The South Coast, 251 U.S. 519 (1920)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
The South Coast, 251 U.S. 519 (1920)
Full caption
THE SOUTH COAST.1
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 1, 1920
THE SOUTH COAST.1
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 68. Submitted November 10, 1919.—Decided March 1, 1920.
In purchasing necessary supplies, the master of a demised vessel, appointed by the owner but under the orders of the charterer, is the charterer’s agent. P. 523.
A charter-party, demising a vessel, required the charterer to pay all expenses and save the owner harmless from liens, allowed the owner to retake the vessel should the charterer fail to discharge any liens within a stated period after they were imposed, and placed the master, appointed by the owner, under the charterer’s orders. Applying the Act of June 23, 1910, held that the charter-party, if it did not grant, at least assumed authority in the charterer to bind the vessel for necessary supplies purchased by the master in a domestic port, and that the statutory presumption of such authority could not be dispelled by denials and warnings from the owner to the supply man. Id.
247 Fed. Rep. 84, affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.1
Mr. Oliver Dibble for petitioner. Mr. Marcel E. Cerf and Mr. C. H. Sooy were on the briefs.
They relied largely on the following authorities, decided
1 The docket title of this case is: South Coast Steamship Company, claimant of the steamer “South Coast,” etc., v. J. C. Rudbach.
before and since the Act of June 23,1910, as sustaining the proposition that a charter-party which requires the charterer to furnish supplies to the ship withdraws from the master the power to order supplies for which the materialman, with knowledge of the terms of the charter-party, may assert a Hen. The Underwriter, 119 Fed. Rep. 713; The Francis J. O’Hara, Jr., 229 Fed. Rep. 312; The Columbus (1879), 5 Sawy. 487; The William Cook (1882), 12 Fed. Rep. 919; The S. M. Whipple (1881), 14 Fed. Rep. 354; The Secret (1879), 15 Fed. Rep. 480; Stephenson v. The Francis (1884), 21 Fed. Rep. 715; The Cumberland (1886), 30 Fed. Rep. 449; The Ellen Hobgate (1887), 30 Fed. Rep. 125; The International (1887), 30 Fed. Rep. 375; The Samuel Marshall (1892), 49 Fed. Rep. 754; The Samuel Marshall (1893), 54 Fed. Rep. 396; The Kate (1896), 164 U. S. 458; The Valencia (1897), 165 U. S. 264; The Alvira (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 144; The Rosalie (1895), 75 Fed. Rep. 29; The H. C. Grady (1898), 87 Fed. Rep. 232; The Robert Dollar (1902), 115 Fed. Rep. 218; The North Pacific (1900), 100 Fed. Rep. 490; The George Farwell (1900), 103 Fed. Rep. 882; The Vigilant (1907), 151 Fed. Rep. 747; Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dunkley-Williams Co. (1909), 174 Fed. Rep. 121; The City of Milford (1912), 199 Fed. Rep. 956; The Thomas W. Rodgers (1912), 197 Fed. Rep. 772; The Ha Ha (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 1013; The J. Doherty (1913), 207 Fed. Rep. 997; The Malola (1914), 214 Fed. Rep. 308; The Oceana (1916), 233 Fed. Rep. 139; The Yankee (1916), 233 Fed. Rep. 919; The Oceana (1917), 244 Fed. Rep. 80.
A shipowner’s immunity from the necessity of paying the ship’s biHs relieves his ship from a like necessity. The Sarah Cullen, 45 Fed. Rep. 511; The Iris, 100 Fed. Rep. 104.
The provision of the charter-party requiring the charterer to hold the owner harmless from any lien asserted for supplies furnished the ship is not tantamount to a p. 521declaration by the owner that such liens may be asserted. The Oceana, 244 Fed. Rep. 80; Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dunkley-Williams Co., supra; The City of Milford, supra; The Gen. J. A. Dumont, 158 Fed. Rep. 312; The Golden Rod, 151 Fed. Rep. 6; The Surprise, 129 Fed. Rep. 873,
880.
By the terms of the charter-party and by virtue of the notice given libellant, the charterer and his masters and his agent were without authority to bind the vessel for the supplies. The Sarah Cullen, supra; The Francis J. O’Hara, Jr., supra; The Surprise, supra; The New Brunswick, 129 Fed. Rep. 893; The J. Doherty, supra.
