Armour & Co. v. City of Dallas, 255 U.S. 280 (1921)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Armour & Co. v. City of Dallas, 255 U.S. 280 (1921)
Full caption
ARMOUR & COMPANY ET AL. v. CITY OF DALLAS ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 28, 1921
ARMOUR & COMPANY ET AL. v. CITY OF DALLAS ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.
No. 149. Argued January 18, 1921.—Decided February 28, 1921.
1. Where a city and a railway company agreed for the removal of the railway’s main tracks from a busy street to another location, to promote the public safety and convenience and the operation of the railway, and owners of abutting property alleged that the change, by depriving them of their switch connection, would largely destroy the value of their expensive plant, in violation of their constitutional rights of contract and property, held, that the case was not one for
280. Argument for Appellants.
relief by injunction, and that the plaintiffs had a full and complete remedy in an action at law for damages. P. 286. 2. The District Court should not enjoin the performance of a city’s contract, as void under the city charter, where the same question is involved in a taxpayer’s suit, instituted in the state court by the same parties and still pending, in which a temporary injunction had been granted and is still in force. P. 286. Affirmed.
This was a direct appeal from a decree of the District Court which dismissed, upon the merits, a bill brought by the appellants to enjoin, upon constitutional grounds, the removal of certain railway tracks in the City of Dallas. The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Francis Marion Etheridge, with whom Mr. Ralph W. Shauman, Mr. Samuel B. Cantey, and Mr. Joseph Manson McCormick were on the brief, for appellants:
Their argument on the principal point decided was expressed as follows:
The fact, if it be a fact, that the continued use of Pacific Avenue by the Railway Company by the running of a hundred heavy trains over it every twenty-four hours is incompatible with the safety and convenience of the public, constitutes no answer to the proposition that the restricted use of Pacific Avenue by the maintenance and operation of the switch track serving appellants’ plant will not operate injuriously upon the public interest. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record showing or tending to show that such restricted use of Pacific Avenue will in the least interfere with the safety or convenience of the public. Such being the state of the record, it is not conceivable that appellants should be denied appropriate remedy for the enforcement of their legitimate contract, protected, as it is, by the due process and obligation clauses of the paramount law. It is obvious that the damages incident to the removal of the switch track, which must necessarily result in rendering appellants’ plant
Opinion of the Court. 255 ü. S.
valueless and in terminating the conduct of its profitable business, are incapable of ascertainment. Appellants’ equities are very great.
They are entitled to have their contract rights specifically enforced by an injunction. Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 230 U. S. 58; Emporia v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 94 Kansas, 718; Taylor v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 54 Florida, 635; International & Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Anderson County, 106 Texas, 60; 246 U. S. 424; H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Ennis, 201 S. W. Rep. 256; Harper v. Virginian Ry. Co., 76 W. Va. 788; McKell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 186 Fed. Rep. 39; American Malledbles Co. v. Bloomfield, 83 N. J. L. 728; Southern Ry. Co. v. Franklin & P. Ry. Co., 96 Virginia, 693; Raphael v. Thames Valley Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 147; Greene v. West Cheshire Ry. Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 44; Jacksonville &c. Ry. Co. v. Hooper, 160 U. S. 527; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 600; Atlanta W. P. Ry. Co. v. Camp, 130 Georgia, 1; Columbus Ry. Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399.
Mr. Thomas J. Freeman and Mr. James J. Collins, with whom Mr. Allen Charleton, Mr. Carl B. Calloway and Mr. Rhodes S. Baker, were on the briefs, for appellees.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court.
In 1872 the Texas and Pacific Railway Company built its single track main line to the west on a street in the village of Dallas, then as now called Pacific Avenue. In 1890 the City granted to the Company a fifty-year franchise to double track its railroad on that street. In the latter year the population of Dallas was 35,057; now it is 158,976;1 and the existence and operation of the rail-
112th Census, Vol. I, p. 430; U. 8. Census Bureau, Population of Cities Having 25,000 Inhabitants or More, 1920.
