are doing Congress neither can take that right away nor prevent the State from proceeding in this Court for such remedy as law or equity may afford. But if these premises were granted, it would not follow that the bill should be maintained. It is a proceeding in equity in which the requirements of complete justice and of public policy must be taken into account. When they are considered it seems to us pretty clear that the State should be remittee! to the remedy offered by the statutes—a suit in the District Court in which the United States is made a party. Complete justice requires that the railroads should not be subjected to the risk of two irreconcilable commands—that of the Interstate Commerce Commission enforced by a decree on the one side and that of this Court on the other. The decision in this case although an authority would not be res judicata, and the Commission would not be concluded from rearguing the whole matter. As to public policy, Congress has indicated the policy of the United States. For although it is argued that the requirement that the United States should be made a party is a mere matter of procedure for the purpose of giving the Department of Justice control, we cannot limit the significance of the Judicial Code, § 211, by such a speculation. The language of the section shows that public interests were before the mind of Congress, and that in its opinion an order made in the public interest should not be hindered from going into effect until the representative of the public had been heard. It appears to us that this view is so reasonable that it should be accepted by this Court even if not bound.
485. Syllabus.
There is no doubt that a State can sue in the District Court when the United States is a party and has consented to be sued there and has not expressed its consent to be sued elsewhere. United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 32. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449. For the reasons that we have indicated it is equitable that a decree should not be entered except in such form as to bind the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States and therefore this bill must be dismissed. The right of the State is sufficiently protected by its right to appeal from the decision of the District Court. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 395, et seq.
Bill dismissed.
CORNELI v. MOORE, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
GHIO v. MOORE, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
BRYAN v. MILES, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.
EASTES v. CRUTCHLEY, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
Nos. 174, 175, 428, 548. Argued December 15, 1921.—Decided January 30, 1922.
1. Under the National Prohibition Act, the owner of whisky stored in a bonded warehouse can not secure its release upon payment of
Counsel for Parties. 257 U. S.
the tax, for transportation to his dwelling for consumption there as a beverage by himself, his family and bona fide guests. Sections 3,25,33,37, Title II, and § 6, Title III, considered. P. 495. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U. S. 88, distinguished. 2. Thus construed, the act does not deprive the owner of the liquor of property without due process of law, or take it for public purposes without compensation. P. 498. 3. So held, where ownership was acquired, by purchase of warehouse receipts, (a) before the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, (b) after the ratification and before the effective date of the Prohibition Act, and (c) after that date. P. 498. Affirmed.
Appeals from decrees of District Courts dismissing on motions as many bills filed by parties alleging themselves to be owners of barrels of whisky in bonded warehouses and praying mandatory injunctions to compel the collectors of internal revenue in charge to accept payment of the government taxes, issue the stamps and allow removal. In Nos. 428 and 548, the federal prohibition directors were also joined, the bills praying that they be required to issue the necessary permits for removal and transportation to plaintiffs’ homes. In No. 174, the plaintiff alleges that he became the owner in the spring of 1917, and in No. 175 that ownership began on February 28, 1920, by purchase of a warehouse receipt. In Nos. 428 and 548, the bills show that ownership began by purchase of warehouse receipts, October 2, 1919, and August 24, 1917.
Mr. Elliott W. Major and Mr. Glendy B. Arnold for appellants in Nos. 174,175, and 548. Mr. John T. Barker was also on the brief in No. 548.
Mr. Julian 8. Jones and Mr. J. Wallace Bryan, with whom Mr. James T. O’Neill, Mr. Glendy B. Arnold and Mr. Elliott W. Major were on the briefs, for appellant in No. 428.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. p. 493491.. Opinion of the Court.
Mr. Wayne B. Wheeler, by leave.of court, filed a brief as amicus curiae.
■ Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases, though having different parties and coming from different courts, are dependent upon the same considerations. They differ in some details but they all involve the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and'its assistant legislation, the National Prohibition Act.