The law applicable to this case was not altered by the Act of June 23, 1910. See opinion of the court below. Also The Sinaloa, 209 Fed. Rep. 287; The Dredge A, 217 Fed. Rep. 617; The Yankee, supra. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend changes not clearly evinced.
“It is the general principle of the maritime law that an admiralty lien is to be construed stricti juris, and cannot be extended by construction, analogy or inference.” The James T. Furber, 157 Fed. Rep. 126, 129; Pratt v. Reed, 19 How. 359; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Aurora, 194 Fed. Rep. 559; The Yankee Blade, 19 How, 82; The Dixie, 236 Fed. Rep. 607.
The statute specifically provides that there shall be no lien if the furnisher knew or could have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence that, for any reason, the person ordering the supplies had no authority to bind the vessel therefor. The furnisher in the instant case had been warned that the owner and the charterer had agreed, either by the terms of the written charter-party or by some other contract, that the vessel should not be held. Before he furnished the goods he had been informed of this fact by the owner, the charterer and the charterer’s agent. Notwithstanding the words “or for any other p. 522reason/’ appearing in the statute, the learned District Judge limited the application of the statute to the terms of the charter-party.
Mr. S. Haskel Derby for respondent. Mr. Ira S. Lillick was on the brief.
Mr . Justi ce Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a libel against the Steamer South Coast, belonging to the claimant, a California corporation, and registered in San Francisco, for necessary supplies furnished in San Pedro, California. The answer denies the authority of the master to bind the steamer. The bare vessel at the time was under charter to one Levick, the contract stipulating that Levick was to pay all charges and to save the owner harmless from all Hens or expenses that it might be put to in consequence of such Hens. There was also a provision that the owner might retake the vessel in case of failure of Levick to discharge within thirty days any debts which were Hens upon it, and another for surrender of the vessel free of all Hens upon Levick’s failure to make certain payments. When the supplies were ordered representatives of the owner in San Pedro warned the libellant that the steamer was under charter and that he must not furnish the supphes on the credit of the vessel. He replied that he would not furnish them in any other way, but the reply does not affect the case because by the terms of the charter the master who ordered them, although appointed by the owner, was under the orders of Levick. It is agreed by both courts below that if the owner had power to prevent the attaching of a Hen by its warning it had done so. Both courts however held that the charter gave the master power to create the Hen. 233 Fed. Rep. 327. 247 Fed. Rep. 84. 5. C. 159 C. C. A. 302.
519. Dissent.
By the Act of June 23, 1910, c. 373, § 1, 36 Stat. 604, a maritime lien is given for such supplies and by § 3 a presumption is declared that a master appointed by a charterer has authority from the owner to procure them. It is true that the act goes on that nothing in it shall be considered to give a hen where the furnisher knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained, that because of the terms of a charter-party, or for any other reason, the person ordering the necessaries was without authority to bind the vessel. But the authority of the owner to prohibit or to speak was displaced, so far as the charter went, by that conferred upon the charterers, who became owners pro hoc vice, and therefore, unless the charter excluded the master’s power, the owner could not forbid its use. The charter-party recognizes that liens may be imposed by the charterers and allowed to stand for less than a month and there seems to be no sufficient reason for supposing the words not to refer to all the ordinary maritime liens recognized by the law. The statute had given a lien for supplies in a domestic port and therefore had made that one of these ordinary liens. Therefore the charterer was assumed to have power to authorize the master to impose a lien in a domestic port, and if the assumption expressed in words was not equivalent to a grant of power, at least it cannot be taken to have excluded it. There was nothing from which the furnisher could have ascertained that the master did not have power to bind the ship.
Decree affirmed.
Mr . Justi ce Mc Kenna , Mr . Just ice Pitney and Mr . Justice Clarke dissent.
Syllabus. 251 U. S.
BATES, RECEIVER OF THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, v. DRESSER, ADMINISTRATOR OF DRESSER.
DRESSER, ADMINISTRATOR OF DRESSER, v. BATES, RECEIVER OF THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS.
BATES, RECEIVER OF THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, v. DEAN, EXECUTOR OF GALE, ET AL.