road on the Avenue has become a serious menace to life and limb, a great inconvenience to the whole people, burdensome to the Railway, and an injury to neighboring property. North of the Avenue lie largely the residential sections of the City; adjacent and to the south, largely business sections. A part of the Avenue is in the heart of the City. There six of the leading business streets —great thoroughfares—cross it; and on two of them street cars cross the railroad at grade. Two other much travelled streets are parallel. One of these, which is only two hundred feet distant, is the principal business street of the City. The number of trains operated daily over the Avenue had risen in 1918 to more than one hundred; and there were, in addition, switching operations to many neighboring industries. Trains are now longer—some of them consisting of eighty freight cars; and they occasion serious interruption to street traffic. The necessary use of larger engines, due partly to a heavy grade, results in much noise, smoke and cinders. Regulations concerning operation of trains imposed by the City in the interests of safety were necessarily severe; and had proved expensive and embarrassing to the Railway. Still further safeguards and restrictions upon operation appeared to be necessary. Plans were proposed for putting the tracks in subways, for elevating them and for eliminating the grade crossings; all of which the City confessedly had power to require of the Railway. But none of these projects appeared to offer a satisfactory solution of the problem. Finally a plan was worked out for the removal of the tracks from this part of the Avenue for a distance of nearly a mile and for diverting the trains to the line of another railroad with which it was proposed to make connections. This involved establishing a wholesale trade district elsewhere.
This plan proved acceptable to the Railway, its receiver, the City and most of the real estate owners affected. In order to carry out the plan the Wholesale District [p. 284] Trackage Company was organized; and this corporation, the City, the Railway and its receiver entered into a contract under which the improvement was to be made. Then Armour & Company, owner of a plant served by a switch track connecting with the main line on the Avenue, and its lessee, brought this suit in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas against all the parties to the contract seeking to enjoin its performance and specifically the removal from Pacific Avenue of the tracks which connected with their switch track. Jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked on the ground that the action proposed would deprive plaintiffs of their property without due process of law and impair the obligation of their contracts in violation of the Federal Constitution. After full hearing on the merits a decree was entered dismissing the bill with costs. The case comes here by direct appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code.
First. The basis of the plaintiffs’ principal claim is this: In 1912 Armour & Company, being desirous of erecting a plant in Dallas, made a contract for the purchase of a lot on the Avenue, the purchase to be conditioned upon the Railway securing from the City a franchise to lay a switch connecting the lot with its main track on the Avenue and upon Armour & Company then securing from the Railway an agreement to build and maintain the switch. Upon satisfying itself through negotiation with officials of the City and of the Railway that these conditions would be complied with, Armour & Company completed the purchase of the lot. The City then passed an ordinance granting such a franchise to the Railway for the period of twenty years, conditioned, among other things, upon Armour & Company dedicating about ninety square feet of their land to the public to round the two corners of their lot. The small parcels were dedicated; the plant was erected; the switch was built by the Railway; and over the switch Armour & Company’s lessee customarily receives [p. 285] about 600 cars of freight a year. The plaintiffs contend that the switch franchise, granted by the City to the Railway, was entered into for Armour & Company’s benefit; that it was, in effect, a contract with them; that the City and the Railway are powerless under the Federal Constitution to abrogate that contract either directly by surrendering the switch franchise or, indirectly, by removing the main track with which the switch connects; and that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction, because the plant, which cost nearly $80,000 to build, would lose most of its value if deprived of its rail connection.
To this claim several answers are made: (1) That the City did not make any contract with Armour & Company and under its charter would have been without power to do so; (2) that the Railway did not make any contract with Armour & Company to maintain the side track and that it had been authorized to remove the tracks from Pacific Avenue by the Railroad Commission, under appropriate legislation, on the ground that it would “serve the public interests by promoting the public safety and convenience;”
(3) that the plaintiffs have already sought and been denied, as against the Railway and its receivers, the same relief here applied for; having intervened for that purpose in the original suit brought for appointment of the receiver in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana; that the decree of the District Court therein dismissing its petition asking the same relief had been affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Armour & Co. v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 258 Fed. Rep. 185; and that this court had denied Armour & Company’s petition for writ of certiorari, 251 U. S. 551; (4) that even if the franchise had purported to grant an absolute right to maintain the tracks on Pacific Avenue it would have been subject to the fair exercise by the State, through the municipality as its agent, of the police power to promote the public safety; and that, under [p. 286] the circumstances, removal of the tracks was essential for this purpose since the tracks could not appropriately be placed underground or be elevated. See Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 241, 244; Erie R. R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394; (5) that the franchise for the switch was not absolute; that power of revocation had been expressly reserved by clauses in the ordinance which made the franchise subject to the City’s charter powers and provided “that in the event the said Railway Company shall be required to abandon, to elevate or to place in subways said main tracks on Pacific Avenue, then in that event this franchise shall be subject thereto”; and that the Railway was so required; (6) that even if plaintiffs had the legal right which they assert, they were not entitled to relief in equity by injunction; since an action at law would afford an adequate remedy and an injunction would interfere with a paramount public interest.