The Amendment after its ratification prohibited for beverage purposes, among other things, the transportation of intoxicating liquor within the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof. And Congress and the States were given concurrent power to enforce the prohibition by appropriate legislation.
Congress in pursuance of that power passed the National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, 41 Stat. 305. Are the cases at bar within the mandate and the prohibition, are the special questions involved in them.
First, as to the cases as displayed in the bills—there are some differences in their averments but their essential allegations identifying them in principle are as follows: The appellees were, respectively, Collectors of Internal Revenue for the First Internal Revenue District of the State of Missouri, the District of Maryland, and the Sixth Internal Revenue District of the State of Missouri. It was the duty of each to collect and receive taxes on distilled spirits in government bonded warehouses, and upon payment of the taxes to issue revenue stamps showing the payment of the taxes. As such officers they had, respectively, the custody and control of the spirits, and the right of ingress to and egress from the warehouses.
Each appellant became the purchaser of a barrel of whiskey, in one of the warehouses (it is designated), p. 494which was identified and which he was desirous of removing to his dwelling for use and disposition of the spirits according to law. The appellees refused to release or deliver the spirits, or to accept the payment of the taxes thereon which appellants either tendered or, on account of opposing declarations of appellees, ommitted to tender.
The refusal of appellees to release the spirits is asserted to be wrongful and illegal and a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives appellants of their property without due process of law and takes it for public use without just compensation.
The prayers of the bills were in effect (we disregard particulars) to require appellees to do what was necessary to release the spirits from the warehouses and to enable them to be transported to the respective dwellings of appellants.
The bills were dismissed upon motions of appellees.
Against the rulings upon the motions, and against the decrees dismissing the bills, appellants adduce certain provisions of the National Prohibition Act and cite Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U. S. 88.
So much of the cited portions as is relevant we insert in the margin. We may observe, however, that while their provisions extend to the manufacture, sale and other disposition of intoxicating beverages, as well as to their transportation, we only insert the provisions concerning the latter.1
1
“ Sec. 3. No person shall on or after the date when the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into effect . . . transport ... or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this Act, and all the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented. . . . Provided, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the purchase and sale of warehouse receipts eighteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States goes into effect, the kind and amount of intoxicating liquors in his possession. But it shall not be unlawful to possess liquors in one’s private dwelling while the same is occupied and used by him as his dwelling only and such liquor need not be reported, provided such liquors are for use only for the personal consumption of the owner thereof and his family residing in such dwelling and of his bona fide guests when entertained by him therein; and the burden of proof shall be upon the possessor in any action concerning the same to prove that such liquor was lawfully acquired, possessed, and used.”
Before considering the provisions here specially involved, we may say that the act has been sustained, and it has been decreed that the power of Congress can be asserted against the disposal for beverage purposes of all liquor manufactured before the Amendment became effective, as it can be asserted against subsequent manufacture for those purposes. Either case is within the constitutional mandate and prohibition.
A consideration of the act becomes necessary. Section 3 is comprehensive in its prohibition, and it takes pains to provide that it shall have such liberality of construction as to achieve its declared purpose.
covering distilled spirits on deposit in Government bonded warehouses, and no special tax liability shall attach to the business of purchasing and selling such warehouse receipts.”
“ Sec. 25. It shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this title or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such liquor or property. . . . No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such. . . . The term ‘ private dwelling ’ shall be construed to include the room or rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. . . .”
“ Sec. 33. After February 1, 1920, the possession of liquors by any person not legally permitted under this title to possess liquor shall be prima facie evidence that such liquor is kept for the purpose of being . . . disposed of in violation of the provisions of this title. Every person legally permitted under this title to have liquor shall report to the commissioner within ten days after the date when the
It is, however, contended that there is modification of this apparent universality of prohibition, and that, by a permission of traffic in warehouse receipts, liquor in storage in bonded warehouses is not subject to the ban of the section.