BATES, RECEIVER OF THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, v. BUNKER ET AL., ADMINISTRATORS, ETC., OF RICHARDSO'N.
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.
Nos. 155-158. Argued January 19, 20, 1920.—Decided March 1, 1920.
The degree of care required of directors of a national bank depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied, and each case is to be determined in view of all the circumstances. P. 529. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132.
The bookkeeper of a national bank during a series of years defrauded it of an amount aggregating more than its capital and more than the normal average amount of its deposits, by a novel scheme involving exchanges of his personal checks on the bank for checks of an outsider on another bank, cashing of the checks outside, abstraction by the bookkeeper of his own checks when returned to his bank with clearing-house statements which were settled by the cashier, and falsification of the deposit ledger, kept by the bookkeeper, so as to conceal the transactions by false charges against deposits and false additions of the totals, diminishing the apparent liability to depositors. The fraud could have been discovered by the cashier if he had
524. Counsel for Parties.
himself taken and examined checks as they came from the clearing house or had carefully examined the multitudinous figures of the deposit ledger or called in and compared with it the depositors’ pass-books, but he negligently over-trusted the bookkeeper and made his statements to the directors accordingly. Semi-annual examinations by national bank examiners revealed nothing wrong, and wrong was not suspected, the seeming shrinkage of deposits being attributed to innocent causes.
Held: (1) That directors, serving gratuitously, who were without knowledge of the cashier’s negligence or of the possibility of such a fraud, and who had assurance from the president, as from the bank examiners’ reports, were not negligent in accepting the cashier’s statements of liabilities, like his statements of assets, which always were correct, and were not bound to inspect the depositors’ ledger or call in the pass-books and compare them with it; although there was a by-law, nearly obsolete, calling for examinations by a committee semi-annually. P. 529.
(2 ) That the president, who, besides being a large depositor, was habitually at the bank, in control of its affairs, with immediate access to the depositors’ ledger, and who had received certain warnings that the bookkeeper was living fast and dealing in stocks, was guilty of negligence in failing to make an examination. P. 530. One who accepts the presidency of a national bank accepts responsibility for any losses the bank may suffer through his fault. P. 531. Interest upon the amount of a decree for such damages may be awarded as a matter of discretion, not of right. Id.
Interest allowed in this case, from the date of the decree in the District Court until the date when the judgment creditor (receiver of the bank) interposed delay by appealing to this court. Id.
250 Fed. Rep. 525, modified and affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Frank N. Nay, with whom Mr. William A. Kneeland was on the brief, for appellant in Nos. 155, 157, 158, and appellee in No. 156.
Mr. Robert G. Dodge, with whom Mr. Robert M. Morse, Mr. Paul Dudley Dean, Mr. John B. Sullivan, Jr., and Mr. Harold S. Davis were on the brief, for appellant in No. 156 and appellees in Nos. 155, 157.
Mr. Clarence Alfred Bunker for appellees in No. 158.
Mr. Albert E. Pillsbury, with whom Mr. Arthur P. French was on the brief, for Barber, appellee in No. 157.
Mr . Justi ce Holme s delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill in equity brought by the receiver of a national bank to charge its former president and directors with the loss of a great part of its assets through the thefts of an employee of the bank while they were in power. The case was sent to a master who found for the defendants; but the District Court entered a decree against all of them. 229 Fed. Rep. 772. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decree, dismissed the bill as against all except the administrator of Edwin Dresser, the president, cut down the amount with which he was charged and refused to add interest from the date of the decree of the District Court. 250 Fed. Rep. 525. 162 C. C. A. 541. Dresser’s administrator and the receiver both appeal, the latter contending that the decree of the District Court should be affirmed with interest and costs.