It was on the last of these grounds that the Circuit Court of Appeals in Armour & Co. v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 258 Fed. Rep. 185, unanimously affirmed the decree dismissing the intervening petition. Among the judges sitting upon appeal in that case was the Circuit Judge who entered the decree in this case here under review. He does not appear to have written an opinion in this case but presumably he dismissed this bill also on that ground. For it is clear that the case is not one for equitable relief. If the plaintiffs as abutting property owners have any legal right which is interfered with, an action at law for damages will afford them a full and complete remedy. See Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393, 405; Beasley v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 191U. S. 492,496-7. We have no occasion, therefore, to consider any of the other reasons urged for affirming the decree.
Second. Plaintiffs urge, apparently as taxpayers, this additional ground for relief: They allege that the contract [p. 287] entered into by the City is void and that its performance should be enjoined; because the contract therefor was not countersigned by the Auditor and the expense thereof was not charged to the proper appropriation as required by the City’s charter. It was agreed that the plaintiffs had brought a suit on this ground in a state court on behalf of themselves and of other taxpayers of Dallas against the City and others, that it had obtained upon an ex parte hearing a temporary injunction restraining the City from carrying out the contract, that this suit was pending on appeal before the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of Texas when this case was heard below, and that the temporary injunction, so far as appears, is still in force. The District Court was clearly right, under the circumstances, in refusing to grant an injunction on this ground.
Affirmed. [p. 288] DAWSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, ET AL. v. KENTUCKY DISTILLERIES & WAREHOUSE COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.
DAWSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, AND INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL. v. J. & A. FREIBERG COMPANY, INCORPORATED.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.
Nos. 439, 582. Argued January 6, 1921.—Decided February 28, 1921.
1. The tax sought to be imposed by a law of Kentucky of fifty cents a gallon upon whisky either withdrawn from bond within the State or transferred in bond from the State elsewhere, although described as an “annual license tax” on persons engaged “in the business of owning and storing” whisky in bonded warehouses, is not an occupation tax but essentially a property tax, tested by the local law. P. 291.
2. Being a property tax, it is void because it fails to comply with § 171 of the Kentucky constitution, which provides that taxes shall be “uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxation”; whisky never having been classified separately and being taxed under another law on its fair cash value. P. 291.
3. To pay under protest and sue to recover is not such an adequate legal remedy against an illegal state tax as will prevent the federal courts from exercising their equitable jurisdiction to restrain enforcement if the right to recover back is uncertain under the state law when the injunction suit is begun. P. 295. § 162, Ky. Stats., considered.
4. An equitable remedy available in the state court is not lost by suing in a federal court. P. 296.
5. Under the amendment of Jud. Code, § 266, which provides that
proceedings in a federal court to restrain execution of a state statute shall in certain circumstances be stayed to await determination of a suit in a state court to enforce it accompanied by a stay of proceedings under it, the stay granted in the state court must* be sufficiently general to protect the suitors in the federal court from the irreparable injury against which they there sought protection. P. 296. 274 Fed. Rep. 420, affirmed.
Direct appeals, under Jud. Code, § 266, from orders granting interlocutory injunctions. The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Chas. I. Dawson, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, with whom Mr. W. T. Fowler, Assistant Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, was on the briefs, for appellants.
Mr. W. Overton Harris, for Louisville Public Warehouse Company, appellant in No. 582.
Mr. William Marshall Bullitt, with whom Mr. Levy Mayer was on the brief, for appellee in No. 439.
Mr. Thomas Kennedy Helm and Mr. Levi Cooke, with whom Mr. Edmund F. Trdbue, Mr. John C. Doolan and Mr. James P. Helm, Jr., were on the brief, for appellee in No. 582.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court.