Regarding the words of § 3 in connection with some of the provisions of §§ 25 and 33, they give some plausibility to the contention and some puzzle to construction, but we are repelled nevertheless from those of appellants. To accept them would defeat the purpose of the act and its achievement of the mandate of the Constitution. That mandate is, as will be seen by reference to § 1 of the Amendment, that the “ transportation of intoxicating liquors within . . . the United States . . . for beverage purposes ” shall be prohibited. And, as we have said, the act declares (§3) that all of its provisions shall be liberally construed “ to the end ” to quote its words, “ that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented.” The method of appellants, we think, tended to the opposite effect; tended to the use of liquor as a beverage—not its prevention.
We are unable to see in § 33 which takes illegality from the “ liquors in one’s private dwelling while the same is occupied and used by him as his dwelling only ” and the rights that may attach to liquors in such situation an intention to extend such rights to liquors not so situated or, to put it more pointedly, an intention to make all bonded warehouses of the country outbuildings of its dwellings.
There is nothing favorable to appellants’ contention in § 37.1 It permits transportation to bonded warehouses p. 497but not from them as inferred by appellants. Transportation from them is confined to transportation to a wholesale druggist for sale to him for purposes not prohibited. A permit is necessary even for this.
1
“ Sec. 37. Nothing herein shall prevent the storage in United States bonded warehouses of all liquor manufactured prior to the taking effect of this Act, or prevent the transportation of such liquor to such warehouses or to any wholesale druggist for sale to such druggist for purposes not prohibited when the tax is paid, and permits may be issued therefor. . . .”
In connection with § 37; § 6, Title III of the act is pertinent. It permits distilled spirits produced and fit for beverage purposes remaining in bonded warehouses to be withdrawn for denaturing “ or for deposit in a bonded warehouse established under this Act.”
Counsel urge Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., supra, against this conclusion, and as sustaining their contention. In that case, by motion to dismiss, it was admitted that Street was the lessee of a room in the Deposit Company’s warehouse, in which he had stored liquors, acquired prior to the effective date of the National Prohibition Act, which liquors were “in his exclusive possession and control, and are intended, and will be used only for personal consumption by himself and the members of his family or his bona fide guests.” The storage room was obviously the use of a convenience very commonly employed and contributory to his dwelling, and therefore, for the reasons stated in that opinion, it was concluded that the National Prohibition Act did not render unlawful the storage of liquors there involved or their transportation, under proper permit, to the dwelling of the owner for lawful uses. And this difference in the facts in the case from those in the cases at bar removes it as a precedent. There is no analogy in Street’s relation to the room in the Deposit Company’s warehouse and appellants’ relation to bonded warehouses. They had neither control, access to nor possession of the spirits they purchased. Mere ownership was not the equivalent. Under § 33 there must be ownership, and possession in one’s private dwelling, and that character cannot be assigned to the bonded warehouses of the Government.
Comment on other provisions of the act we do not think is necessary. A reference to them demonstrates that they have no militating force against our conclusion.
But appellants contend the effect we assign to the act is to assign to it the effect of depriving them of their property without due process of law or taking it for public purposes without just compensation. To understand the conditions of the contention, a distinction in the cases must be noted. The purchases by appellants were at different dates. The spirits purchased by Cornell were all stored in bond in the Spring of 1917, a date prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. Bryan became the owner of his on the second of October, 1919, and, therefore, prior to the effective date of the Volstead Act which was January 16, 1920. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368. Ghio’s purchase was about the twenty-eighth of February, 1920, which was after the date of the Amendment and the effective date of the Volstead Act. Eastes avers his ownership dates from August 24, 1917.