The bank was a little bank at Cambridge with a capital of $100,000 and average deposits of somewhere about $300,000. It had a cashier, a bookkeeper, a teller and a messenger. Before and during the time of the losses Dresser was its president and executive officer, a large stockholder, with an inactive deposit of from $35,000 to $50,000. From July, 1903, to the end, Frank L. Earl was cashier. Coleman, who made the trouble, entered the service of the bank as messenger in September, 1903. In January, 1904, he was promoted to be bookkeeper, being then not quite eighteen but having studied bookkeeping. In the previous August an auditor employed on the retirement of a cashier had reported that the daily balance book was very much behind, that it was impossible to p. 527prove the deposits, and that a competent bookkeeper should be employed upon the work immediately. Coleman kept the deposit ledger and this was the work that fell into his hands. There was no cage in the bank, and in 1904 and 1905 there were some small shortages in the accounts of three successive tellers that were not accounted for, and the last of them, Cutting, was asked by Dresser to resign on that ground. Before doing so he told Dresser that someone had taken the money and that if he might be allowed to stay he would set a trap and catch the man, but Dresser did not care to do that and thought that there was nothing wrong. From Cutting’s resignation on October 7, 1905, Coleman acted as paying and receiving teller, in addition to his other duty, until November, 1907. During this time there were no shortages disclosed in the teller’s accounts. In May, 1906, Coleman took $2,000 cash from the vaults of the bank, but restored it the next morning. In November of the same year he began the thefts that come into question here. Perhaps in the beginning he took the money directly. But as he ceased to have charge of the cash in November, 1907, he invented another way. Having a small account at the bank, he would draw checks for the amount he wanted, exchange checks with a Boston broker, get cash for the broker’s check, and, when his own check came to the bank through the clearing house, would abstract it from the envelope, enter the others on his book and conceal the difference by a charge to some other account or a false addition in the column of drafts or deposits in the depositors’ ledger. He handed to the cashier only the slip from the clearing house that showed the totals. The cashier paid whatever appeared to be due and thus Coleman’s checks were honored. So far as Coleman thought it necessary, in view of the absolute trust in him on the part of all concerned, he took care that his balances should agree with those in the cashier’s book.
By May 1, 1907, Coleman had abstracted $17,000, concealing the fact by false additions in the column of total checks, and false balances in the deposit ledger. Then for the moment a safer concealment was effected by charging the whole to Dresser’s account. Coleman adopted this method when a bank examiner was expected. Of course when the fraud was disguised by overcharging a depositor it could not be discovered except by calling in the pass-books, or taking all the deposit slips and comparing them with the depositors’ ledger in detail. By November, 1907, the amount taken by Coleman was $30,100, and the charge on Dresser’s account was $20,000. In 1908 the sum was raised from $33,000 to $49,671. In 1909 Coleman’s activity began to increase. In January he took $6,829.26; in March, $10,833.73; in June, his previous stealings amounting to $83,390.94, he took $5,152.06; in July, $18,050; in August, $6,250; in September, $17,350; in October, $47,277.08; in November, $51,847; in December, $46,956.44; in January, 1910, $27,395.53; in February, $6,473.97; making a total of $310,143.02, when the bank closed on February 21, 1910. As a result of this the amount of the monthly deposits seemed to decline noticeably and the directors considered the matter in September, 1909, but concluded that the falling off was due in part to the springing up of rivals, whose deposits were increasing, but was parallel to a similar decrease in New York. An examination by a bank examiner in December, 1909, disclosed nothing wrong to him. ,
In this connection it should be mentioned that in the previous semi-annual examinations by national bank examiners nothing was discovered pointing to malfeasance. The cashier was honest and everybody believed that they could rely upon him, although in fact he relied too much upon Coleman, who also was unsuspected by all. If Earl had opened the envelopes from the clearing house, and had seen the checks, or had examined the deposit p. 529ledger with any care he would have found out what was going on. The scrutiny of anyone accustomed to such details would have discovered the false additions and other indicia of fraud that were on the face of the book. But it may be doubted whether anything less than a continuous pursuit of the figures through pages would have done so except by a lucky chance.