On March 12, 1920, the Legislature of Kentucky passed and the Governor approved an act which imposed upon every person engaged in the business of manufacturing whisky or “in the business of owning and storing ” the same in bonded warehouses within the State what was called an “annual license tax” of fifty cents a gallon upon all whisky either withdrawn from bond or transferred in bond from Kentucky to a point outside that State. Acts [p. 290] 1920, c. 13. The act took effect, by its terms, on its approval by the Governor. At that time there were stored in «such bonded warehouses about 30,000,000 gallons of whisky worth in bond perhaps 81.50 a gallon. Much of this whisky was owned by citizens of other States, their ownership being evidenced by negotiable warehouse receipts. Shortly after the enactment of the statute two suits were brought in the District Courts of the United States for Kentucky to enjoin its enforcement. The first was brought in the Western District, by the J. & A. Freiberg Company, Incorporated, an Ohio corporation; the second in the Eastern District by the Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company, a New Jersey corporation. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth and the Auditor of Public Accounts were made defendants in each. In the former the Louisville Public Warehouse Company was also a defendant; in the latter, the Commonwealth’s Attorney.
In the Freiberg case it was alleged that the whisky was in a general bonded warehouse;1 that the owner wished to withdraw it for removal in bond to a general bonded [p. 291] warehouse in Massachusetts; and that the defendant warehouseman, acting under provisions of the Kentucky statute, refused to permit such transfer unless the tax in question was paid by the owner. In the Distilleries Company case the plaintiff alleged that it had in its distillery warehouses large quantities of whisky, most of which was owned by others, that requests were being made daily either to withdraw lots from bond upon paying the government tax or to have them transferred in bond to other States; and that the defendants threatened to enforce heavy penalties if any such withdrawal or transfer was permitted without making payment of the fifty cents a gallon state tax. In each case a motion for an interlocutory injunction was made and heard before three judges under § 266 of the Judicial Code. The substantial questions presented in the two suits were the same. The plaintiff contended, in each, that the Kentucky statute was void under both the state and federal constitutions; and in each case the defendants, besides asserting the validity of the act, insisted, among other things, that the suit should be dismissed for want of equity because there was an adequate remedy at law. The District Courts granted plaintiffs’ motions, holding that there was no adequate remedy at law and that the statute was invalid under the constitution of the State because it was a property tax, was not uniform in its operation, and was confiscatory. The case comes here by direct appeal under § 266 of the Judicial Code. We shall consider first the validity of the tax.
1
Every bonded warehouseman was required to make to the State on June 1, 1920, and monthly thereafter, a report showing all the whisky in bonded storage and the number of proof gallons withdrawn or transferred. The act provided by § 3 that all bonded warehousemen “shall, at the time said reports herein provided for are made, pay to the Auditor of Public Accounts the tax of fifty cents per proof gallon upon each proof gallon of such spirits removed from the bonded warehouse ... or transferred under bond out of this State, up to the date of making such report; and for the purpose of securing the payment of the license taxes herein provided for, the Commonwealth shall have a lien on all such spirits stored in such bonded warehouses, together with the other property of the bonded warehousemen used in connection therewith; and in all cases where the spirits so removed or transferred were owned or controlled by another than the bonded warehouseman, then the bonded warehouseman shall collect and pay the tax due on such spirits so removed or transferred under bond, and shall be subrogated to the lien of the Commonwealth.”
First. The Attorney General concedes that the tax, if a property tax, is invalid; since it does not comply with the requirements of a property tax specified in § 171 of the state constitution. It is not “uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxation,”1 and though [p. 292] called an “annual ” tax was not intended to be such.1 He contends, however, that the tax is, as stated in the title of the act, a license tax upon “the business of manufacturing ” distilled spirits and upon “the business of owning and storing such spirits in bonded warehouses.” Section 181 of the state constitution authorizes license or occupation taxes; and statutes imposing such taxes measured by the amount of the product have been repeatedly sustained by its highest court. Raydure v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Kentucky, 84; Strater Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Kentucky, 604. Here we are concerned only with the taxes which are alleged to be on “the business of owning and storing such spirits in bonded warehouses.” The question is whether as to such this fifty cents a gallon tax is an occupation tax or is a property tax. The question is one of local law, so that a decision of it by the highest court of the State would be accepted by us as conclusive. But the validity of the statute does not appear to have been passed upon by any Kentucky court. We are, therefore, called upon, as were the District Courts, to determine this question of state law.
1
If the tax in question were a property tax there would be double taxation of this property and the uniformity clause would be violated, because the whisky has never been put into a separate class; and under another statute all whisky stored in bonded warehouses was required to be assessed by the State Tax Commission at its fair cash value; and taxes at the rate of 40 cents per $100 of value were payable thereon. Ky. Stats., § 4019, as amended March 5, 1918, c. 4, Acts 1918. Compare Campbell County v. City of Newport, 174 Ky. 712,723. Raydure v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Ky. 84, 97. 1 It was admitted that it would be clearly void as being confiscatory unless it was assumed that it was to be levied only once—namely when the whisky is withdrawn from bond or when it is transferred in bond to another State. Compare Salisbury v. Equitable Purchasing Co., 177 Ky. 348, 351, 353.