In considering the bearing of the dates of purchase and their relation to the dates of the Amendment and the Volstead Act, the question of their construction blends in the discussion somewhat confusingly with the question of their constitutionality. It is asserted that the Eighteenth Amendment was not intended to be retrospective and that if it and the Volstead Act should be so treated, that is, if applied to liquor manufactured and lawfully, acquired before their respective dates, they are void—they thereby taking from property its essential attributes, “ the right to use it, possess it and enjoy it,” contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,—and that the Fifth Amendment is not repealed by the Eighteenth Amendment. We are not disposed to trace the elements of the contentions minutely—they are answered in all their phases by the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 387.
Decrees affirmed.
491. McReynolds, J., dissenting.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting.
These cases differ somewhat and I speak with reference to No. 174—Corneli v. Moore,—finally determined on motion to dismiss.
The opinion and ruling just announced seem to me in direct conflict with Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. (1920), 254 U. S. 88. I think the reasoning of that opinion is bad; but it has been adopted, and the construction which it placed upon the act should be adhered to or frankly overruled. The effort to distinguish the present case from the earlier one is but toying with the immaterial.
Prior to the enactment of any National Prohibition law and during the Spring of 1917, Corneli acquired the barrel of distilled spirits numbered 125,694, then on deposit in United States General Bonded Warehouse No. 1, St. Louis, Mo., where he resides. In strict conformity with law he allowed the spirits to remain there until the Autumn of 1920, when he offered to pay the taxes and demanded permission to move them to his home for lawful use.
In Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., wines and liquors, worth more than $3,000 “ securely and properly packed and stored in bottles, barrels, casks and cases,” had long been held in the large public warehouse, No. 60 East Forty-second Street, New York City, owned and operated by the Deposit Company, and it was alleged that “ complainant does not intend to remove the same voluntarily except as they may be required from time to time for consumption”. Notwithstanding the inhibitions of the Volstead Act it was ruled that the owner might continue to store them for an indefinite period and then remove them to his dwelling for personal use. The opinion not only declared the storage lawful but also said (p. 93): “ That transportation of the liquors to the home of ap-
6267°—22------ 37
McReynolds, J., dissenting. 257 U.S.
pellant, under the admitted circumstances, is not such as is prohibited by the section is too apparent to justify detailed consideration of the many provisions of the act inconsistent with a construction which would render such removal unlawful. . . .”
Cornell entrusted his supply to a government warehouse as permitted by the statute and is denied the privilege of taking it home because that warehouse is not contributory to his dwelling, nor an adjunct thereto, nor an outbuilding connected therewith. Street made no such claim concerning the Forty-second Street Warehouse—indeed his counsel seem to have been wholly ignorant of this extraordinary extension of his home—and the decree in his favor was not rested on that gossamer. It went upon the assumption that Congress never intended to prohibit bona fide owners of lawfully acquired liquors from storing and removing them for personal use at home, although the Government stoutly maintained the contrary view. The following quotation from the opinion sufficiently indicates the theory accepted by the court:
“ It may be that the custody of liquors by a warehouse company was thus not declared to be unlawful because the writers of the act did not have such a case in mind, but it was more probably because Congress would not consent to allow lawful possession and use of liquors in dwellings having storage facilities for them, while denying the only possible means of preserving and protecting such liquors to persons with less commodious homes. The Congress was concerned with the great problem of preventing the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes in the future, and it seems to have given but slight attention to the consumption of such relatively small amounts of such liquors as might be in existence in private ownership and intended for consumption by the owner, his family or his guests, when the Amendment and the act should take effect. An intention
491. Statement of the Case.
to confiscate private property, even in intoxicating liquors, will not be raised by inference and construction from provisions of law which have ample field for other operation in effecting a purpose clearly indicated and declared.”
If Comeli had only suspected the remarkable power of the Forty-second Street Warehouse to attach itself to the dwellings of all patrons, without regard to distance, he might have chosen a safer course. He stored where the statute said he might. Now he is told that no analogy exists between his lonely barrel there and the many “ bottles, barrels, casks and cases ” which, within more favored walls, await the pleasure of their owner.