The question of the liability of the directors in this case is the question whether they neglected their duty by accepting the cashier’s statement of liabilities and failing to inspect the depositors’ ledger. The statements of assets always were correct. A by-law that had been allowed to become obsolete or nearly so is invoked as establishing their own standard of conduct. By that a committee was to be appointed every six months “to examine into the affairs of the bank, to count its cash, and compare its assets and liabilities with the balances on the general ledger, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the books are correctly kept, and the condition of the bank is in a sound and solvent condition.” Of course liabilities as well as assets must be known to know the condition and, as this case shows, peculations may be concealed as well by a false understatement of liabilities as by a false show of assets. But the former is not the direction in which fraud would have been looked for, especially on the part of one who at the time of his principal abstractions was not in contact with the funds. A debtor hardly expects to have his liability understated. Some animals must have given at least one exhibition of dangerous propensities before the owner can be held. This fraud was a novelty in the way of swindling a bank so far as the knowledge of any experience had reached Cambridge before 1910. We are not prepared to reverse the finding of the master and the Circuit Court of Appeals that the directors should not be held answerable for taking the cashier’s statement of liabilities to be as correct as the p. 530statement of assets always was. If he had not been negligent without their knowledge it would have been. Their confidence seemed warranted by the semi-annual examinations by the government examiner and they were encouraged in their belief that all was well by the president, whose responsibility, as executive officer; interest, as large stockholder and depositor; and knowledge, from long daily presence in the bank, were greater than theirs. They were not bound by virtue of the office gratuitously assumed by them to call in the pass-books and compare them with the ledger, and until the event showed the possibility they hardly could have seen that their failure to look at the ledger opened a way to fraud. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132; Warner v. Penoyer, 91 Fed. Rep. 587. We are not laying down general principles, however, but confine our decision to the circumstances of the particular case.
The position of the president is different. Practically he was the master of the situation. He was daily at the bank for hours, he had the deposit ledger in his hands at times and might have had it at any time. He had had hints and warnings in addition to those that we have mentioned, warnings that should not be magnified unduly, but still that taken with the auditor’s report of 1903, the unexplained shortages, the suggestion of the teller, Cutting, in 1905, and the final seeming rapid decline in deposits, would have induced scrutiny but for an invincible repose upon the status quo. In 1908 one Fillmore learned that a package containing $150 left with the bank for safe keeping was not to be found, told Dresser of the loss, wrote to him that he could but conclude that the package had been destroyed or removed by someone connected with the bank, and in later conversation said that it was evident that there was a thief in the bank. He added that he would advise the president to look after Coleman, that he believed he was living at a pretty fast pace, and that he p. 531had pretty good authority for thinking that he was supporting a woman. In the same year or the year before, Coleman, whose pay was never more than twelve dollars a week, set up an automobile, as was known to Dresser and commented on unfavorably, to him. There was also some evidence of notice to Dresser that Coleman was dealing in copper stocks. In 1909 came the great and inadequately explained seeming shrinkage in the deposits. No doubt plausible explanations of his conduct came from Coleman and the notice as to speculations may have been slight, but taking the whole story of the relations of the parties, we are not ready to say that the two courts below erred in finding that Dresser had been put upon his guard. However little the warnings may have pointed to the specific facts, had they been accepted they would have led to an examination of the depositors’ ledger, a discovery of past and a prevention of future thefts.
We do not perceive any ground for applying to this case the limitations of liability ex contractu adverted to in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540. In accepting the presidency Dresser must be taken to have contemplated responsibility for losses to the bank, whatever they were, if chargeable to his fault. Those that happened were chargeable to his fault, after he had warnings that should have led to steps that would have made fraud impossible, even though the precise form that the fraud would take hardly could have been foreseen. We accept with hesitation the date of December 1, 1908, as the beginning of Dresser’s liability, but think it reasonable that interest should be charged against his estate upon the sum found by the Circuit Court of Appeals to be due. It is a question of discretion, not of right, Lincoln n . Claflin, 7 Wall. 132; Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. S. 534, 539, but to the extent that the decree of the District Court was affirmed, Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 138 U. S. 509; De La Rama
Syllabus. 251 U. S.
v. De La Rama, 241 U. S. 154,159, it seems to us just upon all the circumstances that it should run until the receiver interposed a delay by his appeal to this Court. The Scotland, 118 U. S. 507, 520. Upon this as upon the other points our decision is confined to the specific facts.
Decree modified by charging the estate of Dresser with interest from February 1, 1916, to June 1, 1918, upon the sum found to be due, and affirmed.
Mr . Justic e Mc Kenna and Mr . Justi ce Pitne y dissent, upon the ground that not only the administrator of the president of the bank but the other directors ought to be held liable to the extent to which they were held by the District Court, 229 Fed. Rep. 772.
Mr . Justic e Van Devanter and Mr . Justi ce Bran - deis took no part in the decision.