The name by which the tax is described in the statute is, of course, immaterial. Its character must be determined by its incidents; and obviously it has none of the [p. 293] ordinary incidents of an occupation tax. Unlike the tax of one and one-fourth cents a gallon upon rectifiers sustained in Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, and the tax of two cents a gallon upon distillers and warehousemen sustained in Greene v. Taylor, Jr. & Sons, 184 Kentucky, 739, this tax is not upon the business or occupation of the warehouseman. A particular lot of whisky may pass through a dozen bonded warehouses without one of them being obliged to pay the tax. For the only warehouseman required to do so, is he who has the whisky on storage at the time of its removal from bond (Government) tax paid or when it is transferred in bond to another State. The tax is made primarily payable by the warehouseman and to secure its payment the State is given a lien upon the warehouse and the whisky therein. But the warehouseman is a collection agency merely empowered to get reimbursement through subrogation to the State’s lien on the whisky of others which ultimately bears the burden of the tax. Nor is the alleged business of merely owning and storing whisky in bond made taxable. So long as the whisky is stored in bond within the State it is free of the tax. One may own and store the whisky for years in the hope of selling it at a profit, and yet be free from any obligation Gver to pay this tax, if, before its removal from bond within the State, the whisky is sold to another or if, while so owned, it is destroyed or forfeited to the Government. Likewise the tax is not one imposed upon the business of owning, storing and removing whisky from bond. For the tax would become payable on account of whisky removed, although there had not been storage for any appreciable time; thus the tax would be payable on whisky if it had been removed from the warehouse immediately after the approval of the act. Nor is the tax one on the business of removing liquor owned. For the tax is payable in respect to any lot of whisky removed; and a single transaction does not con-
Opinion of the Court. 255 Ü. S.
stitute engaging in the business, be it that of buying and selling whisky or in the business of otherwise using it.1 In fact the tax is one imposed upon each lot of whisky at the time it is removed from bond within the State. The tax might be said to be upon the act of removal from the bonded warehouse within the State. But as stated by the lower court, “the thing really taxed is the act of the owner in taking his property out of storage into his own possession (absolute or qualified) for the purpose of making some one of the only uses of which it is capable, i. e., consumption, sale or keeping for future consumption or sale. . . . The whole value of the whisky depends upon the owner’s right to get it from the place where the law has compelled him to put it, and to tax the right is to tax the value.” To levy a tax by reason of ownership of property is to tax the property. Compare Thompson v. Kreutzer, 112 Mississippi, 165; Thompson v. McLeod, 112 Mississippi, 383. It can not be made an occupation or license tax by calling it so. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 148-150; Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, 220 U. S. 187; United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28. The language of the emergency clause in the act discloses that the Legislature considered that it was, in fact, taxing the whisky.12
As we hold the tax to be one on property and it is conceded that, if it be such, it is invalid under the state constitution, we have no occasion to consider whether [p. 295] it would be also invalid under the state constitution as a license or excise tax, because confiscatory; compare Owen County v. F. & A. Cox Co., 132 Kentucky, 738, 743; City of Louisville v. Pooley, 136 Kentucky, 286; Salisbury v. Equitable Purchasing Co., 177 Kentucky, 348, 351, 354; or for other reasons. Nor need we consider whether it is not also obnoxious to the Federal Constitution as imposing a burden upon interstate commerce. Compare Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178.
1
That an isolated transaction would not under the law of Kentucky constitute engaging in a business; see Hays v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 655, 658; Evers v. City of Mayfield, 120 Ky. 73,77; Louisville Lozier Co. v. City of Louisville, 159 Ky. 178, 180.
2
“And whereas, the liquor which they are handling and in which they are dealing is constantly in large quantities being removed from the bonded warehouses and disposed of, without the State securing an adequate license tax thereon, an emergency is hereby declared to exist.”
Second. The Attorney General insists that these bills in equity should have been dismissed because each plaintiff had a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. The contention rests upon § 162 of the Kentucky Statutes, which declares that: ‘1 When it shall appear to the Auditor that money has been paid into the treasury for taxes when no such taxes were in fact due, he shall issue his warrant on the treasury for such money so improperly paid, in behalf of the person who paid the same.”
Greene v. Taylor, Jr. & Sons, 184 Kentucky, 739, is cited to show that if the Auditor fails in this duty, a writ of mandamus will issue to compel performance. The plaintiffs, it is said, should have paid the tax under protest and have sued at law to recover the amounts so paid. But when these suits were brought (April and May, 1920) the decisions of the highest court of the State left it at least doubtful whether money so paid could have been recovered at law by the taxpayer, among other reasons, because the money would not have been paid under compulsion of distraint or of a right of distraint or under a mistake of law or of fact.1 It was not until November 16, 1920, which was after these appeals had been entered in
Compare Louisville City National Bank v. Coulter, 112 Ky. 577, 584; Couty v. Bosworth, 160 Ky. 312; Louisville Gas Co. v. Bosworth, 169 Ky. 824; and the first opinion in Craig v. Security Producing & Refining Co., rendered March 9,1920.
this court, that Craig v. Security Producing & Refining Co., 189 Kentucky, 565, 568, settled that money paid under such circumstances could be recovered. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky recognized the doubt arising from its earlier decisions and in order to remove the doubt found it necessary to overrule several of its recent opinions “so far as they conflict with the construction herein given section 162.”
It is well settled that “if the remedy at law be doubtful, a court of equity will not decline cognizance of the suit.” Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 688. But whatever remedies § 162 is now regarded as conferring, it is clear that at the time this suit was brought they were not regarded in Kentucky as sufficiently adequate to oust the jurisdiction of equity to enjoin the illegal collection of taxes. Gates v. Barrett, 79 Kentucky, 295; Norman n. Boaz, 85 Kentucky, 557, 560; Negley v. Henderson Bridge Co., 107 Kentucky, 414; Louisville Trust Co. v. Stone, 107 Fed. Rep. 305, 309. And if the equitable remedy was available in the state courts it was not lost by suing in the federal court. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 221; Cowley v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 159 U. S. 569. Nor is the equitable jurisdiction lost because since the filing of the bill an adequate legal remedy may have become available. Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U. S. 71; Busch v. Jones, 184 U. S. 598. We have no occasion, therefore, to consider other reasons urged why the legal remedy, if any, would have been inadequate.
Third. The Attorney General moved that these suits be abated relying upon the amendment to § 266 of the Judicial Code by Act of March 4, 1913, c. 160, 37 Stat. 1013, which declares that if before the final hearing of an application to restrain the enforcement of a statute or an order made by an administrative board or commission, “a suit shall have been brought in a court of the State having jurisdiction thereof under the laws of such State, [p. 297] to enforce such statute or order, accompanied by a stay in such State court of proceedings under such statute or order pending the determination of such suit by such State court, all proceedings in any court of the United States to restrain the execution of such statute or order shall be stayed pending the final determination of such suit in the courts of the State.”
The suit pending in the state court was this: A liquor dealer who owned whisky in a distillery warehouse had, prior to the enactment of the statute here in question, caused it to be bottled in bond and had paid thereon the two-cent a gallon state tax imposed under the law of 1917. He claimed the right to withdraw the whisky from bond without payment of the fifty cents a gallon tax; and brought suit in a county court to enjoin the warehouseman from preventing his doing so. The latter set up this 1920 Act. Thereupon the plaintiff, by amended petition, joined the Attorney General and the Auditor as codefendants and prayed that they be enjoined from compelling the plaintiff or the warehouseman to pay the fifty-cents a gallon tax on the plaintiff’s whisky. A restraining order to that effect issued.
Whether this, suit in the county court was of such a character as to entitle the state officials to stay the proceedings in the federal court we do not decide. Strictly speaking it was not “brought ... to enforce ” the statute in question; but it is, at least, arguable that it might have been accepted by the state officials as a means to that end, and so have fulfilled in substance the statutory requirement. See House Report No. 1584, 62nd Cong. 3rd sess. But whether this is true or not, it was not “accompanied by a stay in such State court of proceedings under such statute,” within the meaning of the Judicial Code. The stay contemplated by Congress is a general one, which would protect, among others, those who had already sought protection in the federal court. The [p. 298] restraining order 1 issued in the purely private litigation between third parties in the county court left the plaintiffs in the suits before us subject to all the danger of irreparable injury against which they had sought protection in the federal courts.
Affirmed.